Framing Elections: Issue Framing Around Valence ...

Framing Elections: Issue Framing Around Valence and Position and the Paradox of Rational Campaigning

Peter Bloom Swansea University [email protected]

Alexia Katsanidou European University Institute [email protected]

This is a work in progress. Please do not re-cite without the explicit permission of the authors.

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Abstract This article presents a general theory of electioneering revolving around the framing of issues by elites to reflect valence or positional considerations. We argue further that this framing behaviour conforms to a general electoral logic connected principally to government popularity. Specifically, we hypothesize that incumbent’s stress valence if popular and position when unpopular while their challengers do the opposite. We tested these hypothesises within the context of post – war Britain in the six elections between the years 1983 and 2005. The results confirmed our suppositions, isolating a paradox of rational campaigning, whereby ideological campaigning is most prevalent when it is least likely to be effective thus putting into question normative ideas of elections as a “market place of ideas.”


Introduction Both popularly and scholarly, elections are hailed as a “marketplace of ideas”. The prevalence of this view is reflected for instance in the past dominance of Downs’ spatial model of voting associating elections primarily with ideological competition.1 However, the growing acceptance by election scholars of the importance of non-ideological considerations for voting behaviour reveals the need to re-think these traditional assumptions.2 Specifically challenging this established perspective is the increasing distinguishing of valence from positional voting.3 These competing perspectives are treated largely as mutually exclusive ways for explaining vote choice, valence providing an alternative for understanding individual’s electoral preferences away from those linked to ideology or policy evaluations.4 Similarly putting into question such conventional understandings is the rising acknowledgement of the central role issue framing plays within campaigning.5 Electioneering is seen less as a matter of ideological persuasion and more about the ability of parties to manipulate the agenda6 through shaping how citizens perceive and vote on issues.7 Building on such insights, this paper contends that democratic competition primarily revolves around how party and candidates strategically frame issues according to position or valence for their perceived advantage. We argue further that this framing behaviour conforms to a general electoral logic connected principally to government popularity. In this respect, electoral position is a stronger influence on issue framing than political beliefs. Thus we maintain that a party’s ideological position is less relevant to their campaigning than their attempt to frame issues according to valence or position in order to take advantage of perceived electoral conditions. The British elections beginning with the re-election of Thatcher until the present (1983 – 2005) provide a good lens for examining this phenomenon in practice. Over this period the centre-right Conservative and centre-left Labour party have inhabited the role of incumbents and challengers in equal measure within analogous electoral circumstances. Consequently, it offers the opportunity to see the ways parties and candidates are similarly incentivized to present politics either ideologically or non-ideologically, regardless of ideological differences. This work has potentially dramatic implications for understandings of modern democracy. The central role issue framing around valence and position plays in electioneering puts into question prevailing notions of elections as a “marketplace of ideas”. Instead, valence considerations can often be used strategically to lessen ideological debate and contestation. Indeed our analysis reveals conversely how elections in fact paradoxically -3Copyright PSA 2010

reduce the possibility of direct ideological competition between rivals as well as minimizing the effectiveness of ideological campaigning by incumbents and challengers alike.

Valence, Position, and Issue Framing for Electoral Strategies Voting behaviour literature has long concerned itself with the role of ideology as a decisive factor of vote choice. Traditional normative theory assumed that individuals decide primarily on the basis of personal conviction. This argument was challenged by empirical research beginning in the 1950s, finding that “non-policy” factors including long standing party loyalty8 and a candidate’s perceived personal qualities dominantly influenced vote choice.9 Expanding on these insights theoretically, Stokes developed the concept of valence to account for these non-ideological factors and as a rival to established spatial assumptions of the positional voter.10 Importantly valence offers different evaluation criteria for individuals’ electoral preferences, focusing on a parties or candidates embodiment of commonly held values rather than traditional ideological or policy cleavages.11 As such it represents a new way for conceiving politics overall separate from positional accounts. Whereas previously politics was understood as the attempt to achieve ideological and policy goals through democratic elections, this new orientation stresses instead the ability of politicians to achieve shared social and economic objectives. 12 Strategically, this also re-orients electioneering around themes of issue ownership and competence as opposed ideological competition.13 On the one hand, office-seekers primarily emphasize those issues having mass appeal where they are perceived strongest, hence “owning”.14 Through this strategy, positional issues are ranked to reflect this valence advantage, therefore benefiting one party exclusively while further attracting voters with similar preferences.15 On the other hand, electoral success is dependant on a party or candidate’s ability to project an image of credibility and competence for solving important social problems.16 Valence has been criticised however for not being as innovative as initially supposed. Hinich and Munger contend that valence issues can actually be represented in competitive dimensions like positional issues. Similarly Kitschelt correctly observes that measurements of the empirical impact of valence issues on voting behaviour ultimately rely on spatial model structures.17 Recognizing the value of these objections we nonetheless attribute these tensions not to valence theory itself but a more general inattention within the literature to the strategic way office-seekers present politics ideologically or non-ideologically for purposes of


electioneering. Specifically, it is imperative to examine how politicians frame issues according to valence or positional criteria to maximize their vote share. To do so requires a broader understanding of the framing process. How actors cognitively perceive issues significantly influences their political preferences and vote choices. More precisely, processes of “issue framing” play a key role in an individual’s broader “construction of reality”18 influencing their interpretation of politics generally19 as well their particular policy views. 20 This speaks to the importance of external manipulation for preference formation as priming, the triggering of individual’s cognitive responses to certain stimuli, can be used to mould actors’ perception.21 Relevant to this research is the employment of these techniques by party elites to direct how individual perceive and respond to dominant issues.22 Many electoral scholars thus question the ability of citizen’s to make independent choices, stressing instead how all decisions result from elite manipulation.23 Yet while political science increasingly recognizes the importance of issue framing, especially for social movements, its role within electoral campaigning remains largely unexplored. Key exceptions include Ryan, Carragee and Meinhofer’s work on the attempt by office-seekers to strategically frame issues to their advantage, reflecting recent findings showing a direct link between voter perception of issues and party manipulation.24 This has led scholars to note the significance of framing for campaigning overall, as electoral success is positively linked to the competition over which politicians frames are dominant.25 Yet despite this growing connection of issue framing to party strategy, there is comparatively little analysis into how this relates to themes of valence and position.

Re-Thinking Electioneering using issue framing according to Valence and Position The key contention of this work is that central to electioneering is the framing of issues according to valence or position. Both incumbents and opposition strategically present issues in terms of position or valence to overcome their own deficiencies and highlight those of their rivals. Consequently, questions of whether or not elections centre on ideology is intricately connected to elite strategies of issue framing. Acknowledging the diversity of voter motivations scholars increasingly strive for approaches combining the insights of positional and valence theories. Merrill and Grofman’s propose for instance a “unified theory of voting” stressing both policy and “non-policy” considerations for explaining voting and campaigning alike.26 In a similarly integrative vein27, spatial modellers reveal how office seekers can under certain conditions combine valence and positional considerations into a comprehensive election strategy. They show -5Copyright PSA 2010

particularly how a valence advantage allows politicians to also capture the centre position ideologically, thus marginalising their opponent on both ideological and non-ideological grounds.28 These readings echo existing voting theories emphasizing the malleable frequently inconsistent nature of individual’s preferences. Zaller in this respect argues that citizens commonly hold a range of often contradictory views on an issue.29 Actors’ beliefs are thus ever-changing, constantly adapting to short term considerations of what is deemed presently desirable. Yet while this tradition concentrates primarily on vote choice and media manipulation30, it is equally relevant for understanding campaigning. Current political science perspectives like the “dominance principle”31, “saliency theory” 32 and “issue ownership”33 reflect these concerns, highlighting how parties “seek to shape campaign agendas by emphasizing issues that accent their strengths and avoiding issues that give the opposition an advantage.”34 However, these approaches have thus far not addressed themes of issue framing around valence and positional criteria. At stake is to assess how parties manipulate valence and position during campaigns to their expected advantage under a diverse range of conditions. We argue that office seekers frame issues in terms of valence or position in order to simultaneously enhance their own perceived strengths while highlighting the weaknesses of their opponent. Thus electoral elites will similarly frame issues positionally if they believe they are strongest ideologically and according to valence when confident of their nonideological credentials such as competence and personal character. This strategy of playing to one’s strengths also can be used to offset potential weaknesses. This resonates with the fleeting insight that in certain cases elites can use their valence advantage to distract voters from the unpopularity of their ideological position.35 Further, parties and candidates can deploy these framing techniques to outmanoeuvre rivals by exposing their weaknesses. Consequently, if a party thinks their opponent is vulnerable ideologically they will tend to frame issues positionally while doing the opposite if their opponent appears weak valence wise. A potential objection to this theory relates to dimensional nature of positional evaluations compared to the directional character of valence judgements. This difference however does not detract from the way office seekers will use each equally to maximize their vote share over their rivals. A second possible criticism is whether an issue can simultaneously be both positional and valence. Whereas traditionally these two orientations were considered mutually exclusive, recent research reveals how an issue can be equally -6Copyright PSA 2010

understood to be valence and positional in nature.36 Law and order concerns may be equally perceived by an electorate to be valence in character (e.g. the shared desire to reduce crime) and positional (e.g. whether approaches to policing should punitive or rehabilitative). This analysis represents a novel lens for understanding electoral behaviour linked primarily to politicians’ efforts to frame issues according to position or valence. Building upon previous spatial and valence explanations, we emphasize the key power elites have to frame issues ideologically or non-ideologically for their overall advantage. This is particularly significant given that parties and candidates often cannot escape their past either ideologically or valence wise. Enelow and Hinich state thus “a candidate who attempts to run as a moderate one year and a conservative the next may lose credibility with the voters.”37 What

they can do however to downplay a potential ideological disadvantage is shape elections away from positional considerations and toward valence appraisals to enhance their own standing and undercut their more ideologically favoured rivals. This competition over frames takes on added significance in light of evidence that elites can attract votes merely on the basis of the strength of its frames.38 Thus parties and candidates may achieve victory through presenting elections in valence or positional terms despite holding largely unpopular policy views or being seen as untrustworthy and incompetent by citizens overall.

Hypotheses This article presents a general theory of electioneering revolving around the framing of issues by elites to reflect valence or positional considerations. This broader insight can be summarised in the following assumptions - (1) the choice between a positional or a valence frame depends on the party’s relative electoral position and (2) in a competitive environment frame effectiveness depends not only on its strength and frequency, but also on the relative dominance of the framing actor. However, in testing these assumptions it must be remembered that elections do not happen within a vacuum. As most elections are not contested over an open seat, we will focus on how this theory applies specifically to incumbent and opposition party strategy. It is well documented by political scientists that incumbents have an electoral advantage.39 Particularly relevant to this analysis is their greater ability to manipulate electoral conditions in order to increase their popularity.40 These practices include lowering taxes nearer election time to create an appearance of economic prosperity or instituting minor redistributive measures to normally marginalized groups to assure their vote.41 Noticeably absent from such -7Copyright PSA 2010

discussions are themes of issue framing, especially in relation to shaping voter’s short – term considerations toward valence or position. In order to fill this gap, we assume that incumbents have a privileged position for framing issues in terms of valence or position. This is due to their ability to take advantage of their popularity or respond to their unpopularity linked to their performance while in office. There is abundant evidence to suggest that elections are in large part referendums on incumbents rather than a “clean slate” to discuss policies and values.42 Accordingly office holders will seek to play to their strengths during elections, highlighting their effective performance if favourably viewed by the populace and their correct ideology in an effort to evade criticisms of their actions if unpopular. This leads us to our first hypothesis.

H1: If an incumbent feels electorally confident due to a presumed good term in office they will seek to highlight this performance through valence campaigns. In contrast when an incumbent feels insecure they frame issues ideologically to deflect attention away from their recent failures. This proposition emerges from the two driving assumptions of this analysis. The strategy of a party in power is linked to their electoral position and perceived popularity. Moreover, their overall dominance as incumbents benefits them as issue framing agents, having a clear advantage in choosing which type of orientation of issues is most favourable to their election prospects and forcing the opposition to respond accordingly. This process of strategic framing further conforms to two important aspects of effective priming. The first notes that framing is most successful over short periods, losing its grip on individuals over time.43 The second is that its credibility is directly linked to its already held general acceptance among the populace as priming fades when contradicted in daily conversation. It holds then that parties and candidates will frame issues to maximize their present advantages and emphasize those things which are most controversial for the opposition.44 Incumbents will therefore choose to present issues in valence or positional terms based on short – term advantage and controversy avoidance. Thus if an officeholder has strong approval ratings then they would be incentivized to emphasize valence so as to steer clear of potentially contentious ideology or policy positions. Conversely, opposition parties by nature must respond to incumbents. To this end, they adhere to the same general rational for issue framing as all office seekers during elections but in mirror image to their incumbent rival. As such, while they similarly campaign ideologically or non-ideologically to highlight their strengths they will also frame issues in -8Copyright PSA 2010

direct competition to incumbents in order to weaken their position. This speaks to why elites, particularly non-incumbents, do not simply play to their strengths regardless of their opponents presumed advantages. Given parties over-riding priority there is little rational incentive to frame issues according to valence or position if this places them at a disadvantage compared to rivals. This rationale is already present in political science discussions of “leap frogging” denoting how parties and candidates will not try to “out do” competitors ideologically if their opponent has already captured the centre position.45 In similar fashion, we argue that less dominant parties will strategically frame issues using the opposite frame to their more powerful rivals so as to expose their weaknesses and in the process draw support to themselves. Formally we hypothesize:

H2: When incumbents stress valence to take advantage of their popularity opponents rely more heavily on ideology in order to minimize their valance disadvantage. Conversely, the reverse is true when incumbents frame issues positionally.

This contention again reflects our central assumptions. Whereas the opposition will frame issues based on their relative electoral position their less dominant status means they must always respond to the strategies of existing office holders. Our hypothesis also corresponds to practices of effective priming. Non-incumbents are incentivized to frame elections according to short – term conditions, witnessed for instance in how government failures opens the way for challengers to campaign effectively on valence in an attempt to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction while drawing attention from their own ideological unpopularity. The opposition will furthermore act to replace an incumbent’s chosen frame for one that is more contentious so as to lessen their rival’s success as an issue framing agent. Returning to a previous example, if an office holder frames law and order concerns in terms of valence to exploit popular views of their competence on this issue, challengers will emphasize instead the ideological assumptions driving such policies (e.g. punative vs. rehabilitation) to shift the debate into an area where the incumbent is more politically vulnerable. The foregoing argument linking electioneering to issue framing around valence and positional considerations can be applied to and tested within a diverse set of modern democracies. This paper turns to the context of British elections between the years 1983 and 2005 for this purpose. We will return to the general implications of this theory within the discussion and conclusion following the presentation of this case. -9Copyright PSA 2010

Britain between 1983 and 2005 We will now test our hypothesis within the context of post – war Britain. Specifically we will look at the six elections occurring between the years 1983 and 2005. This provides us with a good cross-section of election cases in order to verify or challenge our hypothesis. The reason for choosing this particular period is threefold. Firstly, the elections were primarily conducted between two major parties – Conservatives and Labour. The benefits of this are that it allows us to look at how rivals with contrasting historical roots and bases of support, behave similarly or differently when confronted with analogous electoral conditions. Put differently, will Conservative and Labour act to type despite differences when both are popular incumbents or unpopular challengers? Secondly, given the lack of term limits for British office holders (unlike say US Presidents) there are no “open” contests. Consequently, all elections are waged between an incumbent and challenger thus permitting us to more clearly examine the behaviour of parties in these positions. In this way we can see how being an incumbent or challenger induces certain types of common framing behaviour regardless of the specificities of the party or candidate in this role. Finally, the number of elections, length of time covered, and changing political culture and climate within this period (i.e. from Conservative to Labour rule, both parties moving from high to low popularity) provides us the opportunity to trace out the general relationship issue framing in terms of valence or position has with party strategy rather than simply context based explanations.

Testing issue framing The central concern of this work is how electoral conditions induce office seekers to frame issues according to valence or positional considerations. Accordingly, our research design focuses principally on campaign strategy across election cycles, with particular attention paid to the relationship between the incumbent and a dominant challenger. This analysis will primarily examine this framing phenomena as it is present in party manifestos.. We define position as based on deeper ideological, policy, or value based differences. By contrast, valence represents the evaluation of candidates based on competence and effectiveness in achieving shared goals. This differs from existing definitions of valence in its emphasis on service provision and ability to ensure non-ideological goals of economic prosperity and social improvement rather than simply the personal qualities of party or candidates.

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Returning to our hypothesis, we expect that incumbents will frame issues according to valence if popular and position if unpopular while their opponents will do the opposite. As such it is necessary to find a proper indicator for basing these assumptions of popularity. In the case of Britain we chose the measure of government satisfaction. We decided on this variable over others, must prominently leadership satisfaction, since there is strong empirical and historical evidence that the British vote according to parties not individuals candidates. 46. Measures of government satisfaction provide a clear view to the framing agents and researcher alike of how happy or unhappy an electorate is with the performance of a party in power. Equally significant is where we position the benchmark for assuming popularity. Given the single member simple plurality system or more commonly known as the “first past the post” nature of British elections, with office seekers commonly needing only slightly more than a third of the total vote for victory, we place the dividing line between popularity and unpopularity at 30% government satisfaction. Put differently, if government satisfaction is over 30% then office holders assume that a suitable number of people perceive them to be doing a good job, therefore giving them a valence advantage over their opponents, and if under 30% then the reverse will be true. It is now possible to restate our expectations in light of the particularities of our selected case:

H1: If government satisfaction is over 30% then incumbents will frame issues in terms of valence and challengers will frame issues positionally.

H2: If government satisfaction is under 30% then incumbents will frame issues positionally and challengers will frame issues in terms of valence.

To assess how parties present issues within their manifestos we will do the following. First we examine whether introductory statements emphasize valence or position. We then evaluate how each party frames the three main political issues that matter to the electorate, determined by the ipsos-mori index.47 Finally we look at the overall theme of the manifesto, contained either in its concluding remarks or as is often the case a defining statement within the text.48 This analysis of primary sources is further supported by reference to secondary scholarly evidence of the campaign itself. With these methods in place we can now turn to the analysis of our case.


Expectations and Results Provided below are two tables showing firstly electoral information for the contests from 1983- 2005 and secondly our expectations of party issue framing based on this information. - Table 1 about here Table 1: Election Information (1983-2005) Year Incumbent Challenger Gov. Satisfaction Winner 1983 Cons

Lab

43%

Cons

1987 Cons

Lab

40%

Cons

1992 Cons

Lab

29%

Cons

1997 Cons

Lab

23%

Lab

2001 Labour

Con

37%

Lab

2005 Labour

Con

31%

Lab

- Table 2 about here -

Table 2: Expectations of valence or positional Party issue framing (Winner italicised) Year

Conservatives

Labour

1983

Valence

Position

1987

Valence

Position

1992

Position

Valence

1997

Position

Valence

2001

Position

Valence

2005

Position

Valence

In order to test our hypothesis regarding campaign strategies we will look at how both parties framed issues in their manifestos. We will do so first by presenting what were the most important issues to the electorate and what were the main focuses of the party. We will then provide an in depth reading of the manifestos along with an election summary to determine how both Conservative and Labour framed issues according to valence or position in each election.

What do manifesto data tell us? - 12 Copyright PSA 2010

The data collected from the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) show the salience of an issue within the manifesto of each specific party. Valence as we define it cannot be pinpointed in one issue only, but is rather a way to frame issues. However one of the coded issues might be able to offer a numerical measure of valence in terms of performance. Political parties while campaigning can present issue in terms of valence, which translates in practice as framing the issue highlighting their good performance and reminding the electorate of the opposition party’s inability to perform to the same level. Coded item per305 is Political Authority- Positive, which shows exactly that; the favourable mentions of the party’s ability for strong and effective governance and/or other party’s lack of such competence. MRG data measure the percentage of appearance of quasi-sentences relevant to the coded topic as they appear in the whole of the text. The figure below shows the variations across election years of both political parties, as well as their difference of use of valence. The lines of the two parties never cross, which demonstrates the clear difference in manifesto writing and (potentially) campaigning styles. The Conservatives have clearly a more valence centred campaigning style. The labour party uses valence framing much less than the Conservatives. The second important thing that these lines tell us is that the campaigning style has changed over time for both parties. Up until 1992 valence campaigning was kept to a minimum. At the 1997 elections we experience a “valence explosion” for both political parties. However, neither of these lines can tell us much about valence framing depending on circumstances. The third line shows the difference between conservatives and labour valence usage. The smaller it is, the higher is the Labour valence usage in comparison to the Conservative usage. Specifically, in the years before 1997, when we have a Conservative government the higher the values of valence difference show a lowering of the conservative usage and increase in the Labour usage. In the years 2001 and 2005 we see that the difference line slowly increases showing that the conservatives start using valence more and Labour less. These measures are of course very generic, especially as they were not designed to capture valence issue framing. They do show however some variations in the amount of valence usage in party manifestos. To explain and understand better the mechanisms of valence issue framing we need to use closely into the actual manifesto text. Therefore we move immediately to present our cases using a critical reading of the texts.


Use of Valence in Party Manifestos 20 18 16 14

Labour Valence focus

12 Conservatives Valence focus

10 8

Valence focus difference

6 4 2 0 1983

1987

1992

1997

2001

2005

Election years

Figure 1: The use of valence in party manifestos.

General Election 1983 In 1983 the incumbent Conservative party were seeking re-election against a Labour challenger. There was much reason for optimism with government satisfaction at 43%. The main issues were nuclear weapons, the economy (particularly inflation), and education. It was expected that Conservatives would campaign on valence and Labour on position. The valence focus of the Conservatives was evident from their manifesto’s introductory remarks:

In the last four years, Britain has recovered her confidence and self-respect. We have regained the regard and admiration of other nations. We are seen today as a people with integrity, resolve and the will to succeed. This Manifesto describes the achievements of four years of Conservative government and sets out our plans for our second term. 49 This emphasis was also apparent in their treatment of the major issues. The party justified its nuclear weapons policy by highlighting its essential continuation for the country’s safety, proclaiming “the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has been an effective deterrent to another war in Europe.” They then pre-empted potential ideological criticism around themes of disarmament by assuming it as a universal goal best achieved through its


programme of deterrence, stating “every thinking man and woman wants to get rid of nuclear weapons. To do that we must negotiate patiently from a position of strength, not abandon ours in advance.” They likewise approached the economy according to valence declaring: “Britain is once more a force to be reckoned with. Formidable difficulties remain to be overcome. But after four years of Conservative government, national recovery has begun.” Specific to concerns over inflation they maintained “the Government's role is to keep inflation down and offer real incentives for enterprise. As we win back customers, so we win back jobs.” Education similarly was framed in terms of valence, the party stressing its training programme noting that “we have provided the most imaginative and far-reaching scheme in our history.” Their conclusion continued in this valence vein:

“Under Conservative government, confidence is brushing aside pessimism at home. Abroad, Britain is regarded for the first time in years as a country with a great future as well as a great past. We mean to make that future a reality.”

Taking the opposite tact the Labour manifesto introduced its positions with the rallying cry:

“Let's put a stop to defeatism, and put a stop too to all those sermons about Victorian values. The labour movement - the Labour Party and the trade unions acting together came into being, as one of our poets, Idris Davies, said, to end "the long Victorian night". It was a fight to introduce civilised standards into the world of ruthless, deviltake-the-hindmost individualism.” 50

This ideological approach was affirmed in their promise that “within days of taking office, Labour will begin to implement an emergency programme of action, to bring about a complete change of direction for Britain.” This was moreover apparent in their ideological split from the Tories on the nuclear weapon issue, calling for complete disarmament and stating “an essential difference between the Labour and the Tory approach is that we have a foreign policy that will help liberate the peoples of the world from oppression, want and fear.” The economy was even more indicative of this positional strategy with the party pledging that “the next Labour government was committed to radical, socialist policies for reviving the British economy.” Finally, regarding education they proposed more “radical - 15 Copyright PSA 2010

changes” including abolishing private schooling. Their efforts to define themselves predominantly as ideologically against the reigning Conservative government is perhaps best illustrated in their summary statement that “we provide a radical programme of action, for a full, five-year parliament, to save British industry and rebuild the welfare state.” The campaign corresponded to the strategies first seen in the manifestos. The Conservatives ran an organised and efficient campaign trumpeting their achievements and criticizing the competence of their Labour challengers. This was witnessed in their desire to emphasize “realistic goals”.51 The Labour Party highlighted ideology, presenting themselves as a radical socialist alternative to the Tory’s belief in the market.

General Election 1987 The 1987 election again saw the Conservatives as incumbents with Labour as it primary challenger. According to polls government satisfaction stood at 40%. The main issues were nuclear weapons, NHS, crime, and the economy. The expectation therefore was for Conservatives to stress valence and Labour position. The title of the Conservative manifesto “The Next Move Forward”52 reflected its valence focus, illustrated further in its opening statement: “In the last eight years our country has changed - changed for the better.... for the first time in a generation this country looks forward to an era of real prosperity and fulfilment.” Talking about the economy, the Government trumpeted its achievement stating “Our industries are flourishing. Unemployment is falling”. Specific to issues, it argued according to valence that nuclear weapons were “vital to the task” of the “defence of the realm and the preservation of peace” and that “only the Conservative Party stands by the defence policy which every post-war government has seen to be necessary and which has kept the peace of Europe for more than a generation.” Improvements to the NHS were similarly linked to economic successes, declaring that “founded on this new prosperity, we are building a better Health Service and providing more care for those in need. Living standards are higher than ever before.” Crime was uniquely presented equally in positional and valence terms. After listing a range of existing policies including increased prisons and support for the police, the Conservatives tellingly ended the section saying “all this we have done; and we will intensify these efforts.” The Conservative manifesto concluded proclaiming:

“Today Britain is a stable and well-governed country which exercises great influence in the world. We seek the support of the British people to make this achievement truly - 16 Copyright PSA 2010

secure, to build upon it and to extend its benefits to all...No other party, presenting its manifesto proposals to the nation, has been able to support them with such a solid record of achievement” By contrast Labour’s manifesto was largely positional.53 While highlighting Tory failures they nonetheless stressed “philosophical” differences contending that “commonsense and the common interest require that the Tory philosophy of selfishness and short-term gain is replaced by the democratic socialist philosophy of community and caring, of investment in people and in production.” This emphasis extended to its treatment of nuclear weapons, proposing a “properly negotiated and monitored international agreement to remove nuclear weapons” and noting that “we were the first to propose to the superpowers the zero option in respect of intermediate nuclear weapon.” The NHS was also primarily dealt with ideologically, reinforcing the party’s history as the founder of the service, “its proudest achievement” against conservative opposition and promising that “Labour will establish the NHS in its rightful place as a high quality service for the prevention and treatment of illness, free at the time of use to all who need attention...” Again it is only crime for which Labour adopts a purely valence focus, exclaiming that “the Thatcher government has broken its promises on law and order... Labour will take urgent action to make people safer.” This is largely due to the perceived failings of the government on this issue, supporting our hypothesis that challengers will attack on valence rather than positional grounds to take advantage of incumbent weakness. This sole exception did not distract from the overall ideological focus of the manifesto however, symbolised in Labour’s belief that theirs:

“is a message of hope and confidence - the alternative to the divisive and dictatorial approach of the Conservatives... from our own history and from the example set by our competitors, that national economic success cannot be achieved without government. Britain will win with a Labour government that invests to enable people to use their abilities and to stimulate modern training, research, development, production and marketing. These are the ingredients of economic vitality, and the foundations of fairness.”

The campaign followed a similar pattern with Conservatives stressing valence and Labour position. The main thrust of the Conservative campaign, despite initial wavering, was the threat Labour posed to the country’s hard won prosperity, illustrated in ads like “Britain is - 17 Copyright PSA 2010

great again. Don’t Let Labour Wreck it!”54 and “Don’t Undo 8 Years Work in 3 Seconds.”55 It also was able to use this advantage to attack its opponent on both valence and positional grounds, seen for instance in its criticism of Labour’s defense policies saying “Britain has no desire to live under the Red Flag of socialism or the white flag of surrender”.56 Conversely Labour party leader Neil Kinnock continually played on ideological differences. As early as 1985 he promised a “new direction” for both the Party and the country.57 During the campaign, even while playing on non-ideological themes of being a “family man”58, he famously stressed what the “welfare state” had done for him as the first member of his family to attend university. In his final appeal he proclaimed Thatcherism as: “...morality is a mixture of being economical with the truth and worshipping the gods of greed.”

General Election 1992 The 1992 election followed found once again the Conservatives as incumbents and Labour as challengers. However, due to economic recession the Conservatives, now led by John Major, had an approval rate of only 29%. The main issues where NHS, Economy, Education. Given the low government satisfaction, the Conservative would be expected frame their campaign positionally. However, given that the figure is so close to the benchmark for victory at 30% it is expected that they will stress both position and valence, depending on the issue. Conversely, we expect that Labour will focus almost exclusively on valence based on perceived dissatisfaction with incumbents. The opening of the Conservative manifesto demonstrates their dual valence and positional focus:

This Manifesto is about making our country respected and secure, and helping you achieve a better; safer and more prosperous future. For I believe - strongly - that you, and not the Government, should be in charge of your life. That's what Conservatism stands for. That principle underlies all the policies in this Manifesto.59

In relation to the NHS they adopted a positional stance, though distinguished from their traditional market ideology, instead introducing a “first ever strategy for health” and proclaiming “the Conservative Party is totally committed to the National Health Service... need, and not ability to pay, is and will remain the basis on which care is offered to all by the NHS.” The economy conversely was framed according to both position and valence with Major reaffirming his belief “in a society in which government doesn't try to take - 18 Copyright PSA 2010

responsibility away from people... I believe in low taxes not just because they ignite enterprise - the spark of economic growth - but because they put power and choice where it belongs: in your hands” while warning the country that “Britain must not throw this opportunity away by electing a Labour government... in Britain we have laid the foundations for recovery. What is needed to trigger confidence and growth is a Conservative victory with a decisive majority.” The manifesto analogously approached education in both valence and position terms as the government equally reinforced its guiding principles that “high standards in education and training are the key to personal opportunity and national success” and “By extending opportunity and arming people with the power to choose, we will give valuable freedoms and a powerful spur to achievement” while simultaneously trumpeting their achievements, promising to “continue to expand higher education and training”. This mixed strategy is shown in the manifesto’s concluding appeal “We have a new leader, proven in office, and a new agenda - yet a tried set of principles.” The Labour’s valence strategy was immediately evident in their Manifesto title “Time to Get Britain Working Again” and opening remark “this general election is a choice between a Conservative government paralysed by recession, and a Labour government determined to get on with building recovery.”60 Their treatment of the main issues reflects their desires to frame the campaign in terms of valence, even while giving lip service to ideological differences. For instance the party deals with the NHS by stating “We will create a modern, efficient NHS with incentives to improve performance - but without the queue-jumping and waste created by a market in health care.” In parallel fashion they refer to their economic programme as a “properly run business” proclaiming “our proposals add up to a co-ordinated programme for recovery...public investment will modernise services help business and industry and stimulate private investment. It will make you and your family better off.” This continues in regards to education where they promise, “by investing in better teaching, smaller classes and modern books and equipment we will raise education standards.” The campaign conformed to these manifesto positions. Traditionally the 1992 election has been understood as a straight “valence – issue election”.61 In retrospect, this is largely accurate as the Conservatives continually stressed that “things would be worse under Labour”62 and attacked Kinnock as an “economic illiterate” whose policies “would mean perpetual recession for this country”.63 However, Major also combined this valence approach with a positional strategy, demonstrated in his attempts to present the Party as “caring” even taking it upon himself to eliminate the much hated “poll tax”.64 While this may be read as valence, it in fact represented a new policy direction for the party as illustrated in the - 19 Copyright PSA 2010

introduction of a “citizens charter”.65 This contrasted with the Labour party’s almost exclusive concentration on competence – leading one commentator to refer to it as the “caring vs. competence” campaign.66 Labour hammered home the Conservatives attempt to deny responsibility for the economic downturn, symbolized in a well known cartoon entitled “Tory’s defence plan” which posed Major and other leaders cowering behind the stonewall of Thatcher against the present recession.67 Moreover, they tried to highlight their own credibility as economic caretakers by having dinner with businessmen, known popularly as their “prawn cocktails”.68

General Election 1997 In 1997 for the fourth consequent time Conservatives were the incumbents and Labour were challengers. However, government satisfaction stood dismally at 23%, indicating that conservatives would campaign on position and Labour on valence. The main issues were the NHS, economy and education. Though initially referring to its three decade rule as “among the most successful in British peacetime history”, the Conservative manifesto soon shows its positional focus, attributing its success to its underlying market ideology.69

“The enterprising virtues of the British people have been liberated from the dead hand of the state...The free market is winning the battle of ideas the world over. From Russia to Vietnam, from China to Romania, people are realising that the socialist model has failed. This is not just an economic triumph. It is a triumph for human freedom. Britain helped to secure it. We should take pride in it.”

This strategy was further evident in its economic pronouncements, noting that privatisation “has gone from the dream of a few Conservative visionaries to the big idea which is transforming decaying public sector industries in almost every country in the world.” Ideologically they distinguished themselves from Labour arguing “the choice between the two economic philosophies is clear...Privatisation works” and “we are the only party that can cut taxes because we are the only party which is serious about controlling public spending.” This pattern extended to issues of education where they admitted that school standards “are still not good enough...we must do more.” A new educational proposal – the “guarantee of education standards” – emphasized increased assessments of school performance and parent participation along with conservative friendly policies of school - 20 Copyright PSA 2010

“choice” and “diversity” allowing for the acceptance and expansion of private education. Even with the NHS, where the party reiterated its support for a public health system, their positional bias shone through in its proposal for a “Private Finance Initiative which will unleash a new flow of investment funds into the modernisation of the NHS.” The manifesto concludes by presenting the electorate with “two futures” – one based on continued success with Conservative ideology or another which risks such “hard fought” achievements on “politicians whose own declared policies would burden the United Kingdom with new spending and taxation, new regulations, and new threats to the stability and sovereignty of the nation itself.” The Labour manifesto title, “New Labour because Britain Deserves Better” signalled its valence strategy as did its central slogan “Britain will be better with New Labour.” Their introduction similarly proclaimed:

“New Labour is a party of ideas and ideals but not of outdated ideology. What counts is what works...some things the Conservatives got right. We will not change them. It is where they got things wrong that we will make change. We have no intention or desire to replace one set of dogmas by another.”70

This emphasis on “what works” not ideology was apparent in their specific platforms. In respect to the NHS they promised an integrated approach which would “keep the planning and provision of healthcare separate, but put planning on a longer-term, decentralised and more co-operative basis” noting that “the key is to root out unnecessary administrative cost, and to spend money on the right things - frontline care.” They also portrayed themselves as economic pragmatists, eschewing the “old left” as well as laisses faire of the “conservative right”.

Instead they proposed that:

“Government and industry must work together to achieve key objectives aimed at enhancing the dynamism of the market, not undermining it... In economic management, we accept the global economy as a reality and reject the isolationism and 'go-it-alone' policies of the extremes of right or left.”


They retained this tact regarding education, proposing to build on existing policies stating “in this way we modernise the comprehensive principle, learning from the experience of its 30 years of application.” The vision of New Labour was clear- valence not position:

“We will be a radical government. But the definition of radicalism will not be that of doctrine, whether of left or right, but of achievement... It is not the politics of a revolution, but of a fresh start, the patient rebuilding and renewing of this country renewal that can take root and build over time.”

The campaign mirrored the differing party strategies found in their manifestos. The Conservatives cautioned the country against throwing away their successes for the unproven and uncertain ideology of New Labour.71 Early in the campaign they warned that a Labour victory would mean increased kickbacks to trade unions.72 This was followed by slogans of “Britain is booming. Don’t let Labour Blow It!” a nod more to their differences in ideology rather than competence.73 They further sought to distance themselves from Labour ideologically on Europe – a move whose success was undercut by the Parties own divisions.74 Additionally, they tried to increase what they felt could be a positional advantage by portraying Labour as being devoid of ideology, as a Party “planting trees without roots.”75 Labour sustained its valence focus as Blair promised a “third way” where “what counts is what works.” They presented a ten point “contract with the people” emphasizing pragmatic policy on everything from NHS to education (the main issue for the Party) and immediately defended themselves against attacks of union favouritism by assuring the public that “unions would get no favours”.

General Election 2001 For the first time in over 20 years in the 2001 election Labour were incumbents and Conservatives the opposition. Government satisfaction was at a healthy 37%. The main issues were NHS, Education, and Crime. It is expected that Labour would campaign according to valence and Conservatives on position. The Labour manifesto revealed its valence focus in its opening statement.76 “Since May 1997 we have laid the foundations of a Britain whose economy is stronger, where investment is now pouring into public services, where social division is being slowly healed and where influence abroad is being regained.” Their promise to “Build on Five Achievements” reinforced this strategy, stressing throughout achievable targets aimed at - 22 Copyright PSA 2010

improving their successes on specific issues. They pledged extra staff for the NHS while its “radical reform” of the health service centred on a “ten year goal” for reducing waiting times and becoming a “healthier nation with fast, high-quality treatment, free at the point of use.” On education they also eschewed ideology for achievement, promising that “every school will have a clear mission, with more teachers, new types of school, new opportunities for children and education tailored to fulfil their potential.” Similarly, regarding law and order they boasted that “crime was down ten percent” and guaranteed “to ensure all families are safe in their communities by tackling crime and its causes” through providing “6,000 extra recruits to raise police numbers to their highest ever level.” These claims were premised on a policy of maintaining the country’s new found “economic stability.” Interestingly, Labour did attack their opponents positionally – contending that “the Conservatives will spend most of this election telling you what their government cannot do” and warning that they “had swung farther to the right”. Yet this was meant less to wage an ideological campaign and more to highlight their own valence advantage, presenting themselves as a party of stability and competence, saying that while in the past:

“Many people found their head telling them to vote Tory, and their heart telling them to vote Labour. Today, head and heart are coming together… We have made our choice: stability not boom and bust; investment not cuts; engagement not isolationism; the many, not the few.”

This valence emphasis was perhaps best illustrated in their statement “we have shown we are a reformed party, competent to govern. Now we offer more. More change, and more rewards for Britain's hard-working families: more prosperity, more opportunities, more security.” The Conservatives on the other hand took a distinctly positional approach, its introduction claiming that the manifesto represented “the most ambitious Conservative programme for a generation.”77 While its title “Time for Common Sense” appears nonideological, it nonetheless denoted the Party’s contention that the government was moving the country away from its core values, arguing that “Labour does not understand our country and cannot value what it cannot understand.” By contrast the party claimed “our programme is rooted in the instincts of millions of people whose beliefs are mocked by Labour…. the common sense wisdom of the mainstream majority, on crime, or on taxes, or the family, or on Europe, is under threat as never before.” Regarding the NHS they sought to increase private - 23 Copyright PSA 2010

care, pledging to “build a new partnership between the state and independent sectors” as well as “ending political interference in medical judgments and giving choice to patients.” They would further “pursue a very different policy” on education aiming to “give parents choice and head teachers’ freedom” based on Labour failures attributed to their trying to run the nation's schools from Whitehall.” Similarly on crime the party would fight for “…a criminal justice system that reflects our values rather than undermines them.” This carried over to their concluding remarks, where ideology was again prominent:

“Conservatives have a vision of what our country can be when it is true to its own character. We want strong families and enterprising business. We want a free and responsible society… This manifesto sets out the vision that will inspire the next Conservative Government.”

The campaign followed the course set out in the manifestos. Labour, confident in their performance represented in their large pre-election lead, highlighted the need to stay on the strong course they had set with Chancellor Gordon Brown stressing the importance of maintaining their “hard won stability”.78 Rather ironically, but perhaps not surprising given our hypothesis, their strategy mirrored past Conservative governments – trumpeting their own achievements while denigrating their opponents as radicals whose extreme views imperilled the country’s prosperity. This was illustrated in their criticism of Conservatives planned spending cuts as potentially damaging to recent improvements to public services. Their valence strategy was moreover displayed in their central slogan “Work Goes On.”79 The Conservatives oppositely campaigned on positional grounds, symbolized in a string of editorial cartoons entitled “Not all Parties are the same” which ideologically distinguished the two parties on issues of taxes and crime.80 For Conservative leader William Hague the election was about “whether our children and grandchildren will inherit the same freedoms that we inherited”81 and he tellingly ended the campaign proclaiming “issue by issue, we have made and won our case.”82

General Election 2005 In 2005 Labour was again running for re-election against a Conservative challenger. Government satisfaction stood at 31%. The main issues were NHS, education and crime. It is expected that Labour would campaign valence wise and Conservatives positionally.


Labour’s valence approach was immediately apparent from the title of their manifesto, “Britain Forward not Back”, and their opening pronouncement that in their eight year rule they had “banished Labour demons” by showing “we could run the economy well, cut crime, and stand up for Britain abroad.83 We proved our competence.” This focus on achievement carried over to their treatment of particular issues, declaring “Our country is changing for the better, because we fulfilled the promises of our 1997 and 2001 manifestos.” This was followed by a detailing of “what has changed” noting:

“Investment in public services is up – an extra £1,000 per pupil per year in real terms since 1997, and spending on the NHS has more than doubled to £69 billion. There are over 28,000 more teachers and 105,000 extra teaching assistants and support staff. The National Health Service now has 79,000 more nurses and over 27,000 more doctors. And public servants – from nurses to police officers – are better rewarded for their work.”

Moreover, they highlighted the fact that “crime has fallen by 30 per cent overall, with almost five million fewer crimes a year than in 1997.” In terms of the economy they once again reminded voters of all they had achieved, proudly declaring “Britain now has a stable, growing economy with the lowest inflation since the 1960s.” This valence strategy was clearly evident in their pledge that “in our third term we will build new ladders of social mobility and advancement on the firm foundations of stability, investment and growth.” The Conservative manifesto took the opposite tact, emphasizing ideology as illustrated in their introduction:

“Britain is a great country. But today it is heading in the wrong direction ...Conservatives know that governments don’t have all the answers. But if they govern with the right values, they can make a real difference. Today, Britain is being governed with the wrong values.84”

They continued to attack the government positionally on the issues most important to the electorate. They argued that “the NHS has been too centralised. We should trust local professionals – doctors and nurses.” Further, addressing law and order concerns they asserted “our society needs more respect, discipline and decent values. Crime is wrong and should be punished, not excused.” This concentration on ideology was perhaps most clearly on display - 25 Copyright PSA 2010

in their plans for the traditionally strong Labour issue of education, arguing that “Even more important than extra money, we must get the fundamentals right.” They continued in this vein proclaiming:

“Today, these basics have been completely neglected... A Conservative Government will put the right values at the heart of our education system. We will ensure proper discipline in schools by giving heads and governors full control over admissions and expulsions”

They concluded their Manifesto setting a clear dividing line between the parties:

“The choice before voters is very clear. They can either reward Mr Blair for eight years of broken promises and vote for another five years of talk. Or they can vote Conservative, to support a party that has taken a stand and is committed to action on the issues that matter to hardworking Britons.”

The Party’s campaign strategies largely mirrored what was presented in their manifestos. Labour initially retained their manifesto title “forward not back” as their central slogan, signalling their intentions to stress their achievements as opposed to engaging in a broader ideological debate.85 However, responding to anger with their policies on the campaign trail, particularly over their closeness ideologically to the Conservatives and their support for the Iraq war, the incumbents adopted a more positional strategy. They insisted that “only a Labour government can bring about the sort of society a traditionalist Labour government can believe in.”86 Yet even with this greater emphasis on ideology they still preserved their valence approach overall as their new slogan “If you value it, vote for it” was primarily linked to the government’s accomplishments in health and education. Indeed rather than vigorously promoting their values, Labour instead presented themselves as a better alternative to their Conservative rivals with Blair acknowledging that “if you measure any government against perfection, you would vote for someone else. But you must measure us against the alternative, which is the Conservatives.”87 By contrast the Conservatives focused on ideology, illustrated in their principle slogans “are you thinking what were thinking?” and “taking a stand on issues that matter.”88 However, interestingly by the end of the campaign, picking up with growing dissatisfaction with Labour’s performance, they increasingly


included a more valence oriented strategy, demonstrated in their leader Michael Howard’s remark:

“The people have had enough of spin and smirk – they just want someone who’ll make things work. It’s no use being a man of destiny if you can’t be bothered with details. People don’t want a date with destiny. Most just want a date with the dentist.”89

Analysis of Results The findings from our case confirm our hypothesis. As incumbents both the Conservatives and Labour framed issues according to valence when popular and position when unpopular. Similarly, in opposition each campaigned ideologically when their governing rivals stressed valence and valence when incumbents emphasized position. These results reflect the structural rather contextual nature of this relationship, as electoral conditions shape generally how office seekers frame issues ideologically or nonideologically. Further, this phenomenon was more pronounced the more satisfied or dissatisfied the electorate was toward the government. Thus in 1983, 1987 as well as 2001, when the government had larger approval ratings, they emphasized valence more heavily while their opponents adopted a greater ideological focus. This framing behaviour can also occur within campaigns, witnessed for instance in 2005 where Labour began by highlighting their achievements due to their assumed popularity yet took on a more positional tone when popular dissatisfaction became apparent while campaigning. Conforming to our expectations, Conservatives responded to this shift by enhancing their valence attacks.

Discussion This analysis, validated by our findings, casts new light on electioneering. Contrary to established perspectives valence and position are not the result of inherent voter priorities but are instead a matter of elite manipulation. Parties and candidates go to great lengths to convince citizens to view elections and vote in terms of valance or position according to which one increases their chances for democratically achieving power. There are thus always two dimensions at play in any election, each vying with the other for temporary dominance over the hearts of the electorate. Importantly, these insights challenge the perceived role elections play as a “marketplace of ideas”. This evocative phrase paints a vision of elections as the pre-eminent - 27 Copyright PSA 2010

social space for contrasting ideological and policy views, similar to the function of a “free market” in economics.90 Importantly, criticisms of this view largely revolve problems of elitism91, and its negative impact on diversity of opinion within the public sphere92, while largely ignoring how democratic elections themselves work against such values. However, this reading is undercut by the fact that as our research shows, elections are rarely waged between competing ideological positions. Instead there is a strong incentive for office seekers to attack positional campaigns on valence grounds. Even more troubling, the discussion of ideology and policy can be a severe disadvantage to the electoral prospects of incumbents and non-incumbents alike. In this respect, our analysis reflects how elections themselves in their current form rationally work against normative desires for a free competition of ideas. To this end we propose that undermining this aspiration for democracy to function as a “marketplace of ideas” is a paradox of rational campaigning. More precisely, ideological campaigning is most prevalent when it is least likely to be effective. Concretely, elites frame issues poitionally when they are at electorally at their most vulnerable. This is particularly problematic regarding the strategy of opposition parties and candidates. Not only do they turn to ideology when at their weakest, they also refrain from such strategies when office holders are at their most vulnerable. Consequently, when those in power, and their ruling ideologies, are most susceptible to defeat they are least likely to be challenged as to their fundamental governing beliefs and guiding policy assumptions. However, the impact this has for incumbents should not be overlooked. As this analysis reveals they too must work within this paradox – only emphasizing position when deprived of a valence advantage. This reality prevents office holders from using their valence success to further their ideological agenda therefore putting into question the belief nonideological effectiveness catalyses broader changes in ideological preferences. Instead what emerges is that those in power “play it safe” in such circumstances – a fact supported by the empirical evidence.93 Of course, it may be argued that to the victor goes the spoils, whereby winners are free to pursue their policy preferences ex ante.94 Nonetheless, this hardly reflects the use of implementation achievements to win the proverbial battle of ideology through elections. Illustrated thus is that elections, at least in two party non-open types, provide a structural incentive against direct ideological competition, effective ideological challenges to existing regimes, and the expansion of ideas who have shown their practical value.

Conclusion - 28 Copyright PSA 2010

This work contends that a central feature of electioneering is the framing of issues in terms of valence or position by parties and candidates. In this respect a key part of both incumbents and challengers campaign strategy is how they choose to convince individuals to vote according to ideological or non-ideological criteria. Moreover, we argue that this framing follows a general pattern linked to incumbent popularity in systems with only two office seeking parties. Future research can be directed at how this occurs within open elections and those with more than two dominant parties as well as empirical investigation as to the actual effect of this strategic framing on voter choice. This analysis challenges prevailing understandings of elections by arguing that questions of valence and position are inexorably linked to campaign strategies. Further it isolates a paradox around ideological campaigning which puts into question normative ideas of elections as a “market place of ideas.”


End Notes 1

Downs, Anthony, 1957: An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. For an empirical discussion of this shift see C. Pattie and R. Johnston, “Positional issues, valence issues and the economic geography of voting in British elections”, Journal of Economic Geography, 8 (2008). 33Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 4 J.M. Shanks and W.E. Miller, “Policy Directions and Performance Evaluation: Complementary Explanations of the Reagan Elections”, British Journal of Political Science, 20 (1990), 143-235. Also J. Green ‘When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition’ Political Studies , 5 (2007) , 629-655 5 D. Chong, “Creating common frames of reference on political issues” in DC Mutz, PM Sniderman, RA Brody, eds, Political Persuasion and Attitude Change ( Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press, 1996), pp. 195-224. Also D. R. Kinder, T. E. Nelson, “Democratic debate and real opinions”, in N. Terkildsen, F. Schnell, eds., The Dynamics of Issue Framing: Elite Discourse and the Formation of Public Opinion ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 6 For a discussion see Green-Pedersen Christoffer 2007 ‘The Growing Importance of Issue Competition: The Changing Nature of Party Competition In Western Europe’ Political Studies Vol. 55, pp. 607-628 7 Nelson, Thomas E., and Zoe M. Oxley, “Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion”, The Journal of Politics, 61 (1999), 1040-1067. 8 A. Campbell, A., G. Gurin, & W.E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954). Also A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960). 9 Glass, David P., “Evaluating Presidential Candidates: Who Focuses on Their Personal Attributes?” Public Opinion Quarterly, 49 (1985), 17-34. Rahn, Wendy M., John H. Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, and John L. Sullivan. 1990 “A Social-Cognitive Model of Candidate Appraisal.” In Information and Democratic Processes, ed. John A. Ferejohn and James H. Kuklinski. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Carolyn L. Funk, “Bringing the Candidate into Models of Candidate Evaluation”, Journal of Politics, 61 (1999), 700-722. Carolyn L. Funk, “The impact of scandal on candidate evaluations: An experimental test of the role of candidate traits”, Political Behaviour 18 (1996), 1 – 24. 10 D.E. Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’, The American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 368–77. Also D.E. Stokes, “Valence Politics”, in Electoral Politics, ed., Dennis Kavanagh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 11 Stokes, D. (1963). "Spatial Models of Party Competition." American Political Science Review 57(2): 368-377 and van der Brug, W. (2004). "Issue ownership and party choice." Electoral Studies 23(2): 209-233. 12 J. M. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, “Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition” Journal of Politics, 44 (1982), 115-130 13 Schmitt, H. (2001). Politische Repräsentation in Europa. Eine empirische Studie zur Interessenvermittlung durch allgemeine Wahlen. Frankfurt, Campus 14 Green-Pedersen, C. (2007). "The Growing Importance of Issue Competition: The Changing Nature of Party Competition in Western Europe." Political Studies 55(3): 607-628 15 Bélanger, É. and B. M. Meguid (2008). "Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice." Electoral Studies 27(3): 477-491 16 van der Brug, W. (2004). "Issue ownership and party choice." Electoral Studies 23(2): 209-233 17 Melvin J. Hinich, Michael C. Munger (1996) Ideology and the theory of political choice University of Michigan Press Kitschelt, H. (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 18 E. Goffman, Frame Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1974) 19 See Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000) 20 T.E. Nelson and D. R. Kinder, “Issue framing and group-centrism in American public opinion”, Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 1055-1078. 21 S.J. Herman, D. M. Mackie, D. M. Driscoll, “Priming and the differential use of dimensions in evaluation”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16 (1990) 405–18. Also E. Tulving and D.L Schacter 1990, “Priming and human memory systems.” Science, 247 (1990), 301-306. 22 See Price, Vincent, “Priming Ideological Leanings: The Impact of Salience and Commitment”, Report to the National Election Studies Board of Overseers, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1991). Also Vincent Price and David 2


Tewksbury, “News Values and Public Opinion: a Theoretical Account of Media Priming and Framing”, in G. Barnett and F.J. Boster, Progresses in the Communication Sciences (Greenwich, CT: Greenwood, 1995), 173212. Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M. Kosicki. 1997. “Priming and Media Impact on the Evaluations of the President’s Perfomance.” Communication Research, S: 3-30.Nicholas Valentino, “Appeals that Matter: Political Advertising and the Priming of Ideology in Candidate Evaluations", Journal of Communication, 49 (1999). 23 J. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). R. M. Entman, “Framing: towards clarification of a fractured paradigm.” Journal of Communication, 43 (1993), 51-58 . Also Larry M. Bartels, “Is ‘Popular Rule’ Possible? Polls, Political Psychology, and Democracy” Brookings Review, 21 (2003), 12-15. 24 Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder, News That Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). S. Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991). Also Nelson, Thomas E., and Zoe M. Oxley, “Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion”, The Journal of Politics, 61 (1999), 1040-1067. 25 Zeev Maoz, “Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings”, World Politics, 43 (1990), 77-110. William G. Jacoby, “Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending”, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 750-767. Denniss Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies American Political Science Review, 101(2007), 637-655. Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments,” Journal of Communication, 57 (2007), 99-118. 26 Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 27 For other attempts to integrate these two criteria see Stuart MacDonald, Elaine and George Rabinowitz, “Solving the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position, and Direction in Democratic Politics” Electoral Studies, 17 (1998), 281-300 Stephen D. Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, Jr., “Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models”, Public Choice, 103 (2000), 327-336. Also James Adams “A Theory of Spatial Competition with Biased Voters”, British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 121-158. James Adams, Samuel Merrill, III, and Bernard Grofman. A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).. 28 Tim Groseclose, “A Model of Candidate Location When One Party has a Valence Advantage”, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-886. 29 John R. Zaller, The nature and origins of mass opinion, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 30 Interestingly Zaller himself challenged his original thesis based on then President Clinton’s continuing popularlity following the Monica Lewinsky scandal, arguing that people do indeed base their opinion on “real” issues. See John R. Zaller, “Monica Lewinsky's contribution to political science”, PS: Political Science and Politics, 31 (1998). However, this mea culpa was itself criticized by Lawrence and Bennett contention several years later that this in fact did represent manipulation, as mass opinion was shaped by the media to see this transgression as a personal rather than public matter. See Regina G. Lawrence and Lance W. Bennett, “Rethinking media politics and public opinion: Reactions to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal”, Political Studies Quarterly, 116 (2001). 31 This theory, introduced by Riker, states that parties will attempt to strategicaly focus campaigns on different issues to enhance their advantage over their rivals. See William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986). Also William H. Riker, “Rhetorical Interaction in the Ratification Campaigns’”, in William H. Riker, ed., Agenda Formation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993). 32 According to this perspective parties and candidates emphasize particular policies or aspects of issues to strengthen their electoral position. See Ian Budge, “Issues, Dimensions, and Agenda Change in Postwar Democracies: Long-term Trends in Party Election Programs and Newspaper Reports in Twenty-three Democracies” in W.H. Riker, ed., Agenda Formation (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993). Also J. A. Krosnick, J.A. “The Role of Attitude Importance in Social Evaluation: A Study of Policy Preferences, Presidential Candidate Evaluations, and Voting Behavior.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55 (1988). Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies (London: Georg Allen and Urwin, 1983). 33 This theory argues that parties will highlight those issues which they have a competence advantage in relation to their opponents. See John R. Petrocik, “Issue ownership in presidential elections”, American Journal of Science Review, 58 (1996). Also John R. Petrocik, William L. Benoit, and Glenn J.Hansen, “Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952–2000”, Political Science Quarterly 118 (2003). 34 Jane Green and Sara Binzer Hobolt, “Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices in British Elections”, Electoral Studies 27 (2008), p. 463.


35

John Londregan and Thomas Romer, ‘Polarization, Incumbency, and the Personal Vote’, in William A. Barnett, Melvin Hinich and Norman Schofield, eds, Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 36 Kitschelt, H. (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p 201-3 37 Enelow, J. M. and M. J. Hinich, The spatial theory of voting (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), 116. 38 Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman “Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies.” American Political Science Review, 101 (1007):637-655. 39 David R. Mayhew, “Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals”, Polity, 6 (1974). Gary C. Jacobson, "The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives", American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987). John Alford and David W. Brady, "Partisan and Incumbent Advantage in U.S. House Elections, 1846- 1986" Center for the Study of Institution and Values, Rice University (1998). 40 William D. Nordhause, “The Political Buisness Cycle.”, Review of Economic Studies, 62 (1975), 169-190. Cukierman, Alex and Alan Meltzer, A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation Under Discretion and Asymmetric Information, Econometrica, 54 (1986) 1099-1128. 41 David Golden and James Proterba, “The Price of Popularity: The Political Buisness”, Cycle Re-examined”, American Journal of Political Science 24 (1980), 696-714. K.M. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case”, World Politics 48 (1995), pp. 82-116. 42 V.O. Key, The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1966). R.M. Stein, “Economic voting for governor and U.S. Senator: The electoral consequences of federalism”, Journal of Politics 52 (1990). Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 43 See James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence”, American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003). Also James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert Rich, “Misinformation and the Currency of Citizenship,” Journal of Politics, 62 (2000). 44 Mendelsohn argues that daily conversation can serve as a “buffer” lessening the impact of priming on individuals. See Matthew Mendelsohn, “The Media and Interpersonal Communications: The Priming of Issues, Leaders, and Party Identification”, The Journal of Politics, 58 (1996). This reading was reinforced by Druckman and Nelson. See James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’ Conversations Limit Elite Influence”, American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003). By contrast, Druckman notes how conversation may aid in priming when it is reinforcing a generally accepted view, even if made so through effective framing. See James N. Druckman, “Priming the Vote: Campaign Effects in a US Senate Election”, Political Psychology, 25 (2004). This can be also attributed to the fact that individuals usually talk to individuals with similar viewpoints and preferences. See D.C. Mutz and P.S. Martin, “Facilitating Communication Across Lines of Political Difference”, American Political Science Review 95 (2001). 45 Budge, I. "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally," British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 443-467. 46 Butler, David, and Donald E. Stokes. 1969. Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. New York: St. Martin's 47 Ipsos-Mori: http://www.ipsosmori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=56&view=wide We consistently use the month before the election takes place, securing also compatibility with the previous 3 months, in order to minimize the campaign effect on the issue agenda. 48 Importantly the Labour Party Manifestos do not have a “concluding remark” sections as the Conservative Manifestos do. 49 1983 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, “The Challenge of Our Times”, electronic resource available at http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1983/1983-conservative-manifesto.shtml. 50 1983 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, “New Hope for Britain”, electronic resource available at http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1983/1983-labour-manifesto.shtml. 51 J. Lees-Marshment, Political marketing and British political parties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). 52 1987 The Conservative Party General Election Manifesto “The Next Move Forward”, electronic resource available at http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1987/1987-conservative-manifesto.shtml 53 1987 Labour Part General Election Manifesto, “Britain Will Win with Labour”, electronic resource available at http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1987/1987-labour-manifesto.shtml


54David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1987 (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1987), pg. 109. 55 Ibid., 110. 56 Ibid., 105. 57 Ibid., 51. 58 Ibid., 102. 59 1992 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, “The Best Future for Britain”, electronic resource available at http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1992/1992-conservative-manifesto.shtml 60 1992 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, “Britain will be Better with New Labour”, electronic resource available http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml 61 Kenneth Newton, “Caring and Competence: The Long, Long Campaign”, in Britain at the Polls 1992 (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publisher, inc., 1993), 135. 62 Ibid.,140. 63 Ibid., 140. 64 Ibid., 132 – 133. 65 Ibid., 146. 66 Ibid., 129. 67 Ibid., 140. 68 Ibid., 141. 69 1997 Conservative Party General Election Party Manifesto, “You Can Only Be Sure with the Conservatives”, electronic resource at http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/1997/1997-conservative-manifesto.shtml 70 1996 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, “New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better”, electronic resource available at http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml. 71 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1997 (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1997) 72Ibid., 97. 73Ibid., 101. 74Ibid., 102. 75 Ibid., 76 2001 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, “Ambition for Britain”, electronic resource available at http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/2001/2001-labour-manifesto.shtml 77 2001 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, “Time for Common Sense”, electronic resource available http://www.conservative-party.net/manifestos/2001/2001-conservative-manifesto.shtml 78David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 2001 (Basingstroke: Macmillan, 2001), 98. 79 Ibid., 104. 80 Ibid., 101. 81 Ibid., 105. 82 Ibid., 107. 83 2005 Labour Party General Election Manifesto, “Britain Forward Not Back”, electronic resource available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13_04_05_labour_manifesto.pdf 84 2005 Conservative Party Election Manifesto, “Are You Thinking What We’re Thinking? Its Time for Action”, electronic resources available at http://www.conservatives.com/pdf/manifesto-uk-2005.pdf 85 Dennis Kavanagh and David Butler, The General Election of 2005 (Basingstroke: MacMillan, 2005), 71. 86 Ibid., 75. 87 Ibid., 72. 88 Ibid., 71. 89 Ibid., 81 90 This phrase is most associated with issues of “freedom of speech”. It can be traced back classically to Socrates however its most modern philosophical roots is most notably found within the liberal tradition, particularly to the theories of John Stuart Mills. More concretely, it has been used by the US Supreme Court in a number of decisions including Abram v. United States (1919) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967). For its specific application to democracy and elections see Erik Asard and W. Lance Bennett, Democracy and the Marketplace of Ideas: Communication and Government in Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 91 Stanley Ingber, “The Marketplace of Ideas: a Legitimizing Myth”, Duke Law Journal 1 (1984). 92 See especially Krotoszynski, Ronald J. Jr.; Blaiklock, A. Richard M., “Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas”, University of Illinois Law Review, 813 (2000) 93 Tim Groseclose, “A Model of Candidate Location When One Party has a Valence Advantage”, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 862-886.


94

Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
