Giuseppe Marco ATTANASI CV - Paris School of Economics

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Macroéconomie, Economie du Tourisme et Economie des Institutions ... Chargé de cours de Microéconomie et Macroéconomie (Licence). Fév. 2002 – Oct. 2004.
Giuseppe Marco ATTANASI CV RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS

ADRESSE PERMANENTE

Lieu de naissance: Galatina (LE), Italie Date de naissance: 21.02.1976 Nationalité: Italien e-mail: [email protected]

Maison des Sciences Economiques Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne 106, boulevard de l’Hôpital 75013 PARIS Tel. +33 659 200 132

Langues: Italien (langue maternelle), Anglais (courant), Français (courant), Espagnol (bon niveau). Poste actuel (Janvier 2012 – Août 2012): Chercheur Postdoctoral, Paris School of Economics FORMATION Avril 2006

Doctorat en Economie, Università Bocconi, Milan Jury de thèse: Prof. Pierpaolo BATTIGALLI (Directeur de thèse, Università Bocconi, Milan); Prof. Andreu MAS-COLELL (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona), Prof. Aldo MONTESANO (Università Bocconi, Milan); Prof. Rosemarie NAGEL (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona).

Juillet 2007

Master en Economie Industrielle, Universidad de Valencia (Espagne)

Juillet 2001

Master en Economie (MEc) avec distinction, Università Bocconi, Milan

Juillet 2000

Licence en Economie, Università Bocconi, Milan, avec une spécialité en Théorie et Analyse Economique. Titre de la thèse: «Incertitude et irréversibilité dans les décisions environnementales». Note finale: 110/110 summa cum laude

1996 – 1997

Etudiant Erasmus au Queen Mary and Westfield College (Département de Économie et Mathématique), University of London (UK)

Juillet 1994

Baccalauréat Scientifique: Lycée A. Vallone, Galatina (Italie). Note finale: 60/60 POSITIONS DE RECHERCHE PRÉCÉDENTES

2007 – 2011

Chaire Junior à la Toulouse School of Economics (Fondation “Jean-Jacques Laffont” – Chair “Georges Meyer” in Mathematical Economics) et au LERNA (Laboratoire d’Économie des Ressources Naturelles)

2009

Chercheur associé à l’Institut d’Economie de l’Entreprise et du Travail, Università Cattolica, Milan

2006 – 2007

Chercheur associé au “Laboratoire d’Economie Expérimentale” (LEE), Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Espagne)

2005

Etudiant de doctorat visiteur à l’Univesitat Autonoma, Barcelona

2004 – 2005

Etudiant de doctorat visiteur à l’Univesitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona 1

ACTIVITÉS d’ENSEIGNEMENT et AUTRES ACTIVITÉS DANS L’UNIVERSITÉ March 2012 – May 2012

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris): Chargé de cours de Economie de l’Information (Master).

Jan. 2012 – Feb. 2012

Pôle Universitaire Français, National Ho Chi Minh University (Vietnam): Chargé de cours de Microéconomie (Licence) et Organisation Industrielle Appliquée (Master).

Déc. 2007– Jan. 2011

Université de Toulouse 1 (Toulouse School of Economics): Chargé de cours d’Economie Expérimentale au DEEQA (Diplôme Européen d’Economie Quantitative Approfondie);* Secrétaire du groupe BEE (Économie Comportementale et Expérimentale).

Mai 2010 – Juin 2011

Università Cattolica (Milan): Chargé de cours d’Economie Expérimentale (Doctorat).

Mars 2007 – Oct. 2009

Università Bocconi (Milan): Chargé de cours de Microéconomie (Licence).

Fév. 2005 – Juin 2007

Università del Salento (Lecce, Italie): Chargé de cours de Théorie des Jeux (Doctorat) et de Microéconomie, Macroéconomie, Economie du Tourisme et Economie des Institutions Internationales (Licence).

Fev. 2001 – Juin 2007

Università Bocconi (Milan): Assistant d’enseignement de Théorie des Jeux et Microéconomie (Doctorat);* Assistant d’enseignement de Microéconomie (Master) et de Microéconomie, Analyse Economique et Finances Publiques (Licence);

Sept. 2003 – Dec. 2006

Università Bicocca (Milan): Assistant d’enseignement d’Economie et de Finances Publiques (Licence).

Fév. – Juillet 2003

European School of Economics, Milan. Chargé de cours de Microéconomie et Macroéconomie (Licence)

Fév. 2002 – Oct. 2004

Représentant des étudiants de doctorat de l’Università Bocconi dans le cadre du Conseil de Faculté de l’Université.

Fév. 2002 – Juin 2007

Adjoint administratif du directeur du DES (Degré/Licence en Economie et Sciences Sociales) à l’Università Bocconi, Milan.

Depuis Oct. 2004

Rapporteur pour les revues: Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Management Science, Review of Economic Studies.

2010 – 2011

Membre du Comité Scientifique du “SEET (Experimental Community of Southern Europe) Meeting” et de la “Experimental Methods and Economic Modeling International Conference” (Capua, Italy). AUTRES ACTIVITÉS NON UNIVERSITAIRES

Sept. – Nov. 1999

Stage à l’Office Commercial de l’Ambassade d’Italie à Paris: analyse des données économiques et financières des économies italienne et française.

Oct. 1998 – Jan. 1999

Superviseur “Educational Testing Service” pour les examens informatisés TOEFL, GRE et GMAT au Centre de Langues “Calatafimi”, Milan. 2

ACTIVITÉ DE RECHERCHE Publications dans des revues ou livres avec comité de lecture: A.1)

Book Review of “The Feeling of Risk: New Perspectives on Risk Perception”, by Paul Slovic. Earthscan, London, 2010, Journal of Economic Psychology, 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.010, forthcoming.

A.2)

“The Price for Information about Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity” (with A. Montesano), Theory and Decision, doi: 10.1007/s11238-011-9271-6, forthcoming.

A.3)

Book Review of “Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity”, by Peter P. Wakker. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2010, Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011, 32, pp. 538-540.

A.4)

“Non Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals” (with A. García-Gallego, N. Georgantzis and A. Montesano), in L. A. Petrosjan and N. A. Zenkevitch (Eds.) Contributions to Game Theory and Management IV, 2011, pp. 19-32.

A.5)

“Competing for Endogenous Information in an Irreversible Environmental Resource problem: a gametheoretic analysis” (with A. Montesano), International Game Theory Review, 10, 2008, pp. 229-243.

A.6)

“A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence” (with R. Nagel), in A. Innocenti and P. Sbriglia (Eds.) Games, Rationality and Behavior. Essays on Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments, Palgrave McMillan, 2008, pp. 204-232.

Papiers en cours de révision dans des revues avec comité de lecture: B.1)

The Value of Endogenous above Exogenous Information in Irreversible Environmental Decisions (2011), with A. Montesano, WP 10.01.307, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

Revised and Resubmitted to: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Papiers soumis à des revues avec comité de lecture (apparaissant dans des séries officielles de documents de travail): C.1)

An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals (2011), with A. GarcíaGallego, N. Georgantzis and A. Montesano, WP 11.23.357, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

C.2)

Voting as a Lottery (2009), with L. Corazzini and F. Passarelli, TSE Working Papers 09-116, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

C.3)

Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as determinants of Majority Thresholds (2010), with L. Corazzini, F. Passarelli and N. Georgantzis, TSE Working Papers 09-088, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

C.4)

Double Auction Equilibrium and Efficiency in a Classroom Experimental Search Market (2011), with S. Centorrino and I. Moscati, WP 11.03.337, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

C.5)

Cultural Investment, Local Development and Instantaneous Social Capital: A Case Study of a Gathering Festival in the South of Italy, with F. Casoria, S. Centorrino and G. Urso, WP 12.04.361, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

C.6)

Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence, with V. Angelova and Y. Hiriart, WP 12.05.362, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

C.7)

An Experiment on Resource and Welfare Division through a Modified Trust Game, with S. Ambec and A. Reynaud, WP 12.06.363, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

C.8)

Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game, with P. Battigalli and R. Nagel, WP 12.07.364, LERNA, University of Toulouse. 3

Livres publiés: D.1)

Eventi, Cultura e Sviluppo. Il caso de La Notte della Taranta, con F. Giordano, EGEA, Università Bocconi (Milano), Agosto 2011, pp. 380 + XXXVIII [Book in Italian].

Autres publications: E.1)

Coopérer, mode d’emploi, with R. Dessí, in L’Expansion, March 2011, p. 119 [French national economic magazine].

E.2)

Monetary Observatory n. 3/2009, Laboratory of Monetary Analysis, Università Cattolica (Milan), with A. Antonietti, F. Casoria, I. Castelli, R. Carluccio, P. Iannello, A. Marchetti, D. Massaro and P. Tedeschi, pp. 1-118 [Research report in Italian]

Papier sur le point d’être soumis à des revues avec comité de lecture: F.1)

Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game, with P. Battigalli and E. Manzoni.

F.2)

The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis, with A. Hopfensitz, E. Lorini and F. Moisan.

Travaux en cours: G.1)

Disentangle Ambiguity Aversion and Probabilistic Risk Aversion in the Lab, with C. Gollier and A. Montesano.

G.2)

Guilt and Reciprocity in Repeated Trust Games, with P. Battigalli and R. Nagel.

G.3)

Alcohol consumption and perception as a source of social capital in mass events, with F. Casoria and G. Urso.

G.4)

Role-models, Identity and Cooperation, with R. Dessí and D. Robertson.

G.5)

Cultural transmission as complementarity-building investment, with N. Georgantzis and M. Ginés.

G.6)

Tournaments and piece rate schemes: homogeneous vs heterogeneous groups, with L. Cappellari and P. Tedeschi.

G.7)

Strategically Sophisticated Bidding in First-Price Auctions, with P. Battigalli, J. Brandts and G. Cappelletti.

CONFERENCES et WORKSHOPS auxquels j’ai présentés mes papiers 2012: 1. “VIII International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics”, Castellon, Spain. 2011: 1. SEET Workshop 2011, Agadir, Morocco. 2. “VII International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics”, Barcelona, Spain. 3. “Florence Annual Workshop on Behavioral and Experimental Economics”, Florence, Italy. 4. “Experimental Methods and Economic Modelling”, Capua, Italy. 5. “Social Economics: the Young Economists’ Contribution”, Forlì, Italy (invited talk). 6. ESA “Economic Science Association World Meeting”, Luxembourg. 2010: 1. SEET Workshop 2010, Marrakech, Morocco. 2. “VI International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics”, Bilbao, Spain. 3. “Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference”, Newport, California. 4. “Cognitive and Experimental Economics Workshop”, Capua-Caserta, Italy (invited talk). 5. FUR “XIV International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory”, Newcastle, UK. 6. ESA “Economic Science Association European Meeting”, Copenhagen, Denmark. 7. 4

“XXV Jornadas de Economía Industrial”, Madrid, Spain. 8. Labsi Conference on “Neuroscience and Decision Making”, Siena, Italy. 9. “V Alhambra Experimental Workshop”, Granada, Spain. 2009: 1. “V International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics”, Granada, Spain. 2. “BEE workshop on Neuroeconomics and Psychology”, Toulouse, France. 3. “PET Workshop on Public Economics: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches”, Lyon, France. 4. ESA “Economic Science Association European Meeting”, Innsbruck, Austria. 5. IV Alhambra Experimental Workshop, Granada, Spain. 6. Workshop on Markets and Firms Dynamics: from micro patterns to aggregate behaviours, Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe. 7. Workshop in honour of Roger Myerson: Mechanism Design, Game Theory and Political Economy, Toulouse, France. 2008: 1. “IV International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics”, Alicante, Spain. 2. “Thematic Meeting of the French Economic Association”, Toulouse, France. 3. “Catholic University Summer School on Decision Processes”, Milan, Italy. 4. IAREP & SABE Congress on “Behavioural Economics and Economic Psychology”, Rome, Italy . 5. “Labsi International Conference on Political Economy and Public Choice: Theory and Experiments”, Salerno, Italy. 6. ESA “Economic Science Association European Meeting”, Lyon, France. 2007: 1. “Second PhD Presentation Meeting – Royal Economic Society”, London School of Economics, UK; 2. “Reciprocity: Theories and Facts - International Conference”, Università Bicocca - Milan, Verbania, Italy. 3. “22nd European Conference on Operational Research”, Prague, Czech Republic. 4. “Labsi International Conference on Political Economy and Public Choice: Theory and Experiments”, Siena, Italy. 2006: 1. “Communication and Incentives” Conference, UCSB Economics, Santa Barbara, California, USA (invited talk); 2. “International Workshop on Behavioural Game Theory”, Capua, Italy. 3. FUR “XII International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory”, Rome, Italy. 4. “6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice dedicated to development, natural resources and the environment”, Zaragoza, Spain. 5. IAREP & SABE Congress on “Behavioural Economics and Economic Psychology”, Paris, France. 6. ESA “Economic Science Association North American Meeting”, Tucson, Arizona, USA. 7. “European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society”, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Torino, Italy. 8. “XXXI Simposio de Analisis Economico”, Oviedo, Spain. 2005: 1. “II International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioural Economics”, Valencia, Spain. 2004: 1. “IX Spring Meeting of Young Economists (SMYE)”, Warsaw, Poland. 2. Annual meeting of the “Society for Economic Design (SED)”, Mallorca, Spain. 3. Annual meeting of the “European Economic Association (EEA)”, Madrid, Spain. 2003: 1. “European Doctorate Group in Economics (EDGE) Jamboree”, Marseille, Aix-enProvence, France. 2. “XXVIII Simposio de Analisis Economico”, Sevilla, Spain. SEMINAIRES INVITÉS pour présenter mes papiers 2012: 1. Université Montpellier 1, LAMETA, France. 2. Université du Maine, GAINS, Le Mans, France. 3. Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES, France. 4. Université de Strasbourg, BETA, France. 5. Université Paris-Nanterre, Economix, France. 6. Durham Business School, UK. 2011: 1. University of Namur, Department of Economics, Belgium. 2. Durham Business School, UK (July). 2010: 1. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona, Spain. 2. Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy. 2009: 1. Universidad de Valencia, Department of Economics, Spain. 2. Università Cattolica Milan, Department of Economics, Italy. 2008: 1. Università di Padova, Department of Economics, Italy. 2. “Workshop on Development and Behavioural Economics”, Universidad de Navarra, Spain. 2007: 1. Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, Seville, Spain. 2. Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany. 3. University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Norway. 4. Università Cattolica, Milan, Department of Economics, Italy. 5. Università di Padova, Department of Economics, Italy. 6. Universidad Jaume I, Department of Economics, Castellón, Spain. 7. Université de Toulouse, IDEI, France. 8. Universidad de Navarra –Pamplona, Department of Economics, Spain. 9. Oberlin College, Department of Economics, Ohio, USA. 10. Università di Padova, Department of Economics, Italy. 2005: 1. Università Bocconi Milan, Department of Economics, Italy. 2. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona, Spain. 2003: 1. University of Salento, Department of Economics and Mathematics, Lecce, Italy. 5

RESUMÉS DES TRAVAUX DE RECHERCHE

Publications dans des revues ou livres avec comité de lecture: A.1)

Book Review of “The Feeling of Risk: New Perspectives on Risk Perception”, by Paul Slovic. Earthscan, London, 2010, Journal of Economic Psychology, 10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.010, forthcoming.

In this article, we review the last book of Paul Slovic, one of the scientists who have contributed most to the definition and quantification of perceived risk. We critically discuss the main points of Slovic and co-authors’ interdisciplinary studies that could interest both researchers dealing with the analysis of risk and policymakers concerned about the impact of their decisions on risk perception and communication. We underline the need of a more efficient integration of Slovic’s psychometric approach and ‘‘standard’’ elicitation techniques in the experimental analysis of risk. Further, we suggest possible ways to realize this integration in laboratory and field risk elicitation techniques, in order to strengthen the connection between the three fundamental ways of dealing with risk which emerge in the book: risk as feeling, risk as analysis, and risk as politics, with the last dimension a prescriptive synthesis of the first two. A.2)

“The Price for Information about Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity” (with A. Montesano), Theory and Decision, doi: 10.1007/s11238-011-9271-6, forthcoming.

In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk and ambiguity attitudes affect the reservation price for ambiguity resolution. These effects are analyzed for different levels of ambiguity of the act. Operating instructions for the elicitation of the reservation price for ambiguity resolution in an experimental setting are provided at the end of the article. A.3)

Book Review of “Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity”, by Peter P. Wakker. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2010, Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011, 32, pp. 538-540.

In this article, we review Peter Wakker’s new textbook about decision under risk and under uncertainty. The book is an ambitious attempt to challenge the view – common especially among decision theorists – that Kahneman and Tversky’s work concerns only choice under risk and is all but inappropriate for choice under uncertainty. In our critical analysis of the main novelties in Wakker’s prospect-theoretic approach to decision under uncertainty, we discuss the potential drawbacks of the extension of Prospect Theory from risk to uncertainty. For example, we show how the mere application of rank-dependent expected utility models to a decision setting with unknown probabilities requires too strong assumptions on the probability weighting function. At the same time, we underline how the book clarifies many widespread misunderstandings in economic literature and methods today (e.g. the relation between decision under risk and decision under uncertainty), facilitating future dialog between psychologists and economists. 6

A.4)

“Non Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals” (with A. García-Gallego, N. Georgantzis and A. Montesano), in L. A. Petrosjan and N. A. Zenkevitch (Eds.) Contributions to Game Theory and Management IV, 2011, pp. 19-32.

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games. We define this kind of bargaining mechanism as “games with confirmed proposals”. In these supergames, players bargain over the strategies of a non-cooperative game (original game). In this paper, we focus on a confirmed proposal mechanism with a chain, requiring that in the bargaining supergame each non-confirmed strategy profile becomes the starting point for the next negotiation round. We show how this chain is able to reduce dramatically the number of outcome-equivalent subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining supergame. Furthermore, we show that the bargaining mechanism proposed in this paper leads to “similar” equilibria in the supergame for original games with different strategic structures. A.5)

“Competing for Endogenous Information in an Irreversible Environmental Resource problem: a game-theoretic analysis” (with A. Montesano), International Game Theory Review, 10, 2008, pp. 229-243.

The paper analyzes strategic behavior in a two-stage environmental choice problem under different information scenarios. Given uncertainty about environmental cost and irreversibility of development, “learning without destroying” emerges from strategic competition when information is endogenous and publicly available. This happens since agents trade off the higher payoff of being the first-mover against the potentially free acquisition of endogenous information without developing their own environmental endowment. We prove that in a 2X2 dynamic environmental game with payoff uncertainty and irreversibility publicly available endogenous information could lead players to destroy less in aggregate terms with respect to the case in which information is exogenous. A.6)

“A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence” (with R. Nagel), in A. Innocenti and P. Sbriglia (Eds.) Games, Rationality and Behavior. Essays on Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments, Palgrave McMillan, 2008, pp. 204-232.

We provide the main theoretical insights of the general psychological game framework, through the example of a simple trust game in which belief-dependent motivations are involved. Moreover, we describe and discuss the main experimental papers that directly or indirectly refer to psychological game-theoretic explanations as being able to rationalize their experimental results. Throughout this work, we try to clarify ideas and to dispel misconceptions emerged among economists about this new field, in order to stress the role and the importance of psychological games both for the strategic interaction analysis and for the related experimental applications.

Papiers en cours de révision dans des revues avec comité de lecture: B.1)

The Value of Endogenous above Exogenous Information in Irreversible Environmental Decisions (2011), with A. Montesano, WP 10.01.307, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

This paper introduces the concept of the Testing Value into the analysis of environmental decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. It is defined as the value of endogenous above exogenous 7

information. We start from a situation where information concerning future economic benefits and costs of resource preservation is exogenous. We show that if information can also depend on the level of development carried out (i.e., it may be acquired also endogenously) the Testing Value could push a risk-neutral decision maker to preserve more in the present and eventually in the future. Although its existence stems from endogenous information, surprisingly enough, the Testing Value can be positively related to the probability of acquiring information exogenously.

Papiers soumis à des revues avec comité de lecture (apparaissant dans séries officielles de documents de travail): C.1)

An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals (2011), with A. GarcíaGallego, N. Georgantzis and A. Montesano, WP 11.23.357, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type. C.2)

Voting as a Lottery (2009), with L. Corazzini and F. Passarelli, TSE Working Papers 09-116, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

Supermajorities have their advantage as well as their disadvantage: they provide a hedge against being in the minority, but they make being in the majority less likely. We characterize this trade-off and compute the most preferred majority threshold. The relevant parameters are voting power, risk aversion and pessimism. People who feel powerful prefer low thresholds. High thresholds are preferred by risk averters or by those who are pessimistic about being in the majority. Further we study constitutional agreements on the voting rule. Members of the constituent assembly are heterogeneous in the parameters above. We show that weak and minority members succeed in pushing forward on high and protective rules. C.3)

Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as determinants of Majority Thresholds (2010), with L. Corazzini, F. Passarelli and N. Georgantzis, TSE Working Papers 09-088, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between a voter’s risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter’s optimal majority threshold negatively relates to the voter’s confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behavior, the private signal tends to replace confidence.

8

C.4)

Double Auction Equilibrium and Efficiency in a Classroom Experimental Search Market (2011), with S. Centorrino and I. Moscati, WP 11.03.337, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

Experimental markets working under double auction have been designed so far to understand the equilibrium and the efficiency of competitive markets (in particular, financial markets) and to prove that automata can do as well as humans when they trade under simple rules. In this paper, we use an experimental market to understand the behavior of agents and of zero-intelligent automata when they are not provided information about asks and bids. This setting is equivalent to a search market in which every agent is looking for the best trading counterpart (over-the-counter market). We argue that we can apply our results to financial markets, when agents are not market makers, but they are trading through brokers, so that they post offers based on closing prices only; and to commodity markets, for which a publicly available book does not exist. We find evidence that this reduction in information slightly reduces market efficiency, because of available units left out of the market. Indeed, we study how this reduction depends on the number of traders and on their type (human vs automata). However, we find that the over-the-counter market rapidly converges to the long-term equilibrium price, both when human traders are involved and when agents are zero-intelligent automata. C.5)

Cultural Investment, Local Development and Instantaneous Social Capital: A Case Study of a Gathering Festival in the South of Italy, with F. Casoria, S. Centorrino and G. Urso, WP 12.04.361, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

In this paper we show how the investment in cultural events may encourage the building of social capital and foster the development of local communities. We rely on a case-study that we conducted about the socio-economic impact of the Festival “La Notte della Taranta”, the most important European music festival dedicated to traditional music (about 170.000 participants per year), on the sub-region of southern Italy where it is held. Our evidence is based on a large survey, consisting of nearly 10.000 interviews to Festival participants over a span of five editions (2007-2011). A primary result is that the initial economic investment in the Festival has brought a short-term return in terms of touristic attraction worth more than two times as much. More importantly, our results indicate that a cultural festival, despite being a mass gathering, is able to create strong bonds among its participants and between them and the area where the event takes place. Although these bonds are “instantaneous”, i.e. temporally restricted to the duration of the event, they are positively correlated with the economic impact of the event on the territory. C.6)

Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence, with V. Angelova and Y. Hiriart, WP 12.05.362, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm’s investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric information call for public intervention to define rules aimed at increasing prevention. We determine the investment in safety under No Liability, Strict Liability and Negligence, and compare it to the first best. Additionally, we investigate how the (dis)ability of the firm to fully cover potential damages affects the firm’s behavior. An experiment tests the theoretical predictions. In line with theory, Strict Liability and Negligence are equally effective; both perform better than No Liability; investment in safety is not sensitive to the ability of the firm to compensate potential victims. In contrast with theory, prevention rates absent liability are much higher and liability is much less effective than predicted.

9

C.7)

An Experiment on Resource and Welfare Division through a Modified Trust Game, with S. Ambec and A. Reynaud, WP 12.06.363, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

We design an experiment on sequential common-pool resource extraction with side-payments. Two players share a common resource sequentially. Each player is endowed with a production function transforming units of the resource into wealth. The production function is linear with diminishing return above a threshold. The first player decides how much to extract and, therefore, how much to leave to the other player. The latter might decide to transfer part of his production to the former. In this set-up, which can be interpreted as a modification of the classical trust game (Berg et al., 1995), we define several “natural solutions” related to different concepts of fairness. Our experimental design is aimed at analyzing which of the “natural solutions” emerge in the strategic form and in the repeated version of the sequential common-pool resource extraction game. We find that efficiency can be achieved under specific compensation schemes, when the second player has a technological advantage and the game is repeatedly played within the same pair. Furthermore, we find that the non-cooperative outcome is more likely to emerge for those pairs where players do not share the same idea of fairness. C.8)

Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game, with P. Battigalli and R. Nagel, WP 12.07.364, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

We study behavior in a trust game, assuming that the truster is self-interested and the trustee has beliefdependent preferences given by a mix of guilt aversion and intention-based reciprocity. We propose a theoretical model, derive solutions for the corresponding psychological game with complete information about preferences, and offer a qualitative analysis of the incomplete information case. We test our theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment in which, depending on the treatment, the psychological type of the trustee can be elicited through a structured questionnaire and the answers can be disclosed to the co-player. We find that guilt aversion is the prevalent psychological motivation and that behavior and elicited beliefs move in the direction predicted by the theory under the assumption that the questionnaire is answered sincerely and its disclosure approximately implements a psychological game with complete information. Questionnaire transmission yields a polarization of behavior and beliefs with more trust and cooperation when it reveals a highly guilt averse type.

Livres publié : D.1)

Eventi, Cultura e Sviluppo. Il caso de La Notte della Taranta, with F. Giordano, EGEA, Università Bocconi (Milano), Agosto 2011, pp. 380 + XXXVIII [Book in Italian].

The book provides a multidisciplinary analysis of the relationship among events, culture and development of a territory - extensively debated in the literature. The results of a field research on the economic impact of cultural events and the comments of researchers and scholars of different disciplines (economics, sociology, anthropology and musicology) underlines how investing in culture and in cultural events can be instrumental for the social and economic development of a community. Culture positively impacts on the behavior of individuals who benefit from it directly and indirectly, promotes the creation of social capital and therefore sets the conditions for sustainable economic development of a territory. Successful cultural events are those being able to build and nurture the heritage of a community identity, thereby renewing and reinforcing existing social ties.

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Autres Publications: E.1)

Coopérer, mode d’emploi, with R. Dessí, in L’Expansion, March 2011, p. 119 [French national economic magazine].

This short newspaper article is nothing but a qualitative description for a general audience of the preliminary results of the work in progress “Role-models, Identity and Cooperation” (G.4), which is described in more detail below. E.2)

Monetary Observatory n. 3/2009, Laboratory of Monetary Analysis, Università Cattolica (Milan), with A. Antonietti, F. Casoria, I. Castelli, R. Carluccio, P. Iannello, A. Marchetti, D. Massaro and P. Tedeschi, pp. 1-118 [Research report in Italian]

This work presents the results of a field study - conducted by a group of economists and psychologists aimed at identifying in a systematic manner the limits of the existing questionnaires drawn up by banks in Italy in order to comply with the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive). This compliance concerns the understanding - by potential investors - of some key elements of financial markets, such as the relationship between returns and risk, the diversification principle and the contractual features of different securities. Our results show that financial literacy in Italy is very poor and that this poses consistent operational problems for credit institutions. Indeed, if a subject invested in securities as “tango bonds”, it cannot be assumed that he/she was aware that high return rates should correspond to high risks. The second important finding concerns the methodology of field investigation of potential investors’ time preference and risk attitude. We have tested several types of instruments: some deriving directly from economic models, other arising from psychological research. We show that different elicitation methods of intertemporal and risk preferences provide correlated orderings of potential investors’ preferences.

Papiers à proximité d’être soumis à des revues avec comité de lecture: F.1)

Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game, with P. Battigalli and E. Manzoni.

We analyze models of the Trust Game whereby players have incomplete information about the guilt sensitivity of the co-player, because s/he is selected at random from a heterogeneous population. We seek to obtain qualitative predictions about the impact of making the trustee’s (belief-dependent) preferences public information among the co-players, assuming that one can at least approximate such a condition in the lab. The most tractable models have a guilt-neutral individual in the role of the “truster”. Simple models where it is common knowledge that the “truster” is selfish are consistent with a theory whereby the possibility of guilt feelings is triggered by the game role, and only the “trustee” can feel guilt. We also analyze models with role-independent guilt sensitivity. We favour models with heterogeneous beliefs in (Bayesian) equilibrium because they accord better with experimental evidence. Yet, when we couple such feature with role-independent guilt sensitivity, we obtain less tractable models. The best compromise between tractability and the need to organize experimental data under the assumption of guilt aversion seems to be a model with a selfish “truster” (role-dependent guilt sensitivity) who does not know the objective distribution of the guilt-aversion parameter, and a guilt-averse “trustee” who does not know the distribution of epistemic types of the “truster”s. 11

F.2)

The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis, with A. Hopfensitz, E. Lorini and F. Moisan.

In this work, we are interested in investigating the influence that social ties (e.g., relationships between close friends, married couples, family relatives, class mates, etc.) can have on behavior. After having defined the concept of “social tie” that we consider, we propose a coordination game with outside option, which allows us to study the impact of such ties on social preferences. We provide a detailed game-theoretic analysis of this two-shot game while considering various types of players: i.e. selfinterest maximizer, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these models that require strategic reasoning in order to reach some equilibrium state, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. Finally, we show that through an economic experiment one can easily determine which of these models correlates with social ties.

Travaux en cours: G.1)

Disentangle Ambiguity Aversion and Probabilistic Risk Aversion in the Lab, with C. Gollier and A. Montesano.

We propose a theoretical model and a related experimental analysis in order to capture and disentangle different motivations for the lower willingness to pay to participate in a lottery when probabilities of the events are unknown. Our theoretical model combines Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (henceforth RDEU) with Choquet Expected Utility (henceforth CEU). RDEU in decision under risk captures the distortion of known probabilities through the probability weighting function. CEU with probabilistic risk aversion under uncertainty captures the distortion of unknown probabilities through an event weighting function, which we interpret as the composition of the probability weighting function and the subjective probability on the event. The results of a pilot study do not corroborate the null hypothesis that the decision maker “weighs” probabilities in the same way both under risk and under uncertainty. This could be due to a complementarity between probabilistic risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, that we are currently analyzing through additional experimental sessions. G.2)

Guilt and Reciprocity in Repeated Trust Games, with P. Battigalli and R. Nagel.

In this paper, we extend the analysis of Attanasi, Battigalli and Nagel (2012) [see C.8 above] to a dynamic strategic setting. Through a similar feeling elicitation and transmission procedure, we test players’ behavior in a finitely repeated game, in which first and second-order beliefs are elicited at the beginning of each period. This study is aimed at disentangling between the (standard) effect of reputation and the (non-standard) effect of public information of trustee’s feeling sensitivity on players’ behavior. We both define specific intertemporal psychological utility functions and introduce two (behaviorally derived) monotonicity conditions on the dynamics of players’ beliefs. These conditions allow us to select among the multiplicity of sequential psychological equilibria obtained by applying Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) solution concept – for guilt-averse trustees – and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) solution concept – for reciprocity-concerned trustees. The subset of equilibria satisfying our monotonicity conditions matches quite well the behavior of participants in our experimental sessions. Finally, we show the existence of a complementarity between public information of the trustee’s guilt aversion within a pair and reputation building. G.3)

Alcohol consumption and perception as a source of social capital in mass events, with F. Casoria and G. Urso.

This paper is a follow-up of Attanasi, Casoria, Centorrino and Urso (2012) [see C.5 above]. We analyze the determinants of the generation of social capital among participants in a cultural festival. 12

More specifically, we study how the social capital generated during the event depends on alcohol consumption and on the perception of own and others’ consumption due to the participation in the event. Other relevant explanatory variables (i.e. identity, gender, education, age, etc.) are related to alcohol consumption and perception during a gathering event. The dataset concerns 800 observations on alcohol consumption and perception in the audience of the 2011 edition of “La Notte della Taranta”, the most important European music festival dedicated to traditional music (about 170.000 participants per year). G.4)

Role-models, Identity and Cooperation, with R. Dessí and D. Robertson.

In this paper, we investigate experimentally the importance of role models and peer effects in generating and transmitting cooperative norms. Our methodology builds on previous experimental studies of cooperation in public good voluntary contributions games and in intergenerational transmission games. Our experimental design is non-standard for several reasons. First, generations differ not only because of the timing of their play, but also because of their composition in terms of subjects’ age, experience and knowledge. We have two “generations”. Subjects in the first generation, the “senders” (of information), are graduate students. Subjects in the second generation, the “receivers”, are undergraduate students. Since graduate students are older, more experienced and (hopefully) more expert in analyzing and playing the baseline game, they can be thought of as potential role models for undergraduate students. Second, in all sessions and treatments, there is no payoff interdependence between senders and receivers. The only link is the information transmitted about the senders: behavior and final payoffs in the baseline game; some personal traits (gender, age, graduate studies achieved and nationality); picture, taken while they are in front of their own computer before the experiment starts. We concentrate on analyzing the behavior of the “senders”. We find that when individual identity (through the picture) is stressed, ‘experienced’ subjects (graduate students) choose to contribute less on average, implying more selfish behavior. Moreover, knowing that their individual identity will be transmitted along with their behavior to subsequent undergraduate sessions has a significant impact on the variance of contributions within the group. G.5)

Cultural transmission as complementarity-building investment, with N. Georgantzis and M. Ginés.

We model cultural transmission as an altruistic investment in another individual’s capacity to benefit from synergies between the “transmitter’s” and the “receiver’s” efforts. Contrary to most models in the literature on altruism, we assume that “culture-transmitting” agents have no direct utility from their giving behavior, ruling out any genuinely altruistic component in their utility function stemming from “other-regarding” preferences. Furthermore, we rule out reputational effects yielding incentives for a more pro-social action in the present in order to favor Pareto superior outcomes in the future. In the general case, isolated consumption of one’s own benefits from own efforts is the worst equilibrium (“bad” equilibrium), which unfortunately for the society is globally stable and is shown to exist in all cases. On the contrary extreme, there may be an alternative equilibrium in which all agents invest all they can in cultural transmission. This equilibrium (“good” equilibrium), when it exists, is also stable and Pareto dominates the aforementioned “bad”, no transmission equilibrium. An intermediate equilibrium which is unstable involves potentially asymmetric and “unfair” configurations in which the agent who invests more in cultural transmission ends up with lower utility. Among other extensions discussed, coordination against the Pareto inferior equilibrium can be implemented by sequential play, which is especially relevant in an inter-generational context of cultural transmission. G.6)

Tournaments and piece rate schemes: homogeneous vs heterogeneous groups, with L. Cappellari and P. Tedeschi.

We use laboratory experiments in order to examine whether workers’ preferred compensation scheme depends on the level of group competition. More specifically, we are interested in workers’ 13

performance and preferred compensation scheme under group homogeneity and under group heterogeneity in terms of ability in a specific mathematical task. In our laboratory experiments, we focus on two main payment schemes: a tournament and a piece rate, with the former leading to competition in individual performance in the task. The two schemes differ also in terms of conjectural requirements a subject has to face: while a tournament defines a game for workers to play (hence with some strategic interaction involved), a piece rate requires them only to solve a maximization problem that does not depend on the other group members’ performance. Our null hypothesis is that if competition should take place in a group that is homogeneous in terms of ability in the specific task, then a subject is more prone to choose the tournament versus the piece rate. If instead the group is heterogeneous, then the higher the perception a subject has about his/her own relative ability, the higher the probability that he/she will choose the tournament versus the piece rate. A preliminary analysis of our experimental data seems to confirm this hypothesis, though we find a significant gender effect (with males’ overstatement) in conjecturing one’s own relative ability in heterogeneous groups. G.7)

Strategically Sophisticated Bidding in First-Price Auctions, with P. Battigalli, J. Brandts and G. Cappelletti.

In the theoretical analysis of standard auctions there are no strong reasons to assume that each player holds correct conjectures on the behavior of (each of) his opponent(s). Hence, when analyzing the deviations from the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium, we use as starting point Battigalli and Siniscalchi’s (2003) theoretical findings on rationalizability in auction theory. More precisely, we follow their intuition of adopting the notion of (interim) rationalizability to capture strategic sophistication and we regard non-equilibrium (but strategically sophisticated) bidding as a potential explanation of experimental findings. In this paper, we first check whether their theoretical analysis is qualitatively consistent with the existing experimental findings, by using Selten and Krischker’s (1983) measure of predictive success for area theories. Then, we design an experimental setting able to minimize the impact of bounded rationality, in order to see how much of the deviations from the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium can be explained by the heterogeneity of beliefs allowed by strategic sophistication. In particular, we produce in the laboratory a “decision support system” that allows bidders to focus on guessing the behavior of their competitors (as a function of their valuations) without having to worry about the problem of computing the optimal response to their conjectures. This system helps bidders to make two or three steps of the iterative deletion procedure.

REFERENCES SCIENTIFIQUES de quelques co-auteurs (a) Prof. Pierpaolo BATTIGALLI, Università Bocconi, via Roentgen 1, 20136, Milano (Italy). Email: [email protected], Tel: +39 02 58 36 54 02. (b) Prof. Christian GOLLIER, Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI & LERNA), 21, allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse (France), E-mail: [email protected], Tel.: +33 (0)5 61 12 86 30. (c) Prof. Aldo MONTESANO, Università Bocconi, via Roentgen 1, 20136, Milano (Italy). Email: [email protected], Tel: +39 02 58 36 53 15. (d) Prof. Rosemarie NAGEL, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona (Spain). Email: [email protected], Tel: +34 93 542 2739. 14