Inference of happiness But are You Really Happy? - Adaptive Social

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RUNNING HEAD: Inference of happiness. But are You Really .... indicated no effect of this variable, so question order will not be discussed further. Consistent ... expect others to be more likely to express happiness than unhappiness. This lay ...
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happiness RUNNING HEAD: Inference of happiness

But are You Really Happy?: The Negativity Effect in the Inference of Happiness and Unhappiness

Hyunjin Song and Oscar Ybarra University of Michigan

Contact: Hyunjin Song ([email protected], 734-717-8757) 3236 East hall, 530 Church St. Ann Arbor, MI, 48104

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happiness Abstract This research examined whether people make correspondent inferences more readily for others’ expression of unhappiness than happiness. Study 1 measured people’s lay theory of the range of emotional expressions that happy and unhappy people enact. We found that people perceive that a person who is unhappy has a wider range of emotional expression than a person who is happy. Participants in Study 2 inferred that another’s description of his/her own unhappy life was more revealing of that person’s true attitudes and feelings than another’s description of his/her own happy life. Following up on these findings, Study 3 showed that people’s inferences regarding another’s level of happiness were more affected by situational information when the person described a happy life compared to an unhappy life. Together, these three studies point to a negativity effect in person inference that also applies to the expression and communication of happiness and unhappiness.

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Key words: emotional disclosures, correspondent inferences, happiness/unhappiness, negativity effect

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happiness But are You Really Happy?: The Negativity Effect in the Inference of Happiness and Unhappiness

The proposition that bad is stronger than good, that is, that negatively valenced events are more influential to people than positively valenced events, has been confirmed in many aspects of psychology (for a review see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). For instance, people weight costs more than gains in judgment (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984); negative behaviors are more diagnostic of the quality of a couple’s relationship than positive behaviors (e.g., Gottman & Krokoff, 1989); there are more specific negative emotional terms than positive ones (e.g., Russell, Fernadez-Dols, Manstead, & Wellenkamp, 1995); and punishment generally leads to faster learning than reward (e.g., Penny, 1968). A stronger effect of negativity compared to positivity has also been supported by many studies in person perception. Negative information about others receives more processing and it is given greater weight in final impressions compared to positive information (Anderson, 1965; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972, Ybarra, 2001, 2002). For instance, people recall and recognize others’ negative behaviors better than positive behaviors (e.g., Hastie & Mazur, 1978; Ybarra, Schaberg, & Keiper, 1999). Memory for others’ negative behaviors also endures over time compared to memory of others’ positive behaviors (Carlston, 1980), and people treat others’ negative behaviors as better indicators of a person’s dispositions than others’ positive behaviors (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1978; Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994; Ybarra & Stephan, 1996, 1999; Ybarra, 2002). Many researchers have made reference to a positivity norm in society in trying to explain the negativity effect in person perception (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston,

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happiness 1987; Snyder et al, 1978; Ybarra, 2002). Since social regulations encourage people to behave positively, positive behaviors are more common and supported by normative pressures, in addition to potentially reflecting a person’s underlying attitudes, feelings, and dispositions (Ybarra, 2002; Reeder & Coovert, 1986). On the other hand, negative behaviors, which deviate from social norms, exclude the motivation to conform to the norm as a possible explanation for such behaviors. Therefore, positive behaviors, compared to negative behaviors, have a higher probability of being attributed to situational demands, allowing negative behaviors to have stronger effects on overall impressions than positive behaviors (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994; Ybarra & Stephan, 1996, 1999; Ybarra, 2002). The negativity effect in person perception appears quite potent, even to the point where at times situational norms that pressure for the enactment of negative behaviors do not attenuate the correspondent inferences people readily make for such behaviors (Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979; Jones, Davis and Gergen, 1961; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Skowronski & Carlson, 1989; Ybarra, 2001; for a review see Ybarra, 2002). For example, Reeder and Spores (1983) showed that immoral behaviors led to dispositional inferences even when the behavior was in-role, in other words, under situational demands. In their study, the actor either donated money to charity (a moral behavior) or stole money from the fund (an immoral behavior) in situations in which the person’s friend either encouraged or discouraged the behavior. The investigators found that when the actor’s behavior was immoral, the situational information did not influence judgments of the target person, as they were generally judged as immoral. On the other hand, when the actor’s behavior was moral, the person was judged as more moral when the situation discouraged moral behaviors than when the situation encouraged moral behaviors. Overall, these results indicate that negative information about a person’s behaviors has a stronger impact on dispositional

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happiness inferences than positive information and is less open to the influence of situational constraints. The same pattern of results has been replicated in other character domains related to social desirability such as friendliness (Dreben et al, 1979; Vonk, 1993) and likeability (Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994). The aim of the present research was to study another domain in which the negativity effect may dominate in correspondent inferences, and that has to do with the inference of others’ happiness and unhappiness. Feeling happy is indicative of psychological well-being and social adjustment, especially in American culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Wierzbicka, 1995). In addition, displays of unhappiness invoke calls for social support and sympathy, which may make people at times wary of approaching such interactions (Sarason & Sarason, 1999). Further, unhappy people themselves tend to become evasive and avoidant in social interactions, which can result in other problems in social life (Forgas & Cromer, 2004; Plutchik, 1980). Therefore, looking and sounding happy is a socially desirable condition that people expect from others, while looking and sounding unhappy may lead to costly consequences in social life. Consistent with this proposal, studies on people’s lying suggest social desirability in people’s displays of happiness (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 1996). These investigators found that about 25% of college students’ lies involved faking positive affect, whereas about 3% of their lies related to negative affect. A second, community sample showed similar rates (23.79% for positive affect and 1.19% for negative affect). Faking positive affect included lies in which people pretended to like someone or something more than they really did, faking a positive emotion that they did not really feel, pretending to have a more positive opinion than they actually did, pretending to be more interested in a topic or a person or an event than they actually were, and saying that they did not mind something that they actually did. These results suggest that the expression of positivity is socially desirable and that people try to fake

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happiness happiness compared to unhappiness. One question relevant to how people infer others’ happiness is whether perceivers are aware of this positivity norm in the expression and communication of happiness/unhappiness (i.e., that they hold a lay theory of positivity). If perceivers possess such a lay theory about the differential expression of happiness and unhappiness, one implication is that people’s expression of unhappiness might be perceived as more indicative of a person’s actual attitude and feelings than people’s expression of happiness. This should be the case because expressions of happiness compared to unhappiness can be more readily attributed to a motivation to conform to social norms. One consequence of such a process is that perceivers might also take into account more situational information when making judgments of others’ expression of happiness than unhappiness. If this is the case, inferences regarding the expression of happiness and unhappiness might thus also follow the patterns of inference for other dimensions of socially desirable or undesirable behaviors and result in negativity effects in judgment. The present research was designed to examine these different possibilities. Study 1 assessed whether people are aware of a positivity norm in the expression of happiness and unhappiness and thus expect more positivity than negativity in others’ expressions. Study 2 examined whether people find the expression and communication of unhappiness as more revealing of a person’s attitudes and feelings toward life than expressions of happiness. Finally, Study 3 tested whether this negativity effect is strong enough such that information about situational pressures fails to lead to adjustment of those inferences when they concern expressions of unhappiness but not happiness. STUDY 1 Study 1 tested whether or not there is a positivity norm in the expression and communication of happiness. This was done by assessing people’s lay theories about the range

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happiness of expression that happy and unhappy people enact. We asked participants to estimate how often a person who is happy expresses unhappiness, and they were also asked to estimate how often an unhappy person expresses happiness. As with other types of behaviors that may be governed by social desirability, we reasoned that people would judge that a person with a positive condition (a person who is happy) is less likely to express a negative condition (e.g., unhappiness), whereas a person with a negative condition (e.g., a person who is unhappy) is quite likely to display a positive condition on the same dimension (e.g., happiness). Such a pattern of results would mean that expressions of happiness are more generally expected from others than expressions of unhappiness. Method Participants Twenty four students (7 males, 17 females; 18 White, 2 black, 1 Asian, 1 other, 2 noindication) were approached on the University of Michigan campus and asked to fill out the onepage questionnaire. Procedure and Design In assessing people’s lay theories, the participants answered four questions. Two examples included: “In general, how often does a person in a happy (unhappy) mood express unhappiness (happiness)?,” and “In general, how often does a person in a happy (an unhappy) situation express unhappiness (happiness)?” The questions were answered on 7-point scales (1 = never, 7=very often) and were counterbalanced across the participants. Thus, the basic design of the study was 2 (type of question; situation, mood) X 2 (valence of expression; a happy person expressing unhappiness, an unhappy person expressing happiness) within participant design. At the end of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, and ethnicity, and then they were thanked and debriefed.

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happiness Results Participants’ responses were submitted to a two-factor repeated measures ANOVA (type of question X valence of expression). Separate analyses that took question order into account indicated no effect of this variable, so question order will not be discussed further. Consistent with the hypothesized social desirability in the expression of happiness, the results produced a significant main effect of valence of expression, F(1, 23)=6.76, p=.016. That is, a person who is considered unhappy is thought to express happiness to a greater extent (M=2.86, SD=.21) than is a person who is considered happy thought to express unhappiness (M=2.33, SD=.14). There was no significant interaction between type of question and valence of expression, F(1, 23)=.19, p=.664. Thus, the questions, regardless of whether they referred to mood or the situation, showed the same pattern. Study participants judged that a person in an unhappy mood expresses happiness more often (M=2.67, SD=1.20) than a person in a happy mood expresses unhappiness (M=2.21, SD=.66), t(23)=2.2, p=.038, and they judged that a person in an unhappy situation expresses happiness more often (M=3.08, SD=1.35) than a person in a happy situation expresses unhappiness (M=2.46, SD=.98), t(23)=1.84, p=.079. Discussion The results from Study 1 showed that, overall, people believe that a person who is unhappy expresses happiness more often than does a person who is happy expresses unhappiness. These results suggest that the expression of happiness is normative, so that in daily life people expect others to be more likely to express happiness than unhappiness. This lay theory concerning the expression of happiness/unhappiness may have an influence on the person inference process. Given that it is normative to express happiness, one implication is that expressed happiness may be perceived as ambiguous in terms of its underlying causes. In contrast, apparent unhappiness in a person should be counter-normative, which should

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happiness eliminate situational constraints as a possible explanation for such expressions. If so, perceivers should be more likely to see the expression of unhappiness compared to happiness as a more genuine expression of the person’s attitudes and feelings. Study 2 tested this implication of the present analysis. STUDY 2 In Study 2 we set out to test the hypothesis that people perceive others’ expression of unhappiness as more revealing of the person’s true attitudes and feelings compared to others’ expression of happiness. We did this by asking participants in a between participants design the extent to which the seeming happiness or unhappiness with life expressed by a person revealed that person’s true attitudes and feelings toward life. Based on the proposal that people believe that happiness is also likely to be expressed by a person who thinks and feels the opposite way (a person who is unhappy), whereas unhappiness is less likely to be expressed by someone who is happy, we expected that participants would judge an unhappy expression (compared to a happy one) as more revealing of the person’s true attitudes and feelings. Method Pre-test of Happiness/Unhappiness Descriptions We pre-tested the valence of the happy and unhappy life descriptions of a target person to ensure they were comparable in extremity. Thirty-two students (24 females, 8 males; 28 white, 3 Asians, 1 no indication) were approached on campus (UM) and asked to read a one-paragraph essay and answer a question about its evaluative tone. We gave half of the participants the happy essay and the other half the unhappy essay about college life. After reading the essays, the participants were asked to rate how positive the tone of the essay was on a 9-point scale (-4 very negative, +4 very positive). As expected, the participants judged the tone of the happy essay (M=3.12, SD=.89) as more positive than the tone of the unhappy essay (M=-3.44, SD=.81),

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happiness t(30)=21.831, p