Gender and Gender Stereotyping

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In that sense, greater numbers of female Democratic than Republican ... gender quality, equal gender roles, and feminism in American society and elsewhere.
Partisan Sorting and the Feminist Gap in American Politics

Leonie Huddy and Johanna Willmann Stony Brook University

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2016, Philadelphia and the 2016 annual meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, July, Warsaw. We thank Simon Jackman, Ted Brader, and Vince Hutchings for providing the initial impetus for this project and Stanley Feldman for invaluable statistical advice.

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Abstract Americans have increasingly sorted in recent years into political parties based on gender, race, and religion. This social partisan sorting has occurred in tandem with ideological partisan sorting. In this research we differentiate between social and ideological partisan sorting as explanations for women’s greater concentration within the Democratic Party. We focus on feminism not gender as the identity that drives women and men’s social partisan sorting and assess its effects in recent ANES data. More women than men support feminism but not all women do so. Moreover, feminism has a more powerful influence on partisanship among women than men, boosting women’s identification with the Democratic Party to a greater extent than among men. Its rejection, in the form of anti-feminism, also boosts women’s identification with the Republican Party to a greater extent than among men. These effects are large and independent of different facets of ideological partisan sorting.

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Over the last several decades, Americans have sorted increasingly into political parties on the basis of social groups such as gender, race, and religion (Mason 2016). The Democratic Party has become more female, black, Latino, and Asian and the Republican Party increasingly white, evangelical, male and southern (Abramowitz 2013; Achen and Bartels 2016). At the same time, American partisans have become more ideologically consistent. Political liberals who support gay marriage and government supported health care dominate the Democratic Party and conservatives who oppose legalized abortion and support tax cuts are concentrated in the Republican Party. The two phenomena – social and ideological sorting -- are related but they are also distinct. Ideological sorting divides Democrats and Republicans on bedrock economic issues such as taxation and social-moral issues such as gay marriage whereas social sorting is linked to identity politics and splits partisans on questions of societal group treatment, equal rights, and the relative standing of their own and other groups within American society. Researchers have focused more intensively on ideological (Abramowitz 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Levendusky 2009) than social partisan sorting (Mason 2015; Mason 2016). But an emphasis on ideological sorting is likely to overestimate the influence of policy position on partisan polarization. This point is made forcefully by Achen and Bartels (2016) who argue for greater attention to the role of group allegiances within politics. As they note “social identities have trumped policy reasoning in shaping the politics of religion, race, and abortion in contemporary America” (p. 231). A focus on group allegiances shifts the conversation about partisan polarization away from ideological and toward social sorting and identity politics. Mason identifies a socially sorted partisan individual as one whose partisanship, race, religion, and ideological identities align-- for example a Democrat who identifies as liberal, black, and secular or a Republican who identifies as white, evangelical and conservative. In her research, aligned or sorted partisans experience the strongest political emotions in response to political success and failure, are

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most angry with the other political party, and are most politically polarized (Mason 2016; 2015). The heightened emotionality and polarization of sorted partisans arises because a partisan identity aligns with racial, religious, and ideological identities, heightening the motivation to defend one’s party and express animosity toward opposing partisans (Mason 2015). By extension, increased partisan social sorting helps to explain the recent rise in affective partisan polarization (Iyengar et al 2012). There is more to social sorting, however, than aligned identities. According to social identity theory, individuals who identify strongly with their gender, race, religion, or ethnicity, are also motivated to defend the group’s status, eradicate group-based discrimination, and work toward positive societal recognition (Huddy 2013). In that sense, social partisan sorting is not just about the merging of partisan, racial, religious and other identities. It also involves the sorting of individuals into parties on the basis of group–related concerns. A strongly identified African-American who is aligned with the Democratic Party expects the party to adopt positions that respect and strengthen the status of black Americans. A strongly identified Christian evangelical aligned with the Republican Party expects the party to respect and promote Christian values. It is important to assess the degree to which group-linked beliefs, not just merged social identities, fuel partisan social sorting. Gender and Partisan Sorting In this project, we focus on the growing concentration of women within the Democratic Party and examine the extent to which this can be traced to a set of group-based beliefs that we refer to as feminism. It is important to acknowledge at the outset that women do not constitute a unified political force. Since the early 1980s, American women have consistently voted in greater numbers than men for Democratic presidential and congressional candidates and gravitated increasingly towards the Democratic Party and its candidates (Box-Steffensmeier et al 2004; Chaney et al 1998). According to exit polls (CNN 2016), 13% more women than men voted for Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, a gap that was only slightly larger than in the 2012 presidential election.

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The modestly sized gender gap in vote choice and partisanship makes gender an especially complex group in which to study partisan social sorting. From another angle, however, its political complexity is advantageous because it forces a deeper consideration of the processes that underlie partisan social sorting. To what extent does social sorting rely on objective group membership, such as being white or female, versus thinking of oneself as a group member? Is the relevant identity the entire social group (e.g., white people, women), or a politicized subset of the group (e.g., white nationalists, feminists) (Simon and Klandermans 2001)? Does a politicized identity such as feminism serve to divide objective group members (e.g., women) into those who are for and against the group’s politicization? And can someone who does not objectively belong to the group (e.g., men) side with politicized group members (e.g., feminist women) as a fellow traveler motivated by a similar desire to elevate the group’s standing? The answers to these questions are central to an understanding of partisan social sorting. The role of feminism as a basis for women’s stronger affiliation with the Democratic than Republican Party needs to be contrasted with ideological sorting, an important alternative. Women may be more numerous than men within the Democratic Party because they are more supportive of broad societal equality and the government provision of social welfare benefits (Huddy et al 2008). Obviously, feminism and a liberal ideology are linked within contemporary American politics. Feminists support liberal policies such as paid family leave, equal pay legislation, and affirmative hiring programs for women which involve government intervention in the marketplace. Nonetheless, feminism can be distinguished from political ideology when construed as support for women’s political advancement, the equalization of male and female power, the removal of barriers that impede women’s success, and a strengthening of women’s autonomy. Some of these goals can be achieved by promoting women to key positions within the party and passing legislation with strong symbolic value for women without necessarily favoring conservative or liberal economic principles. In that sense, women may have moved towards the Democratic Party because it supports women

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politicians and is concerned about gender equality (Hansen 2014). In contrast, women’s greater support of the Democratic Party may be grounded in liberal ideology and support for a broad liberal agenda that extends well beyond gender. Gendered Loyalty, Affinity, and Antipathy Research into partisan social sorting has been based on the assumption that group membership shapes partisan preferences in a relatively straightforward manner. The logic is simple: the Democratic Party supports and furthers the interests of African-Americans, Latinos, and women leading them to identify as Democrats (Dawson 1994; Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). But race is less diagnostic of partisanship among whites, complicating the discussion of group-based political loyalties. As blacks gravitated toward the Democratic Party in the wake of the civil rights movement, racial antipathy propelled some whites toward the Republican Party fueling the southern realignment (Valentino and Sears 2005). Other whites, however, held positive racial attitudes that kept them within the Democratic Party, a dynamic that was especially visible in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections when racial attitudes were a potent force of both white opposition and support for Barack Obama (Kinder and DaleRiddle 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010; Tesler 2016). The partisan divisions observed among whites can also be found among women, posing the questions raised earlier as fundamental to an understanding of partisan social sorting. If partisan social sorting helps to explain women’s partisanship, what is the gender identity that propels some women towards the Democratic Party and others towards the Republican Party? It is unlikely to be an identity as a woman which is primarily personal. Feminist has long been recognized as the politicized version of a female gender identity. It is not endorsed by all American women, but it is endorsed by a majority. In a 2015 national survey, 60% of women (and 33% of men) considered themselves a feminist (Hamel et al 2016). Specific political beliefs typically accompany a feminist identity. Perceived gender discrimination is the kind of status grievance that has driven Latinos, Asians, and blacks towards the Democratic Party

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(Hajnal and Lee 2011; Masuoka 2006). It may also enhance feminist women’s Democratic identification. The complexity of gender as a political category arises, in part, because men and women are highly interdependent (Burns et al 2015; Jackman 1994). Unlike the majority of blacks and whites or Latinos and Anglos, men and women live together, have common economic interests, share subjective experiences, and have children of the other gender. As a consequence, some women express feminist loyalty, and identify with the Democratic Party on that basis. Other women express feminist antipathy, identity more strongly with the interests of men, and align with the Republican Party. The interdependence of men and women also means that some men express a feminist affinity, have considerable sympathy for feminism, and may also identify with the Democratic Party for that reason. The possibility that non-group members sort into a political party in affinity with a social group has received little attention in the literature on social sorting but remains a very viable possibility. Ultimately, we expect women’s feminist loyalty and antipathy to play a greater role in shaping their partisanship than feminist affinity among men because feminist and anti-feminist identities have greater personal relevance for women than men, elicit stronger emotions, and will be more central to women’s political outlook (Conover 1988). Achen and Bartels (2016) provide some evidence that women are more likely than men to translate their stance on gender issues into partisanship. They report that non-Catholic pro-choice women were more likely than comparable men to shift from the Republican to Democratic Party between 1982 and 1997 as the parties diverged in their support of legalized abortion. In contrast, men were more likely to stick with their political party and change their position on abortion to be consistent with their partisanship. In this way, modest gender differences in feminist beliefs can amplify the gender gap in partisanship because women not only express greater support for feminism than men but also translate it more readily into a partisan preference. In this research, we shift the discussion of gender and partisan sorting away from a discussion of differences in men and women’s partisan preferences, the typical gender gap, towards men and

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women’s loyalty, affinity, and antipathy towards feminism. We develop a robust multi-item measure of feminist beliefs using data from the 2012 and 2016 ANES and assess its role in driving partisanship and party polarization in contemporary American politics. The 2012 and 2016 ANES contain a larger battery of gender items than previous ANES surveys, making it possible to assess the effects of feminism more fully than in the past. We replicate key analyses with data from the 2004 and 2008 ANES which contain a brief measure of feminism and find that feminist beliefs have a substantial effect on Democratic and Republican identification among women and to a lesser extent among men. This feminist gap is independent of political ideology (as assessed by key values linked to social and economic ideology and ideological self-placement) attesting to the power of social partisan sorting. Moreover, feminism has large effects on women’s partisanship rivalling the effects of key aspects of ideology such as support for big government and endorsement of traditional morality. Its effects among men are smaller but still sizeable. Feminist Beliefs Measurement of Feminist Beliefs We draw on Miller and colleagues’ (1981) research on group consciousness to identify three clusters of attitudes that constitute a coherent set of feminist beliefs: subjective group identification, a belief that one’s group is relatively deprived, and a sense that the system is to blame for group disparities and/or should be changed to fix the problem (see also Burns and Gallagher 2010). More specifically, we define feminism as feminist identity, perceived societal discrimination against women, and the need for greater female political power (to remedy systemic problems within the political system). We consider each concept in turn. Feminist identity is the politicized version of a female identity and Americans have relatively positive things to say when asked what it means, equating it with equal gender rights and strong, independent women (Hamel et al 2016). Fully 60% of American women and 33% of men described

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themselves as strong feminists or feminists in the 2015 Washington-Post-Kaiser Family Foundation poll (Hamel et al 2016), a slight increase over the mid-1990s (Huddy et al 2000). In the same 2015 poll, 60% of women and 57% of men also held a favorable impression of feminism. A second crucial aspect of group consciousness involves group-based grievances. Perceived gender discrimination taps that well for feminists. In 2015, 28% of Americans said there was a lot and 51% said there was some discrimination against women in contemporary American society (Hamel et al 2016). Similar numbers are observed in recent national polls conducted by Pew (Pew Research Center 2016). Views on gender discrimination have rarely been included in past measures of feminist consciousness but they are a crucial aspect of group consciousness and constitute an important component of a feminist outlook. In the absence of a grievance, there is little need for a political remedy. The third aspect of group consciousness, system blame and/or a systemic remedy for inequities, is partly captured within feminism by support for an increased number of women in decision making positions including political office. In that sense, greater numbers of female Democratic than Republican members of Congress sends a clear message about how actively the two parties support women candidates. Various polling organizations have asked Americans the importance of electing a woman president and have found majority support in recent polls. For example in a CBS poll conducted in June of 2016, 72% of Americans said they hoped that a woman would be elected President in their lifetime and in a Pew poll conducted in August of the same year 60% said it was somewhat or very important to elect a woman president (Presidential Gender Watch 2016). A feminist or anti-feminist identity, perceived gender discrimination, and support for greater female political power are treated as an interrelated package of beliefs that indicate broad support or opposition to feminism (Conover 1988). In the past, support for equal gender roles was a feature of many scales tapping feminist consciousness (Kalmuss, Gurin, and Townsend, 1981; Banaszak and Plutzer

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1993), or was combined with other aspects of feminist beliefs (Cook 1989; Cook and Wilcox 1991; Rhodebeck 1996; Conover 1988; Conover and Sapiro 1993). But the relevance of this dimension may be waning as paid employment becomes an economic necessity for women. Typically, gender role questions have assessed whether women should work outside the home, whether a man’s career is of greater importance than a woman’s, women’s parenting roles, and women’s responsibility for household chores (Davis and Greenstein 2009). But these issues are a step removed from government policy and are not typically included in measures of group consciousness for other social groups. As a consequence we omit questions on equal roles from our measure of feminist beliefs. The Origins of Feminist Beliefs If feminist sorting helps to explain women and men’s Democratic and Republican partisanship, we need to take one step back and consider the origins of feminist beliefs. Feminist loyalties, affinities, and antipathies are not a simple function of gender. They are linked in more complex ways to personal experiences, interpersonal relationships, religious beliefs, and personality characteristics. More fundamentalist religions sharply differentiate men and women’s roles leading highly religious men and women to be less supportive of feminism and gender equality. Women’s education boosts support for gender quality, equal gender roles, and feminism in American society and elsewhere. Single women lack close interdependence with men and are more likely than married women to be feminists. Members of racial and ethnic minority groups in the US are also stronger feminists than the white majority, perhaps signaling a form of minority group solidarity (Ingelhart and Norris 2003; Rhodebeck 1996; TollesonRinehart 1992). The origins of feminism in basic personality attributes has not been examined but there is good reason to expect such a connection. The personality trait of openness to experience, drawn from the Five Factor model, is characterized by intellectual curiosity, an active imagination, and a preference for variety, and has been tied to support for liberal ideology (Gerber et al 2010; Caprara and Vecchione

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2013). It is also likely to shape American men and women’s support for feminism because it is associated with the questioning of social convention. Agreeableness, another facet of the Five Factor personality structure, also likely boosts support for feminism. It has been linked to low levels of social dominance orientation, reduced racial prejudice, greater egalitarianism, lower support for social hierarchy, and greater support of gender equality (Ekehammar et al 2004). Authoritarianism is another stable orientation that decreases support for feminism among men and may do so among women as well (Haddock and Zanna 1994). Feminism is obviously tied to other political beliefs, including liberal ideology. Conover (1988) documents the association between feminist identity, equal gender roles, egalitarianism, non-traditional morality, sympathy for the disadvantaged, and greater support for increased spending on social programs among women. Cook and Wilcox (1991) report similar associations between liberal values and support for feminism among men. Our challenge is to distinguish feminism, with its emphasis on gender equality, from political ideology and broader aspects of social and economic liberalism. Research Goals In this study we assess the degree to which feminist beliefs increase American men and women’s identification with the Democratic Party as a test of the partisan social sorting hypothesis. First, we establish the nature of feminist beliefs, assessed as identification with and positive feelings toward feminists, perceived societal gender discrimination, the absence of resentment and hostility towards women who challenge male power, and support for female political power. We test whether these attitudes cohere as a singular concept and examine the measurement invariance of feminist beliefs by gender, age, race, and ethnicity. Second, we establish the origins of feminist beliefs in factors that are exogenous to partisanship such as marital status, education, religiosity, and key personality traits. Third, we test the social partisan sorting hypothesis by examining whether feminist beliefs propel

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support for the Democratic Party independently of key ideological beliefs, and whether this connection is stronger for women than men, as predicted. Data and Measures Data are primarily drawn from the 2012 and 2016 ANES studies. Both studies include respondents interviewed face-to-face (FTF, N=2,054 in 2012; N=1,181 in 2016) and respondents interviewed online (N=3,860 in 2012; N=3,090 in 2016). We pool data from the FTF and online samples and use post-stratification weighting and survey design corrections unless otherwise noted (DeBell 2010). The 2012 ANES also includes large oversamples of Blacks and Latinos. We also replicate findings using data in the 2004 and 2008 ANES. Feminism We measure four facets of feminism. In 2012, feminist identity is measured by the feminist feeling thermometer; in 2016, it also includes feminist identity and a measure on how well the term feminist describes oneself. Perceived gender discrimination is measured by five items in 2012: the seriousness of gender discrimination, its pervasiveness, whether the media should devote greater attention to it, the extent of employment discrimination, and perceived gender differences in societal opportunity. The latter four items are drawn from the modern sexism scale (Swim et al 1995). In 2016, perceived gender discrimination was assessed by two of these same items (media, pervasiveness of discrimination). A related concept of gender resentment taps opposition to efforts to increase gender equality and is measured with two items from the modern racism scale in 2012: whether women who demand equality seek special favors, and whether women cause more problems than they solve when complaining about discrimination. In 2016, this concept was expanded to include the two original items and 4 hostile sexism items (women interpret innocent remarks as sexist, women fail to appreciate what men do for them, women seek to gain control over men, and women wish to put men on a leash; Glick and Fiske 1996). Support for more women politicians is assessed in 2012 as support for a woman

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president measured with two items: whether it would be a good or bad thing to have a woman president and the personal importance attached to having a woman president. In 2016 it was measured by a single item asking the importance of electing more women to political office. All variables are standardized on a 0 to 1 scale in which 1 represents the most feminist response. All question wordings and response options are listed in the Online Appendix (Table A1). Partisanship Party Identification is measured with the standard ANES 7-point scale. The variable was recoded from 0 (strong Republican) to 1 (strong Democrat). Partisan polarization was created by subtracting the thermometer feelings for Republican from that for Democrats and recoded to range from -1 (100 degrees for Republicans, 0 for Democrats) to +1 (100 for Democrats, 0 for Republicans). Political Ideology The documented link between feminism and political ideology necessitates their careful separation within analyses. Political ideology is measured in both the 2012 and 2016 ANES by two constructs: support for traditional morality (social ideology), and a preference for government over the marketplace (economic ideology). Moral traditionalism is assessed by additively combining agreement or disagreement with four statements such as “we should be more tolerant of people who live according to their own moral standards,” and “the newer lifestyle are contributing to a breakdown in our society” (α=0.70 in 2012, α=0.71 in 2016). The role of government is assessed by additively combining four questions on the desired size of government and preferred level of government regulation of business and the marketplace (α=0.76 in 2012, α=0.73 in 2016). The 2012 and 2016 ANES also include the singleitem liberal-conservative self-placement scale.1

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Ideology is measured by the standard seven-point continuum. Individuals who said they “haven’t much

thought about this” are coded as moderates.

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Personality Factors Four items from Feldman’s (2003) child rearing battery were additively combined to form a scale of authoritarianism (α=0.60 in 2012, α=0.64 in 2016). Respondents were asked which of two values was more important for a child to possess: independence vs. respect, obedience vs. self-reliance, being considerate or well-behaved, and curious or good mannered. Openness to experience and agreeableness were measured by two items each from the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) (Gosling, Rentfrow and Swann 2003). Demographics Analyses also include a series of demographic factors linked in past research to support for feminism and/or partisanship: gender, marital status, current workforce participation, race and ethnicity, age, education (level of highest education), spousal education, degree of religiosity (church attendance), and region (south). Survey mode (face-to-face versus web) was included in analyses as a check on socially desirable responding which was expected to be higher in face-to-face interviews. All variables are coded from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation except for age, which is coded in decades. The Structure of Feminism We subjected indicators of feminism to a higher-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in both the 2012 and 2016 ANES (Figure 1). The first-order factors reflect the four key concepts underlying feminism: feminist identity, perceived discrimination, lack of resentment, and support for female politicians. At the second level, we assess how well each of the four first-order factors load on the second-order factor: feminism. The analysis is run in MPlus based on polychoric correlation coefficients. The data are weighted, adjusted for survey design effects, and factor scores are robust weighted least squares estimators (WLSMV).

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Figure 1: Structure of Feminist Beliefs 2012

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The results of both CFAs are included in Table 1 below. Entries are standardized loadings which can be interpreted as correlation coefficients and directly compared in size. As seen in Table 1, all freely estimated parameters are substantially large and statistically significant (p < 0.001). The first-order factors load strongly on the second-order feminism factor, with loadings ranging from 0.59 to 0.79 in 2012 and .7 to .94 in 2016. Similarly, indicators load strongly on the first-order factors, ranging from a low of .62 to a high of .97 in 2012 and .43 to .76 in 2016.2 We tested two alternative configurations,

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In addition to the model depicted in Figure 1, the 2012 model fit was improved by allowing two

indicators to load on a second factor as shown in Table 1. The ‘employment discrimination’ item loaded

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neither of which improved the model fit significantly. First, we tested a less parsimonious single-level solution, allowing the four first-order factors to correlate. In 2012, factor correlations varied between 0.41 and 0.61 and in 2016, the correlations ranged between 0.45 and 0.83; the model was neither worsened nor notably improved by the removal of the second-order feminism factor and we adopt the more parsimonious second-order factor solution. Second, we included a two-item gender role scale as a fifth first-order indicator of feminism. This modification did not improve the model fit. The higher-order feminism model provides an excellent fit to the data in both 2012 and 2016 the RMSEA is under .05 (2012: 0.041, 90% CI = 0.037 - 0.046; 2016: .038, 90% CI = .034-.043) and the CFI and TLI are both close to 1 (2012: CFI = 0.986, TLI = 0.980; 2016: CFI=.992, TLI=.987).3 The final model demonstrated measurement invariance (Horn and McArdle 1992) across gender, age, race, and survey

weakly on the resentment factor and the ‘complaining women cause problems’ item loaded weakly on the perceived discrimination factor. Both cross-loadings are minimal with negative standardized estimates of -0.33 and -0.43 respectively, that differ in direction and are well below the size of the other factor loadings. In 2016, errors were allowed to correlate among similar items: all four items from the hostile sexism scale, feminist identity and how well feminism describes you, and the two discrimination items. 3

The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is based on the log-likelihood (χ2) of the

estimation and corrects for sample size and complexity of the model (df). The RMSEA and χ2 should both approach 0. MacCallum, Browne and Sugawara (1996) suggest that an RMSEA below 0.05 indicates a good model fit. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) compare the model χ2 to a baseline (worst fit) model and should approach 1. According to Hu and Bentler (1999), a CFI and a TLI above 0.95 indicate a good model fit.

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mode (Tables A2, A3, Online Appendix), suggesting that Americans basically understand feminism in the same way.4

Table 1: The Structure of Feminism Feminism (Second Order Factor) 2012 Feminist identity/feelings 0.59 (0.01) Women politicians 0.64 (0.02) Discrimination 0.79 (0.01) Resentment 0.72 (0.02) Feminist Identity (First-Order Factor) Feeling towards feminists Consider yourself a feminist How well does feminist describe you Women Politicians (First-Order Factor) Women as president is good vs. bad Women as president is important Important to elect women to political office Discrimination (First-Order Factor) Discrimination as a serious problem Media should pay attention to discrimination Employment discrimination Opportunities are greater for men vs. women Discrimination against women Complaining women cause problems (rev) Lack of Resentment (First-Order Factor) Women seek special favors (rev) Complaining women cause problems (rev) A woman puts man on leash (rev) Women seek to control men (rev) Women don’t appreciate all men do (rev) Women see innocent remarks as sexist (rev) Employment discrimination

2016 0.89 (0.02) 0.70 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02) 0.74 (0.16)

1.00 (0.00) -----

0.76 (0.02) 0.74 (0.02) 0.69 (0.02)

0.87 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01) ---

----1.00 (0.00)

0.78 (0.01) 0.75 (0.01) 0.82 (0.02) 0.62 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01) -0.33 (0.04)

--0.74 (0.02) ----0.55 (0.02) ---

0.68 (0.02) 0.88 (0.03) ---------0.43 (0.03)

0.68 (0.02) 0.64 (0.02) 0.51 (0.02) 0.55 (0.03) 0.55 (0.02) 0.43 (0.02) ---

Note: Entries are completely standardized factor loadings with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are coded so that a high score indicates support for feminism. The metric of the latent factors is fixed to be the same as the first indicator of each factor which has an unstandardized factor loading of one. Reverse worded items are marked as “rev”.

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Measurement invariance was tested by comparing the fit of a series of hierarchical CFA models with

increasingly stringent equality constraints (Cheung and Rensvold 1999; Vandenberg and Lance 2000).

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Figure 2 Distribution of Feminist Beliefs by Gender: Kernel Density Plot 2012

2016

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Based on the confirmatory factor shown in Figure 1, we created a single scale of feminism from the four feminist subscales: feminist identity (α=0.83 in 2016), perceived gender discrimination (α=0.77 in 2012; α=0.56 in 2016), gender resentment (α=0.57 in 2012, α=0.80 in 2016), and support for women politicians (α=0.87 in 2012). The four subscales were combined to form a single measure of feminism (α=0.63 in 2012; α=0.74 in 2016). The kernel density plot for the feminism scale is shown in Figure 2, plotted separately for men and women. As seen in that figure, feminism is reasonably normally distributed in both 2012 and 2016. Men scored significantly lower than women in both years (men: .55 in 2012, .46 in 2016; women: .60 in 2012, .54 in 2016).5 Nonetheless, men and women also overlap considerably in their support and opposition to feminism. Figure 2 thus provides evidence of both

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A t-test indicated that the gender difference was significant in 2012 (t (3,693) = -10.39; p