Globalization, Police Reform and Development

01GPRD_pre(i-xii) 6/21/12 4:48 PM Page i This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Please contact [email protected] if you have any queries regarding use of the file.

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Globalization, Police Reform and Development Doing it the Western Way? Graham Ellison

Senior Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast

and Nathan Pino

Associate Professor, Texas State University

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© Graham Ellison and Nathan Pino 2012 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-0-230-58102-9 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 21

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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For our parents

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Contents viii

List of Tables

ix

List of Abbreviations

xii

Acknowledgements Introduction

1

1. Neoliberal Globalization, Insecurity and Police Reform

11

2. Development Paradigms, Neoliberalism and Human Security – Western Style

35

3. Donor Export and Police Development Assistance

55

4. Afghanistan

83

5. Brazil

99

6. Iraq

115

7. Northern Ireland

131

8. South Africa

148

9. Trinidad and Tobago

164

10. Turkey

179

11. The Contextual Limits of Police Reform

194

12. Conclusion

208

Notes

215

Bibliography

219

Index

246

vii

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List of Tables I.1 3.1 7.1

Factors Relevant to SSR at Three Levels of Analysis COP in Action Organization Responsible for Deaths Due to the Conflict in Northern Ireland (1969–2001)

viii

8 67 136

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List of Abbreviations ACPO ANBP-DDR

Association of Chief Police Officers Afghan New Beginnings Programme’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project ANA Afghan National Army ANC African National Congress ANP Afghan National Police APPF Afghan Public Protection Force AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey) AUSAID Australian Agency for International Development BICC Bonn International Centre for Conversion CBOs Community-based Organizations CBP Community-based Policing CCA Corrections Corporations of America CENIS Centre for International Studies CEPOL European Police College CID Criminal Investigation Department CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance COMPSTAT Computer Statistics COP Community Oriented Policing CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CPATT Civilian Police Assistance Training Team CRPS Committee on the Restructuring of the Police Service CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan DAC Development Assistance Committee DARE Drug Abuse Resistance Education DEA Drug Enforcement Agency DFID Department for International Development DIAG Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups DOD Department of Defence DPPs District Policing Partnerships EU European Union EUJUST LEX EU Integrated Rule of Law mission of Iraq EUPOL EU Police Mission FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office ix

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FDD GAO GEAR HET ICA ICDC ICITAP ICP ICUS IED IFI IFIs IFP IMF INGOs INP INS IPA IRA ISAF JIPTC JUSMMAT KHAD MIT NAR NCPS NIO NISRA NPTC NYPD ODA OECD OEEC OPONI OPS ORA OSAC OSCE

Focus District Development Governmental Accountability Office Growth Employment and Redistribution Historical Enquiries Team International Cooperation Administration Iraqi Civil Defense Corps International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme Independent Commission on Policing International Criminal Victimization Survey Improvised explosive devices International Fund for Ireland International Financial Institutions Inkatha Freedom Party International Monetary Fund International non-governmental organizations Iraqi National Police Immigration and Naturalization Service Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Irish Republican Army International Security Assistance Force Joint International Police Training Center Joint United States Military Mission to Turkey Khedamat-e-Atlaat-e-Dawlati (The Department of State Information Services) Massachusetts Institute of Technology National Alliance for Reconstruction National Crime Prevention Strategy Northern Ireland Office Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency National Police Training Centre New York Police Department Overseas Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Office of Public Safety Office of Reconstruction Assistance US Bureau of Diplomatic Security Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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OSMAN PCA PEPfAR PFA PFP PKK PNM PRTs PSCOs PSNI RAND RDP RIC RUC SADF SANDF SAPRIN SAPS SAPU SAUTT SSR TAF TNC TNP TTPS UDR UNDP UNHAS UNMIK UNPOL USAID USC UVF WTO

Police Complaints Authority President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief Private Finance Agreement Policing for People Kurdistan Workers Party People’s National Movement Provincial Reconstruction Team Police Community Support Officers Police Service of Northern Ireland Research and Development Corporation Reconstruction and Development Programme Royal Irish Constabulary Royal Ulster Constabulary South African Defence Force South African National Defence Force Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network South African Police Service South African Police Union Special Anti-Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago Security Sector Reform Turkish Armed Forces Transnational Corporation Turkish National Police Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Ulster Defence Regiment United Nations Development Programme United Nations Humanitarian Air Service UN Mission in Kosovo United Nations Police United States Agency for International Development Ulster Special Constabulary Ulster Volunteer Force World Trade Organization

AU: Should this be Overseas Security Advisory Council?

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Acknowledgements Completion of this book would not have been possible without the support and assistance of Peter Manning, Kieran McEvoy, Shadd Maruna, Mike Brogden, Dieter Pesendorfer, Onder Bakircioglu, James Sheptycki, Aogán Mulcahy, Ruth Jamieson, Kyong Hee Chee, and Joseph A. Kotarba, who all commented, offered advice or made suggestions on drafts of earlier chapters. We would also like to thank Shawn Pearcy, who assisted us in compiling the bibliography. Any errors, omissions or misinterpretations are of course, our own. We would also like to thank Philippa Grand, Julia Willan, Ellie Shillito, and others at Palgrave Macmillan for their patience and support in seeing the book through to its conclusion. Graham Ellison would also like to thank Richard Hart of Hart Publishing, Oxford, for kindly granting permission to draw (in Chapter 2 of this volume) on earlier work previously published as ‘Fostering a Dependency Culture: The Commodification of Community Policing in a Global Marketplace’, in Andrew Goldsmith and James Sheptycki (eds) Crafting Transnational Policing: Police Capacity Building and Global Policing Reform, Hart Publishing (2007). Graham Ellison would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the British Academy who provided a small research and travel award during his sabbatical from Queen’s (2010–2011) during which time parts of the book were written. Thanks also to Susan Day who facilitated his trip to Texas State University where part of his sabbatical was spent. Finally, Nathan Pino would like to thank the Fulbright US Scholar Programme for the opportunity to teach at the University of the West Indies – St. Augustine, in 2009, when research on Trinidad and Tobago presented in this book was conducted.

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Introduction

In this book we wish to convince the reader that policing and police reform cannot be divorced from other forms of assistance, such as economic, military, and that relating to political development. Overseas development assistance is the larger umbrella under which police reform takes place. Development assistance, in turn, occurs within the context of globalization, characterized by an increased global interdependence among, economic, political and social institutions. Over the course of the past two decades development assistance programmes channelled to any number of transitional, conflicted and war-torn states have included police and Security Sector Reform (SSR) as integral components of democratization and peace-building. However, in spite of large budgets and the tendency to include police and security sector reform in reconstruction efforts, the phenomenon remains something of an under-researched area. Much of the existing literature is practitioner focused and as such lacks a solid theoretical and methodological backcloth. While there have been a number of academic analyses that are of relevance they tend to address specific issues e.g. the role of the UN in international peacekeeping missions or police reform in specific jurisdictions. As such there are few studies that seek to provide a holistic and conceptually grounded analysis of overseas assistance to police reform endeavours and their ultimate success or failure. It is also worth noting that practitioners must become much more reflexive than they have been to date about the effects of their interventions on recipient nations. Police reform discourse usually includes the promotion of democratic policing; that is, policing that seeks to complement democratic institutions rather than to undermine them. Of course, outlining the contours of what democratic policing is supposed to look like is one thing. Translating these into practice on the ground is another matter entirely since 1

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there very often exists a disjuncture between what the reform process is supposed to achieve in general terms and the specifics of what is actually achieved in regard to implementation. Democratic policing grounded in human rights is the preferred model championed by virtually all groups involved in police reform but these concepts are complex and there is little consensus on what they mean, particularly in the topsy-turvy world of post-conflict states and those transitioning from authoritarian to liberalized forms of governance. Anglo-American styles of policing such as community policing, are often exported abroad, but this raises equally problematic questions about the appropriateness of what is being transferred and the power relations inherent in the dynamics of the exportimport process. Nevertheless, there is a growing literature and general agreement that that reform of the structures of public policing in particular and a democratization of the institutions of governance more generally, are key components of peace-building efforts in post-authoritarian and transitional societies (for examples see Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a; Stenning and Shearing 2005). Furthermore, there is also a general acceptance by numerous academics, international development agencies, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and ‘transnational policing regimes’ that reforms must not only establish structures of public policing that are ‘culturally appropriate but also democratic and respectful of fundamental human rights’ (Stenning and Shearing 2005: 169). A willingness to conform to the principles of democratic policing in post-authoritarian and transitional states (recently democratic states or those making the transition toward democracy) is important as an end in itself – to prevent human rights abuses, provide a minimal level of citizen security and so forth, but also more intangibly in that fair and effective policing contributes to the very foundations of political order that democratic freedoms so often depend. There remain significant problems with the way that this vision of democratic policing is operationalized in practice, however. Outside of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (which are not the principal focus of this book) there now exists a phenomenal outward flow of policing knowledges and expertise from the North and West, to any number of developing, post-authoritarian and transitional states, with enormous sums of money being spent by international development agencies and INGOs on police and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Police and SSR are now a global industry. This industry includes state sponsored initiatives, coercive interventions such as that necessary for EU membership or IMF austerity measures, private contracting and security consultancies (Group 4),

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and UNDP, USAID, and UNPOL (previously CIVPOL), as well as any number of initiatives undertaken by retired policing personnel who have branched out into security sector reform industry in their retirement. The purpose of the book is to explore the phenomenon of police reform in transitional, post-authoritarian and conflicted states in the context of broader trends in international development assistance and globalization. It sets out to explore the reality of much donor assistance to international police reform efforts specifically, and security-sector reform efforts more generally: which is that in spite of a few localized pockets of success, the majority of such enterprises rarely meet their stated objectives and in many other cases fail completely. While some efforts create more positive outcomes than others, definitions of success and methodologies to assess programmes vary widely. Researchers are often quick to label their own projects as successful even though current methodologies for testing the efficacy of these programmes often lack rigour. In spite of the huge global industry devoted to overseas police reform assistance the successes are few and far between and not particularly sustainable (similar to other forms of overseas development assistance). Indeed, in spite of this phenomenal level of activity we remain somewhat in the dark about how well particular reform efforts succeed, and under what conditions. The policing studies literature has not been particularly illuminating in respect of these questions. In part this is because the literature itself – particularly that on international police reform and development assistance – has become too fractured, which has hindered theorizing and harmed practice. As we describe below, some (but not all) reform endeavours assume the pre-existence of an empowered citizenry, stable democratic institutions, and economic independence within a globalized world economic system, that are rarely found within transitional democracies or conflicted states. Likewise, there is also a lack of strong comparative analysis to ascertain what works in various contexts and under what conditions. Academics and practitioners would benefit from examining the globalization and development literatures for conceptualizing global police reform assistance and to diagnose what is going wrong, and to plan more appropriate and sustainable forms of police and security sector reform. This book is not intended as a ‘how to’ manual but seeks to influence the debate and actions among development agencies, national governments, practitioners, NGOs, academics, and so on by examining the nature of police reform in a number of jurisdictions to identify what has been the most efficacious in each case. Our argument is that donor assistance to police reform missions cannot be divorced from other patterns of development assistance since very often

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it is governed by the same exigencies and imprimaturs. We propose a theoretical framework for our analysis that draws upon a number of precepts from earlier development sociology such as modernization theory (emphasizing economic growth based on the adoption of entrepreneurial Western values), dependency theory (emphasizing the underdevelopment and economic exploitation of the global South by developed countries) and the more recent globalization literature that highlights the interconnections between states. Development paradigms continue to be relevant to police reform, and while to some they may be seen as passé to our mind they continue to provide the best analytical framework for understanding why the majority of police and security sector reform endeavours fall short of their stated goals and objectives. Overseas police reform and development assistance reflect many of the same problems, but this has been largely overlooked in the policing literature and among practitioners (though see Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Ellison 2007a; Hills 2000; Pino and Wiatrowksi 2006a). For example, both police reform and development assistance suffer from one-size-fits-all strategies, inappropriateness for the local context, the reliance on donors that stifles independent development and the implementation of strategies without paying enough attention to the broader structural context. Linking police reform to the political economy of aid and development assistance can go some considerable way to explaining why few police reform missions succeed, and why in spite of the huge global infrastructure devoted to instilling democratic policing in transitional and post-conflict states, policing in such jurisdictions is still characterized by high levels of human rights abuses and repression. The overemphasis on certain aspects of the security sector in recipient nations is often paralleled by the underemphasis of others. For example, certain aspects of the security sector are structured to meet the strategic imperatives of key Western states (e.g. around international terrorism and drugs) while ignoring local problems of crime, fear and disorder. Whether propelled by international institutions, agreements with foreign consultants or states, or in order to gain political advantage, ‘…unrealistic police reform proposals are devised on a routine basis throughout the developing world’ (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 1). Local and foreign governments and institutions will promise successful reform no matter how politicized and abusive the police currently are, how corrupt the government is, how neocolonial the process appears, or how high the crime rates are. Those pushing reform from abroad are often unaware of or care little about how the police actually operate in the political environments of emerging democracies in the developing world (Hinton and Newburn 2009). Police actions that enhance state power and deepen social inequal-

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ities can be seen as contradicting the ideals of democracy (Hinton 2006), and while developing democracies lack many of the basic criteria for democratic policing, many well-established democracies also have police that resist accountability, oversight and reform, and abuse their power, particularly against marginalized groups while claiming to protect freedom (Hinton and Newburn 2009). In developing countries, including developing democracies, we tend to find ‘regimes’ rather than ‘governments’ (Hills 2000). Regime refers to elite groups that wield institutional power while ‘government’ implies the existence of established institutions that provide services, that are often absent in these countries. In her analysis of policing in Africa, Alice Hills defines the police as a formal group that channels regime power or authority (Hills 2000). She characterizes the police as operating within a ‘police system’ that consists of groups of individuals brought together for a specific purpose to conduct structured behaviours within an identifiable territory. However, the police do not axiomatically support a regime or its policies. The police sometimes experience internal conflict, act in support of subordinate groups, or support their own interests even if they are not in line with the interests of the regime (Hills 2000). The police are relatively autonomous (Marenin 1982). They can violate state rules, act in their own perceived interest, and in some cases can pose a threat to regimes. Furthermore, policing is not just a statist function associated with the public police since in many transitional democracies it is difficult to point to the existence of a state in any kind of institutional sense (Hills 2000). Consequently, what we find are dense networks of groups and agencies providing broadly defined policing and ordering functions. The problem, however, is that donors tend to focus their attention almost exclusively on the public police even though they represent only one institution out of many that reforms should be directed towards. In general terms academic policing studies has tended to ignore the developing world, foreign security sector assistance, or the effects of policing on those who are policed (Hills 2000; Hinton and Newburn 2009; Manning 2010; Brogden and Nijhar 2005), but there is an emerging literature that is helping address these relatively neglected issues on three different fronts. The first relates to transnational policing and the emergence of transnational policing regimes and global human rights discourse (see Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Deflem 2002; Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007; Hills 2009a; Loader and Walker 2007a; Marenin 1996). For example, Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007) seek a universal ethical system for transnational policing based partially on global human rights discourse. The second front concerns police reform in failing, transnational, and

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post-conflict states. Some scholars such as David Bayley (Bayley 2006; Bayley and Perito 2010) have published ‘how-to’ manuals and books on promoting democratic forms of police reform abroad while others have questioned Western orthodoxies and the conventional wisdom underpinning such efforts (e.g. Brogden 2005; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a; Ellison 2007a; Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007; Manning 2010). Third is the emerging field of transnational justice (see McEvoy and McGregor 2008a for an overview) that examines alternative, bottom-up strategies for providing security in post-conflict/failing states. It is suggested that conventional approaches to police and security sector reform tend to be too top-down and state-centred and often overlook important sources of local capacity (Brogden and Shearing 1993). The emphasis here is on establishing local structures for micro-governance that are more relevant and appropriate to the context in question. We are bridging these three literatures by asking four sets of questions we seek to provide answers to in this book: 1. Under what conditions does successful police and security sector reform take place? What needs to be in place before this can be achieved? 2. How can we reform the police or security sector in those states that are governed by political elites and for whom democracy and democratic governance may be an anathema? Where does democratic policing sit with undemocratic state structures? 3. What are the motives of donors? Are police and security sector reform efforts geared more to suit the strategic interests and imperatives of key Western states? Are Northern/Western reform efforts antithetic to the notion of democratization in recipient nations? What are the contradictions in overseas development policy? 4. How can we cultivate the norms of a global civil society so as to make democratic governance, acceptance of human rights, and fair and accountable policing acceptable to recipient nations and the mainstay of reform endeavours? Bowling (2009) has developed a five-tiered typology for categorizing various police organizations (local, national, regional, international, and global). However, in order to answer these questions we need to move beyond the police and consider the role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), government aid and development agencies, INGOs and assorted policy entrepreneurs. We therefore consider it more helpful and parsimonious to conceptually develop a three-level tier of analysis (macro, meso and micro) to outline how each level impacts on the trajectory of police reform

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and SSR more broadly. Based on an examination of specific police reform endeavours at each of these levels of analysis we argue that such assistance is often not appropriate for the local context where it is delivered and may also have unintended downstream consequences. The one-sizefits-all approach of most police development assistance ignores macro level factors that impact on reform efforts, such as underdevelopment and dependency in the world system, trends in contemporary globalization and international terrorism, and the strategic imperatives of key Western states, among others. At the meso level we need to factor in country or regional-level factors such as the legacy of colonial rule, the (pre)existence of state structures that are conducive to democratization, the (pre)existence of a legal system that is normatively conducive to the upholding and maintenance of ‘rights’, ethnic and sectarian conflict, low levels of social and other forms of capital; the willingness or capacity to carry out reforms, and the requirement that reform takes place across a range of sectors, not just the police. At the micro level there is a need to focus on the neighbourhood/community level and understand the ways in which local factors impact on the success or otherwise of reform endeavours, and among other things involves a consideration the situation with local elites, the state of local police infrastructure, levels of crime and disorder, police-public relations, police pay and corruption, the composition of the police, police motivation, and so on. While we would argue strongly against extreme cultural relativism here, the emphasis at the micro level should, where feasible, be about developing ‘local solutions to local problems’ and while this is a commonly accepted precept in much development thinking, it is rarely if ever, applied to police reform. Table I.1 displays the various factors considered at each level of analysis.

Structure of the book The first three chapters set out the conceptual and theoretical template for our subsequent analysis of practical instances of police and SSR explored by way of a number of case studies. In Chapter 1, we make the link between neoliberal dominated globalization and police reform assistance, demonstrating how policing and SSR need to be located within the exigencies of the global economic system. In Chapter 2, the relationship between police reform assistance and the development paradigms of modernization and dependency are developed further, and we demonstrate how police reform often benefits the donor more than the recipient and creates dependency in the security sector, similar to what has been observed in other forms of development aid. In

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Proof 8 Globalization, Police Reform and Development Table I.1

Factors Relevant to SSR at Three Levels of Analysis

Level of Analysis Factors Macro – the economy of the world system – the legacies of colonialism/authoritarianism impacting policing and police-community relations – socioeconomic, SSR, legal, and other forms of relevant aid provided by donor states and organizations and the strategic imperatives of key Western states underlying the aid provided – trends in transnational crime affecting the country in question Meso – ripeness of the state and its institutions for democracy – the position of the country in the global economy and its impact on economic stability, crime rates, and the informal economy – political stability and relations between national and local government – level of ethnic, sectarian, and other forms of conflict and how the transition to democracy has affected them – willingness and capacity to carry out reforms – the strength of civil society – the quality of relations within and between police systems and other institutions in the criminal justice and security sectors, including the military – the influence of the private sector on reforms, including the influence of private policing Micro – local government behaviour, including corruption and efforts to combat crime – local police-community relations – police infrastructure, ethnic composition, behaviour in response to crime and in relations with suspects, recruitment and training, relations with government, and support for reforms – civil society support for reforms

Chapter 3, we discuss the current state of police reform research and practice, including its focus on practitioners and methodological and theoretical weaknesses. After conceptual and theoretical issues are discussed in those chapters, we offer seven case study chapters focusing on countries that have received foreign assistance with police reform endeavours, are located

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in different regions of the world, have unique internal challenges and histories, and different relations with powerful countries. These countries include (in order): Afghanistan, Brazil, Iraq, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey. Each of these chapters examines policing, police reform, the security sector and their histories in these countries based on our scheme of linking police reform with other patterns of development and considering the macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis. Each chapter begins with a country profile, followed by a discussion that covers economic and political issues, crime and general security sector issues, and foreign and national security sector reform efforts. Case study chapters then conclude with an analytic summary broken down by level of analysis. Owing to limitations of space we have had to make several rather tough judgement calls about what we felt were the most significant issues affecting the security sector in each of our case studies. Thus we make no claims to comprehensiveness and fully acknowledge that the actual situation in each of our case study countries is perhaps more complex than presented here. Together as a group the case studies for these countries cover the major issues affecting police reform efforts one might encounter anywhere in the world. The countries we examine derive from different continents, have unique histories, policing traditions, relations with powerful states, and economic, political, and social issues facing them. Each of these countries have either undergone a process of police and security sector reform in the past or is currently undergoing changes to policing and criminal justice structures. In some cases the reforms have worked reasonably well, in others less so. Linking the case studies to our conceptual framework allows us to elicit what factors are conducive to police reform, and what factors serve to inhibit this. Our case studies are informed by a synthesis of the research literature and reports written by governments, NGOs, think tanks, and international organizations. However, six of them are also supplemented by primary research that we have conducted over the years. Graham Ellison has conducted research in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Turkey and has carried out extensive interviews with Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)/Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) personnel who have been involved in the training of the Afghanistan and Iraqi police or who have worked in these jurisdictions as private security consultants. Nathan Pino collected data via interviews and focus groups in Trinidad and Tobago as part of a Fulbright fellowship from January to May of 2009. In Chapter 11, following the case studies, we highlight the differences and similarities in the police and other security sector reform experiences

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among these unique countries and relate them to other relevant observations in the literature. We end with a concluding chapter that seeks to answer the four sets of questions posed above in this introduction, provide our thoughts on the lessons to be learned from the case studies that can be beneficial to practitioners and INGOs, and indicate where we think future academic theorizing and research on these complex issues should proceed.

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1

Neoliberal Globalization, Insecurity and Police Reform

Globalization and neoliberalism In this chapter we discuss neoliberal globalization and its implications for relations among states, crime and insecurity, policing and police reform. An authoritative definition of globalization is elusive in the literature because ‘as a concept, globalisation, like the idea of God, is known to us all, even if we do not all believe in or understand it’ (Kinley 2009: 15). Many scholars define globalization largely in economic terms (for example, see Brady et al 2007), but there is also a significant body of literature that focuses on broader issues, including politics, science, and culture in addition to economics, and as we demonstrate below this understanding has more relevance when it comes to discussing the globalization of crime control and security. Globalization involves greater interdependence among political, economic, and social institutions, and this interdependence expands and intensifies social relations to the point that local occurrences can be influenced and shaped by other events taking place a great distance away (Cerny et al 2005; Giddens 1990; Guillen 2001). Thus, Held and McGrew (2003: 1) provide a more inclusive definition of globalization: Globalisation, simply put, denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human organisation that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world’s regions and continents. Though the origins, extent, and consequences of globalization have been debated quite controversially (Held and McGrew 2003; Hirst and Thompson 11

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1996), it is apparent that the time-space compression that is a dominant feature of its current manifestation is characterized by more rapid communication and capital flows. This has fundamentally altered the conditions under which politics and the world economy affect relations between states (Howard-Hassmann 2004). Globalization has been increasingly influenced and driven by neoliberal ideas over the past few decades (Cerny et al 2005; McMichael 2008; Vogel 1998). Neoliberal activities include the increased privatization of state enterprises, the shifting of power from states to markets, and the liberalization, deregulation and re-regulation of markets via self, state, private, and hybrid forms of regulation that increase transnational corporate (TNC) influence on state policies. In neoliberal thought, major social institutions such as education, politics and the economic system should be market-based and led; a culture of market-oriented behaviour in all individuals is enabled to reduce dependence on the state and increase strident forms of individualism; labour markets, international trade and capital flows are deregulated and then re-regulated in a ‘business friendly’ way; and social and public services are commodified and privatized, all of which work to weaken democratic forms of accountability (Cerny et al 2005; Vogel 1998). However, our point in what follows is that neoliberalism is also resolutely and inescapably ideological. Neoliberalism is not simply an argument about fiscal belt tightening, or about assigning a particular role to the state and market. Nor is it simply a practical response to a fiscal crisis or crises by proposing a series of recommendations via structural adjustment policies and so forth. It is more than any of these things. It is an ideological vision (or project) that seeks to impose its own ways of seeing and feeling on the world. But above all, in spite of what its adherents may like to think, neoliberalism is also fundamentally illogical. Based on the ideology of neoliberalism we would expect to see the state being pulled back in virtually all areas of activity, but in practice the state is refocused to pursue various agendas often irregardless of financial implication. We therefore have the illogicality of a situation whereby one particular state (the US), has spent $1.283 trillion thus far (Belasco 2011) fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the neoliberal ‘freedom’ not to have to spend a tiny fraction of this amount on improving healthcare, education or social policies that may benefit the lives of American citizens. Neoliberalism is a hegemonic force in globalization: its ideology is dominant in major Western states and International Financial Institutions (henceforth IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and neoliberal institutions currently dominate the relations between states and markets in the world economy (Boyer and Drache 1996; Held and

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Proof Neoliberal Globalization, Insecurity and Police Reform 13

McGrew 2003; Peck 2010). These changes have helped increase the power of TNCs, grow global financial markets, and diffuse popular culture globally (Held and McGrew 2003; O’Riain 2000). Nation-states have always attempted to manipulate their economies to their advantage (e.g. controlling trade and capital flows) but neoliberal globalization, with its emphasis on the free market, has undermined many of these domestic controls forcing states to integrate themselves into global networks (O’Riain 2000). The US as currently the world’s only superpower (though this position is increasingly being challenged by China and probably in the future by a re-energized Russia) and IFIs have attempted over the past two decades to proscribe to other countries a set of policies that have been collectively termed the ‘Washington Consensus’ and that are geared to the entrenchment of neoliberal ideas and policies globally (Williamson 2000). These policies involve a simultaneous retrenchment of the state in relation to public expenditures that subsidize social needs; weakening labour, environmental, and legal protections; liberalizing trade and foreign direct investment; privatizing public enterprises; reducing marginal tax and interest rates; extending private property rights; and deregulating economic activity. However, these policies also involve an entrenchment of the state in other areas, particularly in terms of social control policies, and on police and military expenditures to combat a host of actual or perceived domestic and international security threats (see Canterbury 2005). IMF and World Bank structural adjustment policies are integral to the neoliberal agenda and the Washington Consensus (Pieterse 2000) and have had damaging effects on economies, and it is quite clear now that globalization has increased inequalities within and between nations (Brady et al 2007; McMichael 2008; O’Riain 2000). Contemporary global capitalism and its supporting neoliberal ideology have replaced older forms of imperialism to promote dependency and exploitation in the global economic system. In addition, uneven patterns of globalization and development can promote global risks involving ecological hazards, financial instability, and technological change (McMichael 2008; Pieterse 2000). One assessment of structural adjustment policies in nine countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) (2004) found that after various structural adjustment reforms had been implemented economic growth has not been sustained, inequalities remain rife, local populations are further impoverished and marginalized and the claims of ‘partnership’ and dialogue with civil society are largely chimerical. The following factors were seen to impact negatively on the efficacy of structural adjustment: 1) Domestic manufacturing sectors have collapsed and gainful employment

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among workers and small agricultural producers have been reduced owing to trade and financial sector reforms; 2) Agricultural, trade, and mining reforms have disproportionately affected small farmers, producers and mining firms; 3) Flexible labour market policies, governmental budget cuts, privatization schemes, and the reduced role of the government in the economy in general have reduced governmental services and price controls, created less secure employment, lowered wages and benefits, and eroded workers’ rights and collective bargaining power; 4) Finally, enhanced macroeconomic performance has not offset the above problems that increase inequality since the fruits of increased economic growth have been enjoyed almost exclusively by those who already have substantial wealth. IFIs continue these discredited policies in part because it serves the interests of core countries and/or international financiers (see Stiglitz 2003; Vreeland 2003). In many ways they have no other option. IMF and World Bank financiers know only what they have been trained to know: that the market is king and deregulation is the panacea to solve global economic and development problems. Nevertheless, there has been recognition by some financiers, not least from within the World Bank itself, that unadulterated neoliberal reforms were ultimately destabilizing and provoking a fight-back in many Latin American nations (Stiglitz 2003). Consequently, a Post-Washington Consensus has emerged, that comprises a modified neoliberal framework emphasizing the need to manage liberalized markets via codes and various standards of conduct, ideally via private and self-regulation (Onis and Senses 2005). While neoliberals argue that the majority of the world’s poor can benefit from globalization thanks to increases in economic growth (a ‘race to the top’), the research evidence has demonstrated that neoliberal policies have actually deepened inequalities and that ‘a substantial proportion of the world’s population is largely excluded from the benefits of globalisation’ (Held and McGrew 2003: 1). However the situation is more complex than this. For example, neoliberal globalization marginalizes further those already at the bottom, but it is equally likely to impact upon the middle classes that benefitted most from state welfare policies (Rudra 2008). Certainly, the ramifications of the global financial crisis that begun in 2008 have been felt just as deeply by those relatively affluent groups and individuals who have most to lose. Within the US and those Eurozone economies that either have received or are likely to receive IMF bailout funding (Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) the impact of the austerity measures has hit professional and white-collar groups as well as

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those further down the social hierarchy.1 In Ireland for example, it is middle-income families earning around €50,000 per annum that have experienced the deepest cut in net income as a consequence of the $30 billion austerity package imposed by the IMF on the Irish Government as a core lending requirement for its $117 billion bailout of the Irish economy. As the Irish Times commented, ‘Middle income families with children at university will be among the hardest hit and they will begin to feel the pain almost immediately’ (Irish Times 2010). The US has continued its attempts to maintain global economic dominance by promoting a liberal economic order while building its military strength (O’Riain 2000). However, wealthy countries cannot completely tame the neoliberal beast they have unleashed, as neoliberalism has turned on its masters in terms of heightened levels of domestic inequality and debt. In the US, for example, the restructuring of the global economy has resulted in the flight of manufacturing jobs to Asia and Latin America, while the ‘socio-spatial effects of racism’ have entrenched inequalities for under-educated black males who experience prison terms for a wide range of offences as a normal part of the life-course (Gottdiener 1994: 210; Pettit and Western 2006). The round of IMF austerity measures within the Eurozone (discussed above) invoked the justification that such measures are necessary for market stabilization and confidence, increased global competitiveness, and securing a swift return of IMF resources to be able to support further countries (IMF 2010). As Stanger (2009: 47) suggests, ‘In short, even for the uniquely powerful United States, globalization is a revolution that has shifted power from the state and its representatives to the private sector and a range of entrepreneurial forces’. It must be said, however, that globalization is not just a linear neoliberal enterprise characterized by the domination of the core, by the periphery. Rather it is a politically contested process at the local, national, and transnational levels. Indeed, cracks have appeared in the neoliberal edifice: Prominent economists such as Joseph Stiglitz (2003) have challenged some of the assumptions of the neoliberal model; there have been protests globally against IFIs and other multilateral organizations; international social forums meet regularly, and nationalist rhetoric among countries in the periphery and semi-periphery has increased (Babb 2005). Globalization has influenced the rapid diffusion of technological advancements, the political philosophy of liberalism based on individual freedoms, and democratic governance, combining ideas rooted in the Enlightenment with the power of the free market (Kinley 2009; Silbey 1997). Advances in communication and transportation have eroded boundaries created by time and space, expanding globally those Enlightenment ideas concerning

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the importance of objective science and universal law and morality (i.e. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) (Silbey 1997). On the other hand, neoliberal ideas emphasizing market expansion forward the narrative that markets establish themselves worldwide after being constrained within national and regional boundaries and rules, and can therefore enhance efficiency, control costs, and promote justice by empowering consumers to make rational choices (Silbey 1997). One could argue then that the current neoliberal manifestation of globalization is not a predetermined inevitability but a deliberate project and that governments and their citizens still have the capacity to act in decisive ways on economic and geopolitical affairs (McMichael 2008). Social movements including the ‘Occupy Movement’ in its various forms around the world and the recent ‘Arab Spring’ have become global and can influence both national and global institutions by engaging in global networks (Kaldor 2003; Roy 2011). That being said, the changes we are witnessing regarding the diffusion of human rights norms and the spread of communications technologies and global networks and so on are not suggestive of an emergent world society whereby the world’s cultures assimilate into one global civilization (Held and McGrew 2003: 1). The consensus in the literature is that there is no emerging global culture (see Guillen’s 2001 discussion on this point), and various countries reflect on and adapt to globalization differently by embracing some aspects of the dominant neoliberal ideology while discarding others. For example, we find that there are varieties of capitalism being practiced around the world, creating competitive advantages that would be lost if countries would converge towards one model of globalized capitalism (see Hall and Soskice 2001). In addition, as globalization erodes national boundaries it can compel people to attach to long-established cultural and nationalistic ideas and activities, or at least adopt and diffuse the influences of globalization in ways that do not drastically affect their cultural ideas and activities (Rosenau 1997). Increased globalization can therefore lead to tensions between sameness and difference, or to put it another way, a potentially heightened emphasis on local identity via nationalism and/or fundamentalism (Barber 1995). The recent global economic crisis challenged the idea that neoliberalism would remain dominant, but it remains well-entrenched thanks to its adaptability and shape-shifting nature. Neoliberalism is not a static phenomenon: it is in a constant state of flux and evolution as it responds to various economic and other crises (Peck 2010; Wacquant 2009). For example, state institutions supporting free markets, privatization of governmental functions and deregulation now work in a co-mutual manner

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with state institutions that provide social services and focus on worker protections in a way that upholds a capitalist world order characterized by business-friendly regulations (Wacquant 2009). Politicians of nearly all political stripes, including the centre and the left, are increasingly supporting similar policies that cut back social spending, increase employment in secondary labour markets, and enhance the technologies of control and the coerciveness of the state in terms of criminal justice policy as new methods for contending with the poor and dispossessed (Simon 2007; Wacquant 2009). States increasingly view their own economic development in terms of their ability to link in with and benefit from TNCs. Increasingly, there is a compression of the global and the local and national governments allow TNCs to operate globally within state borders in a process that Sassen (2007) has termed denationalization. It has been suggested by Peck (2010: 106) that neoliberal ideology shape-shifts as a way to contend with its own failures: ‘From dogmatic deregulation to market-friendly reregulation, from structural adjustment to good governance, from budget cuts to regulation-by-audit, from welfare retrenchment to active social policy, from privatisation to public-private partnership, [and] from greed-is-good to markets-with-morals…’. Meanwhile, in the global South, due to the effects of globalizing neoliberalism, we have witnessed a growing ‘sovereignty gap’ that exists between the legal sovereignty of these states and their ability to provide basic services to their citizens (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 3). The state should have a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, develop and maintain infrastructure, manage public finances, and engage in other functions that maintain legitimacy, but as we discuss in the next chapter Ghani and Lockhart (2008) document how foreign aid undermines a state’s ability to perform many of these functions. In the following section of this chapter we note that the failure of many states in the global South to ‘provide basic order not only makes fear a constant of daily life but also provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror’ (Ghani and Lockhard 2008: 4). The privatization of security and the increasing authoritarianism of numerous governments are other consequences of neoliberal globalization, as we demonstrate below.

Neoliberal globalization, insecurity, and the security sector Neoliberal influences on the global economy and governmental economic policies are well understood, but we contend that neoliberalism also fuels social insecurity, creating a market for private security services as well as a sustained governmental security response. They also have had

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profound effects on the security sectors of many nations that include the police, other criminal justice agencies and security organizations, militaries, and intelligence organizations. We are witnessing a significant increase in crime and insecurity in many regions of the world, even in countries that have made democratic transitions (Neild 2002). A number of the consequences and characteristics of contemporary globalization shape the problems relating to crime and disorder that affect transitional and developing countries (Findlay 1999). For example, rapid urbanization creates social dislocation and a lack of social cohesion that weakens informal social control. In neoliberal globalization, capital moves to find ever-cheaper sources of labour, resulting in pockets of abandoned workers, widening inequalities, and the potential for increases in predatory crime, particularly in areas where there are high concentrations of young unemployed males (Neild 2002). Furthermore, neoliberal globalization undermines state sovereignty by privatizing state enterprises, weakening state regulatory controls, and ceding authority to global institutions of governance such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). In some cases shadow economies and organized criminals become structurally aligned with the state; increasing corruption, and eroding systems of legal and moral authority (Aas 2007; Wedel 2009). The social control systems of authoritarian regimes are concerned with regime protection rather than enforcing the law or citizen safety. Consequently, increases in crime and feelings of insecurity coupled with a weak or repressive police response may also lead to the privatization of security (discussed further below) and vigilante actions by citizens (Neild 2002). The issue of ‘security’ is of extreme importance here because the consequences of insecurity are immense. For Loader and Walker (2007a: 8) security is ‘simultaneously the producer and product of forms of trust and abstract solidarity between intimates and strangers that are prerequisite to democratic political communities.’ Authoritarian governments rarely have citizen safety at the forefront of their policy agendas. For Loader and Walker, ‘fearful citizens tend to be inattentive to, unconcerned about, even enthusiasts for, the erosion of basic freedoms, and this may lead to increases in risks such as fundamentalist violence, the use of private security, and civil war’ (Loader and Walker 2007a: 8). Individuals and governments attempt to calculate risks as a way to contend with feelings of insecurity. Beck (2002) discusses how ‘risk’ is associated with late modernity. However, rapid modernization ‘has produced a gulf between the world of quantifiable risk in which we think and act, and the world of non-quantifiable insecurities that we are creat-

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ing’ (Beck 2002: 40). In this ‘world risk society’ concerns regarding social welfare and justice are replaced with individualized fears regarding crime, terrorism and other national and international threats such as ecological and economic disasters. These threats are also perceived as uncontrollable because they do not originate from one agent that can be managed by a single nation-state. Therefore, in this context, in many areas of social life, state and private controls are enhanced in order to promote the illusion of control over these seemingly uncontrollable threats (Beck 2002). Whole swathes of social existence can become ‘securitized’ whereby any issue can be transformed into a security issue warranting particular forms of attention or action. Security threats are broadened and deepened for the purposes of profit and/or power and can include military, political, ecological, social, or economic threats (Buzan et al 1998). As the state increases its control apparatus and declares various wars on drugs, crime, terrorism, and immigrants, it helps perpetuate and maintain a culture of fear that compels citizens to support the erosion of liberties (Simon 2007). Feelings of insecurity among the public also create a market for security services (targeted in particular to those with the means to pay), enabling people to feel that they proactively taking steps to protect themselves: As Ian Loader (1999: 381) acknowledges, ‘The most obvious appeal of the security market is that it appears to offer its various consumers (who may be experiencing high levels of victimisation, or anxiety about crime, or both) some semblance of control over an otherwise unpredictable and troubling future.’ Security, however, is an elastic concept. Individuals may well feel they can never be secure enough, and private security companies can market themselves to consumers’ sense of risk and heightened feelings of anxiety. Loader (1999) notes, however, that if this security doesn’t appear to work – if for instance, fear, anxiety, or perceptions of risk become heightened – individuals will feel compelled to purchase a higher level of security services, returning to the market that failed to reduce their anxiety in the past. The consumption of security creates its own kind of paranoid demand for more, and which may also lead to increased levels of private violence and authoritarianism (Loader 1999; Neild 2002). Insecurity can lead citizens to demand more state and private security against perceived risks, diverting further resources from other services. Of course this gels neatly with neoliberalism. Neoliberals have indeed been working to dismantle the protections afforded by the welfare state while increasing state and private systems of social control (Simon 2007; Wacquant 2003). In the US from the 1970s, successive administrations – both Democrat and Republican – have weakened welfare state provision and social safety nets. The prison population alone exploded from less

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than 200,000 in 1971 (Currie 1998) to well over two million today thanks to increased prison admissions and longer sentences even though rates of crime have largely decreased over that period. In the European Union, – what is termed the European Social Model – has increasingly been subjected to what Stephen Gill (2001) has termed ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ that has chipped away at many social and economic rights protections. Of course, there is considerable variation in the extent of this process with Scandinavian countries still maintaining well funded, albeit expensive in tax terms, welfare systems, compared to others, such as the United Kingdom, that have embraced neoliberal ideas rather more enthusiastically. Through globalization, a national emphasis on internal security feeds into an emphasis on international security to contend with perceived external risks. As with socioeconomic policies, international anti-crime, corruption and terrorism initiatives are part of a neoliberal agenda that allows key Western states to internationalize pro-market, deregulatory policies. As neoliberal policies erode public enterprises, subsidies, and welfare programmes, national security replaces social security as the primary focus of state activity and political legitimacy (McCulloch 2007). Neoliberalism has also affected public policy debates about the privatization of security and correctional institutions, as well as debates concerning state initiatives to address transnational crime, border security, and cybercrime (Aas 2007). One telling example, from the US, relates to a recent and controversial Arizona law introduced as the ‘Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbourhoods Act.’ This Act allows the police in Arizona to stop and question anyone who appears to be in the country illegally and to arrest those who lack proof of domicile status. The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) through an organization called the American Legislative Exchange Council played the largest role in writing the Senate bill, and then lobbied to get the bill passed in the Arizona legislature (Sullivan 2010). After the bill passed into law, its constitutionality was challenged in the Federal court on numerous grounds. Policing around the world has also been transformed due in part to the broadening of governance and bureaucratic control systems that extend beyond state borders (Sheptycki 2007). For example, as Held and McGrew (2003: 21–22) acknowledge, ‘…states no longer have a monopoly of force …[and] private armies and the private provision of security play a significant role in many regions of the world’. The authority of government relative to corporations has been lessened and what we are seeing with the increase in private security ‘is a fundamental shift in the location of

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responsibility for guaranteeing and defining the peace from the state to corporate entities’ (Shearing 1992: 425; see also Macaulay 1986). In several fundamental respects, police reform is increasingly conducted with the involvement of private actors (Kempa et al 1999). As Aas (2007) notes, private contractors play a key role in many reform/reconstruction endeavours (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) and private security personnel have amassed a wide range of powers while lacking significant accountability (O’Reilly 2011; Stanger 2009; Stenning 2000). We have also seen an increase in state security in the context of the war on terror via an increase in prison populations, border security, state surveillance and crime control bureaucracies around the world along with an increased paramilitarization of the police (Christie 2000; Sheptycki 2007; Taylor 1999). What this means is that security has been transformed into a commodity that private companies and citizens actively engage in (Loader 1999). Public and private policing have become blurred not only in terms of public-private partnerships but also because the police are compelled to compete with private security firms in a market place, increasingly seeing what they do as a service and taking business practices and jargon such as efficiency and financial accountability as their own. Public police forces have been under increased pressure to adhere to financial accountability and to be run more like businesses; citizens are increasingly labelled as consumers; and the police are more active in promoting their services through public relations departments as if they were a business (see Loader 1999). The privatization of security reframes policing and security away from being a potential public good in democratic societies: For Loader (1999: 384), ‘It enables individuals, organisations and communities to pursue their particularistic (and self-defined) security requirements without reference to any conception of the common good, and free of the obligations associated with the practice of democratic citizenship’ (Loader 1999: 384). The proliferation of private policing and other forms of security such as private military companies has been increasing rapidly since the 1960s. The RAND corporation saw this development positively since they believed private security as an industry was providing a service, helping corporations and other private groups and individuals with self-defence not being provided by the public police (Shearing 2002). While ignoring or discounting concerns about civil liberties, neoliberals also framed private policing not as the proliferation of private armies but as a partner with public police to engage in the same kinds of co-productive crime-fighting activities (Shearing 2002). Neoliberalism is also affecting how states and private actors react to human and natural disasters and international conflicts (Klein 2007).

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Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and other areas along the gulf coast of Louisiana and Mississippi create unstable policy arenas where conflict and disaster-related functions are shifted from a public to private responsibility. Similarly, US procurement law means that contracts for post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq must be offered to US firms who are clamouring for a slice of the $500 billion dollar cake allocated to such efforts (see Chapter 2). Global instability ‘…generates huge profits for the high-tech-homeland-security sector, for heavy construction, for private healthcare companies, for the oil and gas sectors – and of course, for defence contractors’ (Klein 2007: 56). Disasters become markets themselves, as private security forces are hired to provide relief, wage war, secure borders, and spy on citizens (Klein 2007). There is a now well understood distinction between low policing, which involves general crime control and order maintenance, and high policing, which involves upholding the dominant economic and political system via corporate and state security services (Brodeur 1983; also see Sheptycki 2002). One of us (O’Reilly and Ellison 2006) utilized the term ‘private high policing’ to describe how in the increasingly fractured domain of late-modern policing and security private corporations are increasingly encroaching into the traditionally public domain of national security. What we are witnessing is a form of state-corporate symbiosis (O’Reilly and Ellison 2006) and one cannot, for example, analyse the counter-terrorism ‘performance’ of the US police and Federal agencies separately from the huge corporate infrastructure (security consultancies, security contractors, risk advisors and so forth) that has grown up around homeland security. Increased privatization, marketization, commodification and hybridization has resulted in the distinctions between private and public high policing becoming increasingly blurred as private and public security forces of various stripes work together for the same goals upholding perceived state and corporate interests based on contracts and other agreements. This takes a myriad of forms and include those public-private ‘policing’ partnerships; commercial airlines assisting governments’ on various security issues; private corrections corporations operating prisons inside and outside of the US and the deeply entrenched involvement of the corporate sector in national security and intelligence operations (O’Reilly and Ellison 2006; Aas 2007). In an era of neoliberal globalization private firms increasingly dominate those economic and security functions that extend beyond the state, so the proliferation of private high policing is yet another trend that erodes the democratic governance and accountability of security provision globally.

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Neoliberal globalization and security sector reform Space-time compressions in globalization allow for new forms of transnational social organization. At the global level, there are many institutions, organizations, courts, and the like integrated into networks that act as sites for cooperation, sources of expertise and information, and mechanisms of law-making and declaration (Halliday and Osinksy 2006). We see this in international police cooperation as well, which is increasingly used to tackle transnational crimes involving drugs, pollution, human trafficking and other human rights violations, counterfeiting, the trafficking of weapons, art and endangered species, and international terrorism (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Deflem 2002; Held and McGrew 2003). Transnational crime has increased as globalization has become more entrenched, but the policing of drugs, terrorism and various forms of organized crime, have always operated across national boundaries, and international police cooperation to combat these international crimes has also been in force for decades (Bowling 2009; Deflem 2002). For example, international police cooperation has a long history often rooted in the social control of political and nationalist movements such as anarchists and Bolsheviks (see Deflem 2002). Powerful states and international organizations are pressuring governments in the global South to adopt security sector models favoured by the West. Neoliberal institutions have been increasingly interested in security sector reform since the end of the Cold War (Ball 2001; Brzoska 2003). Development and governance are increasingly intertwined (see Chapter 2) and the IMF and World Bank have reinterpreted their mandates to strengthen governance structures via so-called ‘good governance’ initiatives and reforming governmental institutions (Ball 2001). For example, in the name of fiscal responsibility and as a way to calm potential foreign investors the IMF and World Bank have suggested to developing countries that they cap their military spending, demilitarize police forces, reduce weapons trafficking, and reorganize militaries (Ball 2001; Brzoska 2003). Even though nation-states are part of a larger ‘polycentric power system in a fragmented global order’ powerful seigniorial states such as the US still play a role in shaping the global system even though this is now less amenable to US influence (Sheptycki 2007: 49). In a key work bridging the academic areas of criminology and international relations entitled Policing the Globe, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) detail how governments, via bilateral agreements with the US, are homogenizing their criminal laws, creating multilateral organizations, and entering

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into agreements in hopes of collaborating more effectively for combating transnational crime. One example of this is the use of ‘ship rider’ agreements between the US and Trinidad and Tobago discussed later in this volume. While international collaboration led by the US to combat illegal drugs has being ongoing for decades, the US is increasingly using its hegemonic influence to export its notions of crime and crime control for economic, political, and in some cases moral reasons often pushed by international organizations and international NGOs such as the need for strengthening human rights and democratic freedoms. The US acts unilaterally and coercively more often in its international crime control efforts (including picking up fugitives abroad and obtaining evidence in foreign jurisdictions) than other powerful states who tend to rely more on diplomatic and soft-power initiatives. The US makes the shaping of the laws and security sectors of other countries an important element of its foreign policy. It dictates the terms and practices of bi and multilateral agreements and the content of laws, and even coerces other countries to adopt legal measures the US itself could not adopt, such as having foreign militaries carry out domestic police actions, which the US military is prohibited from engaging in domestically (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Historically, the US has also dominated international policing and has sent more police abroad in missions, trained more police overseas, and has signed more bilateral law enforcement treaties than any other country (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Deflem 2002). While the US may claim that the countries are entering into an equal ‘partnership’ agreement, in reality these are asymmetrical in terms of power-relationships and as we discuss below have produced various negative consequences that can retard democratic or rights-based reforms. Of course international police cooperation can also enhance the position of police organizations. Concentrating on cooperation between the US and Germany, Deflem (2002: 23) convincingly demonstrates that national police organizations are more likely to engage in international cooperation when they are more independent from their national governments and have the bureaucratic autonomy needed to establish ‘systems of expert knowledge related to the fight against international crime’. International police cooperation, however, is only one type of transnational policing. As in the area of socioeconomic development, discussion, facilitation and debates regarding transnational policing are occurring among governments, NGOs, civil society groups, academics and policy entrepreneurs (see Chapter 3). Based on bilateral or multilateral agreements, transnational policing operates according to a number

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of sometimes competing agendas including humanitarian relief in postconflict or post-disaster situations, establishing the rule of law, fighting crime, nation-building, and in efforts to combat illicit transnational markets (Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007). In addition, an international law enforcement subculture has formed based on the homogenizing of laws across borders and the building of criminal justice relationships between countries that include ‘…extradition and other law enforcement agreements…international training programs, bilateral working groups, joint investigations, liaison postings abroad, and Interpol and other international meetings’ (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 8–9). In many conflicted regions of the globe international police are engaged in state-crafting which refers to ‘…the increasingly police-led nature of transnational stage-crafting (or state-building) exercises as opposed to state-building exercises led largely by militaries’ (Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007: 1). As we outline in Chapter 3 overseas police aid has become a major global export phenomenon (Bayley 2006; Brogden 2005; Ellison 2007a), involving private corporations who train community policing officers, private consultants, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and Western overseas development agencies. The diffusion of policing concepts and practices are an integral part of globalization, and complements other forms of Western development assistance. Numerous agencies (UNDP, USAID, DFID, ICITAP, NGOs) work to diffuse police concepts and practices at the national and supranational levels. In addition, police aid occurs spatially at every level of abstraction: from the neighbourhood jurisdiction to the national and global levels (Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007). Governments and their police agencies, in differing degrees, respond and adapt, which alters the structures of numerous police agencies around the world and in turn the relationships between the police and civil society. There have been numerous consequences to all of this activity. First of all, efforts to combat transnational crime have rarely been successful, but the increased globalization of crime and crime control have both weakened and enhanced state power (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Technologies have made it easier for criminals to avoid detection and apprehension by states, but have also increased surveillance and other activities that increase state control. Second, US and other ‘…international law enforcement efforts have generated enormous collateral damage’ (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 251). In terms of drug laws, for example, drug users are criminalized instead of provided treatment; and efforts to control human trafficking concentrate solely on the traffickers, thus ignoring the needs of victims (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Third,

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the US and UN, through their foreign police assistance, have been contributing to insecurity by empowering police, intelligence services and the military to engage in abuses against various civilian populations while at the same time claiming to promote human rights and democracy (Hills 2009a; Sheptycki 2007). UNPOL emphasizes civilian policing that conforms to democratic standards, but the organization often relies on public order strategies such as paramilitary tactics to deal with various situations and its officers have been known to engage in abuses. In any case, most of the officers that sign up for UN overseas missions are from nations (Bangladesh, Pakistan and Jordan, for example) that are not exactly renowned for their tolerance of human rights in their own domestic context. In addition to political barriers and inequities, the realities of policing practice at the national and sub-national levels ‘outweigh the idealism and universalizing tendencies of liberal commentators and organizations such as the UN’ (Hills 2009a: 301), compromising the entire enterprise. Fourth, policing is no longer rooted solely within the nation-state due to privatization, transnationalization, multilateralization and the development of a transnational police subculture. It has become fragmented and lacking in democratic accountability and legitimacy in areas such as intelligence sharing between countries, moving some forms of police authority from nation-states to the European Union, and other formal and informal agreements (see Loader 2002; Sheptycki 2002; Walker 2002). For Sheptycki (2007) transnational policing is ‘not securely grounded in “local” and/or “national” accountability structures’ (2007: 41). As security governance becomes less tied to the nation-state while at the same time becoming more transnational in orientation and subject to market influences, police legitimacy and accountability are weakened. For example, there is a growing homogeneity in police technologies (such as surveillance equipment, COMPSTAT) and practices (such as paramilitary tactics and border operations to contend with drug trafficking and terrorism) that are diffused globally. In a sense then, the drivers of policing at the transnational level impact on the structure, organization and delivery of local policing. Fifth, while western democracies usually emphasize ‘democratic policing’ as the favoured export paradigm there is little agreement on what this actually means in practice (Manning 2010; see Chapter 2). Similarly, there is little consensus over appropriate police standards, the amount of force used in policing, or what constitutes effective policing (Hills 2009a). When the US or various international coalitions do attempt to export a purportedly universal policing standard the result does not convincingly match the rhetoric because local political, historical and cultural dynamics

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are not properly accounted for in preparation for or during reform efforts (Hills 2009a). For example, as we discuss in Chapter 2, Western notions of democracy have dominated the theoretical and evaluative discourses on democratization (focusing on political aspects such as regime change and electoral competition) even though this is unlikely to be realized in many regions of the world – such as the Middle East, for example (Caldeira and Holston 1999). In other cases, such as India and Haiti, ‘democracy’ exists but at the price of some of the highest levels of poverty and the lowest living standards world in the world for the vast majority of inhabitants. Furthermore, in both jurisdictions policing is repressive, with the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2007) recently branding the situation regarding the Indian police’s adherence to democratic norms and human rights standards as ‘grim’. In fact if leaders in developing countries are looking for an emulative model to lift millions of residents out of abject poverty then perhaps it is to the East (to China) not the West where they should be looking. Clearly, and we are being a little tongue-incheek here, democratic freedoms may count for little if your basic human needs are not being met whether in a Mumbai slum, a South African ‘township’ or a Brazilian ‘favela’. This of course points to the conundrum about whether it is ‘better’ to be free and die young in poverty, or ‘unfree’ and have basic human needs met (Hawksley 2009). We have no answer to this but if survival is a basic and biologically driven human instinct, and ‘freedom’ a Western-inspired abstraction rooted in the Enlightenment (see Ryan 2011) then ‘democracy’ without a material change in socio-economic circumstances and fundamental political transformation is little more than empty rhetoric. In regard to overseas policing assistance donors attempt to instil Western values and principles where they do not apply on the ground and Western governments might in actuality be promoting their own foreign policy objectives for strategic advantage rather than the interests of the country receiving aid (Hills 2009a; see also Chapter 3). In any event, it appears that transnational policing cooperation concentrates more on technical issues than on the cultivation of transnational policing norms based around conflict resolution and an adherence to human rights principles (Hills 2009a). Sixth, despite all of the pressures on countries to engage in all of the aforementioned reforms, there are various methods of resistance on the part of the countries being pressured to implement them, as we shall see throughout the case studies later in this volume. While laws are more homogenized around the world than ever before, the implementation of these laws and their enforcement will still vary across

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states (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). There are also disagreements among nations on what should be criminalized. Marijuana and other drugs are a good example, as well as disagreements over measures to combat HIV/ AIDS, pollution, and human rights standards. There is also disagreement over the very definition of terrorism (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). While there has been increased cooperation in international crime control efforts, these efforts will continue to be combative and countries tend to act according to varying standards, even if they are ostensibly invoking the same norms. In sum, similar to the patterns discussed above regarding economic and political reform, private and public police forces, along with NGOs and other organizations compete to influence security sector reform efforts. While similar norms involving policing and justice are lauded around the world, suggesting a converging consensus, governments providing assistance abroad often violate the ideals they are promoting. In addition, recipient countries will pay lip service to such ideals to receive aid and gain legitimacy but then act as they see fit once the donors and trainers leave. We discuss the political economy of foreign aid and development assistance further in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

Taming the excesses of globalizing neoliberalism How have scholars attempted to navigate the difficulties of security sector reform in this era of neoliberal globalization? Scholars in this area of inquiry have offered four different options (or reform templates) that attempt to reduce the sovereignty gap in general and improve security sector reform in particular. These options can be delineated as follows: 1) Establish a more effective empire by pragmatically embracing and working within neoliberal globalization and American foreign policy objectives, primarily through top-down strategies, 2) Strengthening state capacity to provide security and reduce the role of private actors, 3) Develop a global transnational ethic for the provision of security, and 4) Seek bottomup strategies for security sector and other reforms by strengthening the capacity of civil society. A more effective empire The first option is based on a rather conservative and appreciative view of neoliberal globalization than the others, and scholars advocating this approach attempt to find ways to make current practices, such as the use of American might and private contractors, more successful on the assumption that these practices are likely to remain in place within

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neoliberal globalization and that the American ‘empire’ is going to retain its hegemonic role for the foreseeable future (Bayley 2006; Bayley and Perito 2010; Perito 2004). Stanger (2009: 163) notes that since increased privatization through public-private partnerships are an inevitable feature of neoliberal globalization, the issue is about ‘getting privatisation right’ instead of questioning the underlying assumptions of privatizing security and other public goods in the first place: …we need a postindustrial foreign policy, one that dispenses with the notion that the keys to wealth and power are access to natural resources and territory. We need a foreign policy that sees power flowing to the entrepreneurs and opinion shapers, and that sees the future as belonging to those who can harness innovation to serve the common good. When it comes to corruption and other illegalities stemming from shady contracts, Stanger argues that the US government is to blame more than the contractors because it sets the rules that allow contractors to control costs. Therefore, the US government should be more reflective and intervene in markets in such a way that they can direct private contractors to engage in ethical practices and have multiple forms of oversight (Stanger 2009). In terms of police reform, instead of questioning the wisdom of invading Iraq or other countries in the first place, Perito (2004) instructs how such operations can be conducted more effectively. He states that because failed states pose a direct threat to US national security, it ‘…will need the capacity to project its power in a manner that ensures the rapid restoration of stability and the creation of an environment conducive to postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction’ (Perito 2004: 323). Instead of building rule-of-law institutions after pacifying a country, he argues that the US and its allies should do so as soon as combat operations end while creating legitimacy by trying and punishing former regime officials, acting with transparency, and creating stability units similar to the formed police units of the United Nations. Similarly, Bayley (2006) and later Bayley and Perito (2010) penned how-to manuals aimed at police and military trainers on establishing democratic policing abroad in post-conflict situations (almost exclusively from a top-down approach) but without mentioning or questioning the efficacy of US foreign policy objectives in any significant or reflexive way. The remaining three options discussed below take a more critical view of underlying objectives of powerful states and neoliberal globalization, and it is to these that we now turn.

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Strengthening state capacity The second option involves strengthening and enhancing the capacity of developing nations to manage their economies and provide security instead of relying on foreign powers or private security companies (Boyer and Drache 1996; Loader and Walker 2007b; Sen 2009, 1999; Stenning 2000). States need more control over their own economies so that their citizens can democratically participate in governance arrangements. As it stands currently, international financial lenders control public spending, taxes, and foreign investment flows more than states or their citizens (Boyer and Drache 1996). Loader and Walker (2007b) also argue that increasing state capacity can tame neoliberal globalization insofar as it would promote what they term a ‘thick’ form of security. The promotion of security in an era of globalization does not have to be authoritarian and abusive, and democratic states can make security a ‘thick public good’ (Loader and Walker 2007a: 4). That is, security itself can have a civilizing effect on political discourse and the relationship between citizens and the state, and it is necessary to figure out how to create security as a public good in authoritarian and failing states. For Sen (2009, 1999) protective security is one of the five freedoms people should enjoy, along with political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, and transparency guarantees. One important dimension of these freedoms, however, is that they can create the conditions for an organic civil society to emerge that promotes collective security. Everyone has a stake in security: if people recognize this they can see that improving the security of others improves their own security (Loader and Walker 2007a). In numerous countries there are some forms of accountability already in place that can be strengthened and more aggressively enforced, such as industry self-regulation, market accountability, and enforcing criminal, civil, contractual liability, and labour laws (Stenning 2000). A global transnational ethic A third but related option is to develop a global transnational ethic for the provision of security for the public good (Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007; Sheptycki 2007). Given that powerful states are making police reform a key component of state-building, and that there are multiple agendas present in reform efforts (humanitarian, crime-fighting, nation-building, etc.) Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007: 2) argue for a global ‘constabulary ethic’ that can ‘identify those characteristics that might describe desirable policing initiatives in transnational and global contexts’. There are many weak or failed states that abuse their own populations or cannot protect them populations from victimization or provide sanctuary for terrorist

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groups, so the need for developing a constabulary ethic would appear to be an urgent one. However, there are perhaps more reasons to be pessimistic than optimistic regarding the development of a constabulary ethic, particularly since the idea originated within the context of military occupation and neocolonialism (Sheptycki 2007). Nevertheless, Sheptycki (2007: 32) wants us to remain optimistic, and argues for police and their patrons to choose to be involved in global governance in a positive way and to foster a constabulary ethic ‘capable of guiding the practices of personnel in policing-type agencies (broadly-conceived) towards social peace and good ends with just means.’ Transnational legal agreements such as the European convention on Human Rights can and do affect the way police are trained; and more international organizations and NGOs are articulating that policing should be based on human rights and democratic principles and that use of force should only be used when it is necessary and authorized (Sheptycki 2007). Still, Hills (2009a) questions whether a global policing ethic that creates a common police craft around the world can be established because of global economic and political dynamics. She also notes that many police reform pay only lip-service to human rights and democratic development and that there is no real consensus, even among Western countries, about what appropriate police behaviour comprises (discussed further in Chapter 2). Even Sheptycki (2007) admits that powerful seigniorial states such as the US may take advantage of global insecurity and co-opt the ever-changing rhetoric while still carrying out activities solely in its own interests and stunting attempts by civil society groups and others to push for democratic and human rights-based police reform. For these reasons attempting to promote a transnational policing ethic may well have negative consequences due to the inappropriateness of various reforms in countries with political or institutional barriers to democratic reform and the regular weakening of those principles to meet various objectives by powerful Western states. Bottom-up strategies Given these difficulties, other commentators have developed ideas around participatory governance to reform policing and justice as a way to navigate around the difficulties in top-down, state-centred development approaches (Cain 2000; Davis and Trebilcock 2001; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Kaldor 2003; McEvoy and McGregor 2008a; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a; Rose 1998; Shearing 2002). These approaches seek to articulate and develop bottom-up strategies that strengthen civil society and invoke local solutions to local problems by drawing on indigenous knowledge and civil society

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strengths while accounting for the diversity of the country or region in question. In order to challenge the hegemony of international financial institutions and transnational corporations, civil society groups with similar goals have been increasing their international networking activities to strengthen their demands to both local governments and international institutions and to educate international institutions and academics on issues affecting the global South (Kaldor 2003). Noting failed approaches by scholars and practitioners in the West to understand crime and crime control in the global South, Cain (2000: 250) seeks an ‘interactive globalisation’ that involves members of donor and recipient organizations learning from each other in a mutual and reciprocal way in order to develop reforms appropriate to the local context. This process geared toward local needs would be global in terms of information sharing and genuine collaboration. State-building strategies that have a citizen focus could adhere to international standards of human rights, accountability and transparency, and be ‘…cemented through “double compacts” between country leadership and the international community on the one hand and the citizenry on the other’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 7). This type of compact would be necessary for legitimacy and more robust forms of democratic governance. Clifford Shearing and his colleagues, for example, have advocated nodal governance as a way of responding to the challenges posed by neoliberal globalization (see Shearing 2001; Wood and Dupont 2006; Wood and Shearing 2006; Johnson and Shearing 2003). The nodal model establishes multiple sites of governance that coincide with the varied ways in which people in society operate in many overlapping spheres at once, increasing the possibility that diverse and conflicting groups can all participate in reform plans, thereby enhancing the legitimacy and potential sustainability of various efforts. Police reformers should be sensitive to the local context, work to build local capacity, and act as partners with recipients without dictating to or patronizing them (Marenin 2005). Police reform can promote and abide by certain democratic principles (upholding the rule of law, legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and subordination to civil authority) and reform should occur while other efforts that include independent socioeconomic development and building human and social capital are undertaken (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006b). Furthermore, it is suggested that local participatory governance may enhance the accountability of the public police and temper the influence of the private security sector (Shearing 1992). We also see similar attempts in the field of transitional justice, which is growing and gaining wider interest in post-conflict reconstruction efforts (see McEvoy and McGregor 2008b; Marenin 2005). Scholars in this

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area note the importance of an interdisciplinary approach and working with civil-society organizations to ameliorate the effects of the security vacuum that often emerges after wars and ethnic conflicts. Most scholars in the area call for transitional justice ‘from below’, that involves citizens and civil society groups in the transition and avoids one-size-fits-all approaches (McEvoy and McGregor 2008b: 2). If indigenous ideas and practices can become part of a reform plan, recipients may be more likely to embrace proposed changes to policy and/or practices, and Western scholars and practitioners can learn from these indigenous knowledges to stimulate new ideas and innovative programmes. Countries providing legal aid can work to develop trust and other forms of social capital with recipient countries, offer lengthy commitments and low political profiles, and exchange ideas rather than attempt one-way transfers of aid with little consideration of the broader context of public sector reform or the local knowledge and histories of recipient nations (Davis and Trebilcock 2001; Rose 1998). Certainly while top-down reform approaches have their problems, we should not exaggerate the potential and capacity of bottom-up strategies since while they may offer a liberating and conciliatory potential they may also be punitive, capricious and intolerant of minorities or outsiders (Crawford 2006, 1997). Such initiatives are also vulnerable to being taken over by elite groups for their own ends and in deeply divided societies promote sectoral or particular ethnic group interests (Neild 2002). More fundamentally though, bottom-up governance initiatives need to be grounded in a discourse of rights – but this leads to a charge of cultural imperialism. However, if this rights discourse is absent then localized bottom-up strategies are equally susceptible to charges of moral and cultural relativism (discussed in Chapter 2). The stoning of adulterous women in Iran and Somalia may be an example of a bottom-up strategy grounded organically in local community practice, but that makes it no less abhorrent and repulsive. Ultimately, however, bottom-up strategies and initiatives are no substitute for fundamental political reform at the structural and institutional levels. They may provide stop-gap solutions but these are unlikely to be efficacious in the longer term. As we discuss in Chapter 2 trying to reform outside or around the state as bottom-up initiatives are liable to do, evades the complex and harder-to-do structural questions, and furthermore may undermine efforts at meaningful and substantive reform.

Summary Neoliberal globalization currently shapes relations between states and security sector reform, though this is not inevitable and challenges to

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neoliberal dominance have forced neoliberals to adapt their strategies when economic and other crises occur (as with the global financial crisis of 2008, for example). The global system that excludes a large proportion of the world’s population from decision-making is characterized by economic exploitation and inequality, that in turn impact on levels of crime, feelings of insecurity and victimization. In some jurisdictions, this insecurity coupled with the privatization of state functions, including policing, that allows the better off to avail of private security while the poor are forced to rely on an increasingly militarized and less accountable public police force. In other jurisdictions, without a history of public service provision, neoliberalism has simply contributed to various ‘tooling up’ initiatives through the export of arms and other repressive technologies to states that are deemed to hold strategic interest for Western powers. Security sector reforms implemented by Western countries led by the US are heavily impacted by the privatization of aid and the interests of those countries providing it; and face similar problems of ineffectiveness and inappropriateness to the local context we see with other forms of development assistance we discuss in Chapter 2. Some scholars have attempted to navigate these difficulties in order to provide a better way to engage in security sector reform. Some of these ideas include promoting a ‘thicker’ variant of security rooted in state and civil society structures, developing a transnational policing ethic, and establishing nodal governance or other approaches that attempt to develop local solutions that embrace universal principals involving democracy and human rights. Unfortunately, it is hard not to be pessimistic about the prospects for better police and other security sector reform efforts in an era of neoliberal globalization, but we acknowledge the good intensions of those seeking solutions to these difficult barriers and hope to provide some ideas of our own later in the book based on a more informed analysis of the global dynamics of police reform assistance.


Proof

2

Development Paradigms, Neoliberalism and Human Security – Western Style

Introduction This chapter both extends our discussion of neoliberalism in Chapter 1 and sets the scene for our analysis of police overseas assistance missions in Chapter 3. It takes as its starting point the view that police reform cannot and should not be divorced from economic and political reforms that seek to alleviate socioeconomic inequalities, enhance the position of women, minorities, and young people, and nurture a normative commitment to the democratic process. In short, what we are pointing to is the centrality of larger development questions to police reform endeavours (discussed in Chapter 3). Paradoxically, however, the way that development is conceptualized and the associated projects promoted by key Western states and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are often in conflict with democratic goals and lead to the structural conditions of inequality that create problems for police democratization and the realization of human security (e.g. increases in crime, social problems, ethnic schisms, and the nurturing and active sponsoring of repressive regimes). The chapter suggests that the failures and problems associated with neoliberal development parallel in many respects those associated with an earlier development paradigm – what was termed modernization theory that achieved pre-eminence in the 1960s (e.g. Rostow 1956, 1960; Eisenstadt 1970; Smelser 1966; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Lerner 1958, 1968). While we acknowledge that neoliberalism and modernization accorded different roles to the state and the market we nevertheless suggest that they share some common assumptions. Like modernization before it, neoliberal development assumes a unilinear diffusionist thesis and an easy logic; it regards interventions from the global North and West to the global South as unproblematic; it has at its core some level of geo-strategic manipulation and an emphasis on donor/national, 35

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interest; and, it promotes a universalistic one-size fits all paradigm with similar development/reformist templates used in a variety of contexts that often differ greatly in terms of history, politics, culture and levels of social and economic equality. Perhaps most fundamentally of all both modernization and neoliberalism have promoted hubristic development programmes, that like the police assistance programmes we discuss in the next chapter have rarely met their stated goals and aims, and in many respects run counter to efforts toward liberalization and democratization. The chapter progresses as follows. The first part provides a broad outline of what is meant by ‘development’ and problematizes a number of issues in relation to aid and official development assistance. We then move on to outline the contours of modernization theory and suggest that many of its key ideas and precepts are still to be found in current development paradigms, particularly those that have a neoliberal flavour. We consider the ways that development and security have become fused through what is termed the security-development nexus and where the emphasis tends to be on ‘national’ not ‘human’ security. Furthermore, given the increasing blurring of state-corporate relationships under neoliberalism we see the emergence of what has been termed the ‘aid complex’ where the provision of aid and development assistance operates according to the rules of its own self-sustaining logic that may have more to do with Western hegemonic interests. These developments have profound implications for insecurity in developing nations and for the efficacy of police reform endeavours. These issues are further explored in Chapter 3.

Development paradigms Social scientists have long agonized over the ethical justifications for transposing Western centred notions of ‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ to other cultures; a challenge that went right to the heart of the establishment of the Declaration of Human Rights itself (Herskovitz 1958; Barzilai 2003; Rachels 2007; Spiro 1986). Our position here is similar to that of the Columbia University anthropologist Julian Steward, who in his rejection of moral and cultural relativism, argued that ‘Either we tolerate everything, and keep hands off, or we fight intolerance and conquest – political and economic as well as military. Where shall the line be drawn?’ (1948: 352). Ultimately, however, there is no easy way from which to navigate one’s way out of Steward’s moral maze: Liberal interventionism is laced with hypocrisy (why Iraq but not Saudi Arabia?) while moral and cultural relativists have made easy bedfellows with religious fundamentalists and zealots. For example, one of the largest donors to the anti-War Respect

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Proof Development Paradigms, Neoliberalism and Human Security – Western Style 37

Party in the United Kingdom that bills itself as a ‘socialist party standing for Respect, Equality, Socialism, Peace, Environmentalism, Community and Trade Unionism’ was an executive member of the now defunct Islamic Party of Britain that advocated the execution of homosexuals and a rollingback of women’s rights.1 We do not propose to answer Steward’s question for the simple reason that there is no easy answer; ultimately any response is going to be governed by one’s normative and moral-political sensibilities. We do, however, agree that many Western interventions exacerbate the long-standing problems still present in the developing world. On the other hand, there are some instances (humanitarian disasters, mass casualty civil wars, the actions of genocidal regimes) where the moral balance tends to tip in favour of intervention. Equally, if the conditions are right and there are signs (perhaps with the Arab Spring currently) that a global civil society is emerging organically then this might be nurtured and encouraged.2 More generally though, there are (and should be) limits to what the global North and West attempt to accomplish in the global South. At one end of the scale attempts to ‘impose’ democracy are simply littered with potential pitfalls that ignore the lessons of history, politics and culture. As Chabal and Daloz (1999) make clear in their excellent Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, key concepts rooted in Western liberal discourses (such as democracy, the state, civil society and so forth) have little meaning, and cannot be readily applied to the (sub-Saharan) African context. As they suggest in relation to the notion of the liberal state: ‘The model of the modern Western European state, itself the outcome of a most singular historical development, cannot simply be transported to a wholly different cultural setting’ (p. 10). Political scientists would be hard pressed to identify key features of Western ‘stateness’ in many African nations with some commentators arguing that Western models simply do not apply (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bayart 1993). Jean Francois Bayart (1993) coined the term ‘Rhizome state’ to describe patrimonial state structures in Africa, so-called because of its metaphorical equivalent to a tangled underground root system, which has ‘no central axis, no unified point of origin, and no given direction or growth’ (Grosz 1994: 199). Such an entity has little resonance with the ‘Weberian ideal state with its impartial, merit-based bureaucracy, commitment to the Rule of Law and monopoly of legitimate violence’ (Goldsmith 2003: 15). Therefore, if our key conceptual frameworks are inappropriate to begin with (police, state, civil society, democracy) then this has major implications for how we conceive and enact the police reform process. It also has implications for the nature of ‘development’; what its aims and outcomes are and the techniques and technologies through which it is realized in practice.

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As Esteva (1992: 8) suggests ‘development occupies the centre of an incredibly powerful semantic constellation…very few words are as feeble, as fragile and as incapable of giving substance and meaning to thought and behaviour as this one’. It is perhaps stating the obvious that there is no one conception or articulation of ‘development’. Like, ‘justice’, ‘crime’, ‘policing’ or any number of concepts and terms within the social sciences, development can be understood differently in regard to processes, outcomes and goals but also normatively, whether it should prioritize human development over that of the state and its institutions, for example. Indeed, as Kothari and Minogue (2002: 1) suggest ‘few subjects are more bedevilled by contested theories’ than development studies. The subject has also lacked intellectual and academic coherence given the varied disciplines and backgrounds of scholars, but has also been underscored by a tension between practitioners, policy makers and the academic community historically. Development and what it entails can be construed narrowly in terms of economic indicators such as GDP, or political indicators such as levels of corruption and transparency. Within development sociology it was initially conceived to explain and advance processes of industrialization and political reform in the so-called Third World through what was termed modernization theory. Later, via dependency and underdevelopment perspectives, it became associated with the unequal and spatial patterning of social and economic opportunities between the global North and South but also within states: between industrial and agricultural, or between rural and urban sectors (Frank 1996; Cardoso 1977; Dos Santos 1971; Wallerstein 1976). More recently, in the context of increased global insecurity, famine, wars, displaced populations, and ethnic strife, there has been a more explicit linkage of development and what has been termed ‘human security’ (UNDP 1994; Sen 1999). It is human security, however, that has become the new orthodoxy (Duffield 2007). The concept of ‘human security’ was first promoted by the United Nations Development Programme in its 1994 Human Development Report, that ‘equated security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms’ (UNDP 1994). In this model human security provides the bedrock for social, economic and political stability that empowers citizens but also creates the conditions for democratic governance to emerge organically. For commentators such as Mary Kaldor (2007), human security ‘combines both human rights and human development’ (p. 182). It is reflected in the notion of global citizenship and intercultural communication (Falk 1994; Sen 1999) and a ‘global justice’ that emphasizes the role that Western states should play in a wide range of humanitarian and military relief efforts (Kaldor 2007).

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Clearly there is much to agree with in these arguments. Nevertheless, the discourse of human security has also found its way into the development discourses of Western states, official aid agencies and IFIs, at least rhetorically. The World Bank in particular has adopted a strategy for social development (World Bank 2005) that works towards ‘empowering poor and marginalised women and men [and] transforming institutions for greater inclusion, cohesion and accountability’ (p. vi). However, as we argued in Chapter 1 it is difficult to square the World Bank’s rhetoric of human security and social development with its practices and policies in developing nations that very often create the massive problems around human insecurity in the first place. For this reason, some commentators have argued that even if human security was realizable in practice (which is perhaps debatable) its increased incorporation into development discourses has established neo-Foucaultian biopolitical technologies of governmentality in developing nations that assists in the control of populations and hinders the fulfilment of human security (Duffield 2007: 111–132). In much the same way that critics of Welfarism in the 1970s accused it of net-widening through the medicalization and criminalization of social problems (Cohen 1985) human security stands accused of ‘securitising’ whole swathes of civil society in developing nations that warrant or demand Western intervention though ultimately in ways that benefit Western nations themselves (Duffield 2007: 3–4). For Duffield (2007) human security paradigms have been augmented by so-called ‘good governance’ development approaches that have neoliberal underpinnings. While rhetorically progressive these have merely reconstituted Occidentalist discourses of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, ‘Developed’ and ‘Undeveloped’. In this way the location of human security within orthodox development discourse ‘ensures certain processes of ruling’ in the periphery and an ultimate maintenance of the status-quo (Escobar 1991: 3). Our argument then is that human security is difficult to realize in practice and its co-option into neoliberal development paradigms means that ultimately it is associated with the ‘policymaking and policy practices of key Western states’ (Chandler 2008: 427). In this sense there are many parallels and continuities in the problems associated with current neoliberalbased development assistance and the earlier modernization paradigm that held sway up to the 1970s. While it is true that current development policies are increasingly multilateral in orientation, it nevertheless remains the case that a significant proportion of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) continues to be bilateral (i.e. state to state) with those nations deemed to be of strategic importance to the US and its European allies traditionally in

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receipt of high levels of funding and other forms of assistance. Even within a globalized world system, Realist concerns relating to national security and geo-strategic priorities continue to dominate the international distribution of aid and development assistance (e.g. see Arvin 2002).

Seeing like a state – Seeing like a donor In his Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed George C. Scott (1998) considers a number of what he terms ‘high modernist’ schemes which as the title of the book implies, have been driven by a grand vision or plan to ‘improve the human condition’. Scott’s thesis is simply that since the 18th century ‘those in authority have tried to organise society through centralised, from-the-top-down plans, and that with the leaden consistency of dum-dum bullets, their plans have failed’ (Keller 2001: par. 1). Scott’s (1998) list of failed projects include Julius Nyerere’s ujamaa programme of compulsory ‘villagization’ in Tanzania and the construction of Brasilia according to a Le Corbusier inspired dreamturned-nightmare of urban living, among many others. In what is perhaps the scariest part of Scott’s analysis, many of the schemes he outlines as ‘failures’ were governed not by malfeasance but by a utopian dream of human betterment. While Scott does not include modernization theory in his list, he perhaps should have, since it was informed by the same ‘high modernist’ goals, and like the others, it too ended in failure. Modernization theory was a highly influential neo-classical theory of development that encapsulated the core of Western ideas about human progress. It contained a number of epistemological assumptions about the role of ideas in sponsoring social change and that ‘modern’ Western values could be easily and unproblematically diffused from the metropolitan core to the periphery (e.g. Rostow 1960; Eisenstadt 1970; Smelser 1966; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Lerner 1958, 1968). By privileging the role of Western agents – so called ‘modern men’ (Inkeles and Smith 1974) – modernization was heavily interlaced with a series of ‘West Knows Best’ assumptions about the ‘right’ kind of development trajectory. A key aim of modernization was the establishment of market economies and pluralistic political systems in the developing world. Tacitly, however, these would be underscored by an adherence and commitment to Western policy objectives: In other words, while Third World nations would get aid and development assistance they would have to play by the rules laid down by core Western states. While modernization came to be associated primarily with US social science it has its roots in earlier classical (European) theories of social

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change in the 19th century. For early social theorists such as Auguste Comte (1865) Herbert Spencer (1896), Karl Marx (1967), Émile Durkheim (1984), Ferdinand Tönnies (1912) and Max Weber (1952) ‘progress’ was an inescapable part of the human condition with societies moving through various stages of evolutionary development: from lower to higher. While we are not implying that any of these theorists condoned European colonialism – in fact Spencer, Durkheim, Weber and Marx were actively opposed – the idea that societies represent various stages on a development trajectory with the West at its apogee was nevertheless fused with evolutionary biology by those looking to justify European expansionism in the 19th century. In a speech to France’s Chamber of Deputies in 1884, the Prime Minister Jules Ferry, provided an impassioned defence of the French colonial project: Gentlemen, we must speak more loudly and more honestly! We must say openly that indeed the higher races have a right over the lower races… I repeat that the superior races have a right because they have a duty to civilise the inferior races… In our time, I maintain that European nations acquit themselves with generosity, with grandeur and with sincerity of this superior civilising duty’ (cited in Adler and Pouwels 2007: 613). Ostensibly the discourse of modernization developed in the US eschewed colonialism to propose the application of Progressive Era scientific and technical advancement to solve global problems (Buenker et al 1986). It was initially associated with the Rockefeller Evangelical Christian missions to China in the 1920s and to the activities of Edwin W. Kemmerer, the Princeton economist and self-proclaimed ‘money doctor’ who winged his way around Latin America advising on economic policy and banking arrangements.3 However, it was President Harry S. Truman’s ‘Four Point Programme’ outlined in his inaugural address on 20th January 1949 that established modernization as the grand vision and favoured development paradigm of the US (Sachs 1992). Truman’s fourth point emphasized the role that the US could play in disseminating scientific know-how and technical assistance to the developing world: We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive

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and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. It is perhaps the case that Truman’s vision was principled, altruistic and optimistic, inspired as it was by the devastation of the Second World War in Europe and the earlier successes of the Marshall Plan (1948–52) that provided US aid and development assistance for European post-war reconstruction. However, the Marshall Plan provided mainly financial assistance, with little direct intervention by the US. Crucially, European nations were given a fair degree of latitude by the US to configure reconstruction efforts themselves within broadly agreed parameters. Allowing the intended beneficiaries an important say in the assistance effort was important in terms of them taking ownership of the process. These reconstruction efforts were also the product of consultative decision-making and consensus by European governments, with funds distributed by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the forerunner to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, it was President Truman’s juxtaposition for the first time of development with underdevelopment that was to redefine the meaning of the former and set the seal on the way the rest of the world was viewed by the Western world. As Wolfgang Sachs (1992: 2) argues: We propose to call the age of development that particular historical period which began on 20 January, 1949, when Harry S. Truman for the first time declared, in his inauguration speech, the Southern hemisphere as ‘under developed areas’. The label stuck and subsequently provided the cognitive base for both arrogant interventionism from the North and pathetic self-pity in the South. In the context of the emerging Cold War, and the Soviet Union’s hostility to the Marshall Plan (it established its own version – COMECON – in 1949) development assistance became invariably associated with US foreign policy objectives, and modernization theory the principal vehicle through which this would be enacted. Theoretically, at this time, modernization was to draw upon two intellectual sources: First, it incorporated the structural-

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functionalist ideas of Talcott Parsons (1937) and Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1945) who emphasized the role that internal (endogenous) cultural and social factors played in inhibiting or progressing social change. Modernization (or development) was about re-engineering and substituting traditional (‘backward’) cultural values in developing nations with Western (‘progressive’) ones. Second, it echoed the views of classical theorists to posit that social change occurred in stages and that there was a positive relationship between advanced economies and democratic forms of government. Importantly, early modernization theorists believed that these ‘stages’ could be artificially leap-frogged in the Third World by Western interventions (e.g. Hoselitz 1952; Smelser 1966; Rostow 1960; Schumpeter 1949; Lipset 1959, 1963). The writings of Seymour Martin Lipset with his underlying thesis – ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset 1959: 56) – emphasized the linkages between economic and political and social development and was to provide one of modernization theory’s foundational mantras. Following the establishment of the Centre for International Studies (CENIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the early 1950s, a consensus around modernization as a core development strategy was formulated and given its most forceful expression by the economic historian and US presidential advisor, Walt Whitman Rostow in his Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist Manifesto (1960) – the title of which makes his ideological preferences quite clear. Space does not permit a detailed exposition but modernization contained a number of key assumptions about development in what came to be termed the ‘Third World’: • First, as noted above modernization theorists argued that economic growth (development) occurred in clearly identifiable stages with the West and in particular the US representing the high point or final stage on the developmental continuum. • Second, development processes in ‘Third World’ economies (such as those in Latin America) were being retarded not by exogenous factors such as unfavourable terms of trade for instance, but rather by indigenous social and economic forces: traditional cultural values, lack of education, subsistence economies and so forth, that were not conducive to Western patterns of development. • Third, modernization theorists gave centre-stage to the ideas of Western experts who are ‘informed, independent, open-minded, cognitively flexible, participate as citizens and possess personal efficacy’ (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006b: 15) and who could diffuse ‘Western’ values to alien contexts.

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• Fourth, borrowing from the classical economist Adam Smith, modernization theorists believed that the ‘hidden hand of the market’ would guide economic policies towards socially desirable ends and impact on political, social and cultural value systems. • Fifth, modernization theory was never just about economic development. It formed part of a grander hegemonic vision that aimed to refashion the developing world in respect of US values, which in the context of the Cold War also had the rather more strategic goal of providing a bulwark against the growth of Communism. From the 1950s, initially with the US International Cooperation Administration (ICA) which financed projects of interest to the US around the world, and the later establishment of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961, to the expansion of international development more generally from the 1970s, many modernization schemes and programmes were overlaid with typically Western assumptions about the ‘root’ causes of underdevelopment. Perhaps early US modernization theorists did genuinely believe that Western-style interventions could kick-start development in what was termed the periphery. But US foreign policy initiatives undertaken under the aegis of modernization in Latin America (e.g. the Alliance for Progress) came to undermine whatever good intentions existed and suggested that all US assistance programmes were ostensibly regarded as a means to promote national security interests by the back door.

Modernization and its discontents The problems associated with modernization theory are legion (Amin 1976; Frank 1998, 1996, 1969; Dos Santos 1971; Jenkins 1987; Köhler and Tausch 2002). In spite of several decades of intensive economic planning in Latin America and elsewhere, and billions of dollars spent on various projects, schemes and initiatives, modernization did little to bring about accelerated economic growth in the periphery. Equally, there appeared to be little direct evidence that the ‘hidden hand’ of the market (cf. Rostow 1960) was somehow guiding developing nations towards ‘Western’ patterns of social and political development. In fact, as Craig and Porter (2006: 50) acknowledge the ‘whole model was a disastrous parade of mistaken assumptions’ that merely compounded the problems of poverty and economic inequalities in the periphery. Hubristic construction projects abounded: Roads that didn’t actually run anywhere, bridges that remained half-finished and hydro-electric dams that drove thousands of

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rural dwellers off their land and into cities compounding problems of over-crowding and crime, became the artefacts of modernization (Lasch 1991). Of course, national governments and political elites came to view aid programmes as a lucrative source of income but this in itself only led to corruption and nepotism and stifled attempts at democratization and political pluralism. In addition, the embedding of national security objectives within modernization programmes led to serious questions about whether they had donor interests rather than recipient interests at heart. From the late 1960s modernization perspectives were challenged by what were termed dependency theories. It would be too simplistic however, to see dependency theory as a unified theoretical position and in fact some dependenistas (as they became known) objected vociferously to the use of the noun ‘theory’ arguing that they were merely providing an overarching framework and not a prescriptive theory within which particular situations of dependence could be delineated (see Cardoso 1977). From an early association with the work of economic reformers such as Raúl Prebisch (1964) dependency developed into a Marxist theory of underdevelopment (Frank 1969) and later, a World Systems perspective most evident in the work Immanuel Wallerstein (1976). At its core though, dependency can be seen as: …a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of this expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development (Dos Santos 1971: 231). Whereas modernization theorists viewed contact between developing nations and advanced industrial nations in the West as being desirable and necessary, dependency theorists argued that this was something that should either be resisted at all costs, or at least be viewed problematically (Kiely 2005: 902). However, in what was perhaps one of their most useful insights – at least in terms of the development economics of the day – dependency theorists argued that there was little utility in studying the economies of developing nations independently of those in the developed world. They argued that it was necessary to view the

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world economy as an inter-connected system (hence the coining of World Systems theory) so as to tease out the dynamics of interaction between the First World and the developing world. While these dynamics are complex they can nevertheless be delineated in the following terms: • Rather than see interactions between the metropolitan core and periphery as benign, dependency theorists argued that such interactions were essentially exploitative in nature, motive and orientation. More radical variants of dependency theory (e.g. Frank 1969) argued that the only way for the periphery to generate and sustain independent development on their own terms was to ‘delink’ from the global economy. • The level of development in the West and North could only be sustained by what was termed the active underdevelopment of the periphery that supplied raw materials, cheap labour and latterly acted an off-shore platform for Western-based transnational corporations. • Dependency theorists questioned whether ‘development’ could be measured simply in terms of crude macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, pointing out that wealth creation in the periphery did not automatically translate to a reduction in poverty and other forms of social development. • The periphery is seen to be highly vulnerable to external forces emanating from the metropolitan core, such as downturns in international financial markets, changes in the terms of international trade, exchange rate fluctuations, the whims of transnational corporations, and indeed the political economy of foreign aid and development assistance. • Dependency theorists viewed foreign aid and assistance as benefiting (more) the giver rather than the receiver. It is perceived as strategic and self-interested, rather than benign and altruistic. Instead of contributing to independent development, aid can weaken local capacity, distort patterns of development and often compound whatever problems there were to start off with. • While dependency theorists were not blind to the fact that indigenous factors within the periphery (corruption, powerful local elites, local governance issues, lack of education and training etc.) were partly responsible for the persistence of underdevelopment, they nevertheless argued that the full picture could only be obtained by considering the structural relation of peripheral nations to the core. By the mid-1970s dependency theory had fallen out of favour. Its empirical failure to acknowledge the precise conditions under which dependency and

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underdevelopment might be engendered blunted its use as a policy instrument. In addition, the emergence of the ‘Asian Tiger’ economies seemed to undermine many of the precepts of dependency theory since non-core states such as Taiwan and South Korea were experiencing strong economic growth with relatively high levels of social development. However, as Petras (1998) argues the rationales for Western aid were premised differently within the Asian Tiger regions than in other areas of the global South. Western interests needed actual development success in that region of the world (Asian Tigers) as a hedge against China and Russia and any new colonial aspirations by Japan. We have no doubt that in many respects dependency theory got it wrong. It was never remotely viable for developing nations to ‘delink’ from the world economy. Only two states – North Korea and Albania – have attempted this, a fact alone that speaks volumes (Velasco 2002). Similarly, the emphasis placed on external factors in retarding developing in the periphery diverted attention from the role played endogenous factors, and in particular that of elite groups within developing countries, for development failures. Many elites were more than happy to view aid and overseas development assistance as a lucrative source of personal wealth (Easterly 2006). Nevertheless, the failure of dependency theory to provide a workable solution to development problems should not blind us to its heuristic and interpretative potential in explaining dependency as a ‘historically derived and persistent condition’ (Holloway 2003) – with the problems that are identified in relation to foreign aid and development assistance being apposite to any discussion of police overseas assistance programmes. Second, the core problématique outlined by dependency theorists is as germane now as it has ever been, insofar as ‘…the idea that the world can be divided into core and periphery retains some validity, and this has enormous implications for understanding contemporary globalization’ (Kiely 2005: 903) [italics in original]. Third, post-development theory has drawn upon many of the critical assumptions provided by dependency theorists to problematize the Western hegemonic nature of development both in terms of theory and practice (Sachs 1992; Esteva 1992; Escobar 1991). While we should be sensitive to the limitations of dependency theory, its flaws are perhaps more apparent in the solutions that its proponents advocated (i.e. a transition to socialism) rather than the explanations which they gave to explain the conditions of dependency. Many of the key assumptions that infused modernization theory in the 1960s and 1970s and which gave rise to dependency theory in the first place are still to be found in the foreign and economic policies of key Western states (or perhaps more accurately dominant geopolitical hegemons) and in the development policies

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of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, not to mention a plethora of overseas aid and development agencies. The development landscape continues to be littered with half-baked programmes that cost vast amounts of public money, rarely meet their stated objectives, are poorly evaluated, cause more problems than they solve, and often bolster the position of elite groups and regimes. The World Bank’s private investment arm – the International Finance Corporation – admitted in 2007 that only about half of the international development programmes that it had been involved with succeeded or came close to meeting their objectives (Associated Press 2007). Moreover, there is not a million miles separating the views of contemporary neo-conservatives such as Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington who at one time or another argued for the triumph of a US styled economic and political liberalism, President George W. Bush’s argument that the main aim of American foreign policy is to advance the cause of ‘global freedom’,4 and the views of early modernization theorists such as Walt Rostow who argued passionately for the promotion of a US inspired laissez-faire capitalism and free enterprise in developing nations.

New wine in old bottles: Neoliberalism as neo-modernization? For the reasons that we have just outlined, modernization theory had fallen out of favour among development economists and policy makers from the mid-1970s and had been replaced as we saw in Chapter 1 by a neoliberal fiscal agenda from the 1980s. From the 1990s onwards however, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the so-called ‘third wave of democratisation’ modernization was revisited albeit in a rather more refined and nuanced form than previously (e.g. Przeworski 1991, 2003; Sachs 2003). In addition, some the original precepts of dependency theory have been reworked into what is termed post-development or anti-development theories, particularly what they took to be the ethnocentric biases inherent in many development assistance programmes and their reinforcement of Western hegemonic relationships in the global South. However, the relationship between neoliberal and earlier development paradigms such as modernization has also been reassessed. For some commentators neoliberalism and modernization are distinct (e.g. McMichael 2008; Babb 2005; Pieterse 2000), whereas for others the former is merely a more upto-date version of the latter, retaining its essential hegemonic principles and ideological thrust (e.g. Kothari and Minogue 2002; Philips 1998; Sneyd 2006).

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It has been suggested that neoliberalism departs from modernization theory insofar as it marks a dramatic reduction in state interventionism via structural adjustment policies such as deregulation, liberalization and privatization (Babb 2005; Pieterse 2000). For Held and McGrew (2003: 7) neoliberal activities, including those involving international policing and police reform, have eroded the ‘territorial principle which underpins the modern state’ and where a proliferation of global networks, politics, and rule-making activities where states, TNCs, and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other multilateral organizations compete to shape global governance. Neoliberalism reconceptualized development from a state responsibility to a private undertaking whereby the private sector drives development via markets with little if any state oversight or intervention (Duffield 2001; Craig and Porter 2006). Around the globe the private sector plays a major role in shaping national politics and IFIs heavily limit the policy options of states. In fact, as Stanger (2009: 53) contends, ‘Across the board, the US government can no longer pursue its foreign policy objectives without the private sector’, as we have seen in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns and the various contractors and INGOs that have received US government funding to perform operations there. While we can accept the broad tenor of these arguments we are not entirely convinced that neoliberalism represents a decisive break with earlier variants of modernization. There may be differences of degree not of kind here. As Kothari and Minogue (2002: 7) put it: While not wanting to deny that the history of development discourse over the course of the past 50 years has been complex, we assert that the modernisation project continues to underlie any apparent change in the development project. That is to say, the mainstream, dominant and powerful development ideology remains within the framework of neoclassical economics. In response to the question of whether neoliberalism is simply a reformulation of modernisation theory, then we would have to answer ‘yes’, even though we recognize that they propound different roles for the state and the market and view the relationship between them differently. Acknowledging the complexities of these relationships we suggest that the continuity between modernization and neoliberalism concerns the view that while development was about modernization (at least at some level), modernization was never entirely about development. In this sense, the ideological rationale, if not necessarily the practice, of earlier

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modernization theories remains highly influential in dictating the aid and development objectives and strategies of key Western states. Similarly, in terms of state-corporate relationships and agendas we should be cognizant of who is doing the ‘steering’ to borrow Osborne and Gaebler’s nautical metaphor (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). While there are undoubtedly higher levels of private sector/corporate involvement in police and security sector reform endeavours – as in Iraq and Afghanistan – the vast bulk of development funding continues to be of the official variety with the 24 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD contributing over $129 billion to the aid budget in 2010.5 More generally, Whyte (2003) for example, has argued that the degree to which public authority is being usurped by private actors is at best ‘empirically naïve’ and that what we are actually witnessing is a ‘reconfiguration of state ordered power’ (Whyte 2003: 580 cited in O’Reilly and Ellison 2006: 14). This has resulted in a form of state-corporate symbiosis whereby public and private actors engage in ‘a mutually beneficial application of game theory to achieve proximate objectives’ (O’Reilly and Ellison 2006: 14).

The security-development nexus We suggested above that modernization theory put the strategic interest of donor nations at the heart of its development objectives. This situation has continued under neoliberalism. The political intrigues and unholy alliances framed during the Cold War meant that repressive regimes were tolerated and sponsored (by both sides) in line with broader hegemonic interests. However, since the collapse of communism and particularly since the events of September 11th 2001, the context of global instability has generated a new need for strategic alignments. While currently more attention is paid to political conditionality in the granting of ODA and repressive regimes are encouraged to improve their human rights standards6 it still remains the case that key Western states utilize such assistance as a means of conducting foreign policy (Minogue 2002; Duffield 2001; Easterly 2006; Hills 2006). Key foreign policy objectives are evidenced in the choice of states that are given support, the kinds of initiatives pursued and their overall strategic interest to the donor nation. In many ways development has always been intertwined with security agendas (Duffield 2001, 2007; Hills 2009b). Following the mass-casualty terrorist attacks in New York, London, and Madrid, there is mounting evidence that development and security sector reform have been interwoven into a global counter-terrorism rubric (Hills 2006). In the United

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Kingdom counter-terrorism forms a core aspect of ODA but this is usually financed by the British military or by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The UK’s international development agency (DFID) remains broadly concerned with poverty reduction programmes and capacitybuilding. By contrast, in the United States national security, global counterterrorism and development have become melded under the auspices of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) that promotes priorities and strategies in relation to global terrorism that were last seen during the Cold War (Hills 2006). During the presidency of G.W. Bush the US was engaged in a policy of what the then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice termed ‘transformational diplomacy’ whereby ‘it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals (Condoleezza Rice, cited in Hills 2006: 629). Of course there are limits to this transformational diplomacy, powerful but repressive states (China and Russia) remain largely immune from US interference, whereas weaker but strategically important states are subject to relatively high levels of meddling in their internal affairs. Illustrating how this ‘transformational diplomacy’ has panned out in Kenya via USAID’s activities there, Alice Hills suggests that the agency performs a ‘quasi-security’ role, providing counter-terrorism training and US sourced equipment (arms, specialized hardware) to specially formed units of the Kenyan police (Hills 2006). In the financial year 2010–11, $8 million from the USAID’s allocated $12 million peace and security budget was devoted to counter-terrorism initiatives in Kenya, compared to a relatively meagre $650,000 for human rights and rule of law programmes.7 However, as Hills notes, this overt identification of development aid with US national security objectives creates a number of problems. It puts USAID offices and staff in considerable danger and personal risk of bombing attacks or hostage-taking in volatile regions of the globe. In addition, the unstable character of the Kenyan police and their wavering political allegiances means that these ‘tooling up’ initiatives are liable to backfire and ‘offer mavericks a business opportunity rather than to enhance US security interests’ (Hills 2006: 639). In fact we would go further and suggest that few lessons have been learned by the US about the consequences of sponsoring proxy groups in highly conflicted and volatile contexts. US financial and military support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan which was closely allied to Osama Bin Laden’s Maktab al-Khadamat8 is a case in point and as history has shown, such groups can rapidly turn the tables on their erstwhile sponsors. For some commentators (e.g. Chandler 2007) this security-development nexus represents a failure of foreign policy. It signifies as he suggests, an

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‘anti-foreign policy’ that provides ‘an arena for self-referential statements of political mission and purpose, decoupled from their subject matter, resulting in ad hoc and arbitrary policy making’ (Chandler 2007: 362). It is encapsulated in grand sloganeering such as the ‘Global War on Terror’ that result in clumsy attempts to deal with the symptoms of global terrorism rather than its root causes. It is a foreign policy that is normatively disconnected from development issues and which ultimately can foster the conditions that make domestic repression, more not less likely, inhibiting the progress of a democratic, rights-based policing and security agenda.

The aid complex As we noted above, dependency theorists argued long and hard that foreign aid often compounded problems in recipient countries and we have alluded to some of these difficulties in this chapter. However, over the course of the past two decades neoliberal development programmes have in many ways exacerbated the difficulties associated with foreign aid through the establishment of what has been termed an ‘aid complex’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). This refers to the labyrinthine relationships between aid and development contracts, policy makers and legislators, police and military organizations, defence contractors, aid organizations and associated policy entrepreneurs. This aid complex operates according to the rules of its own self-sustaining logic and has become so supply-side orientated that key interests in the West and in developing nations (jobs, careers, contracts) hinge on the preservation of the status quo (Chesterman 2004: 174). The problems that dependency theorists identified with overseas aid are reflected in current trends and as Chabal and Daloz (1999) suggest, both donors and recipients may stand to gain from what they term ‘the bounties of dependence’ (see in particular, Chapter 8). In fact, it would appear that there are few checks on how development aid is spent, and as Chesterman notes, in order to meet organizational performance targets, donors are sometimes more concerned with ‘moving money’ rather than ensuring that it is deployed for the purposes for which it was intended (p. 202). We should be clear that considered globally, aid and development, including police and security sector reform are big business with a number of aid organizations extending a corporate reach to rival that of the largest TNC. World Vision, one of the largest development organizations, employs over 40,000 staff and has an annual budget of $2.6 billion,9 while in 2005, the top 50 American philanthropic associations had combined assets in excess of $150 billion (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 62). Our point is that in many respects these organizations need to be seen as commercial enter-

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prises first and development organizations second. They operate according to the logic of a competitive market and there are many vested commercial interests both from within donor and recipient countries to capitalize on high levels of ODA even though their ultimate impacts in terms of projects undertaken may be less than efficacious (Shearer 2000). For example, $3.2 billion of the funds directed to the Commission for Africa in 2005 was spent on mainly Western ‘experts’ to provide technical assistance to what in reality were Western inspired development programmes in the first place (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). In this way it is perhaps unsurprising to see something of a state-corporate symbiosis developing with many NGO lobbyists, development organizations and private contractors closely connected to the corridors of power, whether they be in Washington or Brussels (Easterly 2006; Ghani and Lockhart 2008). For example, the European Confederation for Relief and Development (Concord) which represents the interests of 1,600 development NGOs within the European Union (EU), bills itself as a ‘key information source for NGO networks across the [European] continent as well as a power broker in Brussels’.10 We noted above that we are not making a case against aid per se. However, we need to acknowledge that there is something fundamentally wrong with the current system. Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 85) frame the issues rhetorically: ‘Is the aid system itself in fundamental need of reform?’, and ‘to what extent is the aid system relevant to addressing the issues of poverty and stability?’ Their answer to the first is ‘yes’ and to the second ‘not much’.11 In spite of the huge annual ODA spend there is often little in the way of tangible results or successes to show on the ground. The allocation and distribution of aid is rife with politicking, corruption, nepotism, bad planning and hubris. Significant sums of money are back-channelled by government elites and their families in recipient countries to Swiss bank accounts, as was the case with President Mubarak and his cronies in Egypt. Saif al-Islam Gadaffi reputedly ‘owned’ a £10 million residence in London where he passed the time while allegedly plagiarizing his PhD thesis at the London School of Economics.12 In other cases, too many projects are spread too thinly between aid and development agencies blurring lines of accountability and oversight. One of the biggest offenders here is the United Nations. During a two-year period the UN in Afghanistan financed 400 projects at a cost of $1.8 billion with little to show for it (the UN refused Afghan government requests to provide project management statements). However, Ghani and Lockhart (2008: 93) have estimated that up to 70% of this $1.8 billion was appropriated by UN officials for themselves: white Toyota Land Cruisers, satellite communications, office and residential accommodations, international salaries and travel. UN officials also established their own airline

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in Afghanistan – UNHAS13 – thinking that Ariana, the national carrier was too unsafe (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 93).14 Other UN initiatives are suggestive of a lack of forward planning bordering on the absurd: The acronym adopted by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) translated as ‘enemy’ in the dialect of Albanian spoken in Kosovo (Chesterman 2004: 236).

Conclusions This chapter has developed our discussion of neoliberal globalization in Chapter 1 to suggest that once we eschew the rhetoric of ‘human security’ and ‘sustainable development’ the development strategies promoted by a number of key Western states continue to be undercut with neoliberal assumptions about the nature, character and form that such development should take. Like modernization before it, neoliberal development paradigms often create more problems for recipient nations than they solve, particularly when macroeconomic models are applied to solely boost economic development and the expense of everything else. In this way we are sceptical whether Western development strategies are really about development in the periphery at all, or whether they can be viewed more cynically as ultimately benefiting the interests of the donor nation. This is evident both in terms of the emergence of an ‘aid complex’ where many jobs, contracts, and livelihoods in the West are dependent on the persistence of underdevelopment and dependency in the global South. However, it is also evident in the ways that development is pursued in line with the nationalsecurity objectives of key Western states through what has been termed the security-development nexus. This was always the case during the Cold War, but since the events of September 11th 2001 development has been viewed almost entirely through the prism of global counter-terrorism. More generally, our argument has been that in spite of the billions of dollars spent on ODA annually current development strategies have ended up replicating many of the failures and problems of earlier modernization paradigms. Given the difficulties with aid and development assistance in general it is not particularly far-fetched to question their efficacy in terms of police and security sector reform that we turn to in the following chapter. In many cases these are part of a larger development project and are likely to be susceptible to the same pressures and influences.


Proof

3

Donor Export and Police Development Assistance

Introduction As Michael Kempa acknowledges, ‘The industrialised West has for a long time, been hyperactive in policing reform in ‘societies in transition’ (2010: 272) via a plethora of schemes and initiatives. Citing figures from Bayley (2005) he highlights that considered globally around $200 billion is spent annually on policing, and of this one-third is directed to developing ‘democratic’ policing in transitional and conflicted states (Bayley, cited in Kempa 2010: 273). In many respects police and security sector reform has become a global industry where the lines between state and corporate interests have become increasingly muddied. In addition, the police reform landscape is dotted with any number of policy entrepreneurs – often retired police officers, or representatives of small aid agencies – who criss-cross the world’s trouble-spots promoting particular models of policing. As we discuss shortly, the favoured reform template is invariably community policing since this is intertwined with all sorts of assumptions about the nature of democratic policing (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Increasingly, however, concerns about global terrorism and drugs have meant that key Western states intervene in the security sector of those states deemed to be ‘at risk’ or to pose a risk in some way. This can be done directly, as with FBI and CIA input into specific aspects of police reform in Turkey and Brazil (case studies) and the sponsoring of sympathetic local elites (Iraq/Afghanistan and historically Turkey) or indirectly through ‘tied’ and coercive aid/assistance transfers. In this way policing reform becomes one of the tools used for upholding political economy in recipient nations, rather than something that can truly transform policing democratically. The aim of this chapter is to locate police reform efforts in weak, failing, and transitional states or those states exiting from a period of 55

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authoritarian rule within the broader parameters of the development paradigms that were discussed in Chapter 2. There are four rationales for doing this. First, given huge resources directed towards police and security sector reform globally, with a few notable exceptions, there has been surprisingly little academic attention to the modus operandi and the dynamics of the transfer process (though see Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Pino and Waitrowski 2006a; Van der Spuy 2001, 2007; Chesterman 2004). Second, orthodox development paradigms very often compound the conditions of crime and insecurity in developing nations and police development assistance is often directed more to the maintenance of social order and the protection of elites and regimes rather than to any notion of liberalization or democratization. Third, the problems with development assistance that we identified earlier can be read across to international police reform. It is often assumed that democratic policing can simply be transplanted without due regard for history, politics, culture, legal norms, the existence of a functioning state infrastructure and the presence of elite groups who are normatively committed to democratization. Very often this is not the case and many schemes, though particularly those involving the transplantation of community policing, are often of little practical utility and in many cases do more harm than good. Fourth, police reform is often linked, coercively or otherwise, to the provision of foreign aid and is often a key lending requirement of IFIs such as the World Bank or IMF (Murphy 2007) or stipulated as a core accession requirement for aspirant EU member states. Fifth, recent years have seen an inordinate escalation in the promotional activities by police organizations in key Western states (particularly the US, UK and Canada). In part this has to do with legislative changes (as in the UK) that from the mid-1990s permitted public police organizations to engage in commercial sponsorship and trading and who are increasingly offering their brand for sale/hire on the global market. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has been particularly astute in this regard, tailoring aspects of their brand to a range of complex international security scenarios (Ellison and O’Reilly 2008a). In the chapter that follows we provide a working definition of democratic policing before considering one particular manifestation of the donor export paradigm, namely community policing. In many ways community policing has become the poster child for democratic policing internationally (Peter Manning, personal communication) and is heavily promoted in the research and policy literature as well as a key lending requirement by IFIs and western governments for countries in transition (Murphy 2007; Punch 2005). We suggest that democratic policing is often difficult to realize in many transitional or conflicted states, but community policing initiatives

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Proof Donor Export and Police Development Assistance 57

in particular are conceptually inadequate, of limited practical utility and often suffer from a serious lack of independent evaluation. The chapter argues that aside from the feasibility of implementing community policing we need also to question the normative commitment of key Western states and official development agencies to democratic policing more generally in recipient nations. What we are increasingly finding in the post9/11 scenario and the somewhat panicky nature of global (in)security is that there has been a melding of security and development agendas that puts the national security interests of the donor nation at the core of assistance efforts. This has been complicated further by efforts of the US in particular to bolster the policing structures of many repressive regimes with a view to combating international drugs and terrorism (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Finally, we suggest that analyses of overseas police reform efforts need to consider the role of human agents and policy entrepreneurs in the transfer/export process to a greater degree than has hitherto been the case.

Democratic policing: What is it? Peter Manning (2010) has argued that in spite of its somewhat hyped usage in Western democracies and in the context of international policing reform missions, ‘democratic policing’ as a concept has not been adequately specified, particularly when it has been packaged up for export. He notes that it is derived ultimately from a policing studies grounded in an Anglo-American episteme, that until relatively recently has paid scant attention to the analysis and conceptualization of policing in different legal and political cultures. For Manning (2010) in order to be properly ‘democratic’, governmental institutions, including the police, must be rooted in an enabling legal framework that is normatively committed to the upholding, preservation and protection of ‘rights’. Ultimately, as he suggests, however, it is ‘a democratic state and culture that produce democratic policing’ without which a ‘rights based’ conception of policing can have no validity (2010: 7). Similarly, Bayley (2001) notes that the conceptualization of democratic policing is a relatively recent one, and that previously the moniker of ‘democratic’ was ascribed to governments, not the police, who were defined in terms of their behaviour – corrupt, repressive, fair, accountable and so forth. For Brogden and Nijhar (2005), democratic policing is an oxymoron. As they suggest, ‘inequality and anti-democratic policies are built into the very fabric of policing’ (2005: 233). According to their argument, considered historically policing is about the maintenance and establishment of

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a particularistic social order, where some groups (the poor, marginalized, minorities, the young) have always borne the brunt of police action, or inaction as the case may be. Furthermore, policing depends in the final analysis on the existence (whether exercised or not) of non-negotiable coercion (Bittner 1985: 23). The practice of policing means intervening (sometimes forcefully) in a myriad of disputes or making someone do something that they do not want to do, whether simply moving them along or detaining them against their will. Nevertheless, one does not have to subscribe to a Hobbesian view of human nature to acknowledge that fair and effective policing can contribute to the minimal conditions for social order and democratic governance. As Manning (2010) suggests ‘Police may enhance democracy by sustaining employment, security and democratic procedures such as voting and demonstrations’. However, in broad terms perhaps the best that we can hope for (even in liberal democracies) is that the police take a neutral line on behalf of the state: they eschew partisan loyalties and act with restraint in their dealings with the public. While we recognize that defining democratic policing is a difficult undertaking, and transplanting it internationally even more so, it is necessary to provide a loose template for what it might encompass in terms of our current discussion. Borrowing from Jones et al (1994), Hinton and Newburn (2009: 4) list the following ideal-typical criteria for the establishment of democratic policing (see Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a, Ch. 3 for a similar conceptualization): • Equity – allocating services in relation to needs in a proportionate fashion. • Delivery of service – efficient and effective service provision. • Responsiveness – the police should be responsive to the public in terms of dealing with what are considered to be priority issues. • Distribution of power – the police should not act as an agent of a political party or regime. Nor should the police use their powers indiscriminately or repressively. • Information – there should be transparency and openness in relation to how the police go about their business. • Redress – there should be adequate structures in place to deal effectively with instances of police wrong-doing. • Participation – there should be structures in place to encourage public participation with the police. Clearly it is debatable about the degree to which the police even in established democracies conform to these criteria. However, since the 1990s democratic policing has become the normative template for inter-

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national police reform missions (Jones 2005). If democratic policing is the end then community policing is perceived as the means to that end. We return to a discussion of community policing shortly, but in the meantime we are sceptical about the realization of democratic policing in practice. In those regions of the globe that are characterized by high levels of civil strife, repressive and authoritarian governments, a weak or crumbling state infrastructure, and where a normative and legal commitment to rights-based policing simply does not exist, it is difficult to see how democratic policing can be transplanted. For Gary Marx (Marx 2001) democratic policing is a process not a product to be exported; it needs to be embedded in a wider programme of political, social, economic and cultural change. This is likely to take decades or maybe never occur at all. Democratic police reform depends on, and is linked ultimately to what political scientists term ‘stateness’, or the five key arenas in which the embeddedness of democratic governance can be measured: civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus (capacity), and economic activity (Linz and Stephan 1996: 7–15). Many of these are problematic enough to realize in socially integrated contexts, but extremely difficult to locate in the much more topsy-turvy world of transitional democracies. This has implications for the ultimate achievability of police reform endeavours.

Security Sector Reform Since Clare Short (1999), the then UK Minister for International Development, first introduced the term, Security Sector Reform (henceforth SSR) has been promoted as a key reformist objective by Western states, International Development Organizations and International Financial Institutions. As a concept SSR has a number of advantages, not least insofar as it acknowledges (at least in theory), that those states aspiring in some way to democratic governance require stable economic and political systems as well as ‘a wellgoverned security sector, which comprises the civil, political and security institutions responsible for protecting the state, and the communities within it’ (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002: 175). Consequently, as Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002: 175) acknowledge, SSR is now a key part of: The transition from one-party to pluralist political systems, from centrally planned to market economies, and from armed conflict to peace and is a growing focus of international assistance. Certainly in practical terms it makes little sense to consider police reform in the absence of legal and constitutional reform since it is from here that

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the police derive their powers and mandate. Similarly, the courts system, prosecution, sentencing as well as civil-military relations need to be factored into an overall police reform endeavour. As David Bayley argues, ‘in order for police reform to be effective, whether for capacity building or democracy, it must be accompanied by reform throughout the criminal justice system’ (Bayley 2001: 42). The extant literature on SSR represents a much more joined-up approach to police reform that carries the potential to engage with macro-structural issues in way that simple exports of community policing, for example, can never do (see Marenin 2005; Caparini and Marenin 2004a, 2004b; Hendrickson 1999; Ferguson 2004). SSR includes within its ambit: the armed forces, police, border control systems, intelligence agencies, co-opted informal control mechanisms, as well as the courts, legal system, oversight mechanisms and budget agencies (Marenin 2005: 122). SSR can be regarded as having thick and thin variants. In its ‘thin’ manifestation SSR recognizes that ‘security’ and ‘economic development’ go hand in hand and acknowledges that reform must be holistic and take place in a range of sectors, not just isolated pockets that are of interest to particular donors. A somewhat ‘thicker’ variant of SSR views ‘security’ as a general public good and advocates the concept of ‘human security’ as a core developmental objective (i.e. ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’) (see Sen 1999; Chapters 1 and 2 this volume). As an altogether more ambitious exercise, human security ‘takes people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments’ (Axworthy, cited in Hendrickson 1999: 18). However, the ambitious nature of SSR is also its weakness. In an extensive analytical overview Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) note that while the international community acknowledges SSR to be necessary to establish the conditions for human security, there is no clear consensus about how this is to be achieved. Furthermore they point out that the very different issues affecting the security sector across diverse regions of the globe (e.g. Africa and the states of the former Warsaw Pact) mean that ‘one size fits all’ approaches are unlikely to be efficacious and whatever responses are devised need to be tailored specifically to that country/region, which unfortunately is easier said than done. To illustrate the scale of what might be involved they provide a rather overwhelming list of the myriad agencies, institutions, organizations, police and military forces, and private actors that would need to be brought under the SSR ambit. Incorporating those institutions in the formal sector – police, military, criminal justice agencies, intelligence services, border guards, customs authorities, local security guards and militias, national security advisory bodies, and so on – is

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difficult enough. However, SSR initiatives need to go beyond the formal sector to consider the role of those shadow organizations such as liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies and political party militias (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002: 9) that are to be found in many post-conflict and transitional contexts. As we shall outline in our case study chapters the role played by shadow organizations can be crucial to the overall success or failure of reform endeavours. Such organizations can either promote or facilitate reform or engage in what is termed ‘spoiler violence’ (Brewer 2010) to undermine it. More generally though, Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) note that SSR endeavours are pursued in line with the broader strategic goals of donor nations, with those countries deemed to be important in the context of the ‘war on terror’ having elements of their security sector enhanced in ways that do little to promote either democracy or accountability. In some cases this can have unintended consequences and defeat the object of SSR. For instance, when a nation’s military receives development aid in the context of global counter-terrorism as in Kenya, this can strengthen its already elevated position relative to civil authorities and undermine attempts at broader processes of democratization (Hills 2006). Similarly, in Turkey (case study) the military has been actively funded and sponsored by the US and other Western states for decades with the result that it has become so autonomous from civilian oversight that it now represents one of the major obstacles to security sector reform. Furthermore, as we outlined in the previous chapter, many development projects, including SSR initiatives, continue to operate from within a Western frame of reference in terms of practices and norms. While a broader reformist template is often embraced, the very real logistical, practical and political obstacles to reform mean that isolated projects are pursued that are unlikely to have any long-lasting impact: Thus there continues to be a narrow focus, in many cases on direct military and police training and on efforts to address the proliferation of light weapons, to demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, or to provide human-rights training to members of the security forces (Hendrickson and Karkoszka 2002: 28). As we discuss shortly, many of these police training programmes are incorporated into a discourse of community policing. However, without a broader political and legal commitment to ‘rights’ – police training programmes, however well conducted or intentioned, are likely to be hubristic. For instance, following the recommendations of the

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Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland in 1999, the new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) embarked on an extended programme of human rights training for officers. However, a subsequent evaluation concluded that there appeared to be a belief on the part of some PSNI trainers that the point of human rights training was to teach officers what they could get away with under the UK’s Human Rights Act (e.g. how many punches constitute an assault), rather than to instil human rights as a core value of modern police-work (Kelly 2002). Therefore, the practice of SSR rarely matches its rhetoric and grandiose vision of all encompassing transformation. While there has been an increasing level of political conditionality attached to development projects pushed by Western states and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) this has been uneven both in its application and outcomes. Of course, the imposition of conditions is not necessarily a bad thing since they can act as a carrot; by providing incentives to reform and a stick by threatening a withdrawal of funding, or future cooperation if a recalcitrant regime does not keep to the business of transformation (Chesterman 2004: 187–188). Nevertheless, some of the conditions may be perceived as unfair, difficult for the recipient to meet, or resonate outside the recipient’s cultural experience. In many ways, the EU accession criteria for policing and justice as set out in the acquis communautaire have exacted far higher standards in relation to human rights, policing and criminal justice reform in some accession states than many established EU member states adhere to themselves (Aybet and Bieber 2011). Equally problematic though, SSR is often embedded in neoliberal good governance initiatives promoted by IFIs that in some cases create the structural conditions of inequality and in turn leads to problems for police democratization and the realization of human security (e.g. increases in crime, social problems, ethnic schisms). The scaling back of the security sector can also result in huge increases in unemployment among disgruntled security personnel who can threaten the reform programme by forming alliances with shadow organizations who are engaged in corruption and illicit activities, as has been the case in Russia and some Eastern European nations (Kratcoski 2002; Kutnjak-Ivkovic´ and O’Connor-Shelley 2005). Clearly, then while development and SSR must be considered as part of an integrated whole it is unlikely that either will be effectual in the absence of fundamental political change and the cultivation of a civil society that is normatively responsive to democratic ideals. Governmental institutions, including the police, must be rooted in an enabling democratic and legal framework that is committed to the upholding, preservation and protection of ‘rights’. Second, they must

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have sufficient capacity and willingness to carry out the functions of democratic governance: accountability, transparency, legitimacy and subordination to civilian authority. Just as modernization theorists made economic growth in the so-called Third World a top priority (ignoring other important variables), police development assistance conducted from within a neoliberal paradigm concentrates almost solely on enhancing state capacity that often aids the perpetuation of existing power structures and dynamics. This is evinced most clearly in the merging of security and development agendas, which as some commentators have noted, construe ‘security’ rather narrowly and reflect ‘regime security’ in the context of global counter-terrorism, rather than ‘human security’ or poverty reduction (Chandler 2007; Hills 2006, 2007, 2009a). We acknowledge that SSR has many positive aspects, not least given its emphasis on connecting police reform to wider development issues, and in particular to political and constitutional transformation. In this way it recognizes that police reform cannot be conducted in a vacuum. The problems inherent in many states mean that political and democratic transitions remain aspirational, and that the successes of SSR initiatives are likely to be piecemeal and only partially realized in practice. However, many SSR programmes contain a further problem: Given the difficulties in reforming the security sector as a whole, piecemeal, ad hoc, and hubristic police reform strategies are defaulted to and emulate many of the problems associated with modernization programmes discussed in Chapter 2. As we outline below, this can be seen most clearly in community policing initiatives that remain the core reformist paradigm for all the major inter national aid agencies and IFIs.

Community policing as global export paradigm Community policing has been the dominant ‘model’ in Anglo-American policing for three decades (Brogden and Nijhar 2005), but it is notoriously difficult to define. For Moore (1992) it is as much a ‘movement’ or ‘philosophy’ as a prescribed package or definitive strategy. Similarly, in an expansive review of the literature Bayley (1992) notes that community policing is not a single programme but rather, ‘all sorts of things – not just the usual apples and oranges, but grapefruits, guavas and bananas’ (p. 9) while for Manning (1988), it is a ‘semantic sponge’ whose meaning is blurred and riddled with obfuscation. Punch (2000) notes that community policing is ‘an ill-defined concept that may mean many different things in different countries, or even within one country’ (p. 61). However, leaving aside problems of actual definition most commentators acknowledge that

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community policing differs from the earlier hierar-chical command and control model of police organization. Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 39–40), drawing upon Bayley (1992) summarize what are often taken to be the key characteristics of community policing: • The personalization of policing – traditional reactive law enforcement has created a distance between police and public. Community policing aims to bridge that gap and in the process establish legitimacy in the eyes of the public. • Information gathering through face-to-face contacts – community policing aims to improve the quality of neighbourhood crime fighting through the cultivation of local contacts. • Avoidance of hostile encounters – since community policing implies that officers will get to know communities well it is believed that this can reduce the potential for hostile and adversarial encounters with the public. The police are more effective when they work with the public to solve crime. • Responsiveness – regular consultation between police and communities identify priority areas for police attention. This might mean that quality of life issues rather than crime per se move to the forefront of policing strategies. • Legitimacy – it is argued that because police and community are rooted in some kind of organic relationship this will enhance levels of public support, consent and trust in the police institution. • Informal social controls – community policing strengthens informal social controls within neighbourhoods by involving the public in policing decisions and by encouraging the public to take responsibility for crime prevention. • Commitment – local level initiatives suggest to the public that the police have the community’s interest at heart. This fosters closer police-public relations. • Quality of life – by dealing with visible signs of neighbourhood disorder and so-called Broken Windows issues community policing adds to the quality of life in a particular neighbourhood. • Democratic accountability and participation – by engaging with coproductive activities with local communities community policing fosters a sense of democratic participation where local police commanders are accountable to the public for the performance of policing in their neighbourhood. Perhaps due to the realization by donors and aid agencies that democratic policing depends on fundamental political transformation and is

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therefore difficult if not impossible to do, community policing becomes the easier default option and features heavily in international assistance programmes. Indeed as Murphy (2007: 248) argues, community policing has been ‘aggressively promoted throughout the developing world as a pre-condition for foreign aid, as an IMF lending requirement and as the official UN and NATO model for post-conflict reform’. A quick Google Search using the keywords ‘international community policing’ records over 3.5 million hits. In the most recent Field Guide for USAID Democracy and Governance Officers (USAID 2011) what is termed ‘community-based policing’ (CBP) is the favoured template for USAID assistance to civilian law enforcement in developing countries: CBP is not a single, easily defined project or programme. It is a comprehensive way of thinking about policing. CBP is a collection of practices, behaviours and tactics that bring civilian police together with the civilians they serve… Due to its inherent complexity, in some instances CBP is better implemented in incremental fashion after basic policing techniques are fully mastered (USAID 2011: 27). Similarly, the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in its Guidebook for Democratic Policing (OSCE 2008) promotes community policing as a core component of security sector reform within the 56 states in which it conducts operations. While the OSCE does acknowledge that community policing initiatives should be sensitive to local context, community policing is nevertheless seen as the core aspect of the reformist template. Advertisements for community police trainers/ consultants appear regularly on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recruitment website. Community policing is also adopted as a core component of the UNDP’s Police Reform Programme internationally and schemes have been piloted in Bangladesh, Croatia, Sudan and Turkey, among many other states. The International Peace Academy promotes police reform through community-based policing, and claims that it will not only develop security but also foster development (Groenewald and Peake 2004: i). The United Nations Police (UNPOL) as well as thousands of small development agencies and policy entrepreneurs also promote community policing internationally. We have no wish to be churlish but it is obvious from even the most rudimentary survey of the research literature that the difficulties in implementing democratic policing in conflicted or failing states are immense (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a; Sheptycki 2007; Murphy 2007). Similarly, we can debate the efficacy of community

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policing as the dominant reformist strategy and there is little evidence that it meets any of its stated objectives in spite of the self-interested pronouncements of its various practitioners. The New York based Open Society Foundation has recently conducted a systematic evaluation of OSCE police assistance programmes in the central Asia region that have been organized there since 2001 (Lewis 2011). The results from this evaluation are depressing to say the least: The report notes that ‘these programmes have failed to achieve real reform’, ‘have compromised OSCE ideals by supporting forces that have been accused of human rights abuses’, and ‘represent a general failure of the OSCE to respond adequately to changes in the political context in which police assistance takes place’ with the entire enterprise characterized by ‘ad hoc projects of dubious value which undermine the OSCE’s core commitments to human rights and democratic principles’ (pp. 6–7). At one level it is refreshing to see such a candid analysis. However, the Open Society Foundation has been involved in a few rather dubious police reform initiatives of its own historically: In 2000 it sponsored a team of ex-Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers from Northern Ireland to travel to Mongolia to ‘reform’ the Soviet inherited Mongolian Police along the lines of a community policing programme developed in Belfast (Ellison 2007a)! All our case study areas have been in receipt of high levels of international police reform assistance whether in the form of the transfer of ‘expert’ knowledge and training, financing or the organization of discrete programmes. While the nomenclature may vary, community policing has been heavily promoted as the key reformist paradigm for the police in our jurisdictions, including Iraq and Afghanistan1 (see Table 3.1). Aside from the varied activities that community policing is said to embrace – and it seems that there is little that cannot be subsumed under its mantle – community policing is beset by a range of problems. First, the political economy of police development assistance – whether community policing or ‘democratic policing’ more generally – reflect the problems with Western-centred development assistance more generally that we identified in Chapter 2. In particular, many programmes, strategies and initiatives are often inappropriate for local context and are ultimately unsustainable given the huge infrastructural and other problems that often exist within recipient states. Furthermore, we need to consider the role of Western policy-entrepreneurs in the transfer/export process since they perform a role not unlike the cientificos in Latin America who framed their development strategies around Western centred modernization theories often with disastrous consequences. Second, community policing may actually exacerbate problems in deeply conflicted states, particularly where

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Proof Donor Export and Police Development Assistance 67 Table 3.1

COP in Action

• In Afghanistan a NATO officer thought of standardizing successful efforts with the police started by NGOs and helped train the police to give talks to children in schools about identifying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), supposedly bringing more respect to the Afghan National Police and increasing the self-esteem of police officers (Coyne ND). Community consultations with police were also established and some citizen reporters were trained to see if police had been living up to their promises. • A professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas started a police exchange programme for improving COP initiatives between police in Austin and Georgetown, Texas and the city of Minas Gerais, Brazil (LBJ School of Public Affairs 2004). Each groups spent two weeks in the other country learning COP techniques such as working with children, visiting facilities, and meeting academics, government officials, and other community leaders. The Narcotics Affairs Section of the US Embassy of Brazil put $100,000 toward the project and all participants hoped that the project improves security in Brazil’s Favelas. At the time of writing the exchange programme website was no longer active. • At the request of a local police commander, US airmen trained police in Qarayt Ar Rufush, Iraq in order to transition the police from a combat unit to community police (Chavana 2010). The airmen mentored local police as they engaged in a foot patrol, speaking with residents who spoke about local terrorist attacks. • The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service started a COP programme in 1996, and many thought the programme was successful. However, they decided to make every police officer a community police officer in addition to their normal duties and the ‘whole thing fell apart’. Later in 2008, the police commissioner received criticism for wanting Trinidad and Tobago to model their new COP programme after those in South Africa and Kenya (Bagoo 2008). • Security forces in the Eastern Turkish province of Erzerum established a COP unit as part of the Improvement of Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Sector project with assistance from the UNDP (UNDP 2009a). The unit uses what they call a precautionary security model instead of the traditional reactive process, and because police leaders appear to lack the capacity to engage in internal oversight, civilian oversight is also a major part of the programme. COP is seen as a tool of civilian oversight. In addition, COP in Erzerum involves mutual information exchanges, ‘comfort meetings’ at local coffee houses, and visiting youth centres and providing safety information via cartoons. • South Africa established COP forums where the police meet with community residents to learn about local crime problems. The South African Police Service also created a reservist system where community residents are trained to engage in patrols with the police (SouthAfrica.Info 2007). The police service engaged in a ‘localisation’ project that provided more officers, detectives, resources and equipment to local stations. High tech systems were also instituted so that national leaders could track activities at local stations more easily.

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Proof 68 Globalization, Police Reform and Development Table 3.1

COP in Action – continued

• The PSNI in Northern Ireland have been working with Peak Management Services to develop a community neighbourhood management programme to ‘help all communities work together in harmony in Northern Ireland’. The PSNI also have had discussions with the Civil Aviation Authority to deploy mini-drones that according to a member of the Northern Ireland Policing Board would assist community policing by helping the PSNI catch criminals and counter the threat from dissident republicans. The drones are fitted with live cameras, have a 3km range and fly at ground speeds of 50km per hour. Sinn Féin, however, have warned that the proposals ‘should not be seen an alternative to community policing’ (BBC 2011b).

ethnic tensions are rife and political control of the police is an issue (Neild 2001a). Finally, there is scant evidence that community policing works even in those Western states where it was it was initially developed owing to problems of equity among other things (Murphy 2007; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). For these reasons, some commentators (e.g. Murphy 2007) have argued that the earlier ‘professional’ model may be the best interim police reform model to emulate, while others have advocated the creation of a post-conflict stability force to establish order and the Rule of Law (Perito 2004).

The political economy of police development assistance The more one reads about police reform in transitional contexts, states exiting from authoritarian rule, processes of democratization, NGO activity, donor aid, security sector reform the more cynical one can become about the efficacy of such endeavours. Many evaluations of donor assistance display a clear lack of methodological rigour (Carothers 1999), and even for those evaluations that are methodologically and conceptually sound the results are rather depressing (Celador 2005; Clegg et al 2000; Chesterman 2004). Many schemes have been implemented on the assumption that what works in the West – or more accurately what is thought to work, since here too the evidence may be sketchy – can simply be transplanted to another jurisdiction without due regard for history, politics, culture, economic differentials, the historical relationship of police to public, questions of police legitimacy, state repression, appropriateness and sustainability (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a). The list is endless. In fact as we discussed in Chapter 2, they contain many of the same weaknesses and flaws that development theorists identified in relation to First World attempts to ‘modernize’ the economies of developing nations.

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For Mike Brogden (Brogden 2002) development studies ‘furnished a perception of the way official discourses on development assume the phenomenal form of inevitable evolution but in practice rely on the force majeure, the ideological hegemony, and the economic power of donor countries’ (p. 163). Indeed, the export-import model of democratic policing and community policing in particular, promulgated by western donor nations relies heavily on a diffusion thesis (undercut with particular assumptions about historical progress) deeply rooted in an Anglo-American developmental trajectory and which shares many parallels with earlier incarnations of the modernization perspective discussed in the previous chapter (Brogden 2002: 162). In the first place this diffusion thesis assumes a unilinear and ahistorical trajectory: all societies pass through the same stages of economic development, and community policing is the ultimate end-point in the development of public policing. Second, it is infused with an ethnocentric conceptualization of history as progress, and transfixed by the ‘big idea’: economic development and community-policing are desirable Western-style goals. Third, it contains a ‘one size fits all’ assumption – that its model can be transplanted unproblematically to alien contexts: modernization theory by bringing in Western development experts, community policing by bringing in Western policing experts. Finally, it assumes the same desirable end point: global neoliberal capitalist economies underpinned by democratic policing systems, where Neighbourhood Watch, and Crimestoppers are de rigeur. By contrast, it is possible to view overseas assistance in police reform efforts through the lens of dependency theory and for some commentators the global export of policing models ‘constitutes a new form of exploitative, entrepreneurial neo-colonialism’ (Murphy 2005: 143). This is evident both in the way that police donor assistance contributes to dependency and underdevelopment in and of itself (through inappropriate, unsustainable and unworkable schemes such as community policing), but also in terms of a World Systems perspective that structures reform efforts and assistance programmes in ways that are favourable to the geostrategic interests of key western states, principally the United States. While these may bring some benefits to ruling or elite groups in recipient nations, they arguably have little impact on broader processes of democratization and the development of civil society receptive to these ideals. Indeed, it may well be the case that donor or national interest will win out over humanitarianism every time. Community policing, in particular, holds an attraction for donors. The broad and flexible ideal that community policing is said to embody,

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together with a rather loosely articulated organizational and operational structure, has meant that it has become the export model of choice (Murphy 2007). Furthermore, community policing has spurred a mini-industry in what Punch (2005: 150) terms ‘juicy boondoggles’ and an international merry-go-round of community policing evangelists and missionaries plying their wares (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Unfortunately, many of the schemes that are endorsed or promoted are located at the frivolous end of the community policing spectrum, and are distinctive only for their conceptual naïveté, problematic assumptions and lack of systematic evaluation. Fundamentally, however, police reform (including community policing) is big business. Given the vast sums of money spent in promoting community policing overseas there has been surprisingly little scholarly attention paid to its efficacy as the dominant reformist paradigm in transitional or developing states (though see Brogden 2002, 2005; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Dixon 2000; Van der Spuy 2001). In particular, there has been little attention paid to the precise modus operandi of the export-import model promulgated by the West. As Brogden (2002) suggests: …we have little perceptive analysis of the export-input process, of the motives of often misnamed donor countries; of the nature of the commodity, of the conditions of delivery, of the processes of installation in the ‘host’ society; or of the reactions of the recipient institutions and their agents and the consequences of installation (p. 160). For Brogden (2002: 164–165) the dynamics of the power relations inherent in any policing policy-transfer can be conceived of in four main ways: 1 Charismatic or magical forms of power: this refers to community policing evangelists, and gurus who believe that they possess ‘higher order values over policing’ (p. 164). 2 Traditional: this is commonly found in post-colonial situations with the ex-colonial power retains some sort of ‘mentorship’ or interest in the second country. France and the UK, for example, have maintained historically close ties with former colonies in Africa. 3 Bureaucratic: this is typically performed as ‘an adjunct of larger state policy’ (p. 164) whereby ‘contiguous policing schemes’ (ibid.) are related to the demands laid down in supra-national frameworks. The EU’s acquis communautaire is a good example here, as is the UN’s civilian policing division, UNPOL.

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4 Economic: This is where the donor expects to receive some fiscal reward or payment in kind for the transfer of policing knowledge and expertise. This can be tied directly to the purchase of goods and services from the host country (the phenomenon known as ‘tied aid’), made conditional on doing or receiving something in return, or a loss-leader designed to facilitate market penetration (Dixon 2000). To Brogden’s (2002) list might be added a fifth, ‘strategic’ element that has its roots in (First World) security concerns – particularly the ‘Global War on Terror’ and refracted through local security/reform agendas. 5 Strategic: This refers to the globalization of national security concerns and involves the plugging of security-gaps i.e. perceived weak and vulnerable sectors in recipient nations, as well as the creation of regional security corridors and stable environments for economic investment. Brogden (2002) further suggests that policing studies has been unable (or unwilling) to provide satisfactory conceptual and theoretical tools for understanding the nature of the donor-recipient relationship. Developing an interpretive framework rooted in the sociology of development he demonstrates how the transfer of policing models such as community policing are heavily overlaid with political assumptions about the ‘right’ development trajectory and infused with unequal power-relations between donor and recipient. In short, the transfer of policing models is not a neutral process. This has far-reaching implications for how police reform is operationalized or indeed whether ‘reform’ is even attainable in the absence of other factors: facilitative state structures, a rights-based legal system, normative commitment to democratic ideals and so on. While it is easy to see the attraction of capacity-building reform packages at a general level, it is less easy to see the particular attraction of community policing (outside the narrow professional criteria already mentioned) since it sits so far outside the local mosaic of experience that it has little resonance either in practical application or conceptual reasoning. However, as Van der Spuy (1995) suggests, community policing has a ‘seductive quality’ insofar as it taps into so many different dimensions of safety and security that have an underlying appeal: community policing can be transformed chameleon like into whatever its practitioners want it to be. It may be though, that these states are simply doing what they have long been encouraged to believe; that doing it the ‘Western way’ will provide for order and stability, ameliorate crime increases associated with a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule and go some way to mending the social

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dislocation and disruption that inevitably occurs (Shaw 2002; Shearing and McCarthy 2002). Community policing is touted as being able to restore police legitimacy (or create it if none existed previously) and provide for local control and accountability. It is a ‘one size fits all’ panacea to a whole range of problems. These are tall claims to make, and there is scant evidence even from the developed world that community policing has done any of these things. The problems that we identified earlier in relation to development paradigms resonate with global efforts at police reform and the transfer of community policing in particular, and can be outlined by considering the appropriateness and sustainability of the transfers.

Appropriateness The appropriateness of community policing can be understood in a number of ways, all of which impact on the likely success of reform efforts. Are the transfers appropriate for the task in hand? Can they be conceived as being appropriate at the point of impact? Are they more appropriate for donors than recipients? More generally, two factors impact on the appropriateness of community policing transfers. In the first place the unilinear, diffusionist discourse implies that it can simply be lifted from developed nations of the North and West to another context unproblematically. Doing community policing is seen as a technical issue (Brogden 2002: 162), rather than a fundamentally political and contextual one. How are we to implement community policing in the context of poor or non-existent infrastructural resources, poor or non-existent state and local police capacity, high crime rates, poverty, a mistrustful public, communal rivalries, extremes of wealth and poverty, a lack of understanding about what is required, corruption, nepotism, an absence of democratic state structures, or even the absence of a functioning state itself (Nordstrom 2000)? Second, the supply-driven nature of much development assistance (including community policing schemes) amounts to a solution looking for a problem and very often the solution becomes the problem since the ‘product’ towards the priorities and interests of donors (Chesterman 2004: 187). David Bayley (2001) in his Democratising the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It notes that many American overseas police missions are over-reliant on ‘flying visits’ that prevent personnel from fully appraising the complexities of the task in hand, and as he suggests ‘…American efforts have relied too heavily on “drop in” courses, “turnkey” programmes, and “cookie cutter” projects designed without

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sufficient knowledge of local conditions’ (p. 37). For this reason, Bayley (2001) argues that donor assistance missions should prioritize longterm assignments for personnel, adopt multi-year programmes, and fully assess the potentially negative consequences of aid or assistance on the local economy and indigenous capacity for independent development (pp. 67–69). While there is much to agree with here, Bayley (2001) has relatively little to say about the reform of political structures, which arguably must precede or at least coincide with any form of police democratization nor about national interest which governs the motives of many donors (Manning 2010; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a). For some commentators (Murphy 2007; Neild 2001a) community policing is probably the policing reform template that is the most inappropriate for conflicted and transitional states. In the first place it implies that an identifiable ‘community’ exists with shared values and norms about the legitimacy of the police and what is perceived as their role and function. Even in stable democracies it is difficult to identify a homogeneous community, but in transitional and conflicted states, varying ethnic loyalties and allegiances, extreme patterns of residential segregation and historically variant relationships with the police (whether as perceived oppressor or defender) problematize the development of policepublic relations in any meaningful sense. Furthermore, contained within community policing discourse is the assumption that in order to be properly ‘democratic’ policing must be decentred with ‘ownership’ transferred to local communities. However, when faced with the realities of an ethnically divided society with deep schisms this situation can prove less than ideal (Neild 2001b). There is always the danger that local control of policing can result in its manipulation in ways that suits the interests of dominant ethnic groups without due regard for the rights of minorities or those at the political margins. An unintended consequence of introducing community policing in an already conflicted setting is that the police become repoliticized, not depoliticized at the local level (Murphy 2007: 250). This may be particularly acute in those situations where there is an absence of a broader political consensus or agreement over the nature of policing itself. For this reason Murphy (2007) makes a case for what he terms ‘the professional reform alternative’ that he suggests may be more applicable as an initial reformist template. Historically, police professionalization was heralded as a panacea to solve a number of problems that have traditionally afflicted the police organization. It was ‘perceived to be a solution to the political problem of creating “impartial” policing free of assumed partisan communal influences’ (Brogden and Shearing 1993: 107).

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For example, during the police reform movement in the United States in the mid-1920s, an emphasis on professional ethics and technical competence was advocated by Police Chiefs such as August Vollmer to free the police from their close association with the local political machine and associated allegations of corruption, malpractice and brutality (Fogelson 1977; Walker 1976, 1977). In Britain, police professionalism has also been linked to political impartiality; this time most prominently through the doctrine of constabulary independence and the operational autonomy of Chief Constables (see Mark 1977). For Murphy (2007) professionalism offers two advantages over community policing. First, the existence of a stable, bureaucratic, disciplined and organized force may go some way to creating the conditions of stable social order that is often lacking in transitional contexts. This may allow more community-focused developments to emerge later. Second, it may provide a breathing space for the structures of democratic governance to develop. As he suggests: A self-governing professional model can operate effectively and democratically in a changing and unstable political environment by remaining operationally neutral and detached from direct government and community control (p. 256). A final issue concerning the appropriateness of police assistance transfers relates to the phenomenon of tied aid. Here the recipient nation is locked into an arrangement whereby in return for aid or assistance they must either purchase goods and services from the donor, or alternatively where the donor expects to receive some other benefit in kind (for example, mineral rights, favourable trading relationships and so forth). For instance, in return for a community policing package the recipient might be required to purchase uniforms, computer equipment, weaponry, communications technologies, vehicles, software packages (variants of COMPSTAT), or other goods and services from firms in the donor nation (Beck 2001). The OECD acknowledges that a relatively large proportion of official Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid is tied back to the donor nation in some way (OECD 2006). While the tying of aid to the reciprocal purchase of donor country goods and services has been illegal in the United Kingdom since 2002, it is still common practice in the US, Canada and Australia which appear to be among the worst offenders.2 In 2006, according to the OECD an estimated 34.3% of Canadian DAC aid was tied, while the figures for Australia and the US were, 36.8% and 54.5% respectively (OECD 2006). Under current US procurement law the vast bulk of USAID contracts are awarded to mainly American firms, estimated to be around

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80%.3 Consequently, in Iraq and Afghanistan hundreds of US corporations and private contractors are scrabbling to spend the bulk of the money allocated by USAID4 and the US Department of Defence (DOD) for security and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the Congressional Research Service, between the 9/11 attacks and March 2011, USAID was allocated $67 billion for reconstruction and related costs (Belasco 2011). Department of Defence contracts for private security personnel, in Afghanistan (2005-10) amounted to $33.9 billion and in Iraq during the same period, $112.1 billion (Schwartz and Swain 2011).

Sustainability Normative concerns about appropriateness also relate to practical concerns with the sustainability of donor-assisted projects (Redclift 2002). The notion of sustainability was popularized by the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) [Brundtland Report] but ironically it was the World Bank that summed up its essence in memorable phrase, ‘What is sustainable development? Sustainable development is development that lasts’ (World Bank 1992: 34). Many factors influence the sustainability of donor-assisted projects although one might be an unintended consequence of trying to do the right thing. Many donors deliberately by-pass repressive governments and corrupt state agencies in an effort to channel aid and development assistance to where it is most needed (Clegg et al 2000). This is a laudable aim, but trying to reform around the state may limit what is ultimately achievable: a band-aid solution, dealing with the symptoms of a problem rather than the problem itself. It means that the fundamental political issues in developing countries that give rise to such problems in the first place remain unaddressed. Other factors affect the sustainability of donor-assisted projects. These can range from macro-level problems with coordination within and between supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations, and the competing domestic priorities of national development agencies (for example, AUSAID, DFID). NGO ‘turf wars’ also occur with voluntary sector agencies clambering to fund their pet projects (Chesterman 2004: 185–189). In addition, there are conflicts of interest and rivalries between various national police departments and agencies that have instituted bilateral assistance programmes (for example, the DEA, the FBI, and ICITAP) (see Bayley 2001: 69). Van der Spuy (2001: 348) identifies a number of local factors that impact upon the sustainability of police reform projects. These include overly bureaucratic management structures to oversee the project; poor strategic assessment of

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goals and aims; lack of local political will; corruption and nepotism, vague programme objectives, rapid turnover of personnel, and limited evaluation and oversight of the projects themselves. To illustrate with one example here, there seems little point teaching (or telling) police officers that they should not be corrupt, unless at the same time something is done about the structural conditions that give rise to corruption in the first place. In the words of a Phnom Penh police officer, ‘On $10 a month, [if] you’re not corrupt you don’t eat’ (cited in Craig and Porter 2006: 7). Ultimately, many community policing transfers are flash in the pan efforts that are simply ill-conceived. In a telling example, Malan (1999) documents how some donor-assisted projects for police reform in South Africa took place with little or no input from the South African Police Service (SAPS), and as he suggests, ‘the capacities thus built, remain largely outside the mainstream of police bureaucracy’ (p. 9). Similarly, Hendrickson (1999) argues that police reform efforts undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have taken place ‘without an attempt to build a genuine local vision of the role of the police in a democratic society, or to anticipate the institutional requirements needed for success’ (p. 40). While the UNDP has recently made strenuous attempts to engage local stakeholders in its reform efforts (see case study on Turkey) this nevertheless illustrates the wider tendency to tinker around the edges while neglecting the harder-to-do structural questions. In other cases, some regimes ‘cherry pick’ those aspects of police assistance programmes that suit their immediate political objectives while discarding other aspects that are antithetical to their purposes. For example, community policing ideas have been hijacked to provide the basis for repressive counterinsurgency strategies as has happened with the Colombian National Police (Goldsmith et al 2007).

Policy entrepreneurs and epistemic policy communities Brogden (2005) identifies six main exponents of ‘democratic’ policing on the world stage: (1) private corporations who offer policing for hire on the global market (DynCorp, MPRI, Pacific Architects and Engineers/Homeland Security Corporation who have been contracted by the US to provide and train police officers for overseas missions); (2) policing gurus, private consultants (for example, George Fivaz, the ex head of CID in the South African Police, and the ex Commissioner of the NYPD, William Bratton) who sell their services to host governments and international police organizations; (3) transnational cooperation between state enforcement agencies (for

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example, INTERPOL/EUROPOL and the European Police College [CEPOL]); (4) international organizations such as UNPOL working under the aegis of the United Nations; (5) a range of INGOs and aid agencies who engage with overseas police organizations on a bilateral and multilateral basis; and (6) the overseas development branches of Western governments have also been particularly active in sponsoring and funding overseas community policing projects. For example, The British Government’s DFID, and the US State Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) have been particularly active in this regard, as have the Canadian Government via its International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Australian government’s overseas development agency, AUSAID. However, one aspect that has received almost no attention in the police reform literature and the policy-transfer literature more generally, concerns the role played by policy entrepreneurs such as the ‘gurus’ described above, within epistemic policy communities. Policy entrepreneurs can be defined as ‘entrepreneurs who, from outside the formal positions of government, introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public practice.’ (Roberts and King 1991: 147). Such individuals (or agents) are often hugely influential but have remained largely background figures within the public policy literature (Mintrom 2000) and similarly little attention has been paid to their role within the transnational diffusion of policing ideas. This lack of detailed focus on agency – how the diffusion of policing policies and practices is shaped by human actors and interventions – is important in two respects. First, in the context of our discussion of traditional development paradigms in Chapter 2 it resonates with the role played by what modernization theorists saw as cientificos or ‘modern men’ who would pursue a Western inspired technocratic political and economic orthodoxy in developing nations. Second, it resonates with the huge global movement of key personnel in relation to the transfer of policing knowledges whether in terms of overseas missions, reform endeavours, bi or multilateral exchanges and secondments, training seminars, conferences and the huge volume of unofficial networking that takes place within what Otwin Marenin (2007) has termed the ‘transnational policing policy community’. We discuss this aspect further in our case study chapters but the sheer scale of this networking by retired and serving police officers is simply staggering (for a discussion in relation to Northern Ireland see Ellison and O’Reilly 2008a, 2008b). Our concern here is with the construction of epistemic communities built around the transfer/export of policing knowledges; the enduring appeal of particular strategies such as community policing and more

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recently counter-terrorism; and why some models/policies continue to be exported even though on any objective assessment they are policy failures. Our argument is that in terms of how policy transfer takes place there has been an over-emphasis on the role of the state and official dimensions and that we need to adopt a processual approach to highlight ‘…how ideas, interests, perceptions and discourses are transported and adapted irrespective of state structures’ (Stone 2001: 19, italics added). In particular, we need to consider the informal ways that policing knowledges are communicated, transmitted and diffused within policy networks and the processes by which these knowledges are translated into policies and actions. This we would argue is probably as important, if not more so, than an analysis of official policy per se. The current international knowledge-exchange in policing is undercut by a sense of ‘back to the futurism’. In historical context, the knowledges and experiences of Irish policing policy entrepreneurs played a key role in diffusing both the model of policing developed in Ireland and adopted across the British Empire and also the counter-insurgency strategies developed in Ireland to deal with nationalist and anti-colonial uprisings. Officers from the Royal Ulster Constabulary were also dispatched to postwar Greece and Germany, which were deemed to hold strategic interest for Britain in the context of the Cold War. Similarly, in the somewhat crowded domain of contemporary international police assistance, policy entrepreneurs criss-cross the globe as ‘roving police advisors’ (Sinclair 2006: 53) promoting their particular model or ‘brand’ of policing. These individuals are often senior police officers, government officials, key development agency personnel or in many cases retired police officers who establish their own security consultancy or who have obtained employment with one of the global consultancy firms such as KPMG who through their Development Advisory Service and Fragile and Conflicted States Unit are actively engaging in police and security sector reform initiatives globally.5 There are two issues here that can be expressed briefly: an organizational one and a personal one. At the organizational level the extent of this global promotionalism in policing models should not underestimated with for example, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office making strenuous efforts to promote what it terms the ‘UK Police PLC’ brand globally.6 Key personnel move in the same circles (current and retired police officers, government officials, INGOs) and establish ‘discourse communities’ (Stone 2001) whereby shared solutions are offered to shared problems, and where similar ideas are articulated with little reflexivity. Of course, these discourse communities are in competition, very often along national lines with for example,

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French, Italian and Spanish officials tending to favour police reform models organizationally structured along the lines of a gendarmerie compared to the Anglo-American preference for emphasizing a sharp distinction between military and police units (Hills 2009b: 65). These tensions come to the fore in those countries that are in receipt of high levels of international assistance from multiple donors (e.g. as in Turkey, discussed in Chapter 10). It is here, however, that community policing comes to the rescue since it represents such a loose and eclectic reform template that the contradictions and tensions within competing reformist paradigms can be accommodated and navigated around. In regard to the psychology of belief, what (Berkun 2005) has termed the ‘fake defence perspective’ – ‘we did it the last time, and the time before that so why shouldn’t we do this again?’ – referential data are sufficient to make future claims and predictions. In this sense, the subjectivities, understandings and knowledges of policy entrepreneurs are important at the level of human agency. Policy entrepreneurs are human with human frailties and attributes and their sense of ‘self’ (who they are) is intertwined to a large extent with ‘what’ they know. It makes sense that if a person has invested the better part of their life espousing an idea, and participating in international police reform commissions (as with the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland) then this is what frames their identity and which forms the basis for the esteem and gratification which they believe they are due. Given the degree to which a sense of ‘self’, not to mention a person’s career, is tied to a particular model or way of thinking, it becomes difficult if not impossible to admit that the model is wrong, that there are alternatives that are more valid, might be better in the circumstances and so forth. In these situations it is often easier to fit the world into their model and if it does not fit, rather than changing their model, they instead spin the circumstances so they will fit they model they have got. Changing their model would be tantamount to admitting that they might have been wrong (whether in Northern Ireland, South Africa or elsewhere) and thus a threat to their identity and self-esteem. This is a pretty common human condition: All of us have our worldviews that we cling pretty tightly to even in the face of some fairly blatant contradictions; what psychologists refer to as a ‘cognitive dissonance’ that allows us to ‘justify ourselves and avoid taking responsibility for any actions that turn out to be harmful, immoral or stupid’ (Tavris and Aronson 2007: 2). Indeed, as Tavris and Aronson (2007) acknowledge, it seems to be a hardwired part of the human condition, even when faced with irrefutable and incontrovertible evidence that they are wrong, people do ‘not change their point of view or course

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of action but justify it even more tenaciously’ (p. 2). Unfortunately, however, as we have discussed above, this often results in the peddling of irrelevant or inappropriate models, strategies and approaches and failure is rarely, if ever, acknowledged.

Conclusions This chapter has considered some problematic aspects of police development assistance and provided an overview of the export-import model of democratic policing promulgated by donor nations in the North and West to developing and transitional states. While community policing is the export model of choice for many Western donors, our view is that it is rooted in a police developmental trajectory that has little relevance to the vagaries of transitional and post-conflict states. Furthermore, some would argue that there is actually little evidence, even from within advanced liberal democracies that community policing works (Brogden 2002, 2005; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a) Even accomplishing ‘democratic’ policing is difficult and some would argue logically impossible (e.g. Manning 2010) in the absence of legal and civic structures conducive to democratic participatory and rights-based ideals. Perhaps the most we should (or can) realistically expect of a police reform process in transitional states is that citizens are protected from the coercive machinations of the state and its control apparatuses. It may well be that police democratization/transformation is unable by itself to provide for the type of security as a public good as envisaged by some commentators (Loader and Walker 2001) without a fundamental reassessment of what development processes in transitional societies should look like and what they are expected to achieve. It is perhaps at this point that the flaws in community policing transfers become most apparent in that they follow the line of least resistance and create the illusion of doing something but leaving the larger structural problems largely unacknowledged. The real solution to development problems lies in transforming political structures and that questions of citizen safety in weak and developing states should not be divorced ‘from questions of political authority, social identity and access to resources’ (Goldsmith 2003: 18). We have suggested that outside of rather narrow criteria (humanitarian, peace-making efforts) the success of developing democratic policing has been decidedly mixed. In particular, we have suggested that community policing as the supposed paradigmatic example of democratic policing is vague and contradictory and often inappropriate and unsustainable for

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transitional and developing contexts. This is not to say that progress has not been made. It has. South Africa and Northern Ireland are examples of where previously authoritarian, militarized forces have been transformed and there is evidence that a constabulary ethic is emerging in both jurisdictions, however nascent it may seem at this time. The reasons for these successes, however, lie primarily in a transformation of political structures, and it is not all a bed of roses in South Africa. High levels of crime and continued economic inequalities mean that even a fundamentally transformed, democratic police can have little impact on citizen safety. The issue here as Clifford Shearing and Monica McCarthy (2002) have noted, is finding a way to balance reform with effective security in transitional democracies. Obviously repressive policing agencies need to be changed. However, the mere existence of reforms, of having in place democratic policing structures, of fostering adherence to human rights norms and democratic standards, may ultimately mean little in terms of the police’s ability to provide for public security. In fact, whatever gains have been made may be thrown off-track by factors such as high crime rates, which the police, particularly in developing countries are hardly in a position to influence. Problems such as these go beyond the capacity of the police in such contexts. In the case study chapters that follow we divide a number of the issues we have identified in this and the previous two chapters into a threetiered level of analysis: macro, meso and micro. At the macro level neoliberal globalization, underdevelopment and dependency, the strategic imperatives of key Western states, and trends in transnational crime and terrorism impact the nature and content of reform efforts in any particular country. National and regional level factors at the meso level of analysis influencing the outcome of reform efforts include the ripeness of a government’s institutions for democracy, civil society strength, levels of ethnic or sectarian conflict, human and social capital levels, and the capacity and willingness of a government and its institutions to carry out reforms. At the micro level of analysis factors at the local neighbourhood or community level that impact on the success or failure of reform endeavours include the interests of local elites and their relationship with nationallevel leaders, levels of crime and disorder, the situation with local police forces and militias in terms of composition, public relations, pay, and corruption, and the status of women relative to men and their ability to participate in local decision-making. All our case studies have experienced international assistance with police reform at some level, and all have had varying levels of success.

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However, it is only by drilling down into each level (micro, meso and macro) that we are in a better position to understand what has worked under what circumstances and why. Ultimately, as we shall see, there is no one model of police reform that can be transposed from the West to the Rest. There is no guarantee that what works in Northern Ireland will work in South Africa, Brazil or Afghanistan – in spite of what some practitioners may like to think. Police reform is a highly contingent process; it depends ultimately on having a robust constitutional and political framework in place that is respectful and tolerant of rights, not the whims of regimes, and an economic system that is capable of meeting basic social needs.


Proof

4

Afghanistan

Country profile Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world outside of Sub-Saharan Africa (Rubin 2007). Out of 187 countries, Afghanistan ranks 172nd on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2011). Life expectancy is 43.6 years, the literacy rate is 28% (the female rate is 12%), and only half of children are enrolled in schools (UNDP 2009b). GDP per capita ranks 215 out of 227 countries at $900, and even though GDP grew 7% in 2007, for example, much of the population (80% rural) remains poor and without regular access to clean water, medical care, or electricity (CIA 2011; Gross 2009). In religious terms Afghanistan is estimated to be 80% Sunni and 19% Shi’ia, with 1% being ‘other’, but the ethnic composition of Afghanistan is more complex: 42% are estimated to be Pashtun, while 27% are Tajiks, 9% are Hazara, 9% are Uzbeks, 4% are Aimak, 3% are Turkmen, 2% are Balock, and 4% are other (Cordesman 2008). Germany initially trained Afghanistan’s police force when Mohammed Zahir Shah ruled during the 1960s and 1970s and before the Soviet Invasion of 1979 (BICC 2003; Murray 2007). Policing in Afghanistan was placed under the Ministry of the Interior during this time, but political struggles during the Soviet period led to the separation of the intelligence-gathering arm of the police from the Ministry. This new intelligence unit was named the Khedamat-e-Atlaat-e-Dawlati (the Department of State Information Services, or KHAD) (Halliday and Tanin 1998; Murray 2007). KHAD was a highly paid secret police service under the auspices of the Soviets and modelled after, and monitored by the KGB, engaging in subversion, assassinations, torture, imprisonment, and similar activities (Halliday and Tanin 1998; Murray 2007). Civil war and the conflict against the Soviets intensified ethnic conflict and led to the emergence of regional 83

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leaders with their own militias who would constantly challenge the authority of the central government. At the time the Americans and their coalition invaded at the end of 2001, the police that did exist were still organized on a Soviet-era model comprising career officers and conscripts who served two-year terms in lieu of military service and were badly paid with extremely poor working conditions (Perito 2004). Currently, the Afghan National Police (ANP) under the Ministry of the Interior consist of the Afghan Uniformed Police who engage in every day police activities, the Afghan Border Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (Wilder 2007): there are roughly 75,000 police officers in total (Gross 2009). The new democratic government includes a president and a bicameral legislature with numerous political parties represented. The legal system builds on a mixture of civil and Sharia law, and the judicial system includes high courts, appeals courts, and one supreme court (CIA 2011). While there is an official correctional system, there also exist private correctional facilities and militias run by warlords and there are at least 52 private security companies operating in the country (Boone 2011; Winslow 2010a).

Discussion Economic and political issues Foreign powers have always had an interest in Afghanistan and this has not abated during the 20th and 21st centuries. Since the time of Alexander the Great tribal groups residing in what is now modern Afghanistan have fiercely resisted invasion. The region was embroiled in the Great Game in the 19th century, when Russia and England competed for control over central Asia and India (Bearden 2001). The British controlled Afghanistan from 1839 (the First Afghan War) by fighting off Russian incursions and installing a ruler, but in 1942 the British had to flee owing to tribal resistance. The British fought two other wars there, from 1878 to 1881 (the Second Afghan War) and again in 1917, although ultimate control over Afghanistan proved elusive in both cases (Bearden 2001). During the reign of Sardar Daoud Khan in the 1950s, Afghanistan sought to modernize its economy and requested US military and financial aid. However, the US refused and Afghanistan ended up receiving aid from the Soviet Union instead in the context of Cold War politics (Rasanayagam 2005). This development helped set the stage for the Soviet Union’s future meddling in Afghanistan’s affairs. When the Soviets occupied Afghanistan in 1979 they established a paramilitary force under the Ministry of the Interior called the Sarandoy, which fought the Mujahidin and maintained internal security (Halliday and Tannin 1998).

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Proof Afghanistan 85

Following the departure of the Soviet troops, a bitter civil war broke out in Afghanistan, which the Taliban eventually won with aid from Saudi and Pakistani intelligence services (see Ahmed 2005). After the coalition invaded and occupied Afghanistan at the end of 2001, numerous countries including the US, the UK, Germany, Italy, Norway, Japan, and others framed the Bonn Agreement, which presented the plan for rebuilding Afghanistan. That process ended in 2005, resulting in elections, and the beginning of the Compact for Afghanistan, and its Afghan National Development Strategy. Even though the official rhetoric called for local participation international actors managed governmental functions during the Bonn process (Freeman 2007). The 2005 elections helped reveal conflicts and tensions between various members of the coalition who were proposing competing goals of democratization and political stabilization (Nixon and Ponzio 2007). A loose political consensus emerged, and elections were held to establish a national assembly and provincial councils, albeit with little public debate or political, economic or technical support. The highly centralized Afghan government has difficulty providing services for much of its population, which is scattered outside metropolitan areas, and regional elders in various rural provinces therefore complain about not being consulted in government matters (Rubin 2007). The government of Afghanistan is dependent on foreign aid and President Karzai has argued that inadequate resources from donor countries had made it necessary for him to ally with corrupt politicians (Kandiyoti 2005; Rubin 2007). Corruption is so rampant in Afghanistan at all levels of government, including the judiciary, that the only income generator exceeding it is the opium trade (see Rubin 2007; Schulman 2010). Corruption is also pervasive among foreign contractors and NGOs (Schulman 2010). In many cases traditional warlords compete for power and influence with regional governments and seek to maintain their influence through financial and military strength and corruption (BICC 2003). Legal and governmental reforms have outpaced improvements in security and development, negatively and disproportionately affecting women (Kandiyoti 2005). After the Bonn agreement in 2001, many organizations were developed at the national level to improve women’s lives – including the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Office of the State Minister for Women (for legislative and judicial reform), the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the Gender Advisory Group (Kandiyoti 2005). The new constitution formulated in 2004 provides women with legal and citizenship rights. However, these rights were formulated in the absence of consensus among the new governing elites and reflect fundamental tensions

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between the roles of Islamic law and international treaties for which Afghanistan is a signatory (Kandiyoti 2005: vii). In any case, there seems to be little appetite or willingness to enforce women’s rights. The reduction in quality of life and the proliferation of the informal economy have further eroded the lives of women (Kandiyoti 2005). Crime and security sector issues Numerous challenges threaten the viability of the new Afghan state (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007; Sedra 2006). High levels of government corruption linked to drug dealers and warlordism has resulted in a huge shadow economy that hinders macroeconomic growth. Human development indicators are among the lowest in the world, unemployment is high, and the government finds it difficult to provide for basic social services such as health and education. Particularly troubling is that unemployment remains high among demobilized former militia members who are increasingly drawn to various insurgent groups. The continued campaign of insurgency and the kidnapping of businessmen for ransom have caused capital flight (Rubin 2007), and dominant ethnic groups on the border with Pakistan are making profits from illicit markets including but not limited to drugs (Rubin 2007). The drug trade continues to fund insurgent groups as well. The opportunity to rebuild the state and social institutions is slipping away in part because Afghanistan’s warlords create shadow structures and a culture of graft by using profits from the underground economy to coopt local politicians (Giustozzi 2007). The existence of a shadow state means that bribes and bids are used to fill government posts rather than merit-based hiring practices (Gross 2009). In addition, the US government supports some warlords as a way to fight insurgent groups and the Taliban, even though these warlords are known to engage in smuggling, drug trafficking, summary executions, and other atrocities (Aikins 2009). Funds from foreign aid and the drug trade (mainly opium production) constitute the two largest sources of financial resources in Afghanistan (Koehler and Zuercher 2007). The narcotics trade in Afghanistan extends the violent conflict by funding armed groups weakening formal state institutions with corruption (Koehler and Zuercher 2007). In 2004 attempts were made to limit opium production by the Karzai government who offered farmers financial inducements to cut back on production. However, the promises of financial assistance did not materialize and cultivation predictably resumed and has now returned to the levels it was at previously.

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Foreign and national security sector reform efforts After the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001, various countries participated in attempting to create a new Afghanistan as part of the Bonn Agreement. After the US, the EU was the second largest aid-provider, contributing almost four billion Euros between 2002 and 2006, primarily on humanitarian aid and community-based infrastructural projects (Gross 2009). A number of states have taken the lead in training Afghanistan’s new police and military. Germany for instance, has provided police training, while a Canadian general commanded the NATO-led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). The ISAF engaged in police training at one point, but now it provides on-the-job-training on security matters when there are joint operations between the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the military (Murray 2007). China and Japan have contributed to infrastructural projects such as schools, bus systems, and hospitals, while the Italians took charge of reforming the judiciary. Judicial reform heavily depends on foreign aid from governments, NGOs and aid agencies such as the Asian Foundation, USAID, the US Institute of Peace, US law firms, the International Legal Foundation, and the International Resources Group (Ahmed 2005: 4). In regard to judicial reform, at the beginning of 2004, the transitional government in Afghanistan held a Loya Jirga (constitutional convention) and ratified a constitution praised by UN representatives and various Western legal scholars. Reforms included creating a new criminal code that adheres to Western human rights standards while centralizing the judicial system in addition to training judges, lawyers, court staff, and the like (Ahmed 2005). The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hired jurists to develop the nationalized criminal code for the new constitution. However, local actors view this criminal code as condescending, imperialist, and disrupting the traditional decentralized local jirgas (tribal assemblies of elders) that resolve everyday disputes (Ahmed 2005). While Afghanistan has received foreign funds to carry out various reforms since the fall of the Taliban, the country does not have the local capacity to carry out those reforms partly because of decades of war, brain drain, and the disruption and a decimation of the education system, particularly higher education (see Ahmed 2005). Western aid agencies have attempted to fill the gaps in capacity by conducting training programmes, but Ahmed (2005) reports that these programmes and the development of the constitution imposed foreign concepts and practices that ran against traditional cultural legal practices. In addition, many programmes were conducted without adequate local input from important stakeholders such as religious institutions and their leaders, or careful attention to local

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histories and realities, the relative autonomy of tribal regions outside Kabul, and the tensions between Kabul and those regions. The rule of law in Afghanistan has been dominated by the ‘war on terror’ rather than reconciliation among the Afghan people (Freeman 2007). It should be no surprise, then, that local tribal leaders have resisted the new rules imposed by Kabul and/or foreign governments and agencies, as they have done historically in other situations. Afghanistan’s Islamic legal tradition is well established, particularly in the areas of property and commercial law, and local power holders instead of the state maintain authority in the judicial arena (CITpax 2007; Gross 2009). Religious leaders resist codified laws that reduce judicial discretion and Islamic legal tradition because from their perspective, traditional religious authority is being supplanted (Ahmed 2005). This recent imposition of Western legal structures in Afghanistan serves as evidence that many have not learned from the failures of the American Law and Development Movement from the 1960s (Ahmed 2005). At the same time, however, if international organizations conducting judicial reform overemphasize cultural differences and relative notions of progress, past and current human rights abuses may not be addressed adequately and social divisions along ethnic and gender lines can be exacerbated (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2007; Gross 2009). In 2003, the U.S. helped create ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (PRTs) to enhance ISAF activities as another way to deal with the security situation (McNerney 2006: 32). These teams, similar in size and mandate to UN Formed Police Units (see Wiatrowski et al 2008), consisted of 60–100 soldiers, Afghan advisors, and members of civilian US agencies such as the State Department, the Department of Agriculture, and USAID. Activities of the PRTs focused on security, reconstruction, and enhancing the reach and legitimacy of the Afghan central government and included rebuilding schools, training police, and negotiating conflicts (McNerney 2006; Murray 2007). Unfortunately PRTs have proved to be less than effective since they were underfunded and beset by an unclear mission and internal conflicts between military and civilian members (McNerney 2006). The drug trade in Afghanistan was another problem that donor countries attempted to tackle. Heroin production increased over five times in 2002 compared to 2001, and at that time, according to one estimate, heroin profits, which fund warlords, their armies, and other activities, accounted for 20% of Afghanistan’s GDP (see BICC 2003). Despite the UK pledge to help the border police fight the narcotics trade, heroin production has continued at a high rate (BICC 2003). An Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics was established in 2004 with aid money from New

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Zealand and Australia to make policy on tackling the drug issue, but the Ministry appears to have a primarily advisory role and was given no legislative responsibility for programme management (Murray 2007). The security situation deteriorated during the 2002–2003 period, when international peacekeeping operations were largely limited to Kabul (Sedra 2003). Warlords and their private militias ruled outside the capital, making the security situation too unstable to implement a comprehensive security sector reform plan (see Sedra 2004). It was in this context that attempts for disarmament and demobilization programmes, in addition to police and judicial reform, occurred. The UN Development Programme and the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan manage the Afghan New Beginnings Programme’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project (ANBP-DDR), and the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups Project (DIAG) (Bhatia 2007; BICC 2003). However, attempts by the central government and international organizations to monopolize the use of legitimate force have been uneven because US counter-terror and insurgency efforts took precedent, with the US recruiting men who previously served in militias run by warlords for new military units (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2007; Bhatia 2007; Gross 2009). Attempts at undermining the influence of warlords have also created a dangerous power vacuum. Political and ethnic divisions diminish the effectiveness of disarmament programmes as well (BICC 2003). There have also been widespread attempts at reforming the police to improve the security situation in Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban, in 2002, Germany took the lead in training the Afghan police after the fall of the Taliban mainly because it had been instrumental in providing some limited training for the Afghan police force prior to the Soviet invasion of 1979. Germany helped re-establish the Kabul Police Academy with an initial recruiting class of 1,500 and pledged to commit 40 German police officers and up to 12 million Euros per year for reforming the Afghan National Police (ANP) (BICC 2003; Gross 2009). Germany also developed a five-point plan for reform including plans to rebuild the Kabul Police Academy (partially involving a train-the-trainers programme), reconstruct buildings, and provide equipment, such as cars (BICC 2003). In 2003, the US helped create the National Police Training Centre (NPTC) that has a few non-US instructors (BICC 2003). The US gave local police instructors three-week training courses whereby new trainees went through an eight-week course with the only prerequisite being basic literacy. While the Kabul Police Academy trains potential police leaders, the NPTC trains ‘rank and file’ officers on professional ethics, human rights, democratic principles, and international standards

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(BICC 2003: 34). Overall these training programmes have not been particularly effective and despite the pledges of financial support for reforming the Afghan police little of this aid has been forthcoming. In practice, the Afghan police are poorly paid, poorly trained, and lack adequate infrastructure and resources to do their job effectively (BICC 2003; Murray 2007). Programmes in reforming Afghanistan’s security sector have been compounded by an initial absence of coordinated planning or evaluation (Murray 2007). When it became apparent that the security situation became worse after the fall of the Taliban, SSR reform efforts stressed immediate counter-insurgency requirements at the expense of democratic governance and accountability, and without a clear framework for shaping the process, a coordinated plan to carry it out, or a long-term perspective (Sedra 2006). Once the Taliban fell, Northern Alliance commanders placed private militias with little police training or experience into district and provincial police forces. Next, donor countries tried to create an effective police force out of these units that had shortages of pay, infrastructure, and equipment (Wilder 2007). Initially, police reform was overseen by government departments in donor countries that had few personnel experienced in foreign police training such as the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (Serchuk 2006). Overall, there are few of the required preconditions for SSR in Afghanistan since it continues to be devoid of ‘a minimum degree of security and institutional capacity’ (Sedra 2006: 95). The political system has not delivered a stable government and all democratization has done is reinforce ethnic tensions and schisms. Afghanistan remains deeply dependent on the international community, while insufficient institutional capacity has influenced the US government’s decision to hire DynCorp to recruit retired state and local police officers from the US to serve in Afghanistan (Serchuk 2006). Many private contractors are operating in Afghanistan – a situation that will continue in the future despite protests from President Karzai and the dislike of their presence among Afghan civilians (Boone 2011; Schmeidl 2008). Local Afghans see private security as something only the rich benefit from, and monies channelled to private firms are seen as a diversion of otherwise needed funds for reconstruction (Schmeidl 2008). According to the Afghan government, there are 52 listed private security providers hired to protect development projects as well as military and other convoys, though other estimates range from 90–140, half of which are owned or partially owned by Afghans (see Schmeidl 2008). These

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companies also act as bodyguards, help eradicate opium poppy, and remove landmines. As in Iraq, Dyncorp, AEGIS, Blackwater (Xe services), and Kroll are operating in Afghanistan, and in many of these companies, foreigners from Western countries are in charge while local Afghans or others from developing countries comprise regular guards. Indeed, the UK and US governments have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on private security contractors in Afghanistan, and as in Iraq 52% of US Department of Defence employees are private contractors (Schmeidl 2008; Schwartz and Swain 2011). Western donor countries have pressured the Afghan government to continue to allow private companies to operate until March of 2012, under the assumption that the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) (a quickly trained group of lightly armed Afghans started in 2009 meant to fill the gap until more Afghan forces are trained) can provide security independently – even though Karzai wanted private contractors disbanded by the end of 2010 (Boone 2011). Observers reported to Boone (2011) that private contractors would most likely be able to operate beyond March 2012. Dyncorp was hired to protect President Karzai, and a private security company will also train the APPF (Boone 2011; Schreier and Caparini 2005). Xe Services (formerly Blackwater, see the chapter on Iraq) is on a list of eleven companies in good standing in spite of the company’s notorious activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan. To all intents security sector reform in Afghanistan (a situation that is mirrored in Iraq) has become privatized; a development that is likely to contribute to an already unstable and fractious security outlook more generally. A few positive developments in the security landscape do exist, however, in terms of the rebuilding of facilities as well as basic organizational and administrative features and equipment. Moreover, additional investments have been made in training at different ranks and special units (including traffic and airport immigration), significant increases in salaries (though still lower than military salaries and not enough to support a family), and increases in people asking for help on the streets. The number of women that report crimes to the two family violence units in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif also increased (Murray 2007). Yet, there is still endemic corruption among police and prosecutors; investigative skills are underdeveloped; trainers from inside and outside the country are inexperienced; and international experts lack appropriate knowledge of the country, its customs, and history (Murray 2007). All of the above problems negatively influence the legitimacy of the new institutions and the ways in which the public regard them. When donors dictate reforms, it is easier for opponents within the country to

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question the legitimacy of those reforms (Sedra 2004). Donini (2007) reports on the findings from a public attitude survey to suggest that many members of the Afghan public are critical of overseas assistance programmes, largely on the basis that they do not meet expectations. First, respondents thought that aid did not correspond to what were perceived to be those areas in most need of financing such as infrastructure projects – schools, hospitals and the like. Furthermore, international aid was perceived as corrupt, mismanaged, and unsustainable. It was commonly perceived that foreign donors were in Afghanistan for strategic and instrumental purposes, and that trust in government was low due to perceptions of corruption and ineffectiveness. The security situation was perceived to be worse due to the drug trade, general lawlessness, and insurgency activities. As the Bonn Agreement drew to a close towards the end of 2005 there were some notable successes: Afghanistan had one of the Islamic world’s most progressive constitutions and in 2004 had democratically elected a president, parliament, and privy councils (Goodhand and Sedra 2007). The constitution included human rights, gender equality, and rights for religious minorities in addition to recognizing both Sunni and Shi’a Islam (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007). Some of the largest militias were demobilized, and four million refugees were able to return. However, some goals were met in ways that threatened future stability and legitimacy (Nixon and Ponzio 2007). Politically, the Bonn Agreement included a diverse and representative grouping of prominent Afghan citizens but many who were appointed to political positions in regional governments lacked popular legitimacy and support (Rubin and Hamidzada 2007). The Taliban insurgency remained active and continued to recruit new members in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Heroin production also continued at record levels. Economic growth slowed, with high unemployment increasing conflict. Governmental corruption was rampant. Meanwhile, electric services and other utilities were deemed inadequate. During the later years of the Bush administration, many in the region felt that Afghanistan was not a priority for US foreign policy (Rubin 2007). Afghanistan is almost completely dependent on foreign aid, but the orthodox development models promoted by the West are unlikely to be successful in the Afghanistan context characterized by continuous conflict and ineffective government (Goodhand and Sedra 2007). War on Terror objectives outweighed those of Afghan state-building that include the development of a security sector (Stapleton 2007). As a consequence, the Afghan government is commonly perceived as weak and illegitimate, with its ineffective police reform undercutting military gains made in the South and East (Stapleton 2007).

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The Bonn Agreement’s completion in 2005 led to the Compact for Afghanistan of 2006 between the Afghan government and 60 other donor countries. The framework for carrying out the Compact is called the Afghan National Development Strategy. This strategy attends to three areas: 1) security; 2) governance, the rule of law, and human rights; and 3) economic and social development (Murray 2007). At the expense of establishing civil security, however, police priorities have been focused on fighting terrorism, contending with various armed groups, and combating narcotics (Murray 2007). The EU has prioritized rural development, governance, and health for 2007–2013, and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office and the Instrument for Stability are funding projects concerning transitional justice and the rule of law (Gross 2009). Assessments within and outside the US are viewing the overall effort in Afghanistan more negatively as violence increases in areas previously thought secure, leading to an increase in both US military and Afghan civilian deaths (Katzman 2008). The US, particularly after President Obama took power, has continued to seek security improvements by attempting to expand the Afghan army, and rebuild tribal governance and security structures, while supporting Afghanistan’s efforts to convince the Taliban to stop fighting (Katzman 2008). Meanwhile, PRTs continue their activities, attempting to ‘bridge the gaps that frequently exist at provincial and district levels of government,’ since the Bonn process completed in 2005 (Stapleton 2007: 2). Nevertheless, there remains miscommunication and conflict between PRTs and other actors including the Afghan government. Although they are expected to assist with reconstruction and development by working with provincial and district governments, PRTs may be restricted by the larger political context in which donor countries are putting their own national agendas before creating a unified and coordinated process for Afghan development (Stapleton 2007). The US State Department has placed 30 advisors in the Afghan Interior Ministry to help build antinarcotics units, and has also trained almost 1,000 judges and other court officials via USAID (Katzman 2008). The Afghanistan Compact includes peace-building and counter-narcotic provisions, which may be too vague to provide a map for achieving stated goals (Giustozzi 2007; Goodhand and Sedra 2007). At the same time, the counter-narcotics police are believed to be too corrupt to be trusted in helping control the drug trade (Giustozzi 2007). The US remains the largest contributor of people and resources to the reform effort (Wilder 2007). Germany had remained a key player in

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the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) until 2007 when the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) of Afghanistan was launched (Gross 2009; Wilder 2007). The EUPOL approach broadens Germany’s philosophy to include strengthening the interior ministry and not just the police (Gross 2009). Unfortunately EUPOL has had various difficulties in their mission – staffing problems, disputes between the EU and NATO, equipment and staffing shortages, and the like (Gross 2009). German and American police training efforts had different and conflicting aims. While Germany emphasized future-oriented structural changes and strove to create a force concentrating on civilian law and order, US efforts focused on rapid training of the police (conducted by Dyncorp) in the areas of counterinsurgency activities, literacy, basic police work, and human rights in eight weeks (Gross 2009; Murray 2007; Wilder 2007). Other reform objectives consist of police restructuring (reducing the overpopulated senior officer positions), recruiting police through merit rather than through bribery or personal and factional loyalties, and raising pay in the hopes of retaining more officers and limiting corruption (Wilder 2007). The US Department of Defence’s Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a multinational military formation charged with reforming the Afghan military and police, controls US efforts for both the police and the Afghan National Army (ANA) (Wilder 2007). According to Katzman (2008: 39) there are now about 80,000 ANP members, though none of the units are considered ‘fully capable’ despite experiencing fewer attacks. The US military approach is currently attempting to address equipment shortages, increase ANP pay to make it approach that of the ANA, and place more ANP officers on the streets instead of just in the bureaucracy (Katzman 2008). The US is also engaging in a new ‘focused district development’ programme that concentrates on individual police districts which total approximately 340 (ten in each of 34 districts) (Katzman 2008: 39). Individual police officers are taken off of the street to be replaced by more experienced officers, and the officers are then retrained before being placed back on the street. Police training now provides instruction on human rights principles and democratic policing (Katzman 2008). Government and outside observers are also more closely monitoring the police to check for abuses, although one setback to this is that President Karzai allowed some recruits into the police leader ranks who did not pass merit exams, against the recommendation of the police reform committee (Katzman 2008). Over concerns about the security situation, President Karzai with the assistance of the US, is arming and training tribal militias to help out the police, even though the US initially feared that arming the militias would create rivals

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for the central government, arbitrary justice, and corruption (Katzman 2008). By 2009 the US had invested $6.2 billion in the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police (US Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) 2009). According to the GAO (2009), US agencies, the Afghan Ministry of the CSTC-A, and the US Department of State have been retraining Afghan National Police units through the Focus District Development (FDD) programme. The FDD attempts to contend with the district-level corruption that makes it difficult to retain individual officers. Defence status reports show ‘improvements’ in that 19% of FDD retrained units can carry out missions independently, and another 25% can do so with ‘outside support’ (GAO 2009: 1). Meanwhile, 31% can partially carry out missions with outside support, and 25% cannot carry out missions with or without support. The 2009 GAO report estimates that 1,500 additional CSTC-A members are necessary in order to expand the FDD retraining programmes. A shortage of banks and a lack of ANP cooperation limit efforts to ensure that ANP officers are properly paid (GAO 2009). The recruitment and training of female officers is another area of concern. The Ministry of the Interior has ostensibly made gender mainstreaming a priority, but little action has substantiated the rhetoric (Murray 2007). For example, only 180 of 63,000 police were women in 2006 (Wilder 2007). The international community has instigated some activities that have been add-ons to larger efforts. For example, in policing, the US helped create a family violence unit at a Kabul police station, and the Germans built a female residential facility at the police academy (Murray 2007). Canada, too, helped install a gender advisor at the Ministry of the Interior, while the Norwegian police helped train female police during in-service training. There exists little political will or support for the recruitment of female police officers, as less than 1% of the police in Afghanistan are women, and most of them were recruited before the end of the Taliban regime (Murray 2007). This under-representation is problematic because ‘Islamic practices inhibit policemen managing female complaints, victims, or suspects’ (Murray 2007: 116). Efforts to bring the security and stability necessary to bring hope to Afghanistan’s development face further challenges because of a resurgent Taliban that engages in guerrilla tactics in Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban have created shadow governments such as the one in rural Ghazni that runs schools, handles civil disputes in Islamic courts, and collects taxes (Chivers 2011). The internationally recognized Afghan government has not had a presence in Eastern Afghanistan since the American invasion, making it easy for the Taliban to establish or maintain

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deep roots. These shadow governments are created by local elites and villagers aid the Taliban fighters by providing intelligence, support, shelter, medical care, and a place to hide from US and other forces (Chivers 2011). Afghan police officers are thought to engage in arrangements with the Taliban whose fighters have been able to procure police ammunition and weapons, including the AMD-65. The recent 2010 surge of thousands of American troops by President Obama has failed to significantly change these conditions, and in the autumn 2010 elections in one Afghan parliamentary district, the Taliban were effective in preventing people from voting in that only three people voted out of over 110,000 potential voters (Chivers 2011). Efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people in Talibancontrolled areas have also failed, in part owing to the fact that US soldiers have engaged in war crimes by killing innocent civilians without cause. For example, ‘kill teams’ associated with Bravo company’s third platoon are known to have killed civilians and kept trophies of their killings such as fingers or part of a skull (Boal 2011). Demands by villagers for investigations fell on deaf ears until a whistle blower within the military forced the US authorities to do so. Such actions by the US military make it even less likely that the citizens of rural Afghanistan would switch loyalties from the Taliban or various warlords to the Karzai government and the US. The basic conditions needed for reform are not present, so many reform recommendations in the literature cited in this chapter are simply attempting to improve planning and coordination, and even then it is unclear whether these recommendations might create the conditionsfor long-term improvements. Some argue that future legal development efforts must build on local traditions and capacities with the help of international development and legal aid agencies (Ahmed 2005; Sedra 2004). Scholars have posited that reform should be locally planned, implemented and evaluated, and that better coordination is also needed between different donor governments, between donor governments and Afghanistan, and between different agencies such as NGOs and sub-national agencies and programmes (CITpax 2007; Sedra 2004). Others have recommended that local capacities must be enhanced, and women in particular need access to jobs, education, and genuine participation in the political process (BICC 2003; Sedra 2004). These recommendations of course stumble against the tension between the local and the global in terms of human rights. Locally-driven reforms themselves are unlikely to privilege or acknowledge women’s rights, but if diverse groups of men and women are able to take part in various processes and international development agencies have a genuine interest in rights promotion then the chances of ethnic minorities and women being able to participate in society as equals with the majority might increase.

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Donor governments also need to own up to their pledges to fund reform efforts. Goodhand and Sedra (2007: 59) have contended that donor countries needed to prioritize the need for a strong state in Afghanistan by emphasizing ‘aid for peace’ rather than ‘bribes for security’. Different donor agencies and countries should properly and fully fund their activities, coordinate their efforts better, and work with local leaders in order to improve the perceived legitimacy of the foreign presence in Afghanistan (Gross 2009; Jones 2006). The safety and support of the local population is obviously critical (Jones 2006). Drug lords in Afghanistan are well known and could be brought to justice, and police recruitment should be open and merit-based while offering adequate pay (CITpax 2007). Wilder (2007) recommends that the government and international donors develop a shared vision and strategy for the ANP within the context of an integrated and comprehensive rule of law strategy, prioritize quality over quantity in terms of the police, and ensure financial sustainability of the security sector. Koski (2009) calls for improvements in data collection, such as developing a national crime database and transparency in the evaluation of police reform efforts. Finally, Jones (2006) has argued that more Afghan military members and police officers are needed, as well as a peace treaty with the insurgency and warlords perhaps by way of giving amnesty to insurgents, who lay down their arms and replace warlord militias with Afghan soldiers and police, preferably through peaceful means.

Analytic summary Macro In the course of recent history in the context of the cold war and the ‘war on terror’ first Russia then the US have provided economic and political aid to Afghanistan, and have also invaded and occupied the country. Located in a strategic area of the geopolitical map, Afghanistan under the Taliban lent their support to the mass casualty attacks in the US, London, and Madrid. Because of war, instability, and meddling from foreign powers, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Legal, economic, and security sector reforms sponsored by foreign governments have not been appropriate for the Afghan context. Afghan cultural, religious and political customs are not considered adequately in reform efforts and the interests of donors such as fighting the Taliban hinder attempts to build legitimate democratic institutions. Police officers as well as citizens tend to be more loyal to their traditional regional or local leadership than to the central government, and the US has formed alliances with some warlords involved in human rights abuses, smuggling,

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and the heroin trade in order to help the US fight the Taliban. This situation is unlikely to change dramatically because the United States and other countries involved seem to plan on continuing the war against insurgent forces. The security situation is made that much more chaotic owing to a resurgent Taliban and a plethora of private security company activity. Meso Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium in the world. The opium trade constitutes a major part of the overall economy largely because of the disruption of the formal economic sector. Taking advantage of the economic and political instability, warlords make the drug trade and smuggling operations dominate life in many parts of the country. Ethnic loyalties and a fractured though well-established civil society coupled with high illiteracy and poverty make the establishment of democracy in Afghanistan unlikely. An active insurgency on top of all of these problems makes it next to impossible to develop a democratic police force or other elements of the security sector, even if Afghanistan displays many procedurally democratic dimensions that unfortunately largely exist on paper. The central government welcomes reform efforts, but regional powers within Afghanistan do not unless they strategically benefit from aid. Micro Afghan police training is woefully inadequate for creating an effective police force, in part because of a lack of coordination among countries providing the training and broken promises about the amount of aid to be provided. Sectarian and other loyalties limit the effectiveness of police training. These loyalties are also associated with police behaviours that threaten the objectives of the central government and/or the US and its allies. The police and local governments in general are often corrupt, and their loyalty to the state is often in question, torn between the national government, warlords, and the Taliban. Ethnic schisms cloud police recruitment and loyalties, with the police leadership largely consisting of Tajiks at the expense of Pashtuns. These ethnic schisms at the local level negatively affect police-community relations. Governmental corruption in general is systemic and dampens any prospects for a stable and accountable Afghanistan. Well-established civil society groups, particularly from the peripheral areas of the country, tend to resist the central government but lack unity.


Proof

5

Brazil

Country profile Brazil is the largest country in South America with over 200 million inhabitants; the population is 54% white, 39% multiracial, and 6% black, with the rest comprising Japanese, Amerindian, Arab and other groups (CIA 2011). In religious terms, citizens are mostly Catholic (74%) and Protestant (15%). Brazil became independent in 1822 after more than three centuries of colonization by Portugal. After being ruled primarily by monarchs and military regimes, the country became a full democracy in 1985 with a president, a bicameral legislature, numerous political parties, and a legal system that is based on Roman codes (CIA 2011). Brazil’s Human Development Index ranking is 84th out of 187 countries (UNDP 2011). GDP per capita is approximately $10,800 (CIA 2011). Policing from the beginning of the colonial period in 1500 until the early 1800s originated from public police assisting the military in territorial defence and private police overseeing plantations (Paes-Machado and Albuquerque 2002). As has been observed in other former colonies, Brazilian police brutality has its roots in the old colonial police system. The Portuguese royal court gave the colonial police largely unchecked discretion for containing slave revolts and public disorder (Hinton 2006). The formal police forces were first founded during the early 1800s to control local populations, and by 1831 the military police were established in Rio. Brazil was ruled under a monarchy until 1889, when a nominally democratic republic was built, though a military coup in 1930 produced a dictatorship headed by Getulio Vargas. After the coup, the first police academy in Brazil was established, and a civilian police force (the judiciary police) acted as ‘a secret political force against political adversaries of the dictatorial regime…’ (Paes-Machado and Albuquerque 2002: 62). For example, the 99

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civilian police formed death squads to execute delinquents and political opponents in the 1950s. After another coup overthrew a left-leaning government and replaced it with a military dictatorship in 1964, the police became incorporated into the military in order to help the military repress civilians and political opponents of the regime (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Dos Santos 2004; Hinton 2006). Within the context of the Cold War, the US trained the military police in anti-guerrilla tactics and armed them with heavy weapons (Huggins 1998; Paes-Machado and Albuquerque 2002; Motta 2010). The style of policing that emerged during periods of dictatorial rule continued during and after the transition to democracy (1979–1985) not only because the congressional lobby of the military police was able to thwart reform efforts but also because numerous politicians feared being accused of retaliation against the old military regime (Hinton 2006; PaesMachado and Albuquerque 2002). Even after military rule, the 1988 constitution retained the same civil and military police organizations that are organized at the state level and under the authority of the secretary of public security (Caldeira and Holston 1999). The military police are under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and engage in uniformed street patrols while the civil police wear civilian clothing and deal with administrative and judicial matters such as conducting investigations (Arias 2004; Caldeira and Holston 1999). The military police have a rigid hierarchical structure that is organized into battalions. The civilian police are less hierarchical in comparison to the military police, and are stationed in district stations as well as some units that specialize in certain types of offences including crimes against women and children (Husain 2007). The judiciary in Brazil emulates that of the United States, comprising federal appeals courts, a supreme court, and state courts (Winslow 2010b). These courts have been actively contending with violence among the poor and criminal gangs in the favelas and other impoverished areas, resulting in rapidly rising incarceration rates and overcrowded prisons (Wacquant 2003; Winslow 2010b). Owing to high rates of violence as well as residential segregation based on race, ethnic background and social class, wealthy residents living in the central parts of major cities such as Rio have spurred the privatization of security in Brazil by hiring private police and other forms of security to protect themselves.

Discussion Economic and political issues Brazil’s economic situation since independence has been quite volatile. The country experienced rapid urban growth from the 1950s into the

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Proof Brazil 101

1990s regardless of the regime in power, thanks to social changes, import substitution industrialization, large-scale agriculture, and natural population increase, and in spite of numerous anti-urban growth policies including attempts to remove the poor from the favelas and other slums, roadblocks, and other measures to prevent rural to urban migration (Rodriguez and Martine 2008). The military dictatorship expanded the industrial sector in the late 1960s and early 1970s when economic growth rose significantly (Hinton 2006). It also attempted to diversify its energy supply to take advantage of the economic boom, but by 1983 heavy borrowing, rising US interest rates, and a debt moratorium from Mexico caused a debt crisis, hyper-inflation and fiscal deficits (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Hinton 2006). Import substitution industrialization resulted in an over-burdened civil service that attempted to implement multiple economic programmes, regulations, and social welfare activities while operating inefficient public firms that could not compete on the global market (Bailey and Dammert 2006). Urban primacy developed in Brazil as it did in many other developing countries: by the late 1980s Sao Paulo was producing half of Brazil’s industrial output (Chevigny 1990). Because of its massive debt and need for capital inflows, Brazil was under massive pressure by creditors and powerful Western countries and interests to adopt the neoliberal austerity policies of the international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (Amann and Baer 2002). Multiple economic plans failed to stabilize the economy under President Sarney with high levels of debt continuing to be the norm. From the 1990s, Brazil continued to adopt policies of the Washington Consensus (Hinton 2006; Chapter 1 this volume). These policies included aggressive inflation reduction through fiscal adjustment, trade liberalization via reductions in tariff and non-tariff protection, privatization of state-owned industries and utilities, preference for market interest rates, opening up for foreign investment, and reduced control over the activities of foreign capital (Amann and Baer 2002). In 1993, the new finance minister, Henrique Cardoso, replaced the cruzeiro currency with the real, to reduce hyperinflation, and this launched him into the presidency in 1994 (Hinton 2006: 155). In 1995 Cardoso accelerated neoliberal policies by privatizing more sectors of the economy (utilities, oil, and transportation infrastructure) and by change the law to give foreign firms unfettered access to Brazilian markets (Amann and Baer 2002). Nevertheless, despite these substantial changes, Brazil continued to manage the privatization of industries with caution, and unlike other Latin American countries such as Argentina, kept key industries in state hands or carefully managed public-private partnerships to avoid full privatization (Hinton 2006).

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AU: CIA (2010) not in References. Pls. supply.

Overall, however, successive rounds of neoliberal reforms had negative consequences for the economy, crime rates, and inequality. For instance, economic growth slowed in the 1990s compared to the previous decade. Local firms lost market share to foreign firms, and this caused layoffs of local workers and a general increase in unemployment (Amann and Baer 2002). Cardoso’s Real plan did reduce inflation, increased incomes, and reduced the official poverty rate in the mid-1990s, though at the same time Brazil’s GINI coefficient remained largely unchanged throughout the decade and disparities in income continued to widen (Amann and Baer 2002). Brazil currently has the 13th greatest level of income inequality out of 140 countries (CIA 2010). High levels of crime (particularly violent crime) remained a major concern for a number of reasons: it reduced quality of life, negatively impacted the capacity of health services, disrupted economic growth and tourism, and maintained Brazil’s status as a quasidemocratic authoritarian state (Arias 2004; Hinton 2006). Indeed, Brazil is one of the South American countries that are contending with rising levels of crime (discussed below) at a time when many are also trying to break from their authoritarian, anti-democratic past (Hinton 2006). The country has made a gradual and negotiated transition from military rule to electoral democracy: while it has managed to hold regular and largely clean elections, challenges have lay in legislative and judicial government actions, financially starved state and local governments, unevenly protected civil liberties, and a relatively weak civil society (Bailey and Dammert 2006). These problems have led O’Donnell (1994) to characterize Brazil’s political system as a delegative democracy rather than a representative one. Delegative democracies develop when the newly democratized state faces socioeconomic problems caused by the economic and other legacies of colonialism and/or authoritarian rule, compounded by a shortage of international economic support for the new democracy (O’Donnell 1994). While the media and others can voice opposition to the government and a president’s policies, it is unlikely their voices will be heard or that their concerns will be addressed because there is no effective system of checks and balances within the political and constitutional system. In addition, presidential decisions can be made quickly because presidents have largely unchecked power. Caldeira and Holston (1999: 715) coined the term ‘disjunctive democratization’ to refer to the situation where citizens are able to vote in regularly scheduled elections and possess constitutional and socioeconomic rights, but in a context where the police and judicial systems are either unwilling or unable to protect or enforce such rights. The term may describe Brazil’s case in that the civil component of democracy involving civil rights, access to justice, judicial

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Proof Brazil 103

process, and the application of law has developed unevenly in the country. There has been little improvement in services provided in the favelas since ex-slaves and urban migrants established them around 100 years ago (Arias 2004). The state has interacted with the favelas typically via repression, police violence, and ‘clientelist vote seeking’ (Arias 2004: 2). As with the role of the old South African Police under apartheid (see Chapter 8), the Brazilian police under the military regime, prevented crime from spilling out of the favelas into other areas of cities, such as Rio de Janeiro, from the 1960s until the mid-1980s (Hinton 2006). In the 1980s, however, the government was powerless to suppress the mass rural to urban migration that bloated the favelas, leading to the explosion of the drug trade and drug related violence. While the democratization process was underway at that time, weak governmental institutions as well as a lack of agreement on what to do about the crisis left citizens fearful and distrustful toward the police (Hinton 2006). Various community-based organizations (CBOs) have emerged in the favelas because of weakened state capacity to provide essential and basic services in relation to health, public safety and education for example. Such organizations have the potential to advance local democratization efforts by combating corruption and mobilizing the poor in the democratic process. In places where the government is perceived by residents not to have solved social problems adequately, CBOs have sprouted and found ways to improve housing, transportation, literacy, and food availability (Danaher 2001). This phenomenon is in line with what McMichael (2004) calls the direct democracy movement, where a mix of neighbourhoods, small businesses and merchants, the middle class, workers, and the unemployed appropriate public spaces and maintain factory operations for the benefit of the public. However, while such organizations involving the poor can help bring about change, they can also become corrupt and often get fragmented and co-opted to the point that longterm effectiveness for sustainable political participation becomes extremely limited (Arias 2004). Crime and security sector issues Brazil is experiencing some of the most extreme crime, policing, and inequality problems in South America. According to the latest UN figures (UNDATA 2010) the homicide rate in Brazil is 21.9 per 100,000. The problems associated with policing Brazil’s vast border allows for an extensive international drug trade and has further deteriorated the public security situation. Crime, and violence associated with the drug trade in particular, increased

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dramatically during the democratic transition, disproportionately affecting urban areas and young males (Bailey and Dammert 2006). Homicide victimization is highest among those living in the poorest areas of Brazil’s cities, especially young (15–24) black males, who are seven times more likely to be murdered than all other age and racial groups combined (Huggins 2000). Poor police-community relations and inadequate democratic controls are partially responsible for increases in criminal activities such as prostitution, kidnapping, car theft, and other income-producing offences as well as police-led violence against citizens (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Hinton 2006). Passengers are reluctant to use public transportation for fear of frequent robberies on buses (Paes-Machado and Levenstein 2004). Upon transitioning to democracy, Rio’s Governor Brizola attempted to keep police out of the favelas to protect residents against their brutality. However, this seemed to benefit drug cartels that took advantage of the lack of a police presence. Currently, though, the police and military with mixed citizen support are working to clear certain slums in the favelas such as Rocinha and Vidigal of drug gangs ahead of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics (BBC 2011a). Historically the state has had a consistent disrespect for civil rights, particularly for the poor (Caldeira 2002). Citizens feel they cannot rely on the state to uphold civil liberties and human rights given the presence of a corrupt and ineffective judicial system that appears only to protect powerful criminals, the wealthy, and corporations while oppressing workers and the poor (Caldeira 2002; Caldeira and Holston 1999). Social movements advocating for poor and repressed populations traditionally have not sought the support of the courts when demanding better enforcement of social and economic right. Wealthy individuals and corporations can take advantage of complex laws that are difficult to enforce, and of procedural delays that can tie up cases indefinitely. The police in Brazil ought to be viewed in the context of a weak central state that has failed in its responsibilities as a sovereign government, corruption in local and regional politics, high income disparities, an escalating problem with violent crime and drugs, and a burgeoning private security sector for those that can afford it. In addition, low levels of citizen security and perceived police ineffectiveness and corruption have led to hundreds of authoritarian paramilitary style Autodefesas Comunitárias (citizen defence committees) emerging in poor urban areas to effectively take the law into their own hands and to deal with transgressors through a variety of extralegal punishments, such as shootings and beatings. Even with political liberalization the police in Brazil have not been transformed into a democratic or professional body, which is perhaps no surprise given their role in brutalizing citizens historically, regardless of

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Proof Brazil 105

changes in regimes (Husain 2007). Police have always been used to protect elite groups ‘for the purpose of containing deep social and political schisms’, and since 1930 with the beginning of the first police state (Estado Novo), they have been used to protect the state by targeting political opponents of the leadership (Hinton 2005: 94; Husain 2007). In a way, the police in Brazil currently face a dual crisis, one external and one internal (Dos Santos 2004). Externally, the police lack legitimacy to the public and the government appears unable to correct police ineffectiveness and inefficiencies. Internally, the police suffer from weak management and professional identity, and still lack ‘modern training methods, adequate pay scales, firm performance criteria, and a meritbased career path’ in order to resolve these major crises (Hinton 2005: 94). Institutional violence by the police has actually increased since the transition to democracy in Brazil (Clark 1999). There was no real discussion of the police role in a democratic society following the transition, and oversight tends to be from the top down and is not particularly effective. In the context where political patronage, little oversight, and inequality continue to shape the political behaviours of politicians, the police remain embroiled in politics by being closely linked with local governors and influencing law-makers in order to reduce oversight and avoid the prosecution of officers (Hinton 2006; Husain 2007). Brazilian citizens continue to mistrust the police even after the transition to democratic governance which has hampered reform efforts (Hinton 2006). This is important since establishing an element of trust is an AU: important perquisite in any reform effort (Goldsmith 2005). This mistrust 2005a/b? concerns both structural and performance-based aspects of policing. In Brazil, arbitrary police actions, police brutality, and racial discrimination are interrelated with officers making judgements about citizens simply on the basis of racial or ethnic origin (Brito 2003; Arruda 1999). Traditionally, the police in Brazil have been centralized, authoritarian and militarized in nature, with the police and the military continuing to be closely intertwined (Bailey and Dammert 2006; da Silva 1999; Huggins 1998). In many cities, a highly militarized form of policing is practiced simultaneously with what passes for community policing and this may explain why citizens do not feel any more secure or trustful of the police even if police-community contact has increased (Husain 2007). Paradoxically, however, upper-class city-dwellers in the larger cities are demanding that the police use increasingly militarized tactics in the favelas, suggesting that racial and class divisions undercut any attempts at police reform or enhancing their legitimacy in poor urban areas (da Silva 2000).

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Recruitment and training policies have not helped promote an accountable, professional, and citizen-oriented police service, either. There are various restrictions on who can be an officer in Brazil, for instance, as demonstrated by the fact that many indigenous people are excluded for not meeting minimum height standards (Verma 1999). This kind of restriction results in more positions for dominant racial and ethnic groups. Within the military police, officers tend to be white and educated whereas the rank and file tend to be non-white and from poorer social backgrounds (Brito 2003). In addition, training for the military police is similar to that provided for the army with recruits encouraged to use lethal force as a first resort when drawing a firearm and who are forced to participate in various hazing rituals which are often psychologically and physically damaging both for the trainers and recruits (Paes-Machado and Albuquerque 2002). Overall, there is little in the current training regimen of the Brazilian police that is broadly facilitative of a programme of democratic police reform (Husain 2007). The military and civilian police forces are antagonistic and mutually suspicious toward each other, with each subject to its own unique hierarchies, training, and recruitment policies (Caldeira and Holston 1999), but at the same time, both emphasizing hyper-masculine attributes such as toughness, the ability to brandish weapons, and displays of bravado (Dos Santos 2004). Suffering from resource deprivation and poor management, both organizations are corrupt and have fractured relations with the public. Police budgets are used mainly to purchase mobility and protective gear such as bullet-proof vests, radios, vehicles and firearms (Dos Santos 2004). Corruption is also endemic: Police officers will inform drug traffickers of police activity and make sure to set up patrols so they do not interfere with drug trafficking operations (Arias 2004). Because of their different roles, civilian and military police forces engage in different types of brutality and violence. The civilian police are more likely to torture suspects, given that obtaining confessions are often seen as more important than garnering evidence (Hinton 2006). The military police are more inclined to kill citizens via summary executions as indicated by the fact that the police account for a significant proportion of killings in Rio (as high as 25% of killings since the early 1990s) (Dos Santos 2004). Such summary executions of suspects by police are disproportionately committed against the black and poor, particularly those living in the favelas and are rarely investigated, much less prosecuted (Chevigny 1990). Astonishingly the police admitted killing 1,188 people for resisting arrest in 2008 (Anderson 2009). Police repression is possible in Brazil in part because fear of crime has legitimized police violence (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Chevigny 1990).

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Proof Brazil 107

This support for police violence exists among all social classes, paradoxically among the marginalized poor even though they bear the brunt of such violence. Citizens complain when police brutality happens to them, but they justify it when it happens to others who are considered criminals, closely echoing the narrative of political leaders (Paes Machado and Noronha 2002). This justification legitimizes brutality, especially against minority groups, and makes it difficult for individuals and groups to organize against police brutality (Caldeira and Holston 1999). More broadly, police violence can be seen as a symptom of the failure of other Brazilian institutions (Dos Santos 2004). Unlike the situation in many Western democracies, the police are not immediately identified with the rule of law in Brazil (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Instead of relying on the criminal justice system, citizens seek private forms of justice in a security market if they can afford it, and examples include vigilantism, support of death squads and police violence against suspects, walling or gating in neighbourhoods and shopping centres, installing electric fences and video cameras, and avoiding interacting with others in public (Caldeira and Holston 1999). It is thought that at least 600 private security companies exist in Brazil with about one million people working for them, many of which are clandestine (see Huggins 2000). Vigilante private security companies protect the wealthy and guard businesses from drunkards, the homeless, street children and others who are marginalized in society. Citizens that wall themselves off from the slums demonize those living in the favelas and other impoverished areas as criminals and non-citizens, further justifying vigilante activities (Huggins 2000). One feature of policing in Brazil, and in many Latin American countries more generally, has been the participation of the police and military units in ‘death squads’ (Huggins 1998). Death squad activity began in the 1950s when business owners complained of robberies and thefts, and today small business owners and private citizens continue to hire death squads to kill thieves, protect businesses, or to undertake contract ‘hits’ (Chevigny 1990; Huggins 2000). The proliferation of private security and death squads may occur when citizens largely lack confidence in the state to reduce crime (Hinton 2006; Huggins 1997). While both the civil police and military police have participated in death squad activity, the military police are subject to laxer forms of accountability and oversight and come under the jurisdiction of military law, which is more difficult to prosecute since the perpetrators are tried in a military court (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Even though Brazil’s government is nominally democratic, the military controls much of its police, allowing abuse of its citizens to occur without much governmental resistance (Caldeira and Holson 1999;

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Huggins 1997). Under such conditions, abuses and other crimes by the military police are generally shielded from effective oversight, and are therefore, likely to escalate (see Huggins 2000). Foreign and national security sector reform efforts Given the consistent problems with crime and violence in Brazil, politicians have been quick to import Western police strategies and foreign expertise (Hinton 2006). Huggins (1998) suggests that the repressive nature of Brazil’s police has been partially guided by US-based foreign police training that has made the police more repressive rather than more democratic. The US has been militarily involved in Latin America since the beginning of the 20th century and has also helped establish national police systems in Central America and the Caribbean (Motta 2010). Specifically, from the 1970s and under the aegis of modernization, foreign police training was used to promote specific US national security political interests and objectives, solidifying US hegemony of the Americas by preventing communist insurgencies. To prevent Soviet influence in Latin America, The US employed a strategy of increasing foreign aid for capitalist economic development such as President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress (see Chapter 2), which considerably benefitted US-based multinationals and led to criticism that the Alliance created economic dependency and capital flight (see Scheman 1988). In addition, the notorious School of the Americas trained military leaders of various Latin American countries, and its numerous graduates committed atrocities back in their home countries. It is plausible to hypothesize that the amount of foreign aid provided by the US is positively correlated with more brutal and less democratic police forces among the countries receiving the aid. In the name of professionalization, US assistance militarized the police ‘inculcating a war model of social control’ (Huggins 1998: 7). Official statements from the US government claim that police assistance which started in 1957 was guided by civil police professionals through organizations such as USAID and its Office of Public Safety (OPS), transferring knowledge and skills about police work in order for the Brazilian police to professionalize, but in reality US assistance was guided by political objectives, with most trainers coming from the US military or national security agencies (Huggins 1998; Motta 2010). Military models of control were taught more than civilian ones, such as the paramilitary and anti-guerrilla tactics taught by US military academies (Paes-Machado and Albuquerque 2002). With US assistance, the Brazilian governments before and after democratization created ‘sophisticated internal security bureaucracies’, consisting of the police and intelligence agencies (Huggins 1997: 208). The

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Proof Brazil 109

primary objective of police training was to monitor Brazil’s internal political threats to US interests or to US friendly Brazilian regimes justified by Cold War rhetoric and ideology. Various new police and other internal security agencies were created, and the police were placed under military control so that they were closely linked with the government ultimately under the influence of US foreign policy objectives, but particularly concerns about the growth of communism in the region (Huggins 1998; Motta 2010). For example, after the military coup that deposed President Goulart, the US Office of Public Safety (OPS) provided police trainees to the notorious Brazilian IPM, a military police unit committee used to violently investigate and ‘neutralize supporters’ of the removed president (Huggins 1998: 123). As we saw in Chapter 2 the US supported many Latin American regimes, including Brazil, since drawing upon modernization theory it was believed that capitalist development, even under a military regime, was better than no development at all, and would in any case create the conditions for democracy to emerge (Huggins 1998). By training police and helping shape political processes that place Brazil as a subordinate player in the geopolitical system, the US has contributed in many ways to Brazil’s current malady. Not only has the autonomy of central government been weakened relative to the military – as has also been the case in Turkey (see Chapter 10). Local political participation and other democratic behaviours by citizens have also been affected since historically such activities were often clamped down upon hard by the police and security agencies who saw them as potentially threatening to regime survival (Motta 2010). NGOs, churches, academia, and other groups criticized the OPS into the early 1970s, culminating in US Senate hearings. USAID eventually closed the OPS in Brazil in 1972, but from 1959 until that time, OPS trained around 100,000 police officers and spent more than $40 million in current US dollars on ‘internal security assistance and technologies’ (Huggins 1998: 191; Motta 2010). More recently, Brazil has taken both hard and soft policing approaches from the United States. In terms of hard approaches, the country has taken on the zero-tolerance ideology of policing attributed to the broken windows policies of Bratton and Guiliani seen erroneously by many in the US as a practice that is effective and efficient (Harcourt 2001). While this policy has been found not to be as efficient or effective in the US, as its proponents predict, exporting it to Brazil and other countries could be quite disastrous: income and wealth inequality in the country is even greater that of the US, violence is more associated with the history and economy of Brazil than the US, the police are a major source of violence in Brazil, and its court system cannot guarantee due process and other

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democratic rights (Wacquant 2003). Thus, the criminal justice system can further brutalize and penalize the poor in the name of democracy. In the late 1990s the Ministry of Justice of Brazil attempted to improve police effectiveness and adherence to human rights at the federal level by proposing many minor reforms that sounded major in their rhetoric (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Dos Santos 2004; Hinton 2006; Husain 2007). These proposed reforms included strengthening of federal police forces, attempts to improve training and federal-state cooperation in law enforcement, and creating various agencies to improve management and transparency. Other reforms included controlling private security forces, implementing community policing among the military police, building model stations for the civilian police, strengthening training in both human rights and weapons, and the creation of civilian oversight bodies. The Brazilian Congress rejected many of these proposals partly because the military police and the state administrations both opposed them over the loss of control to the federal level (Dos Santos 2004). Most of the laws that have been passed involve get-tough policies such as strengthening the federal police structure to combat drug and arms trafficking, and strengthening the penal system (Dos Santos 2004). These activities have been observed in other recently democratic governments such as Hungary and South Africa, which have actually increased coercive state powers including the ability to detain suspects longer, to search and seize property, and to conduct undercover surveillance (Stone and Ward 2000). There was a national human rights plan during Collor’s administration (1992–1995) that proposed over 200 measures, hastily put together with design flaws, which were launched in the aftermath of political scandals (Hinton 2006). For example, dozens of clauses were not legally binding, and state governors could decide whether or not to implement them. Other reforms that were implemented often occurred at the state level and included the establishment of community policing in various parts of Brazil as well as cleaning up and professionalizing civilian police stations, the creation of model stations for the civilian police, various attempts at oversight, purging the police of corrupt officers, an anti-drug programme similar to the notorious DARE programme in the US,1 and purchasing new equipment such as police vehicles (Hinton 2006; Husain 2007). Community policing was attempted in numerous major cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Espirito Santo (Husain 2007). For example, in Sao Paulo, the Centre for the Study of Violence at the University of Sao Paulo instigated an exchange programme in 1996 to implement community policing between the military police there and the Canadian Royal Mounted Police throughout the entire state of Sao Paulo,

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Proof Brazil 111

and the state of Minas Gerais established an exchange programme with police in Texas. As in many other countries it has been tried, however, community policing has been implanted differently in each area and only in certain parts of the cities where it was established. In addition, the police were not trained for it adequately (Husain 2007). Various efforts at oversight have also been attempted, with varying success. In the late 1990s, the state of Rio de Janeiro established a judicial ombudsman of the police to rule on citizen complaints against both civilian and military police, with only about 7% of cases resulting in convictions and no convicted officers spending time in jail or being removed from the police force (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Military courts and police internal oversight bodies have promoted authoritarian attitudes and behaviours among the police by largely failing to prosecute and punish police abuses (Macaulay 2002). Despite various attempts at external oversight of the police such as police advisory councils in Sao Paulo, internal police practices filter out cases before they reach independent bodies, and local politicians can also inhibit action (Macaulay 2002). At the same time, public ministers in charge of prosecutions are generally allied with the police, weakening the possibility for proper oversight. Parliamentary investigative committees were created by the federal and several state governments in the late 1990s to investigate drug trafficking, organized crime, and judicial corruption (Caldeira and Holston 1999). Having broad powers such as viewing phone and other records, the ability to subpoena witnesses, and broad public and media support after exposing corruption and investigating organized crime, many in the judiciary resisted and refused to cooperate, greatly weakening the effectiveness of the investigative committees. After soft approaches such as those just mentioned above were applied in Rio, Governor Alencar attempted some harder approaches in the late 1990s that included sending the army to patrol the favelas. This, however, merely resulted in a massive increase in the number of civilians killed by the military police (Hinton 2006). Many of the aforementioned reforms, largely inspired by practices from the US, were seen as failures by observers for a number of reasons: reforms were hastily put together and poorly implemented, did not seek systemic change, and occasionally had contradictory goals (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Hinton 2006; Husain 2007; Macaulay 2002). Hinton (2006) argues that these reforms at the state level failed also because of a culture of corruption, lack of accountability, chaotic and destructive competition, and political interest. Police policies would change on a regular basis, and new policing methods such as community policing and model stations would be implemented without regard to

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previous practices, creating unrealistic expectations for changes in police behaviour. State governors are constitutionally mandated to oversee the police, but reforms that were enacted would not last long because politicians would change loyalties, parties, and causes with frequent abandon if their popularity appeared to be slipping (Hinton 2006). These politicians were also quick to demand army interventions to reduce gang violence based on the argument that the states could not solve public security problems on their own. These contradictory messages also thwarted chances for systemic and sustainable change. The messages coming from politicians were also mixed: The police were told at different points by political leaders either to treat suspects harshly and to raid favelas or to respect human rights and to cease using force (Hinton 2006). As violence stemming from the drug trade intensified, politicians in Brazil, regardless of regime, implemented superficial reforms over time while taking political advantage of the security situation and the police (Hinton 2006). It was easier for politicians to take advantage of ineffective, poorly paid, and demoralized police forces by co-opting and bribing them instead of wrecking established networks and making genuine attempts to reduce corruption (Hinton 2006). When public security problems persisted, the same politicians would scapegoat the police, generating understandable resentment. Under internal pressure to repressively go after crime, and still training its police to use aggressive and repressive tactics, Brazil also faces external pressure to adhere to human rights standards. Brazil therefore needs to balance its human rights needs with security needs. Mendes et al (1999) point out, however, ‘the attempt to convince police forces in countries such as Brazil of the value of democratic policing is not helped by recent moves in the US and Canada to backtrack on commitments to such a form of policing’ (p. 10). Other fledging democracies in Latin America with large socioeconomic disparities and high rates of violent crime might decide that democratic policing is not feasible if the experiments in Brazil fail (Mendes et al 1999). It is important to take into account other considerations. For example, institutional reforms and popular mobilization are crucial in democratizing institutions and processes, and as Arias (2004) found in his study of violent favelas in Brazil, the building of social capital via networking and trust is essential for long-term success. Successful efforts involved networking beyond one’s own favela and maintaining constant communication when others such as criminals or the police attempt to thwart progress (Arias 2004). Efforts to reduce police brutality would likely need to work on not only the police institution and culture that promotes it

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Proof Brazil 113

but also the attitudes of citizens who see marginalized groups as deserving of the abuse they suffer (Caldeira and Holston 1999). NGO involvement appears to increase the likelihood that human rights abuses are prosecuted (Human Rights Watch 1997), and various South American countries have already formed a network to control firearms. In Rio, various NGOs including Amnesty International have helped place firearm control on the political agenda in Brazil with modest reductions in gun deaths in the mid-1990s (Husain 2007). Yet, gun crime and violence remain high, and the public still lives in fear, proliferating further gun ownership.

Analytic summary Macro Brazil experienced the tendencies and pressures of the global economy similarly to many other South American states, undergoing import substitution industrialization and large-scale agriculture followed by debt and austerity measures imposed by the IMF. Economic policies based on the Washington consensus have been maintained even into Lula da Silva’s administration, and they resulted in high economic and residential inequality. The police in Brazil remain closely tied to the military, which shields officers from accountability by conducting its own investigations regarding police corruption and other abuses. Police training conducted by the United States was geared toward eliminating perceived internal threats to US interests, such as leftist political movements that resisted the Washington Consensus, neoliberal globalization within the context of the Cold War, and the ‘War on Drugs’. The US training of the police in a militaristic rather than civilian fashion helped form death squads and maintain the militarized and violent nature of the police. Meso Different branches of the government and politicians do not cooperate well, enacting minor reforms without altering the systemic nature of social, economic, political, and other problems. Perhaps because Brazil’s democracy could be characterized as a delegative democracy rather than a representative one, civil society does not have the strength to force systemic change and must play a mediating role between citizens, gangs, the police, and government. Although the civilian and military police have different subcultures, both abuse the human rights of citizens in various ways. While citizens do not like police abuses, they tend to be tolerant when abuses happen to others thought to be criminals, or minorities. Private businesses and other citizens have at times supported death squads often staffed by

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police officers, and the wealthy have made use of private policing while the poor face abuse from the public police who aggressively target criminal gangs. Micro While economic growth is robust in Brazil, the unequal distribution of benefits from growth contributes to the expansion of the favelas dominated by an illicit informal economy that criminal gangs control. Residents in the favelas and other impoverished areas live in substandard conditions and are in constant fear of violence from both criminal gangs and the police. Class and racial antagonisms negatively affect blacks and the poor, who are most likely to be murdered by other citizens as well as the police. Many Brazilian civilians see the government as corrupt and ineffective, and the police as notoriously corrupt and abusive. Police training is conducted in a way that makes police more rather than less likely to engage in abusive behaviours. Government officials provide conflicting messages to the police when it comes to responding to crime: sometimes the police are directed to aggressively root out crime in shantytowns while at other times the police are told not to use aggressive tactics. The government rarely acts on violations of human rights by the security sector, military courts hear military police abuse cases, and civil society and other social movements do not seek legal remedies to improve police adherence to civil rights owing to the perception that the courts are a venue that only benefits the wealthy and powerful.


Proof

6

Iraq

Country profile Mesopotamia (now modern Iraq) was historically part of the Ottoman Empire and was ruled as a set of three regions until the end of World War I, with the UK assuming control of modern Iraq as mandated by the League of Nations (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). The UK established the first Iraqi police academy in 1914 and a police college in 1947 to create a police force with a military-style chain of command (see Pfaff 2008). Iraq became independent in 1932 and was ruled by the Hashemite monarchy until 1958 (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). During Hashemite rule, Kurds, Shi’ia groups and mullahs fought against the monarchy and its British supporters (Rathmell 2005), and in 1958, the Iraqi military staged a coup whereby Prime Minister Qassem established a left-leaning republic that was friendly to the Soviet Union (Arabic Media 2003; Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Qassem was assassinated in 1963, and the military installed another government under the Ba’ath party. In only nine months, however, the government was deposed in a coup, resulting in leadership changes until the Ba’ath party regained power in 1968 (Arabic Media 2003). Saddam Hussein slowly gained power and took control of the country in 1979. The Revolutionary Command Council led by Hussein was comprised mainly of Sunnis, and the Ba’ath party controlled all government institutions in such a way that state structures fully supported dictatorial rule (Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Perito 2004). Hussein maintained power by concentrating decision-making among family, close acquaintances, and tribal members, and ‘skilfully balanced competing forces within the country, playing on ethnic and religious rivalries and using co-optation and financial inducements’ (Perito 2004: 299). The population of Iraq is thought to be in the region of 23 million, though it is difficult to ascertain with any accuracy due to factors associated with 115

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violent conflict, kidnappings, population displacement and emigration out of the country (Cordesman 2008). Given assessments from various sources, Iraq is mostly Arab, but 15 to 20% are Kurdish and another 3% are Turcoman, Assyrian or other. Religiously, the country is around twothirds Sunni and one-third Shi’ia, with a very small percentage (roughly 3%) being Christian or other. Macroeconomic data including employment figures lack credibility, but according to the UNDP (2011) Iraq ranks 132nd out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index. GDP per capita is estimated to be $3,800 (CIA 2011). Under Hussein, various overlapping security services, including the Republican Guard (an elite military unit) and the Mukhabarat (the Iraqi intelligence service), were in charge of security, intelligence, serious criminal offences, surveillance of workers and universities, and the protection of Iraqi leaders (Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Lefebvre 2003). The Mukhabarat constituted a particularly important security and intelligence arm with its roots in the Jihaz al Khas secret police, which were under Hussein’s control from 1964 to 1966 (Lefebvre 2003). In addition to engaging in foreign spying and analysing intelligence on Iran provided by the CIA, the Mukhabarat not only engaged in surveillance of NGOs and Iraqi state agencies, including the army and police, but also suppressed Kurdish and Shi’ia uprisings, committing torture, assassinations and massacres of opponents of the Hussein regime both at home and abroad (Lefebvre 2003; Perito 2004). Another civilian security organization employed to preserve rule was the Special Security Directorate, made up of the Presidential and Palace Guard and the Republican Guard, which had members of Hussein’s Tikriti clan and was under the control of Saddam Hussein’s son, Qusay (Perito 2004). These units protected the president and his palaces, and also helped hide weapons programmes and smuggle technologies and other goods in defiance of the UN embargo (from 1990). Meanwhile, the General Security Directorate concentrated on internal security matters including but not limited to chilling dissent and monitoring citizens, whereas the Baath Party Security Agency that performed similar activities dealt with universities, factories, and trade unions (Perito 2004). The Iraqi National Police (INP) under Hussein were under military control, trained in police academies, and engaged in basic law enforcement duties such as traffic and other less serious offences, referring serious crimes to the security services (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Originally established with the aid of British advisers, INP history stretches back to the Monarchy (Perito 2004). Prior to Hussein’s rule, the INP had members from all ethnic and religious groups and generally were viewed by the

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Proof Iraq 117

public as being professional and honest (Perito 2004). Under Hussein, however, the INP were undervalued, underpaid (about $5 a month), underequipped, and under-resourced, and such working conditions motivated the police to supplement their income by way of corruption. These civilian police were also undisciplined, corrupt, repressive, and not particularly well developed under Hussein’s Ba’ath party rule, in part due to the fact that the security services rather than the police took charge of security (Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Moss 2006; Perito 2004). The US provided Iraq with aid during the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) but in 1990 a US-led coalition attacked Iraq after Hussein’s regime invaded Kuwait. Prior to the 2003 invasion, the US left Hussein in power but the international community led by the US crippled Iraq’s autonomy with UN sanctions, weapons inspections, and no fly zones. After the US/UK coalition invasion in 2003, the US first established the Office of Reconstruction Assistance (ORA), soon followed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which handed over governance to an Iraqi interim government in 2004. Elections were held, and in the following year a constitution was drafted and the present Iraqi national government was established in 2006. Iraq now has a national police under the leadership of the Ministry of National Security, but the force has been heavily infiltrated by private militia and insurgent groups and officers who served in Hussein’s secret police and security services. The police are typically viewed as ineffective, unreliable, and corrupt, and faced with competition from the private policing sector available in the form of security contractors, insurgent militias, and militias that are supported by government ministries and their officials. The country’s legal system is based on a combination of European civil and Islamic law (CIA 2011d), and the expanded correctional system is often used for arbitrary detention (Winslow 2010c). In 2003 the peak prison population reached around 10,000, but by August of 2007 23,000 prisoners were in US custody and 37,000 in Iraqi custody (Brookings Institution 2007).

Discussion Economic and political issues Failed agrarian reforms dominated Iraq’s economic history during most of the 20th century, but by Saddam Hussein’s rule (1979–2003) higher oil prices helped develop an indigenous middle class (Baali 1969; International Crisis Group 2002). Hussein established a state-controlled economy with a distribution of wealth that favoured Sunnis over Shi’ites and Kurds. Following the introduction of sanctions and the UN Oil-for-Food

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programme in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 the state was considerably weakened but was still able to trade on the illegal market, keeping the population dependent on the regime (International Crisis Group 2002; Perito 2004). The US and its coalition allies including the UK invaded and occupied the country in 2003, attempting to nation-build through direct governance and without an international mandate in an increasingly unstable security situation (Rathmell 2005). Besides rebuilding the security sector of Iraq, the CPA needed to strengthen the economy and establish a representative government that was able to provide basic services (Slocobme 2004). Unfortunately, the CPA had human resources issues. In particular, it lacked competent middle managers and Arab language speakers, and had a high staff turnover (Dobbins 2009). Management proved challenging because of communication, turf and coordination problems among the CPA, the military, the State Department, the White House, and other agencies (Dobbins 2009; Rathmell 2005). When Paul Bremmer, the head of the CPA, arrived, he immediately fired approximately 30,000 senior Ba’ath party government workers as well as dissolved the Iraqi army with the support of Shi’ia and Kurdish groups (Dobbins 2009). In this process, no effort was made up front to compensate many of the disbanded soldiers or to help them transition into civilian life. Consequently many demobilized military personnel joined the insurgency providing it both with arms and technical know how. After taking power the CPA found that Iraq’s infrastructure for water and electricity, health, and education systems were in disarray owing to the combined effects of violence, economic sanctions and the corruption and mismanagement of the Hussein regime (Dobbins 2009). Once the CPA began the tentative process of governing Iraq, retail sales grew, a national currency was unveiled, and some food distribution and income subsidy programmes were implemented (Slocombe 2004). By 2004 basic utilities (electricity and water) and services such as communications, education, healthcare, and transportation were considered have been at above pre-war levels, though insurgent attacks and overuse led to blackouts (Slocombe 2004). One year after the CPA took control, economic growth showed signs of improving thanks to a host of factors including a new currency, policies that curbed inflation, banking industry reforms, lowered tariffs, expanded liquidity, and stimulated consumer demand (see Dobbins 2009). This was short lived, however. By the end of 2007 unemployment was estimated at anywhere between 25 and 40%, and to this day the electrical grid can only supply a few hours of power per day (Brookings Institution 2007; Reuters 2011).

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Proof Iraq 119

Prior to the invasion, US officials did not acquire a detailed knowledge of Iraqi society and its powerful ethnic, religious and tribal affiliations that affected the power structure and politics. Crane and Terrill (2003) from the US Army War College wrote a strategic report around the time of the invasion (which was apparently ignored in post-war planning) that foresaw the problems the US would encounter in Iraq during post-conflict reconstruction efforts: 1) previous US Army failures to plan and strategize in post-conflict situations, 2) tribal, sectarian, and religious divides in Iraq that can spill into civil war, 3) the difficulties of reorganizing and reorienting the military and police into democracy-supporting institutions, 4) the years of sanctions that crippled Iraq’s economy and made it dependent on the UN Oil-for-Food programme, and 5) the perceived need for a lengthy US commitment that would likely increase local resentment. In sum, economic insecurity and sectarian conflict have inhibited local and foreign economic investment and further fractured the political system along ethnic and sectarian lines. These events have undoubtedly impacted upon security sector reform endeavours and police behaviour, as we shall see below. Crime and security sector issues Following the 2003 invasion, Iraqi security and intelligence officers engaged in a scorched-earth policy that took the form of property destruction, looting, and other offences (Bayley and Perito 2010). While US military forces protected the Petroleum Ministry and the Palestine Hotel that housed foreign journalists, they did nothing while looters tore through Baghdad’s other government buildings, commercial districts, residences of former regime officials, and the National Museum of Antiquities where Babylonian, Sumerian, and Assyrian artefacts were stolen or destroyed (Perito 2004). A wide variety of criminal activities and the expansion of an underground economy were made easy after the weakening of security and shortages of police officers, who proved incapable of contending with gangs of unemployed youth who roamed the streets, organized criminals and their myriad networks, looting, including the looting of banks, kidnappings, and trafficking in drugs, oil, and copper (see Looney 2005). A diverse set of insurgent groups are also operating for financial gain and compete for power via attacks on infrastructure, looting, smuggling, and kidnappings in order to fund their activities (Looney 2005). The insurgency represents an armed campaign that utilizes some aspects of guerrilla warfare, comprising different groups with varied size, interests, and methods of resistance (Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Slocombe 2004). For example, the insurgency includes indigenous Sunni groups such as the

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Ansar al-Islam organization that were not loyal to Hussein, ‘Ba’athist sympathizers of Saddam Hussein, Sunni extremists, foreign Islamist fighters, including members of al-Qaeda and the group surrounding the now slain militant leader Abu Musab al-Aarqawi…as well as criminal groups that lack political-ideological motivations’ (Deflem and Sutphin 2006: 272–273; Slocombe 2004). In order to fight insurgents the CPA had to create a new force from scratch (the Iraq Civil Defence Corp, or ICDC) since the CPA had previously disbanded the Iraqi army, but the loyalty of ICDC members was in doubt because some members were recruited locally and lived at home, making them susceptible to infiltration by resistance groups, and US officials hired former police under the Hussein regime to fight insurgents, some of whom were accused of participating in death squads (Clawson 2004; Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Laipson 2007; Moss 2006). Numerous problems plague efforts to reconstruct the Iraqi police. Familial, ethnic, and sectarian loyalties are reflected in police recruitment policies, leading to weakened police loyalty to the central government, increased strains between the central and provincial governments, and increases in police violence against citizens and the abuse of suspects (see Barak 2007; Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Moss 2006; and Pfaff 2008). These loyalties also significantly reduce the chances that police are disciplined for corruption and other crimes (Moss 2006; Pfaff 2008). In addition, the police are primary targets of insurgent groups, and criminal gangs, death squads, and militias run by various religious and sectarian leaders prevent the police from having a monopoly of force in Iraq (August 2010; Moss 2006; Pfaff 2008). The same four factors preventing legitimate and accountable policing in divided societies identified by Weitzer (1985) are present in Iraq: 1) political violence, 2) militarization of the police to fill a void left by an overwhelmed military, 3) police resistance to fighting insurgents and other military-oriented activities, and 4) community polarization in the form of ethnic and sectarian conflict. There are other factors negatively affecting police reform in Iraq, however, including economic insecurity, budgeting problems, recruitment and training failures, the presence of unaccountable private security forces, and an underprepared and delegitimized US and UK occupation and response to these problems. One significant result of these developments is that security in Iraq ‘has a strong physical and exclusionary dimension’ (Hills 2010: 317). Militias provide security more effectively than state agents, but only through a process of domination and exclusion for the purposes of short-term gain based on sectarian or tribal interests, which in turn lead to the ghettoization of security whereby specific groups are secure only in specific areas’

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Proof Iraq 121

(Hills 2010: 301). Even if provided with adequate training and equipment, police would find it difficult to be ethical and accountable because of the more general breakdown in social order following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (see Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Foreign and national security sector reform efforts Police and military reforms in Iraq must be couched within the context of the commercial and strategic goals of the US occupation based upon an aggressive neoliberal philosophy ‘…which brought a new climate of unilateralism and militarism to the long-standing American project of making the world safe for international capitalism under the aegis of an American hegemon’ (Michalowski and Kramer 2005: 446; also see Davies 2007). The US-UK coalition war against Iraq and the occupation that followed violate numerous international laws (Michalowski and Kramer 2005; Whyte 2007). For example, the invasion violated the UN Charter Article 2(4) by engaging in aggressive war without UN authorization despite unsubstantiated coalition claims of humanitarian intervention and potential threats of terrorism from Hussein’s government. The coalition also violated international humanitarian law by failing to protect citizens and their human rights during and after the invasion (thousands of civilians were killed by the actions of coalition forces), conducting torture and other abuses of prisoners, as well as radically altering Iraq’s economic system. In addition, state-corporate crime was rampant in that the CPA suspended the rule of law by granting US and other foreign missions and contractors immunity from prosecution in Iraq and obfuscating attempts to uncover how Iraqi oil revenues were spent and distributed. As Whyte (2007: 177) suggests, ‘The scale and intensity of the appropriation of Iraqi oil revenue makes the 2003 invasion one of the most audacious and spectacular crimes of theft in modern history.’ Immediately after the invasion, the US initially created the Office of Reconstruction Assistance (ORHA) directed by General Garner of the US military to start post-war planning (Cordesman 2006; Perito 2004). USAID started working to increasingly privatize the economy by promoting micro-financing of local businesses and making attempts to spur agribusiness activity, and their National Capacity Building Program seeks to improve the qualifications for and skills of civil servants by supposedly engaging in ‘training the trainers’ approaches where Iraqis are trained to instruct other Iraqis. USAID also has a community action programme to work on improving various services including school infrastructure, literacy, and water and sewage quality. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance within USAID provides humanitarian aid such as shelter and

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food for internally displaced populations. Provincial Reconstruction Teams work with local leaders and NGOs to carry out many of the above activities. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replaced the OHRA starting in April of 2003 and attempted to improve the Iraqi security sector by creating the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which works with Coalition military forces (Slocombe 2004). The Iraqi armed forces were operating relatively independently from the ICDC, however. Members of the Corps were recruited locally and operated in their own communities, receiving a few weeks of training followed by more training on the job, with the hope that they would eventually become the Iraqi National Guard under the Ministry of Defence (Slocombe 2004). Other trainings included that of conventional forces, the Facilities Protection Corps (security guards), and specialized security groups such as border patrol and infrastructure security (oil, electricity, and transportation). The UK has also been involved in security sector reform and developed a national policing policy in Iraq via the Home Office, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, while placing a concentrated effort on what was called the Multi-National Division (South-East) (MND(SE)), which is a British commanded division responsible for security in the South-East of Iraq (Flanagan 2006). In particular, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has participated in training Iraqi police, and the British military works with CIVPOL (an international civilian police group), CPATT, the British Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPC), and the Italian Carabinieri in the MND(SE) to train police as part of the Southern Iraq IPS Transition Plan. The Joint International Police Training Center (JIPTC) in the country of Jordan coordinates the overall police training regimen, while CPATT and the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission of Iraq (EUJUST LEX) has engaged in legal reform and judicial training (Flanagan 2006). Prominent neoconservatives ignored warnings of US intelligence agencies and officials such as O’Niell (2003) and assumed that internal security and stability as well as most of the existing government could be maintained and that the country would be able to carry out independent development thanks to its oil wealth (Cordesman 2006). US decisions regarding the invasion and reconstruction did not involve the normal interagency process, the US military failed to prepare for a formidable insurgency, and US officials relied too heavily on the views of exile groups that lacked local legitimacy (Cordesman 2006; Perito 2004).

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Proof Iraq 123

Cordesman (2006) and Perito (2004) have also criticized USAID’s activities in Iraq on a number of grounds. First, The State Department, USAID, the Department of Defence (DOD), and other agencies in the US government appear to lack the skilled staff needed to properly administer aid for nation-building and working with corrupt and inexperienced contractors. The Bush administration seemed uninterested in developing non-military capacities to contend with post-conflict security. Second, there is a continued failure to develop a plan for restructuring the police, military and other security forces, especially after formally dissolving the Iraqi military with no initial effort to replace it. Third, the strength of the insurgency was underestimated and its roots and complexity were not understood adequately, and all of this led to a lack of comprehensive plans for transforming Iraq’s government, economy, or reconstruction. In early 2003 it was quite apparent that ‘planning for post-Saddam Iraq was still very much a work in process’ (Perito 2004: 305). Fourth, there was limited coordination between US agencies, the ORHA and CPA, coalition allies of the US, and Iraqi leaders. Finally, the CPA relied on hiring shortterm politically appointed staff rather than hiring staff based on merit or experience (Cordesman 2006; Perito 2004). The US decision to disband the Ba’ath Party (comprised of Sunnis) and the Iraqi Army has had lasting implications (Barak 2007). Traditionally the minority Sunni community dominated social, political and military institutions in Iraq and assumed key leadership roles. However, following the invasion the removal of the leadership class and the effective abolishment of its security sector (including 350,000 members of the military who lost income and pensions) created a power vacuum that led to an ‘inter-communal security dilemma’, making governance agreements between Sunnis, Shi’is and Kurds nearly impossible (Barak 2007: 459). Many in the Ba’ath party were members for instrumental reasons only, so disbanding the party in its entirety created enemies out of potential allies (Barak 2007). Other existing political parties and returning exiles were not considered legitimate, or able to fill the political gap left by the Ba’ath party, so fundamentalist religious leaders were able to dominate Iraqi politics (Barak 2007). Further work was undertaken in restoring the judicial and penal systems when in early 2005 the EU and NATO agreed to a joint mission to improve Iraq’s security sector, with NATO training military members and the EU and the UN working on training civilians such as magistrates, and senior police and prison officers (Gourlay and Monaco 2005). Some of the EU and NATO training would occur in Iraq, but training also took place in various EU states such as France, Germany and Spain (Gourlay

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and Monaco 2005). There was, however, insufficient coordination between CPATT and the EUJUST LEX on instituting legal reforms and training judges and others working in the judiciary (Flanagan 2006). Still, by August 2007 there were approximately 1,100 trained judges (Brookings Institution 2007). US training of the Iraqi police soon began after the invasion. Even though he did not have sufficient federal and international police experience, Bernard Kerik, a former New York City police chief, was put in charge of ‘directing, improving, and expanding the Iraqi police’ with a staff of 26 American police advisors from the Department of Justice (ICITAP) (Dobbins 2009: 142; Perito 2004). Kerik oversaw street operations in Baghdad but paid little attention to recruitment and training, though to the relief of many he abruptly resigned after only four months and was replaced by Clayton McManaway (Dobbins 2009). Under the CPA and McManaway, the Iraqi Police Service was formed and a training centre was established in Amman, Jordan, which was operated by the US State Department (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) and ICITAP (see Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Citing US government sources, Deflem and Sutphin (2006) reported that over 65,000 police had been trained in the Amman facility, the Baghdad Police Academy, and elsewhere in Iraq by the end of 2005. In an analysis of the readiness of the Iraqis to take on the responsibilities of sovereignty, Clawson (2004) of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy found that traffic police were plentiful and that more people were reporting crimes with some success in investigating crimes. Notwithstanding, many in the Iraqi Police Service had to be removed from duty for corruption, failure to perform duties, and other unethical behaviours (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Less than half of the 90,000 police were left serving by the end of 2004, while an ever-increasing insurgency was taxing the police even further (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Broadwell (2005) contends that the police training centre in Jordan did not train police adequately because of poor recruit attitudes, overly simplistic straining, and a lack of accountability once recruits started working in Iraq. In late 2004 the Iraqi police were accused of numerous crimes: killing political opponents, engaging in arrest/extortion schemes, and raping and torturing female prisoners (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2005). Meanwhile in Baghdad the Iraqi Interior Minister complained that his 8,000 officers recruited by US officials were ineffective, illiterate, and unreliable, and decided to create his own paramilitary units, but without adequate background checks, recruited from Republican Guards and Special Forces that had served under Hussein (Moss 2006). It was abundantly clear at this time that little effort had been spent by US civilian

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Proof Iraq 125

agencies, the military, or the executive branch for post-conflict planning or coordination. The US government relied heavily on private contractors as police, judicial, and corrections experts, even though they had little experience in post-war reconstruction (discussed further below). The British training of Iraqi police was not much more successful. In a 2006 report to the UK government (not declassified until 2010), Flanagan (2006: 4) revealed that there had been no ‘overarching blueprint for policing in Iraq’ and little attempt to provide for Iraqi input into the process. Whereas 135,000 police had been trained by 2006, it was without attention to the quality of recruitment and training, resorting to the hiring and training of hardened criminals with primary loyalties to one of various militias (Flanagan 2006). There were few local governance structures that could provide uniform centralized standards for policing and vetting systems for officer recruitment. On the British side, intelligence regarding local Iraqi power structures was dubious, and various police units were formed, apparently with approval by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, outside of the coalition-designated recruitment process. In some areas regional police forces were randomly established and it was not immediately obvious what their relationship was to either the INP or the Ministry of Interior (Flanagan 2006). Flanagan (2006) recommended that CPATT take overall responsibility for the police training regimen away from JPITC so that efforts could be coordinated more closely to happenings on the ground, according to his assessment that training at the primary training centre in Baghdad did a better job in training recruits than the centre in Jordan. Coordination between the INP and the Iraqi military improved as evidenced by how they operated jointly during the 2005 elections, although ‘mutual suspicion’ between the two groups continued, threatening future cooperation and coordination (Flanagan 2006: 8). Among the different provinces in Iraq, Al Muthanna had made the most progress in terms of IPS self-sufficiency while Basra had made the least owing to the proliferation of rogue police battalions and intelligence agencies there. The proliferation of private security in myriad forms has clouded further the overall security sector reform process. The presence of private security in Iraq since the invasion has been quite extensive, blurring the boundaries between civilian and military activities such as humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement as well as confusion between military and non-military targets (Bjork and Jones 2005; Ellison and O’Reilly 2008a; Moss 2006). According to Finer (2005: A1): There are now [2005] at least 36 foreign security companies – most from the United States and Britain – and 16 Iraqi firms registered to

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operate here, according to the Interior Ministry, and as many as 50 more are believed to have set up shop illegally. Their total workforce is estimated at 25,000; many are military veterans, though levels of experience vary. As of December [2004], contracts to provide security for U.S. government agencies and reconstruction firms in Iraq had surpassed $766 million, according to a recent Government Accountability Office report. According to Schwartz and Swain (2011), private employees currently outnumber US military personnel as US Department of Defence employees in Iraq, comprising 52% of the workforce (Schwartz and Swain 2011). International companies and government agencies have hired private security companies to deal with the absence of security, and ‘…there is a strong link between the private sector-led reconstruction effort and the surrounding security apparatus, and the Iraqi population’s perception of socioeconomic exploitation and crusaderism’ (Bjork and Jones 2005: 778). Elites within Iraq and foreign companies can amass large profits from foreign contracting, particularly when the industry in the country is under-regulated. The contracts are very large, and involve multiple layers of subcontractors. Subcontracting reduces the transparency of these contracts because only those contracts worth more than $50 million face US congressional oversight, and subcontractors are only accountable to the company that hired them (Stanger 2009). Various private mercenary groups have re-styled themselves as private security contractors, who are hired by the US and UK in order to fill the need for more soldiers and security personnel to protect foreign workers and NGO activity, with little oversight or accountability (Bjork and Jones 2005; O’Reilly 2011; Stanger 2009). In addition to the security contractors, humanitarian organizations such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services and the like receive significant US government funding to operate in the country (Stanger 2009). DynCorp International administered the US Civilian Police Program in Iraq for a contract worth $750 million with 1,000 officers from US state and local police with little if any international experience (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Unlike most other private security contractors such as Blackwater (now Xe Services), Aegis, Diligence LLC, or ArmorGroup, DynCorp officers wore uniforms and carried guns provided by the US government (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). Prior to March 2004, these and other civilian contractors engaged in police training for the US. Following accusations of criminal fraud, shootings of civilians, and the sexual exploitation of women and children by DynCorp and other private security contractor employees the US military has taken a more permanent

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Proof Iraq 127

role (Deflem and Sutphin 2006; Moss 2006). The British Military and CIVPOL cooperated with ArmorGroup, which is a private security firm operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With a status of forces agreement taking effect on January 1, 2009, private security contractors no longer have immunity from prosecution in Iraq: a British contractor was sentenced to 20 years in prison for murdering two other contractors, and Blackwater was banned from Iraq for a 2007 incident where Blackwater employees killed 17 unarmed civilians in Baghdad (Schmidt 2011). In the US, Federal officials attempted to prosecute the Blackwater employees for the killings on manslaughter charges, only to dismiss the case as they had difficulties involved with obtaining evidence and contending with jurisdiction issues and immunity deals that existed before the 2009 status of forces agreement (Risen 2010). To this day, private contractors are still used for various security operations. For example, many ex-officers from the PSNI and RUC in Northern Ireland engage in numerous activities, including protecting the main road leading to the main international airport (‘Route Irish’), protecting VIPs, acting as security consultants, and training Iraqi police under contract from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Ellison and O’Reilly 2008b). Given the recent, relative successes of police reform there, the Northern Irish police reform agenda is seen as providing a template for reform in conflicted societies, including Iraq and Afghanistan (Ellison and O’Reilly 2008b). Pressure from Iraqis and Washington expedited the handover of CPA authority to an interim Iraqi government in June of 2004 (Dobbins 2009). After the handover, numerous challenges remained, according to Cordesman (2006), for the following reasons. First, the establishment of democratic governance was attempted with too few experienced political leaders, and much of the secular leadership had been removed via deBa’athification, dividing the Iraqi political system along sectarian and ethnic lines. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that Iraqis were expected to vote for an interim government, before a number of constitutional issues had been settled (Cordesman 2006). Second, elections were given more attention than the practice of democratic governance, and ministries were therefore not well advised and coordination between agencies was weak. The central government was disconnected from local government, allowing local extremists with their own militias or police to control local areas such as Basra (Cordesman 2006). Government ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior developed sectarian rather than national allegiances, establishing their own violent militias and death squads while the US focused on fighting an underestimated insurgency.

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US efforts to fight the insurgency damaged the infrastructure in urban areas, thereby threatening long-term stability, and the US was also slow to react to increasing tensions among different ethnic and other groups in Iraq. Furthermore, the privatization of the relief effort led to widespread mismanagement and misappropriation of funds, allowing rampant corruption to continue (Cordesman 2006). After the January 2005 elections, a three-person president’s council was established with one president and two vice presidents that together represent the three major sectarian groups in the country (Deflem and Sutphin 2006). A new constitution was developed in October of that year, and following numerous negotiations, a government was formed in April of 2006. The Iraqi government appeared unable to provide governance or maintain a strong military presence on its own, and responsibility transfers from the US to the Iraqis were largely cosmetic (Cordesman 2008). Shi’ia factions operated in the south of the country while the western part of the country involved conflicts with al-Qaeda and brutal tribal conflicts over smuggling routes (see Pfaff 2008). As of 2006, 3,000 police advisors were in Iraq under the direction of the US military (Moss 2006). The primary goal of the trainers was to reduce corruption and improve basic skills among the Iraqi police, but according to US internal reports, the performance of the police was ineffective due to miscommunication between US and Iraqi officials, limited financial resources, shortages of equipment, and sectarian and other political loyalties influencing police behaviour (Cordesman 2008; Laipson 2007; Moss 2006). After mid-2007 into 2008, insurgent attacks in Iraq appeared to be decreasing, and can be traced to the Sadr ceasefire, dissolution of the relationship between al-Qaeda and Sunni tribes, and the Sunni uprising (Cordesman 2008). Still, as of 2011 the new Iraqi government lacks capacity and there are fundamental problems in meeting basic human needs, leading to civil society protests in Iraq similar to those that have been occurring throughout the Middle East (Reuters 2011). In addition to these problems of political stability and legitimacy, one US government review completed at the end of July, 2011 found that Iraq was less safe than it was the year before in spite of the apparent decreases in violence from mid-2007, given increases in bombings in Diyala province near the Iranian border, assassinations, and violent Shi’ite militia activities against US soldiers and other targets (Jakes 2011). The US also failed to negotiate an extended stay in Iraq, so the military left Iraq by early 2012 while some embassy staff remained in order to continue to train Iraqi police (Jakes 2011; MacAskill 2011).

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Proof Iraq 129

One can predict based on the Iraqi experience that security sector reform following an enforced ‘democratic’ transition will likely be fraught with problems, and the system that evolves from the process will likely resemble a Western liberal democracy on paper and not in practice. The effects of the invasion and occupation of Iraq includes continued economic insecurity, insufficient infrastructure and educational facilities, a fractured and fragile political system split along ethnic and sectarian lines, and an ineffective public security sector without a monopoly of force stemming from the presence of militias, an insurgency, and private security groups. Given the perilous and fragile political and economic systems currently in place, these problems are likely to prevail for the foreseeable future.

Analytic summary Macro Iraq under the Hussein regime had suffered economic sanctions from the 1990s until the US invasion and occupation of 2003, which violated a number of international laws – aggressive war, failure to protect citizens and citizens’ human rights, torture and other abuses of prisoners, a radical altering of the economic system, suspension of the rule of law through a granting of immunity to US and other foreign missions and contractors from prosecution in Iraq, and a lack of transparency in how Iraqi oil revenues were handled. After the US occupied the country, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) sought to reorient the economy around a neoliberal economic framework, and established rules to allow overseas corporate interests to own Iraqi assets with the exception of oil and extract those assets abroad. Despite the country’s oil wealth, the recent war, economic mismanagement, de-Ba’athification, and mass emigration of educated professionals have decimated its middle class, making a viable and sustainable democracy that much harder to achieve. The actions of the US and its coalitional allies have made it extremely difficult for Iraq to develop independently, causing economic insecurity, a robust insurgency, the privatization of security, and the presence of militias, all of which negatively affect the efficacy and ethical standards of the police. The police rarely interact with the public because they and other elements of the security sector (military and other militias) have been militarized as a means of tackling the insurgency. Moreover, various errors were made in the planning and implementation of reforms in multiple areas including the economy and security sector.

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Meso Characterized by dependency on oil exports, mass unemployment, and political uncertainties, Iraq’s economy further exacerbates ethnic schisms and the insurgency. The insurgency against the current government consists of different groups with separate agendas, such as those from Sunni and Shi’ia factions, foreign mercenaries associated with al-Qaeda, and criminal gangs, and each group appears to want to overthrow the current government. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein has actually reopened ethnic rivalries, with the previous Kurdish and Shi’ia minorities seeking power and revenge for years of oppressive rule by Sunnis. Democratic governance is unlikely to take root in Iraq and civil society is fractured and beset by negative social capital. Ethnic and sectarian conflict has energized civil society groups that are opposed to the new governance arrangements. In addition, ethnic and sectarian militias headed by religious, sectarian, and governmental leaders are at odds with each other, and private security contractors have destabilized the security situation even further. Micro Efforts to establish a security sector with a functioning military and police force have produced mixed results at best. For instance, police training has been ineffective while the CPA utilized former Iraqi military and police officers to swell the ranks in order to fight the insurgency. Mostly incompetent and brutally corrupt, and seen as illiterate and unreliable, the police face attacks from insurgents more than any other sector of government, and police-community relations remain strained at best. Rampant governmental corruption and the fractured nature of government exacerbate insecurity. The Iraqi government has found it difficult to exert any kind of centralized control over security policy due to the plethora of private security agencies and security forces controlled by different government ministries, many of which have competing and over-lapping agendas. Political and sectarian divides can indeed mitigate against effective accountability and oversight in that police officers recruited locally by tribal and other leaders are often more loyal to their own local group than to the central government. Yet, civil society groups and the police themselves tend resist reform efforts.


Proof

7

Northern Ireland

Country profile Out of all our case studies Northern Ireland is the only country located geographically on the western edge of Europe. Until 1921 all of Ireland was ruled by Britain as a constituent part of the British Empire. Following, a guerrilla war across the country between 1919–21 – the Irish War of Independence – the country was divided into two parts. The largest part (what is now the Republic of Ireland) with a Catholic majority declared independence from Britain, but six of the north-easterly counties with a large Protestant majority and a Catholic minority continued under British rule, and formed the new state of Northern Ireland. Between 1921 and 1973 Northern Ireland had its own devolved Parliament at Stormont, just outside Belfast with one political party, the predominantly Protestant, Ulster Unionist Party, governing for 50 consecutive years. Northern Ireland had one-party government for longer than the Soviet Union, in fact. In the late 1960s allegations of discrimination (political, economic, cultural) against the Catholic minority led to a sustained period of unrest and a campaign for civil rights and equal citizenship. The inability of the Unionist government to implement reforms, and the harsh and repressive policing tactics adopted by the then Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and its auxiliary, the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), inflamed an already volatile situation and led to widespread civil disorder. In 1969 the British government put the army on the streets of Northern Ireland in an effort to contain a worsening situation and in 1972, suspended the Northern Ireland parliament indefinitely and established Direct Rule from Westminster. The events of the 1960s were to act as a catalyst for a period of violent socio-political conflict in Northern Ireland for the next 30 years. Following peace negotiations (from the mid-1990s) and the signing of 131

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a negotiated political settlement – the Belfast Agreement – in 1998, devolved government was returned to Northern Ireland (discussed below). There are two main groups by community background in Northern Ireland: Protestants and Catholics. Northern Irish Protestants are the descendents of British settlers who arrived from England and Scotland during successive waves of ‘plantations’ from the 17th century onwards. This group generally claims a unionist political outlook (i.e. they identify as British and wish to maintain Northern Ireland’s constitutional status and link with Britain). On the other hand, Northern Irish Catholics are descended from the indigenous Celtic population and traditionally maintain a nationalist political outlook (i.e. many identify as Irish and many wish at some future time for the creation of an all-Ireland republic). In the 2001 census 53.1% of Northern Irish born residents identified as having a Protestant community background and 43.8%, a Catholic community background.1 Currently in administrative terms, Northern Ireland is governed as a constituent region of the United Kingdom, along with Wales, Scotland and England. Like Wales and Scotland Northern Ireland has its own devolved political administration (discussed below). There is no separate Human Development Index for Northern Ireland, but the UK as a whole ranks 28th out of 187 countries which is in line with the Western European average. The population of Northern Ireland is approximately 1.8 million, with a majority concentrated in and around the two main urban centres of Belfast in the East and Derry/Londonderry in the North. Average life expectancy is 76.4 years for males and 81.3 for females.2 In terms of racial composition the population of Northern Ireland is overwhelmingly white (99.1%) with non-white minority ethnic groups accounting for less than 1% of the total population. The average per capita income in Northern Ireland is $30,763, which is on par with the average for the North West of England ($33,127), lower than that of the South East of England ($41,147) and Scotland ($37,861) but slightly higher than Wales ($28,790) [figures converted from EUROSTAT 2011]. Currently, the unemployment rate is 7.0% which is below both the EU average (9.6%) and the GB average of 7.7%. However, as a consequence of the global recession from 2008, youth unemployment (16–24) is nearly three times that of adults at 20%, although this is lower than in some parts of England and Scotland. The Northern Irish economy is somewhat imbalanced and is heavily dependent on public sector employment relative to other regions of the UK (EUROSTAT 2011). Northern Ireland is also dependant upon a British government subvention (annually around £5 billion) which is the shortfall between what is generated through local

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Proof Northern Ireland 133

taxation and what it ultimately costs to run Northern Ireland’s public services. Northern Ireland has a highly developed infrastructure with good schools, hospitals and universities and an advanced communications and transportation network. There is one national police force in Northern Ireland – the Police Service of Northern Ireland (henceforth PSNI) that was established in 2001 as the successor to the predominantly Protestant, RUC that policed Northern Ireland from its creation.3 Currently the PSNI force numbers 7,500 officers, of which approximately 31% are Catholic and 24% are female (Northern Ireland Policing Board 2011). The PSNI are assisted by a small number of Police Community Support Officers (PSCOs) who are not sworn officers but who perform a number of low-level policing type functions. Northern Ireland has a comparatively low incarceration rate with 84 prisoners per 100,000 population compared to 148 for England and Wales and 139 for Scotland. There are no private correctional facilities in Northern Ireland, and the average annual prison population hovers around 1,400 – of which approximately one-third are on remand waiting for trial.4 The majority of offenders are male and at the time of writing there were 37 female prisoners, 146 juvenile offenders (17–21) and seven young offenders (10–16) held in custody or secure accommodation in Northern Ireland’s prison system (Northern Ireland Prison Service 2011).

Discussion Economic and political issues Arguably, economic issues affecting the Catholic minority were to precipitate the violence that emerged in 1969. However, economic differentials between Protestants and Catholics were to remain salient through the 1990s. Traditionally, working-class Protestants comprised a labour aristocracy and were to avail of the best paid jobs in the manufacturing sector (particularly ship-building and engineering) while their middleclass counterparts were to dominate the world of business and many traditional professional occupations (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988). However, from the 1970s the global recession and sectoral restructuring saw a decimation of the traditional manufacturing sector and long-term unemployment became a fact of life for both working-class Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland.5 This was compounded by the effects of violent socio-political conflict that had enormous implications for economic and social development. The IRA’s bombing campaign against business and commercial targets in particular, had serious knock-on effects for inward investment (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988; Shirlow and Murtagh

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2006). To some extent job losses in the traditional manufacturing sector were offset by an expansion in public sector employment and in the secondary labour market. However, for much of the period between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, Northern Ireland had a faltering and dysfunctional economy with declining levels of manufacturing output. Unemployment was slightly above that in other UK regions, though this was subject to high levels of spatial variation within Northern Ireland itself (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988: 79). Fundamentally, the conflict hugely distorted the labour market to create an avalanche of jobs in the security sector (RUC, RUC Reserve, Northern Ireland Prison Service, Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and numerous security firms) that were invariably filled by Protestants (McGarry and O’Leary 1999; Ellison and Smyth 2000; Mulcahy 2006). A labyrinthine and opaque security screening and vetting programme also meant that Catholics, in particular, found it difficult to obtain employment in those areas, for example, some government departments, that were considered sensitive in security terms.6 At one level, the peace process resulted in a significant economic dividend to Northern Ireland (International Alert 2006). Over the past decade and a half there has been a huge programme of urban regeneration undertaken in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Considerable gains have also been made in attracting multinational firms (particularly from the US and Canada) to locate part of their European manufacturing operations in Northern Ireland, with relatively high levels of investment in the aerospace, engineering, computing, pharmaceutical and renewable energy sectors. These firms have been attracted by generous government subsidies and a highly skilled and educated labour force. However, the peace cake has not been distributed evenly. It is debatable to what extent those working-class communities that experienced the brunt of the violence have seen a tangible benefit from peace, at least in economic terms. Many of these communities that ranked in the top-ten across all indices of multiple deprivation in 1998 are still there currently, with recent research suggesting that Northern Ireland has the highest level of child poverty in the UK (Department of Social Development 2011). Urban working-class communities are also disproportionately affected by persistent long-term unemployment (up to 40% in some areas) while children from predominantly Protestant working-class areas have some of the highest rates of educational underachievement in the UK (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The key political issue in Northern Ireland was undoubtedly the existence of socio-political conflict. This centred principally on Northern Ireland’s disputed constitutional status and operated at a number of

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different but ultimately related levels (McGarry and O’Leary 1995; Weitzer 1995; Whyte 1990). First, there was a campaign of violence by republican7 organizations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the British state – what they euphemistically termed the ‘armed struggle’. The aim of the IRA was to force a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland by engaging in a bombing campaign against military installations and business premises in Northern Ireland, England and continental Europe8 as well as singling out for assassination those who they deemed to be ‘legitimate targets’ – mainly members of the British Army, the RUC, the Ulster Defence Regiment, prison officers, members of the judiciary and anyone considered to be working to support what was termed the ‘British War Machine’. Second, the IRA’s campaign was mirrored by a pro-state campaign of violence within Northern Ireland and occasionally in the Republic of Ireland, led by loyalist9 paramilitary organizations (such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDA)) that targeted republican activists and Catholic civilians (Bruce 1992; Taylor 2000). Third, underscoring all this was a deep legacy of mistrust and sectarian tension between Protestants and Catholics more generally. This was manifested in, among other things, a high prevalence of sectarian attacks, widespread and deep-seated public order issues, but also extreme patterns of residential segregation with entire towns and villages dominated by either of the two main ethno-religious groups (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). From at least as far back as the late 1980s representatives of the British and Irish governments, the British intelligence services, local politicians and members of the Catholic clergy held a number of behind-the-scenes meetings with the IRA with a view to persuading them to end their ‘armed struggle’ (Maloney 2002). On 31st August 1994 the IRA declared a ceasefire from midnight that night and a ‘complete cessation of military operations’ that was followed seven weeks later by a declaration of ceasefire by the Combined Loyalist Military Command – an organization that represented three of the main loyalist paramilitary organizations (see Mulcahy 2006). The ceasefires set in motion a political dialogue that was to culminate in the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 – a constitutional settlement agreed by a majority of the electorate in Northern Ireland and endorsed by all but one of Northern Ireland’s political parties. Since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 there has existed in Northern Ireland what Johan Galtung might term an ‘absence of war’ rather than a normatively constructed ‘peace’ (Galtung 1996). However, even that in itself is an achievement. While undoubted problems remain, the past 13 years have seen a dramatic reduction in conflict related deaths and violence; notwithstanding the recent activities of dissident republicans

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and the persistence of inter-ethnic tensions in some areas that we discuss further below. Crime and security sector issues The main issue affecting crime and the security sector in Northern Ireland has undoubtedly been the presence of armed conflict and ethno-sectarian tension. However, as with other post-conflict scenarios the peace process has also contributed to increases in volume crime (Ellison and Shirlow 2008) – though not on the scale seen in South Africa – and also organized crime following the demobilization of paramilitary groupings (Moran 2008). There is no denying the toll that the conflict wreaked on a relatively small jurisdiction in terms of deaths and violence. Between 1969 and 2001, 3,529 deaths were directly attributable to conflict related violence with tens of thousands of people also injured in bombing or shooting incidents. Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organizations were responsible for the majority of deaths (virtually all of whom were civilians) followed by the security forces (Army/RUC) [Table 7.1]. While the number of overall deaths may be comparatively small in relation to other ethnic conflicts (Bosnia and Serbia, for example) or to the situation in our other case studies, relative to the overall size of population the scale was significant. Hayes and McAllister (2000) estimate that when scaled up by size of overall population, a corresponding level of violence in Britain and the United States would have resulted in over 100,000 and 500,000 deaths respectively. Consequently, the impact of violence on the social fabric of Northern Irish society has been enormous with huge implications for the mending of community relations, not to mention the psychological effects of the violence on children and young people (Cairns 1987). Table 7.1 Organization Responsible for Deaths Due to the Conflict in Northern Ireland (1969–2001) Organization responsible for deaths British security (RUC/British Army) Irish Security (Garda/Irish Army)

Count 363 5

Loyalist Paramilitary

1016

Republican Paramilitary

2060

Not known TOTAL Source: CAIN 2009

85 3529

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The governance of crime in Northern Ireland has been characterized by a number of anomalies. In spite of high levels of violence that emanated from the political situation, Northern Ireland traditionally had comparatively low levels of ‘ordinary’ crime (Brewer et al 1997; Brewer and Magee 1991) a situation that has persisted in the aftermath of the peace process (Quigley and Freel 2010). According to the most recent International Victimisation Survey (Van Dijk et al 2008) Northern Ireland continues to have the lowest overall crime rate of any region in the United Kingdom, and one of the lowest crime rates of any country included in the survey, apart from Japan. Recent cross-national data from the United Nations (UNDATA 2010) indicate that the intentional homicide rate in Northern Ireland is 1.3 deaths per 100,000. This puts it slightly above England and Wales (1.1), but below Finland (2.4), Scotland (2.1) and the United States (5.2). It is also significantly lower than some of our other case study areas. Factors affecting the crime rate in Northern Ireland have been variously attributed to the relatively small population, the density of family and kinship networks, higher levels of religiosity and church attendance, higher levels of police (and historically army) surveillance, and perhaps paradoxically high levels of ethno-religious segregation which has fostered the existence of close-knit ontologically secure communities (Brewer et al 1997). However, while crime rates remain comparatively low in Northern Ireland there is nevertheless a high level of spatial differentiation with a number of urban working-class areas seeing considerable increases in all forms of crime, but particularly alcohol related violent crime and high levels of anti-social behaviour by young people since the mid-1990s (Ellison and Shirlow 2008). While data from official sources relating to organized criminality need to be treated with some caution (Mulcahy 2006) it cannot be disputed that during the conflict paramilitary organizations of all hues resorted to a fairly sophisticated programme of organized crime in order to fund their various campaigns and activities. While each organization had its own organized crime niche or specialism, the activities ranged from crossborder smuggling (fuel, cigarettes, alcohol); the distribution of counterfeit goods (CDs, designer clothes etc); ‘cash in transit’ robberies; to, drugs, prostitution and extortion rackets (Moran 2008). However, it is doubtful if these activities have ceased totally (Moran 2008). In the current climate the effects of what might be termed the ‘peace dividend as crime dividend’ cannot be discounted, and in particular the movement of some excombatants from ‘political’ to organized criminality. In recent years a spate of high profile bank heists – the largest of which netted the perpetrators (widely believed to have been a pension fund for the IRA) £26.5 million

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($47 million USD) from the Northern Bank in Belfast. Northern Ireland has been dubbed ‘Sicily without Sunshine’ in the local media with the prevalence of organized criminality generating political anger and public disquiet (Cullinan 2005). The multi-party negotiations that led to the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 provided evidence (if any were needed) that the issue of policing occupied a contested space in Northern Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 1999; Ellison and Smyth 2000; Mulcahy 2006; Weitzer 1995). The negotiations confirmed that for a majority of Catholics (both nationalists and republicans) reform of the RUC was to be a key factor in establishing a political settlement. Furthermore, and in something that should not be underestimated, it was made clear by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that police reform was to be an absolute precondition if they were to call an end to their 30-year campaign of political violence. We consider the specifics of the reform proposals shortly but it is first necessary to outline briefly why policing in Northern Ireland emerged to become such a problematic issue. While the reasons themselves are undeniably complex and multifaceted, for our current purposes they can be seen as emanating from three inter-related sources. The first is historical and relates to the disputed constitutional status of Northern Ireland historically. The role of the new police force for Northern Ireland – the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) – differed little from that of its colonial predecessor the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and where its core mandate was the dual one of counter-insurgency and routine policing (Mulcahy 2006; Ellison and Smyth 2000). To this end the RUC was under the direct political control of the Unionist government and from its inception operated with extensive ‘emergency’ powers (of arrest, seizure and detention) with one notorious clause in the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act [1922] giving officers retrospective legal immunity for ‘anything done in good faith for the defence of Northern Ireland’ (Ellison and Smyth 2000; Mulcahy 2006). While there was little in the way of overt conflict (barring one or two isolated cases of IRA violence) in the years up to the 1960s, this masked a simmering resentment that underlay Catholic placidity. As noted above the crisis for both the Unionist government and the RUC came with the demand for civil rights by the Catholic minority in the late 1960s (Purdie 1990; Ó Dochartaigh 1997). An early attempt at reforming the RUC was made in 1970, but as Ó Dochartaigh (1997) argues by this stage it was a case of ‘too little too late’, and future attempts by the RUC to secure the consent of nationalists and Catholics was to prove elusive.

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The second factor, is a corollary of the first and in an effort to normalize the security situation (British troops on the streets of Northern Ireland sent out the wrong message) a change in security policy from the mid1970s underscored that what was now termed ‘terrorism’ could be defeated militarily and the RUC was thrust to the forefront of this. This change in security policy had a number of consequences. By putting the RUC in the front line against the IRA it meant that policing became an incredibly dangerous occupation, and one commentator estimates that prior to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, Northern Ireland was the most dangerous place in the world to be a police officer when adjusted for population (Ryder 1997). Also the new security strategy resulted in a considerably enhanced militarization of policing (Mulcahy 2006). Special units of the RUC were set up and equipped for deep surveillance and undercover purposes. Because of the danger that officers faced many travelled in heavily armoured personnel carriers, and in some parts of Northern Ireland patrolling by vehicle or foot was so dangerous that helicopters were the only viable alternative. Police stations became mini-fortresses and were surrounded by thick concrete walls to protect against blasts. Needless, to say in this context few officers had any experience, much less conception of civil policing. However, the new security strategy also saw the adoption of tactics that were to prove disastrous for the RUC’s relationship with the wider Catholic community. These included the use of torture in obtaining confession evidence, allegations of a shoot-to-kill policy against republican suspects, collusion with pro-state loyalist paramilitary organizations, as well as modifications to the legal and criminal justice system which among other things abolished jury trials for those charged with terrorist-related offences (Mulcahy 2006; Ellison and Smyth 2000; McGloin 2003; McGarry and O’Leary 1999). The adoption of such tactics, however, were meant to provide a good example of the dilemma of the democratic state: Namely, how can terrorism or its threat be dealt with in ways that are compatible with the rule of law and human rights protections. What is clear in the Northern Ireland case is that ultimately they were to prove counter-productive and resulted not only in the British Government being brought before the European Court of Human Rights on a number of occasions, damaging its moral authority but also served to fuel anger and resentment within the wider Nationalist community. In many respects efforts to ‘defeat’ terrorism served to add fuel to the very violence that police actions sought to curb. The final factor points to the relationship between the public and AU: Goldsmith the institutions of governance (including the police), which Goldsmith 2005a/b? (2005) has delineated in terms of ‘public trust’. A lack of public trust in

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the police can be found within marginalized communities in stable democracies, however it exists in an exaggerated form in post-conflict and authoritarian states. As Goldsmith acknowledges, without public trust in the police it will be difficult for the state to guarantee even a minimal level of security and virtually impossible for the police to enhance their legitimacy and effectiveness among the wider community. This issue of trust resonates with the Northern Ireland experience. For Catholics and Nationalists there has historically been a lack of trust in both the institutions of governance and the RUC in Northern Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 1995, 1999; Weitzer 1995). However, while Goldsmith’s conceptualization is useful, it does not fully address the complexities of dominant-subordinate relations in divided societies and needs to be augmented by an opposing conception that acknowledges the excess of trust that is to be found among dominant groups. Here the problem is not so much a lack of trust in the police and state institutions, but rather an over-identification that allows members of the dominant group to symbolically and emotionally relate to the police as ‘theirs’. This of course is true in a prosaic sense insofar as the police are invariably recruited from within the ranks of dominant group membership, but it can also been seen in the ways that the police in such contexts are intimately associated with the trappings, rituals and symbolism of dominant group identity, as with the close identification between the South African Police (SAP) and Afrikaner nationalists in pre-democratic South Africa and the historically close ties between the RUC and Protestants/Unionists in Northern Ireland. In both cases the police were not just police, but rather formed a symbolic conduit that went right to the heart of the construction of dominant-subordinate relations. The implications of are apposite insofar as dominant groups will perceive attempts to reform the police as indicative of a threat to their social position, which is to be resisted. The Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) was established in 1998 as a core component of the Belfast Agreement. It was tasked with putting forward proposals for the reform of policing structures and made a total 175 key recommendations across 19 thematic areas. An increase in the number of Catholic recruits was undertaken via a 50-50 recruitment policy while a reduction in the overall size of the RUC (from 13,000 to 7,500) was undertaken via a financially generous programme of compulsory and voluntary severance for existing officers. The community policing strategy proposed by ICP – ‘Policing with the community’ – was given institutional weight in the new structures for police oversight and governance. For instance, the Policing Board, comprising elected political representatives and independent members, performs a similar role to

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Police Authorities in England and Wales but has considerably enhanced powers to initiate inquiries into police actions as well as monitoring the performance of the police at national level. At local level, there are 26 District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) in each local council area, again comprised of elected representatives and independent members, and that monitor the performance of the local police. The investigation of complaints against PSNI officers is the responsibility of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI), which unlike the situation in England and Wales and Scotland is modelled on a system of fully independent investigation and oversight of all complaints. In addition, PSNI policies and procedures are screened for human rights compliance by a statutory authority, and are also subject to Equality Impact Assessments by the Northern Ireland Equality Commission. What was also of undoubted importance to police reform process in Northern Ireland was that the reforms were not undertaken in a vacuum, with police reform slotting into a wider programme of SSR. Two parallel and broadly contemporaneous reviews of criminal justice and anti-terrorist legislation in Northern Ireland were undertaken at the same time as the ICP was making its deliberations. While perhaps there should have been more engagement between the various reform commissions there was at least the recognition that police reform cannot be conducted in isolation from the criminal justice and legal arenas more broadly. The Northern Ireland Criminal Justice Review Commission (Northern Ireland Office 2000) made wide-ranging recommendations for reforms across the following areas: the courts, judiciary, sentencing, victims, witnesses, prisons, legal reform, probation, public prosecution and introduced a system of mandatory youth conferencing that has effectively abolished custodial sentences for first-time young offenders in Northern Ireland. By comparative international standards, the progress of the police reform effort in Northern Ireland has been broadly successful, and in terms of our case studies it is the jurisdiction where the impact of the reforms is most in evidence. We should, however, be cognizant of David Bayley’s observation (Bayley 2005) that a successful police reform endeavour can take up to two decades before tangible results are evidenced. The first decade relates to the implementation of the reforms and navigating around the hurdles and obstacles to their realization, the second decade is where the reforms are consolidated and established. Northern Ireland is currently entering the second, consolidation phase. Of course there have been problems, but many of these related to the earlier stages of implementation and have now been addressed. For example, the severance arrangements saw many experienced detectives

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leaving the organization and caused early problems with the speed at which criminal investigations were processed. More fundamentally, the PSNI’s ‘policing with the community’ strategy was hampered by Sinn Féin’s refusal to fully endorse or participate in the new policing structures until 2007 – eight years after the ICP initially published its recommendations. Sinn Féin’s stance perhaps reflected political pragmatism as much as intransigence and was based on the party’s recognition that promoting the PSNI to a grassroots republican electorate would be a ‘tough sell’ politically, particularly in a situation where policing and justice powers remained in overall control of the British government at Westminster. However, following a further round of cross-party talks 2007 (the St Andrews Agreement) these powers were devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Sinn Féin has now taken its seats on the Policing Board and District Policing Partnerships. However, currently the main problem affecting the PSNI and the security situation in Northern Ireland generally, concerns the armed activities of shadow organizations such as dissident republican groups that are opposed to the peace process. We noted in Chapter 3 that incorporating shadow organizations (ex combatants, paramilitary organizations and so forth) into any peace process and security sector reform endeavour is crucial to their eventual success. In Northern Ireland the IRA has done a notable job of keeping its membership united and containing dissident views, but a small number of individuals have nevertheless defected to form other organizations that have vowed to continue with the armed struggle. Dissident groups go by the moniker of ‘Real IRA’ and ‘Continuity IRA’ and thus far have killed two PSNI officers (both Catholic) and two British soldiers. While the numbers involved with dissident republican groups are small, and they do not have a political mandate for their activities, they nevertheless regard policing as the fault line of the political process. Such groups believe (probably correctly) that if they can destabilize the PSNI by making Catholics reluctant to join the force, or provoke the PSNI into a harsh counter-terrorism mode (reminiscent of the RUC) then they can also destabilize the political edifice of the Northern Ireland Assembly. One badly planned and executed anti-terrorist operation would have the effect of wiping out whatever limited public support the PSNI may have within republican areas and in a worst case scenario lead to sympathy for the aims of dissident groups. Finally, the spectre of the past continues to cast a dark shadow over the policing transition and has the potential if not sensitively handled to unravel some of the progress made thus far. In September 2005 the PSNI established a Historical Enquiries Team (HET) to investigate around

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2,500 ‘cold case’ murders arising from the conflict committed between 1968 and 1998. However, some HET investigations suggest that there may have been wilful police (RUC) negligence in the initial investigation and these files have been turned over to the Police Ombudsman’s Office for further investigation and the possible prosecution of the RUC officers involved. However, recent allegations that there may have been political interference with the Ombudsman’s Office to avoid overt criticism of the RUC in such historical investigations has already claimed its first scalp in the resignation of the Ombudsman (Northern Ireland Criminal Justice Inspection 2011). Legacy issues in relation to policing during the conflict, and in particular the activities of Special Branch, will continue to rumble until Northern Irish society collectively agrees on a mechanism of truth recovery to deal with such cases are to be handled. Foreign and national security sector reform efforts Historically there has been considerable external pressure on the British government to introduce reforms to Northern Ireland both in terms of politics and economics but also in terms of the security sector, and the RUC in particular. The United Kingdom’s entry into the EEC in 1973 (now the EU) meant that Britain now became a signatory to a raft of legislation that upheld economic, political, social and human rights across all the member states. As Jonathan Stevenson (1997: 41) has argued, the EU became a ‘formidable supranational political lever’ in emphasizing to the British government that they must adhere to international human rights standards in its campaign against the IRA. But it was also to play a key role in nudging both the British government and also Northern Ireland politicians towards a negotiated political settlement. Officially since the 1950s the US has had a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Northern Ireland, though in reality the FBI and RUC have cooperated on intelligence matters and joint training exercises for over the past three decades.10 However, from the 1990s and the development of the peace process, the US was increasingly perceived as an ‘honest broker’ by all shades of political opinion in Northern Ireland, with US Senator George Mitchell chairing the often fraught negotiations that led to the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. Both the EU and the US recognized that police and security sector reform was fundamental to any lasting political settlement in Northern Ireland. However, Northern Ireland did not experience the same degree of entrepreneurialism or the existence of those bi and multilateral initiatives involving overseas policing agencies that have been commonplace in our

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other case studies. Nor were any of the large international development agencies (World Vision, Soros Foundation) or supranational organizations such as the United Nations (UN) involved at any stage in the reform process. Rather the reform programme was seen as a UK domestic issue and as such was coordinated and funded by the British Government via the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) but the final reform template and recommendations were left to the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) and the Oversight Commission that oversaw the implementation process (discussed below). Nevertheless, Northern Ireland has historically been in receipt of relatively high levels of overseas aid and financing for capacity-building and conflict resolution. The main instrument in this regard has been the Peace Programme established by the European Commission in 1995, and which to date has distributed £800 million (plus a further £180 million to be allocated by the end of 2013) to finance local capacity-building in Northern Ireland (Deloitte 2007). In addition, the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), established by the British and Irish governments in 1986 and financed by the governments of the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union (EU) has distributed over £465 million of financial aid to Northern Ireland and the four border counties of the Republic of Ireland (Deloitte 2007). The projects funded by the European Commission and the IFI have been geared to local capacity-building and enhancing relationships between both parts of Ireland and have not been concerned with the reform of the security sector as such. Importantly, the projects are organized and managed locally, without interference from the funding governments. Of course, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have a considerable Irish diaspora so there were undoubtedly domestic vote-winning opportunities connected to achieving peace and stability in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the EU had a broader interest in ending a protracted ethnic conflict in one of its member states, while for international investors the roar of the now muted Celtic Tiger economy in the Republic of Ireland made peace and stability on the island of Ireland a desirable goal. Outside of these criteria, however, it is difficult to see any direct strategic benefit for international actors in the Northern Ireland peace process. Consequently, there has been considerably less meddling and conditionality attached to the distribution of IFI funds, than has been experienced by some of our other case studies. In many respects the Northern Ireland experience offers few lessons in practical emulation for other transitional democracies or post-conflict states (MacGinty 2011). In terms of overall context even at the height of

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the conflict Northern Ireland retained a functioning state infrastructure while there was a broadly based commitment to the democratic process and the rule of law.11 More fundamentally, however, what might be termed a political economy of peace has emerged in Northern Ireland whereby from the perspective of the British government, there seemed to be no problem too big or indeed too small that couldn’t have money thrown at it in the hope it would either go away or resolve itself. Northern Ireland has been in receipt of astronomically high levels of peace support funding that in practical terms are simply beyond the capacity or capability of many developing states or international aid agencies to provide. There has been for example, the direct costs of ‘normalising’ policing as a result of the ICP reform programme which the corporate financial services firm Deloitte has estimated to be in the region of £100 million annually since 1999 (Deloitte 2007: 88).12 This figure is undoubtedly on the conservative side and currently the ICP compulsory and voluntary severance scheme for RUC and PSNI officers alone has topped £500 million.13 However, there have been huge indirect costs associated with the peace process more generally. Loyalist paramilitary organizations demanded £30 million from the British government to assist ‘decommissioning’ who baulked at the figure but nevertheless handed out £8 million (Moran 2008: 15), the Bloody Sunday inquiry into the deaths of 13 Catholic civilians shot by the British Army in 1973 has cost £572 million (The Guardian 2010), while £34 million has been awarded to the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) to investigate ‘cold-case’ deaths arising from the conflict as part of a truth-recovery process (Deloitte 2007). There are, however, two areas where the police reform process has seen some level of internationalization and overseas assistance. The first concerns the composition of the ICP and the Oversight Commission. The former was intentionally comprised of international policing scholars Professor Clifford Shearing (South Africa) and Professor Gerry Lynch (US), the senior Boston police officer, Kathleen O’Toole as well as representatives from the world of business, the legal profession, the public sector and civil society. In addition, Professor David Bayley, Tom Constantine, previously director of US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and Al Hutchinson, an Assistant Commissioner with the Canadian RCMP, were all appointed to the Oversight Commission. Again, however, there was little scope for entrepreneurialism here; they were each working within a framework for which the parameters had already been established. As with the situation in South Africa, there has been, however, a reverse flow of policing knowledge and expertise from Northern Ireland to any

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number of conflicted and transitional states across the globe in the aftermath of the ICP reforms. The reform process has opened up a strategic space for senior members of the Northern Irish policing establishment (senior RUC and PSNI officers, the Police Ombudsman and officials from the Policing Board) to market the transition and promote the ‘best practice’ lessons of Northern Ireland globally (Ellison and O’Reilly 2008a). Many RUC and PSNI officers have taken advantage of generous severance packages to establish security consultancies or alternatively to find employment with private contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. More generally, though the PSNI is showing a degree of entrepreneurial flair that is probably unparalled in the world of public policing. The PSNI have carried out discussions with the FBI (the Israeli IDF has also been mooted) about using the force’s new £140 million training facility for counter-terrorism training (The Irish Times 2011). The training facility comes complete with an aircraft fuselage, train carriages, a ship’s hull and a decontamination unit for chemical, biological or nuclear warfare.

Analytic summary Macro The roles of the EU and the US have been vital in providing the political leverage to drive the peace process in Northern Ireland forward. However, it is difficult to argue that the conflict in Northern Ireland represented a major geo-strategic necessity for international actors to become involved in the police reform process, or that it provided an opportunity for them to peddle their wares through the export of a smorgasbord of policing models. Certainly, while many states may have viewed the existence of a stable Northern Ireland as an economic opportunity, the level of assistance received was mostly financial and importantly was left to organizations within Northern Ireland to administer. Crucially, during the peace negotiations the British and Irish governments set the broad framework for reforms to the police and the broader security sector, but these were operationalized by a number of Commissions that had a high level of independence form government control and direction. Meso The conflict in Northern Ireland cannot be divorced from the disputed constitutional status of Northern Ireland. However, the peace process and the Belfast Agreement have been broadly successful in reducing intercommunal tensions and providing an agreed political framework for the governance of Northern Ireland. In many respects though the debate

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about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status became secondary (historically) to a debate over the reform of the RUC and the strategies adopted by the force to deal with political violence, particularly that of republicans. In this sense policing became part of the problem as well as part of the solution. The single biggest factor facing the PSNI concerns the activities of shadow organizations such as dissident republican groups. While the numbers involved in such organizations are small, they nevertheless have the potential to wreak havoc with the peace process. In addition, increasing levels of unemployment as a consequence of the global recession and a feeling in some urban working-class areas that the spoils of peace have not been equitably distributed, serve to foster disenchantment and such groups offer a ready conduit for the disaffected. Micro Much has changed in relation to policing structures in Northern Ireland but there remain problems in a number of areas. There has been the more general problem of communicating the reforms on the on ground: both to police officers and also to those communities that have traditionally experienced high levels of hostility and mistrust of public policing. There is a sense in such communities that ‘policing’ has been ‘settled at the high table’ but there has been little realization of the vision of ‘policing with the community’ laid down in the ICP in some urban workingclass areas. Consequently, while things are improving some inner-city republican communities remain suspicious of the PSNI. The threat from dissident republicans also means that the PSNI find it difficult to fully operationalize local policing. The targeting of Catholic PSNI officers will also impact on the PSNI’s ability to recruit from within this community. This was a key ICP aim in making the force more representative of Northern Irish society as a whole.


Proof

8

South Africa

Country profile The Republic of South Africa (generally referred to as South Africa) is one of the countries comprising the UN subregion of Southern Africa. It has a huge land border (just over 3,000 miles) with six neighbouring states. The population of South Africa is approximately 49 million (CIA 2011e) that is comprised of black African 79%, white 7.9%, coloured1 8.9%, and Indian/Asian 2.5% (CIA 2011e). By comparative European, North American and Australasian standards the population of South Africa is relatively young with a median age of 25 (CIA 2011e). South Africa ranks as a middle-income country with a GDP per capita of $10,700 (CIA 2011e). Income inequalities are severe between various ethnic and racial groups, but particularly so between whites and the majority black African population. On the Human Development Index, South Africa ranks 123rd out of the 187 countries included in the 2011 data. Historically, the main issue affecting South Africa has been the struggle by the country’s majority black population against apartheid – the policy of racial separateness and white minority rule that culminated in the political transformation and democratic elections of 1994 (discussed below). By the late 1980s, South Africa was not immune to global processes such as the ending of the Cold War, which removed one of the National Party’s rhetorical justifications for apartheid (that it protected South Africa from a communist insurgency) while apartheid itself had become increasingly anachronistic (Cawthra 2003: 31). In any event, the country was an economic basket-case and politically ungovernable: The effects of the country’s international pariah status, economic and political sanctions, a sustained mass struggle by the African National Congress (ANC) and their armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the 148

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Proof South Africa 149

Nation) meant that the ruling National Party under the leadership of President F.W. de Klerk was forced to seek political dialogue and rapprochement with the ANC. Following, the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 and the unbanning of the ANC a series of delicate political negotiations between the ANC and the National Party were entered into resulting in the National Peace Accord in September 1991.2 This culminated in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) that was tasked with drawing up a blueprint for democratic transformation with the first democratic, multiracial election scheduled for 1994. The ANC won the election with 62% of the vote, and elected Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s first black President. South Africa is a parliamentary democracy based on a mixed legal system of Dutch/Roman law and English common law. It has a bicameral legislature, with elections held under proportional representation to ensure that minority parties are represented. Non-racial forms of government have been established at national, provincial and local level. The new South African constitution that was formally approved in 1996, includes a Bill of Rights, and provides extensive human rights protections, equality before the law, freedom from discrimination in regard to race, gender, sex, marital status, ethnic origin, age, disability and religion (CIA 2011e). Chapter 11 of the constitution establishes the structures for the civilian control of the military, the police and the intelligence services (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2011). In 1995 the apartheid era South African Police (SAP) was replaced by the South African Police Service (SAPS), which incorporated the ten forces from the former Bantustans (homelands) and the old SAP into one national police agency. Organizationally the SAPS is structured into national, provincial and divisional command units and has a Reserve division for local crime control. As of 2011 there are approximately 160,394 officers in the SAPS, plus a further 33,498 civilian support employees (South African Police Service 2011a). Whites comprised 36% of the 11 apartheid era police forces, but this has fallen to 20% currently in the SAPS (Bruce et al 2007). However, whites are still over-represented in the SAPS compared to their position in the overall population (8%). The composition of other racial groups in the SAPS is as follows: Black (66%), Coloured (12%), and Indian/ Asian (2.5%) (Bruce et al 2007). South Africa always had a comparatively large private and commercial security sector but this has grown exponentially since 1994. Owing to the rather volatile nature of the industry, accurate figures are difficult to come by but Berg (2007: 5) has estimated that in 2005 there were 4,639 registered private security firms in South Africa, employing nearly 300,000

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staff. For white, and increasingly black middle-class urban dwellers, gated communities and private security have become the norm. Downtown areas of cities such as Johannesburg have all but been abandoned with affluent residents, shops and commercial firms relocating en masse to the northern city suburbs of Rosebank, Parktown and Westcliff (OSAC 2011).

Discussion Economic and political issues The backcloth to the state of economic and political development in present day South Africa needs to be set in the context of the legacy of colonialism and the ‘highly evolved form of settler colonial rule’ that culminated in apartheid (Cawthra 2003: 31). In 1948 the National Party ousted the United Party that had governed South Africa from the 1930s, and embarked on a programme to institutionalize and further entrench the politics of racial segregation and the curtailment of the rights of nonwhite inhabitants that had been developed earlier by the British colonists in the 19th century. Apartheid became the de facto orthodoxy of ruling National Party policy between 1948 and 1994 (Brogden and Shearing 1993; Brewer 1994). It officially classified the population into four racial groups: ‘native’, ‘white’, ‘coloured’ and ‘Asian’ (Wilson and Thompson 1985). Under apartheid, whites of all social classes had full citizenship rights and availed of a standard of living that was in many ways superior to that enjoyed by their counterparts in Europe or North America. Brogden and Shearing (1993: 15) outline the stark rationale for apartheid: Its simple function has been to limit black South Africans’ access to their country’s resources while at the same time ensuring that their labour was available to promote the interests of white South Africans. It is both a state of affairs and a mechanism. It is a way of doing things that at once promotes discrimination and is discriminatory. During its initial stages apartheid not only introduced a crude racial classificatory system for the ordering of the population (including regulations on marriage and sex between races, the use of public facilities, and residence) but also legitimated racism by reference to a divinely ordained Calvinist doctrine and Afrikaner volk epitomized in the Broederbond3 (Brogden and Shearing 1993: 46–54). Under apartheid, the Group Areas Act [1950] designated a number of areas ‘whites in the forced resettlement only’ and resulted of inhabitants into separate ‘townships’ that were established for each of the three designated non-white population

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groups (native, coloured and Asian). The notorious Pass Laws, monitored by the South African Police, strictly controlled movement in and out of the townships. The townships provided an endless supply of cheap labour to service white-owned businesses, mines and factories or provide domestic labour to white families. Townships existed on the periphery of the whites-only metropolitan core and often lacked basic services and amenities such as electricity, a working sewage system and running water. Later, they became notoriously overcrowded due to high levels of migration from rural areas that even the South African authorities were powerless to control and regulate. Informal settlements (squatter camps) often sprang up on the outskirts of townships with makeshift huts constructed from corrugated tin, cardboard or wood. One of the largest townships in South Africa is Khayelitsha located outside Cape Town, with a population of over 500,000. From 1958, Prime Minister Verwoerd advocated what he termed ‘grand apartheid’ and the doctrine of separate development. Under this ‘grand apartheid’ Black Africans were forcibly exiled to Bantustans (artificially created self-governing ‘homelands’) organized by ethnic group (van Vuuren 2006).4 Once there, their South African citizenship was revoked since as far as the South African government was concerned each ‘homeland’ was an autonomous and self-governing territory.5 Some Bantustans such as Ceskei and Bophuthatswana were granted ‘independence’ by the South African government. Others for example, KwaZulu-Natal, became the site of extreme ‘Black on Black’ violence between supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC in the run-up to the democratic elections in 1994. In many instances this violence was precipitated by the SAP and the South African Defence Force (SADF) who acted as agent provocateur (Shaw 2002; Brogden and Shearing 1993). Under apartheid the economy had stagnated for two decades with government borrowing running at almost 10% of GDP (Corder 1997). Presumably in anticipation of some kind of doomsday scenario, corruption by apartheid functionaries was endemic and operated in a ‘seamless web’ across all levels of government activity (Brogden and Nijhar 1998: 89). Huge amounts of money were externalized from South Africa and placed in foreign-holding accounts and swathes of state property were transferred into private hands (van Vuuren 2006). Consequently, the ANC was to inherit a dysfunctional economy and a political substructure that was grounded in apartheid era exigencies. Following the election of Nelson Mandela to the Presidency, the government embarked on a twin-track strategy to boost the flagging economy and to alleviate the socioeconomic inequalities of the apartheid era. The Growth, Employment

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and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy was introduced in 1996 to create a favourable climate for investment and set itself the ambitious target of creating 400,000 new jobs per year (Newman 2005; Harsch 2001). Similarly, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was launched to deal with the malaise of South Africa’s development and social welfare issues. The RDP consisted of six key programmes centred on housing, clean water, electrification, land reform, healthcare and public works. Critics, however (see Lodge 2003) have pointed out that the RDP did not deliver on expectations or its objectives, but it may simply be that the sheer scale of what was required in developmental terms was (and remains) overwhelming, and outpaced by rising levels of need. Certainly as Cawthra argues (2003: 51) if we measure human security in terms of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (see above) ‘then there has been no progress in South Africa since the onset of democracy’. While Cawthra (2003) acknowledges that there has been some improvement in relation to housing, electrification and the provision of clean water, he notes that the reduction in economic inequalities has been hindered by the adoption of neoliberal fiscal instruments via GEAR that served to exacerbate problems of poverty and unemployment. As he suggests: The ANC, once committed to partial nationalisation, aimed systematically to redress racial inequalities and promote socio-economic development through the umbrella policy of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), but its economic policy shifted progressively to the right as it sought to position South Africa competitively in the global economy through neoliberal policies (2003: 33). In addition, there has been little in the way of wealth redistribution in the new South Africa. White farmers own approximately 87% of commercial agricultural land in South Africa. Under the new ANC government, however, the majority of white-owned firms continue to be white-owned, and capital remains largely in white hands (Cawthra 2003: 33). The government’s scheme (under the RDP) to redistribute 30% (64 million acres) of white-owned land to poor blacks has so far resulted in only 5% being transferred, while the timetable for completion has been extended from 2014 to 2025 (The Economist 2009). Similarly, while the ANC’s ‘Black Economic Empowerment Programme’ sought to ‘deracialise’ the economy, critics have argued that it has merely contributed to a new black bourgeoisie, while allowing the fundamental logic of the apartheid era economy to remain intact (Mngxitama 2010). Certainly, across a range of socioeconomic indicators the position of white South

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Africans remains advantageous relative to the majority black population. For example [all data from Statistics South Africa, 2011] just over 22% of black African males aged 20 or over have graduated with a high school diploma (whites 70.7%), while in terms of overall living standards the percentage of black Africans with access to running water in their property is 51.7% (whites 87.2%). The official average unemployment rate in South Africa is 25.3% but again this masks considerable variation between population groups. For example, the unemployment rate for black African males 15–65 is 28.1%, for coloureds 22.5%, Indians, 10.1% and whites 6.4%. The most recent Income and Expenditure Survey which reports on data from 2005–2006 (the next tranche is due to be released in 2012) indicates that the average income of South African households by population group is as follows: White ($33,156); Indian ($15,882); Coloured ($9,377); Black African ($4,452).6 Clearly there remain considerable disparities across a range of socioeconomic indicators in spite of the political reforms that have been undertaken in the country since 1994. There are also considerable variations in health and mortality indices in South Africa. The overall life expectancy is 50.2 years for males and 48.3 years for females (CIA 2011e), but again there are significant differences between population groups. According to data compiled by The Economist (2010) in spite of the government spending nearly 9% of GDP on health (close to the international norm) the average life expectancy of black Africans has fallen from 60 to 50 over the past two decades. For white South Africans it is 72, broadly in line with Europe, North America and Australasia. There are many explanations for this, such as the demand for primary healthcare in majority black areas that outpaces the ability to provide it; a chronic shortage of medically qualified staff willing to work in the public sector; extremely high levels of HIV/AIDS infection among black males (14% compared to 0.3% for whites); higher incidences of alcohol and drug abuse among black males such as Dagga and Tik; and high levels of violence in the townships that often results in fatalities (discussed below). Arguably then the ending of apartheid has granted the black and non-white majority untold political freedoms, but has delivered little in the way of human security with income inequalities and poverty proving particularly intractable problems for the government. Crime and security sector issues The new South African government was faced with a formidable challenge in 1994 in terms of reforming the security sector from a system that benefitted and privileged the white minority, to one based on due process and

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that respected the rights of all equally. Reform of the SAP was an immediate necessity not only because of its historic role as ‘the enforcement arm of the infamous apartheid regime’ (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 136) but also because of concerted attempts by elements within the SAP (particularly the security police) to destabilize the political transition to democracy (van der Spuy 2009). In terms of the reforms introduced post-1994, South Africa has, at least on paper, all the trappings of a criminal justice system that conforms to democratic norms and values. When the ANC came to power in 1994, ‘Crime’ was declared ‘the soft underbelly of the Reconstruction and Development Programme’ by the Premier of Gauteng, Tokyo Sexwale (cited in Shaw 1997). To this end a National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was launched in 1996 that sought to apply a range of social and developmental approaches to the issue of crime: It was to be socially engineered out of existence. Combating crime was seen to lie in introducing a range of measures to deal with poverty, unemployment, poor housing and the huge inequalities that existed across South African society (Newman 2005). Nonetheless, despite the progressive and laudable aims of the NCPS, in practice its implementation was slow to get off the ground, and was encumbered by an overly bureaucratic committee structure leading to difficulties in coordinating policy across departments (Rauch 2002). Factional rivalries over departmental ‘turf’ and disagreements in the setting of targets and funding priorities also served to limit its potential for effectiveness (Newman 2005; Shaw 2002). The apparent failure of the NCPS to make an impact – at least in the short to medium term – on crime levels has perhaps, understandably refocused attention on South Africa’s malady. As several commentators have pointed out (e.g. Newman 2005; Rauch 2002; Van der Spuy and Röntsch 2008; Steinberg 2011) the social and developmental thrust of the NCPS did not last long. From 1998, owing to public anger and disquiet about perceived rocketing crime rates, the rhetoric shifted to a ‘War on Crime’ that ‘resulted in the government’s primary focus and resources being directed to the institutions of criminal justice’ that were encouraged to ‘get tough’ on crime (Newman 2005: 1). However, these ‘get tough’ policies have had a considerable knock-on effect on incarceration levels. Currently, South Africa has the 9th highest rate of incarceration in the world based on population size, with 160,545 inmates (International Centre for Prison Studies 2011a). In the late 1990s the South African government entered into a Private Finance Agreement (PFA) with a commercial consortia including the US-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporation to construct a maximumsecurity prison in Bloemfontein. In 2008, plans were drawn up by the

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Department of Correctional Services to sign PFAs for the construction of a further five prisons (International Centre for Prison Studies 2011a). It is concerns about crime that have impacted on the direction of security sector reform and the process of police democratization in South Africa (Van der Spuy and Röntsch 2008; Steinberg 2011). As we argued in Chapter 3 high levels of crime and continued economic inequalities mean that even a fundamentally transformed ‘democratic’ police can have little impact on citizen safety. High levels of crime results in calls for ‘get tough’ policies; it encourages the police to resort to repressive tactics; it fuels the growth of the commercial and private security sector and it places a burden in resource terms on other elements of the criminal justice system (prisons, courts, sentencing, probation and so forth). Furthermore, there is now abundant evidence that high levels of crime and disorder have important reciprocal effects that hinder the development of an equality agenda across a number of domains: health, education, quality of life, employment, and urban regeneration (Taylor 1999). Certainly the picture of South Africa as a high-crime country needs little illustration. Images of Johannesburg as the ‘murder-capital’ of the world, of Cape Town as a site of numerous unsolved violent attacks, of Durban as a city where only the presence of 3,000 private security officers can guarantee a place in the sun, of robberies of high profile athletes and sports persons, diplomatic staff, and international investors, all suggest a society on the edge of breakdown. Newspaper headlines, police reports, and citizen experience has brought the crime issue to the international agenda. South Africa is portrayed as swamped by a ‘crime wave’. Political and business elites claim that crime is a threat to the stability of the new democracy and a deterrent to investment. Its resolution is viewed as a litmus test of government capacity to rule and of the consolidation of the new democracy. There is little doubt that crime has increased in South Africa since 1994. However, as Mark Shaw (1997, 2002) cautions, crime, and in particular, violent crime, was also endemic in apartheid-era South Africa: It was simply less visible to whites since the notorious Pass Laws and the SAP prevented it from spilling out of the townships and into the suburbs (see also Brogden and Shearing 1993). Currently, higher rates of population density, urbanization, unemployment, absolute and relative deprivation, illegal immigration, the legacy of apartheid and factors associated with the transition have undoubtedly contributed to these increases (Shaw 1997, 2002). Statistical evidence and anecdotal accounts furnish a complementary picture of the crime scene. An article in the Mail and Guardian (Underhill and McDermott 2011) reports that some 15,940 murders were recorded in

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2010–2011, a figure that translates to 43 deaths per day. This is substantiated by officially recorded data that reports South Africa’s homicide rate as 31.9 per 100,000 people in 2010–2011, which is among the highest in the world (South African Police Service 2011a). Incidents of other serious offences such as attempted murder, aggravated robbery, rape, assault involving grievous bodily harm, car-jacking and a gamut of property offences, have also spiralled. The official records undoubtedly understate offences. Rape is a particular South African problem and according to official data is twice the level of the United States with 240 incidents of rape and attempted rape per 100,000 women recorded each year (Jewkes and Abrahams 2002). There appears to be a link between South Africa’s transition to democracy and increases in crime (Shaw 1997, 2002; van der Spuy and Röntsch 2008). This is evident at the level of ‘ordinary’ crime, but also in terms of transnational and organized crime with syndicates dealing in drugs, weapons, human trafficking and prostitution (STRATFOR 2008). This is consistent with other countries’ experience of democratic transition. Political liberalization produced a crime explosion in other societies undergoing sustained democratic transition, especially when democratization was coupled with instability and violence (Shaw 1997, 2002). Such social change occurs at the international level (the novel exposure of South Africa to international crime) and also at the local level in terms of rising expectations for different population groups. Crime grows most rapidly in periods of political transition, when state resources are concentrated on limited tasks, are unsure of and/or unfitted for their new mandate, and may have not yet achieved legitimacy (see Shelley and Vigh 2004). In the interstices, gaps emerge for criminal entrepreneurship. New areas for crime development, bolstered by the legacies of the past, open up. Old institutions have been overthrown but new institutions evolve slowly and have yet to acquire legitimacy. Within that miasma, crime and social disorganization grow – out of expediency (survival needs when traditional income sources have fragmented) – and opportunistically (new possibilities of wealth acquisition). Further, as a consequence of the breakdown in formal control structures, more weapons appear in unauthorized hands. Political struggles have metamorphosed into criminal conflicts. The violence that continued post-1994 in KwaZulu-Natal was regarded as ‘criminal’ rather than ‘political’, despite the continuity of combatants (Taylor 2002). In poor black communities, Self-Defence Units formed under apartheid degenerated into gangs controlling economic territory (Gear 2002). The demobilization of the liberation armies created a reservoir of trained personnel with high expectations but no employment. Those

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accounts that point to South Africa’s democratic transition for the increase in crime focus on the convergence of opportunities, motivations, and extralegal space (e.g. Shaw 2002; van der Spuy 2009). Major economic changes are coupled with shifts in the level of expectations, and an absence of legitimacy for the informal and formal control agencies. In South Africa, the democratic transition impeded the capacity of the police to combat crime, while crime in turn impeded the state’s capacity to transform the force (Shaw 1997; Newman 2005). Public concern at the growth in crime rates coincided with a period in which the SAPS had been severely stressed as a result of the transition. However, castigation of the ineffectiveness of policing should allow for the major difficulties of transformation, including amalgamation of the 11 police forces of the apartheid era, each with different training standards, investigation skills, codes of conduct, promotion policies and uniforms (Bruce et al 2007). The officer corps was depleted as competent officers joined the postapartheid exodus of the racist and incompetent (Brogden and Nijhar 1998). By 2000, over 20,000 officers had resigned or retired from the SAPS, many (often the better officers) to lucrative positions in the private security sector (Mokholwane 2004). Hiring practices also led to ‘rank inflation’ with people moving up through the ranks with limited policing experience (Leggett 2003: 6). In the reverse of what we would expect to find in police organizations elsewhere – where rank and file officers outnumber their superiors – the SAPS has four times as many Inspectors, the most senior non-commissioned rank, as Constables.7 This situation has arisen because of a ‘desire for parity, a quota-based affirmative action policy, and union pressures’ (Leggett 2003: 6) but it also means that there are considerably fewer officers available for day-to-day routine policing duties. From the early days, the new SAPS also lacked specialist skills. In 1998, just over a quarter of detectives had been formally trained in investigation courses while only 13% had over six years policing experience (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). In any case, that detective work was often limited to white areas. Detective work was always underrated – security took precedence in the past, uniformed work in the post-apartheid present. Criminal intelligence was devoted to political matters not to criminal investigation. Determining police establishments is an inexact science but according to the South African Police Union (SAPU) resourcing is concentrated at national level with local areas suffering from a dearth of equipment and too few personnel dedicated to the investigation of serious crime (SAPU 2009). However, as Leggert (2003) points out, the issue is not simply a lack of detectives – the SAPS has a higher proportion of officers involved in detective work than Britain – but rather a lack of

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forensics staff and up-to-date technology. In addition, the sheer volume of case-work has proved to be overwhelming. There are other pressure points in the system as well, such as with the prosecution service and massive delays in bringing cases to trial (Leggett 2003). Van der Spuy (2009) has pointed to a more fundamental set of structural problems that affect what she terms ‘police reconstruction’ not only in South Africa, but in the Southern African region more generally. She points out that debates on police reform have tended to be overshadowed by what is desirable for donors or those involved in SSR efforts, as opposed to what is feasible or doable within a heavy circumscribed set of structural constraints (2009: 38). It is, as she suggests, ‘this discrepancy between what is, and what ought to be, which constitutes the most critical of challenges with which the transformation of safety and security agencies in Africa need to contend’ (2009: 38). She points to the huge resources involved in reform efforts that often exceed the ability of national governments to fund; the sheer prevalence of economic and social inequalities that lead to the conditions of crime and disorder that we discussed above; the difficulties of conducting reforms when the underlying political substructure is fragile; but also, the normative difficulties in changing the mentality of police officers and officials towards a new democratic dispensation that is geared fundamentally to the protection of rights (van der Spuy 2009). The SAPS has one of the world’s highest rates of recorded homicide by the police (Bruce 2010) and has also come under sustained criticism for the prevalence of brutality and violence used against members of the public. According to the Independent Complaints Directorate that oversees complaints against the police, the SAPS shot dead 556 people in 2010, the highest number recorded in 12 years (Mail and Guardian 2010). Some of these individuals appear to have been shot for resisting arrest while others were innocent bystanders. In fact, as Bruce (2010) points out, there is no obvious relationship between high levels of police shootings and the environment in which the police work. Rather, as he suggests, the trend is the more worrying one of a ‘culture of violence’ emerging within the SAPS that is condoned by officialdom. Prior to his suspension from duty on corruption charges, the SAPS National Commissioner, Bheki Cele, had issued a statement arguing that he wanted Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act (that permits the use of deadly force on reasonable grounds) to be amended to allow the ‘police to shoot to kill and worry later’ (Mail and Guardian 2010). Indeed, under Commissioner Cele there has been a creeping authoritarianism and rolling back from the spirit of the initial transformation that saw the SAPS as a global beacon

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of best practice. In 2010, he announced that the South African Police Service would henceforth be known as the South African Police Force, while the civilian rank structure of the police was to revert back to the military ranks of the apartheid era.8 We should also acknowledge, however, that policing in South Africa remains a notoriously difficult and dangerous occupation and an average of 100 officers are killed each year in the course of duty (The Economist 2011). This has no doubt reinforced its own cultural milieu for the way that the public are perceived by the police and how interactions with them are determined (Marks 2006). Foreign security sector reform efforts Van der Spuy (2009: 37) notes that over the past two decades attempts at liberalization and democratization across the African continent (however nascent and limited in many cases) have ‘given birth to a veritable cottage industry’ in international police reform assistance, and South Africa has been no exception. Unlike the situation in Northern Ireland where the British were able to financially underwrite the SSR endeavour in its entirety, in South Africa limited resources meant that the new government was forced to rely on overseas aid and assistance. This meant, however, that too many discrete projects were spread too thinly with minimal funding and a lack of strategic direction (see van der Spuy 2007: 284–285). Following the contours of our argument in Chapter 3, it is debatable how much of this assistance has been efficacious, and actually benefitted the institutional reform of the security sector in South Africa (van der Spuy 2009, 2006; Steinberg 2011; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Dixon 2000). There was also a huge sectoral imbalance: Donors clamoured to fund voguish projects in community policing, but shied away from the less salubrious, but equally important issue of prison reform (van der Spuy 2000). In other cases, donors were simply too ambitious and vastly underestimated the difficulties in implementing reforms in a local context, that many did not fully understand. As van der Spuy (2006: 12) suggests, ‘One critical lesson to be drawn from South African experiments in criminal justice and police reform is that the gap between policy innovation and policy implementation simply loomed far too large for comfort’ (2006: 12). Aside from issues of implementation, questions have also been raised about the relevance of what has been exported in the first place. The two most obvious examples of the importation of the ‘wrong’ Western goods have concerned the cult of community policing that was enshrined into South African law in 1995 (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; van der Spuy 2009) and a Western risk-orientated discourse of ‘crime prevention’ that was

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written into the South African Constitution as the core mandate of the SAPS (Steinberg 2011). Community policing was the watchword of efforts to sell policing as acceptable to the South African public. Understandably, its warm and fuzzy emphasis on consensual relationships and local problem-solving was seen as a corrective to the belligerence of the police under apartheid (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). From the early establishment of ‘Adopt a Cop’ programmes to the junior police training courses of the Technikon SA and the UNISA degree in police science, community policing became the mantra of the new SAPS. The principles of community policing were rehashed verbatim from American textbooks without practical relevance to the South African context (Brogden and Nijhar 1998: 96). However, there were other early problems with the establishment of community policing. Following the creation of the SAPS, over onethird of personnel, and all the senior officers in the new Community Policing Division had been recruited from the old SAP security police that was responsible for most of the abuses under apartheid. For some officers, community policing was just a continuation of what they had always done: gather local intelligence. For other officers there was role confusion. Nevertheless, the lateral movement of so many security police to community police generated considerable scepticism among the public and ANC politicians about the police commitment to the reform endeavour (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 138). Even for those officers who ‘bought’ community policing there was no infrastructure in place locally for them to deliver on its promises, and in any case such officers often met with hostility or indifference by their colleagues, who perceived community policing as ‘soft’ and irrelevant. Whatever the virtues of community policing the salespeople failed to demonstrate its weaknesses independently of any problem of applicability to South Africa’s diversity. For example, a core aspect of community policing enshrined in statute in South Africa was the creation of Community Police Forums (CPFs) in every police station that were supposed to provide for the local oversight of policing. These were beset by numerous problems. The instructions issued to local station commanders offered little in the way of practical guidance as to how CPFs might be established, or what their role and function was, apart from the vague requirement to ‘hold meetings’. In other cases, officers in criminal investigation and public order units felt that community policing simply didn’t apply to them (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 141). More fundamentally, as in most Western countries, such shared governance initiatives quickly become police-led rather than citizen-led and in many cases, perform a public

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relations, rather than an oversight role. According to Steven Friedman (2006) the participatory spirit of CPFs has all but dissipated, and in recent years they have undergone a ‘progressive transmutation from citizen watchdogs to police helpers…[and] CPFs seem too preoccupied with helping police to enable citizen participation’ (pp. 10–11). In the Western Cape, CPFs now act as a kind of labour exchange for the provincial government by providing security personnel in return for a fee (Friedman 2006: 11). Similarly, under the NCPS a new Secretariat for Safety and Security was established that provided for the national oversight of policing policy. From its inception, however, it was underfunded and viewed by hostility by the SAPS who felt it undermined their professionalism (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). For Steinberg (2011) the importation of Western notions of crime prevention along with community policing, has been a hubristic failure in the South African context, but plus ça change has inadvertently reproduced the failures that lay at the heart of apartheid era policing. In particular, the late-modern ‘panickyness’ (cf. Sparks 1992) that lies at the root of Western notions of security (and crime prevention) resonates with the distended sense of security that existed during the apartheid era (Steinberg 2011). It means, for example, that the problems of urban poverty and inequality in the townships are securitized. Poverty, in effect, has become a criminal act in the new South Africa. In an exaggerated form of zero-tolerance policing, the SAPS endlessly roam the townships in paramilitary gangs looking for ‘risk factors’ (Steinberg 2011: 356). High on adrenaline and caffeine (the chain drinking of cola is habitual apparently) they routinely arrest groups of young black males only to release them a few hours later. This ritual is repeated in endless cycles over the weekend (Steinberg 2011). Steinberg’s point is that the relative strength of civil society should have been allowed to deal with the humdrum of routine ordering and what post-apartheid South Africa needed in policing terms was minimal policing that focused on two, and only two aspects: the investigation of serious crime and rapid response to emergencies (2011: 359). However, the paradox of the situation that Steinberg (2011) identifies is that residents in poor areas feel that the police are not repressive enough. This points to larger questions about the emergence of an authoritarian populism between the state and the public in the ‘new’ South Africa, but it also points to our observation in Chapter 2, that unless police reform (rights, accountability and so forth) is balanced with effectiveness, this simply fuels demands for tougher and more repressive policing by residents. Providing, of course, that this repression is not directed at them.

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Not all overseas assistance to South Africa was concerned with the establishment of ‘democratic’ policing, though this formed a large part of what was offered. In some cases sheer unadulterated Western interest loomed large. Samara (2003) has documented how SSR in South Africa has been increasingly refracted through the lens of First World security concerns. In particular, the US came to view South Africa as a regional security corridor in the context of international terrorism, organized crime and drugs. The full gamut of US Federal enforcement agencies have been replicated in miniature in South Africa: State Department, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Secret Service, Customs Service, Agency for International Development, and the Department of Justice (via ICITAP). In addition the US has also embarked on a number of bilateral assistance packages between the US military and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (Samara 2003: 300).

Analytic summary Macro The South African economy was in the doldrums at the point of democratic transition. However, in spite of efforts via the GEAR strategy to revitalize the economy by creating a favourable climate for investment, the strategy has oscillated between neoliberal fiscal instruments and government interventionist approaches, that have not had the desired effect. Inequalities remain rife in South Africa and there has been little improvement in South Africa’s Human Development Index score. In line with the patterns we discussed in Chapter 1, government policy has shifted from a concern with linking poverty to crime reduction via the NCPS, to an administrative concern with controlling crime to make South Africa a safe haven for business. Meso The new ANC government inherited a highly dysfunctional economy and a political substructure that was rooted in apartheid era exigencies. Consequently, there were formidable difficulties in coordinating aspects of government policy to achieve desired goals (as with the NCPS). It is concerns about crime, however, that have both determined and distorted the police democratization process in South Africa. The government’s ‘get tough’ policies have filtered down to the SAPS who are in some ways as brutal and violent as their apartheid-era predecessors. The number of homicides by police is a major cause for concern. Gang violence and the establishment of

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crime syndicates in South Africa pose particular problems for the SADC region as a whole. Micro There were always going to be difficulties in reforming the apartheid era structures into a national police that had a commitment to democratic rights. Many competent officers have been lured poached by the private security sector, which offers better pay and working conditions. The huge expansion of private security in South Africa is an indication that crime has bred a sense of fearfulness across civil society, with gated communities and residences becoming the norm rather than the exception. The local problems of poverty, inequality and relative deprivation have undoubtedly impacted on the style and nature of policing locally. The answer to the problem of security is also one of development, however that is defined.


Proof

9

Trinidad and Tobago

Country profile Trinidad and Tobago is a country comprising two small islands with abundant biodiversity, beautiful beaches, a relaxed and carefree lifestyle and one of the highest murder rates in the world. These islands sit between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of South America and just seven miles northeast of Venezuela (CIA 2011c). The country’s population is just over 1.2 million, consisting of 40% Indian (South Asian), 38% African, 20% mixed, and 2% other or unspecified (CIA 2011c). The country’s ethnic diversity is matched by its religious diversity. Religious faiths represented in Trinidad and Tobago include Protestants (31%), Roman Catholics (26%), Hindus (23%), Muslims (6%), and various others (14%) (CIA 2011c). The nation is considered a middleincome country, thanks to its oil wealth. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2011), Trinidad and Tobago enjoys a relatively high level of development as indicated by a Human Development Index ranking that places it 62nd out of 187 countries in the 2011 data. GDP per capita is approximately $21,200 (CIA 2011c). The economic precariousness of Trinidad and Tobago is impacted by the country’s colonial legacy. The Spanish first colonized Trinidad in 1592, but the British took control during the early 1800s. Slavery was abolished in 1834, resulting in an influx of migrants from India to fulfil the need for agricultural labour (CIA 2011c). Trinidad and Tobago gained independence from the UK in 1962, but has a parliamentary democracy based on English common law. Even though the country has a supreme court, the Privy Council in London is the highest appeals court (CIA 2011c). Colonial history also affects policing in Trinidad and Tobago. During the period under Spanish colonial rule, the capital, Port of Spain, had six 164

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Proof Trinidad and Tobago 165

police officers that served under the management of the mayor, and a ward-watch system existed on other parts of the island in country districts (de Verteuil 1986; Ottley 1964). This arrangement lasted for two more centuries until the expansion of sugar, coffee, and cocoa plantations increased the island’s population (Ottley 1964). Soon after the British took over control of the island in 1802, officers from the Irish Constabulary were brought in to police the sugar cane plantations (de Verteuil 1986). A comprehensive set of rules to govern the police was issued in 1835, and by 1850 the Trinidadian police consisted of one inspector commandant, two sub-inspectors (one each in Port of Spain and San Fernando), ten sergeants, and 100 constables consisting largely of lowerclass whites (‘Barbadian Irish’) who beforehand were living in Barbados (de Verteuil 1986: 30; Ottley 1964). Almost 50 years after the British took control of Trinidad, courts were using both Spanish and British law books, but English law was established in 1844, including trial by jury (Ottley 1964). In 1874, five members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) were appointed to reorganize and strengthen a plain-clothes Inspector Branch that was started in 1862. In the 1890s an RIC officer became the local senior inspector and modelled the police force after the RIC, laying out San Fernando and Port of Spain into beats for purposes of crime prevention and detection (de Verteuil 1986; Ottley 1964). However, the key practice of the largely Irish police was the maintenance of colonial order and through the 19th century there were numerous clashes between the police and the local population on the islands. The Constabulary Ordinance of 1905 provided the basis for how the police would function well into the second half of the 20th century. In addition to the detection of crime, the police force was charged with repressing internal disturbances (steel band activity, religious feuds, and carnival celebrations) and defending the colony ‘against external aggression’ (Ottley 1964: 115). Currently the police operate at a centralized national level under the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, subdivided into nine divisions across northern and southern branches (Kurian 2006). Those of African descent, who were exclusively recruited into the police during the colonial period, comprise around 90% of the police force. Traditionally, physical entrance requirements to the police favour those of African over Indian descent. An extensive commercial security sector in the country comprises prisoner transport companies, private security for businesses, and gated communities for wealthier residents. For incarceration, the country has eight prisons, and all but one – the oldest in Port of Spain, which is decrepit and overcrowded – meets international standards (Kurian 2006).

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Discussion Economic and political issues When Trinidad and Tobago was a British colony, slaves processed raw materials such as sugar and molasses for export to England or the North American colonies (Isbister 2003). This process is tied to the country’s underdevelopment because plantation agriculture limited industrial growth and stunted modernization (Mandle 1996). After independence and the discovery of oil and natural gas, there was an elite consensus on an economic development strategy dependent on energy exports (Mandle 1996). This dependence on energy started with Eric Williams, who was Prime Minister after independence and controlled Trinibagoan politics for a quarter century (between 1955–1981) (Payne and Sutton 2001). Williams used oil wealth in the 1970s to spur development, but did little to diversify via agriculture or manufacturing (Mandle 1996; Payne and Sutton 2001). During the oil boom (between 1974–1980) the government played an active role in the economy, using revenues to subsidize food, oil, welfare, agriculture, and utilities, to reduce taxes, and expand government programmes (Payne and Sutton 2001). Williams’ party, the People’s National Movement (PNM), also traded jobs for votes to ensure that they could stay in power (Payne and Sutton 2001). After Williams died in 1982 during the height of an economic boom, George Chambers (also from the PNM) became the new Prime Minister. The economy then declined for seven straight years because over 50 government-owned enterprises could not offset the impact of lower oil prices. The IMF then stepped in to offer loans with structural adjustment austerity measures (Mandle 1996; Payne and Sutton 2001). Under structural adjustment, the cost of living increased, wages froze, oil prices dropped, unemployment rose, and banks loaned less money, with GDP output decreasing by almost one-half (Mandle 1996; Payne and Sutton 2001; Pino 2009). Structural adjustment policies continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the new National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) government was voted out of power and the PNM once again stepped in to continue the same policies dictated by the IMF (Payne and Sutton 2001). The government sold off or liquidated all but two state enterprises, sought foreign direct investment for the country’s oil and gas, floated the TT dollar (at around $6.2 TT to $1 US), and abolished exchange controls (Payne and Sutton 2001). Lacking enough indigenous individuals with scientific or engineering education, the country had to depend on the US and other core countries for technology (Mandle 1996). Through the 1990s, unemployment

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and the poverty rate remained high among the young adult population, particularly for females (Downes 1998), and as a result the informal sector expanded (Deere et al 1990). The poverty rate that hovered around 18% in the 1960s soared to 30% in the 1990s, and during the same period unemployment doubled from 10 to 20% (Mycoo 2004). Although economic growth has shown some improvement since the turn of the century, economic disparities between various income groups have widened, quality of life has suffered in terms of unemployment, and rising crime rates, with women suffering more of the negative effects than men (Levitt 2005). Male out-migration and low levels of legal marriage owing to the legacies of colonialism and slavery largely explain to a high percentage of female-headed households (Deere et al 1990). Interestingly, the relative economic autonomy of women has not translated to further female participation in government or unions, but women were actually instrumental in mobilizing against the IMF (Deere et al 1990). Civil society leaders have indicated that that there is little community cohesion and trust within neighbourhoods, and a general lack of leadership and vision at various levels of government (Pino 2009). In sum, regardless of the political party in power, various Trinidad and Tobago governments have exacerbated inequality by submitting to structural adjustment and relying on a relatively undiversified economic sector to sustain growth. High unemployment and Trinidad’s geographic position as a transportation hub for drugs has led to an extensive informal economic sector and high rates of violence, as detailed below. Citizen distrust led to the recent election in 2010 of a new prime minister from a coalition of opposition parties (the People’s Partnership), replacing Patrick Manning who had been prime minister for the past decade. Crime and security sector issues The Criminology Unit of the University of the West Indies has compiled police statistics on a number of offences known to the police from 1962 until 2007, including homicide rates that provide a relatively accurate indication of the prevalence of violent crimes in the country. Since independence in 1962 there has been a general increase in homicide from around 50–60 murders per year in 1980 to 100 by 2000. By 2002 the average number of murders rose to 160 per annum; by 2004 there were 245; by 2007 there were 385; and by 2008 there were 550, demonstrating a murder rate of 42.3 per 100,000 people. Violent acts increased dramatically since 2000, by roughly 400% (Townsend 2010; Wells and Katz 2008). One reason for the rise in homicides is the greater availability of illegal guns: in 2001 about half of all murders involved guns, and by 2007 this

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had soared to 75%. The most recent data1 show that there were 509 murders in 2009 and 485 in 2010. While lower than the 2008 peak, the current murder rate in Trinidad and Tobago remains high. To make matters worse, the murder clearance rate is only 7–8% (Wells and Katz 2008), partially because citizens do not feel safe reporting crimes. Some police officers are known to act as informants for criminal gangs, and the repercussions for reporting crimes could therefore be severe (Parks and Mastrofksi 2008; Pino 2009). According to results from a governmentsponsored victimization survey approximately 25% of residents in Trinidad and Tobago have been the victim of a robbery, physical assault (with or without a weapon), or sexual assault over a one year period, and the most crime ridden areas have victimization rates as high as 36% (see Pino 2009). Other areas of Trinidad and Tobago have violence rates much lower, below 15%. While violent crime rates have been increasing dramatically in certain areas of Trinidad and Tobago, property crime rates show different patterns, at least according to police statistics. Overall property crimes and burglaries peaked between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, and since then these rates have declined somewhat. Clearly then, Trinidad and Tobago is not immune from the crime and insecurity problems affecting similar developing countries in an era of neoliberal globalization (see Chapter 1). The increased privatization of governmental functions, economic insecurity, unemployment, and an informal sector based on drugs and other illicit activities are affecting crime rates in the country. In particular, it is the drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago that is a significant contributor to high rates of violence (Deere et al 1990; Klein 2004; Townsend 2010). The Caribbean is a major drug trafficking area for drugs from South America on their way to the US, using international criminal networks also involved in gambling, prostitution, and human trafficking (Deere et al 1990). The trafficking process is disorganized, involving many traffickers killed by rivals for their drug supplies as they attempt to ship them. The illegal drug trade is also related to crimes of violence, sex crimes, domestic violence, child abuse, and corruption in law enforcement (Griffith 2000; Nanton 2004). At the same time, the larger drug lords are seemingly above the law. Traffickers infiltrate the highest levels of society and government as well as the police that are thought to be participating in the drug trade, and security forces have been ineffective in intercepting drug shipments (Townsend 2010). In many ways though, drugs are used as a scapegoat for all of the crime-related problems faced by Trinidad and Tobago: the petty users and dealers reportedly do not play as large a role in the crime problem as unemployment and other major social issues (Klein 2004).

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The criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago is fraught with various other problems including trial delays and insufficient resources. The country has one of the highest rates of prisoners awaiting trial in the Caribbean, and the judiciary is ill informed about the prison system, which has fewer resources than the police (Klein 2004; Singh 2004). Approximately 30% of Trinidad and Tobago’s prison population consists of drug offenders, mostly for petty dealing and possession of marijuana. Numerous reviews of the police service have been conducted since the 1950s prompted in the main by concerns of corruption and other forms of police deviance. The reports based on these reviews include that of the Lee Committee of 1959, the Darby Commission of 1964, The Carr Committee of 1972, and BRICE Committee of 1984, the Police Executive Research Forum Report of 1990, the O’Dowd Committee of 1991 (see Job 2004), and the Seaby report of 1993. Job (2004), a former acting Minister of National Security, lamented that the government had ignored the six previous reviews of the police service and their recommendations regarding organization, management, corruption, abuse of citizens, and technological needs. The BRICE Committee on the Restructuring of the Police Service (CRPS) (1984) reported that relations within the police service were poor and that morale was low. Managerial inefficiencies were associated with various problems such as weak leadership and communication among senior officers, ineffective disciplinary procedures, high turnover among supervisors, uneven and unclear workloads among officers, and lack of respect for senior officers among junior officers (CRPS 1984). According to the same report, the public viewed the police as ‘a repressive force ready to harass people at every opportunity’ (CRPS 1984: 138). Police were perceived as indifferent, unresponsive, and unsympathetic; overly harsh in their treatment of suspects; engaging in arbitrary search and arrest; ignoring serious crimes while attending to minor offences; destroying the homes of squatters; not conducting internal investigations of police misconduct; and failing to engage in foot patrols (CRPS 1984). Urgent calls for assistance and other calls for service were ignored due to a lack of vehicles or insufficient men at the police station. O’Dowd’s (1991) and Seaby’s (1993) reports found similar problems years later, including weak leadership, lack of internal investigations of misconduct, widespread accusations of corruption, lack of response by the police after receiving calls for service, and the like. Internal disciplinary procedures took as long as five years, even though most investigations concerned minor matters such as showing up late to work. Police were also widely accused of impoliteness, discriminatory behaviour, and corruption

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(O’Dowd 1991; Seaby 1993). The O’Dowd report of 1991 called for the increased use of British police advisors to assist with issues of efficiency, performance management training and education, and improvements in the prevention and detection of crime (Job 2004). More recently, police deviance in Trinidad and Tobago has been subject to a report by Amnesty International (2006). This highlighted the excessive use of force, including summary executions, deaths of persons in police custody, officer involvement in kidnappings, and the failure of authorities to properly carry out investigations and sanction officers’ conduct. As found in previous reports, internal and external investigations of complaints against the police, even those involving fatal shootings, experienced extended delays: some officers suspected of misconduct would remain on active duty (Amnesty International 2006). Police investigations lack transparency, and in cases of human rights violations full investigations and punishments of officers are rare, although civil awards have been given to victims at times when officers involved were not disciplined or held criminally responsible. Recent observers have found that nothing has really changed: police stations are dirty and decrepit, and that the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) suffers from poor pay as well as inadequate staffing and equipment such as vehicles (Parks and Mastrofski 2008). Typically, the police do not engage in proactive crime prevention activities, and the public must solicit most police activities (Johnson 2006). Additionally, corruption, frequent turnover, and weak management and supervision remain problematic (Mastrofski and Lum 2008; Miller and Hendrix 2007; Parks and Mastrofski 2008). The police service has also been accused of favouritism, bias, and nepotism in recruitment (Police Service Commission 2004). The basic elements of police culture outlined by Reiner (2000) were reiterated by the authors of these various other reports: pessimism and cynicism regarding the police mission, suspicion, isolation from the public coupled with solidarity with fellow officers, conservatism, and machismo. As one might expect, the police in Trinidad and Tobago lack legitimacy, partly from charges of drug corruption and favouritism, the convictions of police officials, human rights violations, and the perception of the police being indifferent and incompetent (Bennet and Moribito 2006; Deosaran 2000). Police constables in Trinidad also feel that there is little community support for their activities and that they lack legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Interestingly enough, however, Pfaff and Bennett (2008) note that tolerance for police deviance and perceived use of excessive force among the police increased from 1994 to 2007 because of frustration over increases in violent crime.

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The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which hears and compiles citizen complaints, was created in 1993 by an Act of Parliament in part to deal with problems of legitimacy (Deosaran 2002). The PCA’s 2003 report is the most recent one available (perhaps suggesting that the issue of complaints against the police is not taken particularly seriously) but it indicates that the number of formal and informal complaints had increased dramatically, from 769 in 1998–1999 to 1,262 in 2002–2003 (PCA 2003), ranging from battery, criminal damage, failure to perform duties, harassment, impoliteness, wrongful arrest, and extortion. Unfortunately, the PCA is merely a recording device: it does not engage in investigations and substantive powers. One member of the Ministry of National Security stated to one of the authors (Pino) that the PCA was ‘largely defunct’, and that there was no independent oversight body in Trinidad and Tobago to hold officers accountable for police deviance (see Pino 2009). The problems with public policing in Trinidad and Tobago resemble those found elsewhere in our case studies: the police are perceived to be untrustworthy and ineffective at controlling serious crimes, to be abusive to citizens, to be in collusion with criminals, and to be feared and bribed. Police deviance and repressive actions in particular may stem from the colonial policing era during which police were highly responsive to social and political power (Harriot 1998). Despite this lack of legitimacy and distrust, however, many in the population of Trinidad and Tobago appear to be open to working with the police (Deosaran 2002). NGO and CBO leaders as well as Police Service and Ministry of National Security members want the police and community residents to work together (Pino 2009). That being said, Trinidad and Tobago Police Service’s particular culture originating from its recent colonial past would need to be addressed head-on in any reform efforts. High crime rates and lack of trust in government institutions are attributable to increases in the use of private security in Trinidad and Tobago. Upper- and middle-class residents have been moving to gated communities and have walled themselves off from the rest of the population, especially since the mid-1990s. Gated community residents have also hired private companies to maintain infrastructure such as roads and drainage systems in their localities (Mycoo 2004). The business community has increasingly utilized private security firms for protection as well (Miller and Hendrix 2007). In 2007 Cain (2007) identified 57 firms providing private security services on the islands, but by 2011 the number had swelled to over 90, including the American

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company Wackenhut and Amalgamated Security Services, Ltd., which transports prisoners in Port of Spain for the government.2 Foreign and national security sector reform efforts The US government currently influences criminal justice and law enforcement policies in Trinidad and Tobago under the rhetoric of the war on drugs and the war on terrorism. In this context, Trinidad and Tobago has signed ‘ship rider agreements’ that allow US law enforcement personnel to engage in hot pursuit and board ships suspected of shipping drugs in Trinidad and Tobago’s territorial waters, whereas Trinidad and Tobago law enforcement are prohibited from engaging in the same kinds of behaviours in US territorial waters (Griffith 2000). Trinidad and Tobago has also signed extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with various Western countries, while the EU and US have funded demand reduction programmes such as educational campaigns to reduce illicit drug use among the population (Griffith 2000). Through these mutual assistance treaties, distinctions between military and police functions have become blurred. Transnational crime and anti-terror frames are used to justify extrajudicial actions that deny civil liberties (McCulloch 2007). Trinidad and Tobago have increasingly militarized their police forces with aid from foreign countries. In 2004, Trinidad and Tobago created a paramilitary unit comprised of previous members of the police service and the armed forces including the coast guard called the Special AntiCrime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (SAUTT) (Browne 2008). SAUTT is modelled on the American FBI but trained by the British, and recently received the task of contending with gang-related homicides. Many commentators have questioned the legality of SAUTT, and this dilemma has been resolved by placing SAUTT within the Police Service, under the direction of the police commissioner (Browne 2008). Another state paramilitary group that exists Trinidad and Tobago is the Interagency Task Force, which combines military and police personnel. However, according to civil society leaders the task force is known to sweep through poor neighbourhoods using offensive tactics and harassing and abusing suspects (Pino 2009). Aid from abroad is not limited to militarized special units and drug war and terrorism-influenced agreements. Softer approaches such as community policing have also been exported to Trinidad and Tobago. When the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police decided to implement community policing in 1993, Trinidad and Tobago was eagerly committed (Deosaran 2002). Originally, the police leadership

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was behind the implementation of community policing, although poor police capacity and conduct as well as a lack of citizen support were concerns. Police leaders from the islands travelled abroad to the US and UK to learn about community policing and then returned to Trinidad and Tobago to teach other officers what they had learned. However, by 2002 the impetus for community policing had ‘fizzled out’ according to one Police Service member, in part because of inadequate recruitment policies and the hiring of community policing officers who were not prepared to perform community policing tasks (Pino 2009). As is the case in many jurisdictions, police officers in Trinidad and Tobago resisted community policing reforms. Trinidadian police officers saw community policing activities such as interacting and working with the public as going against established expectations for police work, and viewed community policing as social work or at least not real police work. In essence, the police culture that maintains a separation between the police and the community they serve had not changed adequately (Decker 1998; Lurgio and Skogan 1998; Paoline et al 2000; Yates and Pillai 1996). Starting around 2006, the Trinidad and Tobago government attempted to reform the police service yet again with the help of foreign consultants by consolidating more administrative authority into the hands of the police commissioner, providing the government more opportunities to help direct policy, and by improving civilian oversight (Mastrofski and Lum 2008). These reforms spearheaded by the American academic, Stephen Mastrofski, were modelled after recent police reforms in Northern Ireland (see Chapter 7) and with input from individuals at various ranks of the police service and Ministry of National Security (Wilson et al 2011; Mastrofski and Lum 2008). Improvements in external and independent oversight of the police were to occur through the Police Complaints Authority, whereas policy direction would be directed by the Ministry of National Security in order to provide political weight and make the politicians stakeholders. A Crime Policy Commission composed of experts from both political major parties would develop bipartisan recommendations for policy change. The police commissioner would have more power to direct hiring, discipline, promotion, and training, and in order to recruit more qualified people less likely to be corrupt police pay and educational requirements were to be raised. The plans also included updating officer review procedures and removing bad managers, with attempts to make the police more service-oriented (Mastrofski and Lum 2008). As part of these reforms, Parks and Mastrofski (2008) led a subsequent team in 2007 to create a model station programme for the TTPS, drawing on Mastrofski’s (1999) American community policing

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model entitled Policing for People (PFP), which is a managerialist serviceoriented model that ostensibly treats citizens as consumers. Elements of PFP include attentiveness, reliability, responsive service, competence, manners, and fairness (Mastrofski 1999). The reform team created five model stations in high crime, racially varied and geographically diverse areas: Arouca, Chaguanas, Morvant, San Fernando, and the West End, providing these stations with extra resources such as vehicles, other structural improvements, and enhanced capacity to engage in proactive crime management strategies such as identifying crime hot spots. Leadership of the stations would be the primary responsibility of middle managers posted at the stations, rather than directly from the top leadership at the national level. Additional officers for the model stations were hired and trained for 80 hours by one of three field advisors from police forces in the US (Parks and Mastrofski 2008; Wilson et al 2011). These field advisors arrived five months after the model station programme was initiated, however, and each took a different approach to training officers (see Wilson et al 2011). Officers trained for these model stations were expected to show up to work, engage in foot patrols, spend time with community residents, and manage victim-assistance units. The implementation of the programme was not with out its difficulties, however. Some officers did not attend their training sessions, or attended only sporadically, and some of those that were trained were soon transferred away from the model stations to other duties (Wilson et al 2011). In addition, victim assistance staff members were not trained by the end of the first year of model station implementation. Commanders of these stations displayed varying levels of commitment to reform efforts, and high turnover at the command level further hampered programme implementation (Wilson et al 2011). Antiquated recruitment strategies, limited training and frequent transferring of corporals and sergeants also limited the efficacy of the model station programme. As one might expect, each model station implemented reforms differently by emphasizing certain elements of reform over others. In addition, the police service and special units such as SAUTT maintained aggressive paramilitary tactics during the reform period, occasionally utilizing model stations and their staff for various operations (Wilson et al 2011). Research by one of the authors’ (Pino) in relation to the aforementioned reform programme found that Police Service and Ministry of National Security officials felt that the US-led team to be professional and eager to achieve some laudable goals such as increasing officer education and pay, restructuring the police service, creating model stations, implementing a new customer service orientation to police work, and promoting more

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proactive strategies to fighting crime. Nevertheless, the reforms themselves were perceived as having few positive impacts: Local officers resisted the proposed changes; there were no perceived changes in officer behaviour; and systemic changes for improving officer training and behaviour were deemed inadequate. Second, senior police and Ministry officials indicated that the processes for hiring foreign consultants and the implementation of reform plans were not well thought through. Teams had to make multiple bids on separate projects spread out over time, so police service members in charge of carrying out reforms had to work within a plan that was not comprehensive and was put together in a piecemeal fashion, and according to one police leader, the budget for the transformation was underfunded. Third, the government often utilized officers and resources meant for reform implementation, such as vehicles, for other purposes, making one police leader question the commitment of the government to the reform process (see Pino 2009). Civil society group members, including leaders of well-established NGOs operating in the most crime-ridden and impoverished parts of the country, also though that the recent reforms to the police to be inadequate (Pino 2009). First of all, most respondents were largely unaware of the reform process and were not meaningfully involved despite their indigenous knowledge of crime and police-related problems. One NGO worked with the US team on initiatives to reduce gang violence, and another participated in domestic violence training at one model station, but beyond that, NGO leaders could only speak of past co-productive activities with the police, such as sports programmes for youth, initiatives to reduce gang violence, and general methodological assistance. This lack of involvement may be due to the fact that the Trinidad and Tobago government does not officially recognize a number of the NGOs for reasons such as not having a social worker or other educated professionals on staff. Second, NGO leaders were of the opinion that police deviance and corruption was just as rife after the reform period as it was before reforms took place. The police were still felt to be mistreating citizens, failing in their duty to provide security, engaging in crime control inadequately, responding to criminals capriciously, aggressively policing less serious crimes while ignoring serious offences, engaging in various forms of corruption, and colluding with criminals (see Pino and Johnson 2011). This is not to say that NGO representatives would reject any future foreign assistance. Assistance was still deemed to be important but in a much more limited and focused way such as in relation to technical assistance for police investigations, DNA testing, and managerial issues. Foreign consultants were also deemed necessary insofar as they were

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seen to be impartial and neutral in investigating accusations of corruption and other forms of police deviance. Respondents still wished local actors to lead reform planning and implementation activities while foreign consultants facilitated the process by providing ideas, conducting research, offering technical assistance, and training local trainers. What these local actors want is similar to the ‘fourth option’ for contending with neoliberal globalization (discussed in Chapter 1) that seeks bottomup and reflexive strategies as informed by indigenous knowledge to improve democratic governance in general and police reform in particular. Rather than dictating reforms, foreign experts would facilitate reform planning and implementation under the direction of a broad coalition of local actors that would include governmental officials, the police, and civil society. Broadly, however, it appears that the reform programme was not tailored adequately to the Trinidad and Tobago context, given the fact that the template for the reforms appeared to be based almost exclusively on community policing programmes in the US and the moderately successful reforms in Northern Ireland rather than the unique and systemic problems that Trinidad and Tobago faces (Mastrofski and Lum 2008; Pino 2009). For example, the ethnic divisions between Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians are not analogous to the Unionist-Nationalist divide in Northern Ireland; police-community relations have differed historically; there are vast differences between the two countries in terms of crime, the drug trade, and the depth and breadth of corruption; and the two countries are differently placed within global and regional economic and political systems. While Mastrofski and Lum (2008) noted the problems of capacity, corruption, willingness to implement reform, and the like hindering the prospects for successful reform, it seems that the foreign trainers and advisors created a reform programme without sufficient consideration of the economic, political, social and historical factors that can thwart successful diffusion of the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) model to other jurisdictions (see Ellison 2007b; and Ellison and O’Reilly 2008a). It is also unrealistic to expect systemic changes in the police service to occur soon after implementation and without democratic and systemic reforms to other social institutions (see Pino and Wiatrowski 2006a; Wilson et al 2011). It may be a long while before the conditions are ripe in Trinidad and Tobago for these kinds of reform ideas, however. Crime rates remain high, and in late August of 2011 the government imposed a state of emergency after 11 murders occurred on one weekend (Gabbatt 2011). The government instituted roadblocks, mass arrests of hundreds of suspected gang members, and curfews for all citizens between 11pm and 4am. In

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early September the government extended the state of emergency for three months, justifying it based on security concerns and threats stemming from gangs and crime while claiming the curfew had thus far prevented a mass criminal uprising (Associated Press 2011). If government activities of this sort continue in the name of ‘security’ then potential risks to civil liberties should be taken seriously.

Analytic summary Macro Trinidad and Tobago’s reliance on energy exports made the country vulnerable to global price fluctuations, leading to IMF austerity measures implemented under various administrations. Each successive government continued policies that decreased state intervention in the economy, for example, by reducing or abandoning agricultural subsidies and price controls, which in turn deepened inequality and encouraged dependent development. Inequality and high unemployment have contributed to a persistent informal economic sector, the proliferation of criminal gangs, and a marginal impact of NGOs on governance. Even though Trinidad and Tobago has a weak, if functioning, democratic polity, it still retains a colonial-style police force characterized by work avoidance, repressive and discriminatory behaviour, and a lack of accountability. It appears that security sector aid from abroad often fits the needs of the donor more than the recipient. Furthermore, aid for creating paramilitary forces such as the Interagency Task Force is tied to the rhetoric of the wars on gangs, drugs, and terrorism. Trinidad and Tobago ended up relinquishing some of its sovereignty by entering into ship rider agreements and maintaining the British Privy Council as the country’s highest appeals court. Meso Trinidad and Tobago’s geographic position provides an ideal transshipment hub for drugs, resulting in high levels of gang violence and one of the highest violent crime rates in the world. At the same time, underdevelopment and inequality caused the proliferation of informal sector activities. Long-term government commitments to reform face challenges from ethnic schisms played out through political parties as well as foreign energy interests and drug cartels that attempt to influence governmental policies. Civil society has the capacity to participate in governance and the provision of services, but it has not been able to do so to a significant degree. In poor neighbourhoods gangs are involved in service provision by taking over labour-intensive work contracts that could be used to

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greater effect by NGOs. The police and judiciary frequently do not function well together, either, and the police service is often at odds with the government, resulting in the replacement of ministers of national security or heads of the police. Numerous private security companies, including those that transport prisoners for the government, attempt to fill the security gap. Micro Police behaviour in Trinidad and Tobago does not seem to have improved since the colonial period. Multiple investigations over the past halfcentury into the police service report that the police are unresponsive, ineffective, corrupt, brutal, and apathetic. Officers are perceived to be more concerned with keeping their jobs than maintaining order in a democratic manner. Recruitment policies favour those of African descent and the training of the recruited officers is based on a colonial model. Leaders receive training from foreign donors, but it is dubious whether this has achieved any real change. The problems with the police service are arguably systemic rather than attributed to the actions of a few individuals. Research shows that the government responds to crime with rhetoric more than action, and that when it does respond it is often via ineffective offensive tactics. Police-community relations are understandably strained, and while civil society groups and some police and Ministry of National Security leaders voice their wish to reform the security sector to reflect democratic norms and values, many are not in the types of leadership positions to actually effect change.


Proof

10

Turkey

Country profile In the context of our other case studies Turkey is somewhat unique having been both occupier and occupied during the course of its history. Until the early part of the 20th century Turkey was part of a major colonizing power with the seat of the Ottoman Empire located in Constantinople (present day Istanbul). In the aftermath of WW1 the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) formally ceded parts of the Ottoman Empire including Turkey to the victorious allied powers, with Constantinople partitioned and governed by a military administration that included France, Britain and Italy (Fromkin 1989). However, between 1919 and 1923 Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal (later given the title Atatürk when he became the first president of the new republic) were engaged in an increasingly bitter war of independence. Kemal’s success in forcing a withdrawal of the former allied powers culminated in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which granted independence to Turkey and gave international recognition to the sovereignty of the new Turkish state. In no sense could Kemal be considered a democrat and during his tenure as president of the Republic of Turkey (1923–1938) he displayed many authoritarian tendencies and enforced the doctrine of French laicism to establish a strict separation of church and state in favour of secularism (Fuller 2008; Bein 2011). In addition, he embarked upon a widespread programme of modernization – what is often termed Kemalism – that fundamentally transformed Turkish society from one that had its roots in political and religious Islam, to one that increasingly looked to the West for inspiration and guidance (Bein 2011). The Kemalist project resulted in a number of major changes across all sectors of Turkish society: the importation of European laws and jurisprudence that were enshrined in the 1924 constitution; abolishing the dynastic authority of the Sultanate of 179

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the Ottoman Empire; introducing major changes to advance women’s suffrage and rights; the banning of religious clothing and headgear; introducing specifically ‘Western’ practices in relation to law and medicine and other professional occupations; the formal adoption of a written form of Turkish that was based on Latin rather than Arabic; and, the official promulgation of a new Turkish nationalism that emphasized a unitary state, common ethnic identity and language (Fuller 2008: 13–18). Turkey is a middle-income country with an average GDP per-capita income of $12,200 (CIA World Factbook 2010). With a purchasing power GDP of $960 billion and an average annual growth rate of 10% Turkey is an important emerging market and has one of the largest and most dynamic economies in the Middle East and Eastern Europe (World Bank 2011). However, levels of economic and social development vary considerably between the industrialized western and mainly agricultural eastern parts of the country (Fuller 2008). Out of 187 countries, Turkey ranks 92nd on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2011). Turkey’s population is currently 79 million, which is comprised principally of Turkish (75%), Kurdish (18%) and a number of smaller other ethnic groups. Turkey is predominantly Muslim (99.8%) with Christians and Jews comprising less than 0.2% of the population (CIA World Factbook 2011f). Life expectancy at birth is 72.5 years for males and females, while literacy standards are comparatively high for males at 95.3%, though rather lower for females at 79.6% (CIA World Factbook 2011f). Turkey has a parliamentary democracy with a formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Constitutionally the Turkish political system is governed by the principles of secularism and traditionally the Turkish military, which sees itself as the standard bearer of the Kemalist legacy, has intervened directly by staging coup d’état against elected governments that it has perceived as being in opposition to the founding ideology of the Turkish republic. The military staged coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and enacted what is referred to as a post-modern coup in 1997. Thus there exists something of a paradox: While Turkey’s military sees itself as the avant-garde of modernity, it is arguably a handicap to the country’s image as a civilian democracy and has undoubtedly exerted an undue influence over all aspects of Turkish politics and society. The promotion of secularism may in some sense be a guard against the emergence of religious fundamentalism in the political realm, but military interventionism of the kind just described are nevertheless at odds with the notion of democratic governance. As such, while Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for membership of the European Union at the Helsinki summit in 1999 with negotiations for actual

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Proof Turkey 181

membership starting in 2005 these have not been without difficulty. In particular, the interventionist role of the Turkish military in the constitutional sphere and the lack of civilian oversight of the security sector generally have been key concerns of the European Union under the terms of the Copenhagen criteria that stipulate the conditions under which a country is eligible to join (Goldsmith 2009). Furthermore, as a result of the 1982 constitution (drafted by the military) Turkey retains a highly centralized administrative system that until recently was not noted for its democratic responsiveness. Each province in Turkey is administered by a governor (kaymakam) appointed by the Council of Ministers in Ankara. As Goldsmith (2009: 31) notes, ‘the Turkish security sector is as complex as it is substantial’. Since joining NATO in 1952 the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have undergone extensive modernization and expansion and in a state of emergency or war the TAF could in theory mobilize upwards of one million personnel (Fuller 2008). Currently the TAF has a complement of nearly 520,000. However, a further 250,000 Jandarma (gendarmerie) can be mobilized for military duties as and when required. As well as providing assistance to the Turkish military in relation to internal security operations concerning the ongoing campaign of violence by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in South Eastern Anatolia, the Jandarma perform policing duties in predominantly rural areas and also conduct border control duties. The Jandarma are technically a component of the TAF and receive military training but assume their duties under the Ministry of the Interior in peacetime and the TAF in times of emergency (Goldsmith 2009). As we discuss further below the relationship between the Jandarma and the Turkish National Police (TNP) has traditionally been somewhat fraught, making attempts at reforming the security sector difficult. In addition, since the mid-1980s around 100,000 paramilitary-style village guards or Korucular have been deployed in South Eastern Anatolia to act as a local militia against attacks by guerrillas from the PKK. The Korucular in particular, have been heavily implicated in human rights abuses including torture, disappearances, extra legal executions, rapes, robberies and illegal property occupation (Human Rights Watch 2006). Turkey has a national policing system with the Turkish National Police (TNP) the primary policing agency, although as noted above the Jandarma provide policing duties in rural areas or where the TNP have a limited presence. The origins of policing in Turkey lie in the highly centralized French prefecture system which was adopted during the Ottoman period (Goldsmith 2009). As Goldsmith (2009: 35) notes the TNP is a large force by comparative international standards with 175,000 sworn officers assisted by a further 18,000 civilian support personnel. Organizationally the TNP

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equates to the traditional professional model of a highly centralized bureaucracy with a rigid chain of command stemming from the General Directorate of Security in Ankara to the provinces and districts. Traditionally the TNP has not been particularly responsive to political oversight or the public and has ‘developed a high degree of institutional autonomy not just from the society in which in operates but also from the civilian administration under which it is formally subjugated by law’ (Goldsmith 2009: 34). The relative lack of democratic control over the TNP has been noted by the EU as a problematic issue for Turkey’s accession and has been a core dimension of two research studies commissioned by the European Commission and coordinated by the UNDP in Turkey (discussed below).

Discussion Economic and political issues The reform of the Turkish security sector to meet the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria has been hamstrung by the legacy of authoritarianism in Turkish politics that in constitutional terms has privileged the promotion and defence of national interest over the development and cultivation of a democratic polity (Fuller 2008; Goldsmith 2009). This as we shall see, has also been hampered by the introduction (since the 1980s) of neoliberal fiscal instruments that have not only privileged economic and political elites in Turkish society but the Turkish military establishment also (Fuller 2008; Gönenç 2004). While in theory the Turkish constitution sets out a number of rights and protections such as the right to freedom of expression, the equality of citizens, limitations on the powers of the police and military, and prohibitions on arbitrary arrest and detention, in practice these have often been overlooked and subsumed within a security discourse (S, ener 2004). While the first constitution of the new Republic (1924) has been amended several times to take account of changing circumstances, it has traditionally accorded a uniquely privileged role to the TAF and the security sector generally, whose role, including that of the TNP, has been defined and interpreted with the exclusive aim of providing for state security rather than citizen security. The constitution drafted by the military junta in 1982 included in Article 15 a clause that gave retrospective and prospective legal immunity to the TAF for actions – including the staging of coups – that could be defended on the grounds of national security (Gönenç 2004). This in effect gave the Turkish military free reign to intervene in the constitutional sphere as and when it saw fit without fear of legal reper-

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Proof Turkey 183

cussion. Consequently, previous attempts at reforming the security sector (discussed below) have stumbled on the broader constitutional framework that accord a privileged role to the TAF and that more broadly have seen a whittling away of rights and protections under the rubric of national security (Can 2006). Attempting to reform institutions without paying attention to the legal and constitutional framework that gives them their powers and provides for their modus operandi are unlikely to be efficacious (Cerrah 2008). Since its accession to power in 2002 the centre-right and moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has proposed two constitutional referenda (2007 and 2010) that introduced a number of amendments to the constitution in order to enhance the role of the president and parliament over that of the military as well as introduce a number of democratic reforms in line with EU accession criteria. The referendum in 2007 was precipitated by difficulties faced by the AKP in having its nominated candidate Abdullah Gül elected to the presidency in the face of stiff opposition from the TAF who made a series of public pronouncements – including a direct warning to the AKP on its webpage – insisting that the Kemalist legacy of the Turkish state would be under threat from such an appointment and that it would act ‘if needs be’ (Migdalovitz 2007: 4). In a classic master-stroke the AKP wrong-footed the military, however. In what was widely perceived as an open challenge to the government (Migdalovitz 2007), and fearing that the TAF were gearing up for another coup, the AKP suddenly announced a snap election and was returned with a greatly increased majority and a popular mandate to proceed with the constitutional reforms including the nomination of Gül. In 2010 the AKP again held a constitutional referendum that sought to bring the constitution into line with EU accession criteria. Among other things it proposed to amend Article 15 (see above) to limit the political space within which the TAF could operate by making officers subject to the rule of law and legal sanction. Other changes concerned the adoption of economic and social rights, individual freedoms and judicial reforms. The proposed constitutional changes were supported by 58% of the electorate (BBC News 2010). This is not to suggest, however, that the Turkish military have been the only obstacle to democratization in Turkey, but they have been a significant impediment. Certainly, while the TAF continue to occupy an elevated position in the public consciousness there now appears to be an acceptance that the military should be fully under the control of the civil authorities and eschew any active interventionist role in the political and constitutional realms (Goldsmith 2005; Fuller 2008).

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As Can (2006) notes, in many respects the TAF’s elevated position in the domestic political arena has been maintained and enhanced by the historical and structural challenges of neoliberal policies and practices in Turkey since the 1980s. Indeed it is Can’s thesis that early attempts at democratization in Turkey (during the 1970s) were actively undermined by the Turkish military and political establishment with the active support of the US who favoured shifting the Turkish economy from one orientated to the domestic market and import substitution industrialization to one geared up to export led growth model with Turkey’s economy exposed to international markets (Can 2006). As such the neoliberal experiment adopted in Turkey has gone hand in hand with higher levels of institutional repression but has also contributed to problems elsewhere such as Kurdish upheaval, far right jingoism, the emergence of a Turkish mafia, political corruption and pro-Islamic tides (Can 2006: 5). Similarly, for S¸ener (2004) neoliberalism in Turkey has been paralleled by a rise in authoritarianism that is required to implement fiscal measures in the face of widespread opposition and which has impacted on current efforts at SSR in the country. In this it differs little from the trends identified between neoliberalism and authoritarian states elsewhere (e.g. see Canterbury 2005) but in the Turkish case it has also resulted in an entrenchment of military power and influence that has until recently proved remarkably resilient to reform. Certainly the Turkish military has been at the vanguard in the promotion of neoliberalism even more so than political elites. With an annual budget of $12 billion the Turkish military is one of the world’s largest purchasers but more importantly through the establishment of shell companies has a direct financial interest in 60 of Turkey’s principal commercial ventures (Akça 2010). With the assistance of the US government the Turkish military established OSMAN – one of Turkey’s largest export fleets – in 1978. As well as being the main shareholder in military hardware and defence firms such as ASELSAN and MKEK – the military are also the outright owner of Turkey’s leading commercial enterprise – OYAK – that in addition to its involvement in banking and finance, manufactures everything from cement to chocolate bars and cars (Yavuz 2011). The Turkish military have also maintained procurement contracts with both Israeli and US defence firms that have traditionally been shrouded in secrecy and not subject to effective par˘lu 2007). While the current AKP govliamentary oversight (Sarıibrahimog ernment under the premiership of Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an has attempted to limit the political influence of the Turkish military clipping its commercial and economic wings has proved to be a rather more difficult

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Proof Turkey 185

proposition. Nevertheless the AKP acknowledges that allowing the military to pursue a lucrative sideline in the commercial sector is unacceptable if Turkey wants to be perceived as a mature parliamentary democracy. However, the military are unlikely to relinquish their commercial interests voluntarily or without a fight. The high level of involvement of Turkey’s military in the commercial sector was a consequence (and reward) for deregulating the economy in the aftermath of the coup in 1980. Following the coup the democratically elected Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was arrested while the IMF, World Bank, Turkish commercial interests and the military junta moved to take control of the economy and country. The prime minister later appointed by the junta was the World Bank economist Turgut Özal who was tasked with increasing foreign trade, embarking on a widespread programme of privatization, reducing state expenditure on social services and liberalizing Turkey’s foreign exchange system (S¸ener 2004). As with the earlier military coup in 1971 it is widely believed that the 1980 coup was actively sponsored by the US government who had been funding and training a highly secretive unit of the Turkish military called the Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi [ÖHD]) since the early 1970s under the Joint United States Military Mission to Turkey (JUSMMAT) programme (Can 2006; S¸ener 2004). Even more so than the regular military this unit operated entirely outside of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny and saw itself as the vanguard of the Kemalist legacy. The US had a particular interest in steering Turkey towards what it perceived as a more strategically acceptable form of government since it regarded the previous regime of Süleyman Demirel to be on too friendly terms with the Soviet Union, and given Turkey’s geo-strategic role in Cold War politics and NATO it was inconceivable that such a situation be allowed to continue: Authoritarianism was to triumph over democracy. Certainly, the 1980 coup was viewed positively in Washington and London. Presumably referring to the role of the US funded ÖHD, when he heard the news President Carter expressed the view that ‘our boys finished the job’ (cited in Can 2006: 10) while The Economist in London published an editorial championing the actions of the Turkish military (Can 2006: 13). Military interventions in the Turkish constitutional setting point to the existence of what many Turkish observers believe to be ‘the deep state’ – or a state within a state (Can 2006; Goldsmith 2009). This is a coalescence of ultra-nationalist Kemalist interests with ties to the country’s military and security forces. While the existence of whether a ‘deep state’ exists has often been subject to rumour and conspiracy theories there is nevertheless the belief among many Turkish officials that elements within

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the military hierarchy have been pursuing their own anti-democratic agenda for several decades (Dogan 2008; Fuller 2008). In particular, the current AKP administration has brought prosecutions against members of a shadowy organization called Ergenekon with links to the Turkish · military and MIT (the national intelligence organization) that it believes to have been responsible for acting as agent provocateur in fermenting PKK unrest as well as carrying out a number of political assassinations and bombing campaigns that have been intended to destabilize the Turkish government (Jenkins 2011). Clearly any discussion of Ergenekon is subject to an element of conjecture given its clandestine association with the Turkish intelligence agencies. However, what is not in doubt is that the traditionally sanctified role of the Turkish military has allowed it a far greater sway in subverting the nature of democratic governance than should reasonably be expected. Furthermore, the high level of involvement of the Turkish military in commercial enterprises outside the purview of governmental oversight raises equally problematic questions about the relationship of the military to civil society more generally. Both factors complicate the process of security sector reform in Turkey. Crime and security sector issues According to the International Criminal Victimisation Survey (ICVS) the crime rate in Turkey for all offences included in the study are comparatively low and broadly in line with Western Europe (van Dijk et al 2008). Nevertheless, the survey does not include offences connected with the PKK insurgency, while arguably the reportage of sexual offences is also underestimated. Human rights groups have traditionally pointed to high levels of rape, sexual offences and violence against women within Turkish society generally and the relatively low importance attached to them by the police (Sehlikog˘lu 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011a). In 2004 a new Turkish Penal Code Draft Law was proposed by the AKP government and accepted by the National Assembly in Parliament that advanced over 30 amendments to advance women’s rights and promote gender inequality in Turkey. For instance, for the first time marital rape was criminalized and patriarchal concepts like ‘chastity’, ‘honour’, ‘shame’ and ‘indecent behaviour’ were removed from a variety of penal codes, while sexual assaults committed by security force personnel are now treated as aggravated offences. For single women access to abortion is guaranteed, although married women must still obtain the consent of the male spouse before a termination can be authorized (Women for Women’s Human Rights, nd). Turkey is affected by many of the institutional problems affecting policing and police reform in transitional societies: low officer morale,

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Proof Turkey 187

comparatively low salaries (around $800 per month), long hours and poor working conditions, low-level corruption (particularly within the traffic police) and a relatively low status in the eyes of the public when compared to the military (Goldsmith 2009; Cerrah et al 2009). However, the problems in the security sector go beyond the police and armed forces. Additional concerns relate to Turkey’s burgeoning prison population that has doubled between 2006 and 2010 (International Centre for Prison Studies 2011b) although it should be pointed out that official data from Turkey are notoriously unreliable (S¸ener 2004). In terms of world rankings Turkey has the 12th highest incarceration rate at 168 per 100,000 people with an overall prison population of 124,074. While this is a mere fraction of the incarceration rate in the United States1 it is nevertheless high by comparative European standards. Human rights organizations have increasingly raised questions about over-crowding and inhumane prison conditions, and also the historic abuse of the prison system by the authorities to detain those suspected of political offences (such as those suspected of PKK involvement) indefinitely. Aside from issues around imprisonment for political offences, the overall rise relates to blockages in the criminal justice system more generally. Around 47% of all prisoners are detained on remand waiting on trial or sentencing – some for years – which points to problems processing cases through the courts, the system of public prosecution and the relative lethargy with which the TNP conducts investigations (Council of Europe 2007). Turkey’s private security industry has also burgeoned in recent years that corresponds with the rapid growth in the economy and also a widening of income differentials. Since the rules governing the private security sector were liberalized in 2004 the number of personnel employed in the sector has swollen to 415,000, a figure that equates to nearly half the strength of the entire TAF (Anatolia News Agency 2010). As in some of our other case studies (South Africa, Brazil) the private security sector in Turkey is increasingly providing services (guarding, rapid response) for those that can afford it (Eryılmaz 2007). Arguably one of the main impediments to the reform of the security sector in Turkey concerns the ongoing conflict with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in South Eastern Anatolia. The roots of the PKK conflict are complex but date from 1974 when a small group of left-wing Kurdish student activists campaigned to have the Kurdish language and identity officially recognized by the Turkish authorities. One of the consequences of the Kemalist, one nation, legacy was the forced assimilation of ethnic groups and the imposition of a common ‘Turkish’ identity and language policy across the country as a whole. The existence of minority cultural

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traditions were perceived by the authorities as antithetic to the existence of a unified nation-state (Çolak 2004). Central to this Kemalist project, was the purging of Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language to create a Öz Türkçe (translated as pure or core Turkish) that would reconcile language and cultural policies with the vision of a unified territorial entity that emphasized its modern national-secular character rather than traditional imperial-religious underpinnings (Çolak 2004). Following, Kurdish cultural mobilization in the 1970s the military junta of 1980 securitized the language issue and moved to ban outright the use of spoken and written Kurdish, delineating it as a proscribed, non-official language (Çolak 2004). This ban was only lifted in 1991 while the first official broadcast in Kurdish by Turkish state television took place on 1st January 2009. The language ban was perceived by Kurdish nationalists as an official denial of their national identity and only served to further intensify demands for the establishment of a separate Kurdish state in South Eastern Anatolia. However, these demands were met with fierce resistance by the Turkish authorities that used the military to crack down hard on Kurdish separatists (Bein 2011). Thus a cultural conflict over language and Kurdish identity soon gave way to a campaign of armed insurgency by the PKK against the Turkish state. According to official figures released by the Turkish authorities, between 1984 and 2010 just under 7,000 Turkish police and military personnel have been killed by the PKK, while the Turkish armed forces have been responsible for the deaths of nearly 30,000 PKK activists and Kurdish civilians (S¸ener 2010). However, human rights organizations acknowledge that these official estimates are likely to significantly underestimate the scale of deaths and casualties both of state forces and PKK activists and Kurdish civilians (Amnesty International 2010). The conflict with the PKK has had undoubted ramifications for the perception of Turkey internationally and many international human rights organizations have pointed to widespread human rights abuses committed not only by the Turkish armed forces (particularly the Korucular) but also by the PKK against those Kurdish civilians who have been suspecting of collaborating with the Turkish authorities (Human Rights Watch 2011b). The conflict has stymied political debate given the large number of Turkish politicians that have been assassinated, while the deaths of soldiers, many of them young conscripts has served to harden attitudes among mainstream Turkish society towards the PKK pushing a political resolution to the conflict further out of reach. More fundamentally, however, under successive political (and military) administrations the conflict has resulted in the widespread securitiza-

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Proof Turkey 189

tion of Turkish society with anti-terror legislation used indiscriminately to stifle political dissent. Nevertheless, since the election of the AKP there have been some, albeit limited, efforts to reach a form of rapprochement with the PKK to resolve the Kurdish question. For Prime Minister Erdogan the conflict with the PKK is a major stumbling block to his vision of Turkey as a major regional power (Barkey 2011) and he has increasingly faced down criticism from the military to propose a negotiated political settlement. In 2009, for example, Erdogan initiated what he termed ‘the Kurdish opening’ whereby cultural rights were guaranteed for Kurds; a state TV channel in the Kurdish language was launched; and a political dialogue was promised if the PKK were to lay down its weapons. Furthermore, the AKP is viewed with less suspicion by Kurds because of its Islamist roots, and in the 2007 general election massively outpolled the main Kurdish nationalist party in Anatolia increasing its share of the vote from 28% to 53% (McManus 2011). Foreign and national security sector reform efforts Traditionally there has been a high level of overseas involvement in Turkey’s security sector although few of these initiatives were designed with either democratization or human rights in mind. Turkey’s key geostrategic location given its proximity to the Middle East and the then USSR and its entry into NATO in 1952, meant that Western security concerns – particularly that of the US – trumped the domestic reform agenda and that human rights abuses would be overlooked providing Turkey’s strategic role and alignment with NATO continued. Consequently, Turkey has been in receipt of enormous aid flows and development assistance that has tended to prioritize national security but not human security. As Gabelnick (1991: 1) notes ‘considered a strategic NATO ally, Turkey has benefitted from a US policy that is long on military assistance and short on constructive criticism’. Following the coup in 1980 the Turkish military junta received over $6.5 billion in grants and loans from the US to purchase military hardware (Gabelnick 1999). More recently Turkey fulfils an equally strategic role for Western states in the context of international terrorism, drug trafficking and as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism (Gabelnick 1999). In economic terms Turkey also performs a key strategic role by acting as the primary conduit that connects Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy to world markets via the EastWest Energy and Transport Corridor (Petersen 2009). The scale of Western military assistance to Turkey and the tendency to overlook domestic human rights abuses by the police and military has left a legacy that may take decades to undo: It entrenched the role of the

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AU: Goldsmith 2005a/b?

Turkish military in relation to civil society making democratic oversight difficult and fostered a deep-seated legacy of authoritarianism that carried through to police policies and practices. Consequently, the current SSR reform agenda is coloured to a significant degree by past practices in the provision of development assistance to Turkey. Since the late 1990s in line with Turkey’s EU aspirations a significant programme of security sector reform has been undertaken in Turkey (Goldsmith 2009; Celador et al 2008). However, somewhat unusually given Turkey’s status as an important emerging market with a robust economy there has not been the scale of international entrepreneurialism involved in police and security sector reform endeavours that we have seen for example, in the South African context. Of course, there have been several initiatives, with for example, Turkish police officers receiving training in the UK and the US but the bulk of the reform effort has been led almost entirely by the EU. Currently, the EU, via its Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is providing financial and technical assistance in the following areas: rural development, human resources development, regional development, cross-border cooperation and transition assistance and institution building. The combined annual spend in 2011 for projects in each of these areas amounted to €779 million which is projected to increase to €935 million by 2013. Police and security sector reform falls into the last category (transition assistance and institution building) with the annual spend in 2011 amounting to €231 million (European Commission 2010). Clearly the EU is providing adequate funding for the reforms. More importantly, however, it is adopting a multisectoral approach by recognizing that reforms in one area impact those in another, which goes some way to mitigating the tinkering around the edges approach that we have seen in some of our other case studies. While in some cases reform assistance is contracted to an external agency such as the United Nations Development Programme (discussed below) they nevertheless operate with the assistance of local personnel who are aware of local context. Aside from assistance with reforming the Turkish constitution, prisons and the prosecution system there have been two main areas in relation to policing that both the EU and Turkish government authorities have focused on as priority areas. The first concerns establishing structures to render the TNP liable to civilian oversight and democratic control. This has provided the framework for two projects funded by the European Commission but operationalized by the UNDP. The first project reported in 2005 (Goldsmith 2005) [henceforth UNDP 1] while the second was undertaken by the UNDP between 2008 and 2010 with €2.5 million funding

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Proof Turkey 191

from the European Commission [henceforth UNDP 2]. One of the authors (Ellison) was involved in the latter project. The second issue concerns the development of an independent police complaints machinery in Turkey. The UK Home Office has provided technical assistance in this regard. Subjecting the TNP to effective democratic oversight is a mammoth task, not just in terms of the sheer size of the organization with nearly 200,000 personnel but also because as we suggested above it has traditionally been able to maintain a high level of institutional autonomy from civilian authorities (Goldsmith 2009). The report of UNDP 1 proposed a series of recommendations for civilian oversight to the Turkish authorities and the TNP, but it is striking how few of these had been operationalized by the time UNDP 2 began its work. Putting in place effective oversight structures in the provinces and districts has proved particularly problematic. In addition a common feature of both UNDP 1 and UNDP 2 was that the Jandarma were less than willing to cooperate in the projects and in fact refused completely to participate in UNDP 2 (Ellison, personal observation). This is important since it is the Jandarma that provide the de facto policing service in many rural areas and in the Eastern parts of the country, so developing an infrastructure for the civilian oversight of the security sector without either the participation or the cooperation of the Jandarma is unlikely to be efficacious. Furthermore, in UNDP 2 it appeared that the emphasis of the Turkish authorities was more about establishing political authority over the police (and security sector generally) and less about democratic responsiveness in terms of making the police accountable to the public for their actions (Ellison, personal observation). In terms of an overall assessment it would be fair to say that considerable progress has been made in reforming the Turkish police and security sector. However, significant obstacles remain. Many of these are rooted in history and the Kemalist legacy bequeathed to the civilian authorities but also the blind eye turned by seigniorial states such as the UK and the US to past human rights abuses. This has entrenched authoritarianism and autonomous action by various security sector actors (particularly the military) that will perhaps take decades to unpick. The ongoing conflict with the PKK also continues to be a sticking point in terms of how future reform endeavours pan out. There are perhaps limits to how much stick Turkey is prepared to take, however. For its part Turkey regards itself as complying with the Copenhagen criteria for accession imposed by the EU but regards the hostile attitude of some EU states (France and Germany) to Turkish membership as reflecting a thinly disguised racism. In any case, the EU carrot is

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proving less tempting to the Turkish electorate now than in the past with the percentage of respondents favouring accession falling from a high of 73% in 2004 to 38% by 2010 (Poort 2010). Turkey’s rapidly expanding economy, which has grown more rapidly than many core EU states apart from Germany, means that the country is coming to see itself as a key regional actor and power broker. Turkey’s refusal to allow US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish soil in 2003 has meant that its relationship with Washington has cooled considerably and it is striking up new strategic alliances in the Middle East and in the Caucasus. Turkey like South Africa has become a prominent aid donor in its own right distributing $5.2 billion to the Balkans, Caucasus, Eastern Europe and North Africa between 2004 and 2008 (Deniz 2011). It also participates in overseas policing missions with the Turkish contingent the third largest in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after the EU and the US.

Analytic summary Macro The reform of the Turkish security sector has been adversely affected at the macro level by Turkey’s strategic role and use value for key seigniorial states in the West historically. Turkey as a buffer between the then USSR and NATO, and its proximity to the Middle East meant that aid and development assistance were invariably designed to refract Western security interests rather than democratization. In addition there has been a fairly high level of meddling by Western powers (chiefly the US) in Turkey’s security sector, as with the sponsoring of clandestine units of the military. This legacy has proved remarkably resilient to reform and it is only now that the AKP supported by public mandate has been able to disentangle the military from the reins of power in the country. In addition, neoliberal economic reforms foisted on Turkey in the 1980s have contributed to economic growth, but also widened social inequalities both spatially (between West and East of the country) but also within social groups. Meso The reform of the security sector has been undoubtedly impacted by the ongoing conflict with the PKK in South Eastern Anatolia, although many cities and regions have been affected by bombings, kidnappings and assassinations. The conflict has had the adverse effect of securitizing Turkish society and contributing to human rights abuses by the Turkish armed forces and police as well as restrictions on freedom of speech, freedom of

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Proof Turkey 193

the press and an overall weakening of constitutional protections. In addition, a significant number of those incarcerated in Turkish prisons are there for ‘political’ offences and the burgeoning prison population has been subject to critical reports from human rights organizations. Micro The reform of the Turkish security sector is affected by many of the problems that affect transitional and post-conflict states. The police traditionally (although this is changing) have had a reputation for brutality and ineffectiveness and have not achieved widespread trust and confidence among the public. The situation has of course been compounded by the PKK conflict but also by the organizational structure of the TNP itself which is highly centralized and with a rigid and somewhat inflexible chain of command. This has mitigated against democratic responsiveness in the provinces and districts and raised issues around local police governance and accountability. Subjecting the police and the military to effective civilian oversight is an ongoing issue and a key dimension of the EU accession criteria. The historical animosity between the Jandarma and the TNP is also problematic and remains to be resolved satisfactorily. The role of the Turkish military in the constitutional and political space has been addressed by the AKP administration (under pressure from the EU) but concerns nevertheless remain about the military’s autonomous financial holdings and corporate interests. The huge growth in the private and corporate security sector has also contributed to a bifurcation between those that can afford to purchase ‘security’ and those that have to rely on the vagaries of the public policing system.


Proof

11

The Contextual Limits of Police Reform

In this chapter we outline the patterns we found throughout our case studies that can help inform future policy and research activities. A key theme in our discussion is that police reform and SSR more generally cannot be divorced from the impact of neoliberal globalization that has profound implications for the relations between states, their levels of political and economic development, and in particular their ability to establish a political and legal system that is tolerant and respectful of democratic ideals both normatively and practically. Our case studies demonstrate that it is difficult to transform policing systems when there remain infrastructural blockages and obstacles elsewhere such as extremes of wealth and poverty (South Africa, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago) a legacy of authoritarian rule (Turkey) a collapsed state infrastructure (Iraq, Afghanistan) or the lingering of ethnic schisms and spoiler violence in spite of a widely lauded peace process (Northern Ireland). In this sense we cannot emphasize enough how each of the seven countries examined are unique historically, economically, culturally, and politically – a fact that makes any attempt at promoting a single narrative of democratic police reform particularly difficult. This has implications for both conceptualizing police reform endeavours but also their success or failure. Certainly, in terms of actually ‘doing’ police reform it is still too often the case that one-size-fits-all strategies are applied to a wide variety of hugely different contexts. While there are common themes running through our case studies (the legacy of colonialism or foreign conquest, a history of repressive policing, corruption, huge socioeconomic differentials) these pan out differently, and have variant implications for the provision of security. Many of the problems with policing and the security sector more generally that we have identified in our case studies are firmly grounded in the specifics and peculiarities of local context and it makes little sense, for example, to view corruption in the 194

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Proof

t f

The Contextual Limits of Police Reform 195

South African police (or society generally) through the lens of what is occurring in Iraq, Brazil, Afghanistan, Turkey or Trinidad and Tobago. There are simply too many loose ends and police corruption may be due to any number of organizational, political or economic exigencies that manifest themselves differently depending on context. For instance, as we noted in our case study that there is a fairly high level of what might be defined as low-level corruption among the traffic police in Turkey (accepting gifts, small amounts of money etc.,) but there is also a fairly high level of cultural tolerance shown towards this by the public since it is a relatively common ‘smoothing’ practice in dealing with officialdom generally. Likewise, it is difficult to argue that the old RUC in Northern Ireland were financially or monetarily ‘corrupt’ – they didn’t need to be given their huge salaries of nearly $100,000 per annum – but there is no doubt that there was an element of political corruption within the RUC’s Special Branch with for instance allegations of collusion between the police and loyalist paramilitary organizations (see Mulcahy 2006; Ellison and Smyth, 2000). Therefore, police corruption, what it is and the interpretation placed upon it, differs wildly depending on specific context. At the same time there are some common problems and themes that emerge from the case studies that makes a degree of generalization possible. Again, however, these operate with different intensities and exert more of an influence in some of our case studies rather than others. We will organize our discussion by level of analysis.

Macro level patterns At the macro level security sector reform and police reform in particular must be placed within the context of globalization, dependency, uneven development, underdevelopment, and the history of colonization and Empire. As McMichael (2008) has demonstrated, economic colonization has persisted after former colonies gained independence from their erstwhile masters. The neoliberal strategic interests of core countries and IFIs provide the historical context of the interests of donor countries when it comes to security sector reform assistance. Each of the countries we examined is in a different position within the global system, but to varying degrees lack independent development, which affects governmental policies, including those involving security. Afghanistan is one of the very poorest and least developed countries in the world characterized by a lack of foreign or domestic investment owing to the violent instability afflicting the country. General commodity prices make opium an attractive product to farm, and opium is the largest export out of Afghanistan.

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Instability is also a fact of life in Iraq. Economic sanctions and an illegal invasion with its destabilizing effects and economic restructuring based on neoliberal principles crippled the economy and lead to middle class flight from the country. The global economy has affected Brazil similarly to other South American States. Brazil attempted import substitution industrialization and large-scale agriculture, leading to debt, structural adjustment, and economic and residential inequality. While Brazil has embarked on a programme of political reform and liberalization it can be more accurately categorized as a delegative democracy (discussed above) characterized by a weak system of checks and balances in government resulting in a strong executive branch that can ignore citizen and media grievances (O’Donnell 1994). Trinidad and Tobago also experienced structural adjustment and deepened inequality owing to the country’s dependence on energy exports. Turkey, particularly since the military coup of 1980, was encouraged to follow a path of neoliberal economic reform which in turn led to several decades of authoritarian rule. The country’s strategic role in NATO and its location at the interstices between West and East also meant that it was beholden in terms of aid and development policies to seigniorial states such as the US. It is really only since the election of the AKP in 2002 that Turkey has felt able to pursue a path of independent development. South Africa has similarly pursued neoliberal economic reforms that in spite of the laudable aims of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) have done little to narrow income inequalities between whites and the majority black population. Levels of crime and violence associated with poverty and social inequalities remain notoriously high. Northern Ireland has been less impacted by the harsh effects of neoliberal globalization than some of our other case studies with the economy bolstered by historically high levels of UK government funding. Nevertheless, the decline in the traditional manufacturing as a consequence of sectoral restructuring has resulted in some working-class areas of Northern Ireland experiencing persistently high levels of long-term unemployment (sometimes in excess of 40%). Many of the countries we examined in our case studies have colonial legacies that have impacted on the nature of their political development (Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, Brazil, Northern Ireland) while others (Afghanistan) have been fought over in what was termed ‘The Great Game’ by the British and Russian Empires in the 19th century. Iraq (then Mesopotamia) was initially part of the Ottoman Empire, but following the defeat of the Central Powers in WW1 was partitioned and became a British mandate. Turkey as one of the six independent Turkic states was

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Proof The Contextual Limits of Police Reform 197

subject to high levels of Allied interference following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of WW1, though Constantinople (present day Istanbul) was itself the seat of the Ottoman Empire. Our point is that each of our case studies has in various ways been subject to high levels of political instability historically, which has profound implications for the development of a political culture conducive to democratic ideals. Similarly, at one point or another, each of our case studies has been subject to authoritarian rule and regime policing. The police in the countries we examined were paramilitarized and distanced from the public (e.g. the protection of the state or regime was prioritized) during colonization or occupation. In many cases these legacies have persisted and stymie reform efforts during democratic transitions to varying degrees. Tribal resistance to foreign invasion happened on a regular basis in the area now known as Afghanistan, so the fact that there was massive local resistance to Russian and latterly American occupation should come as no surprise. Since the establishment of modern Afghanistan regional leaders such as the warlords have rejected the central government and have been quite successful at operating autonomously. The Afghan National Police established by coalition forces are often more loyal to their tribe or warlord than to the central government, which is seen by many in the country as a puppet of the US and NATO powers. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the US occupation forces kept the police heavily militarized so that they could assist in battling the insurgency. As in Afghanistan, sectarian and other local loyalties often trump national loyalties for the police. US involvement in Brazil also militarized the police, which was already brutal and closely linked with the military since Portuguese colonization. The British colonized Trinidad and Tobago after the Spanish and created a colonial police force trained to suppress riots and maintain British interests. This legacy remains and there is currently little trust between the citizenry and the police in Trinidad and Tobago. In many respects policing in post-colonial states tends to emulate its colonial antecedents and continues with a legacy of authoritarianism (Hills 2000). Nation-building activities, legal aid, and good governance initiatives such as the law and development movement rarely promote or establish democratic institutions or create a legal framework that supports democratic policing or criminal justice reform in these countries. IMF-mandated public spending cuts often reduce officer salaries, leading to further corruption, and as we have seen in Brazil and elsewhere both retired and active-duty police officers might supplement their incomes by working as private security guards or participating in death squads (Hinton and Newburn 2009).

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In many cases assistance with police reform is tied to the wider strategic interests of the donor state and with few exceptions (e.g. the role of the UNDP in Turkey, or the inclusion of civil society actors in Northern Ireland and South Africa) local stakeholders such as civil society groups, local governmental leaders and the citizenry are usually not consulted in any meaningful way or are pushed to the periphery of the process. Topdown strategies from states and supranational organizations are likely to fail if there is little support for the reforms in the recipient country irrespective of whether there is the promise of membership of a particular body (e.g. the EU) or the threat of sanction (Muehlmann 2008). In both Afghanistan and Iraq there were attempts to rebuild virtually all of the major institutions (economic, political, legal, educational, police, etc.) but the US and its allies did not consider cultural, religious, or political customs or the legacy of history before doing so. In Iraq de-Ba’athification lead to the loss of much of Iraq’s middle class and technical expertise, and also fuelled the insurgency by promoting economic and political instability. US interests in Brazil dominated economic, military, and police aid, with reforms in those areas largely based upon eliminating perceived internal threats to US interests such as leftist movements. In Both Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago experienced IMF structural adjustment reforms that deepened inequality, and in Trinidad most police training from the US government centred on police leaders, the war on terror and the war on drugs. In many of our case studies the lines separating police and military forces have become blurred suggesting that in many cases (Brazil, Turkey) it is the military that is in need of reform as much as the police – a factor rarely considered by practitioners (Hills 2000). Brutal regimes without institutional capacity spawn brutal police forces and attempts by Western states to ‘rebuild’ policing systems according to Western norms are liable to fail. Furthermore, a legacy of colonialism in some of our case studies is that policing is characterized by a centralized and highly bureaucratic system that is inefficient, undisciplined, lacking in appropriate equipment (vehicles, physical infrastructure, training facilities, accurate criminal records, etc.) and filled with line officers that are under-paid and dissatisfied with their jobs (Hills 2000: 7). Since independence the police have adapted to change not by adopting ‘democratic’ policing but instead by adapting to various political developments and ‘accommodating regimes’ leading to no significant changes in police organizations or behaviour (Hills 2000: 187). Political leaders often do the same, with old autocratic leaders converting into democratic leaders after democratic transitions. All of these factors lead to a continued lack of legitimacy. If state-builders retreat

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from democratization efforts for short-term gain, lower their expectations, or emphasize local capacity and ownership right from the beginning it will likely lead to less local service delivery and higher levels of corruption and abuse (Kahler 2009). If donor countries do not accept responsibility or leadership then coordination efforts will likely fail. As we have seen in most of the case studies, donors have been largely uninformed about a recipient country’s history, political and ethnic problems, and cultural scripts for negotiating and implementing agreement; and policies tend to encourage corruption among local leaders so that strategic interests override the establishment of democratic institutions. Donor agencies also act with incompetence regardless of the quality of the plan put in place. For example, not enough funds are allocated or funds are not proportionately applied to strategic imperatives, donors working on the ground with local actors lack expertise of the local country and culture, planning and implementation are often rushed and conducted in a piecemeal fashion, and when multiple organizations or countries are involved in the assistance there is a lack of coordination or a failure on the part of some or all to deliver on promised commitments. Donor governments and their various participating agencies need to follow through with their commitments and cooperate with one another, but in many endeavours around the globe this has not happened (Muehlmann 2008; Smith 2001). In essence, the police reform efforts of donors are plagued by the same kinds of problems found in economic assistance efforts. In some cases the donor has self-interested intentions, with other objectives clouding reform and training efforts, such as the creation of paramilitary units to defeat political enemies and drug traffickers. This contributes to goal deflection and the over-development of some security sectors, such as those that deal with drugs and anti-terrorism. Police reform and training become undemocratic and dependency-driven, and local actors such as NGOs, CBOs, and various local leaders are not involved in the process adequately. Transnational crime is another problem affecting some of the countries we examined. For example, in Afghanistan, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago, the international illicit drug trade has a massive impact on crime rates and instability in general. In Afghanistan, warlords (some of whom retain US aid and support) and the Taliban control opium production and the smuggling of various goods is great business. Local farmers do not benefit from the profit of growing opium as warlords and the Taliban retain most of the revenue for themselves. Both Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago are trans-shipment hubs for drugs, and criminal gangs overseeing the drug trade have infiltrated the police and in some cases the government itself.

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Gang violence over control of the drug trade and at times police violence in response contribute to these two countries experiencing among the highest crime rates in the world.

Meso level patterns The level at which a state is ripe for democracy varies all over the world regardless of how one measures it, and this should be taken into much more consideration by those seeking to democratize the police or other security sector institutions. Trinidad and Tobago is considered a stable democracy but the two major political parties are constantly at odds with one another, which inhibits the long-term viability of any reform effort since whatever reforms are introduced are likely to be countermanded by the new incumbent government. Brazil is also notionally democratic but as we saw in our case study numerous observers contend that it is not representative, lacks proper checks and balances, and fails to enforce the civil rights of its citizens adequately. Iraq and Afghanistan are proof positive that elections alone do not democracies make, since we see insurgencies and civil war in both countries together with fractured civil societies, abject poverty, and particularly in the case of Afghanistan high rates of illiteracy and the oppression of women. The poorest countries in the world are beset with political violence and civil war even though more have had elections recently (Collier 2009). Turkey meanwhile, at least until the rapid assent of the AKP, has had its democratic ambitions thwarted at several junctures by the Turkish military often acting in concert with the US. The legacy of Turkish military rule and US strategic interest has contributed to the development of a security sector that is so far removed from effective oversight that it will take decades to rectify. In South Africa, ‘democracy’ has without a doubt enfranchised the country’s majority black population but that also means that given the ANC’s predominance, South Africa is likely to turn into a de facto one-party state without effective opposition. While this reflects the vagaries of the electoral process, and the ANC’s appeal to the (predominantly black) electorate, the lack of effective opposition and the long-term dominance of one political party opens up the potential for nepotism and corruption within the political realm. Many of the problems addressed by Hinton and Newburn (2009: 6) in relation to police democratization processes in the countries examined in their volume have a resonance in a number of our case studies. These include the existence of ‘weak democratic institutions’, ‘corruption and weak rule of law’, ‘significant levels of poverty and inequality’, ‘high

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crime and societal instability’, and ‘poorly institutionalized channels of police accountability and responsiveness’. Third wave democracies (those countries that became democratic in the 1970s and 80s) rarely exhibit strong democratic institutions. Instead, these recent democracies often have authoritarian provisions in their constitutions with too few safeguards against control by militaries or the elite, elections are often fraudulent, corruption and lack of accountability are well entrenched, civil society can be easily co-opted and lacks the ability to organize and mobilize the population, parliaments and legislatures have not learned to act independently from the executive branch, and crime rates tend to be extremely high while authoritarian policing models remain prominent, leading to poor police-community relations and a lack of confidence in the police (Hinton and Newburn 2009). Reform requires political stability and favourable relations between federal, regional and local governments, but these conditions do not exist in many of the countries we examined. In Afghanistan the Taliban and regional warlords see the central government as illegitimate. The central government has little presence outside of Kabul and is rife with corruption. Foreign aid and protection from the US and other NATO powers help the central government survive, but corruption and instability allow warlords and the Taliban to take advantage by establishing their own governments that provide services and engage in smuggling and the drug trade. The central government largely welcomes reform provided by Western powers but regional leaders outside the capital reject reform unless they see themselves benefitting from it. In Iraq the toppling of the Hussein regime re-opened sectarian strife, with Sunnis, Shi’ia and Kurdish groups competing for power and access to the oil wealth of the country. These sectarian groups control different ministries in the government, and sectarian differences hamper cooperation between the central government and regional powers. A lack of cooperation among the different branches of government, as well as between the central and regional governments, also characterize the situation in Brazil, leading to the enactment of minor reforms that fail to challenge systemic problems. By contrast, Turkey has what might be regarded as an over-centralized political system with little autonomy accorded to the provinces. This means that in terms of policing provision the TNP are not particularly responsive to local communities and have little room for autonomous action in addressing issues and concerns that such communities deem to be important. The highly devolved nature of policing in Northern Ireland as a consequence of the reforms of the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) have arguably been key to the relative success of the process, since

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those communities that have traditionally had the most antagonistic relationship with the public police can now claim a sense of ‘ownership’ policing and security; a situation that was absent historically. However, Iraq and Afghanistan represent the what happens when there is too much local control of police – the highly fractious nature of both societies has meant that policing has tended to be dominated and controlled by rival ethnic groups and factions. South Africa has moved from highly centralized public police system under apartheid to one that is now organized with a fairly high level of autonomy in the provinces. Structural reforms to the new SAPS under the South African Police Act [1995] provided for organizational decentralization to allow local communities a say in the local governance of policing. However, as we noted in our case study Community Police Forums have not worked as well as originally anticipated. Paradoxically, centralization has not occurred in the SAPS where it is needed most: criminal investigation, forensics, crime prevention and intelligence gathering (Shaw 2002). It is important that civil society plays a role in reform efforts, but the capacity of civil society to participate varies considerably by country. In Trinidad and Tobago, civil society is politically active and able to supply services, but many of these groups, particularly CBOs in high poverty, high crime areas lack legitimacy in the eyes of the government owing to a lack of trained social workers and other professionals on staff, and criminal gangs have taken over various labour intensive work contracts meant for CBOs to administer. Civil society is also well established in Afghanistan, but it is fractured along ethnic, regional and tribal lines. The sectarian divide in Iraq has also prevented the formation of a united civil society, but since civil society groups were outlawed under the Hussein regime the capacity of such groups to develop organically has been limited for a long time. In Brazil, civil society lacks sufficient strength to beget social change, in part because civil society groups have been relegated to mediating between citizens, gangs, the police, and the government. Ethnic and sectarian conflicts negatively affect civil society strength, and these conflicts are present in every country we examined in this volume: ethnic and tribal conflict in Afghanistan, ethnic conflict in Trinidad and Tobago, sectarian and ethnic conflict in Iraq, racial conflict in Brazil and South Africa, sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland, and ethnic and cultural conflict in Turkey in relation to the Kurdish issue. These conflicts have hindered the efficacy of police reform and the political process in general, albeit in some cases (Northern Ireland) they have been managed to better effect. Poverty and inequality can also prevent popular mobilization and political participation insofar as citizens spend most of their time con-

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sumed by subsistence and survival concerns, and politicians can easily purchase votes with jobs, cash, and various services (Hinton and Newburn 2009). In highly unequal countries citizens are more willing to accept authoritarian rule and politicians are more easily able to violate human rights and the law as well as weaken justice systems. In poor countries with high crime rates the police are politicized and are used to crack down on minority groups and those at the bottom of the social hierarchy (Hinton and Newburn 2009). Another factor to consider is the willingness and capacity of the country receiving aid to actually carry out the reforms. Overall, based on our case studies, one can conclude that recipients are willing if they see an economic or political benefit from doing so, but the capacity countries to implement reforms, even if they are willing, varies enormously. In Afghanistan the central government is eager to carry out reforms but regional power holders resist reforms unless there is an immediate personal benefit. Long-term commitments to reform are hard to come by in Trinidad and Tobago owing to the political schisms there, and political schisms in Brazil tend to lead only to minor reforms that do not seek to promote systemic changes. In Northern Ireland the British government’s solution to many of the problems thrown up by the peace process has been to fund them out of existence, at least temporarily. Of course, this means that some issues never get satisfactorily resolved and reappear at some future juncture. The amount of money invested by the British government in Northern Ireland is simply beyond the capacity of many developing states to deliver and indeed international aid donors to provide. The only other country in our case studies that has come close in terms of the level of financial aid received is Turkey, which has received high levels of funding from the European Union in terms of pre-accession infrastructural development. In South Africa there has been the willingness to carry out the reforms but in many cases a severe lack of financial resources and infrastructural capacity to enact them. However, the problems associated with security sector reform cannot be blamed solely on those providing aid. Regardless of the official type of political system in place there needs to be a willingness on the part of recipient governments to embrace the reform process. Unfortunately, however, many local politicians are wary of upsetting the status quo too radically and are often more worried about their own careers and the amount of power they can amass and maintain rather than what their citizens need or require. The police continue to be used to meet the personal or sectarian objectives of local and regional leaders via death squads, militias, or regime policing. In Iraq and Afghanistan for example, governmental corruption

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and collusion with criminals or militias is rampant, and issues surrounding race, ethnicity, gender, class and religion cloud the political environment and allow the police to be utilized against various perceived enemies or threats. While liberal democratic reforms should change government policies in relation to political activity, political prisoners, rights of the accused, the elimination of censorship and the nature of policing there is a high level of variation in our case studies as to the degree which this has been achieved in practice. In some of our case studies there has been fairly good progress (Northern Ireland and South Africa), reasonable progress (Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey) but in others (Brazil, Afghanistan and Iraq) the police still rely heavily on coercive powers with little public accountability or oversight. Police relations with other criminal justice and military institutions are an important factor in sustaining the efficacy of a reform endeavour. Again, in terms of our case studies there is considerable variation in terms of how well reforms are conducted across a range of sectors, not just the police. However, inter-sectoral reform costs money, time and effort and it is very often only states or supranational organizations (such as the EU) that can bed down for the long haul. This has been most noticeable in the case of Northern Ireland and Turkey. In some cases (e.g. Brazil) reforms to the police have not taken into account the role of the military, which stands accused of committing a significant proportion of abuses against citizens. In Trinidad and Tobago the police and judiciary have a fractious relationship in part because of problems with evidence and the amount of time it takes between arrest and trial. In addition, the police are often at odds with the government to the point that police leaders are sacked on a regular basis. Finally, the influence of the private sector on reform efforts can be quite broad, and in all of our case studies (with the possible exception of Northern Ireland) we found that private security is pervasive and generally has a negative influence on the conventional police and justice system to fulfil their missions although the extent of this varies considerably within our case studies. In South Africa and Brazil for example private policing has emerged as a commodity for the rich and better off while the poor are forced to place their trust in an often overstretched and ineffective public policing system. In Afghanistan regional private militias and prisons undermine the police and conventional correctional system, and private contractors hired by NATO and the US that commit atrocities are unaccountable. Private contractors are also unaccountable in Iraq for their misdeeds, and various competing militias linked to government

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ministries and powerful mullahs add to an already unstable situation. There are many companies in Trinidad and Tobago that provide security for businesses and the wealthy, and the government hires private companies to transport prisoners. Business groups and the wealthy make use of private security and even death squads in Brazil while the poor make do with a brutal police force. Conventional police supplement their incomes by moonlighting as private security guards and many police have also participated in death squads.

Micro level patterns Political divides and schisms prevent an effective response to governmental and police corruption. In some countries such as Trinidad and Tobago crime is fought more with rhetoric than action but when action is taken it is often brutal against the poor and minority groups. In Afghanistan the government is systemically corrupt at all levels and local government resistance to the central government and influence by the Taliban and warlords make matters worse. Brazil’s police receive conflicting messages from politicians on how to respond to crime, ranging from aggressive enforcement to passivity, depending on the political situation. In some of the countries we examined control over the police is ‘personalistic’ meaning that instead of the police being held to institutional forms of accountability they are instead under the influence of individual politicians (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 14). In Brazil for instance, police commissioners are replaced on a frequent basis and tenure is dependent on loyalty to a political party or regime. Centralized police forces are often less able to contend with local problems and priorities, and accountability and effectiveness are made more difficult due to a lack of quality statistical data and inadequate or politically motivated resourcing (Hinton and Newburn 2009). In countries where general governmental corruption is high and accountability mechanisms are weak, police corruption and involvement in crimes and violence are also high (Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq). Police behaviour is another necessary consideration, and in some of the countries examined we find that corruption is rampant, and that ethnic, sectarian and other schisms negatively impact police behaviour, recruitment and training. In Afghanistan those states providing police training have not coordinated properly and have not provided the amount of monetary assistance promised under aid agreements. As in Iraq, police loyalty to the central government is weak owing to the fact that local and

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sectarian loyalties are given a higher priority by officers. Ethnic schisms in Afghanistan result in the police leadership largely consisting of Tajiks at the expense of Pashtuns. In addition to ineffective training of Iraqi police and attacks on police by insurgents, the CPA recruited former army and police officers to fill the ranks in order to fight the insurgency even though they were known to be abusive in the past. In Trinidad and Tobago recruitment policies favour those of African descent over those of Indian descent, and training has not changed much since the colonial period. Many police officers appear to spend more time working to keep their jobs than in maintaining order or dealing with crime. Numerous ethnic recruitment policies also occur in other post-colonial countries, and those that do engage in ethnic recruitment policies are more likely to have paramilitarized forces, where training is in a military style, numerous rapid deployment forces that protect regime control, and blurred police and military roles even those civilians tend to head police services (Hills 2000). As one might expect police-community relations are poor in many of our case studies as well. The police are still largely distanced from the public, and are seen as abusive, even after numerous reforms have been enacted. Local resistance to the police in Afghanistan is linked to the lack of support for the central government. Owing to the fact that government and the courts are seen as ineffective or illegitimate people attempt to resolve conflict informally, sometimes through well-established Islamic courts that have traditionally dealt with property and commercial disputes. Citizens in Brazil see the police as abusive, but numerous citizens, including the poor who receive a much greater share of abuse, support police violence against drug gangs and the black minority. A similar pattern has also emerged in South Africa whereby poor communities tolerate police violence in the townships so long as it is perceived to be dealing with criminals and offenders. In Trinidad and Tobago a common citizen complaint is that the police treat victims reporting crimes as if they were suspects, and as in other countries such as Brazil the police are seen as corrupt and to be involved in criminal activity themselves. Based on this brief analysis of our case studies and our earlier discussion a number of things are clear. First, there is huge variation in terms of the success of police and security sector reform initiatives. In many respects it is difficult to say ‘what works’ because what can be shown to have been effective in one jurisdiction is unlikely to be so in another because of mitigating structural factors – extremes of wealth and poverty, the historical relation of the police to policed, the strength of civil society, the presence or otherwise of ethnic or racial schisms, the financial resourcing of the reform endeavour and so forth. Second, given these differences it appears

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highly unlikely that we will see the development of democratic policing, modelled on so-called Western lines in a number of our case studies but particularly so in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan ad Turkey. In fact in the Middle East the police in Iraq and Afghanistan may in fact emulate the Turkish model, which itself is drawn from the French republican tradition. In other cases perhaps the best we can hope for is to protect citizens from the more coercive machinations of the state with the help of sanctions, refusal of cooperation, and the like. This assumes, however, that Western countries are not simply thinking of their own geopolitical or economic interests when deciding how to distribute aid, are honest about their motives and objectives, and that institutions participating in reform efforts are working together for common goals rather than selfishly acting with competing interests. In some cases international development agencies such as DFID in the United Kingdom do put together a comprehensive reform plan that takes local context into account, but this is undermined by another branch of the UK government such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that engages in arms sales to the very regime that DFID is trying to reform. Much more clarity, openness and transparency are required here.


Proof

12

Conclusion

We have aimed to show in this book that democratic police reform is a messy business and that there is no ‘off the shelf’ model that we can implant in any one country that will be applicable across a range of variant scenarios. We have to contend with a multiplicity of conundrums, false starts and dead ends when it comes to democracy and democratic policing. One thing is clear however, from our analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq is that democratic policing (and political systems) cannot be imposed. Furthermore, simply holding elections in weak and historically repressive countries will not produce the conditions necessary for sustainable democratic police reform or the establishment of normatively democratic institutions. In addition, as we have seen from the previous chapters, levels of socio-political and economic development and police reform are intimately connected. If the state is unable to provide basic services and security for its citizens, it may repress and abuse minority groups in order to stay in power, but because of inequalities, small arms availability, internal conflicts and related problems civil society groups and the private sector often step in to fill the vacuum which creates its own sets of problems (Goldsmith 2003). In other cases, democratization leads to a further militarization of the police (as arguably has happened in South Africa) who are confronted by widespread and pernicious problems around crime and violence. These issues are obviously not easy ones to tackle. Nevertheless, we will now attempt to provide some tentative answers to the four questions we posed at the beginning of the book. 1) Under what conditions does successful police and security sector reform take place? What needs to be in place before this can be achieved? Without a doubt, different reform plans are needed for each country, owing to the fact that each of them are placed differently within the 208

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Proof Conclusion 209

global economic order and have unique histories, political systems, indigenous policing and larger criminal justice practices, internal conflicts, crime and disorder problems, and relations with other states. There is no one set of best practices that will work everywhere, but there are some general lessons, particularly in terms of what to avoid doing, that can be outlined: Conditions under which successful police reform takes place 1) Effective coordination among multiple states or agencies providing assistance. Various states and agencies involved must hold each other to agreements concerning the different roles played by various actors, which in turn must be clearly defined and planned from the outset. 2) Time and funding commitments are upheld. In countries such as Afghanistan we saw that countries did not uphold their planned funding commitments, which naturally adversely affected reform processes. 3) Involvement of local actors in all aspects of reform planning and implementation. Local actors might include local political authorities, the police themselves, other militias, and indigenous civil society groups. When possible these local actors should lead efforts (or at least participate as equal partners) while donor agencies facilitate rather than dictate, which can enhance the legitimacy of the entire process and increase the chances that reforms are sustainable. Local strengths and capacities, such as locally legitimate informal justice systems in rural areas, must be utilized. Foreign actors and their expertise would still need to be involved however, as their involvement can help limit political gridlock and avoid the appearance of the domination of certain local political parties or blocks (Varenik 2003). 4) An equal emphasis on both security and human rights. The violation of human rights or the erosion of civil liberties must not be conducted in the name of enhancing security. At the same time, an overemphasis on human rights can neglect the desperate desire for security in violent and disordered places. Be that as it may, minimal standards of accountability and human rights regardless of the form of political organization are definitely a priority. Rights-based policing involving these minimal standards is a more paramount concern than having democratic policing per se because the idea of democratic policing is too nebulous, misunderstood or abused, and rights-based policing is more proscriptive than the fuzzy concept of democratic policing. In fact, policing scholars might want to think about discussing police reform in terms of rights-based policing instead of democratic policing for these reasons. Still, security is not possible without order: ‘Order implies a degree of predictability, regularity and

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stability to social and political relationships, institutions, and behaviours’ (Hills 2009b: 12). Order requires a consensus on rules and how to carry them out, which means that power relations play a role in the development of order. NGOs and CBOs can play a role in establishing the order that makes sustainable security possible. 5) Accountability and transparency. Independent evaluation via data collection and analysis as well as the continual dissemination of information to the country’s citizens should be an important part of any reform plan. Continual independent and methodologically sound evaluation is needed in order to improve on efforts and to ensure that long-term goals are being sought or met. Independent oversight specifically for the police is needed, and a Federal agency could be created for the promotion of innovation and study (Varenik 2003) perhaps similar to the role played by the Oversight Commission in Northern Ireland (see Chapter 7). Multiple layers of oversight, including civilian oversight boards (including members of all ethnic, racial, and/or sectarian groups) that have subpoena power overseeing projects would be helpful. It is imperative that donors should also uphold their rhetoric on accountability and transparency. Donor countries and organizations should be accountable and transparent to their citizens and stakeholders regarding foreign activities. 6) An emphasis on long-term goals. This is particularly important when considering training, recruitment, and evaluation procedures. In Iraq and Afghanistan, goal deflection based on the need to combat insurgent groups prevented the police from developing into a democratic and conventional unit with regular citizen contact, and in Brazil short-term political goals prevented long-term planning for police reform. Creating a democratic police force is obviously one common long-term goal one can focus on, but this to some extent pre-supposes the existence of a political democracy in the first place. Taking into account the factors outlined in this book and elsewhere that engender as well as impede success, one should have an idealistic but realistic approach to reform. What is needed before the above conditions are in place? Contemplating this issue compels one to realize the harsh realities facing reform efforts. 1) A stable, non-repressive government receiving aid that attempts to provide basic necessities for living and development. We are not precluding the fact that initially the government must necessarily be democratic (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) but the country should be fairly ripe for democracy and importantly demonstrate a commitment to democratic ideals and legal principles. A basic level of economic stability and economic and

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political security should be in place so that the police are less likely to be paramilitarized to deal with issues around crime and disorder, and there should also be the absence of major ethno-national conflict as well as the potential for a strong legal and criminal justice system in general. 2) A global economic and political system more conducive to independent development. Neoliberal globalization predicated in part on elite domination of major forms of social organization is antithetical to independent economic, political, and social development. It also confounds police reform efforts in numerous ways as we have seen throughout this volume. It creates huge inequities in local political and economic systems, contributes to extremes of wealth and other inequities, creates the huge insecurities around crime, fosters the development of an often unaccountable and exclusivist private security sector, and contributes to authoritarianism and/or repressive policing which is very often required to deal with the consequences of neoliberal reforms. 3) Mutually sought reform. Police reform (or economic and political reforms for that matter) must be for the benefit of the country receiving aid, and there should be a full commitment and shared understanding among donor and recipient countries or organizations. It is also imperative that there is the political will to drive reforms forward in both donor and recipient nations. What we have seen too often in our case studies are reforms that are intended in the final analysis to benefit the giver rather than the receiver. 4) Donor countries and organizations have ethical leadership and a competent staff that understand the recipient country. This includes historical, cultural, economical, and political knowledge so that appropriate reforms can be successfully negotiated and implemented. Strong and ethical leadership is needed in order to maintain a long-term focus and to contend with inevitable roadblocks. 5) Democratic reform of the larger political system and its institutions occurs simultaneously. Systemic changes to the overall political system and its institutions are seen by Hinton and Newburn (2009: 23) as necessary in order to democratize police forces, since it is apparent that ‘democratic political and police reform are intertwined’. 6) The police must be receptive to change and be sufficiently independent from a regime or ethnic group. The police deserve the right to feel they have something to gain instead of a lot to lose if they agree to be a part of the process. Some police are suspicious of reforms since it may lead to questions about their involvement in past crimes/atrocities. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to navigate this and dealing with ‘the past’ and the establishment of truth-recovery processes have proved to be particularly problematic in Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent in South Africa.

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2) How can we reform the police or security sector in those states that are governed by political elites and for whom democracy and democratic governance may be an anathema? Where does democratic policing sit with undemocratic state structures? The short and brutal answer these two questions is that we cannot reform the police or security sector in anti-democratic states, and democratic policing does not sit with undemocratic state structures. If undemocratic states want reform it must obviously be sustainable, tied to other reforms that promote democracy over the long term, uphold human rights as a top priority, and have independent civilian oversight, backed up perhaps by an international body. International organizations such as the UN can tie police or other security sector assistance to other types of foreign aid that helps the people of the country receiving aid rather than exclusively the regime and the donors. Because forced reform is likely to be unsustainable or reversed in the medium to long term a carrot and stick approach via diplomacy rather than war is preferred. This has been the case in Turkey with EU accession criteria, although there are potential limits as to how much ‘stick’ a country may be prepared to take. While it is apparent that democratic policing cannot exist when political institutions are themselves undemocratic, it is also the case that democratic systems can generate undemocratic police structures. Democracy of course can be unrepresentative and the police can be used as a tool of a political party or ethnic group. Police in democratic societies can easily engage in practices that weaken democracy, widen inequalities, and fail to promote the contested notion of justice (Manning 2010). 3) What are the motives of donors? Are police and security sector reform efforts geared more to suit the strategic interests and imperatives of key Western States? Are Northern/Western reform efforts antithetic to the notion of democratization in recipient nations? Our case studies suggest that in the main the motives of donors for providing aid and development assistance tend to be largely strategic and self-interested. There are of course, important exceptions. But generally geopolitical hegemons use economic, political, and security sector reforms to influence the behaviour of other states in the world system to influence events and assuage risks that they feel threatens their own security. This is perhaps understandable and has been a core feature of state-craft for centuries. Nevertheless, the practices of core states in this regard (as with discourses around counter-terrorism and drugs) have reduced incentives to democratize institutions in recipient countries or actively undermined whatever reform processes are ongoing. Instead, there are more

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incentives for ‘hard-line security policies, centralizing policing, and supporting hard and soft dictatorships throughout the world’ (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 24). This then leads to the conclusion that for the most part reform efforts are antithetic to notions of democratization in recipient nations, but it does depend on the context and it is a matter of degree. Contradictions in overseas development policy are many, with various donor agencies and militaries promoting contradictory objectives and strategies, such as supporting democratic policing rhetoric while engaging in risky arms deals and paramilitarizing the police. 4) How can we cultivate the norms of a global civil society so as to make democratic governance, acceptance of human rights, and fair and accountable policing acceptable to recipient nations and the mainstay of reform endeavours? Unfortunately this question assumes that donor countries and organizations want to promote human rights, democratic governance and policing that are accountable to citizens in recipient nations. It is quite apparent once we consider the political economy of foreign aid and development assistance that we cannot assume this. In any case many countries in the North and West have increasingly centralized and made more authoritarian their own security sectors. If the US for example, will not allow UN inspectors to view its own immigration detention facilities there is little incentive for developing democracies to allow UN or other international teams to inspect theirs (Hinton and Newburn 2009). States in the North and West must therefore practice what they preach. It is apparent, that these norms must be promoted not only to recipient nations but donor nations and organizations as well. The cultivation of a global civil society might be accomplished through linkages between international and local civil society groups, and using those linkages to pressure and persuade the UN and other international bodies to compel undemocratic states to reform their security sectors and to ensure that donor states and organizations uphold their rhetorical commitments through action. Democratic reforms can be a negotiated element of membership in international organizations and alliances such as the EU, but as we have learned this cannot be done by force or by neocolonial notions that include the idea that Western countries know what is best for everyone else. However, we may not be able to cultivate the norms of a global civil society to change reform endeavours overnight or even in a few decades, as there is no real global consensus on these issues and one-size-fits-all orientations are, as we have seen, often inappropriate in differing contexts. Social and cultural changes needed to create sustainable

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and viable democracies in places beset with state violence and repression such as Latin America are not addressed by Western discourses around rights and democracy adequately (Caldeira and Holston 1999). This is in part because developing countries tend to have different cultural contexts, develop differently from Western countries in economic terms, and develop democratic systems differently. Our discussion in this book about the possibilities for democratic police reform has been rather pessimistic. Of course, progress has been made. Out of all our case studies it is Northern Ireland that has seen the greatest progress but it is probably no coincidence that it lies at the edge of Europe and is administratively at least governed as a region of a key economic power. There are perhaps few international lessons that Northern Ireland can offer, but if there is one it is that throwing enough money at a problem usually makes it go away or at least moderates any destabilizing impact. This is emphatically not to undermine the strenuous efforts of those individuals in Northern Ireland who have worked tirelessly for peace, but it is certainly the case that the ‘transition’ was smoothed by the lure of money. Even the most ardent, sectarian and embittered RUC officer could not but have been tempted to take early retirement by the offer of a cash payment of over $230,000 and a guaranteed pension of $75,000 for life as laid down in the ICP severance proposals. Therefore, the perennial problem of how to demobilize police was solved in the Northern Ireland case by the British government wielding its cheque book. It is doubtful, however, if this option is available to too many of our other case studies. In our other case studies there has been reform and progress but whether this translates to an emulative Western model is a different matter entirely. More generally though many overseas police reform efforts follow the line of least resistance and leave the larger structural problems unaddressed. Our final point is that there must be a commitment to social justice and activism that operates at the global level, although this is notoriously difficult to realize in practice. Following John Rawls, Manning (2010: ix) argues that democratic policing ought to be concerned with justice. That is, the police should defend equality, respect human rights, and promote fairness in operations and as he suggests, ‘Order absent justice is a dubious and undesirable façade’. This however, depends on political transformation. As Andre Gunder Frank (Frank 1969) noted several decades ago the ‘real’ solution to development problems lay in politics. So too, we contend that the ‘real’ solution to international police reform depends as much on the transformation of political and economic structures as it does on the transformation of the structures of policing.

15GPRD_notes(215-218) 6/21/12 4:51 PM Page 215 This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Please contact [email protected] if you have any queries regarding use of the file.

Proof

Notes Chapter 1 Reform

Neoliberal Globalization, Insecurity and Police

1 http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3750_1.pdf

Chapter 2 Development Paradigms, Neoliberalism and Human Security – Western Style 1 See Peter Tatchell ‘Green is the New Red’, The Guardian, 15th June, 2004. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/jun/15/greenpolitics.elections2004? INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 (accessed 11th November, 2011). 2 It is likely, however, that this Arab Spring is going to disappoint those who were hoping for the establishment of institutions a la London or Washington. What seems more likely is that an Islamic secular democracy on the Turkish model will emerge, although on the other hand democratization may lead to previously secular (but repressive) regimes giving way to hardline Islamist groups. 3 Edwin W. Memmerer Papers, 1975–1945. Princeton University Library: http:// findingaids.princeton.edu/getEad?eadid=MC146&kw=#series3 4 See Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/id/2114260/ (accessed 21st September, 2011). 5 http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_34447_47515235_1_1_1_1,00.html 6 This of course is highly selective. Compare for example, the relative noninterference in Saudi Arabia with the denunciation of Syria, Libya and Jordan for human rights abuses. 7 http://www.USAID.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/kenya/kenya_fs. pdf 8 This was a volunteer, Islamist ‘army’ organized and funded by Osama Bin Laden which fought against the Soviet and DRA troops during the civil war in Afghanistan in 1978. 9 See World Vision Donors Dig Deep, http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/ 2009/02/09/story8.html (accessed 1st October, 2011). 10 See DEVEX ‘For Europe’s Development NGOs a key lobbyist’, Kristine Ballad, 13th April, 2010. Available: http://www.devex.com/en/articles/for-europe-sdevelopment-ngos-a-key-lobbyist 11 We recognize that there are success stories. To give credit to President G.W. Bush, his President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPfAR) whereby he pledged $15 billion over a five year period to provide anti-retroviral drugs in Africa has been a noted success and has been acknowledged as one of the most efficacious public health interventions ever undertaken. See http://www.time.com/time/ politics/article/0,8599,1944554,00.html 12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-12608869 (accessed 22nd September, 2011). 215

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Proof 216 Notes 13 See UN Interagency Common Air Service, http://one.wfp.org/operations/current_ operations/project_docs/105140.pdf (accessed 22nd September, 2011). 14 Ghani & Lockhart (2008) make the reasonable point that even if this were the case the $300–$500 million that it took to establish UNHAS should have been invested in the national carrier Ariana to purchase or lease new aircraft and to bring the airline up to Western safety standards. This would have benefited all Afghan citizens, not just UN officials.

Chapter 3 Assistance

Donor Export and Police Development

1 See Getting to Community Policing in Afghanistan, http://www.peacefare.net/? page_id=1045. Security forces help promote Iraqi community policing, http:// www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123199984 (accessed 23rd September, 2011). 2 Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have recently pledged to curtail the proportion of tied development aid. 3 See Unsung Hero Resurrects US Tied Aid Reporting. Available: http://aidwatchers.com/ 2009/02/unsung-hero-resurrects-us-tied-aid-reporting/ (accessed 25th September, 2011). 4 US Agency for International Development. As the USAID website indicates in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The prime contracts will be awarded to US firms through a competitive procurement process. Existing US foreign assistance law establishes a preference for US firms.’ 5 http://www.kpmg.com/eastafrica/en/WhatWeDo/Advisory/Development-Advisory-Services/Documents/Fragile_and_Conflicted_States.pdf (accessed 26th September, 2011). This incidentally is not a criticism of KPMG. Private sector organizations have particular skills relating to project management and as such may be more transparent and accountable than other governmental or NGO agencies. 6 This reference to the UK Police PLC brand was made by Assistant Chief Constable Colin Firth, when he was seconded to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. See http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/46534/smith-statement.pdf (accessed 27th September, 2011).

Chapter 5

Brazil

1 DARE, or Drug Abuse Resistance Education, is a programme implemented in schools, and aims to encourage students not to take drugs or join gangs.

Chapter 7

Northern Ireland

1 See Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) Northern Ireland Census 2001 Output, http://www.nisranew.nisra.gov.uk/census/Census2001 Output/index.html (accessed 9th November, 2011). 2 See Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). Life Expectancy in Northern Ireland, http://www.nisra.gov.uk/demography/default.asp130.htm (accessed 10th November, 2011).


Proof Notes 217 3 The Royal Ulster Constabulary was always predominantly Protestant with Catholics comprising around 8% of its membership historically (see Mulcahy 2006). 4 Although as is the case elsewhere in the UK private security employees are used for prison escort duties. 5 Until the 1950s for instance, around 35,000 people were employed by the main Belfast shipbuilder Harland & Woolf. However, by the 1990s this had fallen to 500. 6 For example, see ‘Ex-Priest sues over PSNI security vetting’, BBC News, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8693191.stm (accessed 9th November, 2011). 7 Republicans are generally associated with the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The term refers to those individuals and organizations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who advocate violence to bring about a united Ireland at some future time. Republicans are distinct from nationalists insofar as the latter advocate a united Ireland by peaceful constitutional means. 8 British military bases and military personnel in Germany were targeted by the IRA. Bars and night-clubs frequented by British soldiers were also targeted. Between 1987 and 1996 the IRA conducted over a dozen bombing or shooting attacks in Germany. 9 Loyalists are generally associated with the Protestant community in Northern Ireland. Loyalists advocate the use of violence to maintain Northern Ireland’s constitutional link with Britain. Loyalists are distinct from Unionists, insofar as the latter advocate a maintaining this link by peaceful, constitutional means. 10 This was mainly to do with the belief by the FBI and other US Federal agencies that the IRA were training FARC ‘narco-terrorists’ in Columbia. 11 After a peak in the mid-1970s, the level of violence in Northern Ireland reached what a British government Minister termed ‘an acceptable level’. The conflict was localized and spatially concentrated and outside a small number of areas many people could go about their daily business in relative normalcy. 12 This figure is derived from data obtained in 2004–2005 and includes the £56 million allocated to the ICP severance programme for that financial year and the estimated £50 million annual cost to modernize the police estate. 13 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12171098

Chapter 8

South Africa

1 In South Africa this is the official term used to describe a distinct ethnic group. It does not have the same pejorative meaning or connotation as it does in the United States. Coloured people are reputedly the descendents of slaves from South and South East Asia (what used to be known as the East Indies). 2 Arguably however, President de Klerk’s public stance represented the tail end of a protracted, secret and behind-the-scenes process involving the ANC and the South African National Intelligence Service (Brogden and Shearing 1993). 3 This was a quasi-Masonic organization with religious overtones dedicated to the promotion of the Afrikaner way of life and culture (Brogden and Shearing 1993).


Proof 218 Notes 4 Ten Bantustans were established in South Africa itself, and ten in South West Africa (now Namibia) which was then under South African control (see Wilson and Thompson 1985). 5 While each ‘homeland’ recognized each other’s territory and maintained pseudodiplomatic relations, the only actual state to do so was Israel. Presumably, this had to do with the close relationship between apartheid era South Africa and Israel and the weapons and defence contracts signed between them (see McGreal 2010). 6 See statistics South Africa: http://www.statssa.gov.za/ies/Pamphlet.pdf 7 For example, in 2003 there were 56,930 Inspectors, compared to 12,191 Constables, the most junior rank in the organization (Leggett 2003). 8 See SAPS (2011b) Rank Structure: http://www.saps.gov.za/careers/saps_rank_ structure.htm

Chapter 9

Trinidad and Tobago

1 Available at http://www.ttcrime.com/stats.php 2 See www.tntisland.com/securityservices.html for a current list of private security providers in Trinidad and Tobago.

Chapter 10

Turkey

1 Certainly, while this level of incarceration is high in comparative European terms it is nevertheless a fraction of that in the United States, which has an incarceration rate of 743 per 100,000 people with a total prison population of approximately 2.2 million (International Centre for Prison Studies 2011a).

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Proof 236 Bibliography

AU: Should this be described in full? Pls. advise.

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