In Search of Modernity and Rationality

In Search of Modernity and Rationality

Armed Forces & Society Volume 35 Number 1 October 2008 180-202 © 2008 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. All rights reserved. 10.1177/0095327X07312085 http://afs.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

The Evolution of Turkish Military Academy Curricula in a Historical Perspective Mesut Uyar A. Kadir Varog˘lu Baskent University

The aim of this article is to analyze the educational programs of the Turkish Military Academy both in the Ottoman era and the Republican time with special emphasis on the sociology courses. This analysis is important in the sense that the Military Academy is always perceived as a pioneering institution of the modernization process in Turkey. As a result of assessing the development process of the Academy curricula it could be safely stated that the aim of changes and designs has always been to promote rationality and to follow up with the recent improvements in military academies of other countries. Explanation is also offered why a sociology course has not been a permanent feature of the curriculum at the Academy. Keywords: military academy curricula and modernity; sociology and military academy

T

he strong impact of the military in the Turkish society goes back to earlier Turkish states, including the Ottomans; the military was always seen as the primary agent of modernization process.1 As discussed by Bozdogan and Kasaba, Turkey’s history of modernization and Westernization, extending back to the institutional reforms of the late Ottoman and Republican era, could be evaluated from very different perspectives such as the humanities and social sciences, architecture, and the Ottoman. Turkish modernization was seen to be succeeding as an elite-driven, consensus-based, institution-building process that took its inspiration almost exclusively from the West.2 The same proposition should also hold for the military and military institutions in Turkey. According to the well-known scholar Niyazi Berkes, the foundation of the Turkish Military Academy (Mekteb-i Fünun-u Harbiye-i Sahane, which can be translated as Sultan’s School of War Sciences) established in 1834 was the most important turning point in the history of Turkish modernization: “We can not understand the mechanism of the Turkish modernization without taking into account the Military Academy and her graduates.”3 This proposition is the starting point on which we wish to reveal 180 Downloaded from http://afs.sagepub.com at Baskent Universitesi on September 18, 2008

Uyar, Varoglu / The Evolution of Turkish Military Academy Curricula 181

the academic background of officer–modernizers. Then, the Turkish Military Academy and its curricula starting from its establishment in 1834 were chosen as a case to analyze the development process. At the same time, when evaluating the curriculum development of the Turkish Military Academy, the reasons behind the absence of sociology lessons are also considered specifically.

Early Periods of the Ottoman Empire The Ottoman political leadership realized the problems and weakness of the Ottoman Empire from the very early stages of the massive military transformation— so-called “military revolution.”4 Beginning from the seventeenth century (like its Western counterparts), discussions about what to do with the state system were frequently the topics of high-level statesmen. These early efforts had nothing to do with the intellectual implications of the European Enlightenment and Reformation. The main reason for seeking reforms in the state apparatus was the poor performance of the Ottoman military and the frequent defeats suffered at the hands of the Habsburgs and Russians.5 Even though the reforms before 1787 were purely focused on military issues, they had far-ranging implications on sociopolitical life. The early reformers were smart enough to understand that some of the reasons behind the military defeats were related to political, social, and economic problems and the effects of foreign powers. Nevertheless, as can be expected from their highly conservative and traditionalist approach, the early reformers identified the main reason behind the military problems as corruption and misuse of the classical military institutions, which they immediately linked with the lost virtues of a centralized, efficient, and rational classical system.6 Only after more humiliating defeats and military disasters did the governing elite design and introduce structural reform packages modeled after Western examples. However, the opposition of the vested interest groups and conservative circles, who were using religion as a shield, blocked or limited them until the old military system—which had the famous Janissary corps as its backbone—was successfully destroyed in 1826, after which reformers under the leadership of the Sultan Mahmut II were able to launch more concrete and wideranging military reforms. They also began to invoke external military threat to the Empire as grounds for making reforms on the other aspects of the governance system and society. Sultan Mahmud II and his inner circle were more than sure that their long-cherished dream of founding a modern military was within their immediate reach after the bloody end of the Janissaries. However, even though Mahmud meticulously and patiently (for nearly eighteen years) planned and prepared for the destruction of the Janissaries and the classical military system, he simply had no concrete ideas, no master plan, nor any able advisors to help him found a new military.7 He and the administration were equally ignorant and unprepared for the drastic changes of the

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182 Armed Forces & Society

post-Napoleonic world order and disintegration of the empire because of the rise of nationalism and separatist movements within his Christian subjects. Additionally, they underestimated the will of Russia to sabotage any reform which would strengthen the Ottoman military. Furthermore, the empire suffered difficulty in filling the socioeconomic and moral vacuum that was created by the abolishment of the Janissaries. The sudden disappearance of the old order, as well as the values and patterns related with it, was instrumental in the creation of a moral crisis that the administration was ill-equipped to deal with. In a way, the administration had taken “the heart and soul out of the people” without replacing them with new ones.8 The reformed military of Mahmud did not fulfill the expectations of its sovereign and wider public. After several false starts and trials, the importance of officer corps was understood by everybody. It was the establishment of a new military educational institution, namely the Mekteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye (Turkish Military Academy), in 1834 that turned out to be the zenith of Mahmud’s military reforms and one of the most important turning points in the history of the Ottoman modernization. Previously, the officer corps of the empire was not separate from the other ranks and there was no separate officer training school or training corps. Every regiment trained and selected its own officers within the regiment according to seniority, merit, and courage. Therefore, except for some clerical posts, all the officer positions within a regiment were filled out only by the members of the regiment. A vacant position would most likely be filled by promoting the next lower person in rank and so on. This linear promotion system based on job training worked well during the classical period (1453-1606) and kept the corrupt practices—that is, favoritism, birth rights, purchase of commissions—out of the military, whereas European armies continued to suffer from such maladies for two more centuries.9 However, with the transformation of warfare after the groundbreaking reforms of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus, the classical Ottoman system lagged behind the ever-increasing demands for new warfare and military technology. Therefore, except for a few engineers and artillery officers, none of the Ottoman officers were academically trained. The majority of the junior officers were rankers (Alayl¸) without even a primary school education and their identical social and military origins caused problems in terms of respect to higher ranks and discipline. In most cases, the clients of grandees and protégés of the sultan occupied high-ranking military posts. There were a few junior scribes who also managed to get commissions by making use of their literary talents in an army of illiterates. As can be expected, most of the generals had no military background and experience only owed to the patron–client relationship. They were promoted according to court politics. Likewise, the rankers had limited capacity to command units above company level.10 As a consequence, the Ottoman Empire depended on connections or chance and talent, rather than on a developmental system, for manning its high command. Some military schools had been opened before the Military Academy. However, they either turned out to be purely technical schools with very limited enrollment or



they disappeared in a short time.11 Contrary to these early schools, the Military Academy was something totally different. The main idea behind its foundation was to educate as many cadets in European style as possible for the newly founded army corps. In this way, reformers were hoping to overcome the deficiencies of the Ottoman military system. At the same time, they wished to have officers who could understand Europe in every aspect and were able to continue the reforms not only in the military but also with the other institutions of the Empire. That was the reason why the reformers preferred to follow the French military educational system instead of the short-term officer corps training system which had successfully been founded by the Egyptian Governor Mehmet Ali Pasha.12 It is no surprise that the founding father of the Academy was a highly trained civilian bureaucrat who was commissioned as a military officer later in his career, Mehmed Nam¸k Pasha.13

The Foundation of the Military Academy Nam¸k Pasha followed the fashion of his time and advocated the French model, the recently founded (in 1802) French military school L’Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, which provided purely military vocational education with specific emphasis on theoretical studies. According to his vision, the school must be self-sufficient without need for prerequisites from any other institution. Consequently, Old Barracks (Macka K¸slas¸), isolated from the civilian quarters of Istanbul, was chosen and refurbished. A state-of-the art indoor amphitheater, library, and printing-press facility was constructed. In addition to these, he did not forget to build a mosque to silence criticism coming from religious circles.14 The role of Nam¸k Pasha and the establishment of the Academy showed clear similarities to the example of the United States Military Academy at West Point and its founder Thomas Jefferson, and the later “Father of the Military Academy”—Sylvanus Thayer. However, in contrast to United States of America, the empire did not have a satisfactory primary and secondary educational system. Making things more difficult, the elite and even the middle class preferred not to enroll their sons in this new school, which was perceived as an un-Islamic and sinfully Western institution. Consequently, the administration had few alternatives other than to forcibly enroll young soldiers and to collect orphans or the sons of the poor.15 This development disconnected cadets from the patronage system but ensured them to be almost entirely illiterate. Therefore, the first cadets began their training by learning how to read and write, and other lessons were then provided at the primary level of education. After six years, cadets began to take secondary and high school level lessons. The main focus of their training concerned the application of their future military duties, and they took courses like “Military Engineering,” “Military Ballistics,” and “Strategy and Operational Art.” However, there were competing pressures coming from the civilian side of the reform movement, that asked for the addition of lessons that would provide useful civilian



skills such as “Urban Planning,” “Art,” “Politics and International Politics,” and “Civil Engineering.” In turn, the new Military Academy began to train its cadets in a broad range of Western ideas and it became a safe haven against reactionary opposition.16 Under the ever-increasing urgent calls from field commander, the first cadets continued their training without interruption for another period of eight years.17 But when the first graduates got their diplomas in 1848, initial reactions were far from satisfactory. Only ten officers were commissioned, which was merely a drop for an army that was thirsting for officers. Yet there was another problem. These were the few available officers trained in European style and there was a high demand coming from all departments of the government. At the end, none of the graduates became platoon leaders, which was a function originally designated for them. Some remained in the Academy as lecturers while others were assigned to senior positions in the civil departments.18 The Ottoman line infantry and cavalry units received their first academy graduates during the Crimean War—twenty years after the foundation of the Academy. Unfortunately, these pioneers had to struggle more with the elder generation of officers, who were anxious to protect their own vested interests, rather than fight against the Russians. The British military advisor of the Kars fortress, Colonel Fenwick Williams, wrote of the bitter experiences of fourteen academy graduates, and the insults and degradation they suffered at the hands of the older generation. Not surprisingly and to the detriment of the Eastern Army, most of them found ways to transfer to better assignments in Istanbul.19 This trend continued well into 1860s when the Academy began to graduate more than fifty officers per year. After the foundation of civilian academies and other technical schools as early as 1859, the demand for Military Academy graduates decreased. Nevertheless, a tradition was already established. The graduates of the Military Academy continued to serve in the other governmental departments on a fulltime or part-time basis. One outcome of this tradition was, of course, the great pressure coming from every department toward the academic education. These pressures led to changes made in its curriculum, such as the introduction of “Astronomy” because of the civilian pressure and “Gymnastics” because of the military pressure at the beginning of the 1860s.20 During the same period, another important factor that would have a lasting effect on the academic curriculum appeared. It was the outcome of the governing elite’s fascination with technology; an effort to follow the up-to-date military technical developments as closely as possible. Not surprisingly, when an innovation had affected battlefield or military unit formation, the authorities of the Military Academy immediately included a special course in the curriculum dealing specifically with this innovation. If they could not manage to include a new lesson, they would change the content of a course to deal with this new innovation. This behavior, which was the byproduct of the logic of the military reformers, became the most important factor during the 1870s. In their opinion, every course in the curriculum should have had



an obvious application field in the military. The result of this way of thinking was semi-engineering academic education. It was not a full engineering program because of the needs of the other departments. The first victims of this logic were, of course, the departments of social sciences and humanities that were originally founded during the 1840s. Even though some of their primary lessons remained, they were just titles without scientific content. For example, “History” courses dealt with only with military history in a technical way and the Ottoman history as a traditional folk tale. “Literature” courses focused only on writing and reading in a fast and correct way as in training scribes. This was the consequence of the emphasis on pragmatism and considering the tools of literacy to be more important than an academic approach into method and content. After 1845, several French officers or ex-officers began to serve in the Military Academy as lecturers. But it is interesting to note that none of them served as instructors of the core lessons such as “Mathematics” or “Engineering.” They were teaching “Cavalry,” “Fencing,” and, of course, “French.” The exact reason for this preference is not clear, but this attitude created a tradition. From that time on, all foreign officers who had been assigned to the Military Academy served only in military technical application courses and foreign language education.21 The death of Sultan Abdulmecid on June 25, 1861 and the ascent of Abdülaziz to the throne were generally perceived as a victory for the reactionaries. Abdülaziz certainly did not have the elegance and refined manners of his predecessor; he was just the opposite. Being a professional wrestler, he had a wide-framed, muscular body without any trace of refinement. He was not only rude, vulgar, and hot-tempered but also hateful of all polished manners and the rules of European diplomatic protocol. He was deeply suspicious of all sociocultural reforms. Without doubt he was a traditional autocrat, who used modern technology and methods to further increase and widen his control.22 Interestingly, his suspicious attitude toward European intellectual and cultural movements did not block reforms within the military educational system. He assigned the founding father of the Military Academy, Nam¸k Pasha, as the new commander in chief on July 1, 1861, thereby giving additional stimulus to military educational reforms.23 New military high schools were opened in nearly all the core provinces and cities, hosting field army headquarters. These schools were specially tailored to support the requirements of the semi-engineering curricula of the Military Academy (Harbiye) and Military Engineering School (Mühendishane). Abdulaziz started a process which his successor Abdülhamid II would follow with increased zeal. The dates and the places of the new military schools were instrumental in understanding their zeal; Baghdad (first 1876 and the second 1886), Beirut and Damascus (1877), Edirne (1879), Bursa, Manast¸r, Erzurum, Trabzon, Erzincan, Elaz¸g˘, and Diyarbak¸r (1881), Aleppo (1882), Sivas (1883), Kastamonu and Salonika (1884), Tripoli (1886), Sana’a (1889), Van and Bitlis (1890), Süleymaniye-Iraq (1892), Benghazi (1892), Mosul, Üsküb, and Taiz-Yemen (1893), and Abha-Asir (1896). Therefore, they created



a network of military schools all around the empire encompassing all provinces and all Muslim groups.24 By increasing the number of military secondary schools and keeping them free for all citizens, the administration deliberately provided social mobility channels for the poor and shaped the identity of the future officer corps. In effect, this created an elite corps of men with decent backgrounds, who underwent highly technical training and dedicated their lives to the military.25 Not surprisingly, the elitist approach to military education continued during the ruling of Abdulaziz. The administration was still insisting on a very comprehensive education that, under the circumstances, could only accommodate a limited number of cadets. High academic levels of the semi-engineering curriculum provided for graduates (the Mekteblis) to achieve remarkable success in various technical duties such as fortification, road and bridge construction, and even building barracks and drinking-water facilities. Several contemporary observers were highly critical of deficiencies in military application lessons and a general ignorance in military theory and strategy caused by the allocation of more time for engineering subjects.26 Thus, the most significant constraint of the Military Academy educational system remained as its limited capacity to satisfy the ever-increasing demand for academically trained officers. The army high command had to find enough numbers of qualified officers to man its ever-increasing numbers of command and staff positions. The only available source outside the Military Academy was from the units of the army itself. The Ottoman military was long accustomed to commissioning able soldiers, who were called Alayl¸ (literally “from regiment”). Certain regiments and battalions performed the task of an unofficial officer training corps in every field army. Even though the Alayl¸ officers were experienced small unit leaders and had good relations with the soldiers, most of them were illiterate and had a very limited understanding of modern combat tactics and techniques. At the same time, they were politically very conservative and, in fact, often rebellious against academy trained officers (Mektebli, which means literally “from school”), as well as hostile toward European style training and administration.27 To give an understanding of the seriousness of the situation, out of twenty thousand regular officers in the Ottoman Army of 1877, only 1,600 were from the Academy. Furthermore, there were just 132 school-trained general staff officers for seven field armies. The artillery corps was more fortunate in this respect because Mektebli officers constituted 20 percent of its entire total of artillery officers. The relative combat efficiency and success of the Ottoman artillery corps, compared to the rest of the army, was the result of this better Mektebli percentage. Even though with slow pace, the Mekteblis changed the army. Even the appearance and bearing of the military changed drastically. The caricature type old generation of officers with dozens of orderlies and long baggage trains disappeared and was replaced by a young and scholarly looking new generation.28



Hamidian Period The unlucky new sultan, Abdülhamid II, put his stamp on the military reforms immediately after the end of the war. The total defeat at hands of the Russians forced the Ottoman high command to reconsider the value of officer training and the effectiveness of the Military Academy. Coupled with this urgent need, Sultan Abdülhamid II’s fascination with military technical and educational sides of the reforms, his autocratic way of governing, his suspicion about Ottoman generals, and the international atmosphere were instrumental in choosing the German military as a model and asking for help from Germany for carrying out the reforms. Abdülhamid initially requested military advisors from a traditional ally, France, well before asking for Germany’s help. He probably planned to balance German influence with that of French. However, the repeated Ottoman requests to France were ignored, and so because of its unresponsiveness France unknowingly cleared any doubts about or barriers to Turkey’s acceptance of a solely German military mission. The official request for German military assistance was made in May 1880. After much discussion and a long negotiation process, only a team of four officers under the leadership of Colonel Otto Kaehler was dispatched on April 29, 1882.29 Kaehler, as a newly commissioned Ottoman general, prepared a long reform and reorganization proposal after a brief investigation. He found the Military Academy useless in terms of military aspects. According to his observations, the cadets were spending most of their time trying to learn the principles and theories of various sciences including civil and mechanical engineering, ballistics, and geography but no time was allocated for the application of these courses. The cadets were commissioned without any field experience. Abdülhamid requested an additional officer to reform military educational institutions. Major Colmar von der Goltz was assigned by the German General Staff. Goltz was a highly talented general staff officer who had an already established reputation within German military circles and was a prolific writer. However, his military intellectual activities and his criticism of the German system (especially his book about Gambetta’s army) effectively destroyed his chances of promotion, which was the reason for this new assignment. After a brief inspection, von der Goltz came to Kaehler’s conclusion. He was also surprised by the high scientific level of the French-style semi-engineering curriculum. The cadets were commissioned without any field experience let alone small-unit leadership. So Goltz came to the conclusion that the current academic system was useless for the military profession and should be discarded. The German officer-training system, which was based on military application and frequent regimental tours, should be introduced to replace it.30 In 1884, new military application lessons were added to the curriculum and some engineering subjects were discarded. But the core lessons of the previous curriculum were kept.31 Even though most of the young general staff officers and some influential figures like Küçük Said Pasha were very supportive of this suggestion, Goltz



could not able to convince influential Gazi Osman Pasha (hero of Plevna defense) and Military Academy officials. They refused to exclude advanced mathematics and physics from the curriculum. Obviously they saw the officer training not only in terms of the military but also as a part of the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. For them, it was essential to continue the semi-engineering curriculum to have officers who would be capable of handling the civilian duties.32 Goltz’s effect on general staff (Erkân-¸ Harb) officer education turned out to be more important and enduring. He not only drastically changed the education and training system but also the overall status of the general staff officers. First of all, according to the new evaluation system, only the best and brightest of the cadets were selected—twenty to thirty out of one thousand cadets—for General Staff College, which was three years long and academically very demanding. After graduation, staff officers would spend three to five years on probation, serving at the field level of all combat corps, then they would be part of a special and privileged brotherhood where every member knew and supported each other. They were protected against arbitrary assignment and promotion practices. Moreover, nearly all the influential command and staff positions were allocated to general staff officers. Not surprisingly, staff officers became disillusioned with their superior officers in relatively short time, and their work ethic, military–political culture, and closely knitted group structure were instrumental in the organization of secret opposition circles and overthrowing the Sultan.33 Understandably the biggest impact of the German military mission was accepting the German army as a model for every aspect of military system and Germany as a political model. The German military manuals and other military literature replaced the French and British ones. The German military industry established a monopoly on nearly every weapon system and equipment in which Goltz played a crucial role. Initially, a couple, later on, tens, and after 1909, hundreds, of officers and other military specialists were sent to Germany for training. These officers not only learnt military subjects but also the German culture, lifestyle, and political system. Even though German advisors and other officials paid special attention to the political sensitivity of Abdülhamid and tried their best to stay away from Ottoman politics, in practice, they played a crucial role by promoting the merits of their system, providing a model, new training methods, and work ethics.34 Abdülhamid achieved remarkable results in the military reforms and reorganization of the Ottoman military after the disastrous defeats. However, his paranoia and lack of confidence in the officer corps he himself had created limited the overall end results of the reforms. The Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 not only showed the successes and shortcomings of the Hamidian military but also acted as a catalyst in which disaffection and disillusion of the highly trained young officers reached record levels. In a way, Abdülhamid created his nemesis by providing better military education but not fulfilling the high expectations of the officers.35 Constant counterinsurgency missions to deal with traditional bandits and separatist nationalist rebels played an important role in the political consciousness of the



officer corps. The administration was more than happy to let officers handle everything without giving substantial support, only to bother if the situation got out of hand. Combat units became alternative military schools and mess-halls became clubs where one could discuss anything without fear of prosecution. As can be expected, this rare blend of freedom and conflict affected the political understanding and consciousness of the Mektebli officers. The academic training gave the necessary tools to follow and evaluate these developments such as theoretical background and competency in foreign languages. The effect of academic training becomes more obvious when the Alayl¸ officers are taken into consideration. Alayl¸s also lived through the same experiences but they remained staunchly loyal to the Sultan.36 As can be expected, officers decided to act and founded secret societies to overthrow Abdülhamid’s regime. The first political protests were conducted and secret organizations were. founded by cadets in Istanbul37 by the end of 1880s like the foundation of Osmanl¸ Ittihad Cemiyeti (Ottoman Union Committee) in 1889 by Imperial Medical School cadets. Their education and counterinsurgency experiences provided necessary tools for launching a successful conspiracy. After much preparation and secrecy, the events unfolded without a master plan in April 1908. Several units rebelled and took refuge in the mountains. Government functionaries were assassinated. Popular public demonstrations were held and mass petitions were sent. At the end, Abdülhamid gave up under intense pressure and restored the Constitution that he had suspended in 1878. Mes¸rutiyet (literally “constitutional monarchy”) was a remarkable victory won by the Mektebli junior officers. All of a sudden they became the praetorian guards and kingmakers.38

Political Supremacy of Military Mes¸ rutiyet and later on the dethronement of Abdülhamid reduced the power of Sultan on military affairs to a minimum. General Staff filled the vacuum and became not only the sole authority on military affairs but also literally independent of. any political control. General Staff under the leadership of German-trained Ahmed Izzet Pasha initiated a revolution in military education and training. Forbidden subjects of the previous regime (like Ottoman military history, unconventional warfare, political history, and the like) were added to the curriculum of military schools. Cadets had to spend more time for the application of theoretical lessons. Units higher than battalions began to conduct realistic field maneuvers and firing exercises according to modern tactics for the first time. Rank and file enjoyed using modern weapons and equipment that had been locked in the depots for years because of the paranoia of Abdülhamid. Command post exercises and staff trips became the most important duties of the divisional and corps staffs.39 Unfortunately, for the Ottoman military the timing was not appropriate to carry out these drastic reforms. Only two years after the initiation of military reforms the



Italians launched a surprise assault against the Ottoman province of Trablusgarb (Tripolitanian). One year later, this unjust foreign aggression was followed by Balkan League nations (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro). They acted before the Ottoman reforms would produce results. The Ottoman military was clearly defeated in a series of (mostly independent) battles. Seemingly, the only victories were . to be found in the stubborn defenses of three fortress cities (Edirne, Yanya, and Iskodra) and Çatalca line. Everybody, including officers themselves, blamed officer corps for the disastrous defeats and loss of Ottoman Balkans. The new political and military leadership (most of whom had been trained by Germans) finally approved the repeated requests of successive German military advisors who continued to emphasize the importance of military application courses and to follow the German system as closely as possible. In 1914, the decision to reorganize the Military Academy according to German model was taken but it was too late. Because of the approaching war, the decision was not put into effect.40 During the pre-war years, sociology as a science became a hot issue in intellectual circles. It was the time of great sociopolitical and cultural changes in Ottoman society. Every Ottoman intellectual was trying to understand and find out the reasons for the general decline of the Empire. All of a sudden, just after the 1908 Constitution . reforms, sociology (Hikmet-i Içtimaiyye) had started to be seen as a kind of panacea for every kind of social illness and disorder. For understandable reasons, politicians, rather than scholars, took the lead in introduction of sociology to the Empire. Ottoman politicians and intellectuals preferred conservative sociology schools. For example, the key opposition leader, Prince Sabahaddin, was totally convinced about the magical powers of Frederique Le Play’s Science Sociale school. According to him, the only way for the salvation of the Empire was nothing but the introduction and prevalence of individualism (Demolins’s concept of Formations Particularistes).41 Ziya Gokalp, who was the most influential political ideologue of his time, became the prophet of Emile Durkheim’s theories. In opposition to Sabahaddin, he wanted a more influential role for the state (a nationalist one), not for the individual. Even though they were at the opposite poles, both of them and other adherents of sociology paid special attention to education as a means of transformation of Ottoman society according to the models provided by various French sociologists. Immediately after the publication of the first scientific sociology book in 1912, sociology became a course at the Istanbul University (Darülfünun) in 1913. Ziya Gökalp was the author of this book, which was nothing more than a basic introductory textbook. However, it played an important role in terms of providing basic terminology and principles.42 Not surprisingly, this trend also influenced officers and the Military Academy. As a center of modernization, the Military Academy was the medium of every kind of intellectual discussion. Many cadets and officers—including the future founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—avidly followed the discussions and read most of the materials published then. Interestingly, the officers—because of their intensive topography education—understood the discipline of sociology as a source



of material to draw up the future map of the Empire more effectively. However, somehow nobody attempted to put sociology in the curriculum. There were various possible reasons for this, including the highly politicized nature of sociology within the Empire. Thus, without doubt, the main reason was nothing but the Libyan War of 1911 and Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The intellectual glare of sociology was lost during the heat of the wars and disastrous military defeats. The humiliating peace treaty further weakened any chances of introduction of sociology to the curriculum of the Academy.

The Period of the Turkish Republic World War I was a turning point in the history of the Military Academy. After the mobilization decree, the Academy was closed down and several officer training corps were opened. Cadets took their basic military training for six to eight months and were sent directly to combat units. Attempts to reopen the Military Academy after the war failed because of the Turkish War of Independence that lasted until 1923. The long years of war changed the general attitude toward officer training. The high command of the new Republican Army was generally satisfied with the outcome of the war-period officer-training system. In their opinion, there was no need to return to the old academic system. A new two-year educational system was designed after the experiences of officer-training corps.43 Except for the foreign language training, all of the new lessons were purely technical with immediate military application in the field. It is very surprising that there were no academic courses at all. Even the basic courses in mathematics, physics, and history were not present in the curriculum. As an example, cadets took “Chemistry of Gases” without taking any basic “Chemistry.” In this course, they learned only how to use chemical warfare protection gear and how to lead their troops under poisonous gases.44 During the application of this custom-tailored military technical curriculum, it was understood that especially in some military branches like signals, aviation, transportation, and engineering, cadets had to take “Mathematics” and “Physics” before their branch courses. “Mathematics” and “Physics” were added to the curriculum during the 1930s for these branches, but not for infantry, artillery, cavalry, and armor. This curriculum design continued until the end of World War II. In 1945, “Mathematics,” “Physics,” “Economics,” “Law,” and “International Law” were included in the curriculum for every military branch. Also, surprisingly for the first time, without any apparent reason, “Military Psychology” was also added, but instead of establishing a base or tradition for the introduction of sociology, it eventually evolved into a “Military Leadership” course. In 1947, “World History” and “Modern Turkish History” were added to the curriculum after forty years of interruption.45 There were two main reasons behind these changes. The first one was related to the new relations established with the West after World War II. During the Ottoman



period, the high command and the Academy officials had always taken Western military academies and their curriculum into account. Additionally, various European military advisory teams—chief among them German—directly affected the military education and training. However, between the two World Wars (1923-1945), Turkish relations with the West cooled off somewhat; the period might be rightly named a period of introversion. The Turkish political leadership put priority on socioeconomic development projects and financial assets were allocated accordingly. Except for some German advisors, there were no military relations with the other nations. The end of World War II and the beginning of American aid drastically changed the dynamics within Turkey. The Turkish political and military leadership decided to change the overall understanding of officer training accordingly.46 The second reason had something to do with the pioneering mission of the Academy in the Turkish modernization. The Military Academy was the first universitylevel, modern school of the Ottoman Empire and continued to be one of the best after the opening of the civilian academies. However, the decision to continue the “warperiod officer-training corps system” caused the Military Academy to lag behind the civilian academies and universities. Civilian academies and universities greatly improved their academic level after the educational reforms of the new Turkish Republic. Especially during World War II, many German refugee scientists and scholars who had served in Turkish universities and academies brought with them a totally different approach to higher education. Unfortunately, the Military Academy did not benefit from these opportunities. The only thing they considered important was war readiness. But in 1945, Academy officials had realized the gap between the military and civilian higher education and decided to do something about it. In 1953, a group of Military Academy officials—including the Superintendent and representatives of departments—visited the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. The delegation tried to observe and examine every aspect of life at USMA. The success of this visit started a tradition of regular visits to USMA.47 The visit of 1953 gave a new impetus to change the whole officer-training system. For the first time in decades, a full-fledged university education was the core of the discussion. But at the end, conservatives managed to defeat the reformists.48 The general curriculum system was preserved with minor changes. It is very difficult to describe and analyze the conservative circles. They were not part of a homogeneous group and they did not have a clear agenda. The only norm that they all had consensus on was to keep the military technical curriculum as intact as possible. Interestingly, they saw World War II combat experiences validating their way of thinking in direct opposition to other nations except Russia. In other terms, the conservative approach saw no need to educate the officers beyond military issues and pragmatic tools. Seemingly, they paid no attention to the difference of education and training. Similarly, the so-called reformers were also not homogenous. Their only area of similarity seemed to be long years of service in the military schools. Even though



they were convinced of the merits of an academic education, they were not consistent and had difficulty in designing an effective implementation plan because of their short-sighted approach to military education systems. Reformers saw officership as something not only for the battlefield but as also useful for being an intellectual serving the country. Nevertheless, they were not able to present an effective argument for the necessity of academic education for the officers. Even the authors of this article suffered difficulty in trying to understand their arguments from the minutes of the meetings and other archive documents.49 Occasional discussions to change the Academy curricula ended in failure. Even though the entrance into NATO resulted in opportunities and rising numbers of Turkish officers gaining foreign experience, the conservative opposition remained strong. Understandably, Turkish high command preferred to send officers abroad for engineering-related education rather than making use of occasional social sciences–related opportunities. The activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Team might have also supported the conservative attitude. The American advisors focused on Army branch schools and preferred to limit their training activities on the military application field such as using new weapons, driving armored vehicles, and employing small-unit tactics. This conservative approach remained until 1969. Although there was a stalemate between the reformists asking for a four-year university training and conservatives poised to preserve the old system, in 1969 a three-year-long semi-academic curriculum was put into effect. Even the consecutive political crisis and increased participation of university students—so-called the generation 1968—in the mass protests and riots did not help in this respect. The new three-year-long curriculum was a mixture of everything. There were military–technical lessons like before and basic science lessons like “Mathematics” and “Physics,” as well as “Literature,” History,” and three different economics lessons: “Introduction to Economics,” “Economic Systems,” and “History of Economic Thoughts”—probably to give a concrete understanding of economics to fight against Communist propaganda. Thus, the real change was the addition of sociology, psychology, and leadership under the title of “Behavioral Sciences.” This course, like others, was a compulsory course, dealing only with terminology and basic principles of the related disciplines. However, because of the lack of clear aim or agenda, it did not achieve any remarkable results. Lecturers from various disciplines taught the course according to their backgrounds and cadets paid limited attention, if any.

The Recent Developments at the Turkish Military Academy This interim period lasted for only five years. The decision was finally given in 1974 to adopt a university-type academic curriculum. The historical decision of 1974 was the product of a 140-year-long tradition. The Higher Education Council, which was composed of representatives from headquarters of Turkish General Staff, Army,



Air Force, Navy, Gendarmerie, as well as civilian universities, agreed on a general principle about officer training: “Officership is a unique profession which has no counterpart in the civilian sphere. An officer is a product of various sciences which must be cultured, multi-faceted and a real intellectual.” The special emphasis on being an intellectual was the first open statement that Turkish officers have a duty in the Turkish modernization and society. Turkish President Fahri Korutürk attached special importance to this topic in his speech at the inauguration ceremony of the Military Academy. In his opinion, university education is important for officers because they can now continue their careers in civilian posts. They had this advantage during the Ottoman era but not after the acceptance of the two-year-long officertraining system.50 Several other factors also influenced the decision makers. First of all, most of the members of the high command were envious of the results achieved by the academic military educational systems in Europe and North America. They began to understand the importance of university education for military success. Second, the number of conscripts who were university graduates began to rise. So, the need for officers who had compatible diplomas became a necessity to strengthen the leader–commander status. Third, the status of the Turkish military as a medium of modernization began to look controversial with this archaic technical curriculum. Even though we can easily see the effects of Huntington’s definition of “expertise” on the newly accepted general principle, the implementation of the principle was somehow different. Instead of taking Western military academies as an example, the Higher Education Council took a Turkish technical university, the Middle East Technical University (METU), as a model. METU was founded with the help of United States as a role model of higher technical education for Middle Eastern countries. The reasons given below show the general attitude of the representatives, which was a clear legacy of the Ottoman period and a rare blend of conservatism and reformism: “All other universities pay attention to the theory of sciences. METU is the only university in Turkey which emphasizes the technical and application side of the sciences.” In short, the Higher Education Council realized professional education as only “imparting the specialized skills and knowledge of the profession.” They just did not recognize the importance of “imparting a broad, liberal, cultural background.”51 The new curriculum was custom-tailored according to the needs of different military branches. All cadets had to take the same lessons in the first year. “Mathematics,” “Physics,” and “Chemistry” were the pillars of the first year. “Behavioral Sciences” was still in the curriculum but again was not given enough importance. At the end of first year, cadets would choose a department and a military branch according to their grades and the needs of the Army. There were six departments: civil, electrical and mechanical engineering, economics, management, and law. So, for example, an armor cadet would continue his education in mechanical engineering but an infantry cadet would do so in management. The military application courses lost their dominance in the curriculum and shrank to less than 40 percent. In short, the curriculum was a



semi-engineering program—clearly showing the polytechnic legacy of the Ottoman period.52 The workload for a week was thirty class hours, which provided a possibility of giving not only military science courses but also a very comprehensive academic curriculum. For the first time, most of the lecturers were civilians. The prestige of the Academy, a brand new challenging academic program and various opportunities were instrumental in attracting distinguished professors and inspiring young instructors—including the current U.N. Development Programme Administrator (Kemal Dervis) from METU and other universities. However, this was a temporary measure. Following the Ottoman tradition closely, the Academy launched its program to train the future lecturers of the Military Academy from the ranks of first graduates of the new academic curriculum— including one of the author of this article. In a relatively short time, more precisely beginning from 1982, the number of the military officer–lecturers surpassed the civilian ones. At the same time, pressure from conservatives began to affect the general understanding of the education program of the Academy. In fact, it was always emphasized that the mission of the Academy was naturally not only to provide university graduates to the Army; but also to educate and train officers who were capable of leading various military units at the platoon level. Step by step, the number of military courses was raised and in 1985 the academic subjects shrank to 45 percent. The Economics Department was the major victim of the renewed conservatism and closed down. Only an introductory economics lesson remained in the curriculum.53 Another important factor also began to affect the curriculum. Most of the officer– lecturers of the Academy were influenced by the rise of “Management” as a popular discipline. After long discussions, the engineering programs were supported with management courses. The expectation was to enhance the curriculum into a more interdisciplinary nature. There were two factors supporting this trend; first, the management discipline was new and perceived to fit the requirements of the military and second, this field of study was very fashionable. The search for a good combination of academic and military education continued until 1994. In this decade of searching, attempts were not systematic and were mostly a kind of reaction to the lack of military courses. However, there were also some lessons learned and design attempts toward the end of this decade. At the beginning of 1990s, an academic program called “Systems Engineering” was established at some universities and at the USMA. The idea was to combine the programs of management and engineering. At civilian universities, there were industrial engineering programs that were very flexible and contemporary for the requirements of the new age. The mentality of an industrial engineering academic program was applied to the needs of the military and public environment. The result was a program balancing not only technical and social academic information, but one that also provided the formation of military sciences within the academic courses. In fact, this was a change from a specialist to generalist orientation in the academic program. This program was original in the sense that it was arranged according to the



requirements of officership. This new program had a sociology course for a very short period of time. It continued for two years at fifty minutes a week for each group. The content was very basic, including theories of sociology, family, economics, health, environment, and societal relationships. “Systems Engineering” was looked on as an ideal solution to balance three different tendencies: an engineering program, military vocational training, and a management program. Since 1994, “Systems Engineering” has been applied at the Academy as the only program. Of course, the search for rationality continued at this stage too. It was possible to see the impact of “technology imperative.” For example, computer sciences, modeling and simulation, qualitative problem-solving techniques, and quality management were the subjects of some trendy courses included in the program. This time, the starting point for the curriculum design was to define the combat environment and new tasks for officers at an intellectual level. In that way, the aim of the academic program was defined in such a way that an officer at any level should know how to handle sociotechnical systems and use the systems thinking methodology.54 The Academy graduates who became teaching staff were able to make such designs after returning home with some degrees and fresh military viewpoints. In addition to the baccalaureate program at the Academy, in 1997, the Land Forces Command decided to educate officers at the Master’s level not only for meeting the requirement for instructors and specialists for the headquarters, but also as a career development stage just before the Staff College (Harp Akademisi), which was founded as a part of the Military Academy in 1845 and became an independent institution after the German led reforms during the 1880s. The Staff College had a two-and-a-halfyear term standing for a Master’s degree program. For this purpose, every year, 2 percent of the young officers were sent to civilian universities within and outside the country. For example, the number of officers sent to the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School between 1997-2002 was the highest when compared to the other countries. After acquiring the necessary know-how from national or foreign institutions, the Academy launched its own postgraduate studies program by establishing an institute. For the first time, civilian students were also accepted to the Academy to attend this new institute. One reason for establishing an institute was to design interdisciplinary programs oriented specifically to military needs like Defense Management, Military Operations Research, Technology Management, Internal Security Operations Management, and so on. Of course, the high command would have the authority to influence the whole program freely. At the end, an institute structure was founded within the Turkish Military Academy in 2001.55 Various doctorate programs started in 2005 with specific emphasis on military issues.

The Contacts with Military Sociology During the 2000s, a series of opportunities provided a suitable atmosphere to initiate discussions about sociology, more specifically military sociology. One of the



authors of this article was invited to the Netherlands to talk on a panel to evaluate the conscription system in Turkey in 2002. This visit was instrumental in establishing contacts with several military sociology scholars. Charles Moskos was invited to Military Academy through NATO Research Institute to give lectures on Military Sociology and spend almost a week not only at the Turkish Military Academy but also at the headquarters.56 Then, Joseph Soeters and some other military sociologists visited the Turkish Military Academy for the same purposes in 2003. Additional factors also played an important role in this renewal of interest. The first factor was the increased participation of Turkish units and individual officers in the peace support operations (PSO). The unconventional nature of PSO increased the awareness of conventional minded Turkish military.57 In contrast to the first one, the second factor was something to do with a national development. Civil–military relations have become a popular issue among Turkish scholars and the number of academic studies about various aspects of the Turkish example has increased since the 1990s.58 Even if some of these studies were highly critical of the role of the Turkish military, this academic trend helped to increase the interest of the high command in the discipline of military sociology. Because of this new interest, the Academy organized an international symposium on military sociology under a title of “International Leadership Symposium 2003.” The keynote speaker was John Allen Williams and the symposium ended with the presentation of Christopher Dandeker.59 Another key event was the interim meeting of the RC01 Armed Forces and Conflict Management group in Ankara in 2004.60 The meeting was jointly hosted by the Military Academy and the Turkish Military Academy Department of Sociology. In recent years, high-level military officials have started to use military sociology terms like scholar–officer and diplomat–officer as defined by Huntington. The famous book The Soldier and State was translated into Turkish in 2005.61 Nevertheless, these developments were not included into the academic curriculum of the Military Academy. The discussions on some sociological aspects of military issues were restricted to some postgraduate programs of the Defense Sciences Institute of the Military Academy.62

Summary and Conclusion Today, the Military Academy provides a full university-level academic education, which has already established a good reputation. But there is still no place in it for sociology and other social sciences. Except for the isolated subject of “Behavioral Sciences,” sociology has not find a place in the curriculum. The reasons behind this can be summarized as follows: First, the Turkish military reformers are mainly elitists. They like to design society without paying attention to understanding it. In fact, they do not have time to



concentrate on understanding society. They are fond of technological developments and have a fascination for topography and maps, and because of their engineering background, are interested in purely profession-oriented know-how. They have a low regard for all disciplines of the social sciences. They like to act as civil engineers and see modernization as rather like the construction of a new building. Second, Turkish reformers have tried and are still trying to follow the developments in the Western countries as closely as possible. But they pay attention only to the material side of the developments and give limited attention to the intellectual side. At the same time, they show less interest to the developments within their own country. Consequently, for them, the Turkish Military needs officer–engineers who can understand and imitate recent changes in the modern armies. Third, the Turkish Military Academy was founded after the example of French St. Cyr Academy. However, the original founders did not pay attention to the whole program of St. Cyr, but only to the engineering part. So, from the very beginning, engineering courses had a strong place in the curriculum. Military application lessons were also a fundamental part of the curriculum, especially after heavy German military influence. After 1984, management became another important part of the curriculum which was obviously the outcome of the American influence. All three programs created their own support circles/groups. But, unfortunately, sociology courses never became a vital part of curriculum and failed to create a support circle. Fourth, Turkish reformers prefer trendy subjects, just like the examples of polytechnic education during the 1830s, general staff courses during the 1880s, management during the 1980s, and system engineering after the 1990s. Sociology was trendy in Turkey only in the early 1900s, and Turkish Military officials were too busy with wars and rebellions during that time to show any interest in sociology. Fifth, the high command paid great attention to keep the military completely outside politics. The tragic collapse of the highly politicized Ottoman Army during the Balkan Wars (1912) was never forgotten. The consequences of this policy were a general suspicion toward sociology and political science courses. There are some other minor reasons for the lack of sociology courses in the curriculum of the Academy, but their effects are just to strengthen the major reasons. In conclusion, the history of the Turkish Military Academy is at the same time an important part of the history of Turkish modernization. The changes in the academic curriculum do not only show the struggle between academic and practical aspects of education, they also display the Academy’s search for modernity and rationality. Unfortunately, sociology never became an important part of this struggle and search. But recent developments within the Turkish Military are raising hopes that in the near future, sociology will have a respectable place in the Academy educational system.



Notes 1. For the discussion the cultural aspects of Turkish military, see A. Kadir Varoglu and Adnan Bicaksiz, “Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of Turkish Armed Forces,” Armed Forces & Society 31, 4 (Summer 2005): 583-98. 2. Sibel Bozdog˘an and Res¸ at Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (University of Washington Press, 1997), 3-4. . 3. Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çag˘das¸ las¸ ma (Istanbul: Dog˘u-Bat¸ Yay¸nlar¸, 1978), 191. 4. For the discussion of early modern military revolution, see Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), passim. Also see Andrew Ayton and J. L. Price, The Medieval Military Revolution (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1998), passim. 5. See Carl Max Kortepeter, “Did the Turks Attain Enlightenment through Defeat in Warfare,” Balkan Studies 40, 1 (1999): 18-29; Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt¸ Hümayunlar¸, Nizam-¸ Cedit, (Ankara: TTK Bas¸mevi, 1988), 29-41. 6. Pal Fodor, “State and Society, Crisis and Reform Century: Ottoman Mirror for Princes,” in In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire . (Istanbul: The Isis Pres, 2000), 23-28; Virginia H.. Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808,” in Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2004), 25-27. 7. Helmuth von Moltke, The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829, trans. Lucie D. Gordon (London: John Murray, 1854), 12; Avigdor Levy, The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 18081839 (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 195-96. 8. Edward Engelhardt, Tanzimat ve Türkiye (Turkish translation of the French original La Turquie et . le Tanzimat), trans. Ali Res¸ ad (Istanbul: Kaknüs Yay¸nlar¸, 1999), 23; Charles MacFarlane, Kismet: Or the Doom of. Turkey (London: Thomas Bosworth, 1853), 6. 9. Ismail Hakk¸ Uzunçars¸ ¸l¸, Osmanl¸ Devleti Tes¸ kilat¸ndan Kap¸kulu Ocaklar¸, vol.1, 3rd printing (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Bas¸mevi, 1988), 214-18, 234-37, 285-87. 10. Levy, Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 382-84. 11. For the early military schools, military reform efforts, and their effects on Turkish modernization, see Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Çag˘atay Uluçay, Enver Kartekin, Yüksek Mühendis . Okulu (Istanbul: Berksoy Matbaas¸, 1958), 12-110. Also see Avigdor Levy, “Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, 3 (July 1982): 227-49. 12. Choosing short-term vocational training or long-term academic training is an important dilemma in every underdeveloped nation. See C. Arnold Anderson, “The Modernization of Education,” in Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, ed. Myron Weiner (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 69. For the military reforms of the Governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali, see Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 45-111, 160-98. . 13. Ahmet Nuri Sinapl¸, S¸eyhülvüzera, Serasker Mehmed Nam¸k Pa¸a (Istanbul: Yenilik Bas¸mevi, 1987), 66-69. 14. Turkish Prime Ministry Archives (BOA), Royal Decrees (Hatt-¸ Hümayun) Catalog no.1747 year 1242; BOA, Hatt-¸ Hümayun Catalog no.17474A, year 1242; BOA, Hatt-¸ Hümayun Catalog no.17700, year 1242. For a contemporary eyewitness description of the Academy, see Julia Pardoe, The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1836, vol.1 (London: Henry Colburn, 1837), 194-204; MacFarlane, Kismet: Or the Doom of Turkey, 47-49. 15. Turkish Military Academy Archives (hereafter TMAA), Künye Defteri (Registry Logbook) no.1; MacFarlane, Kismet: Or the Doom of Turkey, 95.



16. TMAA, Numara Defteri (Cadet Grade Logbook) no.1; BOA, Hatt-¸ Hümayun Catalog no.46425, year 1253; BOA, Hatt-¸ Hümayun Catalog no.46425A, year 1253. 17. Avigdor Levy, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II’s New Ottoman Army 1826-1839,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971): 32-36. 18. Except for two officers who had died at an early age all of graduates served in the Academy as lecturers (one of them remained in the permanent academic staff). Five of them served in several civilian posts like governor of province and diplomatic assignments. The most successful one (Hüseyin Avni Pas¸ a) managed to become prime minister. TMAA, Registry Logbook (Künye Defteri) no.1. 19. Atwell Lake, Narrative of the Defence of Kars, Historical and Military (London: Richard Bentley, 1857), 61-62. . 20. TMAA, Cadet Grade Logbook (Numara Defteri) no.1; Mehmed Esad, Mirat-¸ Mekteb-i Harbiye (Istanbul: Artin Asaduryan Matbaas¸, 1310 [1894]), 57-84. 21. TMAA, Registry Logbook. no.1; Mehmed Esad, Mirat-¸ Mekteb-i Harbiye, 43-87. . 22. Nicolae Jorga, Osmanl¸ Imparatorlug˘u Tarihi, vol. 5, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yay¸nevi, 2005), 442-43; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 118. . . 23. Sinapl¸, S¸eyhülvüzera, 281; Ahmed Mithat, Üss-i Ink¸lap, vol. 2, ed. T. G. Seratl¸ (Istanbul: Selis Kitaplar, 2004), 107-10. 24. Osmanl¸ Döneminde Askeri Okullarda Eg˘itim (Ankara: Milli Savunma Bakanl¸g˘¸, 2000), 14-169. 25. Mahmud S¸evket, Osmanl¸ Askeri Tes¸ kilat¸ ve K¸yafeti: Osmanl¸ Ordusunun Kurulu ¸s undan 1908 Y¸l¸na Kadar, ed. N. Türsan and S. Türsan (Ankara: Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanl¸g˘¸ Bas¸mevi, 1983), 88; . Ahmed Mithat, Üss-i Ink¸lap, 75-76, 112-13. . 26. Ahmed Muhtar, An¸lar: Sergüzes¸t-i Hayat ¸m¸n Cildi Sanisi, ed. Nuri Akbayar (Istanbul: Tarih . Vakf¸ Yurt Yay¸nlar¸, 1996), 50; Keçecizade Izzet Fuad, Kaç¸r¸lan F¸rsatlar: 1877 Osmanl¸-Rus Savas¸¸ Hakk¸nda Eles¸tiriler ve Askeri Düs¸ünceler, ed. Rasim Süerdem (Ankara: Genelkurmay Bas¸mevi, 1997), 23. 27. Ahmed Muhtar, An¸lar, 95; William von Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, 1877 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1895), 10, 44-45, 184. For an example of a high-ranking Alayl¸ officer’s career, see Ethem Erkoç, Bes¸iktas¸ Muhaf¸z¸ Yedi Sekiz Hasan Pas¸a ve Bir Devrin Hikayesi (Çorum: Pegasus, 2004), 24-39, 51-54. . 28. Halil Sedes, 1877-1878 Osmanl¸-Rus ve Romen Savas¸¸, vol.2 (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1936), 117-20; Hikmet Süer, 1877-1878 Osmanl¸-Rus Harbi Rumeli Cephesi (Ankara: Genelkurmay Bas¸mevi, . 1993), 36; Jorga, Osmanl¸ I mparatorlug˘u Tarihi, 477. 29. Jehuda L. Wallach, Bir Askeri Yard¸m¸n Anatomisi, trans. F. Çeliker (Ankara: Genkur. Bas¸mevi, 1977), 25-42; Merwin A. Griffiths, The Reorganization of the Ottoman Army under Abdülhamid II, 18801897 (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965), 40-43, 5-52, 56. 30. Wallach, Bir Askeri Yard¸m¸n Anatomisi, 41-42, 45-49, 55-57; Griffiths, Reorganization of the Ottoman Army, 58-61, 65, 98; Carl Max Kortepeter, “Ottoman Military Reform during the Late Tanzimat: The Prussian General von der Goltz and the Ottoman Army” in The Ottoman Turks: Nomad Kingdom to . World Empire (Istanbul: The Isis Pres, 1991), 254-55; Harp Okulu Tarihçesi 1834-1945 (Ankara: Harp Okulu Matbaas¸, 1945), 26-28. 31. TMAA Numara Defteri (Cadet Grade Logbook) no. 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22. . 32. Izzet Fuad, Kaç¸r¸lan F¸rsatlar, 23; Wallach, Bir Askeri Yard¸m¸n Anatomisi, 49, 57; Kortepeter, “Ottoman Military Reform,” 255-56; Mehmed Esad, Mirat-¸ Mekteb-i Harbiye, 95-130; Harp Okulu Tarihçesi, 28-32. . . 33. Enver, Enver Pas¸ a’n¸n An¸lar¸, ed. H. Erdog˘an Cengiz (Istanbul: Iletis¸ im Yay¸nlar¸, 1991), 36-39, 43-51; Wallach, Bir Askeri Yard¸m¸n Anatomisi, 49; Griffiths, Reorganization of the Ottoman Army, 99-101. 34. Wallach, Bir Askeri Yard¸m¸n Anatomisi, 23, 51-52, 57, 64, 82-83; Griffiths, Reorganization of the Ottoman Army, 67-72, 88-89, 102.



35. Enver, Enver . Pas¸ a’n¸n An¸lar¸, 35; Resneli Niyazi, Hürriyet Kahraman¸ Resneli Niyazi. Hat¸rat¸, ed. Nurer Ug˘urlu (Istanbul: Örgün Yay¸nevi, 2003), 144-47; Metin Ay¸s¸ ¸g˘¸, Mares¸ al Ahmet Izzet Pas¸ a: Askeri ve Siyasi Hayat . ¸ (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Bas¸mevi, 1997), 14-16, 19-21. 36. Halil Kut, I . ttihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyete Bitmeyen Savas¸ : Kutülamare Kahraman¸ Halil Pas . ¸ an¸n An¸lar¸ (Istanbul: 7 Gün Yay¸nlar¸, 1972), 24-27; Kaz¸m Karabekir, Hayat¸m, ed. Faruk Özerengin (Istanbul: Emre Yay¸nlar¸, 1995), 360, 373-75, 378, 384, 388-89. . 37. Niyazi, Hürriyet Kahraman¸ Resneli Niyazi Hat¸rat¸, 133-38; Kut, Ittihat ve Terakki’den Cumhuriyete Bitmeyen Savas¸ , 9-17; Karabekir, Hayat¸m, 247-349. 38. Enver, Enver Pas¸ a’n¸n An¸lar¸, 77, 90-121; Niyazi, Hürriyet Kahraman¸ Resneli Niyazi Hat¸rat¸, 186-374. . 39. Haf¸z Hakk¸, Bozgun (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapç¸l¸k, n.d.), 100-4; Karabekir, Hayat¸m, 365-66; Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 29-30. 40. German Major Back von Erlich was assigned as School Superintendent to the Military Academy to carry out reorganization. Harp Okulu Tarihçesi, 36-38. . . 41. Kaan Durukan, “Prens Sabahaddin ve Ilmi. Içtima Türk Liberalizminin Kökenleri” in Türkiye’de . Siyasi Düs¸ ünceler, vol. 1, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Istanbul: Iletis¸ im Yay, 2001), 143-55. 42. Zafer Toprak, Toplumbilimin Dog˘us¸ u” in Türkiye’de Siyasi Düs¸ ünceler, vol. 1, ed. . “Osmanl¸’da . Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Istanbul: Iletis¸ im Yay, 2001), 310-12. 43. Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategy Directory (hereafter ATASE) Archives, Turkish Independence War Catalog, Dolap.8, Klasör.454, Dosya.1, Fihrist.103, 103-1; ATASE Archives, Turkish Independence War Catalog, Dolap.23, Klasör.1404, Dosya.58, Fihrist.65. 44. TMAA, Cadet Grade Logbook (Numara Defteri) no. 30, 31; Muharebe Gazlar¸ndan Korunma . Talimnamesi (G.Ta.), 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1928). 45. TMAA, Cadet Grade Logbook (Numara Defteri) no. 90, 91, 92. 46. TMAA, Special Files (Özel Konular) Collection. (Because of the absence of catalog or index, authors could not provide catalog numbers for the references.) 47. One of the authors of this article visited the USMA with Academy Superintendents several times. The Introduction of Systems Engineering program and integration of foreign cadets and female cadets into the Cadet Corps were the main reasons of the 1992 visit; whereas during the visit of 2000, the establishment of an institute for postgraduate studies, the accreditation process of undergraduate programs, and the activities of the ethics center and leadership research studies were the main themes. 48. TMAA, Special Files Collection. 49. TMAA, Special Files Collection. 50. TMAA, Special Files Collection. 51. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 8-9. 52. TMAA, Cadet Grade Logbook (Numara Defteri) no. 166, 167, 168, 169, 170. 53. TMAA, Special Files Collection. 54. TMAA, Special Files Collection. 55. TMAA, Special Files Collection. 56. Charles Moskos, “Military Systems in the 21st Century and New Trends,” Journal of Defense Sciences 2, 2 (November 2003): 73-88. 57. See, for example, a study on PSO for Turkish Armed Forces, Joseph Soetres, Erhan Tanercan, A. Kadir Varoglu, and Unsal Sigri, “Turkish-Dutch Encounters in Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeeping 11, 2 (Summer 2004): 362-81. 58. See, for example, Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, “The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience,” Armed Forces & Society, 26, 4 (Summer 2000): 635-57; Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, “The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic,” Armed Forces & Society, 22, 4 (Summer 1996): 619-42.



59. See the papers presented at the Symposium, Nejat Basim, Bunyamin Tuner, and Erdinc Altay, eds., Presentations, The International Leadership Symposium, 15-16 Nisan 2004 (Turkish Military Academy Press: Ankara, 2004). 60. Two seperate sessions were organized to discuss the transition process of the Turkish Armed Forces with sociological perpectives in this interim meeting. See some of the articles in the book by Giuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Kümmel, eds., Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th, vol. 2 (Elsevier, 2005). After that meeting, Turkish Military and Turkish Military Academy has become part of the ERGOMAS project. See the comparison papers on the book by Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Cultural Differences Between the Military and Parent Society in Democratic Countries, vol. 4 (Elsevier, 2007). 61. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. 62. See the Web site www.kho.edu.tr for the academic curricula of the Defense Sciences Institute of the Turkish Military Academy.

Mesut Uyar, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at the Turkish Military Academy. His research interests are geopolitics, war studies, Ottoman military history, and area studies of Middle East and Caucasia. A. Kadir Varog˘lu, PhD, is a professor of management-organization and the Dean of Economics and Administrative Sciences Faculty—Baskent University. His research interests are leadership, negotiation, cross-cultural studies in international management, and strategic management. Address for correspondence: A. Kadir Varoglu, Department of Management, Baskent University, Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakultesi Baglica Kampusu, Ankara, Turkey; e-mail: [email protected].
