generosity, reputation, and costly signaling: a ...

Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 4(2006)2, 173–181 DOI: 10.1556/JCEP.4.2006.2.5

GENEROSITY, REPUTATION, AND COSTLY SIGNALING: A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF ALTRUISM TOWARD UNFAMILIAR PEOPLE BELA BIRKÁS1, TAMAS BERECZKEI, ZSUZSANNA KEREKES Department of Psychology, University of Pécs

Abstract. Generosity seems to be a cross-culturally ubiquitous feature of life. Helping others is considered as a costly act through which the altruists gain popularity and reputation in their reference group and this elevated reputation will pay off for them in future social relationships. This costly signaling theory has been widely tested in pre-industrial societies. Our purpose was to examine if the assumptions of CST are verifiable in modern, industrial societies. Using a complex experimental procedure with four subsequent phases we could examine reputation-gaining in realistic conditions. We found that more people are willing to offer help to a charity organization when their group mates are aware of their altruistic intention than those whose offer was concealed from the rest of the group. In return, the offered charity service increased the altruist’s reputation in the group; in the light of sociometric surveys they gained more popularity than the others. Finally, it turned out that whereas men are more likely to offer potential help in the presence of others, women provide more actual help. Keywords: evolution of generosity, charity offer, costly signaling theory, reputation, differences between sexes

THEORY Generosity seems to be a cross-culturally ubiquitous feature of life. It is well documented that humans are often altruistic toward unrelated individuals, even strangers. This behavior is an evolutionary puzzle, because inclusive fitness theory does not explain how design features that deliver benefits to non relatives can emerge. Recently, however, several evolutionary conceptions have been produced to explain 1

Correspondence may be addressed to Béla Birkás, Department of Psychology, University of Pécs, Ifjúság útja 6, H-7624 Pécs, Hungary. E-mail: [email protected] 1589–5254 © 2006 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest

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why humans behave altruistic toward non-kin: reputation-building, strong reciprocity, altruistic punishment, indirect reciprocity, showing-off and costly signaling (BOWLES and GINTIS 2004; BOYD et al. 2003; FEHR and FISCHBACHER 2003; HAMMERSTEIN 2003; MILINSKI et al. 2002). These theories suggest that altruism is not unconditional, rather it seems to be strategic: the occurrence of an altruistic act depends on several variables, such as the actual situation and the personality traits of the donor and the recipient. Costly signaling theory (CST) is one of the most elaborated and empirically supported theories in evolutionary anthropology that can explain the broad social context and interpersonal conditions of generous act (GURVEN et al. 2000; HAMMERSTEIN 2003; SMITH and BLIEGE BIRD 2000; SOSIS 2000). CST – that has recently integrated showing off models (HAWKES and BLIEGE BIRD 2002) – states that individuals are altruistic because this behavior serves their own interests by reliably demonstrating their qualities underlying the altruistic act that may be useful for the group mates in the future social interactions, such as forming friendships, alliance, mates (GURVEN et al. 2000; SOSIS 2000). In accord with this theory, the ultimate reason of altruism is to inform the rest of the group that the altruist person is generous, trustworthy, and capable of doing valuable services. Helping others is considered as a costly act through which the altruists gain popularity and reputation in their reference group and this elevated reputation will pay off for them in future social relationships. Although they do not expect immediate compensation, in the long run they are likely to be “rewarded” by the others with praise and honor. Consequently, they may be the main target of the future supports and services by the others. The costly signaling theory has a great explanatory power in the interpretation of experimental data concerning generosity towards strangers. Costly signaling theory has been tested in a few researches and observations in pre-industrial societies (PATTON 2005; SOSIS 2000). One of these has been carried out among the Meriams, turtle hunters of Torres Strait, Australia (BLIEGE BIRD and BIRD 1997; SMITH and BLIEGE BIRD 2000). In this tribe when hunters come back from turtle-hunt, they offer their catch for all the group members holding a villagefeast. During the breeding season, when the turtles are out at sea, the costs of hunting, measured in time and energy, and potential risk of injury, are substantial. Under these circumstances, only few young unmarried males hunt, who receive no recompense, not even portions of their catch in the subsequent feast. Those who lead turtle hunts appear to be signaling leadership skills, specialized knowledge, and generosity in supplying collective goods. Consequently, they are entrusted to participate in public meetings and private disputes, which is quite uncommon for young men, in general. In addition, their demonstrated qualities increase their chance to marry the highly ranked girls.

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STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES Costly signaling theory has been primarily tested in hunter–gatherer communities and very few studies have been made so far in the industrial societies. A study revealed that lonely men gave money mainly to female beggars, while those who were accompanied with their female partner (girlfriend, wife) preferred male beggars (GOLDBERG 1995). The extent and the frequency of the charity are independent from the income of the donors, but they are closely related to the nature of the relationship with their partner. Those men with a new partner gave the largest amount of money, whereas those with a stable, long-term partner proved to be less altruistic. The researchers assumed that men were generous at the beginning of their relationships because they wanted to improve their partner’s view about their personality, and thus increase their chance of staying together. In another study, heroic rescuing behavior was studied, using news archives of local papers in the UK (LYONS 2005). It was found that males were more likely to rescue than females, and that a typical rescuer was a low status male rescuing another male. These results are consistent with costly signaling theory in that risktaking behavior can be interpreted as an honest signal of bravery and strength, skills which may be highly desirable traits for potential mates. Furthermore, men from poorer backgrounds might take more risk in a rescuing behavior because they have more to gain and less to lose than those of higher status.

HYPOTHESES A confirmation of costly signaling explanation in the industrial societies needs a more controlled experiment, compared to the previous studies. In our study we make an attempt to investigate generosity in real life circumstances, analyzing variables such as charity offer, costs, reputation, etc. The hypotheses of our experiment are the following: 1. Individuals are more likely to offer help in a situation where their group members are informed about their charity than under circumstances where their charity remains hidden for the others. 2. Individuals who offer help in the presence of others gain more reputation and popularity in their group than those who do not offer help. Whereas men are more likely to offer potential help in the presence of others, women provide more actual help. In the view of sexual selection theory, there is a greater competition among men, than among women who are more cooperative, empathetic and caring than men (GEARY 1998; MEALEY 2000). Therefore, women are expected to engage more frequently in a real helping activity.

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METHOD Subjects In our experiment 81 persons (44 women and 37 men) participated. They all were students of the University of Pécs and belonged to 6 seminary groups. They participated voluntarily and received nothing for their attendance. We sought for groups the members of which knew each other well but, at the same time, did not establish stable friendships. For this purpose we investigated groups that formed at the beginning of the semester, that is group mates had known each other for only a few months.

Sociometry In the first phase of the experiment, subjects were asked to respond to a sociometrical survey. The survey was substantiated by the work of Jacob Lévi MORENO (1954) and MÉREI (1971/2004), and was revised and developed further by COIE et al. (1982), and CRICK (1996). Sociometry is a commonly used assessment procedure for identifying and classifying individuals according to peer acceptance. This survey contains questions referring to important life-situations, in which individuals had to choose group members for a particular social purpose. (Example: With whom of your group members would you willingly spend a weekend? or With whom among your group members do you feel glad and happy?) With this survey we can determine the person’s position and status within the social group. In our study, subjects were asked to complete a sociometric questionnaire that instructed the participants to nominate the classmates in their seminary group they liked or respected the most in terms of sympathy and popularity. The change in social preference (reputation) was measured by the difference between the total scores of the first and the second sociometric survey.

Procedure Our study was a complex procedure, with four subsequent phases, where every stage was characterized with a peculiar experimental situation and stimuli material. Phase 1. In the first phase of the experiment, we visited seminary groups. The meeting was appointed but we did not give any details about the aims of our experiment. We asked the students to complete the TCI and CPI tests mentioned above. After that a sociometric survey was taken about each member. Phase 2. After filling out the test and answering the questions of the survey, 4– 5 weeks had passed until proceeding with the second phase. Then, we trusted a woman on behalf of a charity organization to ask the students to offer various helping activities listed on a sheet. The sheet listed seven different forms of support and JCEP 4(2006)2


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target groups from which the students could make their choice (taking the blood pressure, organizing a day for blood-donors, collecting donations, providing care for the old, providing care for the physically disabled, providing health care for the homeless, providing assistance for mentally handicapped children). Everyone who was willing to contribute to the charity service was asked to subscribe himself/herself on this list. Additionally, we also obtained experimental data about how the presence of others affects charity offer. In three groups, the potential altruists were asked to talk about their charity offer in the presence of group mates, therefore the others exactly knew what kind of help they undertook (public offering condition). In the other three groups, altruists were asked to write their offer on a sheet, so nobody was informed about it (anonymous offering condition). The woman from the charity organization told participants that those who offered help can fulfill their engagement in a few weeks. Until that time they could contact one another by phone or email to conciliate the exact date of executing their help. Phase 3. At the end of the seminar lesson where offers were made the teacher asked the participants to fill out a second sociometrical survey (which was the same as the previous one). Phase 4. Over the subsequent three weeks several persons of the potential altruists – those who had offered help earlier – got in touch with us with the purpose of fulfilling their promise. We called these persons true altruists. The other participants did not contact us after offering help, they did not appear any more. We called them showing off altruists. The true altruists were introduced to a staff member of the charity organization who informed them about the specific conditions of charity service and took them to the scene of support.

RESULTS Charity offer Figure 1 shows that relatively few students were willing to offer help to unknown persons (t = 2.214, df = 79, p < 0.05). This is not surprising: as the relevant research has revealed, helping to a stranger has several strict cognitive, emotional, and social conditions in an industrial society that are highly difficult to be overcome by the majority of us (HOGG and VAUGHAN 2005). In accord with hypothesis 1, the likelihood of charity offer proved to depend on the circumstances of publicity. As Figure 2 shows, significantly more subjects were willing to give assistance if they could make their charity offers in the presence of their group mates than in a situation when the offers were made without the knowledge of the others (F = 14.177, p < 0.01 and t = 1.772, df = 79, p < 0.05).

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Percentage of participants (%)

80 70

offered

60 not offered

50 40 30 20 10 0

Figure 1. The proportion of individuals offering charity service

90 Percentage of participants (%)

80 70

public condition

60

anonymous condition

50 40 30 20

10 0

Figure 2. Percentage of participants who offer help in public and anonymous conditions

Reputation An offered charity service seems to increase the likelihood of the altruist’s reputation in the group. As Figure 3 shows, the difference between the average scores of the first and second sociometrical surveys is strongly associated with the likelihood of altruistic offer. Helping individuals gained better reputation – received more sympathy-based votes – than those who did not offer help (F = 3.82, p > 0.05 and t = 5.306, df = 79, p < 0.01). Interestingly, however, this distinction is independent of JCEP 4(2006)2


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the condition of publicity. Regardless of whether the others could observe the altruistic act or not, the altruist’s reputation increased both in the public and in the anonymous group. Moreover, in the public condition the participants did not increase the sociometric scores of potential helpers so much as they decreased the scores of those who had not offered help. 2.5

2

Anonymous

1.5

Public

1 0.5 0 –0.5 –1

Offering help

Not offering help

–1.5 –2

Figure 3. Mean difference between the scores of subsequent sociometric surveys in public and anonymous conditions

Differences between sexes In phase 4, a small fraction of subjects (10 persons) who previously had offered help contacted us with the purpose of fulfilling their promise. Women were four times more likely to provide actual help than men whose majority promised to help, but did not perform their offer. However, since the number of actual helpers is small, this difference did not reach significance level (8 women vs 2 men, F = 1.781, P > 0.05) DISCUSSION Our study suggests that altruism is influenced by reputation-gaining strategy. More people are willing to offer help to a charity organization when their group mates can experience this offer, compared to those whose charity offer remained hidden for the rest of the group. In return, those participants, who appeared to be generous towards strangers, received more sympathy-based votes in the sociometrical survey, JCEP 4(2006)2


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than those who did not offer any help. Altruism – or at lest the intention to help – may lead to an increase in the popularity and reputation of the altruist people. Even more important, since people show more readiness to offer help in public conditions than anonymous conditions, one can suggest that potential helpers can really hope that their status will rise if the others obviously know about their generosity. Our results may be interpreted by the costly signaling theory. A result that seems to contradict our theoretical expectation is that the altruist’s reputation increased in both the public and the anonymous group. It is possible that group members know each other very well, and in the light of their former experiences they can estimate who will provide help, even if they have not any direct information about the actual charity offer. Thus, people can attribute more generosity to classmates who altruistically behaved in the past, regardless of their single response to the request of a charity organization. In the future, more precisely controlled studies will have to be done for distinguishing the effects of helpfulness and reputation gaining. Obviously, an offer to charity service is not equal to actual help. Our results show that only 12% of those subjects who had offered help contacted us with the purpose of participating in a real, actual helping act. Therefore the majority of participants only showed off the intention to help but never fulfilled their promise in a realistic situation. Finally, our data supports the hypothesis concerning the differences between sexes. More women than men have been found to really want to help that may indicate that men are more likely to pursue show off strategies than women, although the difference did not reach significance level, due to the small number of actual helpers. This corresponds with the evolutionary hypothesis that women were selected to be more cooperative and generous than men, whereas men were selected to be more involved in competitive strategies than women in order to acquire the necessary resources, including social support (GEARY 1998; MEALEY 2000). Our study suggests that in certain social circumstances altruism may result from a basically selfish strategy, that is from the wish to raise one’s reputation and position in one’s own reference group and thus gain long-term benefits. However, this explanation does not exclude the possibility of the reality of true altruistic intention. Several studies have revealed that people are able to help strangers even in the absence of direct or indirect return. More empirical studies are needed to clarify motivational factors, personality traits, and social circumstances that influence the ways and devices we use in helping others.

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