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BOARD OF EDITORS Karen A. Casey, Ph.D. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Ellen G. Cohn, Ph.D. Florida International University Mark Lewis Dantzker, Ph.D. University of Texas–Pan American Alexis M. Durham III, Ph.D. University of Tampa James Frank, Ph.D. University of Cincinnati Evelyn Gilbert, Ph.D. Livingstone College Kathleen M. Heide, Ph.D. University of South Florida Katherine J. Jamieson, Ph.D. University of North Carolina at Charlotte Suman Kakar Florida International University, Miami Campus Sesha Kethineni, Ph.D. Illinois State University Donna S. Kochis, Ph.D. Rowan College of New Jersey Karol Lucken, Ph.D. University of Central Florida James W. Marquart, Ph.D. Sam Houston State University Richard C. McCorkle, Ph.D. University of Nevada, Las Vegas Jerome B. McKean, Ph.D. Ball State University Richard C. Monk, Ph.D. Coppin State College Elizabeth Erhardt Mustaine, Ph.D. University of Central Florida M. G. Neithercutt, D. Crim. California State University, Hayward Daniel W. Okada, Ph.D. Marist College

Robert Rogers, Ph.D. Middle Tennessee State University Sudipto Roy, Ph.D. Indiana State University Lawrence M. Salinger, Ph.D. Arkansas State University Nancy E. Schaffer, Ph.D. University of Alaska, Anchorage Donald W. Scott, Ph.D. Southeastern Louisiana University Leonore M. J. Simon, J.D., Ph.D. Washington State University Elizabeth Szockyj, Ph.D. Southern Illinois University at Carbondale Thomas F. Waters, Ph.D. Northern Arizona University Barbara H. Zaitzow, Ph.D. Appalachian State University

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR Chris Eskridge, Ph.D. University of Nebraska

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR-ELECT San Torres, Ph.D. California State University-Long Beach

ASSOCIATE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Ken Schlegel, Ph.D. Indiana University–Bloomington

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF George E. Rush, Ph.D. California State University, Long Beach

EDITOR-ELECT Chris Eskridge, Ph.D. University of Nebraska

Department of Criminal Justice College of Health & Human Services California State University, Long Beach For Sage Publications: Mark Gage, Randall Lewis, Kathryn Journey, Rose Tylak, and Elena Nikitina

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Published since 1978

Volume 17

Number 4

November 2001

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Published since 1978

Volume 17

Number 4

November 2001

CONTENTS White-Collar Crime Guest Editor: Larry Salinger, Eastern Washington University 305

Editorial Comment Larry Salinger

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Wrongfulness and Harmfulness as Components of Seriousness of White-Collar Offenses Sean P. Rosenmerkel

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Investigating Vulnerability and Reporting Behavior for Consumer Fraud Victimization: Opportunity as a Social Aspect of Age Judy Van Wyk and Karen A. Mason

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Political Fund-Raising, Patron-Client Relations, and Organized Criminality: Two Case Studies Don Liddick

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Slams, Crams, Jams, and Other Phone Scams: Competition, Crime, and Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry Mary Dodge

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Correlates of Internet Software Piracy Sameer Hinduja

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Top Criminals/Top Criminologists: The Most-Cited Authors and Works in White-Collar Crime Richard A. Wright, Kevin M. Bryant, and J. Mitchell Miller

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Book Review

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Index

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Author Guidelines

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Themes and Editors of Forthcoming Issues

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Call for Papers

Sage Publications

Thousand Oaks • London • New Delhi

The JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE presents single-themed special issues that focus on a critical issue in contemporary criminal justice in order to provide a cogent, thorough, and timely exploration of the topic. Subjects include such concerns as organized crime, community policings, gangs, white-collar crime, and excessive police force. For information regarding submissions, see the Author Guidelines at the end of each issue. Submission of a manuscript implies commitment to publish in the journal and that the manuscript has not been published elsewhere, nor is it under consideration by another journal. Authors in doubt about what constitutes prior publication should consult the editor. The JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE (ISSN 1043-9862) is published four times annually— in February, May, August, and November—by Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320; telephone (800) 818-SAGE (7243) and (805) 499-9774; fax/order line (805) 375-1700; e-mail [email protected]; http://www.sagepub.com. Copyright © 2001 by Sage Publications. All rights reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the publisher. Subscriptions: Regular institutional rate $275.00 per year, $75.00 single issue. Individuals may subscribe at a one-year rate of $50.00, $20.00 single issue. Add $8.00 for subscriptions outside the United States. Orders with ship-to addresses in the U.K., Europe, the Middle East, and Africa should be sent to the London address (below). Orders with ship-to addresses in India and South Asia should be sent to the New Delhi address (below). Noninstitutional orders must be paid by personal check, VISA, or MasterCard. This journal is abstracted in Asia Pacific Database, Biological Sciences Abstracts, Central Asia: Abstracts & Index, Criminal Justice Abstracts, Family Violence & Sexual Assault Bulletin, Guide to Social Science & Religion in Periodical Literature, Health & Safety Sciences Abstracts, IBZ (International Bibliography of Periodical Literature on the Humanities and Social Sciences), Middle East: Abstracts & Index, NCJRS Abstracts Database, North Africa: Abstracts & Index, Risk Abstracts, Sage Urban Studies Abstracts, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, Southeast Asia: Abstracts & Index, Standard Periodical Directory (SPD), and Violence & Abuse Abstracts. Back Issues: Information about availability and prices of back issues may be obtained from the publisher’s order department (address below). Single-issue orders for 5 or more copies will receive a special adoption discount. Contact the order department for details. Write to the London office for sterling prices. Inquiries: All subscription inquiries, orders, and renewals with ship-to addresses in North America, South America, Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and the Philippines must be addressed to Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, California 91320, U.S.A.; telephone (800) 818-SAGE (7243) and (805) 499-9774; fax (805) 375-1700; e-mail [email protected]; http://www.sagepub.com. All subscription inquiries, orders, and renewals with ship-to addresses in the U.K., Europe, the Middle East, and Africa must be addressed to Sage Publications Ltd, 6 Bonhill Street, London EC2A 4PU, England, telephone +44 (0)20 7374 0645, fax +44 (0)20 7374 8741. All subscription inquiries, orders, and renewals with ship-to addresses in India and South Asia must be addressed to SAGE Publications Private Ltd, P.O. Box 4215, New Delhi 110 048 India, telephone (91-11) 6419884, fax (91-11) 647-2426. Address all permissions requests to the Thousand Oaks office. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by Sage Publications for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the base fee of 50¢ per copy, plus 10¢ per copy page, is paid directly to CCC, 21 Congress St., Salem, MA 01970. 1043-9862/2001 $.50 + .10. Advertising: Current rates and specifications may be obtained by writing to the Advertising Manager at the Thousand Oaks office (address above). Claims: Claims for undelivered copies must be made no later than six months following month of publication. The publisher will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit. Change of Address: Six weeks’ advance notice must be given when notifying of change of address. Please send old address label along with the new address to ensure proper identification. Please specify name of journal. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, c/o 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320. Printed on acid-free paper

Journal Salingerof/EDITORIAL Contemporary COMMENT Criminal Justice / November 2001

EDITORIAL COMMENT

This edition of the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice deals with white-collar crime. Almost a century old (in 1907, E. A. Ross first suggested the study of behaviors that later came to be known as white-collar crimes), the study of white-collar crime has largely been ignored by criminologists and criminal justicians. Prior to 1960, several influential works, notably those of Edwin H. Sutherland, attempted to define the boundaries of the white-collar crimes. During the decade before “White-Collar Crime” by Gilbert Geis was published in 1968, criminology had turned to other topics of general interest. Since 1968, the criminological discipline has seen a reemergence of interest in this topic, and now, in the first decade of the 21st century, the study of white-collar crime has become extensive. In fact, whereas 20-some years ago it was generally believed that white-collar crime could only be studied using qualitative methods, many researchers have discovered that traditional quantitative methods are in fact very useful in uncovering information regarding this topic. The articles in this issue of the journal represent a cross-section of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, reporting on recent issues of both scholarly and personal interest in the study of white-collar crime. The first article, by Sean P. Rosenmerkel, describes a study of the seriousness of white-collar offenses as compared to violent and property offenses. His measures of crime seriousness take into account both the “wrongfulness” of an act and the “harmfulness” of the act. Whereas previous studies of crime seriousness have repeatedly ranked white-collar and corporate offenses as being less serious in nature than traditional street crimes, Rosenmerkel only partially reached the same conclusion. His data, based on a survey of college students, found that the respondents believed that violent crimes were much more serious than white-collar crimes but ranked white-collar crimes as being more serious than property crimes. In the second article, Judy Van Wyk and Karen A. Mason report on the results of a consumer-fraud-victimization survey conducted in Knox County, Tennessee. They found that younger people are more likely than older persons to be victims of consumer fraud and that younger people tend to socialize more than older people and engage in more financial risk-taking behavior than older adults. Although both increased socialization and financial risktaking were associated with increased victimization, the best predictor of becoming a victim of consumer fraud was age. This study also found that Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 305-307 © 2001 Sage Publications

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there was no significant relationship between age and likelihood of reporting victimization to the police. The third article, by Don Liddick, presents the results of two case studies of abuses in political fund-raising activities that occurred during the 1996 elections in the United States. The first deals with large-scale donations to various political groups to solicit political support for the construction of a pipeline under the Caspian Sea. The second case study deals with an attempt by two Indian tribes in Oklahoma to “purchase” the political influence necessary to obtain the return of native lands rich in natural resources. Liddick emphasizes the importance in social-network analysis in studying how seemingly dissimilar cases in fact are similar in the means in which participants attempt to obtain political clout to further their individual gains and objectives. In the fourth article, Mary Dodge discusses types of crimes, frauds, and abuses associated with the telecommunications industry in the United States. Dodge notes that although the breakup of the AT&T monopoly in 1984 in addition to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were meant to create a competitive market, the intended results have not been forthcoming and that numerous fraudulent practices have become commonplace. For example, she discusses “slamming,” which involves switching a customer’s service provider without the customer’s permission. Dodge suggests that customers may be charged for services never provided, have their rates increased without prior notice, and receive less in the way of services at a greater cost. The fifth article, by Sameer Hinduja, discusses the results of a self-report survey of college students, conducted to determine whether there is a relationship between software piracy and the availability of high-speed Internet access in the university setting. Software piracy, once confined to making copies of floppy disks, is now a more than $12 billion enterprise thanks in part to the reduced cost and increasing sophistication of basic personal computerbased technology. Analysis of the data indicates that there is a weak but significant positive relationship between high-speed access to the Internet and whether a respondent will report engaging in software piracy. In addition, Hinduja found a weak but positive relationship between Internet piracy and previous experience with creating, or “burning,” CD-ROMs. These findings would suggest that although the nature of the technology has changed, the nature of software piracy has not changed. The sixth article, by Richard A. Wright, Kevin M. Bryant, and J. Mitchell Miller, reports on the findings of a content-analysis study of the most cited authors and works on white-collar crime. The authors note that although numerous citation-analysis studies have been conducted on a variety of topics in criminology and criminal justice, none has previously explored whitecollar crimes. Citation-analysis is a useful tool for gaining an understanding of the past, present, and future of a field of study, as well as for getting a feel

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for the theoretical and contextual underpinnings of a discipline. Wright, Bryant, and Miller’s analysis indicates that a large number of important authors and their works on the topic of white-collar crime have been ignored in citation studies on broader topics in criminology and criminal justice.

— Larry Salinger

Journal Rosenmerkel of Contemporary / SERIOUSNESS Criminal OFJustice WHITE-COLLAR / November 2001 OFFENSES

WRONGFULNESS AND HARMFULNESS AS COMPONENTS OF SERIOUSNESS OF WHITE-COLLAR OFFENSES SEAN P. ROSENMERKEL University of Maryland The purpose of this study is to examine the way that individuals rate the seriousness of whitecollar crimes in relation to other types of crime. The contention is that individuals will rate whitecollar crimes as less serious than more common street crimes. Furthermore, the belief is that individuals will show some consensus in the way in which they rank white-collar crimes, with slight variations for those offenses with little or no perceived harm. This study will progress past simply rating a general definition of crime seriousness by examining the crimes in terms of the concepts of morality and the harm associated. Replicating a study by Mark Warr, in which the concepts of crime wrongfulness and harmfulness were introduced, the author will examine the dimensions of seriousness that people use to determine the concept. This will provide an indepth examination of the perceptions of seriousness, specifically in regards to white-collar offenses.

T

he perception of crime has interested scholars for many years. The way in which individuals view criminal activities is of particular interest in the realm of public policy. As Miethe (1982) stated, public perceptions of crime have a potential effect on many aspects of the social world, from gauging crime trends to establishing sentencing guidelines to allocating police resources (O’Connell & Whelan, 1996). Few studies (e.g., Gibbons, 1969;

The author would like to thank Joseph Jacoby, Steve Cernkovich, and Amie Nielsen for help with this endeavor, and Jeff Bouffard for some editorial comments. A version of this article was presented to the 2000 American Society of Criminology conference in San Francisco, CA in November. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sean P. Rosenmerkel, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, College Park, 4511 Knox Road, Suite 301, College Park, MD 20740; phone: (301) 403-8338; e-mail: [email protected]. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 308-327 © 2001 Sage Publications

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Hartung, 1953; Reed & Reed, 1975) indicate that the public rates the seriousness of white-collar crimes the same as ordinary street crimes; however, the present research contends that white-collar crimes, because they do not have a direct, palpable effect on individuals, are perceived as less serious and will be rated as such in surveys. To date, few studies (e.g., Cullen, Link, & Polanzi, 1982) have specifically examined the seriousness of white-collar crime. The scientific study of public perception of crime seriousness began with the pioneering work of Sellin and Wolfgang (1964), who surveyed judges, police, and college students in Philadelphia to obtain seriousness rankings for 141 offenses. In general, Sellin and Wolfgang found the following: (a) there is a great deal of consensus about the relative seriousness of crimes, and (b) perceptions of crime seriousness depend highly on attitudes toward individual loss of life or injury and the amount of money lost in a crime. Since this initial study, many researchers have used Sellin and Wolfgang’s (1964) scale of offenses in replication (e.g., Cullen et al., 1982; McCleary, O’Neil, Epperlein, Jones, & Gray, 1981; Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, 1974). All of these studies, to one degree or another, have confirmed the findings of Sellin and Wolfgang (1964). Rossi et al. (1974), though finding consensus among individuals in rating crime seriousness, also found that the ratings of more highly educated individuals varied less around the average ratings of the sample. McCleary et al. (1981), while examining possible differences between the public and a sample of criminal justice bureaucrats, found a good deal of consensus between ratings of crime seriousness provided by their sample and by the sample used by Rossi et al. (1974). The most common areas of dissensus were seriousness ratings of victimless crimes, certain violent crimes, and crimes against public order. For purposes of the present research, the most important use of these crime scales was conducted by Cullen et al. (1982). This study utilized the Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) scales to study the public perception of the seriousness of white-collar crime compared to other types of crime. Cullen et al. (1982) analyzed data from 105 mailed questionnaires completed by residents of a small Illinois town. The overall purpose of this study was to replicate the study by Rossi et al. (1974), with the intent of singling out white-collar offenses for analysis. Cullen et al. (1982) found that public ratings of overall crime seriousness had increased between 1974 and 1982. More important, white-collar crimes were rated as less serious than almost all other categories of crime. Obviously, other studies looking into the seriousness of crime have been conducted that have looked at the issue from a perspective other than that of seriousness itself. Cohen (1988) conducted a study of seriousness in which

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he broadened the scope of interest past the simple public surveys toward examining the relevance of costs, both in terms of money and risks of injury and/or death. Cohen’s contention is that studying the monetary costs of crime has the potential to provide further insight into seriousness that is not addressed through surveys, thus strengthening any policy implications of overall seriousness rankings. A further study by Meier and Short (1985) examined the seriousness of crime as it relates to an individual’s perception of hazard. Hazard is defined as “a danger or the cause of some danger” (p. 389). In general, Meier and Short (1985) asserted that crime is similar to natural disasters in that both are devastating and can occur without warning. Crime was reported to be similar to natural disasters and other hazards in that natural disasters also pose a risk to life and property, but without the possibility of retaliation. Crime differs from most hazards in that crimes are usually directed at particular individuals, thus giving them a “personal touch.” A final study by Hawkins (1980) examined the perceptions of crime seriousness relative to a punishment scale for offenses. One obvious finding was that individuals believe that some crimes call for harsher punishments than others. Furthermore, they found that the rating of punishment tended to vary not only with the nature of the crime but also with the nature of the offender. They also found that assignment of punishments tended to differ by age, race, and social class. Hawkins (1980) found that seriousness ratings varied among certain subgroups within a race-class interaction. For example, lower income Blacks gave higher seriousness ratings than did upper income Blacks, whereas higher income Whites gave higher ratings than did lower class Whites. Clearly, previous research in the area of crime seriousness indicates that scales for measuring this concept need refinement. Criticisms of the scales of Sellin and Wolfgang (1964), as well as criticisms of other measures, indicate that much remains to be learned about crime seriousness. Some of the criticisms of these scales are outlined below. There are three primary areas of criticism aimed at these types of studies. First, critics argue that the scales do not explicitly define what is meant by the term seriousness, leaving the definition open to individual interpretation (Blum-West, 1985). In the majority of the studies utilizing the scales (e.g., Rossi et al., 1974), this is indeed the case. Respondents are asked to judge the seriousness of the crime, but are not told what seriousness means. Sherman and Dowdle (1974) argued that studies drawing attention to vague ideas of seriousness are bound to gain consensus among respondents; however, when respondents apply their own concepts of criminal harm, they base judgments on a varying scale of crime importance. Rossi and Henry (1980) examined this topic on the basis of differentiating between individual’s personal opinions and obedience to social norms. They


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asked whether the consensus found in studies such as Cullen et al. (1982) and Rossi et al. (1974) might be altered if the participants were applying from their notions of right, in accordance with their socialized norms, rather than their personal opinions. They postulated that more variation would occur if respondents were instructed to rate seriousness based on their own opinions. Warr (1989) examined this issue as well and found that two groups of individuals formed along definitions of seriousness in terms of the moral gravity of the crime, with perceived harmfulness and wrongfulness as dimensions of crime seriousness. Warr distinguished between those who used the concepts of wrongfulness and harmfulness independently when judging seriousness (discriminators) and those who believed all crimes to be wrong, judging the seriousness only on the perceived harmfulness (nondiscriminators). Warr found that although the groups differed on the dimensions of wrongfulness, they had relative agreement on the seriousness and harmfulness of crimes, with nondiscriminators being more inclined to rate seriousness and harmfulness higher than discriminators. In general, Warr stated, “these and other findings indicate that seriousness judgments are more structured and complex than commonly supposed and that conventional measures of seriousness, when applied to substantive problems, may mask or obscure distinct mechanisms of evaluation” (p. 795). Second, critics of the scales argue that offenses defined by a single, brief phrase, such as “seduction of a minor” or “blackmail,” leave respondents to develop their own sense of background into the particular offense. Studies have shown that single-phrase descriptions do not provide enough background of the individual situations of crimes, thus preventing respondents from considering the circumstances that may have precipitated the offense or the full physical or emotional impact on the participants (Blum-West, 1985; Sebba, 1984). Studies using single-phrase descriptions operate under the assumption that seriousness of crimes is assigned based solely on the harm, either physical or economic, that is inflicted. Parton, Hansel, and Stratton (1991) argued that this supposition is not valid, stating that respondents integrate other, more vague concepts of harm into their sense of seriousness. A third criticism of the use of these crime seriousness scales, as well as a criticism of most studies of crime seriousness, is the reliance on samples of offenses that are not representative of everyday crime. Rossi and Henry (1980) stated, the National Crime Information Center codes recognize over 400 general crime classifications, while the most any crime seriousness study has covered is 140 criminal acts that most probably are covered by only a handful, perhaps as many as 25, of the general crime classifications. (p. 498)

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Too few offense types have been included in existing studies to permit generalizing the findings to all offenses. Most crime seriousness studies overrepresent serious, violent criminal acts. For example, in the Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) crime seriousness scale of 141 offenses, there are 13 references to crimes involving murder and 32 references to property crimes. In examining actual rates of offense, however, more than 90% of all crimes are property crimes and only a small percentage of crimes constitute murder. This overrepresentation of serious crimes has the potential to sensitize respondents to the crimes that are most uncommon (Meier & Short, 1982). As reported above, Warr (1989) conducted a study in which he divided crime seriousness into categories of wrongfulness and harmfulness to examine the dimensions that underlie judgments of crime seriousness. Warr outlined distinct differences between the normative evaluation of an offense (wrongfulness) and the assessment of the overall consequences of a particular offense (harmfulness). Warr traced the possible differentiation of these two concepts back to the works of Piaget (1932), Durkheim (1949), and Kant (Taylor, 1975). The study by Warr (1989) was important for studies of crime seriousness in that it attempted to silence some of the criticisms of the crime seriousness scales of Sellin and Wolfgang (1964), primarily those relating to the lack of a definition of seriousness. His purpose was to understand the way in which individuals rate crimes along dimensions of wrongfulness and harmfulness when determining the seriousness of a crime. In general, Warr found that there was some measure of consensus about the overall seriousness of crimes but that individuals rate crimes differently based on perceptions of wrongfulness and harmfulness of particular offenses. For purposes of the present research, one flaw in the Warr (1989) study is his exclusion of true white-collar offenses into his survey instrument. Those crimes within Warr’s survey that most resemble white-collar offenses are classified as either “property crimes” or “other crimes that are balanced along levels of wrongfulness and harmfulness.” The present study, a replication of the Warr research with changes in the survey instrument, provides the opportunity to examine wrongfulness and harmfulness ratings of white-collar crimes in comparison with street crimes. In his influential address to the American Sociological Association, Edwin Sutherland (1949) established the first working definition of white-collar crime, differentiating common street crimes from those committed by individuals in positions of power. In his definition, Sutherland described whitecollar crimes as those offenses “committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” (p. 9). Although opening the door to the analysis of white-collar crime, Sutherland failed to create a definition that would ultimately stand the test of time. Many texts regarding


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white-collar crime recognize that defining white-collar crime is the hardest part of understanding the phenomenon (Albanese, 1995; Coleman, 1998; Poveda, 1994). To this end, many scholars forgo trying to establish an allencompassing definition, preferring to develop typologies of white-collar crime (e.g., Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Coleman, 1989, 1998; Edelhertz, 1970). Most recent attempts to develop a definition of white-collar crime have led to the development of subcategories under a broader heading of white-collar offending. Examples of these are elite deviance (i.e., Mills, 1956; Simon, 1999), occupational deviance (Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Edelhertz, 1970), and organizational or corporate offending (Clinard & Quinney, 1973; Coleman, 1989; Schrager & Short, 1980). In effect, the current nature of whitecollar crime is one that characterizes many differing types of offenses carried out by numerous entities. Having established a better understanding of the nature of white-collar crime, what does the public think of the seriousness of white-collar crime? The initial study by Cullen et al. (1982) found that the public does not view white-collar crime as serious as more common street crimes. Although finding that the opinions of individuals had changed between 1974 in the Rossi et al. (1974) sample and the sample in 1982, the seriousness ratings for whitecollar offenses were, on average, lower than more common street crimes. The Cullen et al. (1982) sample did find some measure of consensus among ratings of white-collar offenses. Benson, Cullen, and Maakestad (1990) surveyed local prosecutors to determine their thoughts on the seriousness of white-collar crimes and the sentencing that these prosecutors recommend. This study revealed that the prosecutors, in general, feel that white-collar crime is not a serious problem. Furthermore, more than half of the prosecutors, both in rural and urban jurisdictions, feel that the number of white-collar cases that they prosecute will remain constant. The goal of the present research is to examine the perceptions of the public concerning white-collar crimes. First and foremost, the purpose of this research is to fill the void that exists in knowledge about the seriousness of white-collar crime. As with the replication of Rossi et al.’s (1974) study by Cullen et al. (1982) to look specifically at white-collar offenses, the present research will loosely replicate the work of Warr (1989) to examine perception of the seriousness of white-collar offending. By replicating Warr (1989), the present research will attempt to address some of the criticisms of the Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) crime seriousness scale to arrive at a better understanding of crime seriousness as it pertains to white-collar offenses. In attempting to differentiate between the way that individuals feel about white-collar crimes as opposed to the more common street crimes, there are

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two hypotheses that will be explored. First, as prior research has shown, the author proposes that there will be a difference in seriousness ratings given to white-collar crimes as opposed to the more common street crimes. This does not assume that all offenses labeled as white-collar will be rated lower than street crimes, rather that as a group, white-collar offenses will have an overall lower mean seriousness rating than street crimes. Second, this research will allow for the exploration of the underlying concepts of crime seriousness, namely wrongfulness and harmfulness. As explained by Warr (1989), individuals do make distinctions between wrongfulness and harmfulness when assessing an overall rating of crime seriousness. In terms of white-collar crimes, the author would postulate that individuals will rate white-collar crimes as wrongful as most other crimes but less harmful that most other crimes, thus creating an overall lower rating in terms of seriousness. Furthermore, in rating crime seriousness, individuals will rely more heavily on the harm of a white-collar crime than other crimes. This idea follows reasoning that white-collar crimes will be viewed as wrongful as most other crimes but not as harmful. SAMPLE The population of interest in the present analysis are adult, U.S. college students. These students were selected from a medium-sized mid-Western university based on their enrollment in large, introductory-level classes in sociology. The selection of classes was based on the discretion of the instructors for entrance into their lectures and the willingness of the students to participate in the study. A total of 300 questionnaires were distributed throughout the classes. Of the 300 originally distributed, 268 (89%) were returned. SURVEY INSTRUMENT The questionnaire used in this research was similar to the instrument used by Warr (1989) in his study of crime seriousness. There are two primary differences between the questionnaire used by Warr and the present questionnaire. First, the Warr (1989) questionnaire included 31 items for rating, whereas the current questionnaire included 23 items. This reduction in number was an attempt to save time needed for completing the surveys. The questionnaire consisted of 8 white-collar offenses, 6 property offenses, and 7 violent offenses. Two other offenses (”driving while intoxicated” and “selling cocaine or LSD”) were included in the questionnaire but did not fit into any of the established crime categories. Second, as indicated above, the research by Warr (1989) did not focus on white-collar offenses, and therefore few actual


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white-collar offenses appeared in his survey. The present research incorporated 8 white-collar offenses into the questionnaire, representing a broad range of white-collar offenses, spanning elite, occupational, and organizational offense types. Specifically, this questionnaire is an improvement over previous attempts to study the public perception of white-collar crime. Much like Warr (1989), by defining categories of wrongfulness and harmfulness of offenses, the respondent can focus on dimensions of crime seriousness rather than rely on their own vague opinions of crime seriousness, as was the case with Rossi et al. (1974) and Cullen et al. (1982). By including white-collar offenses, this study moves beyond Warr (1989) to obtain the focus on those white-collar offenses that are omitted from his research. Each respondent was asked to complete three questions about each offense, rating seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness. This provided the opportunity to study the responses of each individual across the questions, with the potential to examine how individuals weigh the concepts of wrongfulness and harmfulness in determining the seriousness of a crime. The actual list of offenses represents crimes incorporating personal, property, and white-collar crimes. The descriptions of the individual crimes were paraphrased from survey instruments by both Rossi et al. (1974) and Warr (1989) and selected to provide a wide range of crime severity. The order of presentation for the crimes for the first question were conducted by selecting crimes from the list of 23, without replacement to achieve a measure of randomization. This procedure was repeated when selecting the order for the questions concerning wrongfulness and harmfulness. Each respondent was given a questionnaire with the same order of offenses. PRIMARY VARIABLES The primary variables used in the analysis are constructs of crime seriousness, crime wrongfulness, and crime harmfulness. Offense types included “all offenses,” “white-collar offenses,” “property offenses,” “violent offenses,” and “street offenses.” For “all offenses,” the scale is composed of all of the offenses rated in the questionnaire. For “white-collar offenses,” “property offenses,” ”violent offenses,” and “street offenses,” scales were developed utilizing representative offenses from the questionnaire. The items in this scale, as with all of the remaining scales, are determined across seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness. For seriousness, the scale for white-collar crime has an alpha reliability of .832. Similarly, the scale for wrongfulness of white-collar offenses has a reliability of .889, and the harmfulness has a reliability of .749. The alpha reli-

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ability for the seriousness scale of property offenses is .741, for wrongfulness is .868, and for harmfulness is .838. The alpha reliability for the seriousness scale of violent offenses is .747, for wrongfulness is .696, and for harmfulness is .544. The final scale, representing street offenses, was constructed by adding the items of the scales for property and violent offenses together as well as incorporating two remaining crimes that do not fit within either property or violent offenses. Those two offenses are: “driving while intoxicated” and “selling cocaine or LSD.” These two offenses, though not fitting in any particular crime category in the analysis, represent drug and alcohol offenses, which combined to total almost 25% of the caseload of the criminal justice system. The alpha reliability for the seriousness of street offenses is .842, for wrongfulness is .875, and for harmfulness is .807. CONTROL VARIABLES Several key demographic variables were used as control variables in an effort to control for variance related to personal characteristics of the respondents. Age of respondent was asked and was coded as a continuous variable. Sex was coded as a dichotomous variable with 1 representing “males” and 2 representing “females.” Due to the lack of overall diversity in the racial composition of the university students sampled, race was not entered as a control variable in the present research. In an attempt to determine socioeconomic status, three separate questions were asked about the parents of the students. The questions asked about the characteristics of the family in which the child was raised, whether by biological parents or some derivative of a stepfamily. Two of the questions concerned the education level of the parents. The second socioeconomic question asked respondents to list the family’s approximate annual income. The choices of this question ranged from a low response of “under $10,000” to a high of “$80,000 and above.” The scale was constructed to offer selections in $10,000 increments. The categories were coded 1 to 8 respectively. The last control variables were questions concerning the victimization experience of the respondent or respondent’s family. There were three questions for respondents to answer for themselves and three similar questions relating to family members. These questions about victimization asked if the respondent had ever been the victim of a particular type of crime. The crimes represented a range of white-collar, property, and violent offenses. The respondents were also asked whether family members had been victims of any of these types of crimes. The answers were coded 0 for “no” and 1 for “yes.”


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DATA ANALYSIS Following the completion of the questionnaires, analyses were conducted on the data to address the hypotheses concerning the perception of the seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness of white-collar crime. The analyses in the present study loosely follow the analyses used in the Warr (1989) study. The mean rating of seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness was found for each particular offense throughout the entire sample. A mean was then calculated for a group of offenses based on the type of crime. Personal, property, and white-collar offenses were then grouped and an overall mean was computed for each offense category. This enabled an examination of the difference between white-collar offenses and the two other categories, as well as the more general concept of street crime. For this analysis, t tests were conducted to test the differences between the means for white-collar crime and street crimes. The second analysis examined the hypothesis that asserts a difference in the weighting between the concepts of wrongfulness and harmfulness used in determining the overall crime seriousness rating. Initially, a model was constructed that regressed the seriousness scores of all offenses on the wrongfulness and harmfulness of all offenses. This regression and the resulting coefficients allowed for the establishment of a baseline equation against which the author could compare the remaining regressions. Subsequent regressions were conducted whereby the seriousness of a particular group of offenses, (i.e., white-collar, property, violent, or street) was regressed on the wrongfulness and harmfulness of the relevant offenses, incorporating the control variables. These regression models were then compared against the baseline model to determine the extent to which there was agreement. The comparison aided in the determining of how respondents used wrongfulness and harmfulness in determining an overall rating of crime seriousness. One interpretation derived from this comparison was determining the way in which individuals use the concepts of wrongfulness and harmfulness to determine crime seriousness and how an individual rates white-collar offenses as opposed to the more common street crimes along these conceptual lines. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques were used in the analysis of the data. The multiple-regression model followed a set of assumptions concerning the nature of the data. Those assumptions are as follows: (a) the model equation for the regression is Y = a + ΣbiXi + ei, (b) the X in the equation are not linearly dependent, (c) the expected value of the conditional errors is zero, and (d) the variance of the conditional errors is the standard error at every covariate pattern (Agresti & Finley, 1997).

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TABLE 1

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents Variable Age Sex Male (1) Female (2) Parents’ education level Father Mother Total family income Victimization experience White-collar offensesa Respondent Family Property offensesa Respondent Family Violent offensesa Respondent Family

N

Mean

SD

268 266 94 172

19.32 1.65

2.66 0.48

268 268 262

3.77 3.71 4.40

1.60 1.51 2.03

268 268

.09 .33

.29 .47

268 268

.23 .52

.42 .50

268 268

.09 .26

.29 .44

a. Victimization experiences are coded 1 = yes, 0 = no.

RESULTS Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and percentages of the relevant control variables. The mean age for the respondents is low at 19.32, thus creating initial problems for generalizability of results. Furthermore, the population is dominated by females, who outnumber males nearly 2 to 1. The mean education level of parents is remarkably similar, with the average parent having attained a level of education between a technical school and an associate’s degree. The mean annual income for families is moderate, with most students reporting family incomes of between $30,000 and $50,000. The levels of victimization for the respondent are relatively low, with 9% reporting being victims of white-collar and violent crimes and 23% reporting being victims of property crimes; the victimization of family members was reported to be higher, with the range from 26.5% for violent to 52% for property. Table 2 presents the means given for all offenses across categories of seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness. At first glance, the results overwhelmingly indicate that violent offenses are rated as more serious, wrongful and harmful than most of the other categories of offenses. Significant differ-


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TABLE 2

Means of Offenses Rated on Categories of Seriousness, Wrongfulness, and Harmfulness Offense 1. Robbing a store and killing two employees 2. Robbing a person of $400 on the street 3. A father sexually abusing his teenage son or daughter 4. Killing a pedestrian while speeding 5. Planned killing of a policeman 6. A teenager hitting an old woman in the street 7. A man hitting his wife during an argument 8. Shoplifting a pair of socks from a store 9. Breaking into a house and stealing a TV 10. Stealing an unlocked car 11. Painting obscenities on a highway billboard 12. Looting goods in a riot 13. Leaving the scene of an accident 14. Knowingly selling stolen goods 15. Knowingly selling bad food that results in death 16. Overcharging for automotive repairs 17. Employee embezzling company funds 18. Causing injury to employees by neglecting to repair machinery 19. Advertising defective cars as perfectly safe 20. Overcharging for credit in selling goods 21. Company contaminating river used for drinking water 22. Selling cocaine or LSD 23. Driving while intoxicated

Seriousness

Wrongfulness

Harmfulness

9.84 7.66

9.78 8.07

9.87 6.59

9.65 9.28 9.63 8.28 8.18 2.58 6.95 7.41 3.71 5.79 7.22 6.08

9.85 9.07 9.74 8.90 9.24 5.30 7.50 7.48 5.46 6.89 7.46 7.31

9.72 9.72 9.73 9.14 8.96 2.43 4.75 5.26 3.11 4.82 7.07 4.88

9.21 4.94 6.41

9.32 6.47 7.37

9.59 3.62 5.24

7.72 6.06 5.54

7.92 7.59 6.40

8.32 7.91 4.43

8.20 7.72 8.51

8.54 7.83 8.41

8.45 7.99 8.69

ences between the mean ratings for property and white-collar offenses are much smaller. Table 2 lists together the offenses that compose different offense categories. Violent crimes represent offenses numbered 1 through 7 in the table; property crimes are in numbers 8 through 13; white-collar crimes are listed as numbers 14 through 21; and the two remaining offenses, “driving while intoxicated” and “selling cocaine or LSD,” are listed separately. The means of the differing offense categories across seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness were computed in other calculations (see Table 3). The mean seriousness for violent offenses is 8.932, for wrongfulness is 9.236, and for harmfulness is 9.105. The mean seriousness for property offenses is 5.609, for wrongfulness is 6.682 and for harmfulness is 4.572. The

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TABLE 3

Means of Offense Categories Rated on Seriousness, Wrongfulness, and Harmfulness Offense Category White-collar Property Violent

Seriousness

Wrongfulness

Harmfulness

6.7715 5.6095 8.9323

7.6138 6.6816 9.2361

6.5546 4.5715 9.1050

mean seriousness for white-collar offenses is 6.772, for wrongfulness is 7.614, and for harmfulness is 6.555. Table 4 presents the results of the regression of seriousness of all offenses against the wrongfulness and harmfulness of all offenses and the control variables. This model, which incorporates all offenses in the analysis, represents the baseline against which all subsequent regressions are compared. Model 1 of the table shows the regression of the seriousness on wrongfulness and harmfulness only. As expected, the results show that wrongfulness and harmfulness are highly significant predictors of seriousness and the model R2 is extremely high at nearly 54% of the variance explained. The regression coefficients are both positive, indicating that as the level of crime wrongfulness and harmfulness rises, respondents rated crime as more serious. Of note here is the strength of the standardized regression coefficients for wrongfulness (.524) and harmfulness (.284). Although both are highly significant predictors ( p < .001), the results indicate that for all offenses, the mean wrongfulness of the offenses is a stronger predictor of the level of seriousness than is the harmfulness of the offenses. One might posit that respondents relied more heavily on the wrongfulness of the offenses than on the harmfulness of the offenses when determining seriousness of all offense types. Model 2 of Table 4 represents the addition of the primary control variables to the regression equation. The addition of these variables has no significant 2 effect on the equation, as the level of variance (R ) explained by the model rises a negligible amount to 55%. None of the control variables added to the equation are significant predictors of the seriousness of offenses. The only substantive difference introduced by the addition of the control variables is an increase in the predictive power of the mean harmfulness variable and a slight decrease in wrongfulness. Characteristics of the respondents such as age, gender, and SES have a slight effect on this assessment of the level of harm in relation to crime seriousness.


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TABLE 4

Regression of Seriousness of all Offenses on Wrongfulness and Harmfulness and a Control Variables Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Mean wrong of all offenses Mean harm of all offenses Age Sex (1 = male, 2 = female) Father’s education level Mother’s education level Total family income Victimization questions Respondent White-collar Property Violent Other White-collar Property Violent R squared

.524*** .284*** –.011

.507*** .305*** –.010 .014 .011 .035 –.030

Model 3 .501*** .308*** .013 .012 .035 –.031

.010 –.020 –.014

.538

.545

.004 .008 –.017 .546

a. Standardized regression coefficients. *** p < .001.

Model 3 represents the addition of the victimization questions to the regression equation. Once again, the addition of the new variables does not have an affect on the overall results, with all additional variables being nonsignificant predictors of the level of crime seriousness. Previous research (Wolfgang, Figilio, Tracy, & Singer, 1985) has found victimization not to be a predictor of an individual’s perception of crime seriousness. This finding is confirmed by the present study. Table 5 represents the regression of the seriousness of white-collar offenses on the wrongfulness and harmfulness of white-collar offenses and the control variables. Model 1 is the regression of offense seriousness on wrongfulness and harmfulness. As was evident in the baseline equation, wrongfulness and harmfulness variables are significant predictors of the level of crime seriousness as it pertains to white-collar offenses. Not only are the regression coefficients of both variables highly significant ( p < .001), but the amount of variance (R2) explained by the model is large at 41%. Regarding the relative strength of the predictors, the baseline equation indicated that wrongfulness was a stronger predictor of the level of crime seriousness for all offenses. In the terms of white-collar offenses, however, the results indicate that harmfulness (b = .482) is a stronger predictor of seri-

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TABLE 5

Regression of Seriousness of White-Collar Offenses on Wrongfulness and Harmfulness and Control Variables by the Standardized Regression Coefficient Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Mean wrong of white-collar crime Mean harm of white-collar crime Age Sex (1 = male, 2 = female) Father’s education level Mother’s education level Total family income Victimization questions Respondent White-collar Other White-collar R squared

.201*** .506***

.231*** .482*** –.003 –.003 .001 .011 –.008

.229*** .479*** –.008 .002 .000 .012 –.009

.026

.410

.416

.016 .418

***p < .001.

ousness in terms of white-collar offenses than is wrongfulness (b = .201), as was hypothesized. Model 2 represents the addition of the primary control variables. As was the case in the baseline equation, none of the demographic variables are significant predictors of crime seriousness of white-collar offenses. Relatedly, the predictive power of the model does not increase with the addition of these variables. Model 3 depicts the addition of those victimization questions pertaining to white-collar offenses. These variables are not shown to be significant predictors of perceptions of crime seriousness of white-collar offenses. Subsequent analyses were conducted concerning property, personal, and street crimes concerning the ratings of seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness (not reported). In general, these results followed the results found for white-collar offenses; however, there are a few significant differences. In examining the regression of seriousness of property crimes against wrongfulness and harmfulness, the author found that unlike white-collar offenses, wrongfulness is a stronger predictor than harmfulness, although the findings are still not significant. Another difference is that in the regression of seriousness of violent crimes on wrongfulness and harmfulness, income achieves a low level of significance in a negative direction. This finding is in line with previous research that has shown that lower class individuals are more often victims of violent crimes and would therefore be more aware of the consequences of the violent offenses.


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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS The initial hypothesis of this research was to determine if the crime seriousness ratings attributed to differing offense categories were themselves different. The results indicate that this is indeed the case. An interesting finding of this research concerns the level of seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness of white-collar offenses in comparison to property and violent offenses. One belief at the start of the project concerned the notion that whitecollar crimes are believed to be less serious than property or violent crimes. Although this is true for violent crimes, this is not the case for property crime. Across categories of seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness, the means for white-collar crimes lie between property and violent crimes. One explanation for this occurrence concerns the sample used in the analysis. The low mean age of respondents casts some doubt on the level of commitment that is shown to personal property. It is argued that a lower sense of commitment to individual property would result in lower ratings of those offenses that entail the theft or destruction of property. A second explanation concerns a shared sense of awareness of the effect that white-collar crimes have on society. In the study by Rossi et al. (1974), the 140 offenses within their survey were broken down into 11 subcategories of crimes. Their results placed white-collar crimes as the 10th lowest crime category, second only to crimes against public order. With the replication by Cullen et al. (1982), white-collar crimes had moved from 10th to 7th in the list of crime categories. Cullen partially attributed this increase to the heightened awareness of the public to white-collar offending following the Watergate scandal. The results in this study may be a product of the further awakening of the public to the nature of white-collar criminality. With the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s and the constant debate over the Microsoft juggernaut, white-collar crimes have become a larger issue in society and in turn have received increased media attention. The second hypothesis of this research concerned the use of wrongfulness and harmfulness as measures of crime seriousness toward the determination of whether differences are evident in the use of these two components for white-collar compared with other crimes. The results of the analysis provide support for the hypothesis. The results of the regressions of crime seriousness of differing offense categories on the wrongfulness and harmfulness of those offense categories indicate that both variables are significant predictors of crime seriousness. As outlined above, the only difference observed occurred in examining the strength of the relationships across offense types. In terms of white-collar offenses, the results suggest that individuals use the harmfulness of an

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offense more than the wrongfulness of the offense in rating the overall crime seriousness. The belief is that the amount of harm produced by a given crime is apparently more salient to people in determining the seriousness of whitecollar crimes than is the underlying wrongfulness of that crime. Why is this the case? Warr’s (1989) study was not interested in proving why individuals relied more heavily on wrongfulness or harmfulness when rating crimes’ seriousness; he was simply interested in proving that individuals do use wrongfulness and harmfulness differently. In trying to determine why individuals rely more heavily on harmfulness when rating the seriousness of white-collar offenses, one needs to examine the nature of harm itself. There are two primary aspects of harm that effect how an individual might feel about a crime, the type of harm and the intent of the offender. The type of harm relates to whether a crime is economic or physical in nature. As one might expect, these results indicate that crimes that are based purely on economic loss are rated as less harmful and serious than those crimes that have some physical impact on a victim. The white-collar crimes in the questionnaire reflect a wide variety of crimes spanning both economically and physically driven offenses. In general, those crimes that are the most violent or cause the largest amount of loss are determined to be the most harmful. Intent of the offender refers to the desire of the offender to deprive a victim of his right to property or personal safety by committing a crime. Street crimes, whether property or violent, involve an offender whose purpose is to effect a victim by depriving them of property or physical wellbeing, in many instances, during a face-to-face encounter. The findings presented in this article indicate support for the hypothesis that individuals use ideas of wrongfulness and harmfulness in determining overall crime seriousness, and furthermore that they use them differently for white-collar crimes than for other types of crimes. The results show that those surveyed relied more heavily on the concept of harmfulness than wrongfulness when deciding the level of seriousness of a white-collar offense than more common street offenses, for which they relied more heavily on the wrongfulness of an offense. This study has accomplished its primary objectives of furthering the research into white-collar crimes as they pertain to crime seriousness; however, with the limitations outlined above, this study merely sets the stage for even greater probing into the ways in which individuals think about whitecollar offenses. As is the case with most research endeavors, the present study has some limitations that must briefly be addressed. An initial limitation of this study, as discussed above, is based on the sample used in the analysis. This limitation reduces the opportunity to make more general conclusions about the pubic at large. The second major limitation is that raised in refer-


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ence to the work of Sellin and Wolfgang’s (1964) scales of seriousness and the research deriving from it. This limitation centers on the use of a single phrase to represent the criminal acts to be rated. A third limitation, which is addressed above, is the problem stemming from the attempt to identify some common measure of seriousness, wrongfulness, and harmfulness that can be transferred across different offense categories. Trying to measure a true objective definition of harm, for example, across categories of white-collar, property, and violent offenses cannot be accomplished without understanding each individual’s definition of harm for that particular offense category. Even then, the standards by which people apply that measure of harm would differ according to the circumstances of each individual offense. This study is instrumental in outlining the need for further research into the area of crime seriousness as it relates to white-collar crime. Though the sample of respondents analyzed here was not representative of the general population, the results indicate that there is a marked difference in the way that individuals conceptualize white-collar offenses as compared to other offenses. Incorporating the components of wrongfulness and harmfulness into the fold seems to aid in some of the problems with the majority of research into crime seriousness, but they by no means act as a cure-all for future research. The overall direction of research into the areas of crime seriousness and white-collar crime should be expanded significantly to incorporate changes in contemporary events. The future of crime seriousness research should blend the way that individuals feel about the crimes themselves with a sense of the fear that certain crimes create among potential victims. The fear of crime that is felt by those individuals living in rural areas does not adequately compare to the fear that is felt by those living in more urban settings. In addition, ideas of race and class tend to further complicate the essence of fear felt by individuals. Without including some form of fear variable into the equation, studies such as the present one fall short in fully explaining how individuals determine crime seriousness. White-collar crime expansion opens an entirely different set of issues. The future of white-collar crime research is as unpredictable as any form of deviance. The primary problem comes in being able to identify crimes when they are committed. Rapid innovation and the globalization of corporations have made specialization a premium and have opened an arena in which criminals can operate with technical jargon and corporate ideologies. The problem therefore arises from the difficulty of presenting a picture of white-collar crimes that the public can understand so that they might be able to identify the problem with the commission of a particular offense. It is only then that they might be able to realize the true harm that can result from white-collar crimes.

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REFERENCES Agresti, A., & Finley, B. (1997). Statistical methods for the social sciences (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Albanese, J. (1995). White collar crime in America. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Benson, M., Cullen, F., & Maakestad, W. (1990). Local prosecutors and corporate crime. Crime and Delinquency, 36, 356-372. Blum-West, S. (1985). The seriousness of crime: A study of popular morality. Deviant Behavior, 6, 83-98. Clinard, M., & Quinney, R. (1973). Criminal behavior systems: A typology (2nd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Cohen, M. (1988). Some new evidence on the seriousness of crime. Criminology, 26, 343-353. Coleman, J. (1989). The criminal elite. New York: St. Martin’s. Coleman, J. (1998). The criminal elite: Understanding white-collar crime (4th ed.). New York: St. Martin’s. Cullen, F., Link, B., & Polanzi, C. (1982). The seriousness of crime revisited: Have attitudes toward white-collar crime changed? Criminology, 20, 83-102. Durkheim, E. (1949). The division of labor in society. Glencoe, NY: Free Press. Edelhertz, H. (1970). The nature, impact, and prosecution of white-collar crime. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Gibbons, D. (1969). Crime and punishment: A study in social attitudes. Social Forces, 47, 391-397. Hartung, F. (1953). Common and discrete values. Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 3-22. Hawkins, D. (1980). Perception of punishment for crime. Deviant Behavior, 1, 193-215. McCleary, R., O’Neil, M., Epperlein, T., Jones, C., & Gray, R. (1981). Effects of legal education and work experience on perceptions of crime seriousness. Social Problems, 28, 276-289. Meier, R., & Short, J. (1982). The consequences of white-collar crime. In H. Edelhertz & T. Overcast (Eds.), White-collar crime: An agenda for research. Lexington, MA: DC Health. Meier, R., & Short, J. (1985). Crime as hazard: Perceptions of risk and seriousness. Criminology, 23, 389-399. Miethe, T. (1982). Public consensus on crime seriousness: Normative structure or methodological artifact? Criminology, 20, 515-526. Mills, C. W. (1956). The power elite. New York: Oxford University Press. O’Connell, M., & Whelan, A. (1996). Taking wrongs seriously: Public perceptions of crime seriousness. British Journal of Criminology, 36, 299-318. Parton, D., Hansel, M., & Stratton, J. (1991). Measuring crime seriousness: Lessons from The National Survey of Crime Severity. British Journal of Criminology, 31, 72-84. Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Harcourt Press. Poveda, T. (1994). Rethinking white collar crime. Westport, CT: Praeger.


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Reed, J., & Reed, R. (1975). Doctor, lawyer, indian chief: Old rhymes and new on white-collar crime. International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 3, 279-293. Rossi, P., & Henry, J. P. (1980). Seriousness: A measure for all purposes? In M. W. Klein & K. S. Tielmann (Eds.), Handbook of criminal justice evaluation. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Rossi, P., Waite, E., Bose, C., & Berk, R. (1974). The seriousness of crimes: Normative structure and individual differences. American Sociological Review, 39, 224-237. Schrager, L., & Short, J. (1980). How serious a crime? Perceptions of organizational and common crimes. In G. Geis & E. Scotland (Eds.), White collar crime: Theory and research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Sebba, L. (1984). Crime seriousness and criminal intent. Crime and Delinquency, 30, 227-244. Sellin, T., & Wolfgang, M. (1964). The measurement of delinquency. New York: John Wiley. Sherman, R., & Dowdle, M. (1974). Perception of crime and punishment: A multidimensional scaling analysis. Social Science Research, 3, 109-126. Simon, D. (1999). Elite deviance (6th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Sutherland, E. (1949). White-collar crime. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Taylor, P. (1975). Principles of ethics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Warr, M. (1989). What is the perceived seriousness of crimes? Criminology, 27, 795-821. Wolfgang, M., Figilio, R., Tracy, P., & Singer, S. (1985). The National Survey of Crime Severity. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Sean P. Rosenmerkel is currently a doctoral student in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, College Park, and is a graduate research analyst at the Bureau of Governmental Research, and also at the University of Maryland, College Park. His research interests include white-collar crime, public perception of crime, and mental health of inmates.

Journal Van Wyk, of Mason Contemporary / CONSUMER CriminalFRAUD Justice VICTIMIZATION / November 2001

Investigating Vulnerability and Reporting Behavior for Consumer Fraud Victimization Opportunity as a Social Aspect of Age JUDY VAN WYK University of Rhode Island

KAREN A. MASON Washington State University This study investigates vulnerability and reporting behavior for victimization by consumer fraud. Because socialization may increase the amount of contacts with others, contributing to greater opportunities for victimization, we predict that people who socialize more often may increase their likelihood of victimization. Greater levels of socialization are also predicted to increase the likelihood of official reporting behavior for consumer fraud victimization because victims may depend on others for guidance in official reporting. The authors found support for the first prediction, but not the second. Although socialization does increase the likelihood of victimization, the authors found it to have no effect on official reporting behavior. These findings shed some light on the disparity between self-reports and official reports of victimization by consumer fraud.

T

he FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the Justice Department’s National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) gather annual information on the prevalence and characteristics of common forms of crime, characteristics of offenders, and victims. For more than 20 years, differences in the amount of crime reported by official sources and victimization surveys have The authors would like to express gratitude to Michael Benson at the University of Tennessee for the opportunity to conduct the research that led to this article. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology in San Francisco in November 2000. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Judy Van Wyk, University of Rhode Island, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 507 Chafee Bldg., Kingston, RI 02881; e-mail: [email protected]. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 328-345 © 2001 Sage Publications

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Van Wyk, Mason / CONSUMER FRAUD VICTIMIZATION

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been used to specify crime trends and to systematically investigate the factors that influence reporting behavior among crime victims. Nonetheless, we know very little about white-collar crimes, offenders, and victims. Currently, no annual official source of information is available for white-collar crimes such as consumer fraud. Offenders of consumer fraud target the individual and employ “deceit or intentional misrepresentation of fact with the intent of unlawfully depriving a person of his or her property rights” (Rush, 1986, p. 103). Because fraud victimization has remained outside the focus of our most reliable data sources, little research attention has focused on these victims or their experiences. The limited amount of research available on white-collar crime victims tends to focus mainly on their demographic characteristics and on the objective characteristics of the offense (Blum, 1972; Jesilow, Klemper, & Chiao, 1992; Steele, 1975; Titus, Heinzelman, & Boyle, 1995; Vaughan & Carlo, 1975, 1976). Nonetheless, trends in consumer fraud victimization are difficult to assess because only three published studies employed the random selection of subjects from representative populations. These include the Knox County study (see Copes, Kerley, Mason, & Van Wyk, 2001; Mason & Benson, 1996; Van Wyk & Benson, 1997), the Boyle (1992) study, and the nationally based study conducted by Titus et al. (1995). All other studies on consumer fraud victimization have been based primarily on small, nonrandom samples, and most of these studies focus on the victims of one offender or on complaints received at a particular consumer protection agency (see Blum, 1972; Jesilow et al., 1992; Shover, Fox, & Mills, 1994; Steele, 1975; Vaughan & Carlo, 1975, 1976). Two exceptions to the descriptive approach used in previous studies include Mason and Benson’s (1996) investigation of the effect of social support on fraud victims’ reporting behavior and Van Wyk and Benson’s (1997) examination of the relationship between individual measures of risk taking and fraud victimization. Only the Knox County study uses a large representative sample to examine the social characteristics of fraud victims that may affect their likelihood of victimization, as well as their probability of reporting their victimization. Using this data set, we investigate the influence of interrelated factors of opportunity, socialization, and age on the vulnerability of fraud victimization and on the likelihood of reporting. We argue that consumer fraud victimization and the likelihood of reporting are effected by exposure to social opportunities. WHO ARE FRAUD VICTIMS? In a national survey of 1,246 respondents, Titus et al. (1995) found that 58% of the sample had experienced at least one victimization or attempted

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victimization by consumer fraud. In the Titus et al. (1995) study, attempted victimization refers to being approached by a perpetrator with fraudulent intent, but not losing any money or property in the transaction. In other words, not taking the bait. Successful victimization refers to a fraudulent attempt that results in the victim’s loss of money or property. The Titus et al. (1995) study showed nearly one third of the sample (31%) had experienced victimization or attempted victimization in the preceding year. Similar results were reported by Bass and Hoeffler (1992). Of the 31% who were approached in the previous year, just under half (48%) suffered successful victimizations. Thus, approximately 15% of the total sample was victimized by a successful personal fraud in the preceding year. To investigate the characteristics of personal fraud victims, Titus et al. (1995) focused on those victimized in the past year. They found that education is related to fraud victimization. Persons least likely to be victims of personal fraud are those at the extremes of educational attainment (i.e., no high school or graduate degree). In contrast, persons with some college or a college degree were more likely to receive a fraud attempt (Titus et al., 1995, p. 60). Contrary to what one might expect, and to reports in the popular media, Titus et al. (1995) also found that age is negatively related to fraud victimization. Younger persons are more likely to be approached and more likely to lose money or property than older persons are. These findings are supported by nationally representative studies of the experiences of people over 50 for telemarketing fraud victimization conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) (1993, 1996). Although age and education are related to the likelihood of being approached by a person attempting to perpetrate a fraud, neither of these variables is related to whether the attempt will be successful in the Titus et al. (1995) study. Other standard demographic variables, such as income, sex, and minority status, also appear not to be related to the outcome of the fraud attempt (Titus et al., 1995). Another source of statistical data on fraud victims is a recent Fraud Victimization Survey (FVS) conducted as a pilot study by the NCVS (Boyle, 1992). This was a national telephone survey of 400 respondents conducted in 1990. The FVS used a 5-year reference period for victimization rather than the 1year reference period used by Titus et al. (1995). Our analysis of the FVS data set reveals substantial similarities to the findings of Titus et al. (1995) for demographic characteristics. As in the Titus et al. study, age is significantly and negatively related to attempted fraud victimization. Younger persons are more likely to be victimized than older persons. None of the other demographic variables is significantly related to successful victimization. Unfortunately, a measure for education was not included in the FVS study.


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Why are Some People Victimized, and Others are Not? Arming consumers against victimization by fraud requires further investigation into the reasons why some people are victimized by this type of crime and others are not. Although the demographic characteristics of consumer fraud victims indicate who is most often victimized, they tell us little about why they are victimized. In a recent review of the literature on the characteristics of fraud victims, Titus (2001) concluded that the preponderance of evidence in empirical research indicates that younger people are more likely to be victimized by consumer fraud than older Americans. It is unlikely that the chronology of aging somehow increases the likelihood of victimization. Instead, Titus (2001) suggested that younger people may be engaged in more financial transactions than older people are, and so by the virtue of opportunity, they may increase their chances of victimization. In this way, age may be indirectly linked to victimization. Two characteristics that younger people possess to a greater extent than older people are risk-taking behavior and high levels of socialization, and these social aspects of age have been linked to increases in the likelihood of consumer fraud victimization. Risk-taking behavior is primarily a trait of the young and can be considered a social aspect of age. The few studies that do attempt to identify precursors to consumer fraud victimization focus on the victim’s propensity for risky behavior. Blum (1972) reported that most of the victims he interviewed daydreamed about coming into a lot of money and failed to budget the money they did have. Two thirds of the victims interviewed by Vaughan and Carlo (1975) admitted that they should have been more prudent with their financial affairs. Previous analysis of the data used for this study revealed that next to the age of the victim, financial risk taking is the most significant predictor of consumer fraud victimization (Van Wyk & Benson, 1997). It is clear that financial risk-taking behavior increases the likelihood of consumer fraud victimization. The second social aspect of age is the degree of socialization experienced. Younger people are more likely to participate in the work force, socialize with friends and relatives, participate in local community activities, and have school-age children, thus drawing them into school and sporting activities. Younger people socialize more than older people and through this socialization are exposed to greater opportunities to be victimized by consumer fraud. They consume more products than older people do, too, further increasing their likelihood of victimization. Younger consumers are more likely to seek home repairs, upgrade merchandise, and seek future investments. We speculate that younger persons experience greater opportunities to be victimized through increased exposure to risks of victimization.

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Who Reports Victimization? A large percentage of the victims of consumer fraud do not officially report their victimization. Titus et al. (1995) found only 33% of self-reported victims reported their experiences, and Mason and Benson (1996) discovered that even fewer victims reported offenses (23%). Few consistent relationships have been found between reporting behavior and either the victim’s demographic characteristics or the objective characteristics of the crime (Blum, 1972; Jesilow et al., 1992; Steele, 1975; Titus et al., 1995; Vaughan & Carlo 1975, 1976). Mason and Benson (1996) also found that reporting of fraud victimization was not related to any sociodemographic characteristics, including age. Mason and Benson (1996) may have failed to find an association between age and reporting because they inadvertently controlled for an important social aspect of age. They did find that changes in the likelihood of reporting were affected by social support in the form of information from others. In those cases in which victims were encouraged to report their victimizations, the likelihood of reporting increased 78%, whereas those victims who were discouraged from reporting were nearly 3 times less likely to report. Although Mason and Benson did find a relationship between a specific outcome of a social experience, or social support, they did not examine the direct relationship between levels of socialization and the likelihood of receiving either positive or negative social support. It is likely that variation in the amount of socialization may influence access to social support and thus affect reporting behavior. Because younger people socialize more than older people, it is consistent to assume that they may have more channels through which to report their experiences, as well as more access to messages encouraging or discouraging reporting. Because older people socialize less often than younger people, they may have fewer friends, relatives, and coworkers to turn to when they fall victim to consumer fraud. They may also be homebound or may experience disabilities that restrict their communication with others, such as senility or deafness. They may be physically unable to go to the proper authorities to report the crimes. In addition, laws and regulations against consumer fraud change, and the elderly may simply not be aware of the appropriate channels through which victimization should be reported. With fewer ties to the social world, older Americans may be less likely to report victimization by consumer fraud than younger victims may. Just as there are elements of risk involved in the likelihood of victimization by consumer fraud, risk may also influence reporting behavior. Victims of white-collar crime, particularly fraudulent crimes, may be reluctant to report the incident because of feelings of embarrassment (Ennis, 1967). Walsh and


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Schram (1980) have suggested that the neglect of white-collar crime victims can be attributed to “double-standard issues” often experienced by rape victims. Many white-collar crime victims “often are viewed with a mixture of skepticism, suspicion, and disbelief, and viewed as unworthy of society’s protection” (pp. 46-47). Thus, elements of risk are involved in reporting victimization. Because older people are less likely to engage in risky behavior, they may also be less likely to report victimization. PREDICTIONS We predict that younger people are more likely to experience victimization by consumer fraud and are more likely to report their victimization than those who are older. We attempt to explain the age/victimization, and age/reporting relationships via social aspects of age. We predict that younger people socialize more often than older people do, and that they take more financial risks, thus increasing their chances of victimization by consumer fraud. Because reporting behavior may also be related to social aspects of age in much the same manner as victimization, we predict that younger victims will also be more likely to report their victimization. Analogously, we predict that due to low levels of socialization, older people are less likely to be victimized and less likely to report their victimization when it does occur. METHODS Sample and Data The data for this study were collected in spring 1994 via a telephone survey of households in Knox County, Tennessee, which is home to the city of Knoxville and the University of Tennessee. The sample consisted of 400 randomly selected Knox County residents age 18 and older. The questionnaire was based on the instrument used in the 1990 FVS study (Boyle, 1992). A full description of the study appears in Mason and Benson (1996), Van Wyk and Benson (1997), and Copes et al. (2001). The sample characteristics replicate similar studies by Titus et al. (1995) and Boyle (1992) in that we find nearly identical victimization rates and similar patterns of correlation with demographic variables (see the Results section below). The sample also compares favorably with 1990 national census data reported for the same area. Demographic characteristics of the sample are comparable to known population characteristics for Knox County. The average age is around 45. The modal category for annual income is between $15,000 and $24,000. Females are overrepresented (60% in the sample

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vs. 53% in the county) in the sample, but we do not believe this overrepresentation undermines the results. Consistent with previous research, we find that sex is not related to victimization in the present sample. Compared to the FVS and the Titus et al. (1995) samples, the Knox County sample has a higher percentage of persons who have had some college education. This is probably because the University of Tennessee main campus is located in the area. Fraud Victimization Fraud victimization was operationalized by asking respondents whether anyone had attempted to victimize them of 13 specific consumer fraud abuses in the past 5 years (see Table 1). The 5-year reference period was chosen for comparability to the FVS study, which was the only study available at the time the survey was designed. The 13 types of fraud selected for study were the ones with the highest reporting rates in the FVS study (Boyle, 1992). We also relied on suggestions from the chief investigator in the Knoxville Police Department’s fraud unit and information on the types of complaints filed during the previous year at the state Consumer Affairs Agency. The offenses primarily represented victimization by means of false or misleading statements, abuses of trust, and failure to deliver products or services as promised. Up to two instances of fraud victimization were tallied for each respondent. Two measures of victimization were constructed. Attempted victimization refers to any fraud attempt, whether successful or not; 0 = no attempt, 1 = attempt. This measure, which groups together both successful and attempted victimization, is the traditional measure of victimization. We also constructed a measure for successful victimization, which refers to those who reported losing money or property as a result of an attempted fraud victimization; 0 = unsuccessful attempt, 1 = successful attempt. Table 1 lists attempts and successes for each fraud type and the mean and median dollar loss for each fraud type. Theoretical Variables Theoretical variables predicting consumer fraud victimization include risk-taking behavior and socialization. The risk-taking variable is similar to the one used in Van Wyk and Benson (1997) and is constructed from Likerttype responses to the same seven statements. Responses to these statements asking about financial risk-taking behavior were recoded such that high scores represent greater risk taking. Responses to all seven statements were summed, producing a Cronbach’s alpha score of .58. The questions were:

TABLE 1

Types of Fraud Incident and Outcomes Reported in Spring 1994 via Telephone Survey of Households in Knox County, Tennessee Type of Fraud Unnecessary work for repairs or services on home, car, or appliances Charged more than what was estimated for repairs or services on home, car, or appliances Charged for repairs or services on home, car, or appliances for work not completed as promised Told you would get a prize, free vacation, or a free sample, which later turned out not to be free or ended up costing more than it was worth Purchased or been offered a guarantee or warranty that you later found out did not cover the things it said it would Someone tried to get a donation from you, claiming to be from a religious organization, some type of charity, or other type of organization, that you later found out did not go to that charity Agreed to buy a product or service for a certain price, but later charged a lot more than agreed on Been tricked into giving someone your credit card number or telephone card number so that someone could make charges without your knowledge or permission

Number of Incidents

Number of Attempts

Number of Successes

Percentage of Successes

Mean Monetary Loss in Dollars

Median Monetary Loss in Dollars

44

11

33

75.0

618

200

36

17

19

52.8

810

88

40

21

19

47.5

446

100

27

13

14

51.9

150

40

8

4

4

50.0

369

15

34

32

2

5.9

35

6

5

1

16.7

83

19

11

8

42.1

35

15

335

(continued)

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TABLE 1 Continued Type of Fraud Someone sold or tried to sell you life insurance or medical insurance that was worthless or didn’t cover what they said it would cover Someone tried to help you improve your credit or finances, convert the equity of your home, or prepare you financially for retirement but actually cheated, or tried to cheat, you out of your money or property Someone sold or tried to sell you a health, beauty care, or weight-loss product that did not work as claimed You gave someone money for advance fees or a lifetime membership in a health club, dance studio, or another organization, which went out of business and did not refund your money or never existed You got involved in an investment deal that turned out to be phony or a scam

Number of Incidents

Number of Attempts

Number of Successes

Percentage of Successes

Mean Monetary Loss in Dollars

Median Monetary Loss in Dollars

1

0

1

100.0

1,300

5

3

2

40.0

859

247

0

0

0

0.0

0

0

2

2

0

0.0

0

0

2

1

1

50.0

100

100


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1. I enjoy making risky financial investments now and then. 2. I only spend money I think I can afford to spend. 3. In regards to saving my money, I live for today, and don’t worry too much about the future. 4. I have found that the best way to get what you want is to save your money carefully. 5. I don’t mind taking chances with my money, as long as I think there’s a chance it might pay off. 6. I try to arrange my finances so that I always have a little extra set aside to handle emergencies. 7. Having a little money in the bank is more important to me than having lots of new things.

Socialization is an index consisting of the summed responses to three questions asking about social functions attended in the past 2 weeks. The Questions are as follows. 1. Please tell me how many times in the past 2 weeks you participated in community functions, such as PTA meetings, club meetings, or community workshops. 2. Please tell me how many times in the past 2 weeks you attended a churchrelated service or function. 3. Other than at church or community functions, please tell me how many times in the past 2 weeks you socialized with friends and/or relatives other than those you live with.

Responses to these questions were summed across all three indicators because socialization is assumed in this study to be cumulative. These indicators do not covary, nor would we expect them to. The more often one associates with others, the greater socialization accumulates. This index ranges from 2.55 to 30 and has a mean score of 8.94 for the sample. Demographic Variables Demographic variables thought to be associated with consumer fraud victimization are included in the analysis. They include age, sex, race, education, and household income. All of these variables have been measured at the categorical level. Age is represented as seven categories beginning at age 18, sex is coded 0 for male and 1 for female, race is coded 0 for non-White and 1 for White, education is represented as six categories, and income as seven categories. Missing cases for each of the demographic variables were assigned the mean score from the sample for each variable.

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TABLE 2

Victimization Rates for Three Surveys on Fraud Reference Period One Year in % Attempted victimization Knox County FVS Titus, Heinzelman, and Boyle (1995) Successful attempts Knox County FVS Titus, Heinzelman, and Boyle (1995) Overall successful victimization rate Knox County FVS Titus, Heinzelman, and Boyle (1995)

31

Five Years in %

57 35 58 46 38

48

15

26 13 28a

NOTE: Adapted by permission from Van Wyk and Benson (1997). FVS = Fraud Victimization Survey. a. This number is an estimate.

Reporting Behavior Reporting behavior was measured with a dichotomous variable that asked respondents who indicated a victimization or attempted victimization if they reported the incident to anyone (0 = did not report, 1 = did report). In this question, “anyone” refers to both official and nonofficial agencies. ANALYSES AND RESULTS Extent of Victimization A total of 227 respondents reported at least one attempted fraud in the 5 years prior to the interview. This yields an attempted victimization rate of 57%. This figure is virtually identical to the “lifetime victimization rate” of 58% reported by Titus et al. (1995) but is higher than that found in the FVS study (see Table 2). Of those who were approached, 104 said the attempt was successful. Thus, the percentage of attempts that resulted in successful victimizations in the present study is 46%. This rate is very close to the 1-year successful victimization rate of 48% found in the Titus et al. (1995) study, and not far from the 5-year rate of 38% found in the FVS study. Considering the sample as a whole, 26% reported being successfully victimized by fraudsters in the past


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5 years. Unfortunately, Titus et al. did not report on the successful victimizations for their lifetime victimization measure. However, assuming that the risk of successful victimization is constant, we can calculate a “lifetime successful victimization” rate for their data. Multiplying the 48% successful rate Titus et al. report for their 1-year victims by the 58% lifetime victimization rate yields a lifetime successful victimization rate of 28%. This rate is similar to our 5-year successful rate of 26%. Bivariate Relationships The effects of the two theoretical variables, the demographic variables on both victimization variables and on reporting behavior are analyzed. Bivariate relationships between all of the independent and the three dependent variables are presented in Table 3. Analyses indicate that younger people are more likely to experience consumer fraud victimization attempts, both successful and unsuccessful (–.263**), socialize more often then older people (–.164**), and engage in financial risk-taking behavior to a greater extent than older people (–.272**). These results confirm predictions stated earlier. Education, income, and race are not significantly related to victimization versus no victimization. The only difference between attempted and successful victimization is that people with lower incomes were more likely to experience successful victimizations than those with higher incomes (–.144*). None of the predictions for reporting behavior are supported by the analyses. The data do not support the assumptions that younger, more socialized, or more risky people are more likely to report their victimization. Because age is a key theoretical variable in the analyses, we report the probability of consumer fraud victimization and three categories of age to further illustrate the relationship between these two important variables. The results clearly indicate that the risk of victimization decreases with age (see Table 4). Eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds experienced the greatest risk of victimization at 77% of the sample, then 35- to 44-year-olds at 63%, and 65to 74-year-olds at 40%. Because each of the dependent variables are dichotomous, and Pearson’s coefficients may not accurately measure these associations, t tests for independent groups compare the mean scores on risk-taking behavior and socialization for each of the three dependent variables in Table 5. The mean scores on risk-taking behavior and on socialization significantly differ between victims and nonvictims of consumer fraud, and the results indicate that the relationships are in the predicted direction. Victims of consumer fraud victimization are more likely to take financial risks and to socialize with others than nonvictims are.

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TABLE 3

Bivariate Analyses of all Independent and Three Dependent Variables Variable 1. Fraud victimization: Attempts and Successes versus No Attempts 2. Fraud victimization: Successes versus Attempts 3. Reporting 4. Age 5. Socialization 6. Risky behavior 7. Education 8. Income 9. Race 10. Sex * significant at < .05. ** significant at < .01.

1

NA NA –.263** .133** .167** .091 .035 –.075 .028

2

3

.096 –.021 .046 .018 –.084 –.144* –.085 .062

.065 .043 –.130 .067 –.068 .016 .073

4

–.164** –.272** –.140** –.084 .151** .085

5

.008 –.111* –.148** .003 .037

6

.017 .077 –.014 –.133**

7

.473** .009 –.124*

8

.129* –.134**

9

–.066


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TABLE 4

Probability Estimates for Consumer Fraud Victimization by Age Age

Estimated Probability of Victimization in %

18 to 24 35 to 44 65 to 74

77 63 40

NOTE: Adapted by permission from Van Wyk and Benson (1997).

TABLE 5

Independent Sample t Tests for the Main Theoretical Variables and all Three Dependent Variables Victimization (No/Yes) n = 400 Risk-taking behavior Socialization

–3.383*** –2.681**

Victims Only (Attempts Only/ Successes) n = 224 –.265 –.683

Reporting (No/Yes) n = 226 1.956* .649

* significant at < .05. ** significant at < .01. *** significant at < .001.

Mean scores on the two theoretical variables between attempted and successful victimization do not significantly differ. There appears to be little difference in socialization and risk-taking behavior between victims who experience a loss of finances or property (victimization) and victims who do not lose capital (victims only). The results for reporting behavior are mixed. The mean score for risk-taking behavior significantly differs between victims who report and those who do not report their experiences, although the significance level is very low ( p = .052). The results indicate that victims who score higher on risky behavior are more likely to report their victimization than victims who take fewer financial risks. Mean scores for socialization do not significantly differ for reporting and nonreporting behavior. Multivariate Analyses Separate multivariate models are constructed containing all of the theoretically important variables for each of the three dependent variables (see Table 6). Logistic regression is used because the dependent variables are dichotomous. Each model contains the same predictor variables: risk-taking behavior, socialization, education, income, race, sex, and age. The first model assesses

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TABLE 6

Logistic Regression Models of Results From Telephone Survey of Households in Knox County, Tennessee, in Spring 1994 Victims Only (Attempts Only/ Successes)

Victimization b

SE

Wald

Risk-taking behavior .091* .038 5.549 Socialization .052* .024 4.645 Education .113 .078 2.102 Income –.001 .074 .000 Race –.317 .401 .623 Sex .288 .224 1.661 Age –.244***.065 13.935 n Model chi-square

b .017 .008 –.042 –.148 –.404 .219 –.020

400 41.45***

SE

Wald

.044 .158 .027 .084 .100 .177 .095 2.415 .456 .785 .283 .599 .087 .052 224 6.71

Reporting b –.082 .016 .189 –.147 .166 .298 .065

SE

Wald

.056 2.161 .032 .263 .117 2.614 .113 1.690 .543 .093 .341 .762 .101 .414 226 8.58

* significant at < .05. *** significant at < .001.

the impact of the predictor variables on consumer fraud victimization, the second on attempts versus successful victimization, and the third for reporting behavior. The two main theoretical variables, risk-taking behavior and socialization, significantly influence the likelihood of fraud victimization, and the association is in the predicted direction (Wald = 5.549, p = .018, and Wald = 4.645, p = .031, respectively). Respondents who socialize to a greater extent and whose financial behavior is more risky are more likely to be victimized by consumer fraud than more socially isolated and more prudent people. Age also significantly influences the likelihood of victimization as predicted (Wald = –.244, p = .000). Younger respondents are more likely to experience consumer fraud victimization than older people are. None of the remaining predictor variables significantly affect the likelihood of consumer fraud in the presence of the other variables. The second and third models do not produce any significant results among the variables. None of the predictor variables significantly affect the likelihood that a respondent would experience victimization attempts versus successes, likewise for reporting behavior. None of the variables in the model successfully predict whether a victim of consumer fraud reported their experiences. Only 3% of the variance in attempts versus successful victimization is explained by the model (Cox & Snell R2 = .030), and nearly 4% of the variance in the likelihood of reporting is explained by the model (Cox & Snell 2 R = .037).


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Risk-taking behavior, socialization, and age explain nearly 10% of the 2 variation in the likelihood of consumer fraud victimization (Cox & Snell R = .098). Given our theoretical assumption that socialization and risk-taking behavior are two social aspects of age, it is important to assess which of the three significant predictors increases the overall model predictability to the greatest extent. Introducing each of the three variables into the model in separate blocks, we assess the contribution of each variable. The model chisquares are increased 27.048 (p = .000) by age, 36.612 ( p = .028) by socialization, and 35.707 (p = .017) by risk-taking behavior. The p value is the most accurate measure of contribution between the three variables because each of the three dependent variables is measured by a different metric unit. Therefore, we conclude that age makes the most significant contribution to the model and must be assumed to represent a quality that significantly differs from socialization and risk-taking behavior because the model controls for these effects. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Recent research indicates that younger people are more likely to experience consumer fraud victimization than older Americans are. We attempted to explain this relationship via social aspects of age. Specifically, we assessed the relative correlation of socialization and risk-taking behavior in the presence of other demographic characteristics on victimization, including age. We found that younger people do socialize to a greater extent, and they take greater financial risks than older people do. Both of these characteristics are significantly associated with increased likelihood of victimization. Nonetheless, relative to all other predictors, age remains the most significant predictor of victimization by consumer fraud. Whether chronological or social aspects of age more significantly affect the likelihood of victimization by consumer fraud is difficult to assess, thus requiring further investigation into the social and perhaps social-psychological aspects of age. We can conclude, however, that socialization and risk-taking behavior contribute little to the overall ability of age to predict consumer fraud victimization. We found no support indicating that age itself, or social aspects of age, influences the likelihood of reporting behavior. Although younger people socialize more and take financial risks more often than older people do, they are not more likely to report their victimization as we predicted. This finding merits further assessment and speculation. Social support has many dimensions, only one of which was measured in this research. Although the number of contacts people have with others may not affect reporting behavior, Mason and Benson (1996) did find that the nature of information shared within relationships does influence reporting. Thus, we have discovered that the likeli-

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hood of victimization may be influenced by one dimension of social support, although reporting behavior may be influenced by another, and neither victimization nor reporting is influenced by all dimensions of social support. We also found that although younger people are greater risk takers than older people are, and those who take greater risks are more likely to be victimized than others are, we failed to find support for an association between risky behavior and reporting. Just as there are many dimensions to social support, there are multiple dimensions to risk-taking behavior. We measured financial risk-taking and assumed, as most of the theoretical assumptions about risk do, that risky people take risks in all aspects of their lives, and more prudent people do not. We made no empirical distinctions between financial risk taking and other types of behavior. If we had, perhaps we would have found that although financial risk taking affects the likelihood of victimization, other forms of risk taking affect reporting behavior. Certainly, these speculations merit further investigation. Concerning public policy, this study suggests that public information programs aimed at the prevention of fraud are needed. Information programs should focus on dispelling the myth that fraud victimization is a problem encountered primarily by the elderly and emphasize that fraud is a crime that affects all segments of our society. Furthermore, educational programs should emphasize the use of caution when transactions sound too good to be true, thus discouraging risky financial behavior. They should inform the public on procedures for reporting victimization and increase public access to, and awareness of, reporting agencies. Perhaps it would benefit all Americans if producers of goods and services accept an active role in educational programs aimed at stopping consumer fraud. Businesses and corporations have a vested interest in reducing the us/ them relationship that exists between producers and consumers that consumer fraud has fostered. Such programs would be a public service to consumers and would create an atmosphere of trust between producers and consumers, and companies would be reimbursed for the costs of these programs via the advertisement they would provide for their products. REFERENCES American Association of Retired Persons; Princeton Survey Research Associates. (1996). Telemarketing fraud victimization of older Americans: An AARP study. Washington, DC: American Association of Retired Persons. American Association of Retired Persons; Princeton Survey Research Associates; Consumer Affairs Section. (1993). Behavior of older consumers: An AARP study. Washington, DC: American Association of Retired Persons.


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Bass, R., & Hoeffler, L. (1992). Telephone-based fraud: A survey of the American public. New York: Lois Harris. Blum, R. H. (1972). Deceivers and deceived. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. Boyle, J. M. (1992). Fraud victimization survey, 1990. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Copes, H., Kerley, D., Mason, K., & Van Wyk, J. (2001). Explaining variation in the reporting behavior of fraud victims: A test of Black’s theory of law. Justice Quarterly, 18, 343-363. Ennis, P. H. (1967). Criminal victimization in the United States: A report of a national survey. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Jesilow, P., Klemper, E., & Chiao, V. (1992). Reporting consumer and major fraud: A survey of complainants. In K. Schlegel & D. Weisburd (Eds.), White collar crime reconsidered (pp. 149-168). Boston: Northeastern University Press. Mason, K., & Benson, M. L. (1996). The effect of social support on fraud victims’ reporting behavior: A research note. Justice Quarterly, 13, 511-523. Rush, G. E. (1986). Dictionary of criminal justice (2nd ed.). Guilford, CT: Dushkin. Shover, N., Fox, G. L., & Mills, M. (1994). Long-term consequences of victimization by white-collar crime. Justice Quarterly, 11, 75-98. Steele, E. H. (1975). Fraud, dispute and the consumer: Responding to consumer complaints. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 123, 1107-1186. Titus, R. M. (2001). Personal fraud and its victims. In N. Shover & J. P. Wright (Eds.), Crimes of privilege: Readings in white-collar crime (pp. 57-67). New York: Oxford Press. Titus, R. M., Heinzelman, F., & Boyle, J. M. (1995). Victimization of persons by fraud. Crime and Delinquency, 41(1), 54-72. Van Wyk, J., & Benson, M. L. (1997, Spring). Fraud victimization: Risky business or just bad luck? American Journal of Criminal Justice, 21(2), 163-179. Vaughan, D., & Carlo, G. (1975). The appliance repairman: A study of victimresponsiveness and fraud. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 12, 153-161. Vaughan, D., & Carlo, G. (1976). Victims of fraud: Victim responsiveness, incidence, and reporting. In E. Viano (Ed.), Victims and society (pp. 403-412). Washington, DC: Visage Press. Walsh, M. E., & Schram, D. D. (1980). The Victim of White-Collar Crime: Accuser or Accused? In G. Geis & E. Stotland (Eds.), White-collar crime: Theory and research (pp. 32-51). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Judy Van Wyk is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Rhode Island. She has published and presented papers on employee theft, victimization by consumer fraud, and partner violence. Her current research interests are investigating contextual and compositional effects on partner violence. Karen A. Mason is an assistant professor at Washington State University. Her principal interests are white-collar offending and victimization and juvenile justice. She is currently beginning a project evaluating juvenile drug courts in Washington State.

Journal Liddick of / POLITICAL Contemporary FUND-RAISING Criminal Justice / November 2001

Political Fund-Raising, Patron-Client Relations, and Organized Criminality Two Case Studies DON LIDDICK University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg This article provides two case studies of political fund-raising abuses committed during the 1996 U.S. election cycle. The author contends that the behaviors described are best characterized as a form of organized criminality and that a good way to study these behaviors is to frame them in terms of patron-client relations. Though noting the limitations of this approach, the author concludes that social network methods are not only a good match with the patron-client perspective but also offer a realistic opportunity to advance the understanding of organized/white-collartype crimes.

T

he raising of campaign contributions in and around the 1996 elections involved a wide variety of crimes perhaps best described as organized criminality. Although typically framed by many politicians and pundits as relatively minor technical violations of statutes governing campaign finance, a close examination of the case studies provided in this article demonstrates that political fund-raisers committed a variety of more serious crimes and did so in a coordinated fashion. The purposes of the article are (a) to describe two of the lesser known campaign fund-raising episodes associated with the 1996 scandal, (b) to suggest that these crimes should be viewed as a breed of organized criminality (a category of behaviors in which so-called white-collar crimes would fall), and (c) to posit that patron-client relations theory and social network methodology are appropriate and useful ways to analyze the crimes described.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Don Liddick, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg, 1150 Mt. Pleasant Road, Greensburg, PA 15601. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 346-357 © 2001 Sage Publications

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The article will begin with the provision of the campaign fund-raising case studies and conclude with a discussion of the patron-client relations perspective. ROGER TAMRAZ In the mid 1990s, Roger Tamraz, an international fugitive wanted on bank fraud and embezzlement charges,1 attempted to obtain U.S. government support for an oil pipeline project that would cross the Caspian Sea region. Tamraz’s efforts included using his past relationship with the CIA and making political donations to the Democratic Party to gain access to mid-level and upper level U.S. government officials, including the vice-president and president of the United States. Although Tamraz did not get U.S. support for his pipeline project (at Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearings in 1997, Tamraz admitted to donating about $300,000 to Democrats to gain access and said that next time he would be smarter and give $600,000) (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21), the events surrounding this case study exemplify the widespread practice of purchasing access to government officials and, conversely, the great lengths some officials will go to ensure that contributions are made and access granted. In the spring of 1995, a National Security Council (NSC) interagency group on Caspian Sea oil pipeline policy, headed by Sheila Heslin, became aware that Tamraz was promoting himself in the Caspian Sea region as a deal maker and that the substance of his pipeline proposal ran contrary to U.S. policy.2 Despite his flawed proposal and his shady background in Lebanon (during this time period, Tamraz was wanted by Interpol because of his conviction in absentia regarding the Bank Al-Mashrek failure), Heslin and the NSC group decided that Tamraz at least deserved a hearing in front of his government to assess his proposal. NSC and CIA officials subsequently met with Tamraz in May and June of 1995 to discuss the proposed Caspian pipeline. Prior to a June 2 meeting between Heslin and Tamraz, CIA officials from both the Directorate of Intelligence (DI—analysis of information) and the Directorate of Operations (DO—gathering of information) informed Heslin that they would send her a report. Heslin testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 1997 that the DI report contained primarily negative information about Tamraz, whereas the DO report was completely positive. A CIA agent in the DO, identified only as “Bob” at committee hearings, began to contact Heslin and push for a White House meeting between President Clinton and Tamraz in early June 1995, a lobbying effort that continued through October (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21).

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Efforts to arrange access to the White House on Tamraz’s behalf were not limited to “Bob” at the CIA (most of the information provided by “Bob” to the Senate Committee remains classified, and the DO’s motivation in promoting Tamraz’s proposal remains hidden). After the NSC interagency group led by Heslin indicated to Tamraz that his pipeline proposal would not gain White House support, Tamraz testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that “they kicked me from the door, I will come through the window.” Tamraz’s passage through the window began in July 1999, when he became a major contributor to the Democratic Party. Between July and October 1995, Tamraz contributed $220,000 to various Democratic entities, including the Virginia Democratic Party, the Louisiana Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) Federal Account, the DNC, and the Richard Molpus for Governor of Mississippi campaign. Check-tracking forms obtained by the Governmental Affairs Committee listed DNC chairman Donald Fowler as the solicitor of Tamraz’s donations (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21). Denied top-level access by the NSC, Tamraz came in through the DNC window. The culpability of the DNC and DNC chairman Donald Fowler in soliciting and taking money from Tamraz is beyond dispute. Before and after Fowler’s July 1995 meeting with Tamraz, DNC staffers warned Fowler about the dubious nature of Tamraz’s pipeline proposal as well as his troubles in Lebanon (in 1994 and 1995, the Commerce Department had also declined to support Tamraz and his business ventures). Despite the warnings, Fowler, DNC finance director Richard Sullivan, and other fund-raisers at the DNC not only solicited and accepted Tamraz’s donations but also went to great lengths to arrange access and provide him the political leverage he sought (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21). Vice President Al Gore became interested in Tamraz’s pipeline project in September 1995, when a Tamraz associate, Harut Sassounian, pitched the idea to the vice president at a White House “coffee” (or DNC breakfast—the record is uncertain). Tamraz was invited to a breakfast with Gore on October 5, 1995, but was subsequently uninvited days before the meeting, when Sheila Heslin at the NSC learned of it and tipped off Leon Furth (Gore’s national security advisor) as to Tamraz’s false claims to the U.S. government regarding Caspian region support for his project (as well as his “shady and untrustworthy reputation”). However, the determined Tamraz did not give up, especially because he already had acquired eager-to-please top-level DNC contacts. Shortly after the vice president’s office declined to arrange an official meeting between Al Gore and Tamraz based on the NSC recommendation, DNC chairman Fowler agreed to allow Tamraz to attend various DNC


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events, including a September 11, 1995, Business Council Reception at the White House and a September 15, 1995, DNC trustee dinner in the White House. As Tamraz recalled in his 1997 Senate testimony, his attendance at a private fund-raising dinner on October 2, 1995, at the Virginia home of Senator Edward Kennedy was arranged after he had started making contributions to the DNC and had donated $10,000 to $20,000 either to Kennedy’s campaign or to the Massachusetts Democratic Party. At this event, Tamraz sat at the head table with Senator Kennedy and Vice-President Gore and was referred to DNC finance chairman Marvin Rosen’s Miami-based law firm for additional access-related services (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21). Still undaunted, Tamraz met with the DNC’s Donald Fowler and Richard Sullivan on October 6, 1995, to discuss his recently cancelled private meeting with Al Gore. At that meeting, Tamraz told Fowler about his enthusiastic reference in the CIA, the aforementioned “Bob” who had so vigorously lobbied Shiela Heslin at the NSC. Fowler’s and Sullivan’s handwritten notes taken at this meeting indicated their intention to call “Bob,” and their knowledge of his CIA affiliation. Tamraz also gave to Fowler “Bob’s” classified office telephone number. On October 19, 1995, an internal CIA memorandum written by “Bob” stated: Don Fowler called me at the request of . . . Roger Tamraz. . . . During the conversation, Fowler said that he understood that I was in contact with the vice president’s office concerning Tamraz. Fowler said he was attempting to arrange a meeting between the vice president and Tamraz concerning Tamraz’s oil pipeline from Ceyhan, Turkey, to Baku, Azerbaijan, but was aware that there was opposition in the White House. . . . Fowler queried whether I could provide him a copy of any correspondence on Tamraz I might prepare for the vice president. (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21, p. 2,934)

At about the same time in October 1995, “Bob” also called Sheila Heslin to once again lobby on Tamraz’s behalf. Heslin declined to change her position, so later in December 1995, Fowler once again contacted “Bob” at the Central Eurasia Division of the DO. An internal memorandum prepared by “Bob” stated that “Don Fowler called CE Division to ask if it could provide a letter on Tamraz to clear Tamraz’s name with the president.”3 “Bob” refused to provide the letter, so Fowler then contacted Sheila Heslin at the NSC in an attempt to change the NSC position. Heslin referred the matter to Deputy National Security Advisor Nancy Soderberg; Soderberg conferred with Don

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Fowler, and at some point in December 1995, Heslin received an unsolicited report from the CIA through the office of the senior director for intelligence matters at the NSC. As Heslin noted before the Senate Committee, this DNCengineered letter of reference contained no adverse information about Tamraz and “was totally divorced from the reality of what the guy was about.” Ultimately, despite Heslin’s efforts to deny Tamraz access to top-level officials and sustain U.S. foreign policy objectives in the states of the South Caucasus, Tamraz, through his DNC and Democratic Party donations, was permitted to attend six events with President Clinton from September 1995 through June 1996. The events included the following: 1. A reception for the DNC’s Business Leadership Forum on September 11, 1995. 2. A DNC dinner on September 15, 1995. 3. The DNC chairman’s holiday reception on December 13, 1995. 4. A DNC trustee’s dinner on March 27, 1996. 5. A presidential coffee on April 1, 1996. 6. A buffet dinner and private screening of the film Independence Day on June 22, 1996. (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21)

Having successfully purchased access to President Clinton, Tamraz proceeded to pursue his ultimate goal of changing U.S. foreign policy and influencing the president to endorse his pipeline project to the governments of the Caspian region. Tamraz pitched his proposal to President Clinton at a March 27, 1996, DNC dinner and an April 1, 1996, White House coffee; the president expressed interest, and the matter was referred to Counselor to the President Thomas “Mack” McClarty for investigation. McClarty delegated the investigation of the merits of the pipeline proposal to the Associate Deputy Secretary for Energy, Kyle Simpson, who in turn enlisted the help of his Energy Department colleague Jack Carter. Because the NSC’s interagency task force on Caspian region matters was the only real obstacle to Tamraz’s objective, Carter subsequently called the beleaguered Sheila Heslin on April 4, 1996. Heslin testified before the Senate committee in 1997 that Carter pressured her to change the position of the task force, invoking the clout of Mack McClarty and Tamraz’s sizable campaign contributions. Carter also inferred that her job could be in jeopardy if McClarty ever became energy secretary and informed her that she should not be “such a girl scout.” Moreover, Heslin recalled that Carter quoted a $200,000 contribution figure, a number essentially equal to the $205,000 total recorded in a memoranda compiled for Tamraz by the DNC within 24 hours of Tamraz’s March 27, 1996, discussion with President Clinton about his pipeline proposal. Tamraz’s support for the


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DNC and the Democratic Party was effectively communicated from the president through Mack McClarty to officials at the Energy Department, who attempted to pressure a national security official to change official U.S. foreign policy (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 21). In April 1999, the 515 mile Baku-Supsa pipeline opened and was hailed by Azerbajaini officials because it avoided Russian territory and thus contributed to Azerbaijan’s economic independence. However, the Baku-Supsa line is expected to handle only 10% of Caspian Sea production, and 12 energy companies (including U.S.-based Penzoil, Unocal, McDermott and Exxon, and Amoco/British Petroleum) have formed a $7.5 billion consortium (the Azerbaijani International Operating Company [AIOC]) that favors another pipeline route from Baku northward through Chechnya to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. By October 1998, AIOC had completely rejected the BakuCeyhan route pushed by Roger Tamraz and the Clinton State Department, a friction that was viewed by some as a loss of U.S. credibility on the pipeline issue. Of course, whether Roger Tamraz’s relatively paltry $300,000 influenced U.S. foreign policy is debatable (legitimate reasons for favoring the Baku-Ceyhan route include the empowerment of NATO member Turkey and regional instability on the northern route), but the sale of access to the White House and the undue political pressure placed on a U.S. foreign policy formulator is beyond doubt. For his part, Roger Tamraz has been seeking entry through another window—he is believed to have the support of the China National Petroleum Company in efforts to gain access to the trillions of dollars in untapped crude lying beneath the Caspian Sea (Limbacher & Grich, 1999). THE CHEYENNE AND ARAPAHO TRIBES In March 1997, media accounts revealed that the Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes of Oklahoma had donated $107,000 to the DNC in 1996 with the understanding that the contributions would help them reacquire the Fort Reno tribal lands (the federal government had seized the 9,500 acre parcel in 1883, and it was now believed that significant oil and gas deposits lay beneath it). Staff for the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee interviewed tribal leaders in August and September 1997 (they refused to testify under oath before the committee, asserting their Fifth Amendment right), uncovering a series of events in which Democratic fund-raisers attempted to fleece the tribes out of additional contributions, legal fees, and land development fees (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 24). The story is one of blatant influence peddling that at one point sank as low as attempted extortion.

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Prior to 1996, the tribes had aggressively pursued their claims to the Fort Reno lands, contacting both the Departments of Interior and Agriculture in 1994 and 1995. Frustrated by these attempts, tribal leaders hired Michael Turpen, a former attorney general of Oklahoma, to lobby on their behalf. Turpen set up meetings with Washington officials and accompanied tribal representatives to Washington, D.C., in early 1996 and wrote a letter to presidential aide Mack McClarty seeking his assistance. During this time period, Turpen was also a top fund-raiser in Oklahoma for the Democrats and Clinton-Gore ‘96, so he soon informed the tribes that the way to get heard in Washington is to make political donations, typically in the six-figure range. The tribes eventually agreed to donate $100,000 and were soon invited to attend a luncheon with President Clinton in the White House. On June 17, 1996, two tribal leaders, Surveyor and Todd, dined with the president and a small group of people in the White House. Surveyor and Todd left the meeting uplifted, for as they remember it, the president had told them something to the effect that “we’ll look into it and see what we can do” (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 24). Because the tribes had not actually delivered the $100,000 at or prior to the luncheon, a flurry of phone calls from Turpen and Jason McIntosh (Turpen’s contact at Clinton-Gore ‘96) ensued, pressing the tribes for payment. Turpen called June 20, insisting that the tribes pay the DNC immediately, and McIntosh placed several calls beginning June 24 that became increasingly “aggressive” in tone.4 On June 26, 1996, the tribes wired a contribution to the DNC totaling $87,671.74, representing the entire sum in the tribal bank 5 account. Sometime in July, Turpen called the tribe and reminded them that they were still $13,000 short and suggested that they donate $20,000 to help host President Clinton’s 50th birthday party. The tribal leaders agreed and donated the $20,000 through Turpen’s firm (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 24). By December 1996, the tribes had grown restless because they had seen no progress in their quest to regain the Fort Reno lands. Apparently, the only tangible result of their $107,000 donation was additional solicitations from Democratic fund-raisers including Michael Copperthite, who steered the tribal attorney (Rick Grellner) to Nathan Landow and Peter Knight. Landow is a wealthy Maryland real estate developer and a longtime friend and supporter of Vice President Gore and the DNC, whereas Knight is a former Gore aide, prominent fund-raiser, and the chair of the Clinton-Gore ‘96 campaign. Landow indicated that he and Knight’s lobbying firm could help the tribes with their problem but that it would cost an additional $100,000 down-


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payment to Knight’s firm plus $10,000 a month. Landow’s fee was to be 10% of any real estate development, 10% of any income, and 10% of the oil and gas revenues derived from the Fort Reno lands. When the tribes failed to come up with the retainer, the potential business arrangement turned into something more like a shakedown. According to Grellner and Copperthite, Landow threatened to make sure that the tribes never got their land back, stating: “If you don’t do this deal, I will fuck you” (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 24). Although Landow denied threatening the tribes, the PBS news documentary Frontline did obtain another memorable Landow quote: “They want the land given back to them on a platter . . . they brought in innocent people like me. They’re a bunch of goddamn uneducated Indians” (Jones, 1998). The Washington Post ran a story about Landow’s association with the tribes in March 1997, and the consulting arrangement was dead in the water (“Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns,” 1998, ch. 24). Although apparently there was no quid pro quo (the Cheyenne-Arapaho did not get the Fort Reno lands back because of their $107,000 donation), this case does at the very least embody a classic example of influence peddling. If asked, Roger Tamraz would have likely told tribal representatives that they should have contributed more if they really wanted results. DISCUSSION The two case studies provided here embody what has become intrinsic in the American political process—the purchasing of access, the peddling of influence, and all too often, the brazen sale of political office. Moreover, it seems perfectly legitimate to frame these behaviors as organized criminality, in which public officials, private entrepreneurs (both licit and illicit), and assorted power brokers engage in complicated reciprocal exchange relations. In the present examples, these complex relationships mesh legal, quasi-legal, and illegal behaviors and utterly blur the lines dividing legitimate political processes from what is commonly referred to as white-collar crime. The purpose of this article is to suggest how we can best make sense of these deviant behaviors. As noted, classifying the behaviors described in the political fund-raising case studies provided is difficult if not impossible because the events and relationships manifest attributes of corporate, governmental, and even organizedtype crimes. Moreover, the actors involved are not part of any formal organization with rigid boundaries, hierarchical authority structures, rational divisions of labor, or commitments to the attainment of common goals. Rather, the cor-

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ruption of the American political process and the crimes associated with that process involve countless, informal, and fluid relationships among a variety of societal actors pursuing a range of personal and organizational goals. This observation suggests that a patron-client relations framework is well-suited to studying the phenomena of interest. A description of the patron-client perspective follows. Patron-Client Relationships The study of patron-client relationships is reported in a large body of literature that has emerged in opposition to the classical functionalist approach in anthropology and the structural-functional school of sociology. Rather than focusing on primarily groups and their needs and “boundary maintaining mechanisms,” an examination of patronage systems stresses the importance of personal and interpersonal relations, quasi-groups, networks, and power relations (Roniger & Eisenstadt, 1980). In its simplest form, a patron-client relationship may be defined as a “vertical dyadic alliance, i.e., an alliance between two persons, of unequal status, power or resources, each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself.” The superior member of such an alliance is called the patron, and the person with less power the client (Schmidt, 1977). In modern patron-client relations, “intermediaries or brokers act as a link between national and local systems, and bridge the difference between differing value systems” (Burkolter, 1976, p. 22). Traditionally seen in underdeveloped countries, brokerage is also prevalent in modern industrialized societies in which the “multiplicity of powerful interlocking institutions” leads many would-be clients into a corner of helplessness and powerlessness. The broker steps in to bridge what would otherwise be an insurmountable gap—he brings people together who otherwise would not develop a relationship. The broker, as patron to his clients, enables these relatively powerless individuals to become clients of a powerful patron who can grant them the favors they seek (Burkolter, 1976). Those patrons with the greatest power may not involve themselves in illegal entrepreneurship, political office, or union positions. Instead, they focus solely on the distribution and brokerage of informal power, completely independent of institutional or formal authority. Perhaps the full significance of patron-client relations as complex social arrangements is expressed best by Roniger and Eisenstadt (1980): “patron-client relations denote, in their fullest expression, a distinct mode of regulating crucial aspects of institutional order: the structure of the flow of resources, exchange and power relations, and their legitimation in society” (p. 49).


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Social Network Analysis Because the patron-client perspective views organized or coordinated criminality in terms of informal relationships as opposed to criminal organizations with rigid boundaries, it is therefore natural and appropriate to wed patron-client theory with social network methods. Social network methods are used to study the structure of social groups through the analysis of relational data and the measurement of different kinds of relationships that exist between individual actors in a group. The concept of a social network focuses on the fact that “each individual has ties to other individuals, each of whom in turn is tied to few, some, or many others, and so on” (Jackson, Herbrink, & Jansen, 1996). What this group of analytical techniques provides is a rigorous and mathematically precise way to describe and measure the different kinds of relationships and the strength of relationships among different actors in a group. If we accept that the main focus in social network analysis is on the different kinds of relations that exist between actors in a group and that these relations connect pairs of actors into larger relational systems (Jackson et al., 1996), then the usefulness of network methods in characterizing the structural properties of organized crime groups becomes obvious. Ianni and Ianni (1990) have concluded that social network analysis can even provide valuable insights into police investigations. Network methods can lead to the formulation of alternative hypotheses that may be used to direct or facilitate ongoing investigations (Ianni & Ianni, 1990). In addition, because secrecy and trust are crucial to organized criminal operations, the analysis of cohesion among actors may be especially important in the identification of vulnerabilities (Lupsha, 1983). So, we find that not only does a patron-client/social network orientation have scholarly appeal in its potential to advance our knowledge of organized criminality (including deviances associated with political fundraising), but it also has practical applications in law enforcement strategies. CONCLUSION Finally, a word of caution is necessary. Although patron-client relations and social network methods appear to be quite amenable to studying organized/ white-collar offenses, the use of social network methods to study relationships among criminals is a very recent addition to criminological analyses. Some scholars have observed that the usefulness of this approach has not yet been established in the field (Jackson et al., 1996). Certainly, delving into and mapping social networks (human relationships) with the aim of mathematical precision is undeniably fraught with peril. Joseph Albini warned of the

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complex (and unpredictable) nature of social networks and patron-client relations some years ago when he concluded that because patron-client, friendship, and business relationships are constantly changing, attempts at charting or assigning boundaries to the number and specific types of relationships is impossible (Albini, 1971). Actually assigning values to and measuring what are sometimes infinitely complex social networks/human relationships may be overly optimistic; but, of course, that is no reason for failing to try. Put another way, when studying the complex and informal networks that comprise organized criminality, patron-client relations and social network methods offer a unique and potentially productive way of examining the phenomena. NOTES 1. Roger Tamraz is an American businessman involved in investment banking and international energy projects. Born in Cairo, Egypt, in 1940 and educated at the Harvard Business School, Tamraz went on to become the chairman of Lebanon’s second-largest bank, as well as the head of Jet Holdings, which owned both TransMediterranean Airway and Middle East Airlines. In 1989, Tamraz fled Lebanon after being charged by the Lebanese government with embezzlement in connection with the failure of the Bank Al-Mashrek. Tamraz emigrated to the United States, became a U.S. citizen, and founded his own oil company, now called Oil Capitol Limited. 2. A war between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been fought from 1990 to 1994 over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Official U.S. policy was/is to facilitate oil development in the Caspian region and help bring that oil to Western markets while preserving and enhancing regional stability. Tamraz’s proposal was viewed by U.S. foreign policy experts as “unworkable, undesirable, and perhaps even dangerous.” 3. For his part, Fowler flatly denied ever contacting the CIA. When confronted with evidence to the contrary at Senate hearings in September 1997, Fowler then said that he had no recollection of contacting the CIA, and added that he didn’t know that “Bob” was with the CIA. However, DNC phone records, CIA memoranda, conversations Fowler had with Heslin and Deputy National Security Advisor Nancy Soderberg in which Fowler referred to “Bob” at the CIA, and Fowler’s own handwritten notes clearly demonstrate that Fowler’s initial denial and later faulty memory are dubious at best. 4. This raises an interesting question. What if the tribes had simply refused to make their promised donation? Could the DNC sue the tribes? It might be rather embarrassing to explain in a court of law that the defendants had agreed to purchase access to the president and then failed to remit payment. 5. Interestingly, the tribes engaged in a bit of chicanery in delivering the contribution. Robert Tabor, the business council treasurer, opposed the idea of the donation. To get around him, the money was transferred from the tribal account controlled by Tabor


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to the account of a business development corporation controlled by the tribes—from there the money was wired to the DNC. Perhaps this is one reason why the tribal leaders refused to testify under oath before the Senate committee.

REFERENCES Albini, J. (1971). The American Mafia: Genesis of a legend. New York: AppletonCentury Crofts. Burkolter, V. (1976). The patronage system: Theoretical remarks. Basel, Switzerland: Social Strategies Publishers Cooperative Society. Ianni, F., & Ianni, E. (1990). Network analysis. In P. P. Andrews & M. B. Peterson (Eds.), Criminal intelligence analysis (pp. 67-84). Loomis, CA: Palmer. Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns. (1998). Chapter 21: The Saga of Roger Tamraz (Final Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 1998). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns. (1998, March 10). Chapter 24: The Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes (Final Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 105th Congress, 2nd session, 1998). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Jackson, J. L., Herbrink, C. M., & Jansen, R.W.J. (1996). Examining criminal organizations: Possible methodologies. Transnational Organized Crime, 2, 83-105. Jones, S. (Producer). (1998, October 6). Washington’s Other Scandal. In Frontline. Alexandria, VA: Public Broadcasting Service. Limbacher, C., & Caron Grich, C. (1999). The Caspian connection: Pipeline politics and the Balkan war [Online]. Available: Newsmax.com Lupsha, P. (1983). Networks vs. networking: Analysis of an organized crime group. In G. P. Waldo (Ed.), Career criminals. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Roniger, L., & Eisenstadt, S. N. (1980). Patron-client relations as a model of structuring social exchange. Jerusalem: Truman Research Institute. Schmidt, S. W. (1977). Friends, followers, and factions: A reader in political clientelism (pp. xx). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Don Liddick received his Ph.D. from the Pennsylvania State University in 1995 and has taught and researched as an associate professor of criminal justice at the University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg since that time. He has written and published three books and numerous articles on organized crime and police misconduct. His scholarly interests include the history of organized crime, contemporary transnational organized crime, and the manifestation of organized crime in the form of complex networks of patron-client relations.

Journal Dodge /of TELECOMMUNICATIONS Contemporary Criminal Justice INDUSTRY / November REGULATION 2001

Slams, Crams, Jams, and Other Phone Scams Competition, Crime, and Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry MARY DODGE University of Colorado at Denver The 1984 divestiture of AT&T created a proliferation of telecommunication services and widespread opportunities for corporate and consumer fraud. The evolution of the telecommunications industry has resulted in aggressive marketing practices that have affected untold numbers of consumers and has fostered fraudulent practices that pit major long-distance phone companies against each other and against Baby Bells. This article examines slamming, cramming, jamming, holding, and gouging violations. Data from state and federal agencies are analyzed to show the scope of fraudulent practices and the methods of perpetration. The research traces enforcement actions by state public service commissions and the Federal Communications Commission and offers an analysis of the problems associated with regulatory sanctioning efforts that attempt to curtail unethical and illegal practices.

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he breakup of the Bell telephone system in 1984 caused a proliferation of telecommunication upstarts and an exponential growth in competitive service markets. The divestiture of AT&T limited local services to those provided by one of the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies and local monopolies such as GTE. In 1996, the Telecommunications Act was established to promote further competition in local and long distance. Under the

The author would like to thank Colleen Gately and Vitaliy Shmeriga for their valuable research assistance. Portions of this article were presented at the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, November 2000 and the Academy of Criminal Justice Science, New Orleans, March 22, 2000. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mary Dodge, University of Colorado at Denver, Graduate School of Public Affairs, P.O. Box 173364, Campus Box 142, Denver, CO 80217. Phone: (303) 556-5987; fax: (303) 556-5971; e-mail: m1dodge@carbon. cudenver.edu. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 358-368 © 2001 Sage Publications

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new law, Baby Bells were barred from offering long distance until local monopolies were open to competitors. Expectations were that consumers would see lower rates, greater choices in service, and improved quality. Critics note, however, that major companies have undermined the integrity of the market by delaying competition and pursuing mergers to consolidate their power (Krebs, 1997). The competitive market—unaccompanied by consumer protection—also created numerous opportunities for fraud. Fraudulent practices in telecommunications include a wide array of activities and victims. Fraud may involve switching service providers without customer authorization, charges for services never rendered, and rate increases without notices. Consumers often receive fewer service features and are charged higher rates. Local telephone companies handle thousands of calls from customers angry about a problem created by competitors. Telecommunications is a lucrative business, especially with the growth of the Internet and wireless services. The $100 billion local phone market is controlled primarily by regional Baby Bell companies. The $80 billion longdistance market is controlled primarily by monopolies such as AT&T, Sprint, and MCI. Competition continues to increase as regional companies attempt to break into the long-distance market. Similarly, long-distance companies are eager to break into the local market. In December 1999, Atlantic Bell became the first Baby Bell approved by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to enter the long-distance market. Atlantic Bell’s ability to sell long distance to 6.6 million households is considered a profound reshaping of the industry (Schiesel, 1999). AT&T plans to appeal the FCC ruling. As local, local toll, and long-distance telecommunications services are faced with increasing competition, some companies that are eager to gain an edge have resorted to deceptive practices. Much of the blame for fraudulent practices is placed on long-distance resellers (companies that purchase blocks of time from established facility providers). The number of long-distance resellers grew from 11 in 1978 to more than 825 in 1995 (Maurer, 1995). Fraudulent practices also are perpetrated by regional Bells and major longdistance companies. Most large companies place the blame on aggressive or overzealous telemarketers—many just deny wrongdoing. TYPES OF TELEPHONE SCAMS Slamming Slamming, the unauthorized switch of a long-distance carrier, represents the number one and fastest growing category of complaints to the FCC. Slamming complaints have more than tripled since 1994. The FCC received

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8,761 slamming complaints in 1995 and 12,795 in 1996. The number of consumer grievances rose to more than 20,000 in 1997 and 1998. State regulators reported a 91% increase between 1996 and 1998 in slamming complaints (“Customer complaints on phone slamming,” 1999). The New York Public Service Commission received 445 slamming complaints against AT&T statewide in 1997—a 25% rise from 1996. The actual number of incidents is incalculable. The New York Public Service Commission estimates that six incidents go unreported for every claim that is filed (Robinson, 1998). Local exchange carriers process more than 50 million carrier changes each year. The National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates estimates that as many as one million consumers each year are fraudulently switched (Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 1998). One of the more common methods of slamming is an inducement by companies to register for sweepstakes, called “box programs” in the industry. The entry forms contain fine print that authorizes monthly service charges or the switching of long-distance service. Many of the forms include a notice that it represents an “LOA,” but few consumers know that LOA is the designation for a Letter of Authorization—an FCC requirement for any change in service. In some instances, welcome packages are mailed to consumers that require the return of a postcard rejecting the change in long-distance service. The cards are included with advertising propaganda that many consumers chose to ignore. In this case, failure to respond authorizes the switch. Telemarketers hired by major companies or resellers also are involved in perpetrating the fraud. Business Discount Plan, Inc., for example, told potential customers that they were calling as AT&T representatives. Some fraudsters call and allege to be representatives of a local telephone company offering to “consolidate” telephone bills at no additional cost. In reality, the agreement of consolidation is an approval to switch long-distance service. In one case, a customer agreed to allow NYNEX to arrange a single billing but specifically stated that she wanted to keep her current long-distance carrier. Nonetheless, she was switched by the company. In the majority of reported cases, the Letters of Authorization are outright forgeries. One authorization, for example, was signed by Boris—the customer’s deceased dog. In another case, a woman’s husband, who had died 7 years earlier, was said to have authorized the switch for her household. In February 1997, a hearing before the Georgia Public Service Commission found that Long Distance Services, Inc., had forged letters authorizing changes for more than 6,000 customers. In addition to written forgeries, voice verification often is fabricated. Tapes are edited so that any “yes” answer is an approval for switching. Home Owner Long Distance, Inc. (HOLD), a reseller, would slam customers by calling and asking if they can put them on


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“hold.” An unwitting “yes” is tape-recorded and used as the official authorization to switch the consumer’s long-distance service. Companies that engage in slamming often target minorities. A study of three markets (Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee) showed that people of color were more likely to be slammed: 39% African Americans and 42% Latinos, compared to 28% of the White population (Harris & Associates, 1997). In 1997, California state regulators ordered WorldxChange, a company that targeted Latino and Asian immigrants, to stop conducting business in the state and pay back 56,000 customers who were illegally switched. According to Public Utility Commission (PUC) supervisor Larry McNeely, “the company slammed customers, then slammed them again after they complained about being switched. And, as immigrants, these people were among the most vulnerable of all” (Wagner, 1997). Before the slamming incident, Roger B. Abbott, the founder of WorldxChange, had served 3 years in state prison after a 1982 conviction for cocaine trafficking. His company took in more than $200 million a year in revenue (Wagner, 1997). Abbott and his wife, who had a lavish lifestyle, were paid salaries of $2.9 million a year. A class-action lawsuit in California is seeking $250 million in damages from Business Discount Plan, Inc. (BDP), for illegally switching customers to BDP long-distance services between 1996 and 1998 (Rendleman, 1999). Allen Lund, a transportation broker, operates 15 offices across the United States. BDP switched more than two dozen of Lund’s long-distance lines. The company paid an extra $13,000 in charges (Rendleman, 1999). AT&T also sued BDP in U.S. District Court in Illinois. The case was settled in May 1998 after BDP agreed to tell customers they had been slammed, pay the cost of switching back to the former carriers, and refund the excess charges customers paid. BDP slammed nearly 500,000 customers: 90% were businesses. The FCC fined the company $2.4 million for slamming and “unreasonable and deceptive” telemarketing practices. The Primary Interexchange Carrier (PIC) freeze was designed to prevent slamming, but the measure is often ineffective. The FCC recommends PIC freezes, although the agency proposes to limit solicitation of PICs because they promote anticompetitive behavior (Bahr, 1997). PICs sometimes are unrecognized because the slammer is a reseller of the original carrier and the phone service technically is provided by the same carrier. Slamming also has companies fighting among themselves. US West has accused competitors of slamming more than 25,000 customers in Colorado in February 1999. AT&T and MCI WorldCom questioned the results of the US West survey and accused the company of developing tactics to thwart competition. US West contacted 14,132 customers and nearly 72% said that they were unaware their in-state long-distance service had been switched (Fillion, 1999).

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The King of Slammers The Fletcher case demonstrates many of the problems associated with slamming. Daniel Fletcher is a minister’s son who attended Bible colleges in Maryland. He returned to California in 1988 and started reselling phone services in 1993. During the course of his fraud, Fletcher established eight longdistance resell companies. Two of the companies sported Christian connections: Christian Church Network and Church Discount Group. The religious spin went beyond the companies names; Fletcher also solicited churches with false promises of a 10% discount in the form of donations (Keller, 1998). The other companies had innocuous and vague names: Discount Calling Card, Donation Long Distance, Long Distance Services, Monthly Discounts, Monthly Phone Services, and Phone Call. The names avoided raising consumer suspicions. Church Discount Group entered into a reselling agreement with Sprint in August 1993. Sprint received the major portion of revenue and then paid Church Discount a percentage. In July of 1994, Fletcher modified the agreement so that 70% of the revenue went to Church Discount and then stopped making any payments to Sprint. Sprint terminated the agreement with Church Discount in September 1996. Fletcher owed the company $547,000. In 1996, Atlas and Phone Calls Inc. (PCI), another Fletcher company, entered into a contract. PCI would arrange for customers to switch longdistance phone companies and be placed on Atlas’ network. Atlas is a “switchless” company that supplies intrastate, interstate, and international long-distance service to customers via the Sprint network. In early July 1996, PCI identified approximately 544,000 long-distance telephone customers for switched services. Atlas placed almost 200,000 of the customers on their network. A high percentage of those customers filed slamming complaints with regulators and government law enforcement agencies. PCI denied culpability. Fletcher sued Atlas in August 1996 for refusing to continue the business arrangement. In response, Atlas filed a counterclaim. In August 1997, a U.S. district court entered a default judgment against PCI for $10 million. In mid-1996, other industry firms started to end deals with Fletcher companies because of consumer complaints, and by the end of 1996, all eight companies were out of business. The FCC started receiving complaints in 1993 but waited for 2 years before initiating action. In 1996, the FCC sent Fletcher letters asking him to respond to the complaints. The FCC eventually imposed an unprecedented $5.7 million fine against Fletcher (Vogelstein, 1998). The amount of money Fletcher made is unknown, but he billed more than $20 million to customers and could have profited by as much as $14 million (Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 1998). He also owed AT&T $2 million, US Billing $586,000, and Sprint $547,000. Fletcher


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disappeared, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation believes that he may have left the country. No criminal charges have been filed. Cramming Though slamming has received the most attention, cramming is a popular method of fraud. “Cramming” involves billing consumers for unauthorized, misleading, or deceptive charges. Charges include, for example, unwanted telephone services such as personal 800 numbers, paging, and voice mail. Services generally are provided by third-party companies and are billed on the statement from the local carrier. Many of the services are billed under confusing names such as “enhanced services,” “voice mail,” “calling plan,” “membership,” “telemail,” and “dial management.” Estimated charges for cramming incidents range from $4.95 to $30 per month. Susan Grants, director of the National Fraud Information Center, notes that cramming “is a flexible crime that can piggyback on other scams, or it can be a simple case of phantom billing” (National Consumers League, 1997). Large companies often are targeted in cramming scams because the phone bills are complex and the extra charges go undetected. U.S. Motels Inc., for example, discovered bogus charges on phone bills amounting to more than $10,000. The charges had gone unnoticed for months and were gradually increasing. In 1998, the company was overcharged $2,900 in February, $6,800 in March, and $12,500 in April (Olgeirson, 1998). Slamming and cramming of large companies or public institutions is particularly lucrative. A public utilities official explained that, for example, a state university that has 40,000 access lines may be switched on thousands of lines and misbilled without detection. He explained that the problem in such cases is that “no one checks the bills, and the university is unwilling to admit that they have been slammed because they don’t want to look silly.” Many businesses are now hiring full-time employees just to check phone bills. Gouging, Sliding, Jamming, and Fluffing “Gouging,” a scam directed at consumers, refers to companies that have undisclosed fees when calls are made from pay phones or hotel rooms. The FCC received 5,000 complaints in 1997; some charges were as high as $9.58 for a 2-minute call (Shiver, 1998). Pay phones are unregulated, though many states have established benchmark rates. “Sliding” occurs when an unauthorized carrier switches a specific call from the long-distance carrier. In most instances, companies take over toll calls that fall between local zones and long distance. Bell South Corporation coined the term “sliding” as a reference to customers who fail to read the fine print and sign up for services with-

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out knowing exactly what they are receiving (Fillion, 1999). “Jamming” was coined by MCI for roadblocks that are set up by a company to make it difficult to switch in-state long distance. US West has been accused of unilaterally applying PIC freezes to customers’in-state long-distance service. “Fluffing,” the newest scam reported by the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission, occurs when rates are increased without notification. Holding In the past year, held orders for phone services have received a significant amount of attention. “Holding” is a failure to provide installation service within the legally defined time period. Accusations of holding have been lodged primarily against US West. US West allegedly has a “Customer Not Educated” policy that withheld service information. The company also allegedly established a ranking program, “Gold, Platinum, and Bronze,” to provide preferential treatment based on profit. In Colorado, US West is accused of 70,000 held-order violations during the 16 months from January 1998 to April 1999. Complaints of holding also have been lodged in Washington, Oregon, and New Mexico. In January 2000, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission issued a $12.77 million fine against US West for held orders. In response, US West has decided to appeal the decision and has persuaded public utilities commissioners to review their calculations for a possible reduction of the fine. US West estimates that the company should be responsible for $6.3 million. At the other end of the spectrum, the Office of Consumer Counsel submitted a $17.3 million fine (Hudson, 2000). In Arizona, US West paid $1.6 million in 1996, $215,000 in 1997, $241,000 in 1998, and $1.5 million in 1999 for violations of the service quality plan. US West is engaged in a class-action lawsuit in Colorado related to its holding policy. The lawsuit names seven plaintiffs and estimates that as many as 220,000 customers may have been affected by the company’s inability to provide service. Lawyers for the plaintiffs estimate compensatory and punitive damages that could range from $327 million to $2.7 billion (Colden, 2000). US West denies the allegations that it misled customers and says that the company invested $873 million in 1999 to upgrade local services. REGULATION EFFORTS Regulation efforts primarily fall on state public utility commissions and the FCC. Some complaints are referred to state attorney generals. Regulation for many industries is less than satisfactory but remains the primary form of control (Geis & Jesilow, 1993). The ineffective nature of regulation is often


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related to technological, jurisdictional, legal, and organizational complexities (Braithwaite, 1993). Braithwaite (1993) noted that “given these realities, consistent criminal enforcement against known corporate law-breaking is an impossible aspiration” (p. 17). Companies, consumer advocates, and regulators, however, have taken an aggressive stance to curtail telecommunications fraud. Self-Regulation Many of the major telecommunications companies have taken measures to reduce the amount of fraud. AT&T issued what they called “bold new initiatives” to “eradicate slamming.” The plan curtails the use of independent sales agents, restricts resellers, and establishes a phone hotline to answer consumer complaints. In many cases, telemarketers were paid by the number of customer orders, which created the incentive to defraud. MCI now uses only inhouse telemarketers. In Colorado, the attorney general’s office and eight major phone companies drafted a code of conduct. The code puts forth a zero-tolerance policy against slamming and cramming. It places responsibility on the company for evaluating, investigating, and resolving complaints. Many people, however, believe that unethical and illegal behavior is unlikely to be stopped by voluntary self-regulation. A Colorado PUC official commented that the code “doesn’t say anything.” In January 1997, US West/Qwest began efforts to curtail cramming. The company now reviews every provider and product before allowing a service to be added to its local phone bills. US West severed billing relations for 14 services. A representative for US West explained that the incidents were not reported to the FCC: “We’re not a cop or a regulator. We’re not interested in determining intent [or] who’s at fault” (Tahmincioglu, 1999). Similarly, GTE Network Services’Wholesale Markets stopped billing for three companies and planned to initiate financial penalties against 11 companies for cramming. State Regulation State public utility commissions have taken the most dramatic actions to stop fraudulent practices. A comparison of slamming enforcement actions as of April 1998 shows that the FCC imposed $1.8 million in fines compared to state fines of $17.5 million (Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 1998). Many public utilities commissions are banning offenders from operating in their states. In California, for example, a company that illegally switched the long-distance service of thousands of customers in Orange and Los Angeles

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counties was ordered to stop doing business in the state. California Public Utilities Commission ordered a 40-month suspension for Total World Telecom after discovering that the company switched the carriers of 200,000 consumers, targeting Asians and Latinos. The company was required to refund at least $20 to each of the 32,000 state consumers who filed a slamming complaint. The president of the company, which operates in 40 other states and has annual revenues of about $50 million, said he never intended to defraud anyone and blamed the problem on independent marketing companies (Wagner, 1996). In 1998, California banned Brittan Communications International Corporation and ordered refunds of $702,000 to switched customers. The company was the subject of 35,000 complaints between September 1995 and October 1997 (“Telephone company banned in California,” 1998). Despite the restitution orders, customers rarely received refunds. Companies will avoid fines by filing for bankruptcy or shutting down. The Michigan Public Service Company takes slamming cases to formal administrative hearings. Each case takes about 6 months. A public service official explained that when they bring in a “little old lady in tennis shoes” or “one incompetent senior citizen” and “they cry on the stand, it’s a sure win.” The commission brought forth 56 cases in 1999; 40 reached settlements ranging from $500 to $9,000. Enforcement is difficult, and many public utility commissions have no jurisdiction over slamming and cramming. Regulators also are frustrated by their lack of power. A Colorado PUC official described efforts as a “guise of regulation” in an antiregulation state. Often, charges are referred to the attorney general’s office or the FCC. Much of the blame for slamming has been placed on resellers. Several states now require the registration of resellers, but if the company chooses not to sign up, no penalty is imposed. Federal Regulation The FCC has been criticized as ineffective and nonaggressive in their attempts to curtail telecommunications fraud. Despite an increase in the number and amounts of FCC-imposed fines, penalties often are an inadequate deterrence, particularly if companies see the fines as simply a cost of doing business (Fisse & French, 1985). The FCC has called for increasing enforcement actions, eliminating the profit motive, and educating consumers. The FCC may impose a standard fine for slamming up to $40,000 per incident. Federal regulatory power often is challenged by corporations. According to FCC regulations, the customer is released from payment responsibility for 30 days after the slamming occurred. AT&T, for example, is opposed to federal regulations that exempt victims from long-distance phone charges made


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during the period of unauthorized switch. Ironically, increased protection and enforcement may have forced unscrupulous resellers to target the business community. Third-party verification to verify switches does not apply to small businesses (Torres, 1997). DISCUSSION In 1998, a Senate subcommittee held hearings on the “exploding problem of telephone slamming in America.” The senators overseeing the hearings agreed that “deliberate slamming is like stealing, and it should not be tolerated” (Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 1998, p. 2). Senator Collins sarcastically asked, “So, we should send the slammers to the slammer, right?” Senator Durbin noted, “I think they [slammers] should be held just as accountable as the folks that [sic] are stealing hubcaps.” Public utilities commissions expect that opening local long-distance and local markets will increase incidents of slamming. Holding individuals responsible for corporate crime is a difficult proposition. In addition, the complexity of solving complaints hinders many efforts to combat telecommunications fraud. One incident represents a small amount of money to the consumer. No monetary amounts have been calculated that show the costs to consumers and companies. Corporations often are motivated by financial gain to engage in deceptive practices. As monopolies continue to grow and deregulation expands, telecommunications fraud is likely to increase. REFERENCES Bahr, S. (1997, November 15). Who’s slamming whom? American’s Network, 101, 12. Braithwaite, J. (1993). Transnational regulation of the pharmaceutical industry. In G. Geis & P. Jesilow (Eds.), The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: White-collar crime (pp. 12-30). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Colden, A. (2000, January 15). US West trial set for 2001. Denver Post, p. C2. Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. (1998). The exploding problem of telephone slamming in America (S. Hrg, 105-487, GPO 097100472). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Customer complaints on phone slamming, cramming seen rising. (1999, August 30). Wall Street Journal, p. B10. Fillion, R. (1999, March 7). Slam claims hard to confirm. Denver Post, pp. J1, J23. Fisse, B., & French, P. A. (1985). Corrigible criminals and unruly law. San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press. Geis, G., & Jesilow, P. (Eds.). (1993). The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: White-collar crime. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

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Harris & Associates. (1997). Telephone competition: A study of three markets [Online]. New York: Louis Harris & Associates. Available: www.nclnet.org/ telcomp.htm Hudson, K. (2000, March 15). Proposals for fine on US West differ. Rocky Mountain News, p. B4. Keller, J. J. (1998, April 23). Phoney billing: How a minister’s son discovered slamming and then disappeared. Wall Street Journal, p. A1. Krebs, J. (1997). US West’s monopoly game: A consumer report [Online]. Available: www.seanet.com/~westwatch/uswests.htm Maurer, M. (1995, May 5). Consumers decry long-distance telephone firms’ slamming. Knight-Ridder / Tribune Business News, p. 5. National Consumers League. (1997, November 20). Cramming press release [Online]. Washington, DC: Author. Available: www.natlconsumersleague.org Olgeirson, I. (1998, May 29). Small businesses feel phone pinch. Denver Business Journal, 49(39), A1. Rendleman, J. (1999, January 25). Businesses prey to phone slamming. PC Week, 16(4), 1. Robinson, E. A. (1998, March 16). I got slammed by AT&T. Fortune, 136(5), 34. Schiesel, S. (1999, December 22). Baby Bell about to become a long-distance pioneer. Denver Post, p. C4. Shiver, J. (1998, January 30). FCC moves to cut phone call price gouging. Los Angeles Times, pp. D1, D3. Tahmincioglu, E. (1999, January 7). Broad federal suit aims to stop cramming by local telephone companies. Knight Ridder / Tribune Business News, p. 6. Telephone company banned in California and refunds ordered. (1998, April, 13). Wall Street Journal, p. B6. Torres, V. (1997, September 10). Small firms are latest victims of phone switching. Los Angeles Times, p. D5. Vogelstein, F. (1998, May 4). Feds fine missing phone slammer. U.S. News & World Report, 124(17), 58. Wagner, M. (1996, December 13). PUC kicks phone firm out of state. Los Angeles Times, pp. B1, B6. Wagner, M. (1997, May 21). Regulators want phone firm to quit operating. Los Angeles Times, p. D1, D6.

Mary Dodge is an assistant professor of criminal justice at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver. Her recent work has appeared in Contemporary Issues in Criminology and in Courts and Justice. She is a coeditor, with Gilbert Geis, of the Lessons of Criminology. Her research interests include white-collar crime, fraud in assisted reproductive technology, juvenile informants, and women in the criminal justice system.

Journal Hindujaof / CORRELATES Contemporary Criminal OF INTERNET Justice /SOFTWARE November 2001 PIRACY

Correlates of Internet Software Piracy SAMEER HINDUJA Michigan State University Software piracy has become a significant problem for businesses and educational institutions, and as computer crime continues to proliferate in our Information Age, its causes and roots merit academic inquiry. This exploratory piece establishes the correlative and contributory factors in software pirating, specifically concerning types of Internet access and past experience with the unlawful duplication of computer CD-ROMs. An independent samples t test and a bivariate correlation matrix were used to empirically evaluate relationships between variables. The results of this study suggest policy aimed at combating the onset and perpetuation of unethical and illegal computing activity among students.

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oftware piracy among specific study populations such as business and computer science students has been the subject of previous studies, but these inquiries have been primarily descriptive in nature. Consequently, prior research has failed to satisfactorily establish possible situational or historical causes of the crime. One possible situational influence may be the broadband connectivity granted to students who reside in a university residential setting. A historical factor may be previous experience with pirating software on physical media—such as the duplication of program CD-ROMs. The primary goal of the current study is to determine whether software piracy in a university setting is correlated with the availability and inherent rapidity of a high-speed link to the Internet. The influence of this variable has not previously been addressed but is deserving of investigation as network pipelines and consequently online data transfer speeds are continually upgraded and augmented to meet the usage requirements of a growing popu-

The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and mentorship of Mahesh Nalla, Christina DeJong, and Christopher Maxwell. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sameer Hinduja, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, 560 Baker Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824-1118; phone: (517) 432-7160; fax: (517) 432-1787; e-mail: hindujas@ msu.edu. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 369-382 © 2001 Sage Publications

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lation of wired individuals. Piracy through traditional means—through the use of CD recording devices—is also analyzed as related to Internet piracy. Following a determination of the extant level of this crime, competent policy initiatives can be constructed and developed to curb the amount of illegitimate software that is being transferred and distributed by students over the university’s network pipelines. This study makes several useful contributions to the areas of criminal justice and computer crime research. Previous exploration into this area has not applied a criminological perspective to guide and steer the investigation. As such, it extends the research of criminal justice into an area little studied and works to fill the void of inquiry into deviance resulting from technological advances (in this case, the Internet). Furthermore, the work strives to engender useful policy solutions that universities can implement to curb high-tech crime on campuses. Finally, a latent objective is to spark additional interest in, and the future research of, all aspects of this illegality. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SOFTWARE PIRACY In previous studies, software piracy has been defined and operationalized to include the sharing and duplication of program floppy disks and the misappropriation of application licenses for networks (Cheng, Sims, & Teegen, 1997; Im & Van Epps, 1992; Rahim, Seyal, & Rahman, 1999; Reid, Thompson, & Logsdon, 1992; Simpson, Banerjee, & Simpson, 1994; Wong, Kong, & Ngai, 1990). In the past 5 years, however, additional forms of piracy have emerged as the media on which programs and games are primarily stored and sold has switched—from floppy disks, which are capable of holding 1.44 megabytes (MB) of information, to CD-ROMs, which typically hold 650-700 MB of data. These higher density discs allow for easier installations of complex and powerful applications and games, as well as more advanced computing in general. When CD-ROMs first arrived on the market, they were extremely costly to copy, and one needed specialized duplication hardware not easily accessible through retail channels. As the information technology (IT) industry boomed and the cost of personal computers dropped, however, CDrecording devices, or “burners” as they are informally called, have become available for as little as $100, making it quite simple for end users to duplicate commercially created CD-ROMs, as well as generate their own compilation CDs consisting of various application and game files. Other types of software piracy continuing in prevalence include the purchase of a single workstation license to use a program and subsequently installing it on multiple machines and the loading of new hard drives with unauthorized software by computer dealers (SPA Antipiracy Division’s Copyright Protection Campaign, 1998).

Hinduja / CORRELATES OF INTERNET SOFTWARE PIRACY

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As the definition of software piracy has changed, so too has the means by which piracy regularly occurs. High-speed connections to the Internet are now available at affordable prices for universities, corporations, small businesses, and other entities through the leasing of dedicated fiber optic or copper lines from a local or in-house telecommunications company. Furthermore, cable modems and digital subscriber lines (DSL) are currently being marketed to home computer users, offering high-speed links to the Internet at reasonable prices. According to a recent study by the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society, 55% of individuals in the United States have Internet access either at home or at work, and that percentage continues to increase (“Study of the Social Consequences of the Internet,” 2000). A growing proportion of individuals are using these dedicated connections— from 5 million in 1999 to 12 million in 2000 equipped with cable modem, DSL, or ISDN (integrated services digital network—a less prevalent and slower dedicated link) lines at home (Kelsey, 2001). Thus, technological advances such as the development of media with larger data storage capacity and a network infrastructure that allows for greater speeds in data transmission have redefined and broadened the preexisting conception of software piracy. They have ushered in a revolutionary paperless form of communication and file archival and a burgeoning of productivity for society as a whole but have also increased the frequency and prevalence of the unlawful distribution of software. Apart from this determinant, many individuals are being exposed to the seedier corners of the information superhighway, where pirates make “warez” (pirated software) available through easily navigated Web sites offering “point-and-click, one-stop-shopping to even the most novice of users” (“Internet Software Piracy,” 1998). A final impetus for the proliferation of piracy stems from the essential mechanics of the act—the transfer and distribution of software from a remote to local computer without personal communication, negotiation, or transaction, and with practically zero risk of detection. Some general statistics are useful in portraying the nature of the problem and in underscoring the necessity for research in this area. For instance, a survey commissioned by two antipiracy organizations found that losses from piracy were estimated to exceed $12 billion worldwide in 1999, with the United States and Canada comprising 26% of that total (Beruk, 2000). Furthermore, it is reported that piracy in the United States cost 109,000 jobs in 1998, $4.5 billion in wages, and nearly $991 million in tax revenue (“Colorado Governor Issues Executive Order,” 2000). It is argued that loss to the industry also occurs as piracy removes or decreases the incentive to research, develop, and produce innovative software of a high quality as perpetrators are able to misappropriate the fruits of another’s labor at no cost to themselves.

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Concerning the study population, the university setting has been considered by many to be a breeding ground for software piracy, perhaps because of the necessity to use computers (Cheng et al., 1997; Eining & Christensen, 1991; Im & Van Epps, 1991). Recently, the exponential growth of the Internet has become an essential fixture in the lives of so many individuals, further increasing the potential for pirating. In addition, the student body is arguably more curious and prone to engage in questionable behavior—such as cheating and plagiarism (Agnew & Peters, 1986; Buckley, Wiese, & Harvey, 1998; Crown & Spiller, 1998)—compared to those in lower education or in the “working world.” This particular group is targeted for analysis and subsequent policy development because it is important to speak to this penchant for dubious activities before students exit the sheltered collegiate environment. If a clear cognition of standards of ethical and lawful computing behavior is effectuated now, it is presumed that persons will be less likely to transgress following graduation and entrance into the professional arena. PRESENT STUDY In the current work, the first hypothesis is that high-speed online access in a university setting is positively correlated to Internet software piracy. This assumption is made because broadband connections greatly increase the delivery of data to and from one’s computer. In addition, their dedicated presence allows for continual operability any hour of the day. Having a fast online link in the privacy of one’s house, apartment, or dormitory room—coupled with the necessity of software use for research, papers, correspondence, projects for coursework, or other purposes—lends itself to a significant increase in computer and Internet usage. This increase consequently results in the amplified likelihood of encountering the occurrence of illegal activity on the Internet (such as software piracy) and the chance that an individual will become socialized or somewhat conditioned to condone and ultimately participate in this behavior. This conjecture will be validated or rejected through an independent samples t test and a bivariate correlation matrix to determine if those with high-speed connections pirate more than those who do not have such capabilities. The independent variable is whether the respondent used Ethernet (high-bandwidth local-area network), cable modem, or DSL connectivity to access the Internet. The second hypothesis is that Internet piracy is significantly correlated with past CD-ROM piracy, and the interrelationship of these variables will be ascertained through the aforementioned matrix. Some reasons for this supposition are as follows. Those with previous experience with pirated software


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will be familiar with the attendant rewards. They may be likely to displace such a practice to the networked environment to increase the variety of programs and interested participants available to them. Furthermore, the duplication of software is made easier by removing the need for physical media such as CD-ROMs when entire games and applications can be transferred for use to one’s computer in a simple and efficient manner. At the time of this writing, no previous research has addressed the validity of these relationships, despite their ostensible effect on the phenomenon. DATA AND METHODS A sampling frame was first constructed by selecting random disciplines in each of the colleges of a large Midwestern university. Then, classes were selected with the intent of obtaining a sample representative of the entire student body—freshmen, sophomores, juniors, and seniors. This was accomplished by purposively choosing courses of different levels (100, 200, 300, 400, etc.). The professors of 70 classes were initially contacted; however, only 30 responded positively and accommodated the request to survey their students. The classes were decidedly varied, ranging from Introduction to Political Science to College Algebra and from Money, Banking, and Financial Markets to Basic Biochemistry. An anonymous and voluntary questionnaire, developed to specifically measure software pirating attitudes and beliefs, was designed to gather the data required to analyze the relationships in this study. Software piracy is a controversial topic, and self-reporting instruments usually produce an underreporting of such deviant activities. Accordingly, questions were asked in as neutral a manner as possible to facilitate open, candid communication from the participants, as well as to avoid the predisposition of responses and any subsequent bias. Surveys were conducted in 25 classes between May and June 2000—the summer semester of the school year. A sample size of 507 was derived prior to data cleaning, resulting from an average of 20 students in each class. On listwise removal of cases with missing variables, the final sample size totaled 433 cases. As evidenced by Table 1, the majority of respondents in the sample were White (71.8%), female (53.5%), 21 years of age or older (70.6%), and either majoring in business (23.5%) or a discipline of the social sciences (34.3%). Annual income of the parents of respondents was expressed to be $50,000 or more by 69.8% of respondents. Despite the reasonably comfortable economic status of most families, though, three fourths (74%) of the students who participated in the study worked at least 10 hours a week.

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TABLE 1

Demographics of Sample of Midwestern College Students Regarding Measure of Software Pirating Attitudes and Beliefs (N = 507) Demographic Variable Gender Male Female Race White Asian Other Age 17 to 20 21 and older Educational level Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Graduate Discipline Social science Business Other Parental annual income $0 to $19,999 $20,000 to $29,999 $30,000 to $39,999 $40,000 to $49,999 $50,000 or more Employment (hours per week) 40 30 20 10 0

Percentage

46.5 53.5 71.8 10.3 17.9 28.5 71.5 1.8 4.7 30.6 59.8 3.2 34.3 23.5 42.2 4.6 4.2 7.3 14.1 69.8 14.4 17.4 28.8 13.4 26.0

Outcome Measure The primary dependent variable in this study, “Overall Online Pirating Behavior,” was a factor composed of five individual survey items (see Table 2). Varimax rotation was originally conducted on the following seven survey items:


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TABLE 2

Varimax Rotated Factor Pattern for Primary Dependent Variable of Sample of Midwestern College Students Regarding Measure of Software Pirating Attitudes and Beliefs (Loadings ≥ 0.65) Construct and Item

Factor Loading

Overall online pirating behavior How frequently do you upload/download pirated software to/from others (on average)? Number of mediums used to pirate software Degree of Hardcore Pirate How often in the past month have you pirated software? How often in the past year have you pirated software?

.674 .784 .778 .740 .806

NOTE: Eigenvalue = 2.873, reliability coefficient = .76.

1. How frequently do you upload/download pirated software to/from others (on average)? 2. Number of mediums used to pirate software. 3. Degree of Hardcore Pirate. 4. How often in the last month have you pirated software? 5. How often in the last year have you pirated software? 6. The majority (50%) of software on my computer is legitimately licensed. 7. At least one piece of software on my computer is not legitimately licensed.

The response options for the first item ranged from 0 to 31 or more times per week. Concerning the second item, mediums for transferring software included a Web browser, to/from the Usenet newsgroups, using an instant messaging program, using a chat program, logging into a file server to upload/download to/from others, and setting up a file server to allow others to do the same. An additive score ranging from 0 to 8 was created for “Degree of Hardcore Pirate,” which measured how deeply an individual was immersed in the pirating scene. This third item consisted of the following questions: “I know what warez is”; “I know what a .nfo file is”; “I know what 0-day means”; “I have set up a FTP server on my computer system to allow others to log in and upload/download pirated software to/from me”; “the majority of my file transferring takes place at night (11 p.m. to 7 a.m.)”; “I leave my computer on for extended periods of time (i.e., overnight) to transfer files”; “I have a personal account on one or more FTP sites”; and “I can find almost any piece of commercial software I might need on the Internet, either through friends or searching/browsing through file archives.” The fourth and fifth items of the dependent construct both had answer values ranging from 0 to 36 or more times. Finally, the sixth and seventh items, subsequently removed because they did not load high on one factor, had possible responses of “true”

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or “false.” Cronbach’s alpha for the five remaining items was .76, indicating moderate to high reliability (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). In the independent samples t test, the original seven survey items, the constructed measure of “Overall Online Pirating Behavior,” and a ninth dependent variable—“I have transferred at least one piece of pirated software to/from someone” (with possible values of “true” or “false”)—were included. Independent Measures A predictor variable measuring whether the respondent was equipped with broadband connectivity was “I use Ethernet, cable modem, or DSL connectivity in my dorm room, apartment, or house” (“true” or “false”). In the first analysis, those who answered affirmatively for this item were placed in the “High-Speed” group, and those who responded negatively were placed in the “Dialup” group. Variables measuring opportunity and access, previous piracy with CD-ROM duplication, and Internet pirating behavior were included in the second model to ascertain any correlative effects of one on another. Specifically, these items were as follows: “I use Ethernet, cable modem, or DSL connectivity in my dorm room, apartment, or house”; “I have bought/received/borrowed a copy of at least one software package on CDR” (recordable CD-ROMs); “I have burned/recorded at least one software package onto CDR”; “I have transferred at least one piece of pirated software to/ from someone”; “The majority (50%-plus) of software on my computer is legitimately licensed”; “At least one program/game on my computer is not legitimately licensed”; and “Overall Online Pirating Behavior.” RESULTS First, an independent samples t test was used to determine if the pirating activity of students who had high-speed Internet access differed from those who did not. Results are provided in Table 3. The sample means are higher for every piracy variable among those who have high-speed Internet access, indicating that respondents, so equipped, pirate software with greater incidence and frequency than those who are not. Assuming unequal variances, the t statistic for “At least one program/game on my computer is not legitimately licensed,” “How frequently do you pirate per week,” “Degree of Hardcore Pirate,” “I have transferred at least one piece of pirated software to/from someone,” “Number of mediums used to pirate software,” and “Overall Online Pirating Behavior” all were significant at the .05 level. Thus, the findings show support for the hypothesis that broadband connectivity increases the likelihood of online software piracy.


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TABLE 3

Independent Samples T Test: Dialup (D/U) Versus High-Speed (H/S) Internet Access and Piracy Variables of Sample of Midwestern College Students Regarding Measure of Software Pirating Attitudes and Beliefs Mean Dependent Variable

D/U

H/S

Mean Difference

t

How often in the past month have you pirated software? How often in the past year have you pirated software? The majority (50%) of software on my computer is legitimately licensed. At least one program/game on my computer is not legitimately licensed. How frequently do you pirate per week? Degree of hardcore pirate I have transferred at least one piece of pirated software to/from someone. Number of mediums used to pirate software Overall online pirating behavior

1.14 1.25

1.20 1.43

–.06 –.18

–.95 –1.94

.70

.77

–.07

–1.76

.41 1.37 1.15

.51 1.59 1.76

–.10 –.22 –.61

–2.03* –3.39** –3.26**

.28 .78 –.14

.46 1.39 .24

–.18 .61 .10

–3.79** –4.01** –3.48**

* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

A correlation matrix was next created with the predictor and outcome variables to discover which items were related and how strong of a relationship existed between those items. Use of broadband Internet access was included in the model and compared to the variables that measured piracy. As depicted in the matrix, high-speed connectivity was significantly related at the .01 level to illegally transferring at least one piece of pirated software and with the measure of “Overall Online Pirating Behavior.” This provides evidence that Ethernet, cable modem, or DSL Internet users are more likely to have participated in piracy, perhaps because of the easy accessibility and rapidity of a dedicated file-transferring pipeline. Moreover, the finding lends additional support to the aforementioned t-test analysis. As evidenced by Table 4, “I have burned/recorded at least one software package onto CDR”—a measure of traditional pirating activity—is significantly correlated to overall Internet piracy (r = .38). The coefficient of determination for that predictor is (.38)2, or .14. As a proportionate reduction of error statistic, it can be concluded that 14% of the variation in overall Internet piracy can be explained by, or attributed to, previous experience with the creation of pirated CD-ROMs. Unarguably, these correlations remain relatively weak, perhaps because of the amount of variation that must be explained. In

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TABLE 4

Bivariate Correlation Matrix for High-speed Access and CD-ROM Piracy of Sample of Midwestern College Students Regarding Measure of Software Pirating Attitudes and Beliefs 1 Opportunity variable 1. I use high-speed Internet access. Past piracy through physical media (duplicated CD-ROMs) variables 2. I have bought/received/borrowed a copy of at least one software package on CDR. 3. I have burned/recorded at least one software package onto CDR. Internet piracy variables 4. I have transferred at least one piece of pirated software to/from someone. 5. The majority (50%-plus) of software on my computer is legitimately licensed. 6. At least one program/game on my computer is not legitimately licensed. 7. Overall online pirating behavior

1.00

2

3

4

5

.11* .17** .18** .08

1.00

.44** .38** .06 1.00

6

7

.10*

.18**

.30** .22**

.40

.03

.21

1.00

.07

.31** .49**

1.00

.18**–.10*

1.00

.38

.25** 1.00

* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

fact, the trend throughout the bivariate correlation results is that in general, the independent and dependent variables are significantly related to each other; however, not much differentiation can be made. LIMITATIONS A few methodological issues merit attention. For one, although anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to research subjects, the veracity of the feedback received could not be ensured—an inherent negative characteristic of self-report studies. Nonrespondent bias may have occurred in that those who did respond might have been less likely to misapropriate software than those who did not respond (Seale, Polakowski, & Schneider, 1998). In addition, several variables (e.g., race, age, and year of studies) were highly skewed. The vast majority of the sample was White, of junior or senior class status, 21 years of age or older, and had parents who made more than $50,000


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annually. Although the disproportionate distribution of race and parental income in the sample mirrors the overall student population at this university, age and year of studies might have been more varied had the research occurred during the fall or spring semester of a school year. Fortunately, these logistic problems can be corrected quite easily in a future wave of study. A final note—this particular crime has been predominantly studied among college-aged individuals in a university setting. As such, additional research examining other populations might retrieve different results and would provide interesting material for comparative analyses. POLICY IMPLICATIONS This empirical examination substantiated the two previously specified hypotheses concerning the influence of high-speed online access and CDROM piracy participation on software theft over the Internet. These results suggest policy recommendations that could ultimately aid in reducing, if not eliminating, the illegal duplication of software applications and games by university students. How can students be reminded of the illegal nature of many computer crimes they might be inclined to commit? Perhaps a proviso in text can be called up on their computer screens the first time they register to use the dedicated Internet access in their residential halls. This would delineate the honorable behavior required while using the school’s resources and access to the Internet and remind users of the negative sanctions that will result from illegal behavior. A small, automatically executable file can even be written and installed on every user’s computer displaying a similar warning message at log-on concerning proper computer usage. Periodic mass emails sent to the student body may help to remind individuals that unethical and unlawful actions online will not be tolerated. Another idea would be to require the personal signature of all potential users of the university network and bandwidth—perhaps incorporated into the university application for enrollment form—to officially indicate an agreement to abide by virtuous computing standards. These strategies should reduce, to some degree, the erosion of accountability for unethical computing practices. The Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA) provides a sample policy statement for organizations to use and recommends that all users (faculty, staff, students) read and sign such a document to indicate agreement to adhere to the rules in place (Sample Corporate Policy Statement, 1999). Solomon and O’Brien (1990) found that nearly half of the students they surveyed had never heard a faculty member or administrator speak out against software piracy and that 25% had heard university personnel condone the unauthorized duplication of a program. Although the generalizability of

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these findings is as yet unproven, certainly faculty members have the ability to influence, consciously or unconsciously, the moral practices of their students to some degree. Perhaps it is necessary to require instructors and professors in all courses in which the use of a computer is expected to include in their syllabus a warning against the use of illegal software, as many have found it necessary to provide a similar warning against plagiarism. At the very least, professors of certain majors in which the use of computing resources is extremely high (engineering, computer science, graphics design, journalism) should emphasize the importance of complying with the school’s directives in this area. What punitive measures can be instituted to discipline transgressors and dissuade others from the same deviant path? As mentioned earlier, perhaps those who transgress codes of ethics in a university setting should be denied future use of Internet access on campus for a specified period of time. Although this would be difficult to monitor and enforce, the presence of such a sanction might deter potential offenders. DISCUSSION Advancements in information technology have allowed for improvements in the speed of communications, the accessibility of information and data files, and the increase in overall computing power to run processes previously unfeasible. Such technological progress has also opened the door to a multitude of antisocial behaviors. Specifically, the file-sharing capabilities of the Internet, attendant with high-speed access provided to university students, have greatly augmented the prevalence of the unauthorized distribution and downloading of copyrighted programs from various Web and archive sites. The current work has empirically identified two important contributive factors to piracy and suggests policy that university personnel can implement. It also provides further evidence of how proactive steps must be taken to curtail high-tech crime and serves as a basis for future study of the phenomenon. REFERENCES Agnew, R., & Peters, A.A.R. (1986, March). The techniques of neutralization: An analysis of predisposing and situational factors. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 13(1), 81-97. Beruk, P. (2000). Five years: $59.2 billion lost. The Software and Information Industry Association [Online]. Available: www.siia.net/sharedcontent/press/2000/ 5-24-00.html Buckley, M. R., Wiese, D. S., & Harvey, M. G. (1998, May-June). An investigation into the dimensions of unethical behavior. Journal of Education for Business, 73(5), 284-290.


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Carmines, E. G., & Zeller, R. A. (1979). Reliability and validity assessment. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Cheng, H. K., Sims, R. R., & Teegen, H. (1997, Spring). To purchase or pirate software: An empirical study. Journal of Management Information Systems, 13(4), 49-60. Colorado governor issues executive order on computer software piracy. (2000, March 25). Business Software Alliance [Online]. Available: www.bsa.org/bin/show. cgi?URL=pressbox/policy/952979724.html Crown, D. F., & Spiller, M. S. (1998). Learning from the literature on collegiate cheating: A review of empirical research. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(6), 683-700. Eining, M. M., & Christensen, A. L. (1991). A psycho-social model of software piracy: The development and test of a model. In R. Dejoie, G. Fowler, & D. Paradice (Eds.), Ethical issues in information systems (pp. 134-140). Boston: Boyd & Fraser. Im, J. H., & Van Epps, P. D. (1991, Summer). Software piracy and software security in business schools: An ethical perspective. Data Base, 22(3), 15-21. Im, J. H., & Van Epps, P. D. (1992). Software piracy and software security measures in business schools. Information & Management, 23(4), 193-203. Internet Software Piracy. (1998). Business Software Alliance [Online]. Available: www.nopiracy.com/internet_piracy_c.html Kelsey, D. (2001). High-speed Net access up 148 percent—Netratings. Newsbytes [Online]. Available: www.newsbytes.com/news/01/161676.html Rahim, M. M., Seyal, A. H., & Rahman, N. A. (1999). Software piracy among computing students: A Bruneian scenario. Computers and Education, 32, 301-321. Reid, R. A., Thompson, J. K., & Logsdon, J. M. (1992, Fall). Knowledge and attitudes of management students toward software piracy. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 33, 46-51. Sample Corporate Policy Statement. (1999). Software & Information Industry Association [Online]. Available: www.siia.net/piracy/programs/sftuse2.htm Seale, D. A., Polakowski, M., & Schneider, S. (1998, Jan.-Feb). It’s not really theft! Personal and workplace ethics that enable software piracy. Behaviour and Information Technology, 17(1), 27-40. Simpson, P. M., Banerjee, D., & Simpson, C. L., Jr. (1994). Softlifting: A model of motivating factors. Journal of Business Ethics, 13, 431-438. Solomon, S., & O’Brien, J. A. (1990, Spring). The effect of demographic factors on attitudes toward software piracy. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 40-46. SPA Antipiracy Division’s Copyright Protection Campaign. (1998). Software and Information Industry Association [Online]. Available: www.siia.net/piracy/ programs/backgrounder.htm Study of the Social Consequences of the Internet. (2000). Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society, Stanford University [Online]. Available: www. stanford.edu/group/siqss/Press_Release/Preliminary_Report.pdf Wong, G., Kong, A., & Ngai, S. (1990, November). A study of unauthorized software copying among post-secondary students in Hong Kong. The Australian Computer Journal, 22(4), 114-122.

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Sameer Hinduja is a doctoral candidate in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. His research interests include computer crime, corporate security, and criminological theory.

Journal Wright et ofal. Contemporary / TOP CRIMINALS/TOP Criminal Justice CRIMINOLOGISTS / November 2001

Top Criminals/Top Criminologists The Most-Cited Authors and Works in White-Collar Crime RICHARD A. WRIGHT Chicago State University

KEVIN M. BRYANT University of West Florida

J. MITCHELL MILLER University of South Carolina Numerous studies recently have appeared that identify the most-cited authors and works in the general criminology and criminal justice literature and in several specialty areas, although no previous citation study has specifically examined the white-collar crime literature. Through an analysis of 46 articles and textbooks appearing from 1990 to 1999 in the area of white-collar crime, we list the 62 most-cited authors and the 21 most-cited works. The lists of the most-cited authors and works in white-collar crime are compared to general lists taken from leading criminology and criminal justice journals and introductory textbooks. Our analysis shows that numerous influential authors and works in the specialty of white-collar crime have been overlooked by general citation studies of leading journals and textbooks.

I

n the past few years, numerous studies have identified the most-cited authors and works in the general criminology and criminal justice literature by examining leading journals (Cohn & Farrington, 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998) and introductory textbooks (Wright, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2001; Wright & Cohn, 1996). Citation analysis recently has been extended to the study of the most-cited authors and works in several

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Richard A. Wright, Department of Criminal Justice, Chicago State University, 9501 South King Drive, Chicago, IL 60628; e-mail: [email protected]. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 383-399 © 2001 Sage Publications

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research specialties, including corrections, criminological theory, critical criminology, women and crime studies, and police studies (Wright & Friedrichs, 1998; Wright & Miller, 1998, 1999; Wright & Rourke, 1999; Wright & Sheridan, 1997). To date, however, no study has examined the citation patterns in academic publications devoted to the area of white-collar crime. Through an analysis of 46 journal articles, research notes, and textbooks appearing in the area of white-collar crime published from 1990 to 1999, we report the 62 most-cited authors and the 21 most-cited works. The lists of the most-cited authors and works in white-collar crime are compared to the findings taken from citation studies of general criminology and criminal justice publications. Our data offer some insight into the pivotal concerns that guide research on white-collar crime. EXISTING RESEARCH Studies of the most-cited authors and works in criminology can be traced to Wolfgang, Figlio, and Thornberry’s (1978) Evaluating Criminology, a landmark examination of the citation patterns in all known journal articles and research books (3,690 publications) appearing in criminology and criminal justice from 1945 to 1972. Because Wolfgang et al. (1978) ignored textbooks, Shichor (1982) soon followed with an analysis of the most-cited authors in 20 introductory criminology textbooks published from 1976 to 1980. Recent studies of general citation patterns in criminology and criminal justice have been done by Cohn and Farrington (1994, 1996, 1998a, 1998b) and Wright (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001; Wright & Cohn 1996). Cohn and Farrington (1994, 1996, 1998a, 1998b) have identified the most-cited authors and works in leading periodicals. For example, the 53 most-cited authors in the annual Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (vols. 1 to 17) and the 75 mostcited criminology and criminal justice works in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) were ranked from 1979 to 1993 (Cohn & Farrington, 1996). From an analysis of six leading American criminology and criminal justice journals published from 1991 to 1995, Cohn and Farrington (1998a) ranked the 49 most-cited authors. Wright (1997, 2000, 2001) has reported the most-cited authors in introductory criminology and criminal justice textbooks. Studies have identified the following: (a) the 59 most-cited authors in 22 introductory criminology textbooks published from 1994 to 1998 (Wright, 2000), (b) the 31 most-cited authors in 23 introductory criminal justice textbooks published from 1994 to

Wright et al. / TOP CRIMINALS/TOP CRIMINOLOGISTS

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1998 (Wright, 2001), and (c) the 16 most-cited authors in 39 introductory criminology and criminal justice textbooks published from 1989 to 1993 (Wright, 1997). Citation studies have been criticized for a number of reasons (for a review of these criticisms, see Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998). For example, it is sometimes noted that these studies do not distinguish between positive and negative evaluations of cited works. Still, Cole’s (1975) thematic content analysis of citations to Robert K. Merton’s (1938) Social Structure and Anomie shows that the vast majority of citations to this famous essay elicited either a positive or a neutral response; only 6% of the citations were critical of Merton’s arguments. The consensus among citation researchers throughout the social sciences is that authors and works are seldom cited for the purposes of criticism (Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998). Studies that rely on the SSCI (e.g., Cohn & Farrington, 1996) have some special problems. For example, the SSCI indexes only a few of the many journals published in criminology and criminal justice. Citations in nonindexed journals are missing in these studies. Perhaps worse, the SSCI lists only first authors of works; publications with multiple authors are routinely tabulated incorrectly in studies that use the SSCI database. Citation studies of general criminology and criminal justice publications recently have been criticized for ignoring important contributions in particular research specializations (Wright & Friedrichs, 1998). For example, from an analysis of 81 journal articles, research notes, and textbooks devoted to criminological theory appearing from 1986 to 1995, Wright and Rourke (1999) identified the 50 most-cited authors and the 27 most-cited works. They found only modest associations between lists of the most-cited authors and works when leading criminology and criminal justice journals and introductory textbooks were compared to publications in criminological theory. Other citation research in the specialties of corrections (Wright & Miller, 1999), critical criminology (Wright & Friedrichs, 1998; Wright, Miller, & Gallagher, 2000), police studies (Wright & Miller, 1998), and women and crime studies (Miller, Wright, & Smith, 2000; Wright & Sheridan, 1997) have reported similar findings. White-collar crime is an important research area yet to be examined by citation analysts. We redress this neglect by reporting the 62 most-cited authors and the 21 most-cited works in recent academic publications devoted to white-collar crime. Our examination shows that previous citation studies largely overlooked the many important contributions of white-collar crime researchers. An analysis of citation patterns also discloses the key concerns that guide white-collar crime research.

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RESEARCH DESIGN To compile our lists of the most-cited authors and works, we began by analyzing all the articles and research notes in the area of white-collar crime that appeared in five periodicals—Crime & Delinquency, Criminology, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Justice Quarterly, and Law and Society Review—from 1990 to 1999.1 These journals were selected for our study because they were rated as the most influential academic periodicals in the general areas of criminology and criminal justice in two recent studies ranking the prestige of criminology and criminal justice journals (Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998; Williams, McShane, & Wagoner, 1995). Because the journals that we examined published only 39 articles/research notes dealing with white-collar crime from 1990 to 1999, we extended our 2 analysis to recent textbooks. Seven specialized textbooks in the area of white-collar crime appeared from 1990 to 1999: Albanese (1995), Coleman (1998), Friedrichs (1996), Green (1996), Rosoff, Pontell, and Tillman (1998), Simon (1999), and Simon and Hagan (1999). Citations to authors and to works were collected in the most recent editions of each of these books to 3 supplement our analysis of leading journals. In Cohn and Farrington’s (1994, 1996, 1998a, 1998b) studies of the mostcited authors and works in criminology and criminal justice journals, citations simply were tallied from the references at the ends of articles/research notes. Wright and his associates (Wright, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2001; Wright & Cohn, 1996; Wright & Friedrichs, 1998; Wright & Miller, 1998; Wright & Rourke, 1998; Wright & Sheridan, 1997), however, arguably have developed a more accurate but cumbersome and time-consuming means to count citations: Each mention of an author/work—in the text or in a substantive footnote—accompanied by a reference is counted as a citation. Because we wanted to measure the influence of authors and works using the most valid techniques, we followed the latter procedure. In most prior studies, self-citations have been a problem for researchers. Some analysts exclude these citations from their counts (Cohn & Farrington, 1994, 1996, 1998a, 1998b); others routinely include self-citations (Wright, 1995, 1997). Neither approach is entirely satisfactory: Excluding self-citations risks underestimating the influence of prolific writers, responsible for numerous publications examined in a study (in effect, these authors are ranked against others based on fewer publications). Including self-citations risks overestimating the influence of authors who are fond of citing their own work. We used a formula recently introduced to adjust for self-citations (Wright & Miller, 1998, 1999). C2 (the adjusted number of citations) is calculated as follows:


C2 = C1 +

387

C1 ( P2 ) , P1

where C1 is the total number of citations to an author in publications not written by the author, P1 is the total number of publications not written by an author that cite his/her work, and P2 is the total number of publications written by the author that contain self-citations. For all the publications that cite an author, this formula adjusts for self-citations by projecting the average number of citations the author receives in works that he/she did not write into the works that he/she wrote.4 We calculated adjusted citation scores for each extensively cited author who wrote at least one work examined in our study that contained a self-citation, although the adjusted scores were used to rank authors and works only when these estimates were lower than the actual counts that included self-citations.5 Recently, Cohn and Farrington (1996) have advocated the use of both incidence and prevalence measures to rank most-cited authors and works. Incidence is the total number of times that authors/works are cited in the publications examined by analysts; prevalence is the total number of publications that cite an author/work. Earlier citation studies (Cohn & Farrington, 1994; Wright, 1995, 1997; Wright & Cohn, 1996) ranked authors by incidence of citations, not prevalence. When citation studies ignore prevalence measures, they risk overestimating the influence of authors who are cited heavily but only in a handful of publications. Both incidence and prevalence measures were used to compile lists of the most-cited authors and works (see Tables 1 and 2). In our analysis of the most-cited works, we implemented a simple procedure to offset the influence of “citation outliers”; that is, works that were cited extensively in one or two publications, but nowhere else (incidence outliers), or works that were cited in a number of publications, but only once or twice in each (prevalence outliers). To be considered for our list of the most-cited works (Table 2), publications had to be cited at least 15 times (incidence) in at least five articles and books (prevalence). FINDINGS Table 1 reports the 62 most-cited authors in the 46 articles and textbooks dealing with white-collar crime that we examined. The table ranks these authors by incidence and prevalence of citations. In incidence, John Braithwaite ranked first with 238 citations, 30 and 42 citations ahead of Gilbert Geis (in second place) and Marshall B. Clinard (third place). Geis finished first in prevalence, with a total of 29 of the 46 articles/textbooks (or 63%) citing him at least once, followed by Edwin H. Sutherland (in second

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TABLE 1

The 50 Most-Cited Authors in Scholarly Publications Dealing with White-Collar Crime, 1990 to 1999 Ranka 1/3 2/1 3/5 4/6 5/7 6/2 7 / 29 8/8 9 / 18 10 / 4 11 / 19 12 / 24 13 / 27 14 / 14 15 / 30 16 / 38 17 / 10 18 / 31 19 / 9 20 / 11 21 / 15 22 / 20 23 / — 24 / — 25 / 44 26 / — 27 / 25 28 / — 29 / 2 30 / 22 31 / — 32 / — 33 / 28 34 / 16 35 / 17 36 / 34 37 / — 38 / 26 39 / 45 40 / — 41 / 32

Scholar John Braithwaite Gilbert Geis Marshall B. Clinard Peter Cleary Yeager Stanton Wheeler Edwin H. Sutherland Henry N. Pontell James William Coleman Travis Hirschi Francis T. Cullen Nancy Bode David Weisburd Michael R. Gottfredson Michael L. Benson Elin J. Waring Kitty Calavita William J. Maakestad Paul D. Jesilow Brent Fisse Susan P. Shapiro Donald R. Cressey Sally S. Simpson Toni Makkai D. Stanley Eitzen Nancy K. Frank Stephen Pizzo John L. Hagan Paul Muolo Gray Cavender Kenneth Mann David R. Simon Mary Fricker Richard Quinney Diane Vaughan Herbert Edelhertz Michael Levi Russell Mokhiber Christopher D. Stone Ronald C. Kramer Gary E. Reed William J. Chambliss

Incidence of Citationsb

Prevalence of Citationsc

238 208 196 187 162 155 112 107 106 104 101 95 90 85 75 75 72 65 62 58 58 57 54 52 51 51 50 50 49 48 48 47 45 44 42 41 40 39 39 39 38

26 29 22 22 21 28 11 20 14 25 14 13 12 16 11 9 17 11 18 17 16 14 6 7 8 7 13 7 14 14 5 7 12 16 15 10 6 13 8 3 11

(286)

(216)

(140)

(114) (132)

(82) (87) (82)

(75) (79)

(57) (50) (83)

(30)

(24)

(16) (21) (27) (15)

(13) (13) (19)

(17) (10)

(14) (15) (7)

(5)


389

TABLE 1 Continued Ranka 42 / — 43 / — 44 / — 45 / 35 46 / 46 47 / — 48 / 23 49 / 36 50 / 12 — / 13 — / 33 — / 37 — / 39 — / 40 — / 41 — / 42 — / 43 — / 47 — / 48 — / 49 — / 50

Scholar Mark J. Green Gray S. Green Raymond J. Michalowski Harold G. Grasmick Laureen Snider David O. Friedrichs Jack Katz J. C. Coffee, Jr. M. David Ermann Richard J. Lundman James F. Short, Jr. Austin Sarat Daniel S. Nagin Jeffrey H. Reiman Neal Shover Robert F. Meier Laura Shill Schrager Amitai Etzioni Charles R. Tittle Robert J. Bursik Ronald L. Akers

Incidence of Citationsb 38 37 36 35 35 35 34 34 33 32 28 29 27 23 22 20 13 26 33 30 22

(38)

(38)

Prevalence of Citationsc 6 3 3 10 8 3 14 10 17 17 11 10 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8

(5)

(9) (4)

a. The first rank is by the total number of citations to a scholar (incidence); the second rank is by the total number of articles/research notes citing the scholar (prevalence). In cases of ties in incidence of citations, ranks were determined by the prevalence of citations (and vice versa). b. When incidence scores were adjusted because of self-citations, the unadjusted scores (that include self-citations) are reported in parentheses. c. The first prevalence score excludes publications with self-citations; the second score (in parentheses) includes these publications. Prevalence rankings were based on the scores that excluded self-citations.

place, cited in 28, or 61%, of the publications) and John Braithwaite (third place, cited in 26, or 57%, of the publications). Eight authors—John Braithwaite, Marshall B. Clinard, James William Coleman, Francis T. Cullen, Gilbert Geis, Edwin H. Sutherland, Stanton Wheeler, and Peter Cleary Yeager—ranked among the top ten in both incidence and prevalence of citations. Travis Hirschi and Henry N. Pontell placed among the top ten in incidence of citations, although Brent Fisse and William J. Maakestad replaced them on the list of the ten most-cited authors in prevalence. Much similarity between incidence and prevalence measures is apparent when scanning through the rest of Table 1. Altogether, 38 authors who ranked

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among the most-cited in incidence also were among the most-cited in preva6 lence (for the two sets of names, r = .76). Authors who ranked similarly in incidence and prevalence (separated by five or fewer places) included Michael L. Benson, John Braithwaite, Marshall B. Clinard, James William Coleman, Gilbert Geis, Sally S. Simpson, Edwin H. Sutherland, Stanton Wheeler, and Peter Cleary Yeager. Still, a close examination of Table 1 shows the advantage of ranking the most-cited authors by incidence and by prevalence of citations. Those who ranked notably higher in incidence than in prevalence were Nancy Bode, Kitty Calavita, D. Stanley Eitzen, Nancy K. Frank, Michael R. Gottfredson, Travis Hirschi, Paul D. Jesilow, Toni Makkai, Henry N. Pontell, Elin J. Waring, and David Weisburd. Authors higher in prevalence than in incidence were Gray Cavender, Donald R. Cressey, Francis T. Cullen, Herbert Edelhertz, M. David Ermann, Brent Fisse, Jack Katz, Richard J. Lundman, William J. Maakestad, Kenneth Mann, Susan P. Shapiro, and Diane Vaughan. If this were a conventional citation study that primarily emphasized the measurement of the incidence of citations to the exclusion of prevalence, the influence of the former scholars would be exaggerated, whereas the contributions of the latter would by underestimated. A comparison of the most-cited authors in white-collar crime to recent general citation studies of criminology and criminal justice journals and textbooks showed little similarity in the authors who were extensively cited. For example, only ten names on Cohn and Farrington’s (1998a) list of the 49 mostcited authors in six leading American criminology and criminal justice journals appeared among the 62 most-cited authors in white-collar crime: Ronald L. Akers, Robert J. Bursik, Francis T. Cullen, Michael R. Gottfredson, Harold G. Grasmick, John L. Hagan, Travis Hirschi, Daniel S. Nagin, Edwin H. Sutherland, and Charles R. Tittle (r = .18). There were six matches—John Braithwaite, Brent Fisse, Michael R. Gottfredson, John L. Hagan, Travis Hirschi, and Charles R. Tittle—between Table 1 and Cohn and Farrington’s (1998b) 46 most-cited authors in four leading international criminology journals (r = .11). The most-cited authors in white-collar crime fared little better in citation studies of recent introductory criminology and criminal justice textbooks. For example, 16 of the 59 most-cited authors in Wright’s (2000) analysis of 22 criminology textbooks were extensively cited in white-collar crime publications: Ronald L. Akers, John Braithwaite, William J. Chambliss, Marshall B. Clinard, Donald R. Cressey, Francis T. Cullen, Gilbert Geis, Michael R. Gottfredson, John L. Hagan, Travis Hirschi, Henry N. Pontell, Richard Quinney, James F. Short, Jr., Edwin H. Sutherland, Charles R. Tittle, and Peter Cleary Yeager (r = .26). There was only one match—Francis T. Cullen—between the names in Table 1 and Wright’s (2001) list of the 31 most-


391

cited authors in 23 criminal justice textbooks (r = .02). These data clearly indicate that the important contributions of many prominent white-collar crime researchers have been overlooked in previous general citation studies of criminology and criminal justice journals and textbooks. Table 2 reports the 21 most-cited works, ranked by incidence and prevalence, in the 46 articles/textbooks that we examined. Two classic early contributions to the white-collar crime literature ranked as the most-cited works. Clinard and Yeager’s (1980) landmark study of administrative, civil, and criminal actions brought against 552 manufacturing, wholesale, retail, and service corporations in the United States placed first in incidence (with 99 citations). The inspiration for this work, Sutherland’s (1949/1983) pathbreaking original analysis of violations against the 70 largest manufacturing, mining, and mercantile corporations in the United States placed first in prevalence (cited in 23, or 50%, of the 46 publications). Further inspection of Table 2 shows that most of the influential publications in the area of white-collar crime fit into various conventional criminological research concerns relating to theories of criminal behavior, typologies of criminal behavior, and the social reactions to criminality. Three theoretical works ranked among the most-cited publications, including applications of self-control theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1987) and differential shaming (Braithwaite, 1989) as explanations of whitecollar criminality. Clinard, Quinney, and Wildeman’s (1994) general typology of criminal behavior systems appeared among the most-cited works, along with several important studies of specific property crimes committed by white-collar offenders: Cressey’s (1953/1971) early analysis of embezzlement, Geis’s (1967) review of antitrust cases in the electrical industry in the 1960s, and Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo’s (1991) account of the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s. In addition, Table 2 documents the growing research interest in crimes against persons that sometimes are committed by corporations indirectly (Hills, 1987), for example, through the manufacture of unsafe products in the pharmaceutical and automobile industries (Braithwaite, 1984; Cullen, Maakestad, & Cavender, 1987). Other extensively cited publications listed in Table 2 examine the affects of formal and informal social controls on white-collar crime. Three works deal primarily with the impact of criminal justice sanctions (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1991; Weisburd, Wheeler, Waring, & Bode, 1991; Wheeler, Weisburd, & Bode, 1982), although several other publications note the important influence of informal social controls (e.g., adverse mass media publicity and the organization of consumer protection groups) on white-collar offenders (Fisse & Braithwaite, 1983; Katz, 1980; Stone, 1975).

392


TABLE 2

The Most-Cited Works in Scholarly Publications Dealing with White-Collar Crime, 1990 to 1999 Ranksa 1/2

2/1

3/3

4/8 5 / 10

6 / 19

7/4

8/5

9/6

10 / 11

11 / 9

12 / 20

Work


Marshall B. Clinard and Peter Cleary Yeager, Corporate crime (1980) Edwin H. Sutherland, White-collar crime: The uncut version (1949/1983) James William Coleman, The criminal elite: Understanding white-collar crime (1998) Michael R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, A general theory of crime (1990) David Weisburd, Stanton Wheeler, Elin J. Waring, and Nancy Bode, Crimes of the middle classes: White-collar offenders in the federal courts (1991) Stephen Pizzo, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo, Inside job: The looting of America’s savings and loans (1991) Gilbert Geis, “The heavy electrical antitrust cases of 1961” (1967) Francis T. Cullen, William J. Maakestad, and Gray Cavender, Corporate crime under attack: The Ford Pinto case and beyond (1987) Christopher D. Stone, Where the law ends: The social control of corporate behavior (1975) John Braithwaite, Corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry (1984) Marshall B. Clinard, Richard Quinney, and John Wildeman, Criminal behavior systems: A typology (1994) John Braithwaite and Toni Makkai, “Testing an expected utility model of corporate deterrence” (1991)


99 (105)

18 (20)

83

23d

50

15d

46

10

38 (40)

8

38

5d

(9)

35

12

34 (42)

11 (14)

30

11

25

8

24

9d

24 (27)

5

(8)


393

TABLE 2 Continued Ranksa

Work


Donald R. Cressey, Other people’s money: A study in the social psychology of embezzlement (1953/1971) 14 / 7 Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The impact of publicity on corporate offenders (1983) 15 / 13 Travis Hirschi and Michael R. Gottfredson, “Causes of white-collar crime” (1987) 16.5 / 14.5 Stanton Wheeler, Kenneth Mann, and Austin Sarat, Sitting in judgment: The sentencing of white-collar criminals (1988) 16.5 / 14.5 Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd, and Nancy Bode, “Sentencing the white-collar offender: Rhetoric and reality” (1982) 18 / 16 Jeffrey H. Reiman, The rich get richer and the poor get prison: Ideology, class, and criminal justice (1998) 19 / 18 Stuart Hills, Corporate violence: Injury and death for profit (1987) 20 / 21 John Braithwaite, Crime, shame and reintegration (1989) 21 / 17 Jack Katz, “The social movement against whitecollar crime” (1980)


13 / 12

8d

23

20

11 (12)

20

8

20

7

20 (29)

7

18

(9)

7d

18

6

16 (23)

5

15

7

(8)

a. The first rank is by the total number of citations to the work (incidence); the second rank is by the total number of publications citing the work (prevalence). In cases of ties in incidence of citations, ranks were determined by prevalence of citations (and vice versa). b. When incidence scores were adjusted because of self-citations, the unadjusted scores (that include self-citations) are reported in parentheses. c. The first prevalence score excludes publications with self-citations; the second score (in parentheses) includes these publications. Prevalence rankings were based on the scores that excluded self-citations.

Table 2 permits a comparison of the most-cited works in white-collar crime by incidence and prevalence measures. Publications that were cited frequently in many places (high incidence and high prevalence)—including Clinard and Yeager (1980), Coleman (1998), Geis (1967), and Sutherland (1949/1983)—have had a deep and a broad impact on the white-collar crime

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literature. These are stellar works that were cited in many places and discussed extensively. Works that were cited frequently, but in fewer places (higher incidence, lower prevalence)—for example, Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) and Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo (1991)—have had a deep but a narrow impact on recent scholarship. These publications were cited somewhat selectively but tended to be discussed extensively when they were cited. Finally, Fisse and Braithwaite (1983) typically was cited only once or twice, but in many different places (lower incidence, higher prevalence). This publication appeared to have the enviable status of the “standard citation”: In effect, it is so well-known among white-collar crime researchers that it “needed no introduction” (and required little discussion). By comparing Tables 1 and 2, it is clear that some authors were cited heavily in the white-collar crime literature mostly because of one renowned work: Stuart L. Hills for Corporate Violence: Injury and Death for Profit (1987), Stephen Pizzo, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo for Inside Job: The Looting of America’s Savings and Loans (1991), Jeffrey H. Reiman for The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice (1998), and Christopher D. Stone for Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (1975). Others ranked among the 25 mostcited authors in either incidence or prevalence despite having no work listed in Table 2: Michael L. Benson, Kitty Calavita, Herbert Edelhertz, M. David Ermann, Paul D. Jesilow, Richard J. Lundman, Henry N. Pontell, Susan P. Shapiro, Sally S. Simpson, and Diane Vaughan. Finally, none of the 21 most-cited works in white-collar crime articles/ textbooks also rated among the 54 most-cited publications in Cohn and Farrington’s (1996) comprehensive study of crime and justice periodicals published from 1986 to 1993.7 This shows that importance of conducting citation studies in specialized areas: Apparently, little insight about specific influential works in white-collar crime can be gained through general studies of the leading criminology and criminal justice journals. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION Our study analyzed the most-cited authors and works in 46 scholarly articles, research notes, and textbooks appearing in the area of white-collar crime that were published from 1990 to 1999. From these publications, we identified the 62 most-cited authors and the 21 most-cited works, using both incidence and prevalence measures. When we compared these data to those from several general citation studies of recent leading criminology and criminal justice journals and introductory textbooks, we found few similarities in the most-cited authors and works.


395

There is one important caveat to our research: Lists of the most-cited authors and works are no more representative of a discipline or a specialty than the publications that researchers choose to analyze. We believe that the journals and the textbooks that we selected for our study reasonably reflect the current trends and developments in the academic literature on white-collar crime. We recognize, however, that if other types of publications were included in our research design—for example, research monographs and/or law reviews—our results surely would be different. Reporting the most-cited authors and works in the area of white-collar crime is important for several reasons. First, the comparisons of our findings with the citation studies of leading criminology and criminal justice journals and introductory textbooks suggest that many criminologists and criminal justicians may be unaware of the most influential authors and works in whitecollar crime. We hope that our study will help alert some researchers outside the area of white-collar crime about some of the most significant contributors and contributions inside this specialty. We also believe that our lists of the most-cited authors and especially the most-cited works will prove helpful for preparing reading lists in white-collar crime courses and for library acquisition purposes. Our list of the 21 mostcited works is a particularly useful resource for assessing the collections of university libraries. Criminology/criminal justice faculty who either teach white-collar crime courses or who are responsible for library acquisitions should see that these works are ordered by campus libraries. Finally, citation analysis can provide a better understanding of developments and changes in academic fields and specializations (Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998). For example, the current study offered some insight into several key topics that stimulate research on white-collar crime. As the first citation analysis in the area, we hope that our study will serve as a benchmark for assessing future trends in white-collar crime research. NOTES 1. Wright and Friedrichs (1992, p. 98) have defined white-collar crime as an array of demonstrably harmful activities, motivated by finance- related or power-related objectives and carried out by individuals, organizations, and institutions enjoying a generally respectable status, in the overall context (or behind the facade) of a legitimate administrative or occupational pursuit. It encompasses governmental (e.g., corruption), corporate (e.g., antitrust), and occupational (e.g., medical fraud) activities.

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We used this definition as our guideline to classify articles, research notes, and textbooks as part of the white-collar crime literature. 2. Altogether, 46 articles, research notes, and textbooks were analyzed in the study. We acknowledge that other recent citation studies in criminology and criminal justice (cf. Cohn & Farrington, 1998a, 1998b; Wright & Miller, 1998, 1999) examined more publications. The smaller numbers of works analyzed in our study reflects the neglect of white-collar crime research in criminology and criminal justice. 3. Recent readers/anthologies dealing with white-collar crime (e.g., Ermann & Lundman, 1996; Geis, Meier, & Salinger, 1995) were excluded from the study because these books often featured (a) works already examined in our search of leading journals or (b) classical early selections published well before 1990. We felt that the analysis of these books might bias the findings of our research. 4. To take one hypothetical example, say that Professor X cites himself/herself 150 times in 10 publications, and is cited 30 additional times in 15 other publications. The adjusted citation score (50) probably better estimates his/her impact on scholarship than either the extreme number of total citations when self-citations are counted (180) or the modest number of citations received in the publications that he/she did not write. 5. Because authors/works tend to be cited far more extensively in books than in articles, we separately calculated adjusted self-citation scores for the textbooks and for the articles. These scores were combined in the final data compilation. For readers who wish to rerank the most-cited scholars and works in our study by the unadjusted scores, we also report data including self-citations in Tables 1 and 2. 6. Throughout this study, we used a special formula devised by North, Holsti, Zaninovich, and Zinnes (1963) to calculate correlations on interval-level, nonlinear data. Here, r=

2( M 1 , M 2 ) , N1 + N2

where M1, 2 is the number of matches (or agreements) in two lists of data, whereas N1 + N 2 refers to the total population of the lists. Because this formula violates the conventional assumptions associated with correlation, we chose a cautious interpretation of our coefficients, foregoing the usual F tests of statistical significance used in correlation (Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998). 7. This comparison is limited to journals because to date, no study has analyzed the most-cited works in introductory criminology and criminal justice textbooks.

REFERENCES Albanese, J. S. (1995). White-collar crime in America. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Braithwaite, J. (1984). Corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry. Boston: Routledge Kegan Paul. Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.


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Braithwaite, J., & Makkai, T. (1991). Testing an expected utility model of corporate deterrence. Law and Society Review, 25, 7-40. Clinard, M. B., Quinney, R., & Wildeman, J. (1994). Criminal behavior systems: A typology (3rd ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. Clinard, M. B., & Yeager, P. C. (1980). Corporate crime. New York: Free Press. Cohn, E. G., & Farrington, D. P. (1994). Who are the most-cited scholars in major American criminology and criminal justice journals? Journal of Criminal Justice, 22, 517-534. Cohn, E. G., & Farrington, D. P. (1996). Crime and justice and the criminal justice and criminology literature. In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and justice: A review of research (pp. 265-300). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cohn, E. G., & Farrington, D. P. (1998a). Changes in the most-cited scholars in major American criminology and criminal justice journals between 1986-1990 and 1991-1995. Journal of Criminal Justice, 26, 99-116. Cohn, E. G., & Farrington, D. P. (1998b). Changes in the most-cited scholars in major international journals between 1986-1990 and 1991-1995. British Journal of Criminology, 38, 156-170. Cohn, E. G., Farrington, D. P., & Wright, R. A. (1998). Evaluating criminology and criminal justice. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Cole, S. (1975). The growth of scientific knowledge. In L. A. Coser (Ed.), The idea of social structure: Papers in honor of Robert K. Merton (pp. 175-220). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Coleman, J. W. (1998). The criminal elite: Understanding white-collar crime (4th ed.). New York: St. Martin’s. Cressey, D. R. (1971). Other people’s money: A study in the social psychology of embezzlement. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. (Original work published 1953) Cullen, F. T., Maakestad, W. J., & Cavender, G. (1987). Corporate crime under attack: The Ford Pinto case and beyond. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. Ermann, M. D., & Lundman, R. J. (Eds.). (1996). Corporate and governmental deviance: Problems of organizational behavior in contemporary society (5th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Fisse, B., & Braithwaite, J. (1983). The impact of publicity on corporate offenders. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Friedrichs, D. O. (1996). Trusted criminals: White collar crime in contemporary society. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Geis, G. (1967). The heavy electrical equipment antitrust cases of 1961. In M. B. Clinard & R. Quinney (Eds.), Criminal behavior systems: A typology (pp. 139151). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Geis, G., Meier, R. F., & Salinger, L. M. (Eds.). (1995). White-collar crime: Classic and contemporary views (3rd ed.). New York: Free Press. Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Green, G. S. (1996). Occupational crime (2nd ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Hills, S. L. (Ed.). (1987). Corporate violence: Injury and death for profit. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

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Hirschi, T., & Gottfredson, M. R. (1987). Causes of white-collar crime. Criminology, 25, 949-974. Katz, J. (1980). The social movement against white-collar crime. In E. Bittner & S. Messinger (Eds.), Criminology review yearbook (vol. 2, pp. 161-184). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review, 3, 672-682. Miller, J. M., Wright, R. A., & Smith, M. (2000). “Mostly male and American”: The reporting of women and crime scholarship in introductory criminology textbooks. The Justice Professional, 13. North, R. C., Holsti, O., Zaninovich, M. G., & Zinnes, D. A. (1963). Content analysis: A handbook with applications for the study of international crisis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Pizzo, S., Fricker, M., & Muolo, P. (1991). Inside job: The looting of America’s savings and loans (rev. ed.). New York: Harper Perennial. Reiman, J. H. (1998). The rich get richer and the poor get prison: Ideology, class, and criminal justice (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Rosoff, S. M., Pontell, H. N., & Tillman, R. (1998). Profit without honor: White-collar crime and the looting of America. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Simon, D. R. (1999). Elite deviance (6th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Simon, D. R., & Hagan, F. E. (1999). White-collar deviance. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Stone, C. D. (1975). Where the law ends: The social control of corporate behavior. New York: Harper and Row. Sutherland, E. H. (1983). White-collar crime: The uncut version. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Original work published 1949) Weisburd, D., Wheeler, S., Waring, E. J., & Bode, N. (1991). Crimes of the middle classes: White-collar offenders in the federal courts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wheeler, S., Mann, K., & Sarat, A. (1988). Sitting in judgment: The sentencing of white-collar criminals. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wheeler, S., Weisburd, D., & Bode, N. (1982). Sentencing the white-collar offender: Rhetoric and reality. American Sociological Review, 47, 641-659. Williams, F. P., McShane, M. D., & Wagoner, C. P. (1995). Differences in assessments of relativeprestige and utility of criminal justice and criminology journals. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 19, 301-324. Wolfgang, M. E., Figlio, R. M., & Thornberry, T. P. (1978). Evaluating criminology. New York: Elsevier. Wright, R. A. (1995). The most-cited scholars in criminology: A comparison of textbooks and journals. Journal of Criminal Justice, 23, 303-311. Wright, R. A. (1997). The most-cited scholars in criminology and criminal justice textbooks, 1989 to 1993. The Justice Professional, 10, 199-213. Wright, R. A. (2000). Recent changes in the most-cited scholars in criminology: A comparison of textbooks and journals. Journal of Criminal Justice, 28, 117-128. Wright, R. A. (2001). Recent changes in the most-cited scholars in criminal justice textbooks. Journal of Criminal Justice, 29.


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Wright, R. A., & Cohn, E. G. (1996). The most-cited scholars in criminal justice textbooks, 1989 to 1993. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24, 459-467. Wright, R. A., & Friedrichs, D. O. (1992). White-collar crime in the criminal justice curriculum. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 2, 95-119. Wright, R. A., & Friedrichs, D. O. (1998). The most-cited scholars and works in critical criminology. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 9, 211-231. Wright, R. A., & Miller, J. M. (1998). The most-cited scholars and works in police studies. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 21, 240-254. Wright, R. A., & Miller, J. M. (1999). The most-cited scholars and works in corrections. The Prison Journal, 79, 5-22. Wright, R. A., Miller, J. M., & Gallagher, P. (2000). Citations to critical criminologists in introductory criminology textbooks. The Justice Professional, 13, 125142. Wright, R. A., & Rourke, J. (1999). The most-cited scholars and works in criminological theory.In W. S. Laufer & F. Adler (Eds.), Advances in criminological theory (vol. 8, pp. 493-512). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Wright, R. A., & Sheridan, C. (1997). The most-cited scholars and works in women and crime publications. Women & Criminal Justice, 9, 41-60.

Journal BOOK REVIEW of Contemporary Criminal Justice / November 2001

BOOK REVIEW

Community Policing in a Community Era: An Introduction and Exploration. By Quint Thurman, Jihong Zhao, and Andrew L. Giacomazzi. Roxbury, 2001, 322 pages. Halfway through Community policing in a community era: An introduction and exploration, the authors discuss the way in which typical police academics foster a “we versus them” attitude among recruits that is the opposite of what community policing requires. This occurs when standard training focuses on the unworthiness of citizens (criminals and victims alike) based on the supposed hazard they pose to officers. As the authors state in chapter 8: “Despite the fact that official statistics refute the highly risky nature of police work, academy training tends to place a heavy emphasis on the dangerousness of police work” (pp. 170-171). This reminded me of my 1982 academy in which, on the first day of instruction, our defensive tactics instructor pretended to be a citizen and directed one of my fellow recruits to conduct a pat search of the instructor’s clothing. After the recruit finished his search, the instructor turned toward the recruit, pulled an overlooked gun from his own back pocket, and “shot” the recruit point-blank. Though the gun was a starter pistol, the instructor’s message came through with a bang: You cannot trust anybody. After that informative experience, I suddenly felt in danger policing a city in which I had previously felt perfectly safe. It took a decade of experience as a police officer before I was comfortable talking to the average citizen without assuming a tactical stance. Indeed, a consistent theme throughout Community Policing in a Community Era is that the way in which departments police cannot be separated from their organizational culture. Police agencies organized for the political era policed by a certain method; redesigned professional law enforcement departments in the 20th century operated entirely differently; and now those agencies intent on community policing must find a third way, based on a less hierarchical, more participatory organizational structure and culture. Unfortunately, many, if not most, agencies still seem stuck in the professional bureaucratic mode. Community Policing in a Community Era aptly describes agencies struggling to embrace, often tentatively, community policing, and how the professional structure, with its bureaucratic layers of authority and its emphasis on crime control, stifles those very qualities necessary in police organizations and personnel for community policing to thrive. Yet, establishing that community policing is not only desirable but possible, the book is spotted throughout with successful community policing efforts in various cities across the nation. The first chapter opens with a real-life example of community policing in a small Washington town and provides a useful definition of community policing. Chapter 2 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 400-402 © 2001 Sage Publications

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explains how British policing influenced the professional model prevalent in the United States today, whereas chapter 3 defines the concept of community. Chapter 4 focuses on change, explaining from theoretical and organizational perspectives how police agencies evolved from the political era to the professional era, and concludes that however slowly, police departments are moving toward the community era. Chapter 5 explores environmental factors thought to spark organizational change, including crime rates and trends, political pressures, and expectations of the public in regard to the level and types of services desired. Examples of successful community policing efforts in four cities end chapter 6, with the authors concluding that community policing is for real. Chapter 7 examines how the organizational environment affects the implementation of community policing. Strong, visionary leadership at the top is seen as a key to implementing change, whereas middle managers must facilitate and organize instead of acting primarily as agents of control, as is usually true under the professsional or bureaucratic models. Chapters 8 and 9 are the heart of the book, demonstrating that the personnel and organizational structure of a police department must change before its style of service changes. Recruitment, selection, and training methods conducive to the implementation of community policing are examined in chapter 8, whereas chapter 9 explains why organizational culture, reward systems, and job design must encourage employee empowerment if the creativity so crucial to community policing is to thrive. Chapter 10 points out that although uniformed personnel typically believe that citizens want them to catch or crack down on certain types of criminals, what local residents usually desire from the police is a focus on ameliorating the signs and symptoms of social disorder, such as speeding cars and noisy neighbors. Strategic planning, community assessment, collaborative problem-solving partnership, and community engagement are the primary processes seen by the authors as crucial to bridging this gap to successfully implement community policing. Chapter 11 discusses various measurements available for evaluating the effectiveness of community policing strategies. In spite of the claim by hundreds of agencies across the United States to have implemented community policing, very few departments have conducted scientific evaluations to determine the actual effectiveness of such efforts. Chapter 12 reminds us that any move toward community policing is dependent on not just the police, but the community as well. The difficulty of community mobilization is viewed by the authors as the chief external obstacle to effective community policing. Ironically, areas in which poverty and unemployment are rife are the most difficult to mobilize but are also the neighborhoods most in need of community involvement. Documented methods are described whereby even relatively small groups within such communities can collaborate with police to curb drug dealing, prostitution, and other street crimes so damaging to the social order in those neighborhoods. The closing chapter looks at community policing and where it is headed. In spite of two decades of discussion, programs, and effort, the authors see community policing as a form of organizational change still at the initiation stage. After examining a number of forces at work for and against community policing, the authors conclude that

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although police departments will continue to make programmatic responses to the need for change that the external environment demands, community policing still has a way to go before it is institutionalized. But, we do think it is headed in a forward direction. (p. 210) For college students looking forward to a future in policing, the most important implication of the book is that to make community policing effective, police departments and their officers must change their world view. Community policing affords officers a chance to solve problems from start to finish and encourages relationships with citizens not based primarily on enforcement stops and calls for service. Instead, it focuses on positive interactions between officers and citizens likely to foster mutually favorable impressions, in which both groups are seen as powerful and willing forces of social order. Community Policing in a Community Era will provide the student with a good sense of what community policing is, as well as a realistic sense of just how far most police agencies have to go before fulfilling community policing’s full potential. — Dennis Graham Milpitas Police Department, San Jose State University

Journal INDEX of Contemporary Criminal Justice / November 2001

INDEX to JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE Volume 17 Number 1 (February 2001) 1-80 Number 2 (May 2001) 81-204 Number 3 (August 2001) 205-300 Number 4 (November 2001) 301-412 Authors: BALL, CAROLYN, “Rural Perceptions of Crime,” 37. BERDAHL, TERCEIRA, see Kingsnorth, R. BIBES, PATRICIA, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Columbia, a Case Study,” 243. BLADES, CARRIE, see Kingsnorth, R. BOULEY, EUGENE E., JR., and TERRY L. WELLS, “Attitudes of Citizens in a Southern Rural County Toward Juvenile Crime and Justice Issues,” 60. BROCK, DEON, MIKE COPELAND, ROBERT F. SCOTT, JR., and PHILLIP ETHRIDGE, “Rural Policing in the Midwest: An Examination of Dissimilar Regions and Drug Offending,” 49. BRYANT, KEVIN M., see Wright, R. A. CHESNEY-LIND, MEDA, and VICKIE V. PARAMORE, “Are Girls Getting More Violent? Exploring Juvenile Robbery Trends,” 142. COHEN, NIGEL J., “Nonlawyer Judges and the Professionalization of Justice: Should an Endangered Species Be Preserved?” 19. COPELAND, MIKE, see Brock, D. DODGE, MARY, “Slams, Crams, Jams, and Other Phone Scams: Competition, Crime, and Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry,” 358. EDBERG, MARK C., “Drug Traffickers as Social Bandits: Culture and Drug Trafficking in Northern Mexico and the Border Region,” 259. ELLSWORTH, THOMAS, see Olson, D. E. ETHRIDGE, PHILLIP, see Brock, D. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 403-406 © 2001 Sage Publications

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FRENCH, LAURENCE ARMAND, “Explaining Criminals and Crime: Essays in Contemporary Criminological Theory, by Raymond Paternoster and Ronet Bachman,” 194. FRENCH, LAURENCE ARMAND, “Native American Rights: Current Controversies, edited by Tamara L. Roleff,” 71. GARTRELL, JOHN, see Weinrath, M. GRAHAM, DENNIS, “Community Policing in a Community Era: An Introduction and Exploration, by Quint Thurman, Jihong Zhao, and Andrew L. Giacomazzi,” 400. HINDUJA, SAMEER, “Correlates of Internet Software Piracy,” 369. KASSEBAUM, GENE and DUANE K. OKAMOTO, “The Drug Court as a Sentencing Model,” 89. KINGSNORTH, RODNEY, RANDALL C. MACINTOSH, TERCEIRA BERDAHL, CARRIE BLADES, and STEVE ROSSI, “Domestic Violence: The Role of Interracial/Ethnic Dyads in Criminal Court Processing,” 123. LIDDICK, DON, “Political Fund-raising, Patron-Client Relations, and Organized Criminality: Two Case Studies,” 346. LÓPEZ, ANGELINA, see O’Day, P. MACINTOSH, RANDALL C., see Kingsnorth, R. MARQUEZ, STEPHANIE A., “Editorial Comment,” 83. MASON, KAREN A., see Van Wyk, J. MCCORMACK, ROBERT J., “Editorial Comment,” 207. MILLER, J. MITCHELL, see Wright, R. A. O’DAY, PATRICK, “The Mexican Army as Cartel,” 278. O’DAY, PATRICK, and ANGELINA LÓPEZ, “Organizing the Underground NAFTA: Fayuqueros and El Arreglo,” 232. OKAMOTO, DUANE K., see Kassebaum, G. OLSON, DAVID E., RALPH A. WEISHEIT, and THOMAS ELLSWORTH, “Getting Down to Business: A Comparison of Rural and Urban Probationers, Probation Sentences, and Probation Outcomes,” 4. OLSON, DENISE, “No Safe Haven Stories of Women in Prison, by Lori B. Girshick,” 73. PALOMBO, BERNADETTE JONES, “Profit Without Honor: White Collar Crime and the Looting of America, by Stephen M. Rosoff, Henry N. Pontell, and Robert Tillman,” 196. PARAMORE, VICKIE V., see Chesney-Lind, M. ROSENMERKEL, SEAN P., “Wrongfulness and Harmfulness as Components of Seriousness of White-Collar Offenses,” 308. ROSSI, STEVE, see Kingsnorth, R. SALINGER, LARRY, “Editorial Comment,” 305. SCOTT, ROBERT F., JR., “Editorial Comment,” 3. SCOTT, ROBERT F., JR., see Brock, D. SHELLEY, LOUISE, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition,” 213.

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VAN WYK, JUDY, and KAREN A. MASON, “Investigating Vulnerability and Reporting Behavior for Consumer Fraud Victimization: Opportunity as a Social Aspect of Age,” 328. VIGORITA, MICHAEL S., “Prior Offense Type and the Probability of Incarceration: The Importance of Current Offence Type and Sentencing Jurisdiction,” 167. WEINRATH, MICHAEL, and JOHN GARTRELL, “Specific Deterrence and Sentence Length,” 105. WEISHEIT, RALPH A., see Olson, D. E. WELLS, TERRY L., see Bouley, E. E., Jr. WRIGHT, RICHARD A., KEVIN M. BRYANT, and J. MITCHELL MILLER, “Top Criminals/Top Criminologists: The Most-Cited Authors and Works in WhiteCollar Crime,” 383.

Articles: “Are Girls Getting More Violent? Exploring Juvenile Robbery Trends,” ChesneyLind and Paramore, 142. “Attitudes of Citizens in a Southern Rural County Toward Juvenile Crime and Justice Issues,” Bouley and Wells, 60. “Correlates of Internet Software Piracy,” Hinduja, 369. “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition,” Shelley, 213. “Domestic Violence: The Role of Interracial/Ethnic Dyads in Criminal Court Processing,” Kingsnorth et al., 123. “The Drug Court as a Sentencing Model,” Kassebaum and Okamoto, 89. “Drug Traffickers as Social Bandits: Culture and Drug Trafficking in Northern Mexico and the Border Region,” Edberg, 259. “Editorial Comment,” Marquez, 83. “Editorial Comment,” McCormack, 207. “Editorial Comment,” Salinger, 305. “Editorial Comment,” Scott, 3. “Getting Down to Business: A Comparison of Rural and Urban Probationers, Probation Sentences, and Probation Outcomes,” Olson et al., 4. “Investigating Vulnerability and Reporting Behavior for Consumer Fraud Victimization: Opportunity as a Social Aspect of Age,” Van Wyk and Mason, 328. “The Mexican Army as Cartel,” O’Day, 278. “Nonlawyer Judges and the Professionalization of Justice: Should an Endangered Species Be Preserved?” Cohen, 19. “Organizing the Underground NAFTA: Fayuqueros and El Arreglo,” O’Day and López, 232. “Political Fund-raising, Patron-Client Relations, and Organized Criminality: Two Case Studies,” Liddick, 346. “Prior Offense Type and the Probability of Incarceration: The Importance of Current Offence Type and Sentencing Jurisdiction,” Vigorita, 167. “Rural Perceptions of Crime,” Ball, 37.

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“Rural Policing in the Midwest: An Examination of Dissimilar Regions and Drug Offending,” Brock et al., 49. “Slams, Crams, Jams, and Other Phone Scams: Competition, Crime, and Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry,” Dodge, 358. “Specific Deterrence and Sentence Length,” Weinrath and Gartrell, 105. “Top Criminals/Top Criminologists: The Most-Cited Authors and Works in WhiteCollar Crime,” Wright et al., 383. “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Columbia, a Case Study,” Bibes, 243. “Wrongfulness and Harmfulness as Components of Seriousness of White-Collar Offenses,” Rosenmerkel, 308.

Book Reviews: “Community Policing in a Community Era: An Introduction and Exploration, by Quint Thurman, Jihong Zhao, and Andrew L. Giacomazzi,” Graham, 400. “Explaining Criminals and Crime: Essays in Contemporary Criminological Theory, by Raymond Paternoster and Ronet Bachman,” French, 194. “Native American Rights: Current Controversies, edited by Tamara L. Roleff,” French, 71. “No Safe Haven Stories of Women in Prison, by Lori B. Girshick,” Olson, 73. “Profit Without Honor: White Collar Crime and the Looting of America, by Stephan M. Rosoff, Henry N. Pontell, and Robert Tillman,” Palombo, 196.

Author Guidelines Manuscript Submission Requirements All manuscripts submitted for review must conform to the guidelines provided in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (fourth edition). The length of articles should be approximately 7 to 12 doublespaced typewritten pages (excluding tables, figures, and references). The author’s name, title, name of office, institutional affiliation with complete address, acknowledgements, research grant numbers, and so forth, should appear on the cover page of the manuscript. To ensure anonymity during the manuscript review process, the author’s name must not appear in subsequent pages of the article. All articles must be written in English, and as far as practical, avoid slang and highly technical terminology. An abstract of approximately 100 words and a brief biographical sketch that includes the author’s current affiliation, research interest(s), and recent publications must accompany the manuscript. If the manuscript has been presented before a group, include the date, location, and audience. Four (4) photocopies should be submitted. Please enclose a postcard or a stamped self-addressed envelope for acknowledgement of manuscript receipt. Articles will not be returned. Every effort will be made to notify authors of editorial decisions within 2 months of manuscript receipt. Final manuscripts must be submitted on disk; please specify word processing program and whether IBM or Macintosh. Disks will not be returned. Figures and line drawings must be submitted in camera-ready form. Manuscripts must be sent to the appropriate guest editor. Book reviews should be sent to the book review editor-elect: Sam Torres, Criminal Justice, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower Blvd., Long Beach, CA 90840; phone: 562-985-5134; e-mail: [email protected]. Correspondence regarding suggested themes, style guide requests, and other inquiries should be sent to Chris Eskridge, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588-0630; phone: 402-472-6755; fax: 402-4726758; e-mail: [email protected]. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 17 No. 4, November 2001 407 © 2001 Sage Publications

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Themes and Editors of Forthcoming Issues 2002—Volume 18 #1 Juvenile Justice and the New Millennium. Suman Kakar, Criminal Justice Program, Florida International University, Miami Campus, EC 5439, Miami, FL 33199; phone: (305) 348-5992; e-mail: [email protected]. #2 Social Capital and Criminal Justice. Mark E. Correia, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Reno 89557; phone: (775) 784-6164; fax: (775) 784-6230. #3 Sexuality, Law, and Justice. Henry F. Fradella, The College of New Jersey, Department of Law and Justice, P.O. Box 7718, Ewing, NJ 08628-0718; phone: (609) 771-2442; fax: (609) 637-5141; e-mail: [email protected]. #4 Organized Crime XI: An International Perspective. John Z. Yang, California State University, Long Beach, Department of Criminal Justice, 1250 Bellflower Blvd., Long Beach, CA 90840. 2003—Volume 19 #1 Youth Courts. Vanessa Garcia, Department of Criminal Justice and Sociology, Elmira College, 1 Park Place, Elmira College, NY 14901; phone: (607) 735-1925. #2 Criminal Procedure Issues. Craig Hemmens, Department of Criminal Justice Administration, Boise State University, Boise, ID 83275; phone: (208) 426-3251; e-mail: chemmens@ boisestate.edu.

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Call for Papers Scholars are invited to submit manuscripts for a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice on “Sexuality, Law, and Justice.” It will focus on gay-, lesbian-, bisexual-, and transgendered-related issues in the criminal justice system. If you have written or intend to write a paper on any of these topics, please consider submitting your manuscript for review. The manuscript must not have been published elsewhere or be under consideration by any other publisher. Please submit papers for consideration no later than December 10, 2001. For additional information, please contact Henry F. Fradella, J.D., Ph.D., Guest Editor, The College of New Jersey, Department of Law and Justice, P.O. Box 7718, Ewing, NJ 08628; phone: (609) 771-2271; email: [email protected].

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