Kevin Wong: Deputy Director of Hallam Centre for Community Justice - ... crime are less likely to report their victimisation to the police when compared to other ..... statutes on racially aggravated offences and committed community safety units to .... Burney, E. & Rose, G. (2002) Racist Offences â How is the law Working? The.
This is the author-manuscript version of this work
Hate Crime Victims and Hate Crime Reporting: Some Impertinent Questions Kris Christmann: Research Fellow - Applied Criminology Centre: University of Huddersfield Kevin Wong: Deputy Director of Hallam Centre for Community Justice Sheffield Hallam University
Introduction Much of the academic, practitioner and voluntary sector interest in victims of hate crime have focused upon the impacts of hate crime and the practical and emotional support needs and services for victims. Our own work has been somewhat divergent from this. We were commissioned to identify how hate crime reporting could be improved in a northern town, and made inclusive across different equality groups. We undertook a small scale study that examined individual decision making by hate crime victims in whether or not to report incidents, and how the available reporting arrangements and associated publicity materials affected these decisions (Wong & Christmann, 2008). Somewhat to our surprise, what appeared to be a critical issue in terms of whether or not hate crime policies were likely to succeed was also a much under researched area.1 Whilst our own research findings cannot be generalised beyond the study site, it did allow us to test out and consider more thoroughly some of the assumptions implicit in policy developments around hate crime reporting, specifically the policy goal of full reporting. We want to reflect back on these findings and the broader research literature to pose some questions on the adequacy and utility of the current reporting agencies approaches and the general policy direction to hate crime victims. 1
As acknowledged in Victim Support’s (2005) literature review of the support needs of victims of hate crime
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We believe this has merit because the statutory criminal justice agencies and the voluntary sector are grappling with the challenges of adopting hate crime in its broadest sense, and providing a responsive, effective and victim centred service across markedly different vulnerable groups. Pertinent questions can be asked about what the current policies on hate crime can be expected to achieve given the nature of victim decision making on the critical issue of whether to report their victimisation. We will draw out some implications that the legacy of the Lawrence Inquiry has had for strategic thinking, policy making and make some tentative suggestions on how these might be improved. We argue something that may be considered heresy among hate crime victimloogy circles and victim campaigning groups; that the current policy message concerning victim reporting does not reflect reality, and risks being discredited. What is required, some 10 years post Lawrence is more nuanced responses and ones which acknowledge: the distance travelled by criminal justice agencies in the intervening years; that the majority of hate crime is manifested as single incidents of harassment (which may not necessarily constitute crimes); and the unlikelihood of full reporting by the public, which realistically fits where the public are in terms of their expectations. In doing so we do not pretend to have any authoritative answers to these issues, but believe the questions are worth posing to prompt a debate between efficacy of response versus a largely unchallenged view of hate crime victimology.
Hate Crime Reporting The current policy imperative is aimed at encouraging the reporting of hate crime, driven by the conviction that reporting rates are notoriously low. There is good reason to believe that this is the case as much of the research literature suggests that victims of hate crime are less likely to report their victimisation to the police when compared to other crimes. The Metropolitan police estimate that the majority of racist and religious hatred crimes, and as much as 90% of homophobic hate crime go unreported, although crucially this has to be seen within the context of low levels of reporting generally. For volume crime for instance, the British Crime Survey (BCS) 2008/09 suggests that 41% of crimes2 were reported to the police, whereas 59% were never reported3, although the likelihood of reporting a crime varies considerably by the type of offence. This last point 2
This refers to comparable volume crime which is a subset of crimes (such as vandalism, burglary, vehiclerelated theft, bicycle theft, theft from the person, wounding, robbery, assault with minor injury and assault without injury) rather than all list offences. 3 Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Crime in England and Wales 2008/09, July 2009 11/05
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is well illustrated by Goudriaan et al’s (2004) analysis of the International Crime Victims Survey which spans 16 industrialised countries and found that assaults and threats were the least frequently reported, with only slightly more than a third being reported. Nationally, in 2006, Police recorded 43,000 racially or religiously motivated hate crimes4, but a more complete measure comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS) which indicated a substantially higher figure of 184,000 offences that victims believed were motivated by prejudice. This suggests that over three quarters (76%) were never reported to the police.5 Bouten, Goudriaan, & Nieuwbeerta (2002) found that only half of all incidents across 6 crime types in 17 industrialised countries (including the UK) are reported to the police. Needless to say we do not know the true level of unreported hate crime, as is the case with the ‘dark figure’ of volume crime more generally. In response to such deficits, periodic but patchy local campaigns are launched up and down the country to raise awareness and instruct hate crime victims to the many ways to report incidents.6 The policy logic is that achieving higher rates of reporting to the criminal justice system will better identify the level of presenting need and inform how best to address and control victimisation. But do we know enough already, without sacrificing further resources, in a vain effort to achieve something close to accurate reporting levels, across groups vulnerable to hate crime? In our own study we found that the official concern over reporting all hate crimes for service planning requirements was not shared by the overwhelming majority of respondents, and furthermore, would not have been feasible to deliver (Wong & Christmann, 2008). This regularity in victim decision-making is reflected in the wider criminology literature which consistently demonstrates that the higher the perceived seriousness of a crime the greater the probability that this will be reported to the police (i.e. Goudriaan, Lynch & Nieuweerta, 2004; Skogan, 1976, 1984; Sparks, Glenn & Dodd, 1977; Fishman, 1979). 4
It should be noted that the term ‘hate crime’ has no legal status in the UK, but rather denotes a series of 11 racially and religiously aggravated offences of violence, harassment or criminal damage. These eleven Home Office list offences compile: Racially or religiously aggravated inflicting GBH; Racially or religiously aggravated less serious wounding; Racially or religiously aggravated ABH or other injury; Racially or religiously aggravated harassment/public fear; Racially or religiously aggravated harassment; Racially or religiously aggravated public fear, alarm or distress; Racially or religiously aggravated assault without injury; Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling; Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling; Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle; and; Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage. 5 Although there are additional reasons that explain this discrepancy between BCS and police recorded crime, namely, trends in reporting rates and police recording practice as well as variation within the BCS sample (Home Office, 2008/09: 26). 6 For instance the 'Talk to Us' campaign launched by Camden Council and Camden Police and a range of community and support groups is one of many.
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The underlying assumption has been that victims undertake a cost-benefit calculation (consciously or unconsciously) in deciding whether it is worth the effort involved in contacting the police and making a report (i.e. Skogan, 1984). However, if the victim sustains physical injury or the loss is high, then the benefits of reporting to the police are deemed that much greater, as opposed to when only minor injury or loss, or no loss is involved.
Similarly, in Australia the analysis of victim survey data7 suggests that
incidents causing physical harm to the victim, or with greater potential for threatening the victim’s safety are reported at higher rates than less serious ones. Without exception then, crime seriousness has been shown to be the principal determinant of reporting behaviour, and the BCS findings would also appear to confirm this. Table 1 below summarises the reasons that victims gave for not reporting the incident to the police (across all BCS crime types and for the two most pertinent crime types regards the reporting of hate crime incidents, violence and vandalism).8 Table 1: British Crime Survey 2008/09: Victims Reasons for Not Reporting Crime to Police9 Reasons for Not Reporting Crime to Police
All BCS crime
All violence
Vandalism
Trivial/no loss/police would not/could not do anything Private/dealt with ourselves Inconvenient to report Reported to other authorities Common occurrence Fear of reprisal Dislike or fear of police/previous bad experience with police or courts 10 Other
76
52
87
14 5 4 2 2 1
34 5 6 5 6 3
8 4 1 2 2 1
5
6
3
According to the BCS 2008/0911 reasons for victim’s not reporting volume crime primarily centre on the victim perceiving the incident as too trivial, no loss is involved or believing 7
Carcach, C. (1997) Reporting Crime to the Police, Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice, No. 68 March. 8 The Home Office’s annual reports on Crime in England and Wales does not provide figures for why BCS victims did not report incidents of ‘harassment ‘. 9 BCS: 2008/09, page 41. 10 Category includes: something that happens as part of job; partly my/friend's/relative's fault; offender not responsible for actions; thought someone else had reported incident/similar incidents; tried to report but was not able to contact the police/police not interested; other (BCS: 2008/09:26) 11 For all crime types covered by the BCS: Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Crime in England and Wales 2008/09, July 2009 11/05
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that the police would or could not do much about the offence (76% of incidents)12. A further 14% of respondents felt that the incident was a private matter to be dealt with by them, and a further 5% cited the inconvenience of reporting. Only 1% stated police related reasons such as dislike or fear of the police and having had a previous bad experience with the police or courts. Although, it is interesting to note that Goudriaan et al (2004) found that perceived police confidence had no effect on the reporting of contact crimes, but it did on the chance that property crime would be reported. As we would expect, these reasons for not reporting crime, change markedly when examining violent crime as a separate category, with fewer victims citing the incident as too trivial or fearing police inaction (52%). For BCS respondents, considerably more regarded being a victim of violence as a private matter (34%) than for all BCS crime, (possibly indicating instances of intimate partner violence).
Fear of reprisals, dislike of
the police, repeat victimisation and reporting to alternative authorities all figure higher for not reporting violence when compared to all BCS crime. The overriding reason for not reporting vandalism was that victims considered it too trivial or they concluded that nothing would be or could be done by the Police (some 87%). Similar reasons for non-reporting crime have been found in the Australian criminology literature.13 With this combined weight of evidence we would reasonably expect that the severity of an incident holds true for hate crime victims as well. This was the case with our own research which found a steep decline in victims propensity to report as a function of both the incident severity and the frequency of its occurrence(although others14 have argued for a more inclusive model of crime reporting, that considers the role of contextual factors in addition to just the attributes of the crime, which we discuss later). Whilst police recorded hate crime figures are no doubt incomplete, they do consistently show that the bulk of reported hate crimes ((67% in 2007/08)15 are cases of harassment, whilst the minority of cases (a further 12% in 2007/08) involve the victim sustaining an
12
Unfortunately the BCS merges these different reasons due to the perceived similarity for respondents, so we are unable to know whether it is the victim’s subjective feelings concerning the crime or alternatively their assessments of the police response that results in non-reporting – this is especially unhelpful when trying to understand victim decision making. 13 Australian Institute of Criminology, Reporting crime to the police, Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice, No. 68 March 1997 14 Such as Goudriaan, Lynch & Nieuwbeerta, 2004. 15 Figures were not available for 2008/09 at time of writing due to a quality assurance inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary of some categories of racially and religiously motivated offences.
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injury. That violence and highly emotive crimes are the exception rather than the rule is further supported by research on perpetrators (Ray et al. 2003, 2004; Burney et al., 2002). Drawing on this research and their own professional practice, Dixon and Ray argue that ‘much of what gets labelled ‘hate crime’ is more casual confrontations in which racist (or other hate language) is deployed’ and consequently much of the behaviour is ‘more ambiguous and subject to re-evaluation by the participants who often display adherence to dominant norms of acceptable behaviour’ (Dixon & Ray, 2007: 110). In fact ‘mission offenders’ who constitute the greatest potential danger due to their tendency for premeditated and targeted offending are relatively rare, whereas the more common ‘thrill seekers’ and ‘reactive offenders’ seldom proceed beyond verbal abuse (Dixon & Court, 2003: 151). Gadd et al’s., (2005) study of racially aggravated offenders in Staffordshire found that racism was rarely the sole motivating factor in their offending behaviour, as was the case with our own interviewing of racially motivated offenders (Wong, Christmann, Wilcox , Smithson & Monchuk, 2008). This is not to deny the impact that hate offences can have on victims or that the typologies of perpetrators automatically dictate levels of risk, prejudices can become more entrenched and perpetrators may gravitate and escalate to ‘mission’ activities. Rather there is a tendency within the victimology aspects of hate crime to presuppose a ‘one size fits all’ view of victims and among policy makers a limited understanding of offenders involved in hate crime. What we require is a better policy alignment between the range of experiences and expectations of victims and those of offender motivations. As Dixon and Ray note, the evidence from agencies dealing with racially motivated offending and broader community conflict problems ‘suggests that race is often an issue in violence and anti-social behaviour, but not the issue (2007: 110). Where does this leave the discussion regards a goal of full reporting? Our own research study (Wong & Christmann, 2008) acknowledged that hate crime reporting could be impacted by measures such as improving access, improving the service experience and social marketing exercises that actively engage end users. To this end we recommended significantly upgrading the local service to a ‘Client Centred Service Model’. This was an effort to offer more tangible benefits to victims and thereby overcome the expenditure of the transaction costs of notification, be it to the police or another reporting agency. But we conceded that the reporting gains were likely to only be marginal, irrespective of the efforts that agencies made because victims perceived
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the crime not to be serious, and therefore by definition, it was often not considered worth reporting by our respondents. We also found that providing alternative reporting methods to reporting by telephone or in person, such as via a web-site,16 and a number of other currently unavailable methods (i.e. texting) did not provide any quick solution to under reporting either. In our study, respondents emphasised requiring proof that their report had been made and crucially, actioned (Wong & Christmann, 2008: 28-29) and therefore proved sceptical of non-traditional reporting methods that did not deliver this.
How Did We Get Here? The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report published in 1999 did much to shape the current approach to hate crime reporting. Perhaps for the first time this inquiry acted to expose the nature and challenges in the processing of race hate crime by statutory criminal justice agencies and stimulate policy change to increase trust and confidence in policing among ethnic minority communities (Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, 46.31). Prior to the inquiry racially motivated crimes were only a marginal issue for the police in the context of their overall workloads (Sampson and Phillips, 1995) this despite the fact that the police were the most significant agency for reporting crime. Whilst there have been longstanding tensions between the police and ethnic monitory communities, the Inquiry acted to highlight how the lack of confidence experienced by those communities in the way that cases were dealt with had led to under reporting, despite a greater risk of victimisation. The report drew together some 70 recommendations covering nearly all aspects of policing, and constituted the development of a new strategic approach to racial harassment and hate crime more generally throughout England and Wales (Dixon and Ray, 2007). The key recommendations of the report stipulated a common definition of a racist incident that had wider applicability than racial prejudice alone. There was also an explicit commitment to tackle under reporting, through recommending codes of practice to create a more comprehensive system of reporting and recording of racist incidents, and that local criminal justice agencies (in consultation with local communities) should encourage the reporting of racist incidents and crimes, including the ability to report at non-police station locations and the ability to report 24 hours a day. Emphasis was put on the need to allocate sufficient resources to tackle incidents and support victims, 16
The Police operate a ‘True Vision’ website which allows victims to report hate incidents online.
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again, partly achieved through the development of common reporting systems and encouraging ‘third party’ reporting centres for groups reluctant to report directly to the police (Wong, 2002). Many of these recommendations were adopted by the government of the day, and incorporated in the ensuing legislative and policy programmes. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (section 28), and the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) introduced new statutes on racially aggravated offences and committed community safety units to develop effective multi-agency initiatives to address under reporting. Additional legislation17 revised and extended this to religious hatred, and also required the courts to consider hostility to disability or sexual orientation as an aggravating factoring in sentencing. Two government reports assessing the progress made since the Lawrence inquiry ten years on found there had been significant improvement in the reporting and recording of racist incidents, however under reporting was still felt to remain high (Foster, Newburn & Souhami, 2005) especially for incidents perceived by victims to be ‘less serious’ but which could have a cumulative impact (Docking & Tuffin., 2005). The overall message was that more should and could be done to continue to increase reporting through increasing trust and confidence in the police (ibid, 2005: 24). We have no quarrel with the sentiment being expressed here, and recognise that these combined legislative and policy changes have resulted in a systematic reconfiguration of the ways in which the criminal justice system now deals with prejudice-related offending, including a greater preparedness to recognise a plurality of hate crime victims. However, we do not believe that the current policy messages will substantially increase reporting of hate crimes. Consequently the goal of full reporting risks remaining at the status of policy aspiration for the reasons that we have rehearsed. The Lawrence reforms were driven by the need to address the glaring deficiencies with how the police responded to racially motivated offending, but moreover, they were and remain a priority partly for symbolic reasons - in reforming the Police as an institution and the quality of their operational responses. This is what the policies are really about, despite there being only a meagre evidence base for the effectiveness of some of the adopted approaches, such as non police, third party reporting centres. 17
The Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001), the Race and Religious Hatred Act (2006), the Criminal Justice Act (2003) and the Criminal Justice (No. 2) Northern Ireland Order (2004).
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Target those most likely to report The point of departure for us was how to affect victim reporting regards ‘lower level’ racial or other hate harassment (typically manifested in isolated incidents of name calling/verbal abuse) which is not considered sufficiently serious by victims to report. Although the problems do not stop here, as the victim may not even realise that the incident constitutes a crime (at times requiring a technical interpretation of the law) or alternatively the verbal abuse may not be arousing or disturbing because it does not violate the wider community standards thought to justify intervention by community appointed agents, namely, the police. What we do know is that if it is perceived as serious, it is more likely to be reported. If low level incidents recur, this persistence is also more likely to prompt reporting. We found that victims of hate crime make a clear distinction between violent and non-violent crimes and discriminate accordingly (Wong & Christmann, 2008: 30-31). It was only with the repeated occurrence of a non-violent, non-serious hate crime that the likelihood of this type of incident being reported increased because the perpetrator would be more identifiable and consequent action likelier to result in effective enforcement action in the minds of respondents (ibid, 2008). Figure 1 sketches out diagrammatically where we see the most profitable point of intervention, namely those victims who suffer a hate motivated incident that is sufficiently severe to warrant real consideration of reporting and where there is a realistic potential that this will be carried through. Clearly there are many caveats to note here, victim characteristics differ widely and therefore they may experience incidents differently. Hate crime also covers a variety of offences across a range of different vulnerable groups. However, the figure is for illustrative purposes only and relates to the 2 key determinants of reporting: offence severity and persistence. We want to argue that resources should be targeted at the greatest point of impact in encouraging reporting; this ‘ambivalent group’ who may go either way in independently reporting or not (as indicated by the downward arrow in figure 1).
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Figure 1: Schematic of Hate Crime Reporting
Point of greatest policy impact
Most severe hate offence
Victim considers reporting
Likely to report victimisation
Least severe hate offence
Unlikely to report victimisation
Persistence of hate crime incident
We suggest that this can be achieved by: focussing social marketing messages at this core audience and their social networks; and by using neighbourhoods as the social unit for hate crime control. In our study we reviewed the social marketing materials such as posters, leaflets and information packs used in the city area. With the exception of some of the information packs, these marketing materials were targeted at an unsegmented market; anyone who may experience any form of hate crime, from violence to verbal abuse. Instead of this broad-brush approach, we propose that materials need to be targeted at individuals who experience: crimes types that straddle the boundaries between seriousness and nonseriousness; and those who experience persistent low-level harassment. In addition, messages also need to be targeted at individuals who form the social networks of this targeted group of victims. The rationale for focussing on this social network group comes from a consideration of the broader social context of reporting. Describing the results from a 13 year program on research in the USA on crime victims, Greenburg & Ruback (1992) found that the strongest and most consistent findings
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concern the role that social influence variables play in the victim’s decision to report or not report the crime to the police. Whilst not looking at hate crime victims in particular, the authors found that crime victims often talk with others before making a decision about reporting, and due to their more emotionally aroused state, are more susceptible to the influence of these others. They concluded that the real gatekeeper of the criminal justice system is not the police, or indeed the victim, but rather those people who the victim consults directly after the crime has occurred. This is the ‘neglected decision maker’ in the criminal justice system, and one whom information campaigns should be directed at (Greenburg & Ruback, 1992: 240-241). All crime is nested within social contexts, and one can move to the neighbourhood level and consider it a social unit for hate crime control. Using intelligence led policing at the neighbourhood level to try and address low-level hate crime harassment offences would be one potentially profitable approach.
Work on identifying vulnerabilities could be
undertaken amongst neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs). Devolving down those more targeted responsibilities would allow for identifying individuals and/or geographical areas that are most vulnerable to hate crime. For example, black and minority ethnic staff working in a takeaway, open till late at night next to a pub in an area of high deprivation with a predominantly all white residential population are likely to be vulnerable to racial harassment.
NPT’s already undertake community consultation work and having the
police engage with these more vulnerable communities or their social networks would sell the reporting message to a susceptible audience. An additional, potential outcome of this activity is that this would enhance the reputation of the police among those communities who may have reservations about engaging with them. The role of local authorities in supporting this approach is crucial. Instead of directing their efforts into ‘grandstanding’ (Wong 2009) over the numbers of non police reporting centres (often within local authority premises) within their areas, their resources would be better spent working with NPTs and growing the confidence within vulnerable communities to report incidents to the police. Conclusion We have suggested that the current emphasis on full reporting needs to be revised and assert that agencies need a more intelligent strategy in how they operationalise hate
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crime generally. Our own findings suggested that broad-brush unsegmented local publicity campaigns are likely to be ineffective. Keeping hate crime as a policing priority needs to be maintained, not least because it has yet to permeate sufficiently high in the ‘hierarchy of police relevance’ (Bowling, 1999) across an adequately large number of front line officers. Chakraborti’s (2009) recent review examining the policing of hate crime questioned whether sufficient progress has been made at the operational level and argued that reforms needed to be sustained. We want to argue that a more complex narrative is required at the operational and practice level in the form of a tiered approach for hate crime victims, and one that recognises the reality of under reporting. It is simply unrealistic to expect victims to report low level harassment motivated by prejudice, no more so than with lower severity volume crime more generally. To concede this much is to accept that there is an unacknowledged deficiency with current policy, but at the same time there is a danger in being seen as back peddling on the Lawrence/Macpherson agenda, one that risks interrupting police reform and confusing the public. Clearly there is a tension here that needs to be sensitively managed, between holding onto realistic policy aims whilst retaining the direction of policy travel from Lawrence/Macpherson. We want community safety practitioners at the local level to recognise that full reporting is a wasted effort. Rather they need to refocus their approach and target their limited provision in a more effective way.
Having non-police reporting centres (‘third party
reporting’) is at best an interim measure while the police upgrade their response to hate crime victims, is at worst a diversion absolving the police from upgrading their response to hate crime victims. It would be more profitable to support police efforts that target and engage those vulnerable communities in an effort to buttress confidence in the police. After all, victims realise that the only agency which has the capability to enforce laws and punish offenders is the police. The veracity of this point should not be under estimated. Our own study found that the predominant minimum agency response expected across a wide range of hate incidents was the clear expectation to catch and convict the culprit (Wong & Christmann, 2008). Perhaps the best way to build confidence in the police is through the effect of cumulative peer recommendations from victims, their families and support networks. The spread of positive rumours and stories which recount how the police responded to hate incidents
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has the potential to create a virtuous cycle and further growth in the message's exposure and influence. However, the opposite also holds true, our study found that a previous negative encounter with the police, be it through police disinterest in the report or failing to take any action, acted as a powerful disincentive to report in future. Furthermore, this was the case whether experienced directly or learnt second-hand from someone else. Such negative encounters also hardened attitudes making people resistant to progressive reporting messages (Wong & Christmann, 2008:26). Whilst these barriers to reporting need to be addressed in a proactive way, the central issue we have focused on is how to operationally deal with low level hate crimes which makes the best use of resources. This is one that the police are all too aware of and that the public intuitively realise and accept. We have made some tentative suggestions on some potentially profitable approaches, but remain convinced that significantly increasing reporting for the bulk of hate crime (as manifested as single incidents of harassment) present insurmountable challenges. What is required then is an approach that remains aspirational in its policy aim but realistic in terms of operational resources.
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