Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear

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Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear A Human Security Approach to a New Middle East? Deborah Wheeler US NAVAL ACADEMY

"ABSTRACT "In the Middle East, the persistence of authoritarianism and war, economic stagnation and the 'youth bulge', the proliferation of nuclear weapons, border disputes, competition over scarce resources, refugee problems, terrorism, human rights violations, tribalism, unresolved nationalisms and religious sectarianism make the region one where heads of state tend to place the security of their regimes over the security of the people. From a human security perspective, as explored in this article, states that pursue 'state security without investing in human security' unfortunately 'achieve neither' (UNDP, 2009, p. vi). My argument regarding the need to rethink Middle East security, for the sake of = both state and society, is based upon seven years of field work in10 Middle Eastern countries including Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, and Mo1rocco. Part one of this article looks at the convergence of global change in the security environment, 9 conceptual change in security policy making, and subsequent developments of a 'human security' approach. Part two traces the emergence of a local 'human security' dialogue in the Middle East, and Sillustrates how Arab intellectuals and policy makers are using the human security framework to press for more humane governance inthe Arab world. Aconclusion provides an assessment of the likelihood of a human security approach taking root in the region and shifting state priorities from regime survival to citizen wellbeing. Keywords: Human security, human development, Middle East, state security, citizens' rights, Internet. The battle for peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace. No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs. US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr (1945). (quoted in Smith, 2005, p. 39) In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. (UNDP, 1994, p. 22)

Eo

It is undoubtedly true that development rarely takes root without security; it is also true that security does not exist where human beings do not have access to enough food, or clean water, or the medicine they need to survive. It does not exist where children cannot aspire to decent education or a job that supports a family. The absence of hope can rot a society from within. (Barak Obama, 2009, p. 1) Both globalisation and the end of the Cold War have encouraged a reinterpretation of security. Especially, the decade-old focus on 'human security' (defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want) has broadened the definition to include facets of individual wellbeing in the security calculus. In some ways, the human security approach is a sign of the times-the

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result of two processes: an increase in the peace dividend and an increase in new non-state based threats. In terms of the first, because the world is not as focused on the likelihood of global nuclear holocaust, security can be redefined in terms of 'micro-security' issues such as poverty, political violence within states, and other quality of life factors. A second form of change stimulating a human security approach is the fact that threats in the global system are often articulated outside of a traditional state-based framework. These include for example terrorist networks, global warming, global health crises, refugee problems and cyberwarfare. Both of these forces, including a more peaceful global community, and an increase in nonstate based security challenges, are encouraging a rethinking of security. A human security approach attempts to subvert the logical assumptions of traditional security studies: 'states first, people last' (Neack, 2007, p. 1). In the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 'human security privileges people over states, reconciliation over revenge, diplomacy over deterrence, and multilateral engagement over coercive unilateralism' (Tutu, 2005, p. iii). As such, the human security approach is 'one of the most important and serious challenges to the way in which international security has been both theorised and practised for much of the last century' (McCormack, 2008, p. 113). In the Middle East, the persistence of authoritarianism and war; economic stagnation in some countries like Syria, Yemen, and the Sudan; the 'youth bulge' (defined as a society where greater than 50 per cent of citizens are under the age of 30); the proliferation of nuclear weapons, border disputes, and competition over scarce resources; refugee problems; terrorism; human rights violations; tribalism; unresolved theories of nationalism; and religious sectarianism make the region one of the least secure on the planet. The 2005 Human Security Report lists the following Middle Eastern countries as among the 'least secure' in the world: Iraq, Sudan, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Yemen (Human Security Center, 2005, p. 92). As the 2009 Arab Human Development Report: Challengesto Human Security in the Arab Countries,states: There are too many people in the Arab region living insecure lives, too many people living under persistent pressures that inhibit them from realising their potential as human beings, and too many traumatic events cutting lives short. In some Arab countries, more than half the population lives in hunger and want, with no means to look after their families or safeguard their own quality of life. (UNDP, 2009, p. v) The pages below will explore answers to the following questions: What does a genuine human security approach to the Middle East look like? If human security is in part contextually determined, are there any local voices contributing to the construction and implementation of the idea? The conclusion identifies key human security concerns in the region and assesses what role information technology access may play in promoting human security in the Middle East by making public institutions and the state more accountable to citizens. My argument regarding the need to rethink Middle East security politics is based upon seven years of field work in 10 Middle Eastern countries including Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. Part one of this article looks at the convergence of global change in the security environment, conceptual change in security policy making, and subsequent developments of a 'human security' approach. This section tries to make sense of why the 'human security' approach has been given a lukewarm embrace by many authors in mainstream security studies. One of the most notable critics for the purposes of this analysis is concerned that the human security approach, instead of promoting a more 'emancipatory and empowering' approach to security, creates a wider

Deborah Wheeler,'Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear'l 39

justification for powerful self-promoting states to interfere in the politics of other (weaker) nations (McCormack, 2008, p. 113). In other words, the human security approach can be used to promote and justify 'a new form of control and management of the developing world by the West' (McCormack, 2008, p. 114). The author argues that the Bush Doctrine of 'regional transformation' (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 339), when applied to the Middle East, means using 'American purpose and power' to promote 'non-negotiable demands of human dignity' in order 'to make people free inside strong but accountable states'. While the Bush Doctrine may help to support McCormack's argument, this is not the end of the story, as examined below (Moens, 2004, p. 210). The emergence of a local 'human security' dialogue in the Arab world challenges McCormack's view, and illustrates how Arab intellectuals and policy makers are using the human security framework to press for more humane governance in the Arab world in potentially emancipatory and empowering ways. These Arab human security advocates argue that 'real' change towards a more secure Middle East cannot be forced by outside actors, but rather must evolve organically from within. Just because a handful of Arab reformers are adapting aspects of the globally defined human security framework to explain local politics and to push for better policies, this does not mean that they are advocating for a wider range of foreign intervention (UNDP, 2009, p. 22). On the contrary, they are using the human security approach to point out how foreign intervention destabilises the region, while at the same time advocating for Arab states to 'respond to the needs and concerns of the most vulnerable populations' (Chourou, 2005, p. 7) to 'put the Arab house in order' (Chourou, 2005, p. 65). The conclusion from this analysis illustrates how increasingly available information technologies are being used by citizens throughout the Middle East to 'put the Arab house in order' in the face of states sometimes violently committed to preserving the status quo.

DEFINING (HUMAN) SECURITY Most scholars and policy makers credit the United Nations Development Program 1994 Human Development Report with creating the conceptual foundations for a human security approach. This report argues that, whereas traditional security concepts focus upon 'security of territory from external aggression', a human security approach focuses upon 'the legitimate security concerns of individuals who seek security in their day-to-day lives including protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards' (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). The 1994 Human Development Report oudines four key characteristics of human security:

"*The concept is universal, it applies to all people. "• Human security is interdependent-when one person or community experiences insecurity it affects the collective. In other words the consequences of human insecurity 'travel the globe'. (UNDP, 1994, p. 22)

"* Human security is easier to insure through 'early prevention rather than later intervention'. "* Human security is people centred. It is concerned with 'how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to

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market and social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or in peace'. (UNDP, 1994, p. 23) According to Lloyd Axworthy, former foreign minister of Canada, and one of the policy architects of the human security concept, 'national security and human security' are 'two sides of the same coin. Human security means building security from the bottom up. To use an analogy from economic theory, it is micro-security'. Thus, a human security approach affirms 'that peace and security-national, regional and international-are only possible if they are derived from people's security' (Axworthy, 2000, p. 1). The emergence of a human security approach is a post-Cold War legacy. Mary Kaldor, Professor at the London School of Economics, provides a link between the changing security environment and the need for new analytical tools when she observes that 'our security capabilities largely designed for the Cold War seem incapable of addressing these everyday sources of insecurity'. She elaborates: In today's world, many people lead intolerably insecure lives. They risk being killed, kidnapped, raped, robbed or expelled from their homes; they fear earthquakes or cyclones, the spread of disease or losing their life savings; they may not have enough to eat or clean water to drink; they may lack access to health care. (Kaldor, 2008, p. 1) In light of these everyday insecurities, Kaldor argues, as did the UNDP a decade and a half earlier, for 'a profound restructuring of the global security sector away from a preoccupation with national and bloc security' to a focus on human security (Kaldor, 2008, p. 1). Kaldor defines human security as 'about the security of individuals and the communities in which they live, rather than the security of the state' (Kaldor, 2008, p. 1). Human security is characterised by an 'interrelated link' between 'freedom from fear and freedom from want' (Kaldor, 2008, p. 1). Human security is also characterised by the 'blurring of the distinction between internal.. .and external security' (Kaldor, 2008, p. 1). The Human Securiry Report developed by the Human Security Center at University of British Columbia reiterates the need for a new security studies framework. The Center argues that security is about preventing armed conflict. Traditionally, our theories of security were designed to 'explain wars between states and to prescribe policies to prevent them' (Human Security Center, 2005, p. viii). Given the changing geopolitical environment, we now live in a world where most armed conflicts take place within states. Information gathered by the Center indicates that conflict within states, including civil war, international terrorism, and political violence, constitutes '95 per cent of armed conflicts'. In other words, our current analytical frameworks of security 'explain wars between states-and prescribed policies to prevent them' and thus 'are largely irrelevant to violent conflicts within states' (Human Security Center, 2005, p. viii). A new approach, a human security approach, is needed in order to design 'a sustained and strengthened commitment to conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building' (Human Security Center, 2005, p. 10). While scholars and policy makers make good cases for developing new security lenses with which to understand and respond to our rapidly changing post-Cold War world, a contingent of critics disagree. One of the critiques is definitional. From this perspective, adapting definitions of security to explain a broader range of phenomena dilutes the utility of the term and thus puts at risk what we already know about security. Fen Osler Hampson elaborates on this critique when he states that 'if the concept of security is expanded to include

Deborah Wheeler,'Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear'l 41

every conceivable threat to humanity, it would be so diluted as to mean nothing and would therefore be of little analytical or policy relevance' (Hampson et al., 2002, pp. 14-15). Stated another way, Laura Neack, Professor of Political Science at Miami University, asks, 'Without a clear understanding of what we are securing and what we are securing against, how do we know when we have found the right policy, doctrine, weapon, or alliance that will in fact secure us?' (Neack, 2007, p. 4). In response, scholars have provided more limited definitions of human security, so as to improve the term's analytical utility. For example, the Human Security Center at the University of British Columbia defines human security as an absence of 'violent threats'; in other words, 'the protection of individuals and communities from internal violence' (Human Security Center, 2005, p. viii). Other scholars note that in terms of problems of definition, 'the idea of "threat" needs to be identified with more precision for the human security concept to accrue analytical credibility' (Thomas & Tow, 2002, p. 1). Mary Kaldor expands on the reasons for the resistance to a human security approach when she observes that critics fault the concept's strategic value. From this perspective human security is said to be 'a "soft security" concept' when in the end 'it is hard capabilities that matter' (Kaldor, 2008, p. 5). In response to the critique that human security is not realistic enough, and too 'soft power' based, Kaldor draws on counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and observes, 'As American forces are discovering in Iraq, a population-centric approach may require more people, more equipment and may mean more risk-taking' (Kaldor, 2008, p. 5). In other words, human security may be more of a hardware-based approach to security than traditional notions, it's just that the definition of when and how to use military hardware to counter threats is being expanded to include not only state sovereignty but individual rights and basic human needs as well (Kaldor, 2008, p. 5). Perhaps the most troubling critique of the human security approach for this author is the argument that strong states will use the guise of promoting human security to intervene in the affairs of weaker states, often maximising their own self-interests and subsequently making the lives of individuals living in weaker states potentially more insecure. From this perspective, The merging of development and security presents an inversion of existing international power

inequalities, presenting the weakest and most powerless states as existential threats to the most powerful ones. This serves to entrench existing power inequalities rather than challenge them. Furthermore, the recharacterisation of sovereignty as responsibility... potentially allows powerful states or international institutions greater freedom to intervene in and regulate weaker states.. .This serves to disempower the citizens of weak or impoverished states. (Mc-

Cormack, 2008, p. 114) McCormack's warning about the potential misuses of the human security approach are appropriate, given the way that the United States used a human security argument to justify its violation of Iraqi sovereignty. We see this logic when President Bush claims: For too long, the citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear. The hatred of a few holds the hopes of many hostage. The forces of extremism and terror are at-

tempting to kill progress and peace by killing the innocent. And this casts a dark shadow over an entire region. For the sake of all humanity, things must change in the Middle East. (Bush,

2002, p. 2)

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By forcing regime change from without, in the name of Iraqi freedom, the Bush administration created a downward spiral in the human security of Iraqi citizens. While Iraqis now have a greater say in who governs their country, their everyday lives and livelihood are threatened by random violence and the possibilities of civil war. An October 2010 survey of refugees returning to their homes in Iraq conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Office found that most who had returned were sorry they had (UNHCR, 2010, p. 1). Most responded that their regrets stem from a lack of human security, including 'physical insecurity, economic hardship and a lack of basic public services' (UNHCR, 2010, p. 1). But just because the Bush administration used a human security argument to moralise intervention in the Middle East does not mean that the concept itself is flawed. The section below focuses on how the human security approach is giving local communities in the Middle East globally recognised terms with which to advocate for freedom from fear and freedom from want in the region.

HUMAN SECURITY INTHE MIDDLE EAST The Middle East is a fruitful political environment for understanding how individual liberties and rights and opportunities, i.e., 'human security', come into conflict with efforts to secure the state from both internal and external threats, i.e., 'traditional security'. In the words of Bechir Chourou, Professor of Political Science at the University of Tunis and a human security consultant for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in the Middle East, 'national security is equated with regime security, and disagreements or dislikes between leaders are transformed into animosity and conflicts between peoples' (Chourou, 2005, p. 63). Moreover: rulers designate, arrest, try and otherwise dispose of 'internal enemies': individuals and groups accused of plotting against national security, attempting to seize power illegally, conniving with foreign enemies, betraying the nation and other crimes, when in fact the only charge that may be levelled at such individuals and groups is that of speaking their minds or demanding greater respect for their civil and human rights. (Chourou, 2005, p. 63) It is thus understandable why Arab intellectuals and policy makers seeking reform find a human security approach appropriate. As Aziz al-Azmeh argues, 'a comprehensive framework for addressing the security of Arab citizens is surely needed' (UNDP, 2009, p. 22). The human security approach acknowledges that 'the personalisation of security entails a recognition that the interests of individual human beings are distinct from, and might even conflict with, those of states' (Hampson et al., 2002, p. 37). The human cost of this contest between state and individual rights in the Middle East is examined in light of a human security approach (directed towards freedom from fear and freedom from want) in more detail below. If we define security in terms of how people live, how much freedom they have, what opportunities they have for advancement, and whether or not they live in conflict zones or places of relative peace, then it would not be difficult to argue that the Middle East is a region that suffers from a human security deficit, especially in terms of freedom from fear. Freedom House rates the Middle East as one of the least free places on the planet. Human development indicators for the region reveal that the Arab world ranks in the middle of the index, neither rich nor poor in development, but this data masks pockets of poverty, illiteracy and lack of opportunity that characterise part of the human security challenges of the region.

Deborah Wheeler,'Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear' 43

Table 1: Select Human Security Indicators Middle East (quality of life) Country Life % of pop. exp. literate 15+ (years) 1995-2005 2005

GDP per capita 2005 us $

Yemen

61.5

54.1

$930

GDP Unemployment% of population undergrowth 2009 (est.) nourished 2004 rate (%) 19902005 1.5% 35% 38%

Morocco 70.4

52.3

$4555

1.5%

9.10%

6%

Algeria

71.7

69.9

$7062

1.1%

10.2%

4%

70.7 Egypt Lebanon 71.5

71.4

$4337

2.4%

9.4%

4%

87.4

$5584

2.8%

9.2%

3%

Palestine 72.9

92.4

$2900

-2.9%

28%

16%

ordan

71.9

91.1

$5530

1.6%

12.9%

6%

Syria

73.9

80.8

$3808

1.4%

8.5%

4%

Kuwait

77.3

93.3

$26,321

0.6%

2.2%

5%

Saudi Arabia

72.2

82.9

$15,711

0.1%

10.5%

4%

(Source: UNDP, 2009 and CIA World Factbook,2010) Although the Middle East is not as development challenged as Africa, it faces its own special deficits. For example, in 2002, the inaugural Arab Human Development Report identified three social deficits that provide human security challenges in the region: freedom, knowledge, and women's empowerment. Illustrating once again how the global community may attempt to leverage these vulnerabilities in order to justify intervention, a G8 Working Paper observes, 'The three "deficits" identified by the Arab authors of the 2002 and 2003 United Nations Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR)-freedom, knowledge, and women's empowerment-have contributed to conditions that threaten the national interests of all G8 members,' to the degree that 'so long as the region's pool of politically and economically disenfranchised individuals grows, we will witness an increase in extremism, terrorism, international crime, and illegal migration' (AI-Hayat, 2004, p. 1).

441 Journal ofHuman Security, vol. 7, no. 1,2011

Table 2: Human Security Indicators Middle East (quality of governance) Country Internet users Internet % of user growth population rate % 2000-10

% GDP spent on health (2004)

% GDP Good spent government on accountability military -2.5-2.5 (2005) (higher the better)

Good govt stability -2.5-2.5 (higher he better)

Freedom House rating (2010)

Yemen 1.8% Morocco 33%

2700% 10,343%

1.9% 1.7%

7.0% 4.5%

-1.06 -0.62

-1.48 -0.52

Not free Partially

Ageria 13.6% Egypt 21.2% Lebanon 24.2%

9300% 3691% 233%

2.6% 2.2% .2%

2.9% 2.8% 4.5%

-1.01 -1.24 -0.45

1.18 0.77 -2.09

Not free Not free Partially

Palestine ordan Syria Kuwait

14.2% 27.2% 17.7% 39.4%

917% 1268% 13,016% 633%

7.8% 4.7% 2.2% 2.2%

5.1% 5.3% 5.1% .8%

-1.28 -0.64 -1.77 -0.46

-2.07 -0.29 -0.61 0.40

Paudi Arabia

38.1%

4800%

2.5%

8.2%

[1.59

-0.59

ree

free

Not free Not free Not free Partially free

ot free

(Source: Freedom House, 2010; UNDP, 2009) During more than two decades of participant observation of Middle Eastern politics, I have encountered a region where security of the state is used as a pretext for war, as a pretext for violating human rights, as a pretext for maintaining the status quo, including denying opportunities for entrepreneurialism and individual advancement. For example, while conducting research on information technology and development in Egypt (2000 and 2004), I learned that a complex state bureaucracy allows only the few and well connected to obtain a license to open a new business. In 2010, The Index of Economic Freedom observes that 'obtaining a business licence still takes more than the world average of 18 procedures in Egypt' (Index of Economic Freedom, 2010, p. 2). Likewise, some Internet caf6 managers I interviewed in Jordan in 2004 had to wait five years or more to obtain a licence to open their business. Any kind of 'oppositional' activity taking place on a computer in their caf6 could result in the removal of the owner's licence. In the Middle East, individuals are afraid of repression, afraid of instability, afraid of the next refugee crisis, afraid of the state-and for good reason, as all of these elements of insecurity and threat touch their lives regularly. Recent human security analyses from the Arab world substantiate this anecdotal evidence. For example: The population of the Arab world doubles every 15 years. Six per cent growth in GNP is needed to sustain the basic services needed by the growing population. The annual growth rate in GNP in the Arab states is only one percent, meaning that an increasing number of the population does not have access to sufficient health care, education, employment opportunities and clean water (Moussa, 2007, pp. 11-12).

Deborah Wheeler,'Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear' 45

"* In the Arab world, 60 million people are illiterate; two-thirds of the illiterates are women and more than nine million school-aged children across the region are not enrolled in school (Maktoum Foundation, 2009, p. 97).

"*A shocking 13.5 percent of children between the ages of five and 14 in the Arab world are employed in dangerous forms of manual labour and living on the street (Moussa, 2007, p. 12).

" By 2015 the population of the Arab world is projected to reach 395 million. Sixty per cent of the population is under the age of 25. The Arab world will need to create 51 million new jobs by 2020 to absorb new entrants to the labour market (Friedman, 2009, p. 1).

"*Water demands in the Arab world have exceeded available water resources by 46 per cent (RBAS, 2009, Vol. 2, p. 7). According to Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and leader of the National Association for Change in Egypt, 'the sanctity of human life is not equally valued'; there is a perception that 'society grieves the loss of life in the developed world far more than it grieves the greater loss of life in places like Darfur or Iraq' (ElBaradei, 2006, p. 1). Would the world achieve more security if the life and livelihoods of all global citizens were valued equally? In the Middle East this would mean that the security of Israelis would no longer take precedence over that of Palestinians; the security of the residents of Darfur would be equal to that of the residents ofAbu Dhabi; the security of a king, an emir, a president equal to that of ordinary citizens. As Kaldor observes, 'perhaps the biggest challenge for a human security approach is cognitive. It is the challenge of accepting that the lives of Africans or Asians are equal in value to the lives of Americans and Europeans' (Kaldor, 2008, p. 2). George W. Bush reiterated this perspective when he observes that human security means living with 'prosperity and freedom and dignity'. He articulates that obtaining these quality of life values 'are not just American hopes, or Western hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives and nations' (Bush, 2002, p. 2). In more concrete terms, in his final year as president, on 18 January 2008 in Abu Dhabi, President Bush stated that: In a free and just society, every person is treated with dignity. In a free and just society, leaders are accountable to those they govern. And in a free and just society, individuals can rise as far as their talents and hard work will take them. For decades, the people of this region saw their desire for liberty and justice denied at home and dismissed abroad in the name of stability. (Bush, 2008, p. 1) Some in the Arab world doubt the sincerity of President Bush's commitment to human security in the Middle East, and instead see use of the concept as a disguise for the US's selfinterests in the region. Resentment of the Bush Presidency's use of force to create change (and instability) in the region made the human security message ring hollow. In contrast, President Obama's speech to the Muslim world delivered in Cairo in 2009 had a positive impact on local Arab perceptions ofAmerican interests in the region. In this speech, President

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Obama stressed the interdependent relationship between global and local security when he observed: For we have learned from recent experience that when a financial system weakens in one country, prosperity is hurt everywhere. When a new flu infects one human being, all are at risk. When one nation pursues a nuclear weapon, the risk of nuclear attack rises for all nations. When violent extremists operate in one stretch of mountains, people are endangered across an ocean. And when innocents in Bosnia and Darfur are slaughtered, that is a stain on our collective conscience. That is what it means to share this world in the 21st century. That is the responsibility we have to one another as human beings. (Obama, 2009) While President Obama's approval ratings in the Arab world rose after this speech by 51 percent, one year later, in 2010, the Arab public awarded the US President a 16 percent approval rating (Telhami, 2010). From the Western perspective, 'the interconnectedness of people in a globalised world makes the concern with other people's fate not only an issue for ethics, but also an issue of informed self-interest' (Grimm, 2004, p. 1). The emphasis from this perspective is on humanitarian intervention. Intervention, however, even if done with humanitarian motives, can have a destabilising effect on the Middle East. For example, one recent report posits that the US, 'being convinced that democracy and free enterprise are the best barriers against extremism and terrorism', will 'seek to institute these principles wherever it deems they are lacking' to the degree that any country that 'refuses to cooperate will be.. .brought into the folds of civilisation-by force, if necessary' (Chourou, 2005, p. 28). The drop in the President's approval rating is probably linked to the US's inability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This suggests that while 'aspects of Obama's Cairo speech last year may have helped produce a momentary spike in his popularity in the region, a much more enduring benefit for America's standing in the Arab world will come from implementing sound policies that produce good results' (Inboden, 2010, p. 1). To counter the possibilities of foreign aggression, the Arab world is encouraged by regional human security narratives 'to set up authoritative political institutions to resist intervention by an outsider' (Chourou, 2005, p. 28). Reinforcing this view, Marwan Muasher, Foreign Minister of Jordan (2002-2004), argues that 'the idea is to come up with a home-grown process in order that others not impose something from the outside' (quoted in MacFarquhar, 2004, p. 1). In other words, human security enhancing reforms, although important to crafting a more stable and prosperous Middle East, need to come from within. A recent report from the Arab Reform Initiative shows that one of the weaknesses in transitions to better governance in the Middle East, where citizens' rights are valued and protected by the state, is that 'the democratic transition process is driven from abroad' (Shikaki, 2010, p. 10). Aziz al-Azmeh argues that to 'speak of human security in the Arab world' means to 'enrich the concept of human security by placing it within the framework of Arab community movements'; to 'keep clearly before our eyes that our fundamental purpose in concerning ourselves with human security is to achieve human and national development' (UNDP, 2009, p. 22). While critical of attempts by foreign nations to impose human security strategies from without, local human security strategists acknowledge the overlap in goals. For example, Chourou argues that 'we [Arabs] need to claim the emerging global framework for human security as our own rather than reject it simply because it has been proposed by others' (Chourou, 2005, p. 90). Ironically, the desire 'to construct free and just societies in the Middle East' is not only at the heart of the Bush and Obama doctrines, but as well, it figures prominently in the local human security agenda. The difference, however, is operational.

Deborah Wheeler,'Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear' 47

The Bush doctrine sees the use of force as an expedient tool with which to promote the human security agenda, especially in recalcitrant contexts, while local human security narratives (and the Obama administration) (Hamid, 2010, p. 1) stress 'that reforms have to be voluntary, adopted progressively, and reflective of objective realities' (Chourou, 2005, p. 94). Reiterating the interconnectedness of local and global interests in creating a more secure world, ElBaradei observes, 'the modern age demands that we think in terms of human security... modern society is interdependent as never before' (ElBaradei, 2006, p. 1). Some local human security narratives argue that in order for free and just societies to emerge, the stability and security of states must be conceptualised in such a way as to give equal consideration to the lives of individuals, in addition to the stability of states. This is especially the case in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict where 'the widespread acknowledgement of Israel's security needs has contrasted sharply with the marginalisation of the Palestinians' similar fears and concerns' (Khalidi, 1995, p. 1). Correcting the conceptual imbalances of the security calculus in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would be in both Israel and the Palestinians' best interests, according to one local observer. Operating under traditional security definitions has not brought Palestinians or Israelis increased security. Elaborating, Lucy Nusseibeh observes: In spite of the full application of all the traditional security measures on the part of Israel in order to achieve security, the majority of Israelis still live in fear. The majority of Palestinians live in fear, too, because of the occupation and Israel's application of these security measures. Thus neither Palestinians nor Israelis have any sense of security. (Nusseibeh, 2008, p. 1) What is needed instead, she argues, is not 'the acquisition of more and better weapons' but rather a 'new approach to security' (Nusseibeh, 2008, p. 1). In other words: Shifting the focus to human security instead of military security would encourage the development of mechanisms for the protection of individuals on both sides in a way that would not depend on the power of guns but on the needs of those individuals. As a bottom-up approach, an emphasis on human security could perhaps enable people to see that real security for the region will only come through the dismantlement of walls and checkpoints, the encouragement of economic and personal growth and, of course, through ending the occupation. (Nusseibeh, 2008, p. 4) The lack of human security for Palestinians in the occupied territories provides an extreme glimpse of more general and subtle forms of human security challenges in the region as a whole. As Chourou explains, 'a backlog of deprivation and imbalance' in the Arab world produces forms of insecurity as 'arising from wars and occupation; a lack of participatory governance; gender inequality, poor management of the development process, and shortfalls in the acquisition, absorption, use and production of knowledge' (Chourou, 2005, p. 11). In addition, a dependence on oil and non-diversified economies and a lack of food security given the relative absence of arable land (Chourou, 2005, pp. 46-47) encourage a regional dialogue on human security. Within these local narratives we see how a human security approach can be emancipatory, if strong states do not use the concept to meddle in the affairs of weaker states, and if local intellectuals use the idea to leverage change within their societies. It is not by accident that the recently released 2009 Arab Human Development Report is dedicated to the subject of Arab human security. Its release adds to regional and global debates on the subject. The report argues that 'the trend in the region has been to focus more on the security of the state than on the security of the people' and that such an approach

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'has led to missed opportunities to ensure the security of the human person, and has left the bond between state and citizen less strong than it might otherwise be' (UNDP, 2009, p. v). The security of states cannot be achieved without the security of people in the Middle East. An approach which safeguards the state at the expense of citizens in the region has led to 'suboptimal outcomes for state and citizen alike' (UNDP, 2009, p. vi). In other words, as affirmed by this article, states that pursue 'state security without investing in human security' unfortunately 'achieve neither' (UNDP, 2009, p. vi).

CONCLUSION This article has shown that a human security approach is prudent, especially since change in the world has created the need for new security concepts to address the increasingly interdependent nature of security challenges. Part two of the analysis provided a snapshot of local Middle Eastern narratives on the development of a human security approach to the Middle East. The cost of the Iraq war, the freedom deficit, the youth bulge and unemployment, water scarcity and food insecurity, occupation, and the impact of energy dependence on the region's oil are just a few examples of the geopolitical forces encouraging a human security dialogue. Local scholars ofhuman security argue that to promote peace in the region, Arab states should put their own 'houses in order', and instead of preparing for war, with neighbours and their own populations, they should look out for the disenfranchised. They should provide contexts of good governance whereby people can thrive, be empowered by choice and enabled by opportunities for a meaningful and secure life. Doing so is the best line of defence against foreign intervention and instability in the region. So how can a more human-security oriented state and society relationship emerge in the Middle East? By way of conclusion I argue that if more citizen-friendly states are to emerge in the Middle East, impetus for such change is unlikely to originate with the state, as heads of state and their circles of family and friends have the most to gain from the status quo and are, in most cases, resistant to change except for the most cosmetic of forms. As Marina Ottaway observes, 'The maintenance of order and state security, rather than the provision of good administration, social service, and human security have been and remain the major concerns of Arab governments' (Ottaway, 2009, p. 44). For example, the Syrian state spends 50 percent of its budget on security, and 1.7 percent on social services (Kandil, 2008, p. 425). This is 'bad news' for the increasingly discontented Arab public, as 'the status quo does not hold much promise' for the average citizen in the region (Ottaway, 2009, p. 43). For most citizens in the Middle East, the status quo means 'the perpetuation of regimes that do not believe in accountability or participation and put much greater emphasis on regime security than on human security' (Ottaway, 2009, p. 43). The status quo means 'difficult living conditions, high unemployment, poor education, fraying health services and ... decaying urban infrastructure overwhelmed by population growth' (Ottaway, 2009 p. 43). Given the fact that states in the Middle East have vast coercive techniques, and are not afraid to employ them against citizens to maintain public order and the status quo, even at the expense of the general public's livelihood and individual security, it is contextually insensitive to ask what the Arab state will do to enhance human security. Alternatively, it is more contextually appropriate to query to what length the state will employ coercion and violence to maintain its grip on power. Since it is not state survival (the regimes in the region do just fine, sometimes maintaining their grip on power for 30 years at a time with little change in the distribution of power resources, goods and services) but enhancing citizen

Deborah Wheeler,'Freedom from Want, and Freedom from Fear' 49

livelihoods and human security that is our main concern here, we must redirect our focus from the state to citizens, for 'citizen discontent convinces governments that reform is a wise political option' (Ottaway, 2009, p. 44). Since the late 1990s I have been using ethnographic methods to discover whether or not citizens in the Middle East would use information technology to press for better governance and greater control over their lives and livelihood. From a number of different angles, from gender empowerment, to youth empowerment, to democratic enhancements and campaigns for political change, I have studied at the grassroots level whether or not internet access could be leveraged to enhance Middle Eastern citizens' security in the face of states mostly concerned with self preservation. (Wheeler, 1998, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2010) While in 2010 states remain intact, and the status quo remains relatively stable in most countries in the region, reminders of increasingly evident peoples' power are shaking up norms in the 21st century Middle East. We see the implications of Internet and social media use for citizen empowerment across the region, but especially in Kuwait (Orange Revolution), Iran (election fraud protests), Egypt (blogger revolution), Lebanon (Cedar Revolution) and Saudi Arabia (small signs of IT coordinated change) (Nordenson, 2010; Esfandiavi, 2010; Faris, 2010; Brown 2005; Murphy, 2009). The endgame of this virtual tug of war between repressive states hell-bent on survival and digitally empowered citizens demanding good governance and opportunities for advancement is still emerging. As Mona Eltahawi observes, 'Facebook has not overthrown a single Arab dictator, and Twitter has yet to topple any regimes' (Eltahawi, 2010, p. A13). Instead of looking for regime change, however, she suggests that the best place to assess the impact of new media is 'to look at their effect on young people in the Arab world-the bulk of the population-and the loosening of long established controls' (Eltahawi, 2010, p. Al 3). This is because, as Carolyn Marvin put it, 'electronic and other media precipitate new kinds of social encounters long before their incarnation in fixed institutional form' (Marvin, 1988, p. 3). Encouraged by Jeffrey Goldfarb and his examination of 'the powers of the powerless in dark times', we should focus on 'the politics of small things' that may 'make a difference, in everyday life, in political contests.. .and in the global arena' (Goldfarb, 2006, p. 146). Internet-based practices are small things, by small people, with the potential for drawing big crowds, both virtual and real, in the service of new politics and social norms. With demands for more autonomy and voice, and new opportunities to improve their lives, new publics are emerging and making their mark, if not immediately on the institutions and tools of state, then at least on the minds of citizens and their perceptions of how the world is ripe for change, even if only localised in their own everyday lives.

AUTHOR'S NOTE This article was completed in the (northern) autumn of 2010. The dramatic Twitter- and Facebook-organised revolutions occurring in Tunisia and Egypt in the first two months of 2011 show the potential of social networking tools to mobilise Arab publics in their demands for freedom, better governance, and more equitably distributed opportunities and resources. All of these demands are key to increased human security throughout the region. The spillover effects of these peoples' revolts are still emerging, with the collapse of the old regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and obvious cracks in the status quo visible in Libya, Jordan and Yemen. As this article goes to print, the tug of war between new-media-armed citizens and status-quo-minded state is gaining energy in Algeria and Bahrain. The fact that these chal-

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lenges to the old order were mass based, non-violent, and not based upon any single political or religious platform, but rather supported by gender, class, age, economic and ideological inclusivity, demonstrates the power of the internet to bring people together in their fight for their rights. Together these rapid changes give hope for a more humanly secure Middle East.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Deborah L.Wheeler is an associate professor at the US Naval Academy in the Department of Political Science and is a visiting professor at the American University of Kuwait. She is the author of numerous articles and a book on the development and impact of the internet in the Arab world. Her other areas of research include human security, food security, and cyber security. Over the past 20 years, she has conducted fieldwork in more than 10 Middle Eastern countries. Email: [email protected]

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