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Forward to democracy or back to authoritarianism? The attitudinal bases of mass support for the Russian election protests of 2011–2012 a

Paul Chaisty & Stephen Whitefield

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Department of Politics and International Relations , University of Oxford , Oxford , UK Published online: 18 Jun 2013.

To cite this article: Paul Chaisty & Stephen Whitefield (2013): Forward to democracy or back to authoritarianism? The attitudinal bases of mass support for the Russian election protests of 2011–2012, Post-Soviet Affairs, DOI:10.1080/1060586X.2013.807605 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.807605

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Post-Soviet Affairs, 2013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.807605

Forward to democracy or back to authoritarianism? The attitudinal bases of mass support for the Russian election protests of 2011–2012 Paul Chaisty* and Stephen Whitefield Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Two UK-based political scientists present the results of an original survey they conducted in Russia soon after the presidential elections of 2012. The survey examines the interaction between mass attitudes toward the causal triggers of protest during the 2011–2012 electoral cycle and underlying political attitudes regarding the preferred alternatives to a hybrid regime (both more democratic and more authoritarian). They find that supporters of the protests were not stronger advocates of a democratic transition; on the contrary, they were more likely to support authoritarian leadership and ethno-nationalism. This finding leads to a discussion of whether one of the major constraints on elite-mass mobilization in Russia is the authoritarian direction such mobilization might entail. Keywords: Russia; hybrid regimes; protest; elections; democracy; authoritarianism

Much attention in recent years has been devoted to what have become known as “hybrid regimes,” including those in parts of the former Soviet Union, which combine democratic and authoritarian elements. One of the regime’s characteristics is the existence of elections without democracy or electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006; see also Gill 2012), in which, unlike “nonhybrid” authoritarian systems such as the Soviet Union before Mikhail Gorbachev, multiple parties compete and, crucially, incumbents can be defeated when popular protest against the manipulated nature of such elections results in the ousting of the regime. In this sense, hybrid regimes are unstable, in part because they sustain actors (parties) and processes (elections) that can create conditions for change. However, the nature of the changes produced by successful opposition forces in hybrid regimes is uncertain. Elections can bring about democratic change, but they can also re-establish hybrid regimes, or bring about even more fundamental authoritarian reversals. The existence of varied possible outcomes of anti-regime protest and mobilization in hybrid regimes – democratic transition, authoritarian revanche, re-established hybridity – makes perfect sense. If the existing system is the negative anchor against which change should be sought, opposition forces in hybrid regimes face choices about the direction of political change. Elites may well seek to mobilize popular grievances by arguing that the blame lies in the failure of hybrid regimes to complete the democratic transition, so “forward to

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] q 2013 Taylor & Francis


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P. Chaisty and S. Whitefield

democracy” is certainly one possibility. But anti-hybrid regime elites may equally make arguments about the deficiencies of “existing democracy” and seek to mobilize on “back to authoritarianism.” In short, the inherent instability of hybrid regimes may cut politically in both democratic and authoritarian directions. In analyzing the likely trajectory of opposition in hybrid regimes, the ideological base of support for protest is therefore a central factor. Although electoral fraud and other contextual factors may account causally for the timing of protest, the nature of the support for regime change – democratic or authoritarian – is contingent upon the attitudinal foundations of support for protest. In analytical terms, it is the interaction between the triggers of protest (electoral fraud plus other contextual grievances) and mass attitudes toward the preferred regime alternatives that shape choices about the ideological direction of changes that result from protest. Although elite-level action is crucial to overcome the collective action problems that face opposition forces in authoritarian regimes, it is self-evident that defection at the elite level can only occur when there is a belief that support can be mobilized at the mass level. We contend that it is important to understand the nature of this support for change when analyzing the dynamics of electoral protest. The Russian example of protest during the 2011 –2012 electoral cycles provides an opportunity to examine political dynamics in hybrid regimes. Although the Russian protests took place in the absence of significant elite defection – a fact that of course may explain why protest has to date failed to dislodge the regime – they still allow us to address directly the attitudinal basis of support for anti-regime protest. And, in that context, by analyzing the ideological and grievance bases of protest support, we hope to cast light on the constraints that mass mobilization might impose on the direction of any successful anti-regime movement in Russia. Had elite defection occurred, in other words, would electoral challengers have found united mass opinion and electoral success in “forward to democracy” or in “back to authoritarianism”? Drawing on an original survey that we designed, which was conducted in Russia soon after the presidential elections of 2012, we examine how mass attitudes toward the causal triggers of protest during the 2011– 2012 electoral cycle (opposition to electoral fraud and other significant contextual factors, notably, Vladimir Putin’s decision to seek a third term as president) interacted with underlying political attitudes about preferred regime alternatives: democratic and authoritarian. We find that the supporters of the protests were no more likely to be advocates of a democratic transition; on the contrary, they were more likely to be supporters of authoritarian leadership and ethno-nationalism. This leads to the important political possibility that one of the major constraints on elite-mass mobilization in Russia is the authoritarian direction that might entail. Electoral protest in hybrid regimes In the growing literature on explanations for anti-regime protest in hybrid regimes – much of which is based on the experience of the colored revolutions in the former Soviet Union – particular emphasis is placed on the causal role of elections


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(Hale 2005; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Schedler 2006; Tucker 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010; Radnitz 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2010; Koesel and Bunce 2012; Morse 2012). In this literature, it is argued that elections provide elites who had previously colluded with the regime with the opportunity to challenge the authorities. The involvement of elites is thought to be crucial because they have the resources (parties) to overcome the problems of organizing collectively in authoritarian regimes. Mass mobilization then takes place with challengers tapping into popular grievances against authoritarian behavior (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006) or against resentments caused by factors that are not necessarily democratic in orientation – economic crisis (Haggard 2000; Pei and Adesnik 2000; Reuter and Gandhi 2010), corruption (Seligson 2002; Tucker 2007), and nationalism (Kuzio 2012). The still-dominant authoritarian rulers often resort to electoral fraud to maintain their democratic claims to rule, which then provokes further elite and mass protest enhanced by conditions that are specific to electoral protest (Tucker 2007). The outcome at that point is uncertain, but there are frequent examples of challengers successfully using elections to achieve a change in power. In addition to some cases in which democratic transition and consolidation are then completed, there are others in which hybrid regimes are subsequently re-established and even (e.g., in Georgia) successfully re-challenged. The anti-regime protests that occurred in Russia in late 2011 and early 2012 bore some of the hallmarks of this model of electoral protest. On 4 December 2011, elections took place to the lower house of the Russian parliament (the State Duma) amid widespread allegations of electoral fraud. Serious irregularities were reported by local and international observers, and the Central Electoral Commission received over 1500 complaints (“Svedeniya” 2012). Examples of ballot stuffing went viral on social media networks, and other techniques of electoral rigging, such as “carousel voting” (in which busloads of pro-regime voters were taken to cast their votes in different polling stations), were reportedly used by the supporters of the regime to preserve the parliamentary majority of the governing party, United Russia. Accusations of electoral fraud were not new in Russia. Opposition parties accused the authorities of malpractice in the 2007 parliamentary contest and staged a parliamentary walkout in October 2009 in protest at voter fraud in regional elections. There was also little evidence to suggest that the scale of fraud was any greater in 2011 than in previous elections. However, the mass reaction in 2011 was unprecedented. In a series of demonstrations organized between the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections in March 2012, tens of thousands of Russians took to the streets of Moscow and other major cities. Crucially, the mass perception of fraud was also much greater in December 2011 than it had been in previous elections. Research by the Levada polling agency found that the percentage of respondents who believed the elections to be honest fell from 60% in 2007 to 35% in 2011; in contrast, the percentage of respondents who viewed the elections as dishonest increased from 20% to 45% across the two elections (Gudkov et al. 2012, 27).


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A number of factors contributed to the shift in public perception. Vladimir Putin’s announcement 3 months ahead of the elections that he would run for president in March 2012 was highly controversial. The incumbent president, Dmitry Medvedev, was entitled to run for another full term, and Putin had already served two terms as president (2000– 2004 and 2004 – 2008), and although Putin was entitled constitutionally to run for the presidency after an interregnum as prime minister (2008– 2012), the decision was interpreted by his critics as further evidence of the manipulated nature of Russian politics. Moreover, for many “liberal” supporters of the regime, Putin’s decision to return ended their hope that a second Medvedev presidency would deliver the political and economic modernization that they desired. The fact that Putin’s third term would also last for 6 years, under constitutional amendments which came into force on 31 December 2008,1 compounded this pessimistic outlook. The December 2011 parliamentary elections also took place in the context of falling support for the governing party, United Russia. According to most polling agencies, the party struggled to raise its support throughout 2011, despite receiving the regime’s full backing, and an effective campaign to discredit the party of “crooks and thieves” was waged by the opposition. This campaign, which was spearheaded by the anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, drew on social grievances about corruption and the overconcentration of political power associated with the rule of Vladimir Putin. These grievances had been exposed by the global financial crisis (2008– 2009), which undermined confidence in the regime’s resource-fueled path of economic development (see Chaisty and Whitefield 2012). Even with the alleged voting irregularities, United Russia failed to gain a nationwide majority of the vote in the December ballot, and only just held on to its parliamentary majority. Therefore, insofar as the protests that followed the December elections were triggered by electoral fraud, they resembled anti-regime protests in other hybrid regimes, in particular the color revolutions that have taken place elsewhere in the post-communist world. The protestors who took to the streets of Moscow and other major cities in sub-zero temperatures called for a rerun of the December elections and the resignation of the head of the Central Electoral Commission, Vladimir Churov. The opposition to electoral fraud also appeared to be fueled by latent grievances against the Putin regime. However, unlike the events in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), the protestors did not rally around leaders who had previously served in the regime. The clumsy management of Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin did lead to the resignation of long-serving Minister of Finance, Alexei Kudrin, who joined the protestors; the opposition leadership also included Mikhail Kasyanov, who had been the prime minister during Putin’s first administration; however, these individuals did not provide a realistic alternative to Putin in elite circles, had no electoral support,2 and lacked credibility among the street protestors. Moreover, elite figures within the official opposition who competed in the elections distanced themselves from the street protests. This was illustrated by the cautious position taken by Sergey Mironov, the former speaker of the Federation


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Council and leader of one of the main beneficiaries of the anti-regime mood, the Just Russia party. In any event, the leadership of the protest was dispersed among individuals who were either associated with existing opposition forces or were relatively new on the political scene. The December elections did not produce the elite contestation witnessed elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Although there were clear tensions between supporters of Putin and Medvedev, the split within the tandem Putin – Medvedev leadership, which was strongly desired by many antiregime democratic forces, did not take place either before or after the Duma elections. But, despite the absence of elite defection, it is still vital to know what was the attitudinal basis of mass support that did exist for electoral protest. Did the trigger of electoral fraud and its interaction with contextual grievances lead to protest by individuals who favored a democratic or anti-democratic alternative to the status quo? The answer to this question might not only help us to understand the political direction that Russia could have taken had elite defection occurred but might also suggest reasons why it did not, inasmuch as pro-democratic elites may well have been hesitant about the ideological character of the mobilized masses. In the remainder of this article, we seek to address this question by proposing a three-stage framework for analyzing the attitudinal basis of mass support for postelection anti-regime protests. (1) Attitudinal and ideological: At the first stage, of course, we know that many citizens in electorally authoritarian regimes are simply anti-regime – those who support genuinely opposition parties, who disagree at the level of principle with the economic or political systems – and would likely support anti-regime protest under any circumstances. But, as we note earlier, the ideological direction of anti-regime protest support in hybrid regimes is potentially ambiguous; it may come from those who support democracy or from those who support full-blown authoritarianism. (2) Triggering mechanisms and events: At the same time, as attitudes and political values may generate support for protest, we also anticipate that there will be additional factors that trigger protest support, in particular, given theories and evidence about instability in hybrid regimes, electoral fraud, and constitutional manipulation, as well as grievances with corruption and failures by the authorities to respond to crisis events. (3) Interactions between attitudes and triggers: At the final stage, we may expect that attitudes and trigger mechanisms may interact to lead to greater protest support among certain political groups. Democrats, for example, may find electoral fraud or constitutional manipulation even more motivating than others to support protest. From a democratic normative perspective, moreover, anti-regime mobilization by democrats against fraud would be desirable. But, given the ambiguous nature of hybrid regimes, we must allow for the alternative possibility, that electoral fraud is also motivating to those who find the pretense of democracy undesirable. Data and analysis Our interest, theoretically and empirically, is to consider the factors that affect the willingness of citizens to support anti-regime protest and, crucially, to understand


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the attitudinal orientation of this support: democratic or authoritarian. We operationalize the bases of support for anti-regime protest using data drawn from a 2012 nationally representative survey of Russians, which we designed after the December 2011 parliamentary elections (see Appendix 1). Our survey was conducted in Russia soon after the presidential elections of March 2012. Our dependent variable is attitudes toward the December protests, in which we asked respondents to select from one of five response categories to the following statement: “The protest meetings in Moscow and other cities against the results of the December 2011 elections to the State Duma were justified.” The response categories were ordered on a scale from “entirely disagree” to “entirely agree.” The distribution of the responses is summarized in Table 1. As is evident, 47% of the respondents agreed with the statement that the protests were justified. This result is comparable with research conducted by other Russian polling agencies at this time.3 Against this strong level of support for anti-regime protest, however, is a sizeable group of people (19%) who express opposition and a large group (34%) who is in the neither/nor category. How then do our various explanations fare in accounting for differences between these five categories of respondents? As noted earlier, we consider these questions empirically in a three-stage framework that seeks to explain support for anti-regime protest: (1) attitudinal and ideological; (2) triggering mechanisms and events; and (3) interactions between attitudes and triggers. To recap the argument made earlier, we know that many citizens in hybrid systems are likely to be antiregime – to support genuine democracy or for that matter genuine authoritarianism – and would likely support anti-regime protest under any circumstances. We are also aware from the large literature on political attitudes in post-Soviet Russia (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1996; Whitefield 2009) that many if not all of the attitudinal bases of support for anti-regime protest were already in place in Russia – support both for democracy and authoritarian systems, support for and opposition to the market economy, widespread perceptions of state corruption, and prevalent nationalism. In a sense, to look at the effects of triggers, therefore, we need to control for these ideological stances, but even so it is also substantively important to see which ideological direction – democratic or authoritarian – is most associated with support for anti-regime protest. Moreover,

Table 1. Distribution of responses to the statement: “The protest meetings in Moscow and other cities against the results of the December 2011 elections to the State Duma were justified.” Response Entirely disagree Disagree Neither/nor Agree Entirely agree Total Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012.

Frequency

Percentage

73 160 405 315 253 1206

6.1 13.3 33.6 26.1 21.0 100.0

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we may also expect that attitudes and trigger mechanisms may interact to lead to a greater protest support among certain political groups. We, therefore, operationalize each of our three stages using data drawn from our survey. Each variable is measured using five-point agree/disagree scales ranging from strong support/agreement to opposition/disagreement. (1) Attitudes and ideology Democratic ideals: Tell us, please, what do you think about the idea that a democracy, in which multiple parties compete for power, is the best system for governing Russia? Economic ideals: And what do you think about the idea that a market economy, in which there is private property and economic freedom for entrepreneurs, is the best system for Russia? Ethno-nationalist attitudes (two-item scale): Jews in Russia today have too much power and influence. There are too many Gypsies in Russia. Authoritarian preferences: It will be worthwhile to support a leader who could solve the main problems facing Russia today even if he overthrew democracy. Attitudes towards corruption: How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe-taking is among politicians in Russia? (2) Triggering mechanisms and events Electoral fraud: The official results of the elections to the State Duma of December 2011 did not accurately reflect how citizens of the Russian Federation voted. Putin’s decision to seek a third presidential term: The President of Russia should not hold this office for more than two terms in total. Global financial crisis: How would you rate the performance of the government and the President in running the economy in the period since the global financial crisis of 2008– 2009? (3) Interactions We then created interaction terms for each of the attitudinal and triggering mechanisms. Only those of substantive significance are reported below.

In addition, because we are likely to find that views of anti-regime protest are conditioned by views of the incumbent regime, we also include a control for past vote for the governing party, United Russia. Finally, because the social characteristics of protest supporters are substantively important – young protesters in Moscow may be more threatening to the regime than older citizens in the provinces – we include further variables for social class, education, age, state employment, and metropolitan (Moscow/St Petersburg) residence in each of our models, and discuss important effects of each. Where significant we also create interaction terms of these controls with each of the trigger variables.


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We present the results of each of the models in the tables that follow. We first consider the effects of the attitudinal and ideological variables plus sociodemographic controls; then we add the triggering mechanisms; and finally, we add the interaction effects. Because our dependent variable, support for protest, had five response categories ranging from very positive to very negative, ordered logistic regression analysis was used to regress the effects of each of our predictors and controls. We therefore also provide estimates of the substantive effects of the significant variables in the form of estimates of the change in the predicted probability that respondents will “entirely agree” with the statement that the postelection protests were justified at each value of the independent variables, holding all other variables at their means. Table 2 presents the first set of regressions in which we can see the effects of the ideological and attitudinal predictors on support for protest plus demographic controls and incumbent support, and Table 3 presents the impact of each significant predictor on the probability that a respondent will entirely agree with the protests. Considering the demographic and incumbent effects first, there is not surprisingly a very significant effect for support for the governing party, United Russia, in reducing support for protests (see Table 2). Indeed, those voting for other parties are 11% more likely to entirely agree with the protests, controlling for all other factors (see Table 3). We also see very significant effects for metropolitan residence (Moscow/St Petersburg) where people are 34% more likely to entirely agree with protest. However, it is notable that even controlling for metropolitan and incumbency effects there remain highly significant effects for political attitudes and ideology. Crucially, there is no evidence at all that support for protest is motivated by democratic or liberal political views. Those holding democratic ideals, for example, are no more Table 2. Ordered logistic regression coefficients for the factors influencing support for post-election protests. Attitudes toward The idea of democracy The idea of the free market Ethno-nationalistic ideas Anti-democratic leader Corruption

2 0.009 0.088 0.301*** 0.254*** 0.293***

Social and demographic variables Middle class Education Metropolitan State-employed Youth

2 0.194 2 0.019 1.694*** 2 0.089 0.089*

United Russia voter Pseudo r-squared N

2 0.934*** 0.090 1206

Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012. *p , 0.05; ***p , 0.001.

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Table 3. Effects of significant predictors on the likelihood that respondents will “entirely agree” with the statement that the post-election protests were justified.


Category 0 1 2 3 4 5

Nationalism

Anti-democratic leader

Corruption

0.17 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.26

0.02 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.27

0.06 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.21

Metropolitan

United Russia supporters

0.14 0.48

0.21 0.10

Note: Expressed as predicted probabilities. Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012.

likely than those who disagree with democracy as an ideal system to support protest (see Table 2). The same is true for those who approve of the market system. But, in the reverse ideological direction, we see strong significant effects for those who adhere to ethno-nationalist views (Jews have too much power and influence and there are too many Gypsies in Russia) with those who strongly agree with these statements (category 5) being 18% more likely to strongly support protest than those who simply “disagree” (category 2) (see Table 3). The effect is even stronger for those who hold authoritarian attitudes and would support the overthrow of democracy if a leader could solve the country’s problems, with those who strongly agree being 25% more likely to support protest than those who strongly disagree (see Table 3). We find no support therefore for the protest against the hybrid regime having a clear democratic or liberal complexion. At the same time, however, we do see significant independent impact on support for protest from those who perceive the existing political system as corrupt, with a 15% increase in support for protest when there are strong corruption perceptions (see Table 3). But perceptions of corruption may clearly cut both ways in a hybrid regime, either for democracy as a means of cleaning it up or in favor of authoritarianism. Again, our results point much more strongly to the latter possibility than to the former. We next introduce the trigger variables. Essentially, we are interested to know whether over and above the “usual suspects” – political orientations and views of the incumbent regime – there are significant effects on the likelihood of supporting anti-regime protest that arise because of how citizens viewed the 2011 elections and Putin’s decision to run for a third term. We are also interested to know whether there were additional effects of perceptions on how the authorities have dealt with the global financial crisis. Because views of these triggers may be correlated, we first introduced them into the regressions singly (models 1–3 in Table 4) before including all together (model 4). Again, the impact of each trigger on the probability of being a strong supporter of protest is presented in Table 5. The results, importantly, make little difference to the effects of the attitudinal and demographic predictors discussed earlier, which all remain significant at least until the full model 4, though even then there remains a strong effect for support

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Table 4. Ordered logistic regression coefficients for the factors influencing support for the post-election protests.


Models

1

2

3

4

2 0.007 0.150* 0.112* 0.202*** 0.245***

2 0.010 0.102 0.303*** 0.261*** 0.264***

2 0.041 0.093 0.184** 0.189*** 0.137*

2 0.030 0.150* 0.077 0.175*** 0.131*

Social and demographic variables Middle class 2 0.143 Education 2 0.089 Metropolitan 1.086*** State-employed 0.105 Youth 0.101*

2 0.127 2 0.029 1.601*** 2 0.093 0.085*

2 0.261* 2 0.047 1.103*** 2 0.036 0.100*

2 0.159 2 0.098 0.755*** 0.120 0.114**

2 0.579***

2 0.821***

2 0.579***

2 0.350**

Attitudes toward The idea of democracy The idea of the free market Ethno-nationalistic ideas Anti-democratic leader Corruption

United Russia Triggers Electoral fraud Global financial crisis Putin’s third term

1.275***

Pseudo r-squared N

0.218 1206

0.959***

1.086*** 0.135 0.670***

0.167 1206

0.253 1206

0.375*** 0.098 1206

Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012. *p , 0.05; **p , 0.01; ***p , 0.001.

for an authoritarian leader (see Table 4). The triggers, we conclude, are not simply proxies for these attitudes but do indeed appear to be further bases on which Russians judge the validity of protest activity. And the effects are very strong. In line with the expectations from the existing literature on hybrid regimes, perceptions of electoral fraud are particularly important in generating protest support with perceptions of fraud increasing support for the statement that the protests were justified from 1% to 65% in model 1 and from 1% to 51% in model 4 (see Table 5). There are similarly strong effects for opposition to Putin’s third Table 5. Effects of the political and economic triggers on the likelihood that respondents will “entirely agree” with the statement that the post-election protests were justified. Category 1 2 3 4 5

Electoral fraud Model 1 (Model 4) 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.65

(0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.15) (0.51)

Note: Expressed as predicted probabilities. Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012.

Global financial crisis Model 2 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.28

Putin’s third term Model 3 (Model 4) 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.45

(0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.24)

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Table 6. Ordered logistic regression coefficients for the factors influencing support for the post-election protests.


Models 1

2

3


2 0.009 2 0.170 0.414* 0.701*** 0.141

2 0.177 0.130 0.436* 0.470** 0.046

2 0.245 2 0.024 0.509** 0.558** 0.088


2 0.123 2 0.110 1.07*** 0.094 0.096*

2 0.131 2 0.027 1.606*** 2 0.079 0.082*

2 0.264* 2 0.055 1.082*** 2 0.045 0.088*

United Russia

2 0.532***

2 0.798***

2 0.564***

Triggers Electoral fraud Global financial crisis Putin’s third term Interaction effects: Democracy £ electoral fraud Nationalism £ electoral fraud Anti-democratic leader £ electoral fraud Corruption £ electoral fraud Free market £ electoral fraud Democracy £ global financial crisis Anti-democratic leader £ global financial crisis Nationalism £ global financial crisis Corruption £ global financial crisis Free market £ global financial crisis Democracy £ Putin’s third term Nationalism £ Putin’s third term Anti-democratic leader £ Putin’s third term Corruption £ Putin’s third term Free market £ Putin’s third term Pseudo r-squared N

1.588*** 0.275 1.218*** 2 0.005 2 0.081 2 0.150*** 0.030 0.101 0.056 2 0.072 2 0.044 0.080 2 0.010 0.057 2 0.083 2 0.101* 0.007 0.033 0.225 1206

0.099 1206

0.172 1206

Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012. *p , 0.05; **p , 0.01; ***p , 0.001.

term, and like perceptions of electoral fraud it continues to have a substantive independent impact even when included in the full model 4 (see Table 4). We also see some effect of the global financial crisis in model 2.


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We next turn to the ways in which attitudes and triggers may interact to enhance or reduce support for protest activity. Although the earlier analysis showed that there was no significant direct effect of holding democratic ideals on support for protest, might it be that among those who hold democratic ideals perceptions of electoral fraud (or opposition to Putin’s third term) intensified support for protest? Or, vice versa, although we found that those who might support an authoritarian leader were more likely to support protest, were they even more likely to do so when they perceived electoral fraud? The results of these analyses, in which we interact each of our attitudinal variables with each of our triggers, in turn, are shown in models 1–3 in Table 6. What is notable is that although the direct effects are almost unchanged, there is a general absence of any significant interaction effects. Democrats, for example, are not more likely to Table 7. Ordered logistic regression coefficients for the factors influencing support for the post-election protests. Models 1

2

3


2 0.016 0.144* 0.122** 0.199*** 0.244***

2 0.0136 0.104 0.296*** 0.252*** 0.266***

2 0.032 0.081 0.189** 0.178*** 0.139**


2 0.140 2 0.087 2 1.612* 0.122 2 0.088

2 0.139 2 0.025 0.253 2 0.086 0.259

2 0.266* 2 0.045 2 3.723*** 0.004 0.171

United Russia

2 0.590***

2 0.813***

2 0.557***

Triggers Electoral fraud Global financial crisis Putin’s third term Interaction effects: Youth £ electoral fraud Metropolitan £ electoral fraud Youth £ global financial crisis Metropolitan £ global financial crisis Youth £ Putin’s third term Metropolitan £ Putin’s third term Pseudo r-squared N Source: Authors’ survey data, March 2012. *p , 0.05; **p , 0.01; ***p , 0.001.

1.006*** 0.557** 0.977*** 0.061 0.732***

0.222 1206

2 0.062 0.433

0.099 1206

2 0.018 1.151*** 0.173 1206


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support protest when they strongly agree that there was electoral fraud or objected to a third term for Putin. But there is one exception when the interaction effects are considered: those who support an authoritarian leader are actually less likely to support protest when they agree that electoral fraud has occurred or that a president serving more than two terms is a bad idea. Before abandoning the issue of interaction effects we finally considered how our trigger events might impact on those who live in the metropolis and on younger Russians. Was the effect of perceptions of electoral fraud and Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin on support for protest magnified for these citizens? The question may matter, we would argue, not only because the bulk of actual protest activity took place in Moscow and St Petersburg, but also because it is precisely in the metropolitan centers and especially the capital that protest activity is most worrying for political authorities and regimes. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 7. Again, the direct effects of the attitudinal and trigger mechanisms are not affected when these further interactions are included. But although we see no significant interaction of trigger events with age, we do see very strong effects of metropolitan residence and trigger events. In other words, Russians who live in the metropolis and who perceive electoral fraud or are opposed to Putin’s return are even more likely to support anti-regime protest, a fact that must be of some concern to the Russian authorities. Conclusions The Russian case of mass political protest after the fraudulent parliamentary elections of 2011 is relatively unusual, in that it was not stimulated or supported by significant elite defection. The mass protests, of course, have to date been unsuccessful in effecting regime change in the country. This may point to the critical importance of elite plus mass action if change is to be achieved. But our findings also suggest that if combined elite and mass action does occur successfully, the direction of change may be politically ambiguous in nature. Based on the results of this survey research, a political counter-elite seeking to build mass support in Russia appears as likely to succeed by pursuing authoritarian and ethno-nationalist policies as by democratic and liberal ones. Any such elite certainly would have to deal with an ideologically divided anti-regime opposition. Indeed, although our data do not provide direct evidence, we may speculate that it is precisely the authoritarian possibilities of elite-mass mobilization in Russia that acts as one of the main constraints on elite defection. Do potential defecting democratic elites from the Putin regime fear the possible authoritarian consequences of opening up mass anti-regime protest? For that matter, do democratic citizens contemplating support for anti-regime protest also see the door opening to authoritarian mobilization? Post-protest politics in Russia suggest that these concerns are very real. Despite signs during the last months of the Medvedev presidency that the authorities would be willing to compromise with the opposition, the new Putin presidency has initiated a raft of measures to suppress opposition activity, and these measures have been met with little elite-level or popular resistance. Those elites that


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appeared willing to defect, or at the very least mediate between the authorities and the opposition in the aftermath of the December elections, have sought to rebuild their relations with the regime, while polling research conducted by other agencies suggests that the Kremlin’s measures against the protestors – such as new legislation on rallies and protests – have even received popular mass support (Kommersant, 8 June 2012). In line with the extant literature on hybrid regimes, the Russian case of 2011– 2012 does highlight the potentially volatile nature of elections. Our analysis of attitudes toward electoral fraud strongly supports the contention that the manipulation of elections by authoritarian rulers can trigger significant opposition within hybrid political systems. Moreover, it also illustrates the ways, in which support for protest during elections blends with other causal factors. In the Russian case, the most salient of these was the decision by Vladimir Putin to return to the Kremlin. Yet, although electoral fraud is a necessary condition for triggering the type of protest that can deliver political change, it is insufficient on its own. In most modern authoritarian regimes, leaders have proven themselves more than able to hold on to power in the face of fraudulent elections. Indeed a sizeable literature exists on why authoritarian leaders risk electoral competition (Gandhi and LustOkar 2009). More important for political change appears to be the belief both among elites and the citizenry that change can be achieved in the first place. Therefore, Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) argue that opposition elite strategies and citizen-level behavior will be affected by the political context at that time: “their perception of the likelihood of regime change” (416). In a similar vein, Morse (2012) contends that the likelihood of elections bringing about change is “conditional upon the perceived vulnerability of the regime” (178). These viewpoints emphasize the importance of mass opinion in providing vital cues about the possibility of mobilizing mass action. However, in this growing area of research, there is little analysis of the political choices that mass attitudes present to political elites in hybrid systems. Much of the literature on change, as previously noted, focuses on the role of defecting elites who have the resources (parties) to mobilize citizens. For Reuter and Gandhi (2010), for instance, although the catalyst for defection is economic decline and the social discontent that it produces, it is the existence of a dominant party that ultimately provides elites with the organizational resources that are needed to overcome their collective action problems. Thus, mass action takes the form of broad support for the insurgent party, and the political direction that a successful challenger subsequently takes is explained largely by the characteristics of the elite itself and the institutional environment and legacy – hence, the frequent reestablishment of hybridity. Less attention is paid to the detailed characteristics of mass opinion, values, and grievances when anti-regime mobilization occurs and their impact on the political direction taken subsequently. This question matters, we hypothesize, because hybrid regimes face potential regime challenges from two directions – from a democratic as well as authoritarian opposition. Therefore, if mass mobilization occurs and elites need to appeal for mass support, it matters enormously what the bases of anti-regime mass sentiment are.


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Given the nature of most modern hybrid regimes, this raises a question that is of increasing importance: Is anti-regime protest in hybrid regimes a route to democracy? As we have argued above, “forward to democracy” is only one response to the democratic failures of hybrid regimes, and research on electoral protests over the last 20 years has identified other ideological commitments and grievances that may be considered to be equally, if not more important in driving support for protest in these regimes – research which has also cast doubt on the democratizing effect of electoral protests (see Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). The various “color revolutions” that took place in a number of post-Communist states are critical examples. Many of these post-revolutionary states have either “restabilized” as hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine post-2010, or even moved back to more full blown authoritarianism, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan after electoral protests in 2005. The Russian case highlights the importance of analyzing the mass attitudinal dimension of these crises and the ambiguous outcomes that can result as a consequence.

Acknowledgements The authors thank the University of Oxford and St Antony’s College, Oxford for funding this research and the reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments.

Notes 1. 2. 3.

The constitutional amendments introduced by Dmitry Medvedev extended the president’s term from 4 to 6 years. Kasyanov’s party was banned, and Kudrin did not compete in the election. In a survey conducted by the Levada Center in July 2012, 43% of respondents expressed support for the protests (in December 2011 the proportion was 44%) (“Rossiyane” 2012); research conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTSIOM) put the proportion at 35%, but found comparable proportions of Russians opposed to the protest (“Protestnyye” 2012).

References Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2006. “Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions.” Journal of Democracy 17 (4): 5– 18. Chaisty, Paul, and Stephen Whitefield. 2012. “The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Russian Political Attitudes.” Post-Soviet Affairs 28 (2): 187 –208. Evans, Geoffrey, and Stephen Whitefield. 1996. “Support for Democracy and Political Opposition in Russia, 1993 and 1995.” Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (3): 218 – 242. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. “Elections under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 403 – 422. Gill, Graeme. 2012. “The Decline of a Dominant Party and the Destabilization of Electoral Authoritarianism?” Post-Soviet Affairs 28 (4): 449 –471. Gudkov, L. D., B. V. Dubin, M. A. Zorkaya, and M. A. Plotko. 2012. Rossiyskiye Parlamentskiye Vybory: Elektoral’nyy Protsess pri Avtoritarnom Rezhime. Moscow: Analiticheskiy Tsentr Yuriya Levady, Levada-Tsentr [The Russian Parliamentary Elections: The Electoral Process under an Authoritarian Regime].


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Haggard, Stephan. 2000. The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Hale, Henry. 2005. “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in PostSoviet Eurasia.” World Politics 58 (1): 133– 165. Howard, Marc Morje, and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 365 –381. Kalandadze, Katya, and Mitchell Orenstein. 2009. “Electoral Protests and Democratization: Beyond the Color Revolutions.” Comparative Political Studies 42 (11): 1403 –1425. Koesel, Karrie J., and Valerie J. Bunce. 2012. “Putin, Popular Protests, and Political Trajectories in Russia: A Comparative Perspective.” Post-Soviet Affairs 28 (4): 403 –423. Kuzio, Taras. 2012. “Democratic Revolutions from a Different Angle: Social Populism and National Identity in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 20 (1): 41– 54. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morse, Yonatan L. 2012. “The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism.” World Politics 64 (1): 161 –198. Pei, Minxin, and Ariel David Adesnik. 2000. “Why Recessions Don’t Start Revolutions.” Foreign Policy 118: 138 – 151. “Protestnyye Mitingi: Vykhodit’ na Ulitsu Mozhno, no – V Ramkakh Zakona! [Protest Meetings: To Go Out on the Street Is Possible, But – Within the Bounds of the Law!].”, Accessed August 1, 2012. http://wciom.ru/index.php?id¼459&uid¼112355 Radnitz, Scott. 2010. “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet ‘Revolutions’.” Comparative Politics 43 (2): 127– 146. Reuter, Ora John, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2010. “Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties.” British Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 83 –110. “Rossiyane o Chestnosti Proshedshikh Vyborov i Aktsiyakh Protesta [Russians Weigh in on the Integrity of the Past Elections and Protest Actions].” Accessed August 1, 2012. http://www.levada.ru/01-02-2012/rossiyane-o-chestnosti-proshedshikh-vyborovi-aktsiyakh-protesta Schedler, Andreas. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries.” Journal of Politics 64 (2): 408 –433. “Svedeniya o Zayavlennykh Narusheniyakh Izbiratel’nogo Zakonodatel’stva v Khode Izbiratel’noy Kampanii po Vyboram Deputatov Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii Shestogo Sozyva [Information on Claimed Disruptions of Electoral Laws During the Elections of Deputies to the Sixth Session of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation].” Accessed August 1, 2012. http://www.cikrf.ru/news/relevant/2012/02/03/kniga.html Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and PostCommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5 (3): 535 –551. Whitefield, Stephen. 2009. “Russian Citizens and Russian Democracy: Perceptions of State Governance and Democratic Practice, 1993– 2007.” Post-Soviet Affairs 25 (1): 1 –25.

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Appendix 1: Survey characteristics


March 2012

Representation: national Sampling frame: Census 2002, 2009 Adult pop. (18 þ )

Stratification method

Response rate: 0.51

Stage 1: Territorialadministrative unit (seven regions, as used in the official statistics) Stage 2: Settlement (allocated to six strata in proportion to the population of each stratum) Stage 3: Sampling location (PSU) Respondent selection Stage 1: The selection of households (random route method with a predetermined starting point) Stage 2: The selection of respondent (the most recent birthday method; only one respondent per household was interviewed)

Total contacts: 2383

Respondent noncontact: 1180 Of which refusals: 440 Achieved: 1206