Hurricane Katrina: A Failure of Planning or a Planned Failure?

Chapter 27 Hurricane Katrina: A Failure of Planning or a Planned Failure? By

Susan L. Cutter and Melanie Gall

Hazards Research Lab, Department of Geography University of South Carolina

In C. Felgentreff and T. Glade (eds): Naturrisiken und Sozialkatastrophen Submitted March 2006

Contact Information Dr. Susan L. Cutter Department of Geography University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 29208 803.777.1590, fax: 803.777-4972 [email protected]

*Support for this research was provided by the University of South Carolina, Office of Research and Health Sciences under the Coastal Resiliency Information Systems Initiative for the Southeast (CRISIS) Call for Rapid Response Research on the Social and Environmental Dimensions of Hurricane Katrina and by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), grant number N00140510629. However, any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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Introduction The 2005 Atlantic hurricane season made history and was the most active period on record since hurricane counting started in 1851. With 27 named storms (storms with sustained winds of at least 39 miles per hour), the 2005 season broke the 1933 record of 21 storms. With a total of 14 hurricanes (wind speeds greater than 74 miles per hour) and an unprecedented number of Category 5 hurricanes --Katrina, Rita and Wilma—the 2005 hurricane season was one for the record books (NCDC 2006b). Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma set records in and of themselves: Hurricane Wilma produced sustained winds of over 170 miles per hour and its central pressure briefly reached a low of 882mb, earning it the title as strongest storm ever recorded (NCDC 2006b). Hurricane Katrina turned into the costliest hurricane in United States history, affecting an area slightly larger than Great Britain (about 90,000 square miles). The human toll is staggering as well. Over 1.7 million people in the Gulf Coast region and 1.3 million people in southeastern Florida lost power (NCDC 2005). More than one million people were displaced, over 1,300 people lost their lives, and more than 3,000 remain unaccounted for as of February 2006 (Daley 2006; FEMA 2005a; Knabb et al. 2005; U.S. House of Representatives 2006). The current tally for the storm’s monetary losses exceeds $100 billion with $34 billion in insured losses and this will undoubtedly rise (NCDC 2006b). On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina developed as a tropical depression in the Southeastern Bahamas. By the time it made landfall in South Florida (near Hollywood, FL) it had strengthened to a Category 1 storm (Figure 27.1). Conducive weather conditions, warm seasurface temperatures and an upper level anticyclone over the Gulf of Mexico, allowed Hurricane Katrina to develop to a major hurricane on August 26th. When making landfall at the MississippiLouisiana border on August 29th, Hurricane Katrina had weakened from a Category 5 storm to a strong Category 3 storm with sustained winds of about 125 miles per hour and central pressure of 920mb (NCDC 2005). The devastating winds of Hurricane Katrina were accompanied by 30 plus feet storm surge, which completely wiped out entire neighborhoods along Mississippi’s Gulf Coast and wrecked urban areas like Biloxi and Gulfport (National Weather Service 2005). The massive storm surge flattened block after block in Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Pass Christian. The surge, which often left nothing behind but a concrete slab or pilings (Figure 27.2), extended inland as far as ten miles (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). The three Mississippi counties--Hancock, Harrison and Jackson--were the hardest hit by the direct and immediate effects of the hurricane. This stands in stark contrast to the widely broadcasted mass media images from New Orleans, in the neighboring state of Louisiana. Catastrophic conditions set in when the combination of strong winds, storm surge, heavy rainfall, and human error caused levee failures on August 30th, after the storm had already passed east of the city. Water from the lakes and canals that surround New Orleans poured into the city, flooding at least 80 percent of it with depths up to 10 feet or more in places (Figure 27.3). The wide swath of catastrophic damage left the coastal populations without potable water, power, food, and immediate help. Structural and institutional meltdowns at all levels resulted in delayed search and rescue operations, and inadequate responses to people in need. The televised pictures from the city of New Orleans showed only a fraction of the suffering along the Gulf Coast.

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Given the enormity of the disaster and its impacts, and the failure of disaster response at all administrative levels, the question that occupies the public’s interest and that of the US Congress is: What went wrong? To explore this question in more detail, the broad framework for disaster management in the United States is first described, followed by an examination of the particular response to Hurricane Katrina, especially the interaction of hazard exposure and social vulnerability in the Gulf Coast region. U.S. Disaster Management: Structure and Process Emergency management in the United States consists of four phases—preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Rather than discrete functions, these phases are often viewed as a cycle, where one phase seamlessly moves from one to the next (Figure 27.4). All disasters are local, thus preparedness and response must begin there. However, if local communities become overwhelmed by the enormity of the disaster, state and federal resources are necessary. As a federal endeavor, the United Sates government did not become actively involved in disaster management until the 1930s, and then only did so on an ad hoc basis—repairing bridges, providing funding support for new highway constructions—and only in response to a specific disaster event. For example, the Flood Control Act of 1965 was enacted in partial response to Hurricane Betsy, whose storm waters topped New Orleans’ levees and caused extensive flooding in the city. During the 1960s and 1970s, emergency management was fragmented among multiple agencies. On March 31, 1979 Presidential Executive Order 12127 created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This newly formed entity consolidated federal emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response activities into one agency designed to facilitate coordination among federal partners and with state and local governments. The present policy for emergency preparedness and response in the U.S. is the 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 100-707, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and its implementing regulations (44 C.F.R. §§ 206.31-206.48). The Stafford Act established the administration of federal disaster relief to local and state governments, in particular the procedure for a presidential disaster declaration, and assigned the responsibility of mitigation implementation to FEMA. In addition to the Stafford Act, FEMA developed the first Federal Response Plan in 1992. In this plan, FEMA was designated as the lead federal agency during an emergency and responsible for the coordination of 27 Federal departments and agencies, and the American Red Cross. The Federal Response Plan was implemented whenever State and local authorities became overwhelmed by a disaster, necessitating federal authorities to step in and provide emergency support functions (FEMA 2004b) to the affected area. In 2004, the National Response Plan superseded the FRP and with it, FEMA’s authority as lead agency. In 2000, the Disaster Mitigation Act amended the existing Stafford Act and institutionalized a ground-breaking policy shift from reactive, response and recovery-oriented approach, to a strategy that emphasized pro-active mitigation options aimed at reducing the skyrocketing losses (Table 1) and minimizing overall disaster impacts (U.S. Congress 2000). The cornerstones of this strategy were: a) hazard identification and risk assessment; b) applied research and technology transfer; c) public awareness, training, and education; d) incentives and resources; and e) leadership and coordination (FEMA 1997). During the past decade, FEMA realized numerous successes such as an improved risk assessment methodology (e.g. release of HAZUS MH-MR1 software) and the increased use of research in its mission (Burby 1998; Cutter 2002; Mileti 1999; Tierney et al. 2001). The most

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notable achievement was a shift from a reactive post-event focus on emergency response and recovery, to a more proactive pre-impact focus on hazard and vulnerability reduction using an all-hazards mitigation approach (Godschalk et al. 1999). The change in focus and tenor in FEMA was attributed to James Lee Witt, director of FEMA under the Clinton administration from 1993-2001. Witt was the first FEMA director with experience in the field of emergency management. He turned FEMA from a place where political campaign workers and contributors were rewarded with high level appointments for their service in getting the administration elected into a functional, professional, and trusted emergency management agency (Gertz 1992). When the administration changed in 2001, FEMA reverted back to an agency whose leadership consisted of political appointees with no expertise or formal background in emergency management. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, fundamentally changed FEMA’s responsibilities and status, which were overshadowed by issues of national preparedness and homeland security (FEMA 2004a). As a result, FEMA lost its independent status on March 1st, 2003 and was absorbed by the newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Today, many blame the restructuring of FEMA, the subsequent brain-drain from the agency, the immaturity of DHS, and unfamiliarity with the revised National Response Plan for the agency’s failure to respond to Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina and its Aftermath Hurricane Katrina will long be remembered for organizational and governmental failures in disaster response. Yet, it was the juxtaposition of a natural event with a highly vulnerable region (both physically and socially) that gave rise to this catastrophe. The Gulf Coast and its Vulnerable People Similar to other coastlines in the U.S., the size of the Gulf Coast population increased steadily over recent years. In 2003, the 144 coastal counties were home to more than 150 million Americans (53 percent of the total population), which equals an increase of 28 percent since 1980. This ranks the region the fourth most populated coastal region behind the Northeast, the Pacific, and the Great Lakes regions (Crossett et al. 2004). Given that the current trends continue, the U.S. Census Bureau predicts an increase of the Gulf coast population of over 1.2 million (7 percent) between 2003 and 2008. Throughout past years, the character and spatial distribution of the Gulf coast residents changed as well. A wealth gradient stretches from the waterfront homes of affluent residents to homes and rentals of low-income workers that live further inland (Cutter and Emrich 2006). Million dollar mansions though are the exception in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. A socioeconomic gap divides the poor southern states from the rest of the U.S. Mississippi and Louisiana are the poorest states in the U.S. For example, in 2004, Louisiana’s poverty rate was 17 percent compared to the national average of 12.7 percent, while Mississippi’s was even higher with 17.7 percent (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2005). These figures, however, are averages and mask the differences in poverty rates among racial and ethnic groups. In New Orleans, where 67% of the population is African American, an estimated 25.5 percent of the population lived below the poverty level (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). According to the Social Vulnerability Index developed by Cutter et al. (2003) New Orleans (Orleans Parish) ranked in the top 97th percentile of the most socially vulnerability U.S. counties for nearly four decades (Cutter et al. 2006). The factors driving this high level of

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vulnerability are socioeconomic status, development density, population age, race/ethnicity, and gender (Cutter and Emrich 2006). Despite national improvements in socioeconomic indicators, Orleans Parish shows virtually no change in its level of social vulnerability since 1960. Even when compared to other Katrina-affected counties, Orleans Parish stands out as having the most socially vulnerable population. In many ways, the damage pattern of Hurricane Katrina reflects these pre-existing conditions. Million dollar homes of mostly affluent, white home-owners were flattened by the storm surge along the Mississippi Gulf Coast while flood waters demolished renter-occupied houses in poverty-stricken black neighborhoods in New Orleans. Yet, only 15% of AfricanAmericans suffered damage from Hurricane Katrina in the Biloxi-Gulfport metropolitan area, while a staggering 75% of African American residents were affected in the city of New Orleans (Logan 2006). While the Crescent City suffered from a different causal mechanism (a levee breach causing flooding versus a storm surge inundation), it also faced different everyday problems than those found in the largely suburban areas of Mississippi and Alabama. Segregation, neighborhood decline, socioeconomic deprivation, health inequalities, and marginalization of its poor create challenges to emergency management that have not been adequately addressed by the emergency management community (Cutter and Emrich 2006). For instance, owning a car is a goal beyond reach for more than fifty-one thousand people or 27 percent of New Orleans’ adult population (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). While the emergency plan for New Orleans accounted for a large number of people without transportation, the plan failed to anticipate the need for drivers to operate the pre-positioned buses forcing the remaining 100,000 to 120,000 residents to seek shelter in the Superdome and elsewhere. The storm affected people of all backgrounds, but the geographic distribution of fatalities was concentrated in Louisiana, where 1,000 people died out of an estimated total hurricane mortality of 1,300 fatalities (Daley 2006). Clearly, such a high death toll is avoidable through improvements in disaster mitigation and preparedness. However, the effective implementation of improved disaster policies and practices can only occur when they reflect an understanding of the circumstances and conditions of people’s everyday life (Heinz Center for Science 2002). Hurricane Katrina vividly illustrates the importance of understanding the spatial distribution of social vulnerability and its underlying factors. Poverty, unemployment, poor educational levels, and single, female-headed households, reduce the ability to cope - not only with everyday challenges - but in extraordinary catastrophic situations (Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2003). Hurricane Katrina was the catalyst for the disaster but the existing social vulnerability coupled with administrative malfeasance combined to turn a natural disaster into a social catastrophe. Responding to the Storm Residents of the Gulf Coast have a long-standing experience with hurricanes (Table 2). According to Jarrell et al. (2001b) an average of two major hurricanes hits every three years somewhere along the Gulf or Atlantic coast. Local authorities mitigate the impending impact of hurricane hazards by adhering to basic emergency response principles such as warning dissemination and the timely evacuation of people at risk. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, warning dissemination was extensive and the hurricane advisories issued by the National Hurricane Center were fairly accurate well in advance of the landfall. They included specific information on projected path, impact area, storm surge and

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potential consequences. They also pointed out that an overtopping of New Orleans levees should be anticipated causing widespread flooding throughout the city (National Hurricane Center 2005). Warnings alone though, cannot protect the built environment or prevent social or economic disruption. Decision-making and actions from individuals to local, state, and federal agencies are equally challenging. For individuals, disaster response is highly variant depending on hazard experience, gender, education, race/ethnicity, local hazard culture, and the credibility of warning sources (Burton et al. 1993; Tierney et al. 2001). It is also influenced by the characteristics of the event itself such as type of hazard, magnitude, frequency, and speed of onset (Burton et al. 1993). Hurricane Katrina mobilized an estimated 1.2 million people to seek shelter (Nigg et al. 2006). Many residents fled west and inland from the approaching storm and checked into hotels or stayed with family or friends—a behavior pattern consistently found in the hurricane evacuation literature (Dow and Cutter 2001). The evacuation literature also suggests reasons for non-evacuation and these were apparent in Hurricane Katrina as well: underestimates of the risk potential; overestimates the structural soundness of their home; lack of knowledge on shelter location; refusal to leave pets behind; or following the actions of neighbors, friends, family– namely ride it out. Unlike previous hurricane evacuation research studies, the inability to leave (lack of resources or too sick or old to leave) despite the desire to do so, provides an additional element in the Hurricane Katrina evacuation that has important implications for evacuation as a protective response to disasters. However, residents were not the only ones to underestimate the hurricane’s force. The transition from voluntary to mandatory evacuation orders in New Orleans occurred too late and caused escalating numbers of people that rushed to shelters of last resort such as the Superdome. Mandatory evacuations had never been issued before in New Orleans even though the city weathered Hurricane Betsy and related flooding in 1965. When New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin finally ordered mandatory evacuations on early Sunday morning, less than 24 hours before landfall (Nolan 2005), he fell short of complying with the State’s evacuation plan that mandates an evacuation period of at least 30 hours (Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 2005). Such delayed decision-making at the administrative levels is a common hindrance in disaster response (Tierney et al. 2001) and indicative of the many failures associated with Hurricane Katrina. A comprehensive assessment of administrative breakdown at the local, state and federal level has been compiled in an extensive report by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina under the Chair of Tom Davis (U.S. House of Representatives 2006). The Loss Burden While it is still too early for a completed tally of the losses from Hurricane Katrina, the hurricane does have the distinction as the mostly costly weather-related disaster in U.S. history. While the death toll is high, it doesn’t compare to the most deadly hurricane in U.S. history, that distinction belongs to the 1900 Galveston, TX hurricane that produced more than 8000 fatalities (Jarrell et al. 2001a). The U.S. Congress approved $62 billion in hurricane relief aid (109th U.S. Congress 2005a, 2005b), and FEMA has distributed more than $5 billion to over 1.7 million households (FEMA 2006b). Yet, more than six months after the storm, more than 130,000 people in

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Mississippi and Louisiana continue to live in temporary housing such as travel trailers, manufactured homes (FEMA 2006a, 2006c). According to CNN reports in mid February 2006, about 330,000 residents - two thirds of the New Orleans’s population – were still displaced, 3,000 doctors had yet to return to their work place and only two out of originally seven hospitals were operational (Anonymous 2006). Recovery and Mitigation Mitigation activities cover a large suite of measures ranging from structural, legislative, economic efforts (e.g. insurance, financial incentives) to educational (e.g. training, awareness) ones. In the U.S. the most common tools for mitigation are hazard identification and mapping, enforcement of building codes, land-use planning, insurance, and structural controls (Haddow and Bullock 2003). Hurricane Katrina ignited a national conversation on the implementation of these measures, in particular the use of building codes, land-use planning and insurance. Burby (2006) found that local building code enforcement and local strategic urban planning varies among U.S. states, especially those along the hurricane coasts. For example, while the State of Florida requires local building codes and comprehensive plans, the states of Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi require neither of the two from local authorities. Not surprisingly, Burby’s study revealed that these three states generated excessive flood losses when compared to other coastal states. The U.S. taxpayers, through participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), absorbed these insured losses. The NFIP represents a federally funded insurance program for home or business owners and was established in 1968. To limit flood losses, the NFIP imposes building codes onto new constructions in flood zones. However, the program lacks a) the authority to enforce building codes and b) incentives to reduce repetitive flood losses (Burby 2006). In the Hurricane Katrina ravaged states, the adoption and enforcement of building codes is left to local authorities as it is elsewhere. Unfortunately, the quest for new developments ostensibly to increase local tax revenues directly competes with mitigation goals in such a way that it often minimizes the intended gains of vulnerability reduction. Instead of leaving wetlands and swamps—natural buffers for flood-prone areas--, local authorities “develop” them into residential and commercial areas and assure their residential safety through participation in the National Flood Insurance program. The provision of federally backed flood insurance takes the financial risk away from the homeowner for his/her poor locational choice of housing, which then stimulates the development of hazardous areas. New Orleans, with its below-sea level location and flood proneness is a case in point. The calamitous combination of insured development certainly accounts for much of Hurricane Katrina’s damage, specifically in New Orleans. Yet, even building codes and elevated construction could not protect communities from the impact of the Katrina’s storm surge. For example, bay-front properties in Diamondhead, MS, with improved standards for elevation and housing construction were still completely destroyed with nothing left of many of the homes but the foundation (Figure 27.5). The structural standards for hurricane and flood proofing need to be evaluated and redefined along with flood zones, insurance premiums, local responsibilities and disaster policies. Opinions about the success of the NFIP diverge in light of the fact that the NFIP keeps accruing operational losses. In particular, claims from 2004 (when four hurricanes crisscrossed Florida) and 2005 (Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma) will require an additional infusion of

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money into the NFIP in addition to the annual premiums, just to cover the losses for those two years. A recent study by the Multihazard Mitigation Council suggests that pre-impact mitigation does provide long term savings from disasters, a ratio of 4:1, or $4 saved for every $1 spent on mitigation (Ganderton et al. 2006). Why there isn’t more emphasis on pre-disaster mitigation when it has been shown to be cost-effective rather than post-event responses remains a policy mystery. What Went Wrong The immature organizational structure of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security and it pre-occupation with terrorist events was partially to blame for the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. This immaturity of the organizational structure created additional bureaucratic layers in the chain of command. The new organization coupled with the lack of professional experience in emergency management by sub-agency heads as well as the Director of DHS, led to series of cascading decisions that delayed and often mismanaged the response. In 1993 after an assessment of the federal response to Hurricane Andrew, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that FEMA be elevated to a cabinetlevel agency and that the Director become the leader of the federal response with the capacity to act on behalf of the President (Walker 2006). The recommendation was implemented, but after 9-11, FEMA was integrated into DHS and its functions diluted. At the same time, there is culpability on the part of state and local officials, especially in New Orleans and Louisiana where the local and state capacity was simply overwhelmed. The social and political history of the state and city were also partially to blame in the ineffective response. In many ways, there were a series of failures at all governmental levels, local, state, federal, and it was these organizational and institutional shortcomings that turned a disaster event into a catastrophe. Future Trends Hurricane Katrina could have lasting policy, socioeconomic and demographic effects. The storm resulted in a never before seen internal displacement of residents and such severe destruction that normalcy – or even “normal recovery” - is years maybe decades away. No natural event has influenced population trends or altered the social fabric of the impacted population in the United States as much as Hurricane Katrina in the short and long term. The event might temporarily stall the trend of increasing coastal populations, but perhaps not for long. The rebuilding of flood- and/or hurricane proof communities will attract affluent residents, who can afford to take the financial risks. They will build higher, bigger and better and will insure their properties. However, no housing is absolutely flood- or hurricane proof – at least not under current standards, and the decimation of communities in Diamondhead and Bay St. Louis is tangible proof of this. Still, Hurricane Katrina differs distinctly from other large disasters such as the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 or the Northridge earthquake in 1994 due to the size of the impacted area, the vast numbers of displaced people and the diverse group of affected Americans. No other natural disaster event has resulted in multi-state sheltering to such a degree and for such a long period of time. A month after the storm struck evacuees were registered in all U.S. states (Nigg et al. 2006) and given the slow recovery many might simply just stay at their present locations.

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This could cause the social composition of coastal populations to change drastically. Job opportunities and housing will determine the repatriation of evacuees. In New Orleans were many houses in the Lower 9th Ward and elsewhere have been condemned and their owner or renters have nowhere to go, the city faces the risk of losing larger numbers of (AfricanAmerican) citizens. Even if residents return home they might not be able to stay permanently because of the absence of work or housing. The shrimp and oyster industries, for instance, are halted and will require years to recover due to contaminated fishing grounds, decimated oyster beds, destroyed shrimp boasts, and damaged processing and storage facilities. Thus, fishermen lost everything home, boat and income – and have little hope for a fast recovery. There are many lessons from Hurricane Katrina and many opportunities for improvements in hazards science and disaster policy. There will be continued needs for research, for revising emergency management practices, and for the utilization of wise practices at the local level to develop disaster resistant communities. The success in all these endeavors, however, will depend on financial resources, political will, social justice, local initiative, and personal responsibility. Whether the affected region or the nation is ready for the daunting challenges that lie ahead is uncertain.

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Heinz Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment. 2002. Human links to coastal disasters. Washington D.C.: The Heinz Center. Jarrell, Jerry D., Max Mayfield, Edward N. Rappaport, and Christopher W. Landsea. 2001a. The deadliest, costliest, and most intense United States Hurricanes from 1900 to 2000 [Technical Memorandum]. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Last updated: October 2001 [cited 14 February 2006]. Available from http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/deadly/index.html. ———. 2001b. The deadliest, costliest, and most itense United States Hurricanes from 1900 to 2000 [Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-1]. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Last updated: October 2001 [cited 14 February 2006]. Available from http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/deadly/index.html. Knabb, Richard D., Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown. 2005. Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005. 20 December 2005. Miami, FL: National Hurricane Center. Available from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2005atlan.shtml. Lawrence, Miles B. 2003. Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Lili [Internet]. National Hurricane Center. Last updated: 3 April 2003 [cited 14 February 2006]. Available from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2002lili.shtml. Logan, John R. 2006. The impact of Katrina: race and class in storm-damaged neighborhoods. Initial Project Report. Providence, RI: Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences (Brown University). Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. 2005. State Emergency Operations Plan. April 2005. Baton Rouge, LA: State of Louisiana. Mileti, Dennis S. 1999. Disasters by Design: a reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. National Hurricane Center. 2005. Hurricane Katrina Public Advisory Nr. 25 [Internet]. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Last updated: 28 August 2005 [cited 12 February 2006 2006]. Available from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/pub/al122005.public.025.shtml? National Weather Service. 2005. Post-Tropical Cyclone Report for Hurricane Katrina [Internet]. National Weather Service, New Orleans/Baton rouge Weather Forecast oFFICE. Last updated: 27 December 2005 [cited 11 February 2006]. Available from http://www.srh.noaa.gov/lix/html/psh_katrina.htm. NCDC. 2006a. 1980-2005 billion dollar U.S. weather disasters [Poster]. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Last updated: [cited 14 February 2006]. Available from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html#narrative. ———. 2006b. Climate of 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season [Internet]. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Last updated: 18 January 2006 [cited February 10 2006]. Available from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/hurricanes05.html. ———. 2005. Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina [Internet]. National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Last updated: 29 December 2005 [cited 11 February 2006]. Available from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html. Nigg, Joanne M., John Barnshaw, and Manuel R. Torres. 2006. Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans:emergent issues in sheltering and temporary housing. In Shelter from the storm: repairing the national emergency management system after Hurricane Katrina, edited by W. L. Waugh, 113-128. Philadelphia, PA: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

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Nolan, Bruce. 2005. Katrina takes aim. The Times-Picayune, 28 August 2005. U.S. House of Representatives. 2006 A failure of initiative. Final Report Select Bipartisan Committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. 15 February 2006. Washington D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives. Available from http://www.gpoacess.gov/congress/index.html. Tierney, Kathleen J., Michael K. Lindell, and Ronald W. Perry, eds. 2001. Facing the unexpected: disaster preparedness and response in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press. U.S. Census Bureau. 2005. Small area income and poverty estimates. U.S. Census Bureau. Last updated: [cited 15 March 2006]. Available from http://www.census.gov/cgibin/saipe/saipe.cgi. ———. 2006. Quick Tables: Profile of selected housing characteristics - 2000. U.S. Census Bureau. Last updated: n/a [cited 4 March 2006]. Available from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_DP4&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&_sse=on&-geo_id=05000US22071. U.S. Congress. 2000. Disaster Mitigation Act. 114 Stat. 1552: 106-390. U.S. Congress. 2005a. Making emergency supplemental appropriations to meet immediate needs arising from the consequences of Hurricane Katrina. 109th Congress, 2nd session, H.R. 3645: Public Law 109-61. U.S. Congress. 2005b. Second emergency supplemental Appropriations Act to meet immediate needs arising from the consequences of Hurricane Katrina. 109th Congress, 2nd session, H.R. 3676: Public Law 109-62. Walker, David M. 2006. Statement by the Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's preliminary observations regarding preparedness and response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Preliminary Report, GAO-06-365R, 1 February 206. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).

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Tables Table 1: Top ten weather disasters in the United States ranked by NCDC in inflation adjusted 2002 damages including the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season (in $billion). Year Event Affected States Damages Fatalities 2005 Hurricane Katrina AL, LA, MS** $100.0 1,300 1988 Drought/Heat Wave $61.6 7,500 1980 Drought/Heat Wave $48.4 10,000 1992 Hurricane Andrew FL, LA** $35.6 61 1993 Midwest Flooding IL, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, $26.7 48 SD, WI** 1994 Northridge Earthquake* CA $24.2 57 2004 Hurricane Charley FL, SC** $15.0 34 2004 Hurricane Ivan AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, NJ, $14.0 57 NY, PA, TN, WV** 1989 Hurricane Hugo NC, SC, PR, VI** $13.9 86 2005 Hurricane Wilma FL $10.0 35 2002 30-State Drought $10.0 No deaths Sources: (*Cutter 2002; **FEMA 2005b; NCDC 2006a)

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Table 2: Deadliest and Costliest storms affecting Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi. Year Category Alabama

Mississippi

Louisiana

Total Damage (in Fatalities $billion) 10.0e 119e e 100.0 1300e 14.2 57e d 0.4 1d 3.4b 1b 4.3 27e 1.2e 30 43.7 61e 2.6 4e 3.1 63e 6.3 2c 8.9 256 10.8 75 a 0.6 38 n/a 390 n/a 51 n/a 25 2.1 372 n/a 34 n/a 275 n/a 350 n/a 134 n/a 1,100-1,400 n/a 47 n/a 400

2005 3 Rita 2005 3 Katrina 2004 3 Ivan 2002 1 Lili 1998 2 Georges 1995 3 Opal 1994 TS Alberto 1992 5 Andrew 1985 3 Elena 1985 1 Juan 1979 3 Frederic 1969 5 Camille 1965 3 Betsy 1964 3 Hilda 1957 4 Audrey 1947 4 Unnamed 1926 3 Unnamed 1926 4 Unnamed 1918 3 Unnamed 1915 4 Unnamed 1909 3 Unnamed 1906 2 Unnamed 1893 4 Unnamed 1860 2 Unnamed 1856 4 Unnamed 23, 16, 51, TOTAL (1851-2005)f 7 major 9 major 20 major Note: Most hurricanes affected neighboring states as well. The total reported losses do not reflect the overall totals for the event, but rather for those losses for the three states.

Sources: (aAnonymous 1964; Blake et al. 2005; bGuiney 1999; cHebert 1979; dLawrence 2003; e NCDC 2006a), fupdated Blake et al. 2005. Blake et al. normalized to 2004 values using U.S. DOC Implicit Price Deflators. NCDC reported losses are normalized to 2002 dollars using GNP inflation / Wealth index. Monetary losses reported by Anonymous (Anonymous 1964) and Lawrence (2003) were normalized to 2004 dollars considering only inflation.

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Figure 27.1: Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Plaquemines County, LA and again along the Mississippi-Louisiana state border. The Mississippi Gulf coast experienced a storm surge of 30 feet or more.

Sources: Mississippi Automated Resource Information System, NOAA Hurricane Research Division of AOML

Figure 27.2: Every building along Beach Blvd. in Biloxi, MS suffered severe damage. Hurricane shutters protected parts of the second floor of an apartment complex (left). Huge casino barges anchored off piers along the shoreline broke loose and washed onshore and across the boulevard - a four-lane highway. (Photos by the Hazards Research Lab)

Figure 27.3: Breach of the London Avenue Canal (left) deposited sediment and water in the houses that were adjacent to the levee (right), completely destroying the neighborhood. (Photos by Susan L. Cutter).

Figure 27.4: The four phases of the emergency management cycle.

Figure 27.5: In Diamondhead, MS oceanfront homes were swept off their pillars while debris was deposited in the forested background (left). Note, the scar marks on the trees from the flood surge. In February 2006, rebuilding efforts were already underway amidst a still completely destroyed neighborhood (right). (Photos by the Hazards Research Lab).