Informal and Formal Social Protection Systems inSub ...

Informal and Formal Social Protection Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa

Editors Stephen Devereux Melese Getu

Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) FOUNTAIN PUBLISHERS www.fountainpublishers.co.ug

Fountain Publishers P.O. Box 488 Kampala E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Website: www.fountainpublishers.co.ug Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) P.O. Box 31971 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http//www.ossrea.net Distributed in Europe and Commonwealth countries outside Africa by: African Books Collective Ltd, P.O. Box 721, Oxford OX1 9EN, UK. Tel/Fax: +44(0) 1869 349110 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.africanbookscollective.com © Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) 2013 First published 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. ISBN: 978-9970-25-241-1

Contents Chapter 1:

The Conceptualisation and Status of Informal and Formal Social Protection in sub-Saharan Africa .............................................................. 1 Stephen Devereux and Melese Getu

Chapter 2

‘Giving is Saving’: The Essence of Reciprocity as an Informal Social Protection System among the Arsii Oromo, Southern Ethiopia .............. 9 Mamo Hebo

Chapter 3

Linking Informal Social Arrangements, Social Protection and Poverty Reduction in the Urban Slums of Nairobi, Kenya ..................... 43 Philomena Muiruri

Chapter 4

Securing the Urban Poor in the Age of Privatisation: Lessons from Kampala City, Uganda..................................................................... 69 Sabastiano Rwengabo69

Chapter 5

Informal and Formal Social Protection in Ethiopia ................................ 95 Amdissa Teshome

Chapter 6

Social Protection amid Increasing Instability in Zimbabwe: Scope, Institutions and Policy Options................................................. 121 Innocent Chirisa

Chapter 7

Social Protection and Climate Change Adaptation in Lesotho: Opportunities and Constraints .............................................................. 159 Patrick Gwimbi

Chapter 8

Social Protection Systems in Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of Fentale District, Oromia Region ........................................ 177 Endalew Addis and Samuel Assefa

Chapter 9

Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Coping Strategies and Social Safety Networks among the Pastoralists of Narok District, Kenya ..................................................... 191 Truphena Eshibukule Mukuna

Chapter 10 An Assessment of the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment Programme in Uganda .................................................. 215 Niringiye Aggrey

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Chapter 11 The Impact of Health Insurance on Household Access to Healthcare in Eldoret, Kenya................................................................. 231 Nicholas Walter Otieno Ajwang

Chapter 12 Implementation and Outcomes of Secondary Education Bursaries in Kenya ................................................................................. 259 Constance R. Ambasa-Shisanya

Chapter 13 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 285 Stephen Devereux and Melese Getu

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Acknowledgements OSSREA’s research and capacity-building programmes have been supported by SIDA, NORAD, DANIDA and the Royal Netherlands Government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the last three decades. OSSREA is indebted to all of these organisations for their continued support and the financial assistance that enabled this book to be published. We also thank the representatives of these organisations for their trust in our work. We wish to thank all authors of the book chapters, which are drawn from five subSaharan African countries. The authors worked hard not only to write the chapters but also to present them in a policy conference and to revise them many times to meet the stringent requirements of OSSREA. They have undergone a long and rigorous review process and the authors responded with diligence to the queries and comments of the editors during the editing process. The commitment and patience of all the authors is greatly appreciated. Several persons representing their government organisations in Eastern and Southern African countries presented useful reports on their respective governments’ social protection policies, strategies and programmes and discussed their views with us during the policy conference held in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2011. We wish to thank those who presented reports during the conference, notably Mr Adrian Shikwe from Zambia, Mr Amadeus M. Kamagenge from Tanzania, Mr Kabunga A. Crispus from Rwanda, Mrs Mary Mumbi Kimathi from Kenya, Mr Tamiru Jeba Dessie from Ethiopia and Mr Tawanda Chinembiri from Zimbabwe. We would also like to thank Dr Gidraph G. Wairire from the University of Nairobi and Mr Daniel Hailu from the Loyola University of Chicago and Dr Darlison Kaija from the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research (PASGR), who served as discussants during the conference. Last but not least, special thanks are due to Mrs Judy Hartley for the substantive editing of the book chapters, and to Mr Matebu Tadesse for copy-editing.

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Acronyms ACPDT ADB AMTO ARVs ASAL ASCA BEAM BoLSA CAT CBF CBO CCA CDC CDF CEDAW CFI CID COP CPU CRC CRS CSA CSO CT-OVC DANIDA DFID DSW DSWP EAB ERS ESAP ESCAP ESP ETB ETP EU FBO FDRE FGD FGE FMD FPE FSP

Africa Community Publishing and Development Trust African Development Bank Assisted Medical Treatment Order Antiretroviral Drugs Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Accumulating Savings and Credit Association Basic Education Assistance Module Bureaux of Labour and Social Affairs Continuous Assessment Test Constituency Bursary Fund Community-Based Organisation Climate Change Adaptation Children in Difficult Circumstances Constituency Development Fund Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women Chronically Food Insecure Criminal Investigations Directorate Conference of Parties Civil Protection Unit Citizens’ Report Card Catholic Relief Society Central Statistical Agency Civil Society Organisation Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Danish International Development Agency Department for International Development Department of Social Welfare Developmental Social Welfare Policy Education Advisory Board Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation Economic Structural Adjustment Programme Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific Expanding Social Protection Ethiopian Birr Employment and Training Programme European Union Faith-based Organisation Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Focus Group Discussion Federal Government of Ethiopia Foot-and-Mouth Disease Free Primary Education Formal Social Protection

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Acronyms

GDP GER GNU GoE GoK GoL GTP HEA IGAD ILO INC IPCC ISP JeCCDO KCSE LC LDC LVAC MDC MDGs MEP MFIs MGLSD MLGRUD MoA MoARD MoES&T MoESAC MoF MoFED MoH MoHCW MoHTE MoLSA MoYDIE MSF MSME MYSA NAC NAPAs NASRHF NASSA NAST NCCRS NCPCC NDP NFNM NGO

Gross Domestic Product Gross Enrolment Ratio Government of National Unity Government of Ethiopia Government of Kenya Government of Lesotho Growth and Transformation Plan Household Economy Approach Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Labour Organisation Initial National Communication on Climate Change Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Informal Social Protection Jerusalem Children and Community Development Organisation Kenya Certificate of Secondary School Examination Local Council Least Developed Countries Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee Movement for Democratic Change Millennium Development Goals Ministry of Economic Planning Microfinance Institutions Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development Ministry of Local Government and Rural and Urban Development Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Ministry of Education, Science and Technology Ministry of Educations, Sports, Arts and Culture Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Ministry of Health Ministry of Health and Child Welfare Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment Médecins Sans Frontières Ministry of Small-to-Medium Enterprises Mathare Youth Sports Asociation National AIDS Council National Adaptation Programmes of Action National Adolescent Sexual Reproduction Health Forum National Social Security Authority National AIDS Trust Fund National Climate Change Response Strategy National Civil Protection Coordination Committee National Development Plan Non-Formal, Non-Market Non-governmental Organisation

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NHIF NPO NSA NSPP NSSA NSSF OAG OFDA OPCT OVC PA PANE PASDEP PCC PCDP PCI PFE PMC PMSC POESSA PRDP PRSP PSC PSNP PTR PWIT ROSCA SADC SAFAIDS SAGE SALWs SAP SDF SIDA SLF SNNPR SP SPF SPF SPO SPSS SSA SW SWC TLU UNCRC UNAIDS

National Health Insurance Fund Non-profit Organisation Non-state Actor National Social Protection Platform National Social Security Authority National Social Security Fund Old Age Grants Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance Older Persons Cash Transfer Programme Orphans and Vulnerable Children Peasant Association Poverty Action Network Ethiopia Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to Eradicate Poverty Population Census Commission Pastoralist Community Development Project Per capita Income Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia Privatised Military Company Privatised military and Security Company Private Organisations’ Employees Social Security Agency Peace Recovery and Development Programme Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Private Security Companies Productive Safety Net Programme Poverty Targeting Rate Public Works Income Transfer Rotating Savings and Credit Association Southern Africa Development Cooperation Southern Africa HIV & AIDS Information Dissemination Service Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment Small Arms and Light Weapons Structural Adjustment Programme Social Development Fund Swedish International Development Agency Sustainable Livelihoods Framework Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region Social Protection Social Protection Floor Social Protection Framework Social Protection Officer Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Social Security Agency Social Worker Social Welfare Component Tropical Livestock Unit UN Convention on the Rights of Children Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

Acronyms

UNCT UNFPA UNICEF UPSOA USAID VAC VCT VFSG WASH WEDF WFP WHO YDF YEDF ZANU (PF) ZIMRA

United Nations Country Team United Nations Population Fund United Nations Children’s Fund Uganda Private Security Organisations Association United States Agency for International Development Vulnerability Assessment Committee Voluntary Counselling and Testing for HIV Vulnerable Family Support Grants Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Women Enterprise Development Fund World Food Programme World Health Organisation Youth Development Fund Youth Enterprise Development Fund Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

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Chapter 1 The Conceptualisation and Status of Informal and Formal Social Protection in sub-Saharan Africa Stephen Devereux and Melese Getu

Introduction In recent years, social protection issues have gained unprecedented momentum in Africa. This is reflected in the fact that most African countries have either introduced or are considering social protection measures, as witnessed by initiatives within the African Union (AU), African national governments and their development partners in the international donor community. The 2004 ‘Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action’, the 2006 ‘Livingstone and Yaoundé Calls for Action’, the 2008 ‘African Union Social Policy Framework for Africa’ and the 2010 ‘Social Ministers’ Khartoum Declaration on Social Policy Action Towards Social Inclusion’ are key milestones towards an Africa-wide consensus on the need for social protection. Many national governments are also in the process of establishing social protection strategies and policies. Unfortunately, most of them give little attention to the role or potential of informal social protection systems. This is despite the fact that the rural population and those who are engaged in the informal economy, which together constitute the bulk of these countries’ populations, depend on informal social protection systems. The possibility of building on existing informal social protection systems and creating complementary linkages between the formal and informal systems is rarely considered by policy makers and donor agencies in Africa. Instead, most attention is given to formal safety net programmes. The Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) recognised the fact that the literature on social protection systems in sub-Saharan Africa is not robust in identifying and understanding informal social protection systems, examining the complementary roles of existing informal and formal social protection systems, and designing sustainable social protection programmes based on local capacity and social values. It is against this backdrop that OSSREA launched this book project and invited papers on the status of informal and formal social protection systems in Africa, which is in line with the mission and goal of OSSREA. Two over-arching goals of OSSREA are: to promote African scholarship through building the capacity of scholars to conduct independent social science research; and to encourage dialogue and collaboration between researchers, practitioners and policy makers in Africa.

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In light of this, OSSREA invited researchers to produce country case studies which examine local sources of vulnerability, poverty and exclusion, and investigate the informal and formal social protection systems through which people meet their basic needs, as well as instruments developed by governments, communities and donor agencies to reduce vulnerability and promote sustainable and inclusive development. Three social protection thematic issues were identified for researchers to choose from: • Identify and examine informal institutions such as zakat (Islamic tax for charity), tithe, familyhood, self-initiated group-based schemes and/or community-based social insurance systems that have evolved from within African societies, and address, among others, such research questions as the institutional arrangements, principles, gender dimensions, coverage or scope, impact and status of these systems in the face of socioeconomic transformations, modernisation and globalisation; • Identify and critically assess existing formal social protection frameworks, policies, programmes and projects considered to address the concerns, rights and needs of various social categories (formal sector workers, self-employed, farmers, pastoralists, domestic workers, itinerant workers, street vendors, orphans, vulnerable children, elderly persons, persons with disabilities, single parents, and so on); • Analyse the synergy between informal and formal social protection systems, that is, how both systems function and supplement each other in a transparent and successful manner avoiding duplication of effort, wastage, abuses and misuse of limited resources. In response to the call for papers that was posted on OSSREA’s website, a total of 25 draft chapters were submitted, 11 of which were reviewed and accepted for publication. Then a two-day conference on the theme ‘Informal and Formal Social Protection Systems in sub-Saharan Africa’ was organised by OSSREA and held in Nairobi, Kenya on the 19th and 20th of September 2011. The conference brought together academicians, researchers, policy makers and practitioners drawn from universities, research institutions and the public sectors, all of whom have a stake in social protection issues in Africa. Ten of the book chapters which constitute part of this volume and a total of six brief reports on country-specific (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) social protection policies, strategies and programmes were presented and discussed. The 11 chapters have also undergone a rigorous review process before they were copy-edited and included in this volume. Authors of the draft chapters obtained constructive comments and suggestions from discussants and a wide range of professionals and practitioners who attended the conference in Nairobi. The draft chapters benefited not only from the feedback provided by participants at the conference but also from the editors of this book. This chapter sets the stage for the conceptualisation of the theme: the scope and key elements of informal and formal social protection in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter introduces to the reader the scope and status of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa under the following themes, presented as eight distinct, albeit intertwined subsections: • scope and status of social protection; • social protection policy processes;

The Conceptualisation and Status of Informal and Formal Social Protection 3

• • • • • •

informal and semi-formal social protection; urban social protection and ‘physical protection’; social protection in unsettled contexts; social protection for pastoralists; social protection in the face of climate change and variability; and social protection and social services.

Scope and Status of Social Protection in sub-Saharan Africa The Scope of Social Protection For those who think of social protection as food aid or cash transfers, the range of topics covered by the contributors to this book might seem confusing, or excessive. Cash transfers are discussed, so also are education bursaries, health insurance, numerous informal and semi-formal social protection mechanisms, and even security services. This raises questions about the definition of social protection, especially its boundaries. Standard definitions agree that social protection has two fundamental components—social assistance for the poor, and social insurance for the vulnerable. Broader definitions include social rights legislation and mechanisms to enhance propoor access to education and healthcare. The African Union’s Social Policy Framework states that “the minimum package of essential social protection should cover essential healthcare, as well as benefits for children, informal workers, the unemployed, older persons and persons with disabilities” (AU 2008 cited by Amdissa, this volume). In most of sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of economically active adults work outside formal waged employment; so they lack labour market protection and access to formal social security, such as unemployment insurance and contributory pensions. Informal sector and self-employed workers, including smallholder farming families, face high levels of income insecurity and uninsured livelihood risk, for which they need social protection. Other groups that need special attention because of their particular vulnerabilities include pastoralists and the urban poor. Both of these groups have developed complex informal and semi-formal social protection institutions that provide support to poor and vulnerable community members. Only a few ‘official’ definitions recognise the vital role of informal social protection. In Tanzania, for instance, social protection is defined as “traditional family and community support structures, and the interventions by state and non-state actors that support individuals, households and communities to prevent, manage, and overcome the risks threatening their present and future security and wellbeing” (Oduro 2010, 1 cited by Mamo, this volume).

Social Protection Policy Processes Some contributors to this book are critical of the fact that formal approaches to social protection are being imported into Africa through models developed elsewhere, ignoring the diverse range of indigenous informal social protection mechanisms that have been in place for centuries. In Uganda, for instance, the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) programme is a cash transfer programme for poor and vulnerable people that takes no account in its design or implementation of traditional systems of family- and community-based support systems. A thoughtful assessment

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of SAGE by Aggrey (this volume) raises the concern that such programmes have often been introduced in a policy vacuum, before a national social protection policy has been formulated and with no over-arching strategy to guide their implementation. This is equally true of many other African countries where donor agencies have initiated social protection interventions as small-scale ‘pilot projects’, hoping that a success story will trigger debate and policy development. The problem with this approach is that it is ‘putting the cart before the horse’, as the saying goes. The pilot project inevitably dominates the formulation of the national policy, which is typically drafted by external consultants and is rarely the outcome of a domestic process driven by citizens and reflecting existing local institutions, values and practices of informal social protection. A familiar lesson from the literature that this collection reinforces is that the effectiveness of social protection depends not on the choice of instruments, but on how well they are designed and delivered. In Kenya, for instance, secondary education bursaries are having some positive impacts on student enrolment and performance, but their effectiveness is undermined by mis-targeting, inadequate payment levels and weak management that leads to delayed or inconsistent disbursements and premature termination of bursaries (see Ambasa-Shisanya, this volume).

Informal and Semi-formal Social Protection This book makes a strong case for considering informal social protection more seriously than it has been to date. The rise of formal social protection (delivered by governments or donor agencies) has generally overlooked the array of informal social protection mechanisms (delivered by extended families and communities) that were already in place in rural and urban communities throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The assumption that these informal mechanisms are irrelevant or have disappeared is incorrect, as Muruiri and Mamo (this volume) demonstrate. Muruiri also shows that traditional solidarity networks, based on kinship and extended families, continue to provide the first source of support in many African communities, especially “for coping with contingencies and shocks”. Informal mechanisms remain widespread and their contribution remains significant, especially given the limited outreach and unreliability of formal social protection schemes, which could also learn many useful lessons from the former. Amdissa (this volume) highlights several salient differences between formal and informal approaches to social protection. Formal social protection is guided by economic and social principles, whereas informal social protection is guided by religious and cultural principles, as well as family and . Formal social protection is financed from public revenues (taxation or donor funds), whereas informal social protection is financed by individuals or communities. Most formal social protection schemes “have institutional arrangements, rules and regulations and accountability mechanisms”. There is also an argument for adding ‘semi-formal’ schemes — such as burial societies — as an intermediate category, because they are not publicly provided but they do “operate as institutions with accountability mechanisms” (Amdissa, this volume). Such mechanisms are mainly financed by member contributions.


Urban Social Protection and ‘Physical Protection’ Social protection in Africa tends to be concentrated in rural areas, but several contributions to this book remind us that there are also urgent unmet needs for social protection in urban areas, and that urban and rural needs are not necessarily the same. For instance, while rural farmers are vulnerable to agricultural shocks (such as drought) and need support to cope with fluctuations in food production, the urban poor are vulnerable to income shocks (such as unemployment) and need support to cope with fluctuations in food prices. Also, physical security is more of a concern in urban informal settlements, where crime rates tend to be higher. This raises the question of whether ensuring physical security should also fall under the mandate of social protection. If social protection is defined in terms of its objectives - providing protection to people who face a range of risks and vulnerabilities - rather than in terms of its instruments - which are often limited to welfarist transfers of food and income - then social protection should extend to ensuring that all citizens and residents are protected against physical threats such as crime and violence. Some might argue that these issues should fall under ‘social services’ or ‘policing’ rather than ‘social protection’, but there are clear overlaps between these agendas. Rwengabo (this volume) classifies informal security arrangements in urban Uganda, for instance, as a form of informal social protection: “…security informalisation is a form of informal social protection adopted when and where formal security services do not meet the security needs of those in need”.

Social Protection in Unstable Contexts Social protection is usually understood as mechanisms taken by the state to protect citizens against livelihood shocks and stresses. But what if the state loses its capacity to deliver essential services? Even worse, what if the state, instead of being a protector, is one of the threats that citizens need to be protected against? In Zimbabwe, according to Chirisa (this volume), social protection is defined as “a set of interventions to reduce social and economic risk and vulnerability”- but the state itself is responsible for creating or exacerbating many social and economic risks and vulnerabilities. A comprehensive range of government-administered social protection mechanisms and private social security schemes was in place in Zimbabwe in the 1990s, but their effectiveness was undermined by rising unemployment, homelessness, hyper-inflation, , food insecurity, and collapsing government capacity to deliver essential services. The case of Zimbabwe shares some similarities with conflict-affected states, where the ‘social contract’ between government and citizens is weak or non-existent for all or part of the population, and standard assumptions about the state’s responsibilities in terms of providing protection to citizens no longer apply. This is important for thinking about social protection programming in other ‘fragile states’ with inadequate government capacity or commitment to deliver essential public services.

Social Protection for Pastoralists Pastoralism presents particular challenges for social protection. For one thing, pastoralists face different sources of vulnerability to farmers or urban residents. Pastoralists interviewed in Ethiopia (Endalew and Samuel, this volume) identified climate change, shortages of water and pasture, encroachment of commercial enterprises and national

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reserves onto grazing lands, livestock diseases and conflict with neighbours, among their main sources of vulnerability and poverty. As with other social services such as education and health, the delivery of social protection to pastoral communities is difficult because of low population density, pastoralists’ mobility, conflict and physical insecurity, and limited road networks and telecommunications infrastructure. But this does not mean that social protection cannot be extended to pastoralist areas. In recent years, the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) has successfully delivered regular cash transfers in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of northern Kenya; and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) has been operating in lowland areas of Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the limited outreach of formal social protection means that pastoralists continue to rely heavily on informal mutual support systems.

Social Protection in the Face of Climate Change and Variability Climate change and variability is increasingly recognised as the most significant vulnerability factor in Africa for which social protection is needed. Gwimbi and Mukuna (this volume) demonstrate the impact of climate change on pastoralist societies in Lesotho and Kenya, respectively. As Gwimbi shows, a high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, low incomes and the absence of insurance make poor rural Africans especially vulnerable to climate risk. Mukuna’s contribution links two key themes of this volume – climate change and informal social protection – and argues that the fundamental source of vulnerability is political marginalisation of pastoralist societies, rather than natural processes. Mukuna points out that among pastoralists in Kenya, women are more vulnerable to climate change than men. Although men and women might be equally exposed to climate shocks and stresses, men have more freedom to find alternative sources of food and income. Gwimbi (this volume) argues that not enough attention has been paid to the potential of social protection in terms of mitigating future risks associated with climate change, because of “conceptual weaknesses that lack a holistic view of climate change, vulnerabilities, adaptation and social protection as an integrated strategy”. Climate change adaptation is crucial, for instance, for ensuring longterm food security in Lesotho. By combining elements of social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation to “tackle the underlying causes of vulnerability and promote the ability of poor people to adapt to a changing climate”, ‘adaptive social protection’ offers one possible toolkit for maintaining future food security. Adaptive social protection supports adaptive capacity and builds resilience, by building or rebuilding assets, tackling underlying causes of vulnerability, and reducing dependence on livelihoods that are climate-sensitive. The emergence of adaptive social protection as a policy framework also reveals how the evolving social protection agenda can be modified to address specific forms of vulnerability.

Social Protection and Social Services Although social services such as healthcare and education do not form part of any definition of social protection, measures that enhance the access of poor people to such services often do. Two contributions to this book, both from Kenya, focus on this aspect — one examines the impact of social health insurance, the other considers the impact of education bursaries. In both cases, the outcomes were less positive than


anticipated, for reasons that are instructive for interventions with similar objectives in the future, in Kenya or other countries. Access to healthcare should be a concern of social protection because the costs of illness can cause impoverishment, or can deepen poverty. As Ajwang’ (this volume) points out, “a significant proportion of households that have become poor did so as a result of serious illness, which resulted in their liquidating assets to pay for healthcare services”. Social health insurance has been advocated as one way of enhancing propoor access to health services and providing a safety net against devastating health shocks. But one lesson from Ajwang’s analysis of health insurance in Kenya is that single interventions rarely solve problems on their own; a more systemic approach is required. Kenya’s National Hospital Insurance Fund in particular has perpetuated a “two-tier health system”, with the poor getting poor services while the rich purchase more expensive, better quality private healthcare. Access to education has emerged as a component of social protection mainly because it is integral to conditional cash transfer programmes, where school attendance is applied as a condition on the grounds that social protection can be more effective and sustainable in the long run if it is linked to investment in human capital formation. In Africa, conditional cash transfer programmes are not widespread, but the importance of education for breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty is understood. Social protection instruments to promote access to education in Africa include school feeding programmes, abolition of school fees, and bursaries. In Kenya, however, Ambasa-Shisanya’s analysis (this volume) of school bursaries finds that their impacts on poverty are less than their potential, because of problems with targeting, implementation and inadequate levels of support provided. A general lesson from both case studies is that social protection interventions that stimulate the demand for social services without a corresponding increase in the availability and quality of the supply-side will not achieve the desired outcome. A two-pronged approach is required to avoid a two-tier outcome. The 11 chapters that follow this introduction expound in detail along the themes on which this brief introduction has tried to shed light. The concluding chapter Chapter 13 - provides a recap of the main arguments and the central issues of concern of each chapter. It also advocates and calls for a more focused attention on local or ‘indigenous’ mutual support systems and institutions, sometimes characterised as ‘informal’ and ‘semi-formal’ social protection mechanisms, which are undervalued or even neglected in the contemporary discourse of social protection policy-making and programming.

Chapter 2 ‘Giving is Saving’: The Essence of Reciprocity as an Informal Social Protection System among the Arsii Oromo, Southern Ethiopia Mamo Hebo

Introduction The theme of this book, informal and formal social protection systems in sub-Saharan Africa, appears at a glance to be situated in the provinces of social work and sociology, areas that are close to social policy. The areas of concern for social protection, such as risk, vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity, are cross-cutting issues spanning the boundaries of various social science disciplines. These are not merely issues of wealth and poverty; of the rich and the poor; or the haves and the have-nots; nor are they merely issues of social policy. They are, rather, issues of socioeconomic life and social relations, where some sort of mutuality is always at work. In this chapter, I discuss these themes, employing concepts of reciprocity and social relations (or social organisation, social structure and social networks) largely from the perspective of socio-cultural anthropology. The focus of the chapter is custom-based institutions and the values of solidarity and reciprocity which serve the vast majority of the African population. My fieldwork observations and review of the literature suggest a relative decline in mutuality, solidarity and social cohesion in Africa; some African institutions and values of informal social protection might have been undergoing decades of decline, for various reasons.1 Nevertheless, many of the traditional African institutions and values have never been completely lost or supplanted. In fact, there is a renewed interest in local knowledge and institutions, and some of Africa’s traditional social protection institutions are reviving or being revitalised (for example, Girinka2 in Rwanda; Busa Gonofa3 in Ethiopia; Zundera Mambo4 in Zimbabwe). The current interest is to use these institutions and values to promote social solidarity and social cohesion in an attempt to fight against diverse sources of vulnerability and uncertainty. There is a glimmer of hope in this trend, towards which I am attempting to contribute by exploring and analysing institutions and associated values among the Oromo in Ethiopia, which could be relevant for social protection in themselves or could serve as stepping stones to frame relevant and sustainable policy interventions where needed.

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Following this introductory section, the chapter briefly introduces the context of the research, and the people and their social, economic and cultural life, in order to provide some background for informal transfers of resources, social solidarity and mutual assistance. Objectives of the study and a brief problem statement are also presented in this section. The third section discusses methods of data collection and presentation. The fourth section provides a review of literature dealing with concepts of social protection (both formal and informal) and reciprocity, which serve as anchor concepts for the discussion of informal social protection among the Arsii Oromo. Sections five and six present the data from the field on informal social protection practices (used interchangeably with informal resource transfers, reciprocal exchanges and mutual aid or assistance practices). These sections are further divided into subsections in an attempt to enhance the lucidity of arguments and flow of discussions. The chapter’s concluding section attempts to recapitulate major findings and relate them to the major themes in the literature review section.

Context, Issue and Objectives The Arsii, one of the major Oromo groups in Ethiopia, predominantly inhabit four zones in Oromia National Regional State – Arsii, Bale, West Arsii and East Shewa. The current discussion focuses on Dodolla, Kokossa and Koffale districts of the West Arsii zone. The zone had a population of nearly 2 million in 2007, while the three districts considered for this study had a combined population of over half a million (PCC 2008). The Arsii can generally be described as agro-pastoralists in their mode of economic life, with variations in the predominance of either farming or livestock rearing (mainly cattle) in their livelihoods, depending on agro-ecological variations. The Arsii are a patrilineal clan-based society. The clan (gosa)5 is the largest functional unit of social organisation, and is largely territorial. In terms of marriage, the Arsii customarily practice clan exogamy, and marriage links clans in a new form of social solidarity and communications as sodaadhan (in-laws), or as bunaa-killa6 when the relationship is given a ritualistic overtone. Descent, affinity and friendship thus link clans and individuals to each other. The Arsii’s idiom that ‘hiddi Arsii walkeesa jira’, literally the ‘Arsii’s roots are intertwined’, is an expression of these webs that link members within and across clan boundaries. People make use of these networks under different circumstances and at different levels and intensity. The Arsii practice patrilocal settlement and the proximity of dwelling units usually correspond to residents’ descent proximity. Neighbours, therefore, interact intensely and cooperate in their daily lives in the context of neighbourliness and descent relations or family networks simultaneously. These interactions involve cooperation and mutual assistance. The list of items that might be borrowed or lent range from animals (such as an ox for ploughing, a horse for transporting goods or people) to agricultural tools, to household utensils and even very personal items such as clothing (Mamo, forthcoming). The role of larger descent groups, however, becomes more essential in the face of risks and vulnerabilities which tend to be beyond the capacity of a family or relatives in close proximity. The various community-based informal social protections, therefore, become more conspicuous at critical stages of life, such as marriage and death, or following loss of one’s property, or when a member of a community commits a serious criminal act; the settlement costs of such events could be beyond the capacity of close relatives.

‘Giving is Saving’: The Essence of Reciprocity as an Informal Social Protection System 11

Although mutual aid practices and cooperation are conspicuous features of the Oromo culture and social life, very little work has been done on the topic, and such research as has been done (for example, Bartels 1975; Hultin 1984; Tessema 1996, 2006; Temesgen 2009) focuses on resource-sharing and cooperation. These works have also concentrated on the Mecha Oromo, and tend to emphasise sharing labour, land and animals in the context of cooperation. In addition, assessment of the change of resource transfer practices over time, owing to both internal and external factors, is lacking in the limited literature on the Oromo resource-sharing systems. In this context, the objectives of this research have been to: • explore various forms of informal social protection arrangements developed and used by the Arsii Oromo; • identify the socio-cultural contexts (social relations, reciprocity and solidarity) in which the informal social protections are embedded; • examine the scope or coverage of the various forms of mutual protection (for example, assistance to the poor, to the bereaved, to those affected by disaster and destruction of property, to the elderly, etc.); • identify the functions (intentions) of the informal social protection; and • examine the current state of the different informal social protection practices in view of changes in the socio-cultural and economic lives of the society.

Methodology This research is qualitative in approach owing to its exploratory nature (see Marshall and Rossman 2006; Creswell 2007). It further involves issues of social norms, values, symbols and meanings, an approach which consequently requires deeper interpretative engagements (see Spencer 1996; Marshall and Rossman 2006; Wolcott 2009). Interpretation of symbols or symbolic expressions and explanations regarding reciprocal exchanges, and the reasons (logic) for their existence are made in an attempt to convert them into language and expressions that could be understood crossculturally. Some of the ethnographic data used in this chapter came from my prior fieldwork in the area since the year 2000. The most recent field visits for the purpose of this particular research were made in March and April 2011 on three different occasions for a total of 16 days. The methods of data collection for the recent research included interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). Semi-structured in-depth interviews, with open-ended questions, were held with 35 individuals (20 men and 15 women), purposively selected based on their knowledge of the Arsii Oromo culture in the selected district. Five key informants, again purposively selected because of their special position in the society – two religious leaders, an iddir chairman, a woman who had recently delivered, and a hayyuu (an expert on customary law) – were also interviewed, making the total number of informants 40. Names of reciprocal exchange or informal resource transfer practices and their associated features, their functions, and the circumstances under which they are provided or expected were identified through interviews (see Table 1). Poems and proverbs associated with social relations and mutual aid practices, which have significant analytical importance, were also gathered through in-depth interviews.

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Three FGDs, two male-only and one female-only, were held. The men’s FGDs had eight participants each whereas the women’s FGDs had six participants. As the discussions were focused on controversial issues surrounding mutual aid practices in the context of religious change, the religious composition of the participants was carefully considered. Muslims of the two categories (wahabii and shafi) according to the local classification, Protestant Christians and believers of indigenous religions (Waaqefannaa) were included.

Data Presentation The presentation of data, in sections five and six, includes description, analysis and interpretation7 of concepts, practices and institutions related to informal social protection in the study area.8 While ethnographic data from previous research have provided a context for interpretive endeavours, proverbs, expressions and verbatim extended quotations related to questions on the ‘purpose of reciprocity’ or ‘reasons for giving and receiving’ in the local context, are from the recent short-term field research. Themes (sections) are created partly based on the major guiding questions, and partly on the general data set. A summary of resource transfer practices and their characteristic features are presented in Table 1. Some of the columns of Table 1 are informed by the literature on informal social protection and reciprocity. Under each theme, description of the data obtained through interviews and focus group discussions was attempted and interpretation has been made in both specific as well as general contexts. Interpretations were necessary since many of the expressions entail multiple meanings, some being symbolic (figurative) in essence. Based on analysis and interpretation of the data, schematisation was attempted, setting out general principles versus specific contexts in which informal resource transfer practices are embedded (see Figure 2). My knowledge of the local language and culture and prior research experience in the area has helped me a lot in my interpretative endeavour. The accounts given, however, present a mix of perspectives. On the one hand, insiders’ (local people’s) perspectives have been carefully documented and presented. On the other hand, my role is a dual one. I am an insider-turned-outsider. I was born in the same culture but have now been detached from the everyday life of the people for decades. I have been trained to closely scrutinise cultural practices and processes in comparative perspective and employ interpretative and analytical procedures. Thus, I took nothing for granted and made no pretence of knowing the core working of my own culture. Therefore, I have attempted to present the information as offered by the informants, as I understood them, sometimes concurring with the informants’ accounts and at times questioning them, and interpreting them in the context of broader conceptual and theoretical frameworks.

Conceptual and Theoretical Review This section presents theoretical and conceptual reviews related to two themes, namely: • formal and informal social protection, with emphasis on the latter; and • the concept of reciprocity to which much of the literature on informal social protection tends to approximate. The context of social organisation (social relations) is also discussed in relation to reciprocity.


Formal and Informal Social Protection Systems Social protection is frequently presented as a fundamental human right (see ECOSOC 2001), which is clearly articulated in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Cichon, Behrendt and Wodsak 2011, 2). As a fundamental human right, social protection has four fundamental functions: protective, preventive, promotive, and social justice (Mutangadura n.d.). ECOSOC (2001, 6), however, stresses that the overall goal of social protection is to ‘promote human development, social justice and social cohesion’. There are several conceptualisations of social protection (Oduro 2010). Some tend to focus on the formal conception of the system, while others present broader understandings encompassing both formal and informal arrangements. …Social protection is broadly understood as a set of public and private policies and programmes undertaken by societies in response to various contingencies to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work; to provide assistance for families with children as well as provide people with healthcare and housing. (ECOSOC 2001, 4) Another paper offers a similar definition of social protection, as ‘policy interventions that are intended to reduce poverty and vulnerability (including transitory poverty and vulnerability due to economic or other shocks) and to improve human welfare’ (Yanchun, Thelen and Rao 2010, 3). Both definitions, related to UN bodies, conceptualise social protection as a policy issue and associate it largely with formal state structures. They fail to include informal social protection explicitly, despite their frequent reference to the importance of informal networks in developing countries. These definitions also tend to treat informal social protection cautiously and conceive of it as a secondary institution to the formal one, arguing that “In many countries, particularly developing countries, governments encourage informal arrangements, including community-based mechanisms, which support a survival of the population. This approach may be valid but it should not be seen as a substitute for public action in providing basic protection” (ECOSOC 2001, 6). The same document refers to the limitations of informal social protection because it may be excluding some people or “…imposing extensive care burden” on some section of a society (ECOSOC 2001, 25–26). This focus on formal social protection may obviously be related to the reality in the developed world where formal social protection constitutes a dominant form of social security. The situation in the developing world appears to depict a different image. Works on Africa and Asia explicitly recognise social protection as constituting both formal and informal mechanisms. In this regard, Mendola (2010, 3) defines social protection as “a set of formal or informal mechanisms which enable households either to reduce vulnerability and risk or to cope with economic shocks”. Oduro (2010, 3) distinguishes between formal and informal social protection mechanisms on a “legality” basis in that the former have “legal backing” while the latter are “not guided by formal legal regulations”. ESCAP’s Asian study distinguishes between formal and informal social protection based on structures, the former being “provided by State and market-based actors” while the latter is based on “individual and collective arrangements which fall outside these systems” (ESCAP 2001, 142).

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Countries have also engaged in the conceptualisation of social protection in the context of a particular national social policy. Tanzania’s definition is worthy of full quotation in view of the concern of this chapter. For Tanzania, social protection constitutes: …traditional family and community support structures, and the intervention[s] by state and non-state actors that support individuals, households and communities to prevent, manage, and overcome the risks threatening their present and future security and wellbeing, and to embrace opportunities for their development and for social and economic progress (Oduro 2010, 1). Tanzania’s conceptualisation of social protection: • recognises the dual nature of social protection (formal and informal); • brings informal social protection to the fore, perhaps recognising its pervasiveness and significance in an African society; and • clearly recognises community as a ‘support structure’ (unlike the preceding definitions, which tend to focus on individuals and families or households). In this context, a goal of social protection could be maintaining and sustaining the community. The importance of community and the informal social protection it provides, thus, is an expression of the reality on the ground in Africa. Indeed, the literature suggests the dearth of formal social protection in developing countries, owing to financial, technical and institutional capacity constraints (see Mutangadura n.d.) on the one hand, and the pervasiveness of informal arrangements on the other (ESCAP 2001; Mendola 2010). Informal social protection practices, thus, do not seem to be secondary institutions but primary lines of protection for the majority in developing countries. The informal social protections are provided by diverse social networks and structures and may take different forms, as the following excerpt clearly suggests: Informal social security entitlements are offered by traditional solidarity (such as support payments, gifts, dowries and bequests, which are all based on generalised reciprocity), indigenous self-help (such as burial funds, savings clubs and community support, which are all based on balanced reciprocity) and modern self-help, which can be initiated from above, such as cooperatives, trade unions, charities or NGOs. They can also be initiated from below such as through farmers’ organisations, religious groups or self-help groups on their own behalf. Unconventional social security may provide food (food for work), loan insurance, employment security (guaranteed employment) and a strengthened capacity for solidarity. (ESCAP 2001, 145, emphasis added) This is perhaps the broadest conception of informal social protection. It suggests that informal social protection is not a monolithic system. It involves traditional informal solidarity on which the transfer of goods, money or services, including gifts, support or assistance of various types, resource-sharing and remittance are based. These operate in the context of “generalised reciprocity” (see du Toit and Neves 2009, 1). On the other hand are semi-formal systems, including adopted or introduced self-help groups, which are contributory and with conditional membership (not inclusive). These include burial societies, rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) and labour exchange practices. They largely take place in the context of “balanced reciprocity” (Oduro 2010, 20–21). In this context, the next subsection reviews reciprocity as informal social protection and the context of the social relations in which it is practised.


Reciprocity and Social Relations In anthropological literature, particularly in the sub-field of economic anthropology, several concepts approximating informal social protection abound, such as reciprocity, mutual aid practices, resource-sharing and redistribution (Polanyi 1957; Nash 1964; Malinowski 1966; Sahlins 1972; Mauss 2002; Harris 2006; du Toit and Neves 2009).9 From among these concepts, reciprocity10 is perhaps the broadest, most widely studied, and conceptually developed system. In essence, it is inclusive of other related concepts such as resource-sharing, mutuality or mutual assistance. It thus reflects the essence of informal social protection, viewed as a largely community-based practice, and seen in the context of “informal economy”. Prevailing social ties (networks) and the rights and duties these entail can reasonably be thought of as bases for the provision of informal social protection to the poor and the afflicted, in the forms of material and emotional assistance and potential security to all members of a community. Malinowski (1966, 23), in one of the earliest conceptions of reciprocity in anthropology, saw reciprocity as the basis of social cohesion and “part and parcel of the whole system of mutuality”. His conception of reciprocal exchange has often been characterised as ‘individualistic’ and goal-oriented, in contrast to an altruistic one constrained by social structural elements. His (1966, 26) argument that “the social behaviour of the natives is based on a well-assessed give-and-take, always mentally ticked off and in the long run balanced” supports this characterisation. However, Malinowski acknowledges that “reciprocity establishes a system of sociological ties of economic nature”, and reciprocal exchanges are not carried out haphazardly.. Marcel Mauss’ (2002 [1954]) seminal monograph, The Gift, is perhaps the dominant work in the anthropological conception of reciprocity. His notion of reciprocity as more relational or even ‘spiritual’ rather than materialistic is usually contrasted with Malinowski’s conception of the system. Marshall Sahlins’ (1968, 1972) contributions have provided conceptual vigour to the discussion of reciprocity, and appear to bring Malinowski’s and Mauss’ conceptions of reciprocity together. Sahlins outlined a typology of reciprocal exchanges along a continuum of generalised, balanced and negative reciprocity based on distance of social relations. The first two are briefly considered for our purposes. Generalised or implicit reciprocity “refers to transactions that are putatively altruistic, transactions in the line of assistance given and if possible and necessary, assistance returned” (Sahlins 1968, 147). Generalised reciprocity includes practices such as ‘pure’ or ‘free’ gifts, resource-sharing, generosity, help or assistance. This is a ‘concealed’ type of reciprocity “in which obligation to return is diffuse and unspecified both as to the time within which the return is made and as to the amount that is returned” (Pocock 1998, 116; see also Sahlins 1968, 147). Stressing the social side of this type of reciprocity, Sahlins (1968, 147) argues that the “material side of transaction is repressed by the social” and that “failure to reciprocate does not cause the giver of stuff to stop giving”. Balanced or explicit reciprocity, on the other hand, refers to “direct exchange”. This may range from a perfect or precise balance, “simultaneous exchange of the same type of goods to the same amount” to loosely balanced exchange “which stipulates returns of commensurate worth or utility within a finite and narrow period” (Sahlins 1968, 147–8). “Payments”, “gift exchanges” and some form of “trade”, exemplify explicit reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity is ‘less personal’ than generalised reciprocity. In contrast to generalised reciprocity, the continuance of social relations is based on

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the continuance of reciprocal exchange in the case of balanced reciprocity (Sahlins 1968, 1972; Pocock 1998). Sahlins’ conceptualisation of reciprocity captures different dimensions of reciprocal exchanges and provides an important analytical tool, which is useful for the analysis of informal social protection. More recent analysis of reciprocity recognises both the social and moral (affective) and material dimensions of the system, and the importance and reality of mutual expectations involved in giving and taking (Gudeman 1996; Cronk 2006; Harris 2006).11 These recent works, alluding to the function of reciprocity, also deal with some important concepts such as risk, uncertainty and insecurity, sometimes expressed as “bad” or “rainy” days. According to Harris (2006, 285), “the best way for them [village societies] to provide for their inevitable rainy days was to be generous”. Harris cites a certain Richard Gould as saying that “[the greater the amount of risk, the greater the extent of sharing”. Harris further portrays reciprocity as ‘”a small society’s bank”. Harris’ notion of ‘bank’ alludes to savings, to which one may add that reciprocity is rural society’s “insurance or social protection scheme”.12 Making similar points, Gudeman also says that “in a community economy,13 expectation of mutuality provides a sense of certainty about material life, and this emerges in social and cultural constructions”. The concept of “the moral economy of the peasants” (Scott 1976) also suggests that “smallholders are faced with subsistence risks that help to create social systems of mutual assistance… peasants tend to be risk averse, they develop social arrangements and relationships that help them to redistribute surplus and protect them in bad years” (Gudeman 1996, 176 cited in Robbins 2004, 55). The conception of reciprocity, in relation to uncertainty, risks and vulnerability, thus brings its essence squarely closer to the concept and concerns of informal social protection. In the foregoing discussion, a social context of reciprocity has either been alluded to or has been explicitly expressed. Whether a certain reciprocal practice is altruistic, moralistic and communalistic, or whether it is goal-oriented and involves cost-benefit calculations, decisions are influenced by a certain social context. The context is (or is provided by) social organisation or social relations. Following Gibbs (1964, 164), social organisation can be presented as having two aspects: • “social structural, that is, the network of social relations’ constituting social statuses”, and • “the behaviour or roles associated with the statuses or positions”. Kinship, descent, settlement, community, and associated statuses and the roles of individual members constitute social structural elements, which provide frameworks for reciprocal behaviour. The importance of social relations, particularly for ruralagricultural communities, thus cannot be underestimated. The concepts of “moral economy” (Scott 1976), the “economy of affection” (Hyden 1980), and the economy of “trust and fostering” (Gudeman 1996) depict the importance of emotional ties and social relations in the context of the socioeconomic life of rural communities and as related to various forms of reciprocal resource transfers. As Nash (1964, 176) argues in the context of peasant economies, “generally investment takes the form of using resources and services to buttress or expand existing sets of social relations”.


Finally, treating his structural-functional persuasion cautiously, and understanding that social structural elements may change, and social networks may wax or wane, one is compelled to cite a view attributed to Radcliffe-Brown, which states that, “The exchange of goods and services is dependent upon, is the result of and at the same time is a means of maintaining a certain structure, a network of relations between persons and collection of persons” (cited in Harris 1968, 518). This is particularly relevant in the case of generalised reciprocity, where reciprocal exchanges and the context of social relations are almost inseparable. As du Toit and Neves lucidly suggest, …reciprocal practices cannot be understood outside the context of the social relationship networks within which they exist. Conversely, these networks in turn are created and established through these practices. ... Understanding individual or household decisions… often make sense only within the context of the complex history of debts, obligations, loyalties and links within which they arise. (du Toit & Neves 2009, 26) Understanding social protection, particularly the informal forms, as systems of reciprocity and stressing the significance of the context of social relations as a basis for resource transfer, the following sub-section attempts to make this conceptual linkage.

Social Protection Systems as Reciprocal Systems: An Attempt at Conceptual Linkage At this stage, an attempt at conceptualising social protection and reciprocity is warranted. In this era of globalisation, pluralism (legal, institutional or cultural) appears to be the order of the day. Formal and informal social protection mechanisms appear to characterise almost every human society, although one form may be more dominant in one society than in another. They also interact both with each other and with other systems, adopting new elements or adapting to new conditions. Figure 1 represents these possible pluralisms and interactions. The outermost box depicts a whole setting (a society, for instance) in which all forms of social protection arrangements may operate simultaneously. Broken lines indicate openness of boundaries. Figure 1: Conceptual schema of social protection arrangements as reciprocal systems

Source: Author

Hirpha

Informal Social Protection Mararee Maaskoo dabo Gumaata

Harka

Social Qixee Morma

Shangoo

Equbii

Semi-formal

Formal Social Protection

Reciprocity: balanced and generalised

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The two-headed arrow indicates the notion of reciprocity (generalised and balanced types in this case) as characterising both the formal and informal social protection systems and semi-formal ones as well. Social protection systems, therefore, are represented as systems of reciprocity, and studies of the two systems could have areas for cross-fertilisation and reciprocal benefits. The two systems are basically similar in essence. Even the words they often use – giver–receiver relations (in reciprocity studies), provider (service)–beneficiary linkage (in social protection) – show this similarity. In both cases, membership (either citizenship or kinship) is important, which implies that some rights and responsibilities (duties) are at play. Society/ community–individual (or relations among individuals in the context of the culture of a community) and state–society or state–individual relations, in the context of which resource transfers take place, are essential reciprocal relations. Proper unitisation of entitlements associated with rights, and fulfilment of expectations, are central to the smooth and sustainable (long-lasting) flow of communications and resources in both cases. In addition, both systems involve both contributory and non-contributory arrangements. Neither formal nor informal social protection mechanisms are inherently balanced or generalised, each having both dimensions although with varying importance (for details see subsection 5.2). Semi-formal social protection arrangements, marking a grey area between the formal and the informal, should also be distinguished for analytical purposes as indicated in Figure 1 above, while, nevertheless, sharing features with formal and informal social protection practices. In the preceding pages, the various forms of reciprocal exchange practices among the Arsii Oromo, and the contexts of social relations for the reciprocal resource transfers, are discussed and analysed. Although practices with both a generalised and balanced nature of reciprocity (semi-formal arrangements, for instance) do operate among the Arsii Oromo, the next section focuses more on the former, which lack written rules and structures to manage their operation; display features of generalised reciprocity; tend to be more inclusive; and have wider coverage. Attempts have also been made to articulate changes and continuities that the society is experiencing in this regard.

Informal Social Protection Practices among the Arsii Oromo: Context, Reasons and Forms The Arsii Oromo culture is resonant with proverbs and idioms related to reciprocal practices, their importance, and the social structural elements involved. These proverbs and expressions constitute important analytical ingredients of the subsequent subsections. The first subsection attempts to contextualise, in both broader and narrower senses, reciprocal practices in the Oromo culture, focusing on social organisational frameworks. The second subsection discusses reasons for giving, and whether return is expected for different types of transfers. This includes the description of types of transfers and the general principles underlying them, and interpretive attempts at the inner logic or actual operation of each practice. The third subsection considers the forms of assistance or reciprocal transfers. In this subsection, more pervasive and recurrent practices, and practices which have been recently contested and are undergoing change, are given rather more attention.


Informal Social Protection Practices: Importance of Social Organisations Among the Arsii Oromo, members of a residence group are linked to each other in two basic ways: •

•

webs of social relations based mainly on descent, which also simultaneously involve friendship and neighbourliness – these relations could be either an end in themselves or employed as a means to an end in case of risks and insecurity – and webs of social and material needs resulting from risks and vulnerabilities of various sources.

Marriage-based social relations are equally important, but lie outside the residence setting. People seek and/or provide assistance in the context of these relations, which influence the degree and nature of interactions, levels of intimacy and commitment of members towards each other. It is in this context that mutual aid practices are discussed and their different dimensions analysed, in an attempt to relate what people generally describe as the norm for these practices and how the practices operate. Let us begin with a brief presentation of the Arsii Oromo’s view of the importance of social relations for individual members. As already discussed, the Arsii Oromo’s levels of social organisation range from the family/extended family to the clan. A key informant’s comment captures the importance of these levels: “what couldn’t be handled at home [family/extended family level] is sought from ardaa [minor lineage]; what ardaa couldn’t handle, gosa [clan] would deal with” (Elemo Wako, Morke Peasant Administration, Dodola, May 2011). When asked who should provide assistance when people face different socioeconomic problems in their lives (see Table 1), the most common list included soddaa (in-laws), ollaa (neighbours), ardaa or aanaa (minor lineage) and gosa (clan). In a few cases, all levels of social organisation were listed except the family. In some cases ollaa was omitted from the list, perhaps since it duplicates ardaa or aanaa (a descent-cum-residential group). In almost all cases, the importance of aanaa (close relatives) and of the clan featured conspicuously. Close relatives are important because they are the ones who deal with relatively less severe but recurrent everyday challenges that tend to be beyond the capacity of individuals or families. This level of social organisation often engages with perhaps the most frequent types of challenges, which is why it is readily and frequently mentioned. The expression ‘aanaan reeffatuu aana’ – ‘relatives are related (sit closer) even to a corpse of their member’ – is an expression of intimacy and closeness among members in times of need. This proximity also suggests an immediate reaction to members’ problems. On the other hand, major life crises call for the intervention of larger social structures such as the clan and lineage, making their role very crucial in people’s lives. People often mention death, marriage and loss of property (assets) as issues that require clan intervention. Stressing the role of the clan in the life of individual members, the Arsii elders likened clans to clothing, alluding to their role of protecting members from external challenges, threats or dangers. Several informants conspicuously expressed the power of the clan saying, ‘kan gostti tiyya natti jidde irra kan waaqni natti jige wayya’, which literally translates as ‘I prefer for the sky [sky God] to fall upon me than for my clan to fall upon me’. It follows that ‘if the sky falls upon me, my clan would rescue me; but if my clan turns against me, no one else has the power to rescue me’. Taken literally, the role of the clan in one’s life appears to be greater

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than that of God. Disaster and affliction could be averted with the help of fellow clan members, probably through prayers, aid and assistance of various forms.14 The expression, however, is figurative both in action (‘falling upon’) and in comparative perspective. The intent is to express powerfully the role of the clan in members’ lives by comparing it to the most powerful being. Paradoxically, informants referred less frequently to the role of family/extended family (mana/warra) as a provider in the face of risks and contingencies. They rarely articulated the reasons for such differential conceptions of social organisations. The family’s contribution and its role in this regard might have been taken for granted. One may also suggest that individuals, as members of a family, may not be treated as independent but as an integral part of the family, and the individual’s problems may be seen as being the family’s problems and vice versa. Consequently, the family’s provision to its members may not be regarded as assistance per se. In the preceding paragraphs, attempts have been made to present the social organisational context in which assistance is sought, expected and provided, and how people give different weight to different levels of social organisation. Although not frequently mentioned, perhaps for the reasons given above, the extended family’s role is the most crucial. Again, although people tend to give heavy weight to close relatives (minor lineage) and clan, assistances are not provided at the level of these social organisations but through the networks of individual relations in the framework of these organisations. It is interesting that people refer to social organisational contexts, when in fact exchanges and assistances actually take place between individual members of these organisations. The following subsection deals with another set of questions on the principles underlying reciprocal assistances and associated expectations. Some of the discussions constitute elaboration of the social organisational contexts but are articulated more in terms of the importance of reciprocity-based social relationships.

Reasons and Context for Informal Social Protection: Uncertainties of Life, Essence of Reciprocal and Social Relations When asked about the reasons for giving and receiving assistance or transferring resources among themselves, informants’ responses were of a general nature. Common responses included: assisting each other is the essence of our custom (wal-gargaaruun aadaa teena); one’s possessions/ wealth belongs to one’s clan (qabeeni kan gosaati); and God is pleased when you help people in need (nama gargaaru rabbituu jaalata). These general responses express social, economic and moral grounds for resource transfers. In addition to these general responses, several proverbs and expressions of important analytical purpose came out in conversations with informants, as discussed next. With A Needy Eye Watching, You Don’t Eat Alone ijja ilaaltuu ijji hin nyaatuu This depicts a scenario where the haves and the havenots face each other, figuratively expressed here as the ‘two sets of eyes watching each other’. It illustrates both seeking assistance, as expressed in watching or looking at those who have something to share, and sharing as a social and moral obligation on the part of the haves. The message is about the importance of sharing or at least the inappropriateness of denying help to those in need. This appears to be an ideal or


general principle in the context of this culture. A general statement that declares ‘one’s possessions [wealth] belong to the clan’ also reflects this ideal. This does not mean that a clan actually owns one’s property. It means that one’s possessions serve as ‘insurance’ to fellow clan members – the essence of sharing and mutual reliance. Others’ wealth is appreciated because ‘it can reach out to others when they are in need’. A Human Being Is a Human Being Because of Other Human Beings namni namani nama ta’a This reflects the veracity of people’s interdependence and the sheer importance of ‘others’ in one’s life. Setting this in a local context, the Arsii informants narrate the case of a renowned Arsii wealthy man (dureesa) called Kiso Harmicho. He lived in the Gadab15 area of Arsiiland and reportedly attempted to negate this idiom, saying, namni naman nama; ani ufituu nama – literally, ‘a human being is a human being because of other human beings; I am a human being by myself’. A story narrated by an informant reveals this: Kiso arranged a wedding ceremony for himself. He invited a large crowd of relatives, friends and acquaintances for the overnight wedding party [cidha]. Customarily, guests are expected to come with a container full of milk to the party. Kiso, however, instructed all his guests not to come with anything, since he had prepared more than enough to entertain them. The guests complied and came to enjoy themselves. Kiso threw a huge feast – a display of his wealth. Amid celebration and feast, the time had come for the buna bdasaa16 ritual, and ritual performers were invited to the scene. The ritual is performed by a married couple [called abbaa badaa or father of the hearth and haadha badaa or mother of the hearth], selected by a groom who stood in parental position to Kiso in the lineage’s classificatory kinship. Three things are needed to perform the ritual: coffee beans, barley seeds and cow milk. These items should be brought by the couple performing the ritual from their own home. However, in compliance with Kiso’s order of ‘bring nothing with you’, they came with none of these items. Of course, Kiso had them all. But the milk or coffee beans or barley seeds from his home cannot be used for his own marriage ritual ceremony. Consequently, the ceremony had to be suspended until the concerned couple could bring the required items from their home. Kiso was shown that he was not a human being by himself. (Negash Hebo, an informant from Arsii, interviewed April 2011)

Kiso was expressing his sheer wealth, that he did not need others’ assistance. In so doing, he attempted to claim status for himself, though in vain as he was proved wrong by the Arsii custom. This story demonstrates that wealth is not the key to everything, and no-one is absolutely self-sufficient in all aspects of life. In other words, no one is ‘a full human being by himself’. Others are important to an individual’s life, both temporally and spatially. We all face relative vulnerability and risk in our social, economic and spiritual (ritual) lives. The importance of others in our life reflects the potential vulnerability and uncertainty of life for all individual members of a society. We have also seen earlier that clan, close relatives, neighbours and in-laws are all important for resource transfers, though to varying degrees. Giving Is Saving; You Eat What You Saved: The Essences of Reciprocity Social relations are important and need to be invested in, nurtured and expanded, as the following expressions depict: waan kayyatan nyaatan, ‘you eat what you saved’; waan facaafatan haamatan, ‘you harvest if you plant’; harkinuu koree wal-dhiqa,

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‘even the two hands wash each other turn by turn’; and kan adda nyaatu adda du’a, ‘he who eats alone dies alone’. These all broadcast essentially the same message (see Figure 2), alluding to the importance of social relations, reciprocity and generosity. An expression, which came out at an FGD session, may help to summarise the relevance of these relations and the reasons for giving or engaging in reciprocal exchanges. Kennaan kennata, declared Sheikh Ahmed Beriso, an informant from Hogiso PA, Kokossa, while discussing the importance of resource transfer and mutual assistance. Kennaa refers to both the gift and the act of giving. Kennata, on the other hand, it refers to keeping or storing something with another person or giving something for one’s own sake (for salvation, appeasing the spirit or worshipping). Thus, the phrase literally means ‘giving is saving’. Obviously, people do not keep their valuables with anyone but only with those people they can trust, those closest and most familiar to them. This conspicuously contextualises reciprocal exchange and mutual aid practices among the Arsii Oromo. Although return is not immediate, equivalence may not be always sought and failure to return or to reciprocate may not end social relations, gifts and assistances are not provided for ‘free’. You Turn Not to a House That Smokes but to the One which Is Closer: The Context of Reciprocity The Arsii Oromo, however, frequently qualify these views when they accentuate closer social relations for practising and expecting assistance, or when stressing the importance of generosity and reciprocity. In mana ka aarumitii ka aanuti gorani (‘you turn not to the house that smokes but to the one which is “closer”’), the house that smokes refers to an active house, where cooking, for example, is taking place. For a hungry person in need of food, turning to a smoking house, compared to a house which seems inactive, appears to be logical as it promises the chance of getting something to eat. The essence of this expression is figurative. Mana refers both to a physical house and a kinship term (the family). The term aanaa also refers to both physical proximity and descent proximity. The essence thus is that people turn not to anyone who could provide but to the people to whom they are most closely related and who are, therefore, most likely to help. In other words, all those who have may not give to all those who are in need; people are important in our socioeconomic life but not all people are equally important. Similarly, calls may be answered and assistance could be offered to those in need, but not in all contexts and not for everyone (see Figure 2). Therefore, assistance is expected, sought, and provided in the context of existing relations, and the closer those relations, the more one would be entitled to seek assistance and would expect to receive it. In summary, these expressions underline the consequence of giving and generosity, as well as the importance and limits of social context. In this perspective, giving or generosity is not always an end in itself, but a means to an end, serving as eligibility criteria for receiving or seeking assistance. That is, reciprocity is at the centre of giving and of the relationship. Reciprocal exchanges, therefore, constitute the essence of the resource transfer and mutual aid practices among the Arsii Oromo. Some of these transfers approximate balanced reciprocity while others tend to be closer to generalised reciprocity. Investing in social relations is necessary as it constitutes a condition for seeking and receiving assistance. The more one invests in social relations,


the more one expects in return. The certainty of reciprocity, mutual expectations and assistance increases with increasingly close social relations between people. Figure 2: Schematic representation of principles and practices of reciprocity in the context of Arsii Oromo culture

Ijja ilaaltuu ijji hingnyaatu

Namni namaan nama ta’a A human beings is a human being

The needy eyes watching;

Contexts

You turn not to the house that ‘smokes’ but to the one which is ‘closer’.

Harkinuu koree wal dhiqaa

Reciprocity or exchange contexts

Mana ka aaruu mitii, ka aanuttii goran

Inter-dependence as a reality of social life; insufficiency of one’s possessions; the importance of society in an individual’s life

Principles

Relational context

The haves should share with the have-nots; social and moral obligation to assist those in need .

Even the two hands wash Waan kaayatan nyaatan You eat what you saved Waan facaafatan haamatani You harvest only if you sow Ka adda nyaatu adda du’a kenaani kennata

Source: Author

Modes of Informal Social Protection Practices Various community-based reciprocal transfers and cooperation practices have been identified among the Arsii Oromo in the research area. These can be sorted analytically into three general categories: • • •

informal cooperation and mutual assistances aimed at production practices; semi-formal self-help associations formed around a certain goal; and informal reciprocal practices in response to major events and crises in the sociocultural life of individuals.

The first category includes such institutions as labour exchange (harka), work parties (jiga or daboo), share-cropping arrangement (qixxee or kottaa), and oxen pairing (morma).These are related to agricultural practices and hence concerned with the provision of basic needs. They largely involve more or less balanced reciprocity in which the parties involved have more interest in giving and receiving over a relatively shorter period of time rather than helping. These are largely negotiable arrangements. An important aspect of some of these arrangements is that people bring their different

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endowments together to be able to engage in activities that they would not be able to undertake effectively if they were acting independently. They strike a balance by turning their incomplete possessions into a complete operational unit. For instance, a person with an ox can engage in ox-plough farming by pairing it up with the ox of another person in a similar situation. A family with limited labour makes its land available for share-cropping to a family that has labour but lack land. Therefore, these exchanges largely involve balanced reciprocity of a temporary nature. However, these practices are not devoid of emotional, kinship or other forms of social relations. These relations and ties may influence the outcome of negotiations and gain priority for some over others in cases where several people are interested in the transaction. In the second category, one finds such associations as iddrii (burial or funeral association), iqubii (rotating money pooling) and shangoo (savings and credit association). These are among mutual help associations well studied and prevalent in Ethiopia, particularly in urban settings. Their presence is now being felt in rural areas, too. In the study area, these practices are still in their formative stages in terms of both structure and functions. The third category constitutes of orphans, widows and the elderly. In Arsii Oromo customs these people are taken to fall within the extended family’s responsibilities, and rarely require the intervention of wider social networks. Community assistance or intervention is rarely needed in these cases as they are considered to be within the resource capacities and responsibilities of extended family members. Sons, particularly the eldest is responsible for the care of his ageing parents. Such a responsibility is considered to have both a social and moral basis. In this society, a curse by ageing parents is believed to be deadly in its effect and hence is feared greatly. Their blessings, on the other hand, are highly valued and hence sought. This belief encourages sons to provide appropriate care for their ageing parents.17 Widows are taken care of through the institution of dhaala, whereby one of the deceased man’s brothers (usually the eldest) inherits her, and takes care of the orphaned children as well. Orphans and other needy children are also taken care of through the practice of gudifecha (adoption), which usually takes place within the kinship networks. The third category also involves largely kinship-based traditional solidarity practices, as summarised in Table 1, which are the focus of this chapter. These practices involve wider community networks; entail emotional attachment and a deferred form of return. Informants expressed them as wal-gargaarsa – mutual aid or mutual assistance. Most of these exchange practices do not involve negotiation about the amount to be given, how much should be returned, or the timeframe. Even when a return is expected, it is not explicitly sought. These features, therefore, make them correspond to generalised reciprocity.

(congratulatory or sympathetic feeding) Source: Author

(bereavement assistance) Gumaata

Mararee

(funerary assistance)

(forfeit one’s need for the sake of others) Maskoo

Milk & food, sometimes cash

An ox or a cow to be slaughtered for a funeral

Cash, food, cattle

Relief; risk aversion; show of solidarity

Show of solidarity; capacity-rebuilding; risk aversion

Function/ intent

Childbirth, circumcision, and injury

Expected under similar Initiated by the givers Show of solidarity and circumstances sympathy; enhances health, accelerates healing

Expected under similar Initiated by the givers Moral (emotional) support; circumstances risk aversion; relief; solidarity Death of an intimate Expected under similar Initiated by the givers Emotional support; friend or an in-law circumstances solidarity; fulfilling social role

Death of a family member

Solicited or initiated by givers

Temporary transfer Poverty, presence of Not expected of milking cow children (infants in particular)

(replacement, contribution) Dabaree

Solicited or initiated by the givers

Loss of some or all Not expected of one’s major assets

In cash or in kind

Who initiates?

Hirpha/guuraa

Return/ Reciprocity

Eligibility criteria

Form of transfer

Types of resource transfer arrangements and their major features

Practice

Table 1:


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Maaskoo and Mararee: Forms of Informal Resource Transfer to the Bereaved The traditional Arsii Oromo funeral involves elaborate and costly ceremonies. A family cannot usually handle a funeral with its resources alone. Various contributions and assistance from members of the community are fundamental. These include labour, money, food and other materials needed for the funeral. The lineage, and the clan at large, take overall responsibility for undertaking different activities by assigning groups of clan men and women to such jobs as food processing, cooking, fetching water, collecting firewood and taking charge of guests’ property (such as walking sticks, spears, horses and saddles). These activities are invaluable, and are beyond any financial value, as one informant explained. For the bereaved families, the death of their beloved member creates unimaginable confusion. They simply do not know what to do. They are confused. They make confusing decisions. They may say: ‘slaughter that cow for the mourners to eat’. This may be the only milking cow a family possesses. Yet, there is nothing more valuable than the lost family member. By killing their only cow, they may feel they are sacrificing the most they can in the name of their lost member. It is the lineage members who control them, who make decisions on their behalf. Lineage members also assign individuals for the safety of the bereaved family’s property – a temporary guard. They assign a group of individuals for the different types of activities. (Roba Alaka, Kofale, May 2011).

This illustrates the extent of the material, emotional and social support provided to the bereaved family by their fellow clan members. Maaskoo and maraare are two crucial funeral-related resource transfer practices. The former is particularly important as it enhances the capacity of a bereaved family to cope with the crisis. Maaskoo is contributions, in both cash and kind, by neighbours, friends and kins to the bereaved family. Women usually contribute food items, and women’s contributions usually go to the wife or mother of the deceased person or a senior woman in the family. The food is to be served to funeral attendants and bereaved family members, who do not have the time and energy to prepare food for both themselves and their guests. Men contribute money, and transfer it to the senior male of the bereaved family or other individuals who are responsible for managing the funeral. The money is ideally used to buy necessities such as food items, coffee, sugar and salt that are needed to serve to the funeral attendants, some of whom stay overnight or for several days. Mararee, on the other hand, is cattle contributed by the deceased person’s inlaws or intimate friends. These cattle would be slaughtered for the funeral, requiring some standard procedures to be followed. A person who contributes the animal – for instance, a son-in-law sacrificing a bull for the funeral of his father-in-law – approaches the bereaved family. He calls a senior relative or the eldest son of the deceased and requests them to provide him with feumaa18 (a long leather rope). A formal request goes: aabaan muudaa feumaa naa kennaa – ‘I am here to sacrifice an animal for my “father”, would you please provide me with a rope?’ The term muuda is important in view of the symbolic intent of the giver, though controversial in the current religious context, as shall be discussed shortly. This procedure is a symbolic one. It is a respectful and cautious way of securing permission to sacrifice the animal, rather than asking for the rope per se. Such a request can be accepted or rejected based on the quality of relationship between the givers and the receivers.


Thus, prior to granting permission for the animal to be slaughtered, the type of relationship between the givers and the receivers should be announced. It is important that people know who is giving, who is receiving, and in what capacity. If permitted, the animal is slaughtered and the meat is divided into two halves — one half goes to the bereaved family to feed the funeral attendants, while the other half is taken by the givers who serve their family at the funeral. There are some fundamental issues in this procedure: • The givers honour and declare existing relations by ‘giving’. • By receiving the animal on behalf of the deceased, the receivers also acknowledge and honour existing relations. • In receiving the animal without any complication or argument, the receivers also show their interest and implicitly pledge to maintain existing relations in the future,19 through cycles of reciprocities. Both maaskoo and mararee are of great relief assistance to members of the bereaved family. They serve as acts of social and emotional solidarity. The practices also serve as indispensable mechanisms of risk aversion as they prevent the bereaved family from losing its assets (and hence prevent poverty) in order to undertake the funeral services. Without this assistance, funerals could be devastating for families’ assets and food security. Based on the networks and prior investment in social relations by the deceased or their survivors, a significant flow of assistance, in cash and in kind, provides relief to the concerned family. The volume of resource transfer as maaskoo could be large. As an informant jokingly mentioned, ‘some people receive a huge amount of money, which appears that they “sold” their deceased relative’. However, maaskoo is not a purely altruistic transfer of resources. The receivers are expected to repay the givers when they are faced with a similar circumstance. Consequently, people meticulously memorise or carefully register who contributed what amount. The norm is to return more than the amount received, or at least an equivalent amount. As an elderly informant complained, ‘recently there is a tendency to give [maaskoo] to those who can return it instead of giving to those who deserve’ (Lenco Qexera, Bokore, Kokossa, April 2011). Maaskoo is usually given to the most senior immediate relative of the deceased or the eldest son in the case of a deceased man. The elder’s comment above alludes to a scenario when actual practices deviate from the norm; when most of a maaskoo contribution is channelled to a more influential or wealthier member of the bereaved family, regardless of his seniority. It seems that people sometimes prefer to ‘invest’ in those who have the potential to make returns. Consequently, informants often complain that maaskoo is becoming a ‘loan’ and that its emotional essence is fading away. However, this appears to be an emerging ‘speculative’ behaviour rather than a pervasive tradition.

Gumaata: Feeding the Injured and Mothers upon Childbirth The term gumaata refers to the practice of: • • • •

compensation to the injured by the party that caused the injury; feeding of an injured person by relatives and the community at large; feeding of a circumcised person by the community; or feeding mothers upon childbirth.

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Apart from the first case, the practice of gumaata circulates among people in the context of kinship, family and friendship ties and neighbourliness. In the first case, a person who caused injury is obliged to feed the victim regardless of the outcome of the dispute and the issue that led to injury. It is customary first to heal the wound and hasten the recovery of the injured, then to discuss the broader dispute in the context of which the injury occurred. Compensation could be in cash, with the assumption that it would be used by the injured for food or medication. Customarily, food, a sheep and milk are ideal items. The injured person consumes these items for a quick recovery and healing. In the second instance, the community at large, through established networks, feeds the injured person. While visiting the injured person with the gumaata, visitors express their wishes for a speedy recovery, and also express solidarity and sympathy. People use the expression which states a ‘willingness to share the pain’ with the injured, and make ritualised prayers for a quick healing. In the third case, a circumcised member of a community is also fed through the gumaata contribution. Circumcision is a ritually important stage in Arsii culture and it is considered to be a major event in life. In all three cases above, a large number of people contribute food items and milk. The most pervasive gumaata, however, is the one given in the fourth instance, to a mother upon childbirth. Similar to gumaata for the injured and circumcised individuals, most gumaata for mothers upon delivery come in the form of milk and other food items. Intimate friends may contribute a sheep to be slaughtered and fed to her. Male visitors often contribute money, the amount of which depends on the degree of social relations. Visitors, in addition to transferring resources, engage in ritual exercises whereby they congratulate the woman for having a baby; thank God for her safe delivery; pray to God for the health of the baby; and express their wish for the woman to have more children in the future.20 Most of the messages are congratulatory in essence. An interesting and analytically important aspect of gumaata is the way those who give it organise the resource to be transferred. In order to prepare gumaata in form of milk, a particular donor usually requests contributions from others. The volume of milk to be given as gumaata reflects the level of relationship between the giver and the receiver, and the social standing of either or both of them. When donors themselves do not have enough milking cows to accumulate the amount needed, they seek assistance from others to make up the required volume and in the required timeframe. There are always networks of people who assist each other in the context of generalised reciprocity. In one case, Dharo Hebo, an informant from Kofale interviewed in May 2011, said her son registered 60 women who gave her milk as gumaata. Perhaps hundreds of women might have contributed for these 60 women to transfer gumaata to this particular woman. This obviously is an enormous amount, which indicates the extent of the network the woman had managed to build and maintain. Functionally speaking, gumaata is given to individuals who need it most, and it comes at times when mothers and injured persons need items such as milk, meat and porridge with butter – all with huge protein content – similar to what was suggested by Sahlins’ (1972) analysis of pig rituals among New Guineans. Of these items, milk is the most important and the most frequently provided. Some informants even


indicated that milk used to accompany all other forms of gumaata in the past. Milk has a ritual value and is nutritionally the most preferred as well; people believe that it hastens recovery and healing. We have thus far discussed gumaata as a form of reciprocal system in particular circumstances. This practice still persists in its general sense. However, many of our informants complained that it has been declining in a number of ways. • The type of gumaata is changing, particularly in small rural towns, from milk to soft drinks and injera.21 This is not just a superficial change but also one of quality, since protein-rich milk and butter-soaked porridge are more nutritious than carbohydrates. • The quantity of milk or other gumaata given to people is also said to have been declining significantly. This may be because of an overall decline in the productivity of cattle. • There is a decline in social cohesion and cooperation, and shrinking of the circle of reciprocity and exchange networks. While in the past, wider community members were involved in the reciprocal flow of things, nowadays it is shrinking to just close relatives and intimate friends in Kokossa district. However, informants from Kofale district claimed the gumaata in milk is still thriving. Failure to return a hand (harka) or to reciprocate may result in social and physiological burdens on the concerned individuals. Those who fail to reciprocate may feel embarrassed and might, therefore, avoid those people who are entitled to a return. Nevertheless, informants indicated that people do not complain openly about not receiving a return for gumaata.

Dabaree and Hirpha: Forms of Helping the Needy Dabaree comes from the verb dabarsuu – ‘to transfer or to leave one’s turn to another person’. Dabaree is temporary relief assistance through a transfer of milking cows to a family in need. The transfer usually occurs in the context of intimate friendship, family and kinship ties (Fekadu 2004). The aim is to assist a family without milking cows to have access to milk and milk products. Families with infants or small children are the ones favoured or entitled to this form of transfer. The duration of time that a cow stays with the recipients depends on the degree of relationship between the giver and the receiver and the degree of the receiver’s need. If the giver is a wealthy family, it may leave the cow with the receiver for longer. Eventually, however, the cow and its calf or calves will have to be returned to its owners. Hirpha literally means ‘replacement’. This refers to contributions, traditionally in kind (cattle), to individuals who lost property or cattle due to natural or manmade disasters. These could be due to death or loss of cattle as a result of disease, lightning, theft or raid; fire in a house with property inside; destruction of crops; loss of a large sum of money; or loss of any other source of livelihood. Hirpha, according to one informant, was traditionally a clan-based assistance or aid system. Both hirpha and dabaree seem to have evolved in the context of the Arsii’s traditional cattlebased economy. Hirpha is currently used inter-changeably with guuraa (collection or contribution). Guuraa, however, refers more to a form of monetary contribution, which appears to be a recent phenomenon. Guuraa is reportedly now operating in the context of religious affiliation and at religious gatherings through the medium of

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mosque imams, rather than through clan networks. Informants, however, stressed that clan-based contributions for those who have lost major assets still persist, although some clans are reportedly more organised in this regard than others.

Continuities and Change in Informal Social Protection Practices In the preceding discussions, attempts have been made to explore and analyse many of the traditional forms of resource transfer that still persist, albeit in a changing environment. Change can be triggered by a number of factors, and attributing a given change to any single variable risks reductionism. Many factors might have induced changes in social solidarity and mutual assistance. In the next sub-section, we shall focus on religion, which currently occupies centre stage in the discourse of social life and social relations in the study area. In addition, we shall consider perceptions of change from the local people’s point of view.

Religious Dynamics and Informal Social Protection The Arsii believed in Waaqa, the Sky God, before the introduction of Islam and Orthodox Christianity, largely in the mid-twentieth century in the study area. Among the Arsii Oromo, Islam is now the majority religion, and is a major force.22 An interesting feature of the Oromo belief system is the extent to which elements of the indigenous belief system have survived and synchronised with adopted religions (see Bartels 1983; Braukamper 1988; Baxter, cited in Olana 1996). As Bartes (1983) notes: ‘…Whether they became Christians or Muslims, the Oromo’s traditional modes of experiencing the Divine have continued almost unaffected’. Baxter also rightly observes that ‘tradition still underpins the ritual expressions even of those who have accepted one of the religions of the book… and any Oromo would feel at home as a participant in rituals, prayers, blessings and greetings everywhere in Oromoland’ (cited in Mekuria 1996, 56). Until very recently, this was also the case in the research area. Islam and Arsii custom mostly co-existed. The Kokossa area, particularly, had been peripheral to Islamic influence and, for the most part, its local customs dominated people’s lives. Post-1991, however, intense competition arose between religions in the area. Islam, in particular, has become a new identity marker that cross-cuts and, at times, undermines traditional arrangements. Consequently, incompatibilities were expressed, boundaries were marked, and frictions began to emerge, particularly between Islam and Oromo traditions. This friction was equally apparent among Muslims themselves – between the syncretists (traditionalists) and the puritans (reformists). The discourse between ‘true’ Muslims, referring to those who adhere strictly to the teachings of the Quran and reject traditional customs as ‘incompatible’ with these teachings, on one hand, and those who keep custom and religion together, on the other, has intensified. The former group is known as waabiyii – a corrupted form of ‘Wahabbism’, while the latter are known as shaafiyii – a corrupted form of ‘Shafie’23 in local parlance. Funeral and related reciprocal resource transfers are among the most debated and controversial issues in this regard. The emerging debate is whether maaskoo and maraaree are permissible in Islam. Participants in FGDs held in Kokossa District and subsequent in-depth interviews produced divergent views in this regard. It is evident that the customs of mutual support, grieving for the dead and moral and affective ties among people are in decline. People mention modernity, Islam, decline of


traditional religion and the general deterioration of people’s lives as possible causes. However, they disagree on the effect on funeral and associated assistances. Muslims, particularly the Wahabis, reject the idea that Islam discourages mutual support. In the words of one informant: Islam does not prohibit mutual support. It discourages expensive funeral rituals. It discourages slaughtering and eating animals in the name of the dead. What is prohibited is to give money for the bereaved family today and expect them to return it tomorrow, and to return it with some ‘interest’ on it. So, Islam encourages people to help each other for the sake of helping each other. It is good to give as ‘sadaqaa’. It saves the bereaved family from being over-burdened by organising and holding expensive funeral feasts, and by paying back in the future more than what they collected from people. (Biru Hebo (Bokore) This view clearly illustrates the difference between traditional mutual assistance as discussed above and the Islamic view of this, at least from this informant’s point of view. The difference, however, appears to be not one of form but of essence and intent. Giving is permitted in Islam but the intention and the words used, in which intentions are embedded, are different. Cattle can be contributed by friends or in-laws to support the bereaved family, but not to be sacrificed and eaten in the name of the dead as embedded in the concept of ‘muudaa’. Sadaqaa, thus, replaces muudaa and the receivers of the animal may use it as they wish. It is also permitted to give maaskoo in cash and in kind as long as it is intended and/or declared as sadaqaa. In addition to funeral-related resource transfers, the very nature of funeral ceremonies and associated rituals have also become sources of heated debate. While Islamic teachings in the area discourage long, expensive and elaborate funeral rituals from the religious point of view, some Muslims go beyond this and say: Discouraging expensive funerals is not only Islamic but also in line with Oromo culture. It even goes in line with the current development programmes of the government. It saves time and property from being over-spent. Traditionally, people who spent a night at a funeral home used to beg for food on their way back home. There was no custom of organising feasts at a funeral and people used to spend the night starving. It was even considered taboo to eat at a funeral home. It was only after some wealthy Arsii men in Gadab area began to organise elaborate funeral-related feasts that this custom began to expand. This placed a burden on the bereaved families, which necessitated contributions from relatives and friends to deal with the problem. Nothing will be lost if this practice of having expensive funerals is abandoned. (Biru Hebo, Nyafaro Wabe, April 2011, Bokore) This view, though controversial, was held by several people who participated in the FGDs. The source of controversy was its authenticity, as the issue is even explicitly linked to the current development discourse. For some people, this is just an attempt to discourage the funeral practices by explaining them in terms of their origin, and in a way that appeals to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The following counterargument contains an equally appealing perspective: Religion is used just as an excuse. Whether these funeral ceremonies were in our culture in the distant past, we do not really know. But in our lifetime we saw them just like this. Linking these practices to the current development practices is politics. It appears we are trying to convince each other using whichever reasons appear to be convincing. One thing is clear. People are now trying to avoid funeral-related expenses in the name of religion or development. The truth

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is that people are getting poorer and poorer. Many people now cannot afford to feed funeral attendants even for a day, let alone for days. Mutual assistance is also getting thin. You give to people when you have something to give. People are also divided in an unprecedented manner. We are divided religiously. We fight over a piece of land. Love is lost among people. These things make it difficult for people to live up to the expectations on funerals and related practices. People now tell you to leave their doorstep as soon as they put the body in the grave. And this is done in the name of religion. (Lenco Qexera, Bokore, April 2011)

This perspective is self-explanatory. A general decline in socioeconomic life and social relations is evidently stressed. The controversies, notwithstanding the influence of religion, are reflections of this general decline, a view held by most informants. Whichever of the above perspectives best reflects the reality on the ground, none can be dismissed as all have some validity. What is generally understood is that people attempt either to keep one foot in tradition and the other in religion, or both feet in one of the settings at some time or in some location. Consequently, traditional funeral customs and the practices of reciprocal assistance are not simply fading away. Rather, they are being redefined, justified, and explained away contextually. In this regard, maaskoo and sadaqaa may run side-by-side in one setting while one of them may dominate in another setting. In fact, the concepts are hardly distinguishable functionally speaking, particularly when both involve reciprocity of some sort. The reality, however, is that Islam is becoming a major force joining, if not supplanting, the traditional contexts of cooperation and reciprocity. A new form of aid (as funeral-related assistance) to those who have lost a breadwinner, in the form of sadaqaa or gargaarsa (assistance), is prospering in the context of religious affiliation. The case of a mosque-builder, upon whose death thousands of Ethiopian Birr was raised, clearly illustrates this scenario. He was a well-known mosque-builder and he constructed tens of mosques throughout the district and in the neighbouring districts as well. Although he was paid for each mosque he constructed, thousands of people knew him as a person who devoted his life to serving his religion. Some people did not even know that he was paid for his work. Upon his death, several thousand Birr was raised in his name for his survivors throughout the networks of mosques that he built. This was not maaskoo. It was sadaqaa. It was gargaarsa (assistance) to his survivors. His survivors did not even know who gave which amount. If it were maaskoo, they could have been required to register the names of thousands of people and the amount they contributed. That is a debt, a pure debt. (Roba Alaka, Dhara Hebo, Kofale, April 2011)

This informant presented such a case as proof that assistance in the form of sadaqaa is better than that of maaskoo, which may be viewed as a very subjective judgement. This informant, however, stressed that the amount of money raised upon the death of this man was unprecedented. This is a clear indication of emerging ties between religion and assistance. Whether this would eventually replace the traditional forms of assistance is a matter of debate. Even when it does so, one should not be worried as long as some form of assistance prevails, although it may be discriminatory as it requires religious affiliation as a basis for eligibility. There is, however, a fundamental dimension of traditional mutual aid which is declining – emotional assistance and support to the bereaved family. Traditionally, relatives, neighbours and friends stay for weeks with the bereaved family, particularly during the early difficult days, assisting them emotionally and socially. At these funeral gatherings, stories and jokes are told,


and proverbs are exchanged in order to comfort the bereaved family and help them forget grief. Now it is discouraged by Islam, to stay with the bereaved family and to eat in their home. People are encouraged – sometimes strongly, based on the level of religious commitment – to leave the funeral scene as soon as the burial ceremony is complete. The logic is not to burden the bereaved family and deplete their resources. Some positive aspects of discouraging expensive funerals notwithstanding, the decline of funeral ceremonies, rituals, and associated social support is not without emotional and psychosocial costs to the bereaved families. Whatever the aim of this discourse may be, this new rhetoric has been impacting on the operation of traditional social protection systems while simultaneously shifting boundaries and introducing new dynamism. The impact is highly visible in the life of a society that entails elaborate public ceremonies and rituals – the major ones being marriage, birth and death (funerals). The impact is diminishing cooperation and mutual support among the members of the communities. Some people would find it difficult to participate in these rituals and practices, considering them incompatible with the principles of their religion. Yet, performing these rituals requires communal participation and support. Consequently, intense arguments and heated debates are still ongoing between followers of Islamic principles and traditionalists. In the context of these debates and dynamism, local perceptions of the state of mutual assistance and cooperation are presented in the following sub-section.

When Less was More; when More is Less: The Past and Present of Social Life and Reciprocity People may articulate about their present state of life and past memories in a number of ways. Some are apt to answer questions as presented to them. Others prefer to answer in a broader context, sometimes dramatising their answer, and at times framing it in figurative and symbolic expressions. It was in this latter context that Bariso Haji, an elderly informant from Bokore PA in Kokossa District, whom we asked about the present state of people’s inter-dependence, degree of cooperation and the general state of life, began with the following remarks: Waa saddii bira lufnne We left three things behind [passed by three things]. Waa saddii itti dhufnne We have encountered three things [come across three things]. Ameesa tokko ollaa obaasu birra lufnne A milking cow that fed the entire neighbourhood, we left behind. Dalla guutuu warraa hanqatee itti dhufnne A kraal full of milking cows which is insufficient even for a family, we have encountered. Xiqqo qotanii biyyaa nyaachisu birra lufnne A little farm that fed a multitude, we left behind. Bayyee qotaanii wal hanqatuu itti dhufnne A large field which couldn’t feed even a family, we have encountered. Illma tokocha ollaan ergatuu birra lufnne A son who served the entire neighbourhood, we left behind. Maatii dhalanii abbaanu ergachuu dhabuu itti dhufnne Many sons who don’t help even their own father, we have encountered.

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This is a paradox of life as captured by people who have gone through pervasive changes. Things of the past (partly experienced and partly handed down from past generations) are in stark contrast with things of the present. In the past, people had smaller (or fewer) things that served many people; now they have many (larger) things, which cannot even serve a few. The inability of many milking cows to feed even a family, let alone reach out to neighbours; the inability of a large farm field to feed even a family; the unwillingness of many sons even to serve their father, let alone lend helping hands to neighbours – all are loaded with embedded meanings. The essence is clear. Quantity has been contrasted with quality; large, big or many do not necessarily mean plenty and vice versa. Thus, the elder was capturing the time when less was more (past) and the era when more is less (present). The material, social and emotional aspects (or social solidarity and social integration) of life are embedded in these expressions. People in the research area refer nostalgically to the past as the time of atoota (small yet can feed many; small but last long; few but can buy many things). This is contrasted with boosha (large but does not last long; a large sum but cannot buy much – a sort of deflation). The concept of atoota, thus, refers to both productivity and the strength of currency or any other medium of exchange, such as when a small amount of money is capable of buying much, or when what is harvested lasts a long time. Boosha is an antonym of atoota, referring to a condition where something ends up providing far less than its size or volume would suggest. Indeed, people cultivated less in this area in the past but were better-off. They ate relatively well, and satisfied their basic needs according to the standards of the time. However, as Sahlins (1972) argues, needs may be met either by desiring less or by producing more. In the past, people might have needed less and satisfied their basic needs with what they possessed. Yet needs are not static by their very nature and new needs may emerge over time. Since the 1980s, farming has been expanding in the area. Although informants reported that cattle have been decreasing in both number and quality, Kokossa and neighbouring districts still boast of large cattle populations. The human population has also been increasing steadily. As indicated in the above expressions, the concern is not about how many cows there are today compared to the past, the concern is that today’s cows are less productive. So, we see inadequacies not in size/quantity per se but in quality of life and relative productivity. However, the above expressions go far beyond the economic life of people in the area. As the elders stressed, the inner quality of life is deteriorating over time and the spirit of sharing, cooperation, eating and drinking together is diminishing. Social solidarity and social integration are being challenged. Respect for the elderly is a thing of the past.24 So, what is causing this to happen? No-one had a complete answer. The common response was bara or zabana – the era or the time has brought it, and some refer to individualism and the decline of cultural values because of education and religion. What is the solution? No one could confidently suggest a way out. A common reply was that waan barii fidee baratuu fixaa – what is brought by the era, the era will take care of. Of course, there are issues that people refer to in passing, such as population growth and land shortage. Similarly, changes in their own (material) needs and their perception or assessment of the quality of life do not seem to strike them whenever they complain about the insufficiencies and inadequacies of the present compared with


the abundance of the past. People may be posing the right questions and articulate the differences between the past and the present. But they explained them in a fatalistic way, as if they have no power to control the current perceived state of affairs. One thing is clear from the expressions above. Now, vulnerabilities and risks (particularly qualitatively speaking) prevail, while at the same time cooperation and integration are in jeopardy. Central issues concern that the past reached out to support others versus the present that cannot even provide for one’s own family.

Conclusion A review of the literature for this chapter began with conceptualisations of social protection. Formal and informal social protection systems are differently emphasised, and semi-formal social protection arrangements, which in reality fall between formal and informal systems, are often placed in the informal category. Although the literature also, albeit in passing, relates to informal social protection arrangements to systems of reciprocity, the results of this study and an in-depth scrutiny of the formal social protection literature suggest that all forms of social protection to be systems of reciprocity. Again, one may sense that formal arrangements are more inclusive than informal ones, while reciprocity studies and some other literature tend to associate informal social protection with a generalised type of reciprocity. The result of this study and a broader review of the literature, however, suggest that neither of them are inherently balanced nor are they inherently generalised, as each could entail both dimensions. Similarly, neither of them is absolutely inclusive or exclusive, as both could be in different contexts. Any society, particularly at a higher level of organisation, could possess multiple forms of social protection. Whether one form dominates may differ from setting to setting. In the case of rural communities on which this research has focused, diverse forms of informal and semi-formal social protection arrangements prevail, while formal social protection mechanisms are almost non-existent. These informal and semi-formal social protection arrangements have been explored, categorised and carefully examined in this chapter. Emphasis has been placed upon more pervasive and inclusive informal reciprocal arrangements, which have been entirely neglected in the few prior research studies conducted on informal social protection mechanisms in Ethiopia. Among the informal mechanisms discussed in this chapter, some (for example, maaskoo) may approach balanced reciprocity while others are more socially oriented and embed types of exchanges (for example, gumaata, hirpha or guuraa and dabaree) that approximate generalised types of reciprocity (Figure 3). Indeed, it appears that there is only a thin line between the two categories, as both take place in the context of established social relations, and repayment of a gift or assistance could be significantly deferred. Consequently, many of the reciprocal exchanges discussed in this chapter are simultaneously economic, social and moral since: • for many of them, expectation of return is not a basis for giving; • even when a return is expected, exchanges are informal and based on trust without formal agreement or witnesses; and • failure to repay can still be tolerated if it is justifiable.

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Thus, although elements of either balanced or generalised reciprocity may characterise most of these practices, closer examination reveals that features of generalised reciprocity dominate (see Sahlins 1968, 1972; Cronk 2006). Figure 3: Schema of some reciprocal practices among the Arsii Oromo These could be claimed & These are more altruistic (affective);

equivalence sought; yet their return

they occur between people with

could be significantly

relatively closer social ties; Kennaa (Gift) Hirpha & Guuraa

Liqaa/ergisa (Loan/debt) Dabaree

Gumaata

Maaskoo & Mararee

Geegayo & Gabbara

Forms of informal resource transfer systems

Source: Author Material (and also emotional) inadequacies and insecurities in individual lives make people inter-dependent and engage in reciprocal resource transfer practices. That is, insufficiency of one’s possessions (regardless of relative wealth) and the consequent vulnerability of every member of a society are the basis for these reciprocal exchanges. However, resources are not transferred randomly. Informal reciprocal practices, to a large extent, operate in the context of established social relations in the frameworks of social organisations such as clan and lineage. Currently, religious affiliation is becoming another important variable, providing a context for such practices. Above all, generosity is a central social value and a necessity as well, since it serves as an investment that strengthens existing social networks or creates and expands new ones through which resources circulate. The coverage of informal resource transfer mechanisms appears to be pervasive, including all possible human problems and crises in people’s socioeconomic life, such as injury, delivery, destitution, destruction of property and death – thereby providing protective, preventive and promotive functions. These are functions similar to those of formal and informal social protection arrangements, as discussed in the literature. These practices provide not only economic or material assistance, but also social and emotional support. A fundamental characteristic of many of the informal resource transfer practices among the Arsii Oromo is the extent to which a wider community participates, either directly or indirectly. Many of these practices mirror two-ply systems whereby several people raise a resource that an individual member finally delivers to those who need it. For instance, many friends and relatives contribute milk for a woman, who transfers it as gumaata to a person upon injury or child delivery. There are, therefore, not only many people who give but also many invisible hands in what apparently each individual gives in his/her name to others.


While some of the major practices of informal social protection still operate largely uncontested, some (for example, maaskoo and mararee) are being challenged in view of recent religious dynamics. These practices are now partially redefined, given new names, and carry different intent in the context of Islam. Whether in their traditional sense or in a partially altered form, resource transfers and mutual assistance in the face of major life crises remain crucial forms of social protection for the foreseeable future. This is due partly to their importance in view of pervasive vulnerability and material insufficiency. Therefore, what may be changing is not the practice of giving and receiving per se, but the essence (context) for giving and the expressions associated with giving. In this context, the institution of hirpha, for instance, is reportedly declining under that name, while the practice of guuraa (contributions), which is commonly conducted at mosques, is playing a similar role. The reason for giving (salvation or religious duty) may also be competing with (in some instances replacing) moral and affective duty that prevailed in the context of family and kinship ties. When giving as sadaqaa instead of maaskoo, or guuraa instead of hirpha, a brother-in-Allah may be favoured over a brother-in-Abba (father in Oromo) in the present context. These are important new developments which are still in the making. In this regard, religion, particularly Islam, is now a major force in the area. Although some people fear perpetual conflict between tradition and new religious codes of conduct, it appears that people in the research area found themselves in a time of transition, whereby hitherto stronger traditions are facing challenges from religion. The fact that these districts (particularly Kokossa) have been known for embracing Oromo culture in its near original form until recently made them grounds for religious conflicts and competition between religions and tradition. Once this tide subsides and the area falls fully under Islamic control, then tradition will probably resurface and operate. Even now, people often move back and forth between different approaches and selectively employ the norms of either religious or Oromo culture origin, according to the circumstances. Informal social protection practices are dynamic, as they operate in a dynamic environment. New socio-cultural, ideological, economic and political factors may create friction among members of certain groups and undermine their cohesion and solidarity. As Mendola (2010, 4) comments, ‘traditional networks may be under pressure from factors such as population changes, migration and wealth differentiation’. This concern is evident in the life and mood of the community in the research area. A sense of apprehension regarding the contemporary socioeconomic life of the society appears to be common. People persistently complain of the decline in the general standards of living, social cohesion, mutual assistance and emotional support. Observation from the field suggests a potentially worrisome trend – a relative decline of inclusive and non-contributory informal social protection systems on the one hand, and the rise of semi-formal and contributory (hence non-inclusive) reciprocal systems on the other. This implies not only the challenges facing traditional structures and networks in properly playing their roles but also the consequences of these challenges for different groups of people. The poor and other vulnerable groups could be left out, and exposed to various risks, if contributory systems prevail at the expense of non-contributory ones. In this regard, ECOSOC’s recommendation is equally relevant to our situation: “…Social protection strategies should take account of the roles played by institutions of family, kinship and community… creating an

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enabling policy environment to keep the ‘small systems’ afloat and gradually link them to formal systems of social insurance and social assistance.” (ECOSOC 2001, 25). It is, thus, imperative to conduct a broader social policy-oriented research on the current state of diverse informal social protection practices and the contexts necessary to allow these practices to properly function. Comprehensive and exhaustive research on the diverse forms of informal and semi-formal social protection systems, changes in their operations, interactions or inter-relationships could provide information on gaps and areas of linkage. It would provide the basis for either introducing formal social protection for the most vulnerable and excluded groups because of changes to or inadequacies in traditional informal systems; complementing active informal social protection practices; or enabling and strengthening the social institutions and values essential for informal social protection systems to function meaningfully.

Notes 1.

These may be due to assaults from colonial values, a Western values-oriented education system and policy orientation, the relative decline in resource wealth (both quality and availability) and the consequent competition for survival and the decline in the socioeconomic life of African societies.

2.

Girinka (have a cow) was a traditional solidarity mechanism in Rwanda. It became a government-run programme in 2006 under President Paul Kagame.

3.

Busa Gonofa was a traditional insurance (assistance) scheme in Oromo society. The name has been adopted for the micro-finance institution run by the National Regional State of Oromia.

4.

Literally, the chief’s granary was a traditional insurance scheme in Zimbabwe, the essence of which is currently used in development and community social security schemes in modern initiatives in Zimbabwe (see UNAIDS 1999).

5.

The segmentation ranges, in an ascending manner, from the family/extended family (mana/ warra) to minor lineage (ardaa or aanaa) to major lineage (balbala) to clan (gosa) (Mamo 2006).

5.

Buna refers to coffee or coffee berry, while killa is a small bowl used to prepare a ‘coffeeslaughtering’ ritual where roasted coffee berries are mixed with melted butter and served as a ritual paste at a number of important ceremonies. Bunaa-killa symbolises a set and combinations never to be separated.

7.

The description, analysis and interpretation of the data, however, do not constitute distinct or separate sections but are largely made in an integrated fashion. Similarly, information from different sources such as prior ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and FGDs have been presented in an integrated manner although each carries different weights in different sections.

8.

Given that the data is qualitative, exploratory and based on a limited number of informants, I do not claim the results can be generalised to all Arsii Oromo areas. The data does, however, illustrate an aspect of a complex system of social relationships that characterise the Arsii Oromo culture and provide a glimpse of traditional informal social protection systems, and how these have been evolving in dynamic economic and socio-cultural environments.

9.

Redistribution refers to ‘The transfer of goods and services between a group of people and a central collecting service based on role obligation; while reciprocal exchange is defined as the transfer of goods and services between two people or groups based on role obligation’ (Spradley and McCurdy 2006: 450). Re-distribution occurs when people turn over food and other valuables to a prestigious figure, to be pooled, divided into separate portions and given out again. Harris’ (2006) analysis suggests that with the evolution of chiefdoms into states, the re-distribution system itself persisted in form, though not in essence. State-based forms of social protection, such as social welfare services, could conceptually be approximated to modern forms of re-distribution.

‘Giving is Saving’: The Essence of Reciprocity as an Informal Social Protection System 39 10.

Some tend to associate reciprocity with traditional societies having smaller populations and greater intimacy (for summaries, see Coser 1977: 218; Monaghan and Just 2000: 66–67; Harris 2006), while others view reciprocal exchanges to be characteristics of every society (Cronk 2006: 147). Similarly, there are two points of view on reciprocal exchange and resourcesharing; one treats reciprocity as the basis of relations and moral (affective) and social ties, while the other characterises it as individualistic, goal-oriented and based on cost-benefit analysis and calculated actions (Ritzer and Goodman 2003; Schneider 1974). Sociological works on exchange systems (Blau 1964; Homans 1961, 1974) belong to the latter group.

11.

Cronk (2006: 147) argues that in every society “there are strings attached to giving that affect how people and groups relate to each other”. From Cronk’s point of view, the intention behind gifts and giving may range from benevolence, to showing or seeking status, recognition and security, and may be intended either to maintain existing relationships or create new ones. Harris (2006: 285) also stresses the importance of mutual expectations, saying that “people gave with the expectation of taking and took with the expectation of giving”.

12.

An ethnographic account of the Cherokee in the southeastern United States described the ‘chief’s granary’, which was filled by contributions from the families, as “a public treasury in case of crop failure, a source of food for strangers or travellers or as a military store” (see Harris 2006: 291).

13.

Gudeman (1996: 175) presents community economy as based on ‘commensuality’ and ‘communion’ (referring to living and eating together and norms of relationship of exchange), and emphasises sharing, care and mutual reliance.

14.

This should not, however, be taken literally. The Arsii Oromo frequently describe God as all-powerful and omnipotent, creator of everything, including the clan and its members. In the present religious atmosphere, some even display strong contempt for the very idea of attempting to compare God with clan, and would like to have the above parable presented as: ‘I prefer for the mountain to fall upon me than for my clan to fall upon me’.

15.

Gadab refers to the plains extending from Kofale town to Gadab Hasaasa town north of Wabe River; and extends across the river covering the vast wheat and barley growing plains of Dodola all the way to Adaba town. In local parlance, it refers to these cereal-growing plains as distinguished from the surrounding high hills which are largely pastoral. In other instances, it refers to both the hills and the plains when used to distinguish Bale and Gadab, mainly employed by the Arsii Oromo inhabiting in the Bale Robe and Goba areas.

16.

This is one of the key marriage ceremonies among the Arsii Oromo. A couple are made to taste ritually roasted coffee beans and barley mixed with milk by the abbaa baddaa and haadha badaa (literally father and mother of the earth).

17.

Of course, one may sense an essence of reciprocity in child-parent relationships, which entail both moral and social obligations – for the parents to take care of their children until they grow up and become self-sufficient and self-supportive; and for the children to reciprocate as their parents age.

18.

A long leather rope prepared from cattle hide and used to trap and tie up animals and also to tie things on the back of pack animals.

19.

If existing relations between the two parties are not good or if there is a pending or unsettled case, the deceased person’s side may reject or suspend the offer until the problem is sorted out.

20.

In all cases of gumaata transfer, those who transfer food and milk make one important wish while letting the receiver taste from the item contributed. They say: ‘arjaa garaa siif haa raasuu; donn’a ciqilee siif haa dahu.’ Arjaa means ‘generous’ while donna’a means ‘stingy persons’. The expression is, thus, a sort of prayer which literally means: ‘may God make the benevolent sympathetic with you; may God strike the stingy person’s “elbow”. In both cases, the message is to wish for greater flow of the gumaata, by praying to God to encourage those who always give to give even more, and those who do not usually give to give this time.

21.

Injera is a pancake-like food prepared from the Ethiopian staple food, teff.

21.

Christianity (both Ethiopian Orthodox and Protestant) and traditional Oromo religion

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(Waaqeffanna) constitute religious minorities. While Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity is in continuous decline in the area, Protestantism is making some ground, and is offering some challenge, though not substantial, to Islam. 22.

Wahabbism is a rigid and puritanical sect of Saudi Arabian Islam while shafei is a sect of Islam widely followed in the Horn of Africa (see Adan 2002).

23.

Fathers could no longer instruct their children. ‘In the past we used to say that sons belong to the clan – ‘illmii ka gosaatii’. You call a boy and send him to do something. You could scold children when you came across them engaged in unacceptable activities. They accepted elders’ comments and ran away. They used to feel guilt. Now, it seems that it is their turn to scold the elders, even without elders engaging in any offensive activity’.

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Chapter 3 Linking Informal Social Arrangements, Social Protection and Poverty Reduction in the Urban Slums of Nairobi, Kenya Philomena Muiruri

Introduction The city of Nairobi has experienced a phenomenal growth in its population, which by 2009 stood at 3.2 million (Central Bureau of Statistics 2010). This rapid urbanisation has been accompanied by high levels of urban poverty. More than 60% of the population are classified as poor, residing in informal settlements comprising ‘slums’ which lack basic services and infrastructure and whose residents earn low incomes and have limited assets. The city’s poor are caught up in a web of deprivations and limited opportunities that mutually reinforce one another and make it difficult to climb out of poverty. Apart from deprivation in terms of income and consumption, a defining criterion of poverty is vulnerability to shocks and contingencies, including environmental shocks (natural disasters that are increasing with climate change impacts); economic shocks (high food prices, unemployment, loss of income-earners); and health shocks (high disease incidence). The city’s poor are deprived of the resources and opportunities (assets, savings and insurance, access to credit or new forms of livelihoods) needed to cope with such risks and shocks. The increasing vulnerability is not only related to coping with sudden shocks and crises, but equally to the recovery afterwards, and restoration of livelihoods to the pre-shock level. Hence, there is need for increasing attention to social protection arrangements which are intended to assist poor households overcome such temporary adversity, and as a poverty reduction strategy, to enable them to protect or build their human and physical capital in times of crisis. Social protection involves policies and programmes that protect people against risk and vulnerability, mitigate the impacts of shocks, and support people who suffer from chronic incapacities to secure basic livelihoods (DFID 2006). Social protection has wide-ranging benefits that include: strengthening access to nutrition, health, and education; reducing inter-generational transmission of poverty; promoting political stability, and achieving economic growth (Taylor 2008). In the short term, social protection helps provide relief to affected families and prevents them from falling into destitution. In the longer term, the promotive and transformational functions of social protection programmes address some of the underlying causes of inter-generational poverty.

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Kenya’s Vision 2030 recognises that a large proportion of the population is trapped in long term, chronic and inter-generational poverty (GOK 2007). It is estimated that 46% of its 38.6 million people live below the poverty line, while 19% live in extreme poverty (Daily Nation, 20 February 2010). The levels of vulnerability and poverty are further exacerbated by factors such as: increasing levels of environmental degradation; prolonged and persistent drought; human-induced disasters; unemployment; a lack of income in old age; a breakdown of traditional safety net mechanisms; and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, that have impacted negatively on food production and its accessibility. The ‘Triple F’ crisis (high food and fuel prices, compounded by global financial crisis) has further increased the number of poor and vulnerable people across the country. This has weakened and in some cases eroded the traditional coping mechanisms that cushioned the very poor and vulnerable. Certain categories of the society experience deeper levels of poverty and higher exposure to risk and vulnerability – these include older persons, orphaned and vulnerable children, people living in slums, the rural poor and unemployed youth. This creates an increasingly unstable and unequal society. An effective way to reduce poverty and vulnerability and increase people’s capacity to manage risks and shocks in their lives is through the provision of social protection – a key social pillar in Vision 2030. According to Kenya’s draft National Social Protection Policy, social protection describes all public and private initiatives that provide income and consumption transfers to the poor and vulnerable, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised (KNBS 2009). Existing formal social protection systems do not offer complete coverage and inevitably exclude most of the population. At present, these interventions hardly exist for the urban poor, a great majority of whom are unemployed, self-employed or working in the informal sector, where conditions of work are precarious and there is no access to social protection. A variety of traditional or ‘informal’ ways of providing social protection within households, groups and networks fill some of the gaps and distribute risk within a community. These mechanisms, often provided through social networks, are the mainstay of social security and are based on systems of mutual dependence or reciprocity. In the slums, they exist in various forms – chamas or ‘merry-go-rounds’, welfare groups, savings clubs, self-help groups – which are not primarily social security institutions, but constitute an important informal social security mechanism providing safety nets and enabling the poor to deal with contingencies. This chapter documents different forms of informal social protection in the informal settlements in Nairobi and explores ways in which they could be linked to formal social protection schemes.

Problem Statement Informal social security protection measures are still considered a short term buffer and are often fragmented, unorganised and beset by many obstacles and challenges. As climate change, food and fuel price volatility and global financial crisis all threaten progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, there is an increasing need for new and expanded social protection programmes in the informal settlements of Nairobi to cater for the marginalised groups. These mechanisms can be scaled up, not only to reduce the impacts of shocks and cope with their aftermath, but also to prevent shocks and destitution through poverty-reducing interventions, such as income-generating activities. It is important to explore linkages between existing

Linking Informal Social Arrangements, Social Protection and Poverty Reduction

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informal social arrangements and formal social protection mechanisms in order to create innovative and sustainable social protection innovations for the urban poor. The research will answer the following questions. • • •

What systems of informal social protection exist among households in Mathare informal settlements? What are their membership criteria (gender, age, income); purpose; governance; regulations and enforcement; benefits and challenges? What links can be explored between the formal social protection and informal social protection mechanisms in strategies for poverty reduction?

Literature Review Originally, social protection was limited to supporting people in managing and mitigating shocks and heightened vulnerabilities, but in the last two decades social protection discussions have expanded to encompass four types of interventions: • • • •

protective (recovery from shocks); preventive (mitigating risks in order to avoid shocks); promotive (promoting opportunities); and transformative (focusing on underlying structural inequalities which give rise to vulnerability (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004).

The broadening of social protection can be attributed to increased awareness of and concern about globalised risks such as economic shocks and other threats to livelihoods, the emergence of human security as a unit of analysis, the global human rights discourse, and the centrality of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (ILO 2008b). The international trend toward investing in social protection is taking on new urgency in Africa, fuelled by: persistent high rates of poverty and malnutrition; HIV/ AIDS which interacts with other drivers of poverty to destabilise livelihood systems and family and community safety nets; volatile food prices and the calamities of weather and war; the global financial crisis; erosion of the extended family system which has traditionally been the main source of social security; extensive evidence that denying children basic nutrition, health and education has lifelong, irreversible, and inter-generational consequences; and growing evidence of the effectiveness of social protection in low-income countries throughout the world, particularly in contributing to poverty reduction and improved health, nutrition and education (Devereux and Cipryk 2009; Oduro 2010). Besides being a human right, social protection is an investment in people that yields positive benefits to society. It is important for social and economic development and is critical for tackling poverty and reducing inequalities. In traditional African society, social security was assured in measures availed through social capital. Social capital refers to the processes between people which establish networks, norms and social trust and facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, but are informed by long-standing values of solidarity (Adato and Hoddinott 2008). Traditional mechanisms, based on social capital, were embedded in social networks, bonding similar people and building bridges between diverse people, with norms of mutual dependence and reciprocity. The social networks included a number of family-linked systems, such as the clan, extended family, community-based

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systems and friendship. They took the form of practices and social norms that, for example, ensured that disadvantaged members of society such as the elderly, widows and orphans were taken care of by other members of society. The socioeconomic changes brought about by modernisation including urbanisation, increased poverty, HIV/AIDS and a weakening value system are increasingly leading to a breakdown in these traditional systems (Frane and Roncevic 2003). With time, traditional mechanisms based on kinship and family relations could no longer provide support in the face of ‘modern’ shocks, and new ways to cope were devised. More recent mechanisms such as self-help groups are based on solidarity values and practices and are informed by changing contexts, evolving ethnic mix and the availability of external support. Kenya, like most African countries in the immediate post-independence years, instituted a wide range of social protection measures, from free health services and free education at all levels to non-contributory pension schemes in the government sector. There were significant subsidies for food, agricultural inputs and petroleum products, while the marketing and commodity boards provided some form of insurance to farmers. However, with implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s, many of these social protection measures were abrogated. Concern about the adverse impact of SAPs on the social sectors led, during the 1990s, to the emergence of an international consensus to bring social development back as a development issue. Consequently, many African countries have begun to implement an array of social protection measures in addition to the traditional ones such as pensions and employment-based health insurance. Some common and peculiar features characterise social protection in sub-Saharan Africa (Ellis, Devereux and White 2009; Townsend 2009). Firstly, social protection continues to have limited formalisation, and its expansion is constrained by the lack of formal wage employment among the poor. Very few people are covered by formal social insurance, not more than 5 – 10% of the workforce, principally in the form of pensions for civil servants and employees of large (formal) private enterprises (ILO 2010a). Secondly, safety nets remain important as a response to emergencies, and are widespread. Thirdly, there has been a considerable expansion in the number of specific targeted programmes, aimed at particularly poor and vulnerable groups, although many still remain in the pilot stage. Fourthly, in some countries, especially in southern Africa, schemes based on universality, or broadly defined target groups, are spreading rapidly. The need and potential for expanding social protection in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the feasibility of doing this and its likely development outcomes, have recently been examined by the European Report on Development (ERD 2010). European institutions dealing with international development have realised that poverty cannot be eradicated by concessional loans, technical aid, grants or budget aid alone. Something more is required: social protection for the poor. The ERD suggests that, together with conventional development policy measures, social protection could help sub-Saharan Africa combat poverty by reducing its vulnerability to shocks and promoting inclusive development and growth. The ERD points out the core functions of social protection:


• • •

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offering mechanisms to avoid serious hardship for the poor and non-poor alike in the face of serious risks; offering means to assist the poor in their attempts to escape poverty; and improving access to social assistance and insurance for the marginalised groups.

However, there is not much in the economic and political literature on social protection programmes prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa, in comparison with Latin America and Asia. At the regional level, the African Union, in collaboration with other stakeholders, has made substantial progress among member states in creating awareness and commitments on the importance of social protection to protect the poor and most vulnerable in society. Following the Livingstone Conference of 2006, in 2008, the African Union adopted a Social Policy Framework for the continent that calls for the strengthening of social protection systems, combating poverty and hunger, creating full employment and decent work opportunities for all, improving access to education and healthcare services, promoting gender equality, and ensuring the social inclusion of vulnerable groups in mainstream development (African Union 2008). Yet most African economies are agrarian, with the majority of their populations deriving an income as self-employed smallholders, lacking social security and at the mercy of natural and human forces beyond their control, thus making them very vulnerable to contingencies and economic shocks. Since most social security arrangements cater only for the formal economy, this means that, in terms of coverage, the overwhelming majority of Africans remain unprotected by formal mechanisms against the main risks. In these circumstances, this chapter is important in identifying sources from which the urban poor derive social security. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) reinforced advocacy with regard to social protection when, in collaboration with other UN agencies, it launched the Initiative VI: ‘A Social Protection Floor’ (SPF) campaign as one of the nine UN joint initiatives to cope with the effects of the economic crisis. The SPF initiative aims to promote nationally defined strategies that protect a minimum level of access to essential services and income security for all. Grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Conventions on Social Security, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other human rights instruments, it focuses on two critical components – services and transfers. Services ensure the availability, continuity, geographical and financial access to essential services such as water and sanitation, food and adequate nutrition, health, education, housing and other social services such as life- and asset-saving information. Transfers realise access to services and provide a minimum income and livelihood security through a set of essential social transfers, in cash and in kind, throughout the life cycle (children, working life, older persons), paying particular attention to vulnerable groups (ILO 2010). The SPF is increasingly being recognised as a key policy response to chronic poverty, vulnerability and risk. However, its conceptualisation of social protection is deficient in two respects: it places undue emphasis on the role of the state in social security provision; and it presumes that majority of the citizens have already attained a satisfactory living standard in a modern economy, which social security is designed to protect. This conceptualisation is more appropriate to Western societies and hardly fits the contemporary African situation.

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Conceptualising Social Protection The operational definition of social protection in Kenya refers to: …policies and actions, including legislative measures, which enhance the capacity and opportunities for the poor and vulnerable to improve and sustain their lives, livelihoods and welfare; enable income-earners and their dependants to maintain a reasonable level of income through decent work; and ensure access to affordable healthcare, social security and social assistance. (KNBS 2009) This chapter goes further to conceptualise a ‘transformative’ view which extends social protection to address both the causes and symptoms of extreme poverty and thus, considers equity, economic and social rights. It is also informed by a perception of social protection that goes beyond public actions and a set of policies and programmes, to a citizens’ perspective that includes not only formal (‘public’, as well as ‘private’), but also informal systems, such as community support and extended families, based on traditional values of solidarity and reciprocity. Traditionally, formal social protection has focused on short-term protective safety nets: mechanisms to protect people from the impact of shocks such as flood, drought, or the death of a bread-winner, as well as insurance interventions linked to formal employment. This focus on short term poverty mitigation has been criticised as an expensive, welfarist intervention and a disincentive for individual self-reliance (Adato and Hoddinott 2008). These concerns have seen social protection evolve to include longer term perspectives such as:

• • • •

provision – focusing on social assistance including cash transfers, food aid, affordable health charges; prevention – focusing on health insurance schemes; promotion – seeking to strengthen livelihood and productivity-enhancing interventions; and transformation – highlighting the structural causes of chronic poverty.

This perspective operates with a rights-based approach to transform the status and opportunities of poor and vulnerable groups. Social protection is more than mere ‘safety nets’ that can cushion the impact of serious crises. It is part of a comprehensive approach to getting people out of poverty, allowing them not only to benefit from growth, but also making a significant contribution to the promotion of economic growth and stability (ERD 2010). National social protection systems, providing social security through schemes ranging from basic poverty alleviation to pensions and healthcare schemes, are one of the most powerful means of both alleviating and preventing poverty.

Study Area The Mathare Informal Settlement is home to over 600,000 people, occupying an area two miles long by one mile wide. The settlement’s administrative boundaries are in the form of nine villages, mainly occupied by four predominant ethnic groups, namely: the Luo, Kikuyu, Kamba and Luhya. A household in the slums comprises seven members on average and usually stands on a 12 ft by 12 ft or 10 ft by 10 ft structure with the cheapest room costing almost US$15 per month (US$1 was equivalent to Ksh 80 at the time of study). About 10% of the residents own the structures without legal documentation and sub-let them to the remaining 90% (Pamoja Trust 2009).


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The settlement is characterised by low-quality housing and a general lack of basic infrastructure especially sanitation, drainage, waste management, electricity, roads and clean water. With few toilets (managed by groups and individuals who charge US$0.06 per visit) and pit latrines, there is a continued growth of ‘flying toilets’ (waste placed in plastic bags and thrown outside homes). Most men and women work in the informal sector, earning low wages with little job security. Incomes are variable and range from US$1 to US$4 per day. For most households, budgeting priorities are identified as food, rent and education. Males aged 20 – 35 years old work as casual labourers in construction, food/vegetable kiosks, security guards or auto mechanics. Majority of women aged 25 – 40 years old work as domestic help or washing clothes in neighbouring communities, like Eastleigh and Muthaiga, and others work in smallscale businesses selling food, sundries, or second-hand clothes. Women and young girls also engage in transactional sex (earning US$1.50 per client) and brew illicit alcohol for survival. The unemployment rate in the slums is reported to be 60% and women are almost five times more likely to be unemployed than men. Mathare faces problems of inadequate basic social services such as health and education, and its inhabitants experience high crime rates, alcoholism, overcrowding and insecurity. This has resulted in life-threatening outcomes that contribute to mass poverty, diseases (HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria), high morbidity and mortality, conflict, and other social, ecological and economic hazards such as high food, fuel and water prices (Amnesty International 2009). Consequently, most households are extremely vulnerable to various livelihood shocks and contingencies, and natural disasters due to greater exposure to hazards (living in makeshift housing on unsafe sites) and less capacity to cope (lack of assets and insurance). Not only do external shocks tend to worsen their situation in the short term, but residents often resort to coping strategies that further undermine their capacity to improve their situation in the long term, for example, children dropping out of school because of lack of school fees. The study site is an indication that poverty and vulnerability are inextricably inter-linked while the residents lack access to formal social security beyond the possibilities presented by informal networks such as kinship, welfare groups or community-based schemes.

Methodology A descriptive survey was undertaken to provide a situation analysis of the different forms of informal social protection found in Mathare Informal Settlement. This was qualitative research that capitalised on the ability of qualitative analysis to cast light on the different forms of social processes that provide assistance to the urban poor, by reviewing their experiences and the discursive manner in which they themselves give meaning to and react to their circumstances. Rather than individual or household questionnaires, the methodology was based on purposive sampling of focus groups that were representative of community members by age, gender, ethnicity and economic activities. Four focus group discussions (FGDs), each comprising 12 members, were carried out in four villages. Participants were identified by the village chiefs who are the local government administrators, in conjunction with the village elders. A participatory approach allowed respondents to describe a general overview of the different informal forms of social protection measures in existence in Mathare, including their type, purpose, reasons for joining, membership, challenges and benefits, among others. Eighteen key informants from the Provincial Social Services

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Department, civil society organisations and leaders of specific social groups were selected through chain sampling and interviewed using an interview guide. The analysis of the data included the quantification of focus group listings and rankings and provided a thematic analysis of informal social safety nets. The primary data collected were supplemented by desk reviews in assessing the formal social protection measures and their progress in Kenya. In the last section, areas were identified that link the formal and informal systems and which can be enhanced in poverty reduction strategies.

Forms of Informal Social Protection in Mathare Important organisational infrastructures within which informal social protection is provided in Mathare informal settlement were identified.

Social Networks These were fundamental to survival and wellbeing, and at no time were social relations more critical than in situations of acute distress. The following social networks were identified:

Family Networks These comprised persons linked through lineage. Notions of solidarity and mutual help were strong in traditional African societies and, despite urbanisation and changes in the nature of the family, they still remain an important institution for social protection. The family-based household has remained the basic resource for its members for coping with contingencies and shocks. Extended families provide a significant form of social protection in Kenya through two main types of safety nets: membership in traditional solidarity networks (family, kinship, neighbourhood); and membership in cooperative or social welfare associations (including self-help groups, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs) and welfare associations). For instance, the family, together with wider kinship and friendship networks, helped individuals to find jobs in the informal sector; housed recently arrived rural migrants as they searched for jobs; provided seed money to relatives to start income-generating activities; and provided aid in emergencies (sickness, death, rent distress). Although the family is an important medium for the provision of social assistance and social insurance, several factors determined the extent to which recourse could be made to the family. The family, as a source of assistance, depended on its size and composition, because if most of the adult family members were deceased, then an individual or household facing difficulty was unlikely or unable to make recourse to family members for support; it also depended on the capacity of family members to help, as help would not come from members who had nothing to spare; help was also determined by the willingness to provide assistance as this depended on the strength of the links between the person requesting assistance and the potential benefactor. Besides, the willingness to provide help could also decline with a higher frequency of requests while a failure to stay in touch with family members weakened family ties and the sense of obligation to assist a family member lessened. It also emerged that increasing poverty, soaring household expenditures with respect to education, health and other services, high dependency ratios due to


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unemployment, large numbers of children orphaned by AIDS, and destitution of relatives were eroding extended family obligations, and changes in the nature of the family contributed to a lessening of the family’s role as a source of social protection. For example, the high prevalence of female-headed households in Mathare with higher poverty levels had less recourse to family help, probably because of culture and the entrenched patriarchal nature of the society. Although still considered the first option for support in times of hardships and celebration for many among the very poor, the extended family is often straining from demands being placed on its better-off members, while ‘individualistic tendencies’ were decried by respondents.

Neighbourhood Networks These are social networks that provide mutual assistance and are defined as residents living in a ‘plot’ (which can have up to 40 rooms facing each other) within a specific area. Sophia, a young woman, reported that she relied primarily on collaboration with her neighbours to manage her financial affairs. She often lent to and then borrowed from her neighbours in a complex web of reciprocal arrangements. She used these arrangements to respond to short term emergencies, to buy food when she had no money, to buy medication in case of sickness and to help close family members seize small business opportunities as and when they arose. However, these arrangements were somewhat unreliable; sometimes the neighbours did not have money to lend, or would do so only at quite high interest rates; and at other times when she had lent to others, she had struggled to recover her money. There were also instances when neighbours would provide food to extremely desperate cases: “I cannot ignore a fellow woman in dire circumstances, especially when her children have slept hungry, and in such cases we share the little I have” (respondent). Such measures again depended on the friendliness of the neighbour, as some were reported to be very quarrelsome. A quarrelsome neighbour would have to travel further to get help from friends and relatives. The number of social relationships which an individual or family maintains with non-kin, both inside and outside their neighbourhood of residence, depends on factors such as the level of income of a family, the location of their neighbourhood, age and the type of work done by family members. It was noted that due to the high density and heterogeneity of Mathare, social networks could be fragmented and community cohesion loosened or was dominated by conflict. Tensions from the 2008 post-election violence were still evident within the slum among the two dominant ethnic groups that had strained relations between them.

Welfare Social Groups These networks are not family-based but provide a form of social protection. Welfare groups comprise people coming together to form an association for assistance in times of need or emergencies. These groups have differing membership compositions, including: people from the same rural village; neighbours living in the same area; people from the same clan or ethnic group; or people in a similar profession (vegetable sellers, second-hand clothes dealers, street hawkers, food sellers, slum landlords, illicit alcohol brewers or sellers). These networks are valued for giving a sense of identity and pride, belonging and friendship, as well as help in times of difficulty. Members pay a monthly fee to belong to such a group.

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Most prominent among the welfare groups are burial or funeral societies. They give material and financial support when a member is bereaved; for example, buying the coffin, transportation of the body, feeding mourners and even financial support to the family. The groups also organise and participate in other cultural events, such as weddings, births and circumcision ceremonies. The most important criteria in order to qualify for the benefits are that one has to be a member of such a society with up-to-date monthly contributions. Failure to make one’s payments means that society members would participate as friends or relatives, which is on a much smaller financial scale than when they participate as a society. These groups have a mixture of both males and females, although most leaders are male. Welfare associations were common among ethnic groups from the rural areas, and some were well structured, with elected officials. Among the Luo community, funeral societies were much stronger in comparison to other ethnicities, the main reason being cultural traditions that dictate that a member of the community must be buried in their ancestral home, 300 – 500 km from Nairobi, and in a traditional burial ceremony. Besides offering support during times of need, some welfare societies have invested in rental property, stocks, and other money-earning activities. Among such societies is the Kogelo Welfare Society which has even purchased a van that is hired out to mourners for funerals, and its services were reported to be in great demand, earning the society a tidy profit. Other ethnic groups, such as the Kikuyu, are increasingly burying their dead in the public cemeteries in the city. Kamweretho Welfare Society, comprising 40 men aged 24 – 35 years old, has as its main activity helping its members solemnise their ‘come-we-stay’ marriages. This is the customary marriage where both families know the couple is married but has not yet formalised their relationship traditionally by paying dowry. Members contribute monthly fees of US$5 each that are put in a common pot and used to pay the dowry for a member’s wife. Dressed in black suits, they accompany the young man to the bride’s rural home for the cultural ceremony in which the bride is formally recognised as a wife. This is particularly significant because many of these men are unable to raise the dowry on their own. The group even assists interested members to have church or civil society weddings. Extra funds in the society are invested in the stock market, including those from rental rooms that they have put up in the area. At the end of the year bonuses are shared out. However, it also emerged that welfare societies were not always inclusive, as entry fees and monthly subscriptions could deter the very poor, while eligibility criteria could also be an excluding factor. The strength of social networks to protect the very poor in the face of vulnerability and shocks is evident, as they provide informal solidarity mechanisms through the family, clan, friends or neighbours and community-based groups. Such mechanisms not only provide welfare benefits, but also intangible and essential help. They allow the very poor a measure of recognition in their communities and, through the values of trust and participation, enhance their social capital. However, in the present situation as opposed to the past, traditional systems are often insufficient to address the growing economic and social challenges that communities are facing. Challenges faced by these safety nets include: limited productive resources under the control of households and communities; low levels of income; urbanisation that is eroding extended family obligations; changes in the nature of the family; and high levels of dependency which have worsened as a result of HIV/AIDS and the financial, fuel and food crises.


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Informal Savings Groups These were identified as a vital tool providing a form of social protection to households. In Mathare, the Area Chief estimated that there are over 3,000 unregistered informal savings groups and over 1,500 that are officially registered with the Provincial Social Services Department. These savings groups have different structures that enabled them to be classified as follows:

Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) Often known as chamas or merry-go-rounds, these are the most ubiquitous. A majority of them are used more by women than men in the community. Reasons reported for female domination included: • • •

women are more interested in saving than men, who prefer consumption; women earn very little income in comparison to men; and they socialise more with fellow women and so have more information pertaining to ‘chamas’.

Approximately 80% of households in Mathare had one member in at least one informal savings group (Chief’s estimate). In their most basic form, ROSCAs are a system in which a number of people form a group and contribute equal amounts on a regular basis to a fund which is usually (but not necessarily) given to one person on each occasion, until everyone in the group has received the money in turn. ROSCAs are a very basic and simple form of financial intermediation that has a high degree of flexibility – the amount to be saved, the number of people in the system, the regularity of contributions, the number of people to receive a payout on each occasion, the use to which funds can be put – can all be determined by those participating (Malkamäki 2007). These characteristics made them very popular among households who had a chance to save for indivisible goods like school fees, rent and clothing, but most important was that participation was voluntary. Groups meet regularly – daily, weekly, fortnightly or monthly – when every member of the group puts in a small, easily collected amount of money. Those who can afford to do so put in multiples of amounts of those put in by people who can only put in the minimum. The total paid in by all individuals is then taken home by one individual, whose identity changes each meeting until a cycle of all members is completed. The individual is chosen through a ballot or from a pre-existing order before each new round. Flexibility in ROSCAs was evident as members could swap turns if they had a particular need, either by agreement with the group as a whole or with other individuals. Most groups are small, having 5 – 12 members, although there were larger groups of up to 40. One person could belong to more than one savings group. Contributions varied, depending on each individual’s economic strength. Slum landlords, for example, contributed as much as US$ 70 per month in their ROSCAs. Some members had saved and borrowed from this fund to upgrade tenants’ houses from mud, iron sheet and timber structures to stone houses. Most groups, however, invested very small amounts ranging from US$ 0.25 per week, totalling US$ 1 a month, while others invested US$ 1 – 5 per month. Discussions revealed that a large proportion of the households in Mathare are headed by women and are characterised by extremely low levels of income – a factor

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that constrained their ability to save. Hence, they could only contribute very small amounts of cash. For instance, many women washing clothes in neighbouring estates for a livelihood earned US$ 1.25 – 2 per day in a job that was not guaranteed on a daily basis. This amount had to be divided between food, charcoal, rent, water and toilet facilities and on many days such households survived on one meal per day. To many such women, it was impossible to join any group which required a regular amount of money in contributions. One community mobiliser had convinced 200 women to save at least US$ 0.0125 (Ksh 1) per day, an amount that totalled US$ 0.375 per month, which is significant as average monthly income for a typical household member in the slum was only US$ 40 – 60 per month. For some people, group contributions reflected around 15 – 20% of earnings, with membership fees roughly 10% of earnings. A few ROSCAs in some cases used gifts as an alternative to cash, especially in cases where members experienced extreme poverty. In Jitahidi women’s group, for example, their poverty was so acute that they could not afford any monetary contribution. Consequently, they would agree that their monthly contribution would be a quarter kilogramme of sugar per member (costing approximately US$ 0.3). The following month it would be a bar of soap, cooking oil, or tea leaves in the smallest amount possible. Group formation in the ROSCAs was on the basis of several variables including ethnicity, gender, age, marital status and profession. For example, Miracle Self-Help group that had existed for 16 years comprised 30 women all aged above 40 years. The oldest member was 70 and the youngest was 42. The most important criterion was that a member must have grandchildren of school age – many left behind by absent daughters or by death. The women found the going tough and started by saving US$ 0.065 per week with the lump sum of US$ 1.875 being given to one member. The group’s contribution is now US$ 0.25 and the lump sum of US$ 7.5 is given to one member each week. This money is used to meet emergencies such as paying school fees, rent, clothes and medicines. Through a pre-arranged sequence, each member knows when they will get their lump sum and are thus able to plan for it. There were also many other groups formed by single mothers, married women and among those in similar trades such as sukuma wiki sellers, prostitutes, and others. Some groups are ethnically homogenous and others admitted multiple ethnicities, but most appear to have been formed by individuals who are ethnically related, friends and/or people who live close to each other. The important criteria for being recruited to a group are a person’s integrity, honesty and trustworthiness, especially because of the need to make regular contributions. People with a bad history in previous groups, such as not paying, dishonesty in accounting, late payments, or quarrelsome nature, often found it hard to join a new group. In one group, a condition for accepting a new member was “that the group knows where everybody has her house, so if someone cheats us, group members can go to her house and take away things to repay themselves” (respondent). The most important reason identified for belonging to a ROSCA was to have a lump sum to use in scheduled turn (the ROSCA’s core function is to provide a lump sum). Other reasons were given as being able to cope with unexpected emergencies (suggesting an important insurance element in ROSCAs); support in times of need (ROSCAs may have a welfare element whereby members contribute funds voluntarily towards a fellow member in an emergency); to undertake an income-generating activity (ROSCAs may have a ‘promotive’ role to improve livelihoods); and for social


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reasons, to meet friends, demonstrating the importance of the social dimension of these institutions. These groups are small and are viable only because members know and trust each other, and use sanctions against offending members based on social control dynamics. Enforcement in most cases was by threat of social ostracism and by exclusion from other beneficial group activities. In most groups, expulsion of a member was usually viewed as the ultimate sanction. The groups felt that formal structures, including registration, were not necessary. However, various problems were reported in the functioning of the groups. Some members either did not pay their contributions regularly or they stopped contributing after they had received their lump sum, while others left the group, creating a cashflow problem. One respondent noted that “the usual form of cheating is for a new member to come to a merry-go-round and ask for number 1 or 2 because they have an emergency... and then they stop contributing” (respondent). Other problems cited were gossip, petty rivalry, management and governance problems in the groups. Yet ROSCAs remain important in the provision of social protection, and with their defined beginning and endpoints in the cycle, this allows them to be disbanded and re-formed with great regularity (Bouman 1995). Registered ROSCAs were identified based on whether the ROSCA had elected leaders and whether it had a written constitution. A registered group obtained a certificate from the Provincial Department of Social Services at a fee of US$ 6.25 with requirements to have elected officials, keep minutes of their meetings, and have a set of written rules that determine the way in which group members should act in certain contingencies. Many of the groups opted for registration for several reasons, including: enabling them to credibly enforce punishment for transgressors of group rules; enforce penalties on loan defaulters; use laid-down mechanisms to mediate conflicts of interest between group members; and enjoy supervision by social workers – all factors that help the groups to function. Individuals aggrieved with the behaviour of leaders or administrators in registered groups, or upset with the treatment they had received, could appeal to the social worker, area chief and village elders for interventions. In one incident, five members of Mwihoti Chama reported that their chairlady had absconded with about US$ 75, being members’ contributions for the month of January 2011 that was due to one of them. They reported that she had even moved houses and they wanted the government’s intervention to have her arrested. The chief reported that such cases were very common and often this enabled the law to take its course with the offending member.

Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) These are savings groups that do not give funds to a member, but lend the funds to willing borrowers with interest. The interest paid on the loans accumulates in the group fund. At the end of the year ASCA members often divide part of the profits (from interest payments) among their members. Running an ASCA requires more skill because some book-keeping is necessary, but the fact that people used the term chama’ and ‘merry-go-round’ for both ROSCAs and ASCAs was an indication that in their perception these two groups were very similar. Indeed, numerous ASCAs had within the group one or several ROSCA groups. Many of the groups that had started purely as ROSCAs had added a saving and lending facility to their operations. For example, when Umoja self-help group (a registered society with 12 members) meet, they contribute US$0.25 weekly for the merry-go-round and US$1 monthly for saving

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in Equity Bank – funds that are available for lending up to US$62.50 at 10% interest. However, there were groups that were identified purely as ASCAs. Mwangaza Women Chama, comprising ten women, for example, is a savings club into which each member saved US$0.40 per week from which they could borrow small amounts at 5% interest per month. In an ASCA’s typical operation, from the first meeting onwards, each member saves a minimum monthly amount of, for example, US$1.25. Members are allowed to save more if they wish. After two to three meetings, the group fund is big enough for the first loan product – one-month short term loans with a 10% interest rate. Members are entitled to short term loans of up to two times their savings. When the group fund has grown sufficiently, the second loan product – long term loans – is offered. Long term loans are for 12 – 24 months at 15 – 24% flat interest per annum and members are entitled to loans of up to three times their savings. In most cases, the majority of a group’s members also decided to make contributions for a group welfare fund (sickness, death, weddings). Although the short term loan interest rates appeared high, they are still lower than in micro-finance institutions (MFIs). Members also receive substantial dividends or bonuses at the end of the year, distributed to members based on their savings contributions. The rest of the group’s income was left in the group fund. Advantages for ASCAs were identified as the more friendly monthly repayments in comparison to the weekly repayments that are common in MFIs; flexible savings that can be withdrawn at any time with notice, or small amounts without notice; ability to re-negotiate the loan; bonuses; and, unlike ROSCA products, members did not receive a lump sum at certain times regardless of whether it was needed at that time. The retained accumulated interest also increased the size of the loan fund, enabling members to take bigger loans. A major advantage of ASCAs was that the loans are modest and within the capacities of the groups to repay as they obtained income from their activities. However, challenges identified included default on loans, high levels of illiteracy among members and poor record-keeping.

Investment Clubs Members of investment groups collect their savings into a larger pool which is then used to generate income for the members. Some of the income-generating sources are savings in a bank, or lending to other slum residents at 10 – 15% interest on the amount borrowed. These types of groups are not common as they require members with higher incomes and savings and are more common among welfare societies. Another way of getting funds for emergencies was identified as visiting moneylenders. However, moneylenders charge such high interest rates (from 30%) that their services are used sparingly, mainly in extreme cases and by few people. Most residents prefer to keep away from moneylenders as indebtedness could have dire consequences over and above their economic impact. What emerged from these findings is that many of the informal savings groups have multiple functions, while others have modified their practices. For example, in some groups, the amount collected in each period was not simply distributed to a chosen member; it was put into a savings account in the micro-finance institutions available in Mathare, such as Jamii Bora Trust, Equity Bank, K-Rep Bank, or Family Hope Centre. Initially, these deposits were used to build up a starting capital to use as collateral for obtaining a loan. Later the deposits were also used for repayment


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of the loans. Since banks do not want to give small loans to individuals, or even to small groups that require little capital, the loans were made to the umbrella groups, who, in turn, disbursed them to the smaller groups who in turn disbursed them to their members – working like a credit pyramid. It was reported that participation in savings schemes through groups enabled many families to send several children at a time to school, reducing dropout rates, and had enabled many to start small incomegenerating activities, meet emergency needs such as rent, travel, hospital bills, buy clothing, food and meet other shocks and contingencies in life.

Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) MFIs were identified as a recent phenomenon in Mathare, where for a long time residents had limited access to formal regulated financial services and relied on informal financial systems in order to save. Ten different MFIs − non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs) and private banks − offer loans, in a concerted effort to enable residents alleviate and even escape poverty. However, discussions revealed that residents only borrow from the micro-finance institutions when they need larger sums of money than they could get from the informal lending schemes. A manager at Jamii Bora Trust reported that numerous small businesses had started through the help of micro-finance, enabling the owners to become entrepreneurs and self-employed. This was evident in a hair salon christened ‘Wayside Hair Salon’ managed by four ladies, who saw the business as a way out of the slums and towards a better life for their families. Individually, they became members of Jamii Bora Trust and started saving. Later they formed a loan group in the institution and two years ago they borrowed US$ 200 and started a hair salon. Today, the business is a small success for the women and gives them work and income. On a good weekend, they can earn US$ 30 net. Their dream now is to move from the Mathare slums to Kaputiei, the town which Jamii Bora Trust is building outside of Nairobi. Jamii Bora has expanded beyond financial services, and today is one of Kenya’s largest micro-finance organisations, with about 230,000 members, mainly from the slums. This organisation is building a self-contained town that will someday be home to 10,000 people having within it schools, shops and small industries. Margaret, a former prostitute who had lived with her four children in a rented, one-room shanty next to the Mathare River, still found it difficult to believe that she now lived and owned a self-contained house that had a kitchen, bathroom, two bedrooms, toilet and living room in Kaputei, courtesy of Jamii Bora Trust. Margaret paid about US$ 4,500 for her house and her mortgage is around US$ 40 a month, not much more than what she paid to rent her cramped room in Mathare. Jamii Bora Trust, apart from housing development, also sells life and disaster insurance and has created a health insurance plan, where members pay about US$ 0.005 per week for care in mission hospitals. One woman, who is among the earliest members of Jamii Bora Trust, used her small loan to start a business sewing children’s clothes out of second-hand garments. She took out another loan to buy a sewing machine; borrowed more to keep her business growing; and hired other women as it expanded. Despite her relative success, her family still lives in a single room in Mathare that doubles as her workspace, the reason being, she was not able to save the required down-payment of about US$ 400 for a house in Kaputei until she got her older children through school. As her savings accumulate, she hopes to move soon to one of the houses in Kaputei.

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Micro-finance is now being identified as a platform for social change through providing a whole range of services to the urban poor. Equity Bank, for example, has started giving micro-loans to commercial sex workers in Mathare, empowering them to improve their lives. It is not only banks that are running micro-finance; FBOs are giving small loans to empower Mathare residents out of poverty. One such organisation is Family Hope Centre. Living in the poorest part of the Mathare slum, Anne endured a life of abuse with an alcoholic husband. Her children wandered the streets, constantly in trouble. Besides begging on the streets, she had little income or hope of finding a job. She was encouraged by a friend to go to the Family Hope Centre and ask for help, to get her sons taken into their school. Although there was no room at the school, other children made room for her sons by sharing seats and desks. Then a director at the centre gave Anne a micro-loan and training so that she could have her own business. Today, Anne sells laundry soap, tea leaves, salt and other items to individuals and businesses in the slum. According to Family Hope Centre, its micro-finance programme offers community groups of 20 − 30 people 27 hours of training. After these sessions, each participant has a business plan and an understanding of loan repayment, book-keeping, and marketing. Each participant invests some of his or her own money and begins a small business with the help of a seed grant ranging from US$ 8 to US$ 400. Loans continue to be offered as a business expands. Micro-finance credit helps bridge the poverty gap. However, it is not always smooth sailing as some of the groups that have taken loans from the micro-finance organisations have not been successful. Challenges identified were that some groups developed misunderstandings and mistrust; others had some members default on their loan repayments, in some cases due to failures in their income-generating ventures; there could be misuse of loans; and some women reported being cheated out of the money by their husbands while they still had to repay the loans. Making micro-credit available to the poor helps cushion them from poverty, but without proper preparation and training, this can just as easily backfire, according to an official with Community Aid International, an NGO that runs a micro-credit programme in the slums. Many women take the credit and end up using it to pay for family needs like food or clothing and fail to start a business, for which they were given the money. The family, as a consequence, sinks deeper into poverty as the family property against which the credit was advanced is seized by the lending organisation. Interestingly, it emerged that in Mathare, microfinance clients were overwhelmingly female and the organisations were credited for empowering women by increasing their contribution to household income, the value of their assets, and control over decisions that affect their lives. The growing presence of microfinance organisations in the settlement is an indicator that microcredit reduces vulnerability with positive impacts on income poverty. These schemes provide awareness raising, mobilisation, financial advice, organisational and management training, encouragement, skills, and the initial capital for income-generating activities. Successive loans lead to a build-up of assets over time and the structure of assets shifts in favour of more productive assets. Yet, the majority of residents do not utilise the services of MFIs, citing a lack of flexibility and unreliability. Hence, MFIs must continuously improve or refine systems, products and delivery mechanisms and build flexible and reliable financial services that respond to the real, diverse needs of the poor and vulnerable.


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Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Civil society organisations were identified as providing some form of social protection to residents. This category broadly refers to non-state, not-for-profit organisations such as NGOs, FBOs, CBOs and self-help groups. One respondent noted that there might be as many as 700 – 1,000 CSO groups in Mathare Informal Settlement. Although each CSO must be approved by the local chief, it was not possible to acquire a comprehensive list of such organisations. CSOs were identified as groups of people who come together to pool their resources to meet a common need or goal. In areas where they are well organised and cohesive, they more or less provide the community with most of its basic services, through resource mobilisation and saving schemes. There are also many initiatives that exist at the village level, mainly self-help groups, that are not officially recognised bodies. These include efforts by individuals or groups to organise the community for different reasons such as security, economic activities, education and spiritual growth. Religious groups such as churches also have an important role as each registered member adheres to church rules such as contributing a set amount of cash for activities including birth, deaths, weddings and other religious ceremonies. Again, this only happened if the church member was actively participating, otherwise the church would not be there for a member’s emergency. General estimates indicate that 36% of CSOs work in the areas of HIV/AIDS, 24% in microfinance, 10% in environment, 12% in education, 8% in water and others in orphans or health. Table 1 presents a selection of CSOs working in Mathare Informal Settlement. Civil society organisations play a vital role in service provision in areas where government services are minimal or non-existent. Their activities are concentrated in reducing vulnerability in major spheres such as: hunger and extreme poverty; child education; disease (HIV/AIDS); shelter (for example, children’s homes), micro-finance and training (skills-building and income generation); and human settlement in various forms. There was a continued intervention by CSOs to improve the situation in this slum, such as building schools, water kiosks, health centres, and toilets, but these facilities were inadequate given the high number of people living there. Formal social protection initiatives such as school feeding programmes were reported as the single most effective child protection intervention and ensured that children in the impoverished slums came to class. To the very poor parents, school uniform and a fee of US$ 1.50 for firewood and paying school cooks was still a big economic strain. With no public hospital in Mathare, residents rely on community-based clinics to provide these services. The most widely mentioned was MSF’s Blue House facility managed by Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders). The clinic provides free treatment, particularly for HIV/AIDS and TB, with patients receiving ARVs (antiretroviral drugs) and drug therapies. There are other services including VCT (Voluntary Counselling and Testing for HIV), child and maternal healthcare. In addition to MSF, several other hospitals offer treatment including the Baraka Dispensary − a German medical NGO. Some others, such as the National Council of Churches in Kenya and the Catholic Church, offer treatment by FBOs. Four public dispensaries (Ministry of Health) in the surrounding estates offer good quality and affordable consultations, but prescription drugs are unaffordable; therefore most people visit the private clinics, which distribute drugs free of charge or at significantly reduced rates. Lay healthcare

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providers, including traditional healers and unqualified pharmacists, were reported to be a major healthcare resource for slum dwellers because of their low cost and accessibility, as well as long-standing cultural beliefs and distrust of the official health system. Table 1.

Examples of civil society organisations in Mathare Informal Settlement

Organisation

Type of organisation

The Catholic Church FBO Kenya Network of Women with AIDS Mathare Community Education and Development Organisation (MCEDO) Kikwetu Self-Help Group

NGO CBO

CBO Redeemed Gospel Church

FBO

Compassion International NGO World Vision Naioth Centre LEPTA Roots Federation of Slum Dwellers

NGO FBO CBO CB0 NGO

Mathare Slums Youth Mathare Slums New Awake Mathare Youth For Action Dreams Youth Group

Self-help groups

Area of focus Educational programmes (schools, bursaries); food aid to the poorest Support to people living with AIDS Environment concerns and youth training Orphans and vulnerable children (OVC), illiteracy, HIV/ AIDS awareness, feeding and environmental conservation Spiritual, educational, feeding programmes Child education sponsorship, feeding programmes, medical treatment Educational sponsorship Spiritual, health, education, economic development Personal development, leadership, education Youth empowerment Savings group and community projects such as water, security, access roads Youth empowerment through training, computer courses, education, rubbish collection services

Pequininons Youth Groups You and I for Our Community Mathare Youth Mathare Senior Self-help Group

CBO

Training, income-generating for older men


Organisation

Type of organisation

Mathare Single Mothers Ushirika Mathare 4B Women Mathare Squatters Women Group Majirani Women Group Hope World Wide Jesus Is Alive Ministry Mathare Community Outreach

Women selfhelp groups

NGO FBO CBO

NGO Self-help group

Missions of Hope International FBO Pamoja Tunaweza Single Mothers

Self-help group

Missionaries of Africa FBO Mwelu Foundation

CBO

Safe Spaces Mathare Self-help group Consider Tuelewane Mathare

Area of focus ROSCAs, ASCAs, skills training

Concern Worldwide

Kangaroo Youth

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Self-help group

Good Samaritan Children’s Home and Rehabilitation Centre

Spiritual, education, child support OVC sponsorship and food to the poor Education and feeding disadvantaged children Cash transfers to the poorest families using mobile phone technology, emergency nutrition programmes Pig rearing, gardens HIV/AIDS education, testing and setting up post-diagnosis care groups Gives tours to people visiting Mathare Education, caters for orphans and street children, school lunches, medical care Training in arts, photography to youth Creates safe spaces for girls to meet and talk, play basketball, yoga, drama, and participate in vocational training, e.g. in car mechanics Income-generating from toilets and water points Housing, food and basic education to children orphaned by AIDS

FBO Good Samaritan Mothers Group Training women in sewing and basket-making skills Source: Compiled by Author (2011) Many CSOs have multiple functions. For example, Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA) is a self-help youth programme which started in 1987 as a small project

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to organise sports and environmental clean-ups within the Mathare slums. Today, the project has grown to a renowned organisation that promotes social development through football and rehabilitating over 14,000 young participants. Through a ‘selfhelp’ approach, they have managed successfully to link football to environmental clean-ups, HIV/AIDs awareness/prevention, leadership training and other community service activities. Football for Hope is supporting the enhancement of MYSA’s ongoing sports programme activities. Another example is GROOTS Kenya − a movement of women’s self-help groups and community organisations in Kenya. It was formed as a response to the inadequate visibility of grassroots women in development and decision-making forums that directly impact them and their communities. GROOTS Kenya through Mathare Mother’s Development Centre − a network of 26 self-help women’s groups – has for the past 15 years invested comprehensively in Mathare, through governance and leadership programmes, trainings in HIV/AIDs home-based care, and support for a daycare centre for children. CSOs as non-state actors implement a range of social protection interventions, although most of these are limited in scope and coverage. Besides, the fragmented nature of the various programmes from the diverse and large numbers of CSOs often leads to overlap and duplication of efforts. They face three key challenges: inadequate resources; lack of coordination; and lack of programme sustainability beyond donor funding. One donor noted that pilferage and leakage of aid (cash and food) had led to donor frustration and sometimes fatigue in supporting CSO initiatives.

Linkages between Formal and Informal Social Protection The review of formal social protection schemes in Kenya revealed that despite the lack of an official social protection policy, over the years, various efforts have been made in designing and implementing social protection initiatives. Among these are povertyfocused legislation and policies, ratification of various international declarations, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Constitution of Kenya (2010) that has a comprehensive Bill of Rights. Article 43 guarantees all Kenyans their economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights. It asserts the right of every person to social security and binds the state to provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependants. Several existing social protection programmes targeting the poor and vulnerable are described below.

Social Security Programmes The social security sub-sector is characterised by funded and non-funded schemes. Most consist entirely of contributory social security regimes for formal sector workers such as the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), where members pay between US$ 0.4 and US$ 4 depending on the nature of employment and monthly earnings, and the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which is open to employees in the informal and formal sectors and whose members are eligible for retirement benefit, survivor’s benefit, invalidity benefit, withdrawal benefit, and others. The NSSF also includes individual schemes that are open to all on a voluntary basis with variable benefits according to the scheme. Other social security schemes are mostly directed at the formal sector, including the Public Service Pension Scheme for permanent and pensionable civil servants as provided for in the Pensions Act, and the Occupational Pension Scheme that is employee-based. However, these are limited to a small percentage of the population.


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Social Assistance Programmes The government and its development partners are implementing several social assistance interventions targeting specific categories of beneficiaries. These include the Older Persons Cash Transfer Programme (OPCT) targeting those over 65, which is now in 44 districts where each beneficiary receives US$ 20 per month; and the Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) that provides social protection through regular cash transfers to families living with orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC). Other programmes are free primary education (FPE); the HIV/AIDS Fund targeting individuals infected and affected by HIV/AIDS; subsidised secondary school education provided through the Secondary School Education Bursary Fund (SEBF); hospital fee waivers for children under five years and patients suffering from malaria and TB; school feeding programmes which provide a conditional cash transfer to schools in arid lands and now also in urban slums; food relief in the Ministry of Special Programmes, and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in northern Kenya. Not all interventions that promote livelihoods can be classified as social protection, but some mechanisms that function primarily as social protection also support productive activities and income generation. This includes small business/ enterprise development, micro-finance and skills training, and economic and social empowerment programmes. Among these are the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), established in 2006 to disburse loans to the youth (18 – 35 age bracket) to set up enterprises at concessionary rates with no collateral, and the Women Enterprise Development Fund (WEDF), established in 2007 to provide seed capital and basic enterprise support to women throughout the country. In 2011, the government introduced an informal sector strategy under the government stimulus plan, to give soft loans to community-based groups for income-generating activities. Other categories include public works programmes which transfer food or cash to individuals in exchange for their labour (food- or cash-for-work) − for example, the Kazi Kwa Vijana Programme that seeks to address youth employment needs. Reviews of social assistance programmes highlight the inadequacy of existing interventions. For instance, while repeated distribution of food to poor families in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) has kept people alive, it has not contributed to poverty reduction. In addition, even though the government spends about 0.9% of its GDP on social assistance, most of the financing is by development partners (estimated at 90%). Overall, formal social protection systems are extremely weak, leaving poor populations dependent on informal traditional solidarity mechanisms and, in times of acute crisis (natural disasters and war), on humanitarian relief. The main forms of informal social protection in Mathare are informal financial savings organisations such as the ROSCAs and ASCAs discussed above. Formal social protection does not give enough attention to providing access to financial services. Other challenges include low effective coverage, long payment processes, limited range or scope of benefits and their inadequacy, limited funding, mismanagement of resources and poor record-keeping. Social protection is being addressed through different sectoral interventions which are fragmented and often lead to exclusion of some extremely vulnerable and deserving groups, and targeting of recipients has remained a challenge. The country has over the years lacked a comprehensive policy framework aimed at fostering sustainable social protection programmes. While there is convergence with

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the constitution and Vision 2030 for some of the frameworks, the main difficulties lie more with their operationalisation than with the instruments themselves. In this context, the government is in the process of drafting a National Social Protection Framework to review existing social protection strategies, programmes and activities with a view to promoting synergies and minimising duplication and conflict. The spread of social assistance programmes that provide conditional or unconditional transfers in cash or in kind, and the production of social protection policy frameworks and strategy documents, are the new dimensions of social protection in Kenya. The formal social protection interventions are being introduced to a social system that already has its own informal social protection arrangements, as has been documented among the poor and vulnerable in Mathare Informal Settlement. Formal social protection that is predictable and reliable can complement informal social protection arrangements. Research findings reveal that informal social protection can be fraught with uncertainty. Family members may not be in a position to provide assistance at the time it is required; expected payments from chamas and merry-gorounds may not always be received on time; while the savings can be lost through fraud and theft. Furthermore, informal social protection mechanisms are not always inclusive. The very poor can be left out if access to the informal social protection mechanism requires contributions in cash or in kind, which applies to approximately 20% of the residents in Mathare. Thus, a scaling-up of publicly provided social protection that has an effective targeting mechanism is more likely to reach the very poor and the most vulnerable. Cash transfers to this group could also provide the wherewithal for them to participate in informal arrangements and thus widen their range of options when they are hit by a shock. Social protection can contribute directly to economic growth and poverty reduction through redistributive transfers that raise the incomes and make smooth the consumption of the poor, an element which also allows them to engage in moderate risk-taking, and protect rather than erode their asset holdings when confronted by livelihood shocks. They are likely to participate in local markets by buying local produce. This can have an impact on the structure of demand, and produce multiplier effects in the local economy (HelpAge International 2006). Micro-finance, which plays a major role in providing credit for income generation, savings, emergency loans, insurance and other financial services, can provide more opportunities to extend social protection to the poor through life and health insurance schemes. It is laudable that the Government of Kenya is in the process of mobilising and registering community groups through the Department of Gender and Social Development. Registration is a key element in group identification and recognition as it enhances groups’ capacity to mobilise resources and open bank accounts. Hence, the numerous social network groups gain identification and recognition which enables them to formally interact and collaborate with government and other development agencies, including the private sector. These groups, formed mainly to meet the welfare needs of their members, will therefore be a basic entry point into, and tool for, community development. The registration process, however, is not anchored in any legal premise, leading to multiple registrations of groups, resulting in unequal and uncoordinated partnerships and access to resources. This also leads to confusion, fraud, resource wastage, conflicts and misuse of groups. It is on the basis of these challenges that the government seeks to provide a framework that will address some of the concerns. This involves developing a policy that will legalise the registration of self-help groups


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and CBOs and empower them through building social capital, forming and managing organisations as a means for working together to meet their needs, including advocating their rights. This is in recognition that social protection activities in Kenya are multi-sectoral, involving several ministries, development partners, NGOs, CSOs and associations representing vulnerable groups involved in providing social protection at different levels.

Conclusion and Recommendations It is generally accepted that poor people need access to lump sums of money to send their children to school, to buy medicines and to respond to other shocks and emergencies that beset their households. Overall, it is fair to conclude that formal social protection systems are weak, leaving Mathare inhabitants dependent on informal social protection mechanisms, despite increasing social and economic challenges that weaken these mechanisms. This makes the development of sustained, predictable, formal social protection mechanisms critical. These initiatives should encourage social protection arrangements that build on informal social protection practices while recognising that some informal arrangements place undue burden on some categories of people, women in particular. Formal social protection initiatives could take informal mechanisms into account and build on (rather than substitute) them as they are often beneficial, culturally driven and sustained solidarity mechanisms. Some informal social networks have indeed shown resilience, adaptability and a degree of inclusiveness that can provide opportunities for future growth. If these appear insufficient to address all the economic and social challenges that the very poor face, they nevertheless offer support (material and emotional), invoking the values of solidarity and guided by social values and norms. They protect the poor from shocks and guarantee a minimum standard of living, and formal social protection initiatives will be more effective if they clearly reinforce, whenever possible, existing informal, family- or community-based mechanisms. Formal social protection programmes can encompass a diversity of approaches, such that instead of importing standardised models, schemes can be developed based on local analysis of informal systems that are more relevant to the prevailing situation and focus on addressing poverty and reducing vulnerability, reflecting local perceptions of the nature of vulnerability. Informal social protection measures – including social networks, welfare societies, self-help groups, ROSCAs and ASCAs – can be used as entry points to implement national social protection programmes. These institutions can play an important complementary role, given their attributes of low cost, sustainability, wide coverage and intangible benefits (for example, participation, trust, inclusiveness). Many of these groups focus on savings and credit as a strategy to tackle poverty, and often prove more vibrant, better culturally rooted and therefore more sustainable than groups inspired by external actors (NGOs, government) which are often driven by the prospects of outside support. Anti-poverty initiatives can complement, even build on, existing solidarity mechanisms and the values that guide them. In Kenya, for example, youth and women’s groups provide conduits for the poor to organise themselves and benefit from other government programmes such as the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) and Women Enterprise Development Fund (WEDF). In this way, they obtain loans without collateral but within a group for income-generating activities. ROSCA and ASCA informal savings organisations can

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be taken advantage of in the design of programmes that seek to augment household incomes, including developing these organisations’ capacities in savings and credit management, as well as project planning. Groups can be linked to sources of credit, thus enhancing the tendency to save (rather than consume) group surpluses. Commitment and loyalty within families make viable entry points for support, especially for orphans, the elderly and people living with disabilities. The clan can provide a potentially effective system through which common values and principles can be reinforced, such as with regard to collective initiatives for food security, support to the vulnerable in need, education and responsibility for children/orphans. Clans could also provide entry points for campaigns related to HIV, the fight against corruption, and for mainstream development programmes. If social protection is to shift from top-down to demand-driven, it needs to become more responsive to the range of needs and threats that poor and vulnerable people face. Beneficiary participation is important when beneficiaries are not Included in programme design, implementation and monitoring.There is a risk that decisions about social protection will be made at the discretion of governments and development partners. In that case, decisions about social protection may not reflect the priorities and preferences of the intended beneficiaries, for example, in defining programme objectives, effective instruments for achieving these objectives, eligibility criteria, targeting mechanisms and independent grievance procedures. Consequently, the following recommendations are made: • Develop a toolkit to improve the governance and management of group-based financial systems, ROSCAs and ASCAs, in order to improve their operations and enhance the prospects for financial service provision. This will strengthen savings and credit groups in order to lower defaults, reduce the risk of members losing their savings and improve profitability. • There is a need to engage with key stakeholder groups if social protection programming is to be aligned to the needs of the urban poor. Critical national agents are civil society, civil servants in key ministries, parliamentarians, and beneficiaries. • Political commitment is required for sustainable social protection schemes and to scale them up in the long term, complemented by adequate institutional and administrative capacity. Comprehensive social protection requires not only sustainable financing but sustained political commitment, which must be driven from below – by citizens and civil society – as much as from above – by governments and their international development partners. • Utilise civil society organisations for mobilisation and provision of information about existing social protection programmes such as the National Health Insurance Fund, to reach out to informal workers in the slums and increase their participation.

References Adato, M. and Hoddinott, J. 2008. Social protection opportunities for Africa. IFPRI Policy Brief No. 5. Cited at: www.ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp004.asp (accessed 27th January, 2012). African Union. 2008. Summary recommendations from Livingstone 2 process: Investing in social protection in Africa. Presented to AU ministerial conference on social development, 2731 October 2008 Windhoek Namibia. http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/library/summaryrecommendations-from-livingstone-2-process-%E2%80%9Cinvesting-in-social-protectionin-africa%E2%80%9D.html Amnesty International. 2009. Kenya: Insecurity and indignity: Women’s experiences in the slums of Nairobi, Kenya. Cited at: www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/kenya. Bouman, F. 1995. Rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations: A development perspective. World Development 23(3): 371–84. Daily Nation, 20 February. 2010. Social protection and social justice: A decent life for all Kenyans. Nairobi: Devereux, S. and Cipryk, R. 2009. Social protection in sub-Saharan Africa: A regional review. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Devereux, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. 2004. Transformative social protection. IDS Working Paper 232, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. DFID. 2006. Social protection in practice. Social Protection Briefing Note Series, No. 1. London: DFID. Ellis, F., Devereux, S. and White, P. 2009. Social protection in Africa. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. ERD (European Report on Development). 2010. Social protection for inclusive development: A new perspective in EU Cooperation with Africa. Brussels: Europen Commission. Frane, A. and Roncevic, B. 2003. Social capital: Recent debates and research trends. Social Science Information 42: 155–183. GoK (Government of Kenya). 2007. Kenya vision 2030. Ministry of Planning and National Development. HelpAge International. 2006. Investing in social protection in Africa: Summary report of national consultations held in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Tunisia. London: HelpAge International. ILO (International Labour Organization). 2010a. Extending social security to all: A guide through the challenges and options. Cited at: http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/ gess/RessFileDownload.do?ressourceId=16152 (accessed on 21st January, 2011). 2008b. Can low-income countries afford basic social security? Social security policy briefings; Paper 3. Social Security Department. International Labour Office. Geneva. Cited at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/secsoc/ downloads/policy/policy3e.pdf KNBS (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics). 2009. Draft national social protection policy. Nairobi: KNBS. 2010. Kenya population and housing census. Nairobi: Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030. Malkamäki, M., Johnson, S. and Nino-Zarazua, M. 2009. The role of informal financial groups in extending access in Kenya. Nairobi: Financial Sector Deepening Kenya. Oduro, Abena. 2010. Formal and informal social protection in sub-Saharan Africa. Accra: Department of Economics, University of Ghana. Pamoja Trust. 2009. An inventory of the slums in Nairobi. Matrix Consultants. Taylor, V. 2008. The study of social protection systems in Africa: An overview of the challenges. Paper prepared for the First Session of the AU conference of ministers in charge of social development, 27–31 October 2008, Windhoek, Namibia. Townsend, P. 2009. Building decent societies: Rethinking the role of social security in development. London: Palgrave Macmillan/ILO.

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Chapter 4 Securing the Urban Poor in the Age of Privatisation: Lessons from Kampala City, Uganda Sabastiano Rwengabo

Introduction Limitations in social provisioning in urban contexts lead to destitution, deprivation and new security challenges. The under-privileged urban poor may become a critical source of urban insecurity. Yet, contemporary security services are commercialised as the market plays an important role in security provision. Commercialisation of security has changed the security landscape: privatised military companies (PMCs) accessible from the global security market (Singer 2002) can now offer war-related services, while private security companies (PSCs) provide domestic security to a degree never before witnessed in human history (Cliff and Birzar 2009), including in Africa (Gumedze 2007). Scholars have considered how PMCs and PSCs can be held to professional standards in both state and non-state security provisioning (Avant and Sigelman 2009); the ability of states − as embodiments of collective service through governmental functions − to honour their obligations to people when military functions are ‘denationalised’ through privatisation (Krahmann 2010); how and whether PSCs fill the gap left by the withdrawn neo-liberal state (Gumedze 2009); and questioned the ability of private security establishments to protect citizens against fellow citizens and criminals alongside, and instead of, the state (Rwengabo 2009). Does the privatisation of security have a social protection function, or must such social protection be forged by affected communities? The African scenario is even more telling: post-colonial African security concerns are mainly intra-state. Security is a serious human need in Africa (Schneckener 2006; Fodha 2009). Africa’s security is as inadequate as its social protection systems, even where security privatisation has increased. We need to understand the privatisation of security services beyond military functions to functions related to human safety and the security of persons and property, especially in urban areas where urban crime remains, and how the urban poor have responded to security privatisation in a neo-liberal era. The neo-liberal process – market fundamentalism and its attendant adage ‘let’s bash the state, the markets will resolve everything’ (Williamson 2000, 251) – gives opportunities to the rich and ignores the poor majority who equally need basic human services. Commercialised security in urban areas does the same: serves the rich and overlooks the poor. This raises a social protection question. Social protection signifies

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a range of measures, services ‘and institutional safeguards supposed to protect the population at “risk” of being “in need”’ (Standing 2007, 512). Conway, de Haan, and Norton (2000, 5) view social protection as ‘public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society’; their conceptualisation emphasises risk and vulnerability, support to the poorest, and helping people to reduce, mitigate and cope with risk. Thus, social protection goes beyond provision of welfare services — health, education, pensions, insurance — that dominates scholarship on social protection (Rein and Rainwater 1987; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). In its formal and informal realms, social protection responds to ‘absolute deprivation and vulnerabilities of the poorest’ (Conway, de Haan, and Norton 2000, 5), stressing the notion of atrisk populations, the vulnerable and the needy. This widens our understanding of the poverty−insecurity linkage in the age of privatisation, since poverty, need and vulnerability are concurrent. The urban poor – those unable to acquire the necessary services to reduce risks and vulnerabilities – belong to the needy group for whom social protection is necessary. Securing such people is a social protection intervention. To understand how the poor respond to insecurity we go beyond formal, state- and market-provided safety, to informal measures which fall into the realm of informal social protection. This chapter links urban safety to social protection, using a qualitative methodology. A survey involving thousands of respondents might have provided important quantitative information. But the benefit of non-statistical enquiries is that they allow in-depth qualitative findings that offer improved understanding of complex human phenomena (Marshall 1996). King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that both qualitative and quantitative research methods have a uniform logic of inference, but differ in style and technique. George and Bennett (2005) show that case studies, positivist or statistical methods, and formal models are simply complementary rather than competitive research methods. Inference is about making meaningful generalisations about phenomena that address the curiosity concerns of the investigator. How do urban poor dwellers not served by PSCs protect themselves against urban crime/ insecurity? We shall focus on the case of Kampala City, Uganda, to establish the link between social protection and the informalisation of safety/security. Although Sartori (1991, 253) warns that “case studies sacrifice generality to depth and thickness of understanding”, There is a convinction that this case allows for in-depth understanding of non-formal, non-market security provisioning. Case studies are appropriate for qualitative country studies like the current one, laying the ground for theory-building. Data were acquired through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with purposively and conveniently selected private and public security actors; local government personnel, market leaders, police officers, and residents of slum areas; observations of physical security structures; and critical review of published and unpublished literature found in security reports, papers, and press reports, books and journals. Pseudonyms have been given to respondents and participants in group discussions to protect their identities. Based on city divisions, the researcher began from the division headquarters, acquired information about the worst slum areas, then moved to those particular slum areas. At least two Cells (LCI)1 − one market area and a police post − were selected from each division using the list of administrative units found at the division offices. This yielded a total of ten LCs: five markets and

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five police posts. Beginning with local leaders in these areas − whose approval was critical for further investigations within their respective LCs − the researcher moved deep into the slums. Police officers – from stations and posts, and those on patrol – were accessed first by seeking approval from the Officer in Charge (OC) of the respective stations in the area, and later by following officers on patrol. Market vendors were also accessed by first acquiring the market chairperson’s permission, interviewing him/her, then proceeding to interface with market vendors. Residents were acquired as and when found at their homes as the researcher traversed the slum areas. This ‘convenient sampling’ technique allowed access to respondents, data and trends that allowed further investigation as the research progressed. This technique involves the selection “of the most accessible subjects”, and is less costly to the researcher “in terms of time, effort and money” (Marshall 1996, 523). Aware that it “may result in poor quality data and may lack strong intellectual credibility” (Marshall 1996, 523), convenience sampling was used in conjunction with other methods. For instance, a combination of process-tracing and within-case analysis was attempted by analytically juxtaposing the development of both commercialised and non-commercialised private security provision within a single Kampala case, to assure a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (cf. George and Bennett 2005). Content analysis, and its concurrent thick description, were used through themes and subthemes developed from the study and data analysed along these themes. “Improved understanding of the complex” issue of informalised urban security is “more important than generalisability of results” (Marshall 1996, 524–525). This basic issue – improved understanding of complex human issues – “explains why probabilistic sampling is neither productive nor efficient for qualitative studies and why alternative strategies are used” (Marshall 1996, 524525). The same consideration informed this study. The study links insecurity to social risk – “exposure to risks or events that if they occur, result in further vulnerability” (Ortiz 2001, 601). As Ortiz indicates, there are various risk reduction mechanisms − formal and informal, public and private. Governance is one way of reducing social risks to the poor. It includes managing issues such as “crime, domestic violence, social anomie and political instability” that can be addressed by “providing security and equal access to justice” (Ortiz 2001, 603). This chapter reviews the relevant literature in the context of the privatisation of security in Uganda, and its implications for urban security and social protection in Kampala, and establishes the nexus between the privatisation of security and social protection. Two empirical sub-sections are offered: one provides evidence of urban insecurity in Kampala and examines non-formal, non-market security measures in Kampala’s slum areas; the other draws the implications of these responses for social protection in urban settings. The conclusion sums up the main arguments.

Theory and Literature: Privatisation of Security and Social Protection Justifications for the Privatisation of Security Why and when do states privatise security, accepting the loss of their monopoly on the legitimate use of and control over instruments of violence? Krahmann (2010) offers the republicanism-liberalism debate as the ideological and philosophical basis of different levels of privatisation. According to this thesis, republican forms of government favour

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strong central authorities and agencies − big military, police, intelligence, internal security, gendarmerie and local defence forces − all centralised under state-centric governance structures. Krahmann shows that the republican ideology dominated in Germany and Russia: these were latecomers in the privatisation drive. In Britain and the United States, on the other hand, the liberal persuasions of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan led to widespread privatisation. This is akin to Levy’s (2010) analysis of citizen versus market armies in the West as opposed to Israel, the emergence of market control over nation states’ armed forces in the age of security privatisation (Levy 2009), and Seidman’s (2010) contention that the privatisation of security, especially military functions, relates to a shift from nationalisation to marketisation. These studies address military security functions but their analyses also apply to non-military security. Within a republican ideological milieu, privatisation of security is minimal. Government assumes responsibility for security provisioning. National defence and internal security remain largely state-centric. This supports the thesis that security is a public good: public goods expected from the state (Bryden and Caparini 2006) are non-discriminatory and all-inclusive. The liberal ideology, however, favours lean governments, decentralised control of social and economic activities in society, and the proliferation of non-state actors. A small government is better: it does not burden the taxpayer, nor does it clamp down on civil liberties. If people can innovate and provide security services, the security function need not be exclusively undertaken by the state (Krahmann 2010). This thesis explains why private security actors enter the economic space, but explains little about why and when private security takes different forms in contexts such as Africa.

The Neo-liberal Adjustment and Security Privatisation in Uganda Commercialisation of security in Africa is rooted in the neo-liberal policies of the structural adjustment era. These followed the Washington Consensus − prescribed for Latin American economies to stabilise and open up their economies to trade and foreign direct investment – which was adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and imposed on African economies, then dependent on donor aid following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. Developed by John Williamson and others, the consensus was, “the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989” (Williamson 2000, 251). This Decalogue-like policy ‘advice’ has ten policy prescriptions related to economic governance2 (Naim 2000; Williamson 2000). Prescriptions 4 − 8 constitute economic liberalisation. The World Bank and IMF applied the consensus beyond its regional (Latin American) confines, with little regard for national and regional differences, leading to neo-liberalism: “most liberals believe in macro-economic discipline, privatisation, a market economy, and free trade” (Williamson 2003, 1476). The consensus then acquired the status of “conventional wisdom... among the economically influential parts of Washington, meaning the US government and the international financial institutions”, a meta-narrative that acquired a life of its own and became a brand name worldwide (Sumner 2006, 1403). For Williamson (2000, 251), “the most popular, or populist, interpretation of the Washington Consensus”, was market fundamentalism or neo-liberalism, which refers to laissez-faire Reaganomics. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), implemented by countries like Uganda and Ghana (Dicklitch 1998; Whitfield 2005), were related


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to the consensus, and became conditional to debt rescheduling, new loan facilities, concessions and donor support. SAPs led to divestiture, reduced public sector, expansion of the private sector and increases in non-state actors. Countries like Uganda needed donor funding to reconstitute the dilapidated polity and economy following years of collapse. By the mid-1980s, Uganda was a weak state, characterised by domestic threats to regime security, internal socio-political problems, civil strife, corruption, societal degeneration, crumbling state infrastructure and government failures, and economic collapse (Bryden and Caparini 2006; Tripp 2010). Yet, SAPs came with challenges. Poverty and unemployment followed down-sizing, retrenchment of armed services and contracting out. Unequal development followed the uncontrolled concentration of new businesses and industries in Kampala. This made Kampala the new industrial hub, overtaking Jinja, the country’s historical industrial hub. Urban insecurity that had increased with the post-Amin dwindling state and economy persisted, and the state’s capacity and institutions remained weak. Safety was pushed into private hands. Private security entrepreneurs came in to exploit a free market, and to fill the gap left by the withdrawing state (Alao 2002). In Uganda, privatisation of security occurred in two contexts: the global trend of security privatisation and the African trend of SAPs: “…a global market for military and security services blossomed in the 1990s. Private military and security companies registered in many different countries began providing services to an array of international actors, including states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and global corporations” (Avant and Sigelman 2010, 232). In Uganda, PSCs have increased in number since the 1980s. More than 60 PSCs are now registered under the Uganda Private Security Organisations Association (UPSOA), with more than 17,000 employees as of 2009 (Rwengabo 2009). Those who have examined privatisation of security in Uganda, such as Kirunda (2008) and Alao (2002), indicate that: the withdrawn state in the neo-liberal age of down-sizing, liberalisation of the economy and other neo-liberal policies created a security vacuum into which PSCs fitted; that private PSC-reliant security measures benefit the rich, leaving out the poor; and that there is a concentration of PSC operations in urban as opposed to rural Uganda. They acknowledge increasing urban insecurity amidst the marketisation of safety, indicating that security privatisation does not erase insecurity. Thus, with neo-liberal privatisation, the state failed to constitute and strengthen security forces. Rather, “[d]ownsising the military [and other security agencies such as intelligence services and police] intensifies competition for jobs in the private security industry” (Gumedze 2007, 5). As privatisation encroached on security, PSCs increased in size, number and reach. In 1988, the first PSC in Uganda – Security 2000 − started operations. Then followed several others: Armour Group in 1993; APS, and INTERID (International Investigators and Detectives) 1994; Group4 Security 1994; Saracen 1995; Tight Security 1998; and others (Lilly and Von Tangen Page 2002). Some PSCs are formed by government officials (Alao 2002). Others are extensions of international PMSCs (privatised military and security companies). Most are formed and staffed by demobilised and retired security personnel, seeking a source of alternative livelihood. There was also liberalisation of the arms trade. Privatisation of security was given more impetus by this liberalisation: trade in small arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) makes it easy to access weapons and start a security company. Kirunda (2008) shows how cheap these weapons have

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become in Uganda and neighbouring countries because of the proliferation of SALWs. Some arms are smuggled into the country: the Horn of Africa, especially the collapsed Somali state, continues to act as a route for SALWs coming into Uganda and other East African countries (Mkutu 2007), increasing the insecurity to which marketised PSC-provided security responds. As PSCs guard business establishments, there is a general absence of guards in the slum areas: being a market sector driven by forces of demand and supply, and profitability, PSCs profit at the expense of human protection for those who cannot afford security services.

Marketised Security and Social Protection Studies on the privatisation of security indicate the perversity of commercialised/ marketised security provisioning (Aketch 2007; Gounev 2006; Jager and Kummel 2007; Gumedze 2007 and 2008; Avant and Sigelman 2010; Siedman 2010). They show that commercialisation of security has changed the security landscape, through commoditisation of safety. This commoditisation may lead to new forms of privatisation as people develop responses to security threats facing communities and individuals not served by the market. The focus on “the market for force” and “selling security” (Avant 2001, 2007) in theory and practice, has occurred concurrently with other private security arrangements: privatisation of security is limited to organised private security providers like companies or criminals and rebels (Schneckener 2006; Vinci 2009). Instead, security extends to micro-organised, non-formal, non-market private security mechanisms especially in crime- and insecurity-riddled urban spaces. In theory, reliance on the state for safety and security may lessen initiatives to constitute non-state, informal, security measures. In practice, a privatised security sector breeds new complications. Because commercialised actors look for profit, they do not invest in areas with little profitability. Left out of the commercial supply of security and protection − and simultaneously without sufficient state protection − the poor resort to non-formal, non-market security formations. This explains the concurrent commercialisation and informalisation of private security, which is inevitable in Kampala given that increasing numbers of PSCs have not resulted in significant decreases in urban and general crime, as police records continue to show (UPF 2010a). Commercialised security has three relevant implications for social protection: creating a market institution for providing safety and security; reducing the state’s monopoly; and marginalising the poor who need social protection most. The market institution for social protection belongs to the formal realm of social protection, which includes the state. Rein and Rainwater (1987, 25) argue that social protection institutions “are institutionalised arrangements by which there is a social provision of resources to individuals and families for dealing with particular risks and needs”. Social protection expenditure is defined by Rein and Rainwater (1987, 25) as “any expenditure involved in meeting costs incurred by individuals or households as a result of the materialisation or the existence of certain risks, contingencies or needs in so far as this expenditure gives rise to the intervention of a 3rd party, without there being any simultaneous counterpart by the beneficiary.” This expenditure is incurred through social protection institutions to provide for the needy and vulnerable. Such expenditure may be incurred by government, the market, or philanthropists. There is a contention that the costs of providing urban security belong to the realm of social protection expenditure because there is no equal


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counterpart to the state, for instance, providing law and order and fighting urban threats to lives and property. Because urban security is a social control measure, its absence explains why security-related self-help group initiatives arise whenever state controls weaken. ‘Collective violence is often social control’ responding to deviant behaviour: it may be exercised in the form of lynching, rioting, vigilantism, mob justice and other appropriate methods (Senechal de la Roche 1996, 97). Because the affected group is ‘at risk’ of social deviance – such as substance abuse, aggravated crime, rape, thefts and robbery, murder and more, and is also ‘in need’ of security and safety − it acts non-formally to secure itself; hence informal security. Reduction of the state’s monopoly takes two forms: providing hitherto stateled services, and creating parallel security structures. Traditionally, states claimed control over the realm of security: “states claim sovereignty over a recognised territory... promote themselves as the prime source of identity; insist that they are the supreme decision making organ; and assure that they are the security guarantor” (Baker 2006, 55). But the entrepreneur now provides policing, investigation and guarding services hitherto provided by the state: she wields instruments and means of violence, even capacity to kill, yet only acts in spaces where profit accrues. This does not, however, erase the state completely, hence state-led regulatory measures remain, however ineffectual, but with a reduced monopoly over security. Simultaneously, non-commercial security measures are developed in this environment of ‘non-state security entrepreneurship’ for groups whose security needs are not satisfied by the market. “The use of violence or the threat of it within society is such a distinguishing mark of sovereignty”, but given the inability of states to “provide full security in the urban areas of Uganda and Sierra Leone, there has been a diversification of policing agencies”, with several options beyond the state police, including market traders, drivers, mob justice and youth groups emerging as serious security actors in spaces where commercialised security cannot hold (Baker 2006, 55−76). The emergence of non-market security actors brings to the fore the relationship between safety and social control. Furthermore, the ability of the market to provide urban safety is questionable. The urban poor remain marginalised. Slum areas, where they are concentrated, are not profitable. Owing to their unprofitability, security provisioning for urban ghettoes is ineffective. This creates a security vacuum. Into this vacuum fit non-formal security measures which fall in the realm of social protection because people seek to safeguard their lives, the lives and futures of their children and dependants, their small businesses and property, against thieves, robbers, rapists, fraudsters, extortionists, drug addicts and other criminals. In this context, social protection measures – both adopted by the modern welfare state and non-state institutions, and analysed in scholarship – remain insufficient in problem identification, prioritisation, and choice and deployment of social protection providers. Instead, preventive, protective, and promotional measures applied in social protection (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) apply to urban security provision. Thus, we need to extend the analysis beyond income and livelihood risks and vulnerabilities. Security is a service: in insecurityriddled urban spaces it is a necessary social protection measure. In practice, people need different services outside the realm of social protection: the security and safety of persons and their property precede social protection. They are the foundational constituents of social survival. For social survival depends on, and can never occur in the absence of, human survival. And human survival is a security issue. Delinking

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social protection from safety and security is to assume that security is limited to statecentric defence and national protection, yet security starts with individuals. Internal security has several dimensions, making it a social protection issue. There is no social protection without security. The urban security−social protection relationship may be tabulated as shown in Table 1. Table 1. The urban security – social protection relationship Urban Security Public Military anti-crime units (Operation Wembley; Violent Crime Crack Unit) Police (including CID (Criminal Investigations Directorate), Anti-Riot, VIPPU, Crime Prevention, Family Relations Desk, Community Policing Division) Civil Intelligence Services (including Internal Security Organisation [ISO]; informers)

Gendarmerie (such as Local Defence Units; Election Violence Prevention Units) Local government structures (Urban governance structures, from division to cell level LCI

Private International PSCs (such as Saracen, G4 Security, INTERID, etc.) Local PSCs; political party youth groups; and political party militias

Neighbourhood Watches; spontaneous police informers

Neighbourhood guard groups, market vendors associations, drivers’ associations Personal possession of fire-arms; household protection measures; collective violence/ mob justice; social networks

Relationship to Societal Safety and Protection Extent of formality General reduction of threats to safety from ‘high’ crimes. Most formal and state-sanctioned Crime prevention, detection and law and order; Formal and statesanctioned

Crime detection, reporting, preventive measures. Combining state and non-state, non-market actors and processes; Less formal Local-level protection, of small groups and organised entities; Informal Self-help, self-defence, self-reliance, sociocultural residence considerations; Most informal.

Sources: Senechal de la Roche (1996); Baker (2006); Rwengabo (2010) The table, derived from a review of various sources, tabulates both formal and informal security measures and their implications for urban safety. At the top of the table are the most formal security measures. These are undertaken by the state and market. At the bottom are the least formal, or non-formal, non-market private security measures. These have considerable implications for social protection, for they are more directly related to people’s response to vulnerability and risks caused by insecurity in urban areas. NFNM (non-formal non-market) security measures are not the only service informalities in Uganda. In the social protection milieu, non-formal social service provisioning occurs in the form of non-formal social security. This “refers to ‘traditional’


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or ‘indigenous’ systems of extended family, kinship, and community support, and to new institutional forms that have emerged in response to the inaccessibility of formal social security, rising needs for social security support, and the declining ability of informal networks to address these needs” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004, 14). These various configurations of “self-help and mutual aid mechanisms include various forms of cooperatives, market associations, savings and credit clubs, and burial societies” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004, 14), which straddle Ugandan society. Thus, informalisation of security includes measures which are neither commandeered like insurgent groups, nor organised in the way that state security agencies and marketised security arrangements are. They are also based on low-level accountability mechanisms and procedures, some being (semi-)criminal. This category of private security involves non-state and non-commercial measures and arrangements that do not fit the category of organised non-state, non-commercial arrangements. Informalisation of security is not its trivialisation: it is a response to security threats against which market- and state-provided security do not guard. It includes various forms of self-help and mutual support mechanisms aimed at the security and safety of persons and their property. A societal response to vulnerability, threats to wellbeing, life and human existence, consists in informal social protection. Shut out of protection by the (withdrawn) state and the profit-minded market, the poor urban dwellers ‘have turned to informal sources of security extended by community, ethnic, and “sectarian” organisations; the search for security for the poor and marginalised cascades beyond both state and market’ (GCST 2009) – it extends to social protection in the context of security. The relationship between informal, private security provisioning and social protection can be diagrammed, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1: Security informalisation and social protection

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Both security informalisation and social protection have the triple objectives of meeting the safety needs of people, averting risks and vulnerabilities, and ensuring a secure social space in which individuals, families and groups can thrive. The dominant approaches to social protection rarely address security concerns. The European Commission attends to social protection by focusing on health, insurance, old age, retirement and the job risk needs of its citizens (EC 2001). The Asian Development Bank views social protection as “a set of policies and programmes designed to reduce vulnerability by promoting efficient labour markets, diminishing people’s exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and interruptions or loss” (Ortiz 2001: 41). These views assume that vulnerability, risks and needs are limited to the realm of finance and economics. People with enough income and wealth can secure themselves by paying for the services of private security providers − one’s wealth and income are related to one’s security. Just as countries without medical, education and other forms of insurance and welfare policies have witnessed peopleinitiated measures to improve their wellbeing, so are non-secured people responding to threats to their lives and property through security informalisation. The public− private interplay in social protection that Rein and Rainwater (1987) address is related to the public−private interplay in urban security governance that privatisation of security implies. Hence, Standing (2007) is correct to view social protection in terms of measures, services, and institutional safeguards that protect the population at risk of being in need, including moralistic responses to perceived threats to people’s safety and security, such as collective violence (Senechal de la Roche 1996). Therefore, security informalisation is a form of social protection. This contention widens our understanding of the implications of privatised security for social protection as it questions the provision of accountable and equitable security for, especially, the poor and marginalised or at-risk citizen groups in urban areas.

The Security Situation in Kampala: Evidence of Urban Insecurity Insecurity in Slum Areas The expansion and increase in numbers of slum areas; the inability of the police to effectively patrol poorly planned, poorly constructed and road-deficient slum areas; and urban crime resulting from this situation; constitute both explanatory factors and dynamics of insecurity in Kampala. ‘Slum areas’ are urban concentrations characterised by: • • • • • • • •

overpopulation; poor housing conditions and congestion; poor infrastructure (roads, water channels and walkways); many inhabitants sleeping under one roof of poor and/or unplanned structures; concentrations of urban crime; poor hygiene and sanitation as a result of poor rubbish disposal; disorderliness of actions and actors; and a generally disorderly social and behavioural environment.

Uganda Bureau of Statistics describes them as “areas with shanty housing conditions” (UBOS 2006). Majority of Kampala’s residents live in slum areas, a fact observable by


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anyone who knows or traverses the city. Straddling all city divisions, slum areas have zones and wards forming lower levels of local government administration. Some are inaccessible through city roads and streets (UBOS 2006; researcher’s field observations, May − July 2010; Byuma Zone 2010). Slums increased and expanded due to: uncontrolled rural−urban migration; urban population growth (Nyakaana, Sengendo and Lwasa, 2007)3; concentration of urban development services in Kampala alone “to the neglect of other towns” (Lilly and Von Tangen Page 2002, 34); urban poverty (Amal 2009); and government’s failure to deconstruct and reconstruct already existing slum areas. Moreover, “the level of urbanisation in the central region”, where Kampala is situated, “increased from 14% in 1969 to 25% in 2002” (UBOS 2006, 38). In these conditions, insecurity is the order of the day and sometimes extends to the whole urban space (Huntington 2008; Kasozi 2009; Tayebwa 2009; Bagala 2010; Kiribedda 2010; Ssemakula and Owocum 2010; Kigambo 2011). Urban insecurity in Uganda is exacerbated by prevailing insecurities in the region, and its attendant proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) (NFPSALWs 2007, 2011; Kankiriho 2010; MIA 2011). An urban space in which unemployed and redundant youth live in poorly planned spaces harbours agents of urban insecurity. UBOS further indicates that most of Uganda’s urban centres “developed without proper planning” since the 1960s. The Town and Country Planning Act of 1964, which still remains the legal instrument, provided for planning standards for built-up spaces in urban areas and land uses. The act emphasised the need for development to precede planning in urban areas. Uganda has not developed an urbanisation policy; although at one time it had a Ministry for Housing and Urban Development (UBOS 2006, 35). UBOS warns that uncontrolled and unplanned urbanisation “has further culminated in the growth of squatter settlements and shanty towns (slums)” such that, as long as the present rate of urban population growth continues unabated, without the corresponding growth of the social infrastructure, the demand for housing and other urban-based social services and utilities will proliferate and cause financial difficulties for districts and urban local governments (UBOS 2006, 37). The urban population is growing at a rate of 5.1% per annum (UBOS 2006, 37); with no proper and effective planning, proliferation of slum areas is inevitable.4 Some parts of the city have witnessed construction of good commercial and residential structures in fairly well planned areas and satellite cities. But slum areas have not been improved upon. New ones emerge as old ones expand. The findings indicate that slum areas lack effective, organised, security arrangements involving either the state or the market. By implication, PSCs’ neglect of slum areas has led to security informalisation. These difficult-to-patrol areas, coupled with the inability of the police to secure such areas amidst increasing urban crime (Nyakaana, Sengendo and Lwasa 2007), face security threats. Because neither the state nor the market can serve these areas, dwellers must devise alternative means to security. This has led to the development of non-commercial private security mechanisms: “…for us we cooperate here; we have made theft impossible ... we sat and agreed not to allow suspicious persons to live here and forced local leaders to accept” (Marion Nakabugo, interview, Kiibe Zone, Kalerwe, 14th April 2010). With the Uganda Police Force (UPF) unable to patrol and secure slum areas, response mechanisms remain informal.

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The limited ability of the police to fully patrol and secure slum areas allows urban insecurity to thrive. Constitutionally, the police are duty-bound to protect people’s lives and property, and keep law and order. But the police have experienced years of under-facilitation, lack of motivation, incapacity, limited numbers and corruption (Rwengabo 2009; field interviews, 2010). Respondents revealed that the police are not readily available to respond to security threats: “…we have complained to police but they have not responded. Sometimes when a thief attacks you and then someone informs police of such an incident police refuses to come. It is only when police hears that people want to burn a thief that they come running” (Lubega, interview, 6th April 2010). Lynching a thief is a non-formal, non-market private security arrangement intended to warn and scare others. It is a form of collective violence (Senechal de la Roche 1996), akin to mob justice (Baker 2006). Although there are no reliable data on such instances, respondents indicated that these cases do happen as a form of mob action. The police indicate that mob action increased by 100% between 2007 and 2008, from 184 cases in 2007 to 368 cases in 2008 (UPF 2008, 12).5 Some respondents accuse the police of corruption, connivance with criminal elements, apathy, and incapacity: “…they know where these thieves, robbers and drug addicts live and hide but they don’t arrest them. Some police officers are also [claimed to be] drug addicts and cannot arrest their friends” (anonymous interviewee, Kiganda Zone, Rubaga Division, 3rd May 2010). From all slum areas, respondents blame the police for failing to combat crime such as drug abuse. In Uganda it is criminal to produce, sell or consume drugs. But drug abuse, in Kampala particularly and in Uganda generally, remains a challenge even to the police.6 While the UPF should be patrolling city slums to prevent, pre-empt and detect crime, in some areas they do not appear for days: “…Police does not patrol this area … When the police arrest those [criminals] they know, they release them. We are beginning to suspect that some police officers are part of these deadly people”. To this accusation the police respond: “…We have extended our services to businesspeople like garage owners. Last week we were educating boda-boda7 riders on crime prevention” (Police Officer, interview, Kikoni Police Post, Kawempe, 2nd April 2010). Police also reported carrying out house-to-house patrols and identification of dark spots. The UPF argues that it uses its Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID) operatives and detectives to detect crime, but pre-emptive measures are not enough as some information is centralised. One CID officer revealed, “…we do not have information to do with people who have guns in this area [at this UPF Post] ... it is at Wandegeya, where this information is supposed to be kept” (Police Officer, interview, Kikoni Police Post, Kawempe, 2nd April 2010). In addition, the police guard important persons living in or near slum areas, such as members of parliament (MPs), record both petty and grave crimes, and investigate them. But they are unable to eliminate crime in slum areas. It is very hard for us to tell who is a criminal and who is not, especially in early morning hours when criminals attack people, because both the people moving and criminals are dressed in civilian clothes. Thieves can move with innocent people without showing any sign, then do their business when the place favours them... Police withdraw at 5 – 7 am in the morning, and 5 − 7 pm in the evening to rest. Now these criminals use such hours, even when it is not dark, to attack because they know this is [police’s] withdrawal time. (Police Officer, interview, Kikoni Police Post, Kawempe, 2nd April 2010)


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The fact that criminals can know and predict UPF’s withdrawal times shows: the need for police to conduct random patrols to pre-empt, capture and/or foil crime; that criminals have mastered, monitored and understood UPF’s movements and operations;8 and that private security mechanisms are adopted if people are to survive crime and insecurity. Another hindrance to UPF effectiveness is personnel limitations, as shown in Table 2. Table 2:

Size of the police force compared to national population, 1906 - 2009

Year

Strength

Population Estimate

1906

975

(no reliable records)

1926

1,401

-

1950

2,947

-

1956

5,040

-

1971

18,300

10,000,000

1986

8,000

14,800,000

2004

14,000

26,000,000

2009

38,000

30,700,000

Source: UPF 2011, www.upf.go.ug/aboutus.php (accessed 16th February, 2011) The current UPF human power (about 38,000 in 2011) for a population of more than 32 million implies that the police: people ratio is about 1 : 842. Even if one-quarter of these are deployed in Kampala with an estimated daytime population of 2 million, this number would be insufficient — 1 : 211. UPF revealed: “…We lack enough manpower. We cannot be everywhere, every time” (Police Officer, interview, Kikoni Police Post, Kawempe, 2nd April 2010). Criminals utilise this shortage which worsens UPF’s institutional weaknesses (Enyimu 2006; Tumushabe 2009), leading to: an inability to patrol and secure slum areas characterised by poor planning; congested buildings with no pathways/streets between them; lack of street lighting; and poor drainage. These conditions make police officers themselves insecure when tracking criminals: “…This place is difficult to patrol... It is congested because landlords are developing their plots for business” (Police Officer, interview, Kikoni Police Post, Kawempe, 2nd April 2010). Urban security partly depends on urban planning and infrastructure. Security personnel find better operational conditions in areas where streets are lit, buildings are accessible, streets and roads are passable. Where these developments are lacking, patrol becomes difficult and insecurity prevails. Increase in urban crime − itself related to prevailing socioeconomic conditions − also exacerbate urban insecurity. Youth unemployment, slum areas, urban inequalities, and the breakdown of moral, cultural, religious and social controls and values, breed urban crime (Alao 2002; Kirunda 2008). In addition to threats of terrorism − to which governmental efforts have been directed − criminals are devising complicated methods of criminality, as one informant revealed: “…thieves normally move at night and [seeing you] they pretend that they are drunk. But when you reach near them, they grab you and take your belongings by force” (interviewee, Makerere

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II, Zone C, 02 April 2010). Another informant stated: ”…it is dangerous to move at night especially in areas without security lights. Thieves are making us feel insecure, yet there are newer and newer slums where they hide and plan from. You can see all around it is a slum”. Increasing crime also arises from limited social protection. Huntington indicates that “in the slum areas of Mengo [Kampala] many children and youth are unable to afford school fees and thus are more susceptible to turn to a street life which entails … extreme poverty, drug and alcohol abuse … rape or sexual abuse” (Huntington 2008, 3). Lacking social protection measures that reduce life risks and vulnerability for children, the slum environment is giving way to urban criminals and drug addicts. These increase insecurity and breed new risks worthy of social protection measures – including measures against drug and substance addiction, absolute poverty and psycho-pathologies. In addition, the police indicate an eight-fold increase in cases of ritual human sacrifice, from 3 cases in 2007 to 25 in 2008, and a 43% increase in cases of mob action, domestic violence, arson, and homicides, from 1,927 cases in 2007 to 2,753 in 2008 (UPF 2008). All these, mostly related to non-existent social protection, increase insecurity and thus the need for more security measures. For instance, if child sacrifice continued to increase exponentially, it would be an overwhelming situation in five years. Criminal groups form complicated networks to elude suspicion. In Kampala, for instance, prostitutes and gangsters collude against ‘customers’ to rob them of money and other valuables, humiliate them (when suspected of having anti-prostitution beliefs), or beat and sometimes kill them (when suspected of being security agents). The prostitute−criminal collusion was confirmed by an LC Secretary for Security. The worst security threat we have [are] prostitutes in this area... These work with gangsters, criminals and thieves ... A thief hides under the bed in the lodge. When the man removes all his clothes, the thief removes all the money, phones, and wallet ... Then the prostitute later tells the man: ‘Okay, the money you paid for the service is used up, if you need more service add me more money’. Your thief is under the bed quiet! The man tries to get money, nothing! The prostitute shouts loudly, claiming she has not been paid. More thugs break in and the man is assaulted, which sometimes leads to deaths. (Elder/LC Official, Bwaise Market, 18th May 2010) In such an instance, the prostitute and the thief hiding under the bed have contacts with other thugs. Thugs break into the lodge, with or without the permission of the landlord. There are, thus, emerging criminal formations and metamorphic networks that complicate the security spectrum. One drug addict (the researcher interviewed 11 such people) revealed: “…in such instances we do what we want ... Sometimes we forgive people, other times we “discipline” [meaning beat] them. We can even summarise [meaning kill] you if you are stubborn” (interviewee, Katwe/Makindye Division, 4th May 2010). The fact that criminals effectively form networks complicates the dynamics of urban insecurity. Similarly: These prostitutes connive with thugs. When a man ‘buys’ a prostitute, and, let us say, gives her a bigger note of money, then asks for a balance, he is beaten up by these thugs and the remainder of his money is robbed. It is dangerous to buy prostitutes around here ... I watch them committing all these crimes but I cannot report them, because they will not be detained for long. I fear for my life, my friend. The problem of reporting is that they threaten to kill us if we report to


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anybody. (Female informant, Bwaise Market, 19th May 2010; emphasis added)9 Some respondents claimed that they have found it easy to elude police through female members of their gangs. Whenever a new police commander is deployed in the area, a girl is sent to monitor the police boss for some time. She frequents some places where the officer can be found, and slowly the policeman may be tempted to make advances. Should he try, the girl has penetrated the security system. From this ‘love’ relationship, the girl spies on police, knows when and how security patrols are planned and executed, monitors police movements and action plans, and warns her colleagues in advance. Criminals then escape when swoops are planned based on information from ‘police girlfriends’. Whenever the police boss is a woman, she is ‘cornered’ with bribes and threats (field interviews and focus group discussions, 14th May and 23 July 2010). The ability of criminals to spy on state agencies is a very important finding from this study; it demonstrates the metamorphosis of criminality in urban spaces.

Responding to Insecurity: Non-formal, Non-market, Security Measures Response to insecurity in the age of privatisation is no longer limited to state actions and interventions. Instead, coalitions and renegotiations between state and non-state actors, individuals and collectivities in society prevail. Understandably, when the market for security only addresses the concerns of the rich and corporate entities, the poor resort to rudimentary measures and social technologies at their disposal. In Kampala, we can discern neighbourhood watch groups, ethnic and other identity group formations in residential neighbourhoods, vigilante-like groups such as Kiboko Squad;10 and personal possession of firearms. Baker discovers evidence of mob justice in Uganda (Baker 2006, 69−70), agreeing with police records (UPF 2008, 10−12): these instances are excluded from the analysis in this study, and are viewed instead within the context of neighbourhood watch activities, as mob justice sometimes results from these.

Neighbourhood Watches, Acquaintances and Personal Care From ‘the way people protect themselves’ perspective of security, safety starts with individuals. It spreads to neighbours and covers whole slums or communities. Individuals work together, as neighbours or as groups of concerned people to watch out for crime and improve their security. In Kampala’s slum areas, neighbourhood watches are common in market areas, organised residential areas, and places where residents have established personal and social relationships with high levels of personal acquaintance. These watches involve: taking care of neighbours’ property or ensuring that a neighbour is not robbed; informing neighbours of what happens to their premises; watching over neighbours’ market stalls; observing and reporting suspicious behaviours and personalities of neighbours; working with UPF and LC leaders through secret and voluntary provision of information; responding to alarms, coming to the rescue of neighbours; and abrupt, sudden or spontaneous responses (including attacks) to threats to neighbours and/or their property. What would qualify as mob justice or collective violence (Baker 2006; UPF 2008 and 2010) in many instances occurs as a result of neighbourhood watches. In some areas these watches have improved security. In others, they have not been effective because of the fear of violent reprisals from criminals. In Kyambogo, Nakawa Division:

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If you have a problem and make an alarm neighbours can come to your rescue ... We have lived in harmony with others, and although we have not had sensitisation programmes from police and LC leaders we have shared responsibility of securing ourselves. Your neighbour is your guard. (Lydia Auma, Banda III Zone, Nakawa Division, 13th May 2010)

There, “as a community we have a measure of neighbourhood watching. For example if somebody makes an alarm, then we all make alarms to make sure the criminal stops” (LC official, Banda, 12 May 2010). When alarms are raised, police and LC leaders constitute patrols, respond and quickly apprehend criminals. This way neighbours live in communities too dangerous for criminals. Yet, in slums like Kalerwe, Kawempe Division, Katwe, Makindye Division, and Kisenyi, Central Division, when residents hear alarms, they close their doors more firmly. Going outside is risking death. Criminals fake alarms and terrorise the area, in order to steal. By the time it has become apparent that an alarm is false, the crime has been committed, and the identity and whereabouts of the criminal cannot be established. Criminals subsequently escape arrest and gain advantage from plunging areas into general fear. Criminals usually fake alarms as soon as they become aware that a police patrol has left the area, or they have already connived with them. When the UPF toughens up on them, criminals threaten police officers themselves (Field findings, May−June 2010). Socio-cultural considerations and fear sometimes constrain neighbourhood watch activities. “Some [criminals] are our neighbours, children of our relatives and friends. That is why criminals have increased. We fear to develop hatred with the parents of these criminals, which can lead to a bigger problem like killings” (female LC Leader, Mini-Triangle LCI, Makerere, 4th April 2010).11 A complex balance between fighting crime and endangering oneself creates a challenging scenario. Where neighbourhood watches rely solely on individual responsibility, their effectiveness is limited. With no support from technology such as CCTVs, street cameras and alarm systems and with human security guards having become unaffordable due to commercialised security, individuals must rely on each other in the management of urban insecurity. ‘Personal Care’ relates to UPF’s argument “Security Starts with You”. Security starts with individuals safeguarding themselves and their property. Respondents argued for preventive behaviours, such as: returning home early; avoiding dark places; not travelling at night or through dark corners; avoiding clashes with drug addicts and other substance abusers; locking one’s house whenever absent; asking neighbours to occupy one’s house when away overnight; and avoiding disputes with neighbours. Other measures include: not reporting criminals; installing affordable sirens on one’s house; constructing fences and electrified perimeter walls (few can afford them); concealing valuables from neighbours; and renting houses with some measure of security, such as fenced gates and organised neighbourhoods (where affordable) to preclude thefts and robberies. In addition, personal guards not from PSCs are used. People armed with bows and arrows are available for hire as guards under a personal agreement about methods and payment. These arrows are believed to be fatal, tipped with poison. Being highly secretive and informal, the arrangement has limited accountability. It depends on mutual trust between the guard and his client.12

Ethnic and Socio-cultural Residence Concentrations These are socio-cultural considerations developed in a heterogeneous society in which socio-cultural identity considerations still affect people’s choices and behaviours.13


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They include but go beyond ethno-racial, educational, religious, workplace and political formations arising from people’s interactions over time. It is common to find some zones or neighbourhoods dominated by certain ethno-linguistic groups, named according to the ethno-regional groups dominating or previously dominating such areas − Kitooro, Kifumbira, and suchlike. Socio-cultural and identity mechanisms have been formed in Kampala as a residential security measure. People want to belong to groups in which they feel secure. People assist friends and acquaintances to find rental houses in neighbourhoods, sometimes in the same building or housing estate (field findings, March − July 2010). Secondly, some historical developments in Uganda, such as ethno-political rivalries, sharpen ethnic and religious differences (and prejudices), making people want to identify with their group. In seeking to live with people of a similar persuasion, security mechanisms are forged, creating a feeling of closeness and responsibility within such groups. This too may be double-edged: when a reason arises to attack a group, the neighbourhood may protect itself but it may also be targeted on the basis of its group identity.

General Silence about Criminal Elements Sometimes urban dwellers remain silent about crime, to survive the possible wrath of criminals who get apprehended, or to avoid creating vendettas. It would be risky to report a criminal who is a neighbour’s child, who is then severely punished. The parent may take revenge against the informer, as may the criminal, so people keep quiet. Fear for their lives prevents slum dwellers from containing the insecurity they live with. Weak anti-crime mechanisms make anti-crime activities difficult: criminals serve short prison sentences and then return; theft is a petty crime so thieves are released on bond or bail; while some criminals connive with police to elude arrest. People fear revenge from reported criminals after they return from prison. Respondents also argued that corruption and institutional weaknesses in state institutions make it risky to trust such institutions when dealing with security threats. Finally, neglect of drug/substance abuse makes one wonder whether it is logical to report such crimes, given the shortcomings of prison service rehabilitation of such criminals.

Implications for Social Protection This study indicates that social protection transcends welfare. It is both social and protection: social because it has people, especially those at risk, as its main focus and concern; protection because it responds to threats, vulnerabilities and risks endangering not only the health and social needs of people but also their general wellbeing, including their security. Indeed, in social protection we secure individuals and families against threats to their wellbeing, lives and property, and reduce the risk of declines in productivity that may arise from insecurity. Since the use of resources is a social function, so is their consumption (Rein and Rainwater 1987). This view resonates with Norton, Conway and Foster (2001) who view social protection as public actions intended to alleviate vulnerability, risk and deprivation that are deemed socially unacceptable in any polity. Urban insecurity is an unacceptable risk. The urban poor cannot afford commercialised security but they need protection against urban crime and insecurity. This requires various interventions, including social protection, such as: urban youth employment measures; education; care for street, homeless, destitute

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and orphaned children; rehabilitation of criminals; and more. Kampala’s informal security measures can be categorised as informal social protection, since security is a human need. The implications for social protection are thus clear. In Kampala there is apathy in the face of limited formal protection mechanisms. A state that fails to protect its citizens against simple criminal threats can hardly develop effective social protection interventions for destitute street children and orphans. Yet failure to do so sows seeds of future insecurity as these children grow into urban criminals. In the process, limited or zero social provisioning for needy urban children breeds agents of insecurity: children grow up lacking the supportive institutional environment that would allow them to develop into responsible and productive members of society (Huntington 2008). Insecurity, in turn, instantiates limited social protection. Both are concerned with risks, safety and vulnerability, and reinforce each other. Opportunities for youth employment enable young people to engage meaningfully in the socioeconomic transformation of society, to contribute to tax revenue from which other social protection resources are generated. Thus, without physical protection, personal safety and security, meaningful social protection is impossible. Effective protection systems must, therefore, begin with security. Responses to urban insecurity have vital implications for governing the urban security sector and for meaningful safety in urban spaces.

Social Protection in the Governance of the Urban Security Sub-Sector Both informal and formal social protection systems in Africa are under stress: social networks and community service provisioning have disintegrated under the neo-liberal mantra. The state has relinquished some of its obligations: by 2004 Anne Pitcher had warned against labelling Uganda and Mozambique success stories in restructuring, citing failures in Kenya and Cameroon (Pitcher 2004, 395). Yet, the people have been caught up in the miasma of personal survival: for instance, the neo-liberal mantra of consumerism and individualised welfare sometimes precludes joint efforts against common perceived (or real) threats. It privileges atomised, and individualised human existence that only understands interpersonal relations as contractualised and instrumental exchanges. This has led to declining social protection among people. It has limited people’s ability to respond fully to challenges like insecurity. Thus, by implication, non-formal, non-market security provisioning − the return of socially grounded measures in response to the inability of commercialised security to cater for the safety needs of the urban poor − challenges the notion of the withdrawn State, requires reconfiguring state security, improved urban governance and reducing domestic socioeconomically generated insecurities. Reconfiguring the state security apparatus would be important. The Ugandan state is concerned more with current terrorism threats. The police advise vigilance. Everybody must be vigilant and conscious about their surroundings at all times… take interest in what goes on in the neighbourhood and look out for strange and suspicious looking people [and objects] and demand for their identity and inform an LC official, the nearest police post or any other security official in the vicinity. (UPF Terrorism Alert 2010, www.upf.go.ug/, 15th August 2010) Community policing has become more important. The State needs first to understand what people think security means. While security implies safety, protection, freedom


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from fear and absence of threats, or, broadly, defence, protection and freedom from fear and anxiety (Fortman and Myres 1992), insecurity looms with the absence of these conditions. For Kampala’s slum dwellers interviewed during this study, security means, “Protection of people and their property” (Lubega, interview, 2nd April 2010) – so that vulnerability, deprivation and dependence are reduced. It means “Safety, protection of our lives from danger and property from theft or destruction” (Grace, interview, Bwaise, 15th May 2010). It extends to “Absence of fear from harm, attack or loss of your property” (Lydia Auma, Banda, 13th May 2010), or “Protection of a person and his property against threats” (Informant, Kalerwe/Nakawa, 4th June 2010). Importantly, security is simply “The way people protect themselves” (informant, Kikoni, 4th May 2010), through state-provided, marketised, or informalised protection. Contextualising these definitions in societies faced with intra-state and urban insecurities allows us to view security concerns with deep-seated structural and social imperatives, but which must be addressed through social protection interventions. Crime reduction − through detection, investigation, prevention, and city patrolling – is important in this endeavour. Through the CID, the police get to know of potential and actual crimes, and establish the facts surrounding a crime that has already been committed. Pre-emptive information is used to foil planned crimes. The collection and management of crime information are important and the provision of such information to the police is being encouraged (UPF 2010b). Recent improvements in the working relationship between people and the police help the police to penetrate society and uncover more crimes. The presence of police in most areas of Kampala has reduced daytime criminality, except in areas like Byuma Zone, Makindye Division. Aware and fearful of this presence, criminals remain in hiding during the day. The police have provided a public complaints desk and patrol telephone contacts that anyone can call. Police records show a sharp decline in aggravated crime since 2000 (UPF 2010a). This implies that social protection does not preclude people’s own initiatives, or that states can ignore people’s capacity to respond to their vulnerabilities. Police patrols responding to criminal incidents make the police presence visible and accessible, prevent crime by threatening criminals, and respond to criminal situations faster. However, this method has suffered setbacks related to institutional weaknesses in the police and the challenges of urban governance, which are related to social protection services. For instance, failure to combat drug and substance abuse, connivance with drug addicts and other criminals, child prostitution, domestic violence and sex crimes remain issues of social protection. Likewise, slum reconstruction requires addressing urban governance challenges which complicate security operations. Some are socioeconomic while some are political (UBOS 2006; Makara 2008). Demolishing slum areas, reducing the overcrowding in buildings, reducing socio-legal constraints and ensuring a better planned city space all require attending to the miseries afflicting the urban poor. For instance, addressing urban crime and youth unemployment are concurrent endeavours. Rural−urban migration has led more youth to throng into Kampala, expecting better employment opportunities and improved living conditions. They rarely find such opportunities. Those born and raised in the city have limited educational opportunities, while some of the educated are often unemployed. The lack of social protection for both urban dwellers and newcomers implies that urban destitution is on the increase.

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Although there are no reliable records, youth unemployment is acknowledged by political leaders, including the president (UNCTAD 2010; Mwesigye 2011). The International Labour Organisation (ILO 2010) indicates that before the current economic crisis, youth were on average 2.8 times more likely to be unemployed than adults globally. Estimates show this figure has risen by 1.3%, from 12.1% in 2008 to 13.4% in 2009, and that “the number of unemployed youth increased by 8.5 million between 2008 and 2009, the largest year-on-year increase in at least 10 years, and by more than 10 million since 2007” (ILO 2010, 1). Thus, urbanisation together with population growth and youth unemployment, exacerbates vulnerability and social risks, and increases urban insecurity, calling for serious interventions. Meaningful efforts geared towards improving urban livelihoods through employment creation, fighting urban crime and improved urban governance have never been more necessary. Social protection will in the process address the socioeconomic and security needs of urban dwellers.

Conclusion An under-developed society which embraces over-liberalisation of the economy faces the dual paradox of accumulation amidst deprivation, and safety amidst insecurity. Privatisation in Uganda allowed the rich to accumulate wealth and secure themselves, but made security a commodity to buy and sell. The poor remain insecure. When there are security threats, but no protection – when the state has withdrawn and commercialised security actors cannot provide security to unprofitable poor urban dwellers − non-market private security measures emerge. NFNM security measures constitute a significant element of private security provisioning but belong to the realm of social protection. Privatisation of security has created new security configurations, serving a social protection function. Its informalisation offers alternative services that the market and the state have abandoned. The societal response to vulnerability, threats to wellbeing, life and human existence, is a form of informal social protection: it indicates the inseparability of informal security and social protection. Social protection feeds on and can be fed by security. Since social protection depends on and is related to basic security, informal security measures are essentially social protection measures too. The informalisation of private security in urban spaces largely arises from limited social protection, and has implications for the latter: informal security and informal social protection are bedfellows if not twin contexts of non-market, nonstate social provisioning. Both respond to vulnerabilities, risks and needs. They arise in the context of state withdrawal and market deficiencies. A government which is unable to provide security is unable to undertake other social protection measures. Social protection must target those who would otherwise be sources of insecurity by providing alternative and better means of livelihood. Youth urban employment creation is a social protection intervention which reduces vulnerability, redundancy, substance abuse and urban criminality. Measures such as rehabilitation, education and social support are important in constituting a comprehensive social protection regime. Social protection is impossible amidst insecurity. The safety of people’s lives and their property are fundamental constituents of society’s survival and social continuity. Social survival and continuity depend on human survival. And because human survival is a security issue, there can never be social protection unless we


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cater for people’s security, since vulnerabilities, risks and other needs may result from insecurity. Security needs, risks and vulnerabilities require relevant social protection measures. Just as informal social protection is developed by affected communities not served by formal (state and market) protection (Rein and Rainwater 1987; Standing 2007), security informalisation is a form of informal social protection adopted when and where formal security services do not meet the security needs of those in need.

Notes 1.

‘Cells’ are the lowest administrative units in urban areas (as opposed to ‘villages’ in rural areas) in Uganda’s local government system. Cells (urban) and villages (rural) constitute what is called Local Council One (LCI), comprising a few households.

2.

These included: (1) fiscal discipline (keeping fiscal deficits to a minimum); (2) prioritisation of public expenditures (towards fields that offer ‘both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution’); (3) tax reforms (taxes should be ‘broad’ and ‘moderate’); (4) interest rate liberalisation (domestic financial markets determine a country’s interest rates); (5) exchange rates (adopting a ‘competitive exchange rate that bolsters exports’, making them cheap abroad); (6) trade liberalisation (‘minimising tariffs and eliminating them on intermediate goods needed to produce exports’); (7) foreign direct investment (which should be liberalised to ‘bring needed capital and skills’); (8) privatisation (privatise state-owned enterprises); (9) deregulation (‘to abolish barriers to entry and exit’ in the economy); and (10) ‘secure property rights’ (‘weak laws and poor judicial systems reduce incentives to save and accumulate wealth’).

3.

Nyakaana, Sengendo, and Lwasa (2007) indicate that Uganda is urbanising at an estimated annual rate of 5.5%. Kampala has been the primary city since 1969. It has been growing at an annual rate of 5.6%. With this growth rate, the city absorbs 40% of the national urban population and 4.9% of the national population (UBOS 2002).

4.

UBOS surmises that Kampala’s urban population increased from less than 1 million in 1980 to 3 million 2002: ‘the continued flow of people from rural to urban areas poses a very high demand on the provision of various types of infrastructures and services, in excess of the ability of the Local Authorities to provide them’ (UBOS 2006: 37).

5.

UPF further notes that victims of lynching and related mob justice include robbers, burglars, witchdoctors, thieves, (suspected) murderers and rapists.

6.

The New Vision, 10th September, 2008, quotes the police blaming crime on weak laws: “Anyone dealing in marijuana should be sentenced to death on conviction to discourage the practice”. And: “Cultivation and smoking of marijuana is illegal. This is becoming ... big business in Kampala and surrounding districts. We need to destroy drugs at the source. This will make narcotics expensive and difficult to access”.

7.

Boda-boda are commercial cycles (motorbikes and pedal cycles) used as public transport in addition to commuter taxis and buses. The practice arose from the use of these cycles on border areas with neighbouring countries, and has since become a common means of transport in both rural and urban Uganda.

8.

By implication, UPF’s patrol plans and routes must be constantly changed and made unpredictable if UPF’s patrol system is to be effective. Officers should be sensitised about such criminal spies.

9.

Other tricks include using the victim’s wife or girlfriend, who would easily convince their partner to trust the gang in fraudulent deals. This has led suspected criminals to murder victims (The New Vision, 13 October, 2010, ‘City Car Robbers Show Killing Sites’).

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10.

For more details on Kiboko Squad, see: Daily Monitor and The New Vision, 6th June, 2010; 11th June, 2010; 12th June, 2010; Sunday Monitor, 13th June, 2010; Daily Monitor, 14th June, 2010; The New Vision, 16th June and 17th June, 2010; Daily Monitor, 18th June, 2010.

11.

This informant said she had lived in the area for 37 years, and has seen people born and raised in the area degenerate into criminals. Either their parents have failed to control them, or the environment makes socio-cultural controls difficult. For her, insecurity is on the increase.

12.

I have not found female guards under this arrangement, although they may exist.

13.

With more than 50 ethnic groups and six ethno-linguistic divides, inter- and intra-religious pluralities, Uganda is a plural society.

References Aketch, M. 2007. Breaking the conspiracy of power: Democracy, public law values and the governance of privatization in the weak African state. Paper presented at a conference on ‘Non-state actors as standard setters: The erosion of the public-private divide. Basel Institute of Governance, Basel, Switzerland, 8–9 February. Alao, A. 2002. Privatisation of security and security sector reform in Uganda. In D. Lilly and M. Von Tangen Page (eds.), Security sector reform: The challenges and opportunities of the privatisation of security. London: International Alert. Amal, C. 2009. The gender dimension of urban poverty in Uganda: The case of Tororo municipality, 2000–2008. MA dissertation, Kampala: Makerere University. Avant, D. 2007. Selling security: Trade-offs in state-regulation of the private security industry. In T. Jager and G. Kummel (eds.), Private military and security companies: Chances, problems, pitfalls and prospects. Heidelberg: Alle Rechte Vorbehanten. 2001. The market for force: The consequences of privatising security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Avant, D. and Sigelman, L. 2010. Private security and democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq. Security Studies, 19(2): 230–65. Bagala, A. 2010. Police question Kiboko squad leaders. Daily Monitor, June 18, www.monitor. co.ug/News/National/-/688334/941316/-/x1cqus/-/index.html Baker, B. 2006. Beyond the state police in urban Uganda and Sierra Leone. Africa Spectrum 41(1): 55–76. Bryden, A. and Caparini, M. (eds.) 2006. Private actors and security governance. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Byuma Zone. 2010. Report on security in Byuma Zone, Katwe II Parish. Makindye Division. Kampala: Byuma Zone. Cliff, R. and Birzar, M. 2009. Introduction to private security: Theory meets practice. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Conway, T., de Haan, A. and Norton, A. (eds.) 2000. Social protection: New directions of donor agencies. London: Overseas Development Institute. www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2233. pdf (accessed 11th January, 2012). Devereux, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. 2004. Transformative social protection. IDS Working Paper 232. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Diklitch, S. 1998. The elusive promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. EC (European Commission). 2001. Social protection in the EU member states and the European economic area: Situation on 1 January 2001. Luxembourg: EC. Enyimu, J. 2006. A review of police force budget and its effect on crime management. Kampala: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. Fodha, H. 2009. Africa: A UN Laboratory for peacekeeping and development. African Geopolitics 26 (April − June): 49–59. Fortman, B. and. Myers, G. 1992. Political economy of security revisited. Working Paper Series, No. 137. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. GCST (Global Consortium on Security Transformation). 2010. Background to second call for proposals under Regional Working Group on Privatization of Security. Santiago de Chile: GCST. George, A. and Bennett, A. 2005. Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Gounev, P. 2006. Bulgaria’s private security industry: Risks and realities. ISS Monograph Series 146. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

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Gumedze, S. 2009. Addressing the use of private security and military companies at the international Level. ISS Monograph Series 206. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. (ed.) 2008. The private security sector in Africa: Country series. ISS Monograph Series 146. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 2007. The private security sector in Africa: The 21st Century’s major cause for concern? ISS Paper 133. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Huntington, E. 2008. Educating the forgotten: Non-formal education in urban Kampala. School of International Development. http://digitalcollections.sit. edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1577&context=isp_collection, 10 Dec 2011. ILO (International Labour Organisation). 2010. Global employment trends. Geneva: ILO. www. ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_elm/---trends/documents/publication/ wcms_120471.pdf (accessed 20th December, 2011). Jager, T. and Kummel, G. (eds.). 2007 Private military and security companies: Chances, problems, pitfalls and prospect. Heidelberg: Alle Rechte Vorbehanten. Kankiriho, P. 2010. ‘Fire arms destroyed.’ The New Vision, Monday, 22 February. Kasozi, M. 2009. ‘Museveni switches CBS Radio off after it mobilises thousands for Kayunga.’ Buganda Post, September 11, www.bugandapost.com/main/ archives/489 (accessed 16th September, 2010). Kigambo, B. 2011. ‘Kiboko squad investigation reveals too little.’ The Weekly Observer, 6 March, www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=12444&Itemid=59) (accessed 7th March, 2011). King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. 1994. Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kiribedda, M. 2010. Uganda’s political turmoil post-Idi Amin: The untold stories (Who killed Oyite Ojok). London: AuthorHouse. Kirunda, S. 2008. Private and public security in Uganda. In S. Gumedze (ed.) The private security sector in Africa: Country series. ISS Monograph Series 146. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Krahmann, E. 2010. States, citizens and the privatisation of security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levy, Y. 2010. ‘The essence of the market army.’ Public Administration Review 703 (May/June): 378–89. 2009. ‘From Republican to Market Control over the Armed Forces: A Conceptual Analysis.’ Armed Forces and Society 41(1): 1–29. Lilly, D. and Von Tangen Page, M. 2002. The privatisation of security and security sector reform. London: International Alert, www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art135.pdf and http://books. sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP09.pdf (accessed 10th December, 2011). Makara, S. 2008. Urban governance and civil society in Uganda: A case of Kampala city. Research report, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Kampala. Marshall, M. 1996. Sampling for qualitative research. Family Practice 13: 522–25. MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs). 2011. Ministerial Policy Statement, 2011/2012. Kampala: MIA. Mkutu, K. 2007. ‘The rivate security industry in Kenya: Issues and challenges.’ In T. Jager and G. Kummel (eds.), Private military and security companies: Chances, problems, pitfalls and prospect. Heidelberg: Alle Rechte Vorbehanten. Mwesigye, S. 2011. ‘Museveni bothered by youth unemployment.’ The Weekly Observer, 9th February, 2011. www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=12118 &Itemid=59. Naim, M. 2000. ‘Washington Consensus or confusion?’, Foreign Policy, 1(18): 86–103. NFPSALWs (National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons). 2011. The problem of small arms. Kampala: Ministry of International Affairs. www.mia.go.ug/page.php?1=prob_ small_arms&&2=Problems of Small Arms (accessed 17th February, 2011). 2007. Mapping the small arms problem in Uganda: The development of Uganda’s national action plan on small arms and light weapons. Kampala: Ministry of Internal Affairs.

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Nyakaana, J., Sengendo, H. and Lwasa, S. 2007. Population, urban development and the environment in Uganda: The case of Kampala city and its environs. Kampala: Department of Geography, Makerere University. Norton, A., Conway, T. and Foster, M. 2001. Social protection concepts and approaches: Implications for policy and practice in international development. Working Paper 143. London: Overseas Development Institute. Ortiz, I. (ed.) 2001. Social protection in Asia and the Pacific. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Pitcher, A. 2004. Conditions, commitments, and the politics of restructuring in Africa. Comparative Politics 36(4): 379–95. Rein, M. and Rainwater, L. 1987. Institutions for social protection. In M. Rein and L. Rainwater (eds.), Public/private interplay in social Protection: A Comparative Study, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe. Rwengabo, S. 2009. Supplementing or substituting the Ugandan state? Private security provision in urban Kampala. Paper presented the workshop organised by the CODESRIA on Democratic Governance Institute on Private Security Companies and Democratic Governance in Africa, held at CODESRIA/Dakar, Senegal, 3–28 August. 2011. Neither formal nor marketized: Privatized security in the slum areas of Kampala City, Uganda. GCST New Voices Series, (12). Santiago de Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST). UPF. 2011. History of Uganda police force. Cited at: http://www.upf.go.ug/aboutus.php. Accessed on 16th Feb. 2011), Kampala: UPF. Sartori, G. 1991. Comparing and miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(3): 243–57. Schneckener, U. 2006. Fragile statehood, armed non-state actors and security governance. In A. Bryden and M. Caparini (eds.), Private actors and security governance. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Seidman, G. 2010. From nationalisation to privatisation: The case of IDF. Armed Forces and Society 36(4): 716–49. Senechal de la Roche, R. 1996. Collective violence and social control. Sociological Forum 11(1): 97–122. Singer, P. 2002. Corporate warriors: The rise of the privatised military industry and its ramifications for international security. International Security 26(3): 186–220. Ssemakula, J. and C. Owocum. 2010. FDC, DP form Kiboko Squads. The New Vision, 3rd September, http://allafrica.com/stories/201009060017.html (accessed on 20th December, 2011); also see Sunday Vision, 2 August, 2009: 7–8 Editorial). Standing, G. 2007. Social protection. Development in Practice 17(4/5): 511–22. Sumner, A. 2006. In search of the Washington (dis)Consensus: The “missing” content of PRSPs. Third World Quarterly 27(8): 1401–12. Tayebwa, G. 2009. Security operatives launch war on drugs. The New Vision, 4 October, www. newvision.co.ug/PA/8/13/696789 Tripp, A. 2010. Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime. London: Lynne Rienner. Tumushabe, A. 2009. Lack of juvenile remand facilities fuelling crime. The New Vision, 14th September, Cited at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200909140452.html (accessed on 15th November, 2010). UBOS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics). 2006. 2002 Uganda population and housing census: Analytical report. Kampala: UBOS. Cited at: www.ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/ pdf%20documents/2002%20CensusPopnSizeGrowthAnalyticalReport.pdf (accessed on 25th February, 2011). 2002. Uganda population and housing census. Kampala: UBOS. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2010. The state of youth unemployment: Cited at:. http://us1.campaign-archive.com/?u=588e0871f73ee9df56fc23c6 1&id=a9fa42509f&e... 28.05.2010 (accessed on 16th February, 2011).

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UPF (Uganda Police Force). 2010a. Uganda crime report, 2010. Kampala: UPF. 2010b. Anti-terrorism alert. Cited at: http://www.upf.go.ug/ (accessed on 25th February, 2011). 2008. Uganda crime report, 2008. Kampala: UPF. Vinci, A. 2009. Armed groups and the balance of power: The international relations of terrorists, warlords and insurgents. London and New York: Routledge. Whitfield, L. 2005. Trustees of development from conditionality to governance: Poverty reduction strategy papers in Ghana. Journal of Modern African Studies 43(4): 641–64. Williamson, J. 2003. The Washington Consensus and beyond. Economic and Political Weekly, Special Articles, April: 1475–81. 2000. What should the World Bank think about the Washington Consensus? The World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 251–64.

Chapter 5 Informal and Formal Social Protection in Ethiopia Amdissa Teshome

Introduction Background With a population of over 80 million, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa. Its economy is largely based on rainfed agriculture − a sector highly vulnerable to the vagaries of nature. According to the latest population census data, the sector employs 83% of the population (CSA 2008a) and generates 42.6 % of GDP (Demese, Berhanu and Mellor 2010). After decades of a stagnant and often declining economy, it is now widely acknowledged that Ethiopia has made considerable progress both in economic growth and social development over the last 10 years. The government’s commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has enabled it to make progress in the provision of social services such as education, health and infrastructure by spending up to 63% of its budget in these pro-poor sectors (MoFED 2008), although its expenditure on social protection measures has been on the decline (Daniel 2010). By and large, the UNCT (2011) concludes that, assuming continued support from the international community, the country is on a positive and promising track to meeting key MDGs, either wholly or partially.

Statement of the Problem Economic growth does not automatically trickle down to the most vulnerable segments of the population, who cannot take advantage of the favourable economic climate unless deliberate measures are taken to reach them through Informal Social Protection (ISP) and Formal Social Protection (FSP). Vulnerable groups are individuals or communities that are exposed to certain shocks or hazards and face the risk of disaster, loss of income and assets and/or hunger. Some face problems that are transitory in nature (for example, drought, financial crisis, death of head of the family) while others are chronic (for example, chronic illness, begging and living on the street). Government policy and programme documents such as MoLSA 1996, describe the various vulnerable groups in the country. The list, which has overlapping categories, includes orphans and street children; persons with disabilities; persons living with HIV/AIDS and other chronic illnesses; landless poor; urban poor; older persons; the unemployed; and femaleheaded households. According to the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), the number of persons with disabilities is under a million (CSA 2008a). This differs significantly from the World

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Health Organisation’s (WHO) estimate of 10% of the population but, this difference notwithstanding, persons with disabilities are culturally marginalised, economically and socially disadvantaged. In the rural areas of Ethiopia, disability is often associated with spiritual evil; families do not let disabled persons go out in public and most likely many were hidden from CSA enumerators. This has led the CSA to develop a new statistical strategy that enables it to capture these and other vulnerable groups fully (CSA 2008b). The age distribution shows that in absolute terms there are more children with disabilities than adults, but the rate of disability increases with age and as the elderly population increases from its current level of 4% to 12% by 2050 (Hatendi 2011), the number of older persons with disabilities will become substantial. CSA (cited in MoLSA 2011) estimated that 12% of the 4.6 million orphans in Ethiopia have lost one or both parents due to HIV/AIDS. The age group 10 − 14 represents the largest number of orphans and the number of males and females is fairly equal (CSA 2008a). Some or most of these vulnerable groups (particularly destitute older persons) have little option but to beg. According to Minas (2010), it is estimated that on the streets of Addis Ababa alone, there are about 100,000 beggars, the majority of whom are older persons. It is against this background that the research investigates the role of ISP and FSP in addressing the needs of vulnerable citizens to overcome these enormous social and economic problems. The material presented here is national in scope, in the sense that it uses cases of ISP and FSP ranging from the smallest provisions by NGOs to the largest national programmes, such as the social security and safety net programmes.

Methodology and Research Questions The research builds on the author’s work on the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and social protection issues in Ethiopia. It is exploratory research which by definition aims to shed light on new areas of investigation. Social protection of one form or another has been practised in Ethiopia since time immemorial, but it is a relatively new area of academic inquiry, except for anthropological studies on informal networks that have a long history. This research compares ISP and FSP using a set of themes (research questions) that include perceptions, guiding principles, legal and policy frameworks, institutional arrangements and response to changing circumstances. Key informant interviews (including telephone interviews) are the principal source of information. A total of 48 key informants (including 17 female) were interviewed in four regions (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Tigray) and in Addis Ababa. These included old age pensioners; relevant staff of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and of regional Labour and Social Affairs Bureaus; managers of NGOs, leaders and members of traditional groups such as idirs, and guardians of children. In addition, telephone interviews were conducted with some NGOs and UN staff members on specific questions such as how much they contributed towards a provident fund. The author also participated in and observed a series of regional consultations organised by the National Social Protection Platform (NSPP) and MoLSA. Relevant academic/conceptual literature and various government policy and programme documents were reviewed, along with international literature. An inventory format was developed and distributed to regional MoLSA offices and some non-government offices, to obtain basic information on ISP and FSP in the regions.

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Structure of the Chapter The chapter is divided into four major sections. Section 1 is introductory in nature. Section 2 is an overview of the concepts and typologies of social protection. Section 3 responds to key research questions on perceptions, principles, institutional arrangements, legal and policy environment, and response to the changing circumstances. Section 4 pulls the discussion and arguments together and proposes recommendations to improve social protection provision in Ethiopia.

An Overview of Social Protection: Concepts and Typologies Social protection has moved up the development agenda in Africa (Ellis, Devereux and White 2009), in general, and in Ethiopia, in particular. Policy makers and practitioners are, therefore, confronted by a stream of concepts that need clarification. These include, but are not limited to, social security, social welfare, social safety nets, unemployment benefits, social insurance and pension schemes. However, ‘social protection’ has emerged as an umbrella term because it captures the holistic protection that citizens and other residents require.

Definitions of Social Protection Social protection is a multi-disciplinary knowledge domain that encompasses concepts from, among others, economics, political science and sociology. Economics is primarily concerned with the effectiveness and efficiency of resource use while political science asks who the ‘right-holders’ and ‘duty-bearers’ are. Sociology and social anthropology are concerned with social exclusion, reciprocity and exchange. These challenges notwithstanding, the conceptual debate is more advanced for formal social protection (FSP) than for informal social protection (ISP).

Definitions of Formal Social Protection Brunori and O’Reilly (2010) review 27 ‘most influential’ definitions of FSP and find that it has been framed as a policy response to vulnerability and risks, as a human right, and as an agenda for livelihood building. The World Bank’s definition (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000; World Bank 2003) is probably the best example of vulnerability and risk dimension of social protection. It sees social protection “as public interventions to (1) assist individuals, households, and communities to better manage risk, and (2) provide support to the critically poor” (cited in Brunori and O’Reilly, 2010: 16). In this context, social protection: • •

•

serves as a safety net as well as a springboard for the poor; is not a cost, but rather an investment helping the poor to access basic social services, avoid social exclusion and coping strategies with irreversible negative effects during adverse shocks; and focuses less on the symptoms and more on the causes of poverty.

The World Bank view is shared by a number of authors and many governments, as stated in their poverty reduction papers or other policy documents (for example, Republic of Ghana, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia). The Zambian Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), for example, explicitly states that “No meaningful and sustained economic growth can be achieved in the absence of social protection” (cited in Brunori and O’Reilly 2010).

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The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the champion of the human rights dimension of social protection. It is the first organisation that established minimum standards and established that citizens are rights-holders and states are duty-bearers. Embedded in these definitions are the four fundamental roles that social protection plays: protection, prevention, promotion and transformation. Protective measures are basic transfers to stop vulnerable groups from starving. These include, among others, public employment schemes, feeding programmes, child protection services, cash/food transfers, health/education fee waivers, family support services and humanitarian relief. Preventive measures are designed to stop people from falling into destitution, to maintain dignity in society and to withstand modest shocks. Examples are contributory social security; universal social pensions; universal child allowances; health insurance, savings and credit schemes; burial societies; and crop insurance. Promotive measures are designed to, for example, develop the knowledge and skills of the unemployed so they can go back to work. Transformative interventions create an enabling legal and policy framework for the advancement of citizens’ rights and development (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2007). However, these are by no means mutually exclusive. For example, an integrated community development programme could be designed to protect (for instance, regular cash transfers to HIV/AIDS patients); prevent (for example, encourage savings and insurance); promote (for example, skills training for unemployed youth); and transform (for example advocate child rights). Figure 1 below illustrates this overlapping nature. Figure 1: The overlaps between social protection component classifications Fig a: kernel density analysis by urban status

Rural

Urban

kdensity workdays

.1

.05

0 0

10

Graphs by Place of residence

20

30

0

10

20

30

Work days

Source: Brunori and O’Reilly’s (2010, 8) social Protection components classification


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Definitions of Informal Social Protection Informal social protection is not well served by the social protection discourse. Formal definitions reviewed above and, to a large extent, the typology presented below view social protection in terms of public measures (see for example Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000) such as social insurance, social assistance and the delivery of social services (for instance, universal education, health fee waivers). This approach fails to take into account the crucial role of social support by the family and the broader community. However, Mamo (this volume) notes that works on Africa and Asia explicitly recognise social protection as constituting both formal and informal mechanisms. In this regard, Verpoorten and Verschraegen (2010) acknowledge that intra-household and interhousehold transfers between related or proximate individuals constitute a basic form of social protection in developing countries. Some offer parameters (or defining features) for drawing a distinction between these two modes. For example, as documented by Mamo (this volume), Oduro (2010) identify ‘legal status’ as the key parameter whereas, according to ESCAP (Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific), ‘agents’ providing the protection (for example, state and family) are important parameters for making the distinction. This chapter also offers a range of parameters to explore the differences and similarities between informal and formal social protection, as shown in the third section of this chapter.. The most widely used defining feature of ISP originating from anthropology is reciprocity (see De Coninck and Drani 2008; Mamo, this volume), suggesting that if a household gets support from a neighbour in time of need, it has a moral obligation to reciprocate (return the favour) when the neighbour becomes needy. In the next section of this chapter, we find that a number of ISP mechanisms do subscribe to this principle. However, De Coninck and Drani (2008) warn that mechanisms based on reciprocity tend to exclude the very poor who are not able to reciprocate, exchange or contribute. Finally, bringing these dimensions together, ISP may be defined as asset and/or financial transfers made to protect the livelihoods and to some extent the standard of living of poor families and communities, governed mainly by the principle of reciprocity and exchange and customary laws of social institutions. They may be triggered during normal times or in time of shock. It is most appropriate to give due attention to ISP. This chapter goes so far as advocating the establishment of links between ISP and FSP. But this should not go so far as shifting the responsibility for social protection from the state to the community, as has been the case in Ethiopia.

A Typology for Social Protection A typology is a mapping tool for examining the major components of a field of study, by showing those components at a glance. Pearson, Webb, and Ashenafi (2010) and Hobson (2008) provide basic typologies of FSP that consist of social services (education and health), social insurance, social legislation, and social assistance. These typologies provide a starting point but are inadequate to capture the vast landscape of formal and informal social protection. De Coninck and Drani (2008) provide a typology for ISP in Uganda, with the following elements: in-laws, extended family, the clan, self-help groups, true friendship, blood brotherhood and the community. The strong feature of this typology is its attempt to explain the inter-locking and overlapping nature of solidarity mechanisms and to

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distinguish between mechanisms that still exist and those that have either withered away or are of little relevance to the poor. Figure 2 provides a comprehensive framework that significantly expands the typology provided by these authors. It combines the informal and the formal mechanisms in a single typology. Informal mechanisms have five components – the extended family, burial societies, traditional savings and credit, asset transfers and child support. Each component is further divided into sub-components. Extended family members, for example, operate within and outside the household (including the Diaspora). Similarly, traditional child support takes different forms – legally binding forms and support given voluntarily. The typology also takes into account the most recent developments in Ethiopia and divides social insurance/security into private and public. This typology has considerable potential for expansion. Firstly, it can be further developed to illustrate the links between ISP and FSP. For example, there are possible links between traditional asset transfers and humanitarian assistance and/or safety nets; traditional savings and credit schemes (for example iqubs) and microfinance schemes. Furthermore, ensuring primary education for traditional child support (for instance, gudifecha) is an illustration of links between formal and informal mechanisms. Figure 2: A typology for social protection Employment promotion

Social security

Private

Public

Health Insurance

Social legislation Health

Formal

Fee waivers/exemptions

Social assistance

Social services

Social protection

Semi-formal

Micro-finance

Social transfers (e.g. humanitarian assistance, safety nets)

Burial societies Education

Informal

Traditional savings & credit

Asset/labour transfers

Child support

Extended family support

Universal education (incl. special needs education and adult education)

Legally binding

Voluntary

Within family

Outside family (incl. Diaspora)

Key Formal Semi-formal Informal Possible link between formal, informal and semi-formal


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Discussion How is Social Protection Perceived in Ethiopia? The Constitution of the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FDRE 1995) makes provisions for ‘social protection’. Article 41:5 reads “the State shall, within available means, provide rehabilitation and assistance to the physically and mentally disabled, the aged, and to children who are left without parents or guardian”. The strength of this provision is that it identifies the state as the duty-bearer and recognises the most vulnerable in society. However, it fails to use ‘social protection’ as a standard terminology. This failure is even more noticeable in the outgoing Developmental Social Welfare Policy (DSWP) which used ‘social welfare’ as the working terminology and defined this as “activities being undertaken by a community with a view to facilitating the economic and social conditions that are conducive to a healthy life and a sustainable development as well as activities designed to meet the common needs” (MoLSA 1996, 7). This definition fell short of international standards in a significant way. It shifted the responsibility for social protection from the state to the community, which is contrary to the provision in the constitution and the accepted international standards of the state as the principal duty-bearer. Social protection has climbed up the policy agenda in Ethiopia, and a significant shift can be observed. The government recently adopted a definition of social protection based on the African Union Social Policy Framework (AU 2008), which states that the minimum package of essential social protection should cover essential healthcare, as well as benefits for children, informal workers, the unemployed, older persons and persons with disabilities. The government’s commitment has also shifted from “provide rehabilitation and assistance within available means” to “will commit human and financial resources to ... provide social protection to vulnerable citizens” (MoLSA 2011, 11). The protective, preventive, promotive and transformative roles of social protection have replaced the former rehabilitative and developmental roles of social welfare. In order to gain further insight into how social protection is perceived by implementers, regional-level key informants were asked to define social protection. Box 1 provides examples from four regions, with local language equivalents given in parentheses and in italics. These definitions are by and large influenced by the official position but capture some useful features of social protection. Definition 1 mentions the instruments, target groups and the purpose for which social transfers are used. Definition 2 makes a distinction between contributory and non-contributory social protection and gives examples of such interventions. It is the most comprehensive of the four definitions. Definition 3 specifies the types of transfers (in kind or in cash). Definition 4 talks about community-based social protection.

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Box 1:

Definitions of social protection by key informants in selected regions of Ethiopia

Definition 1: Social protection (Maheberawi Digaf or Maheberawi Tibeqa) is all social support-related interventions (schemes, projects, programmes) whose focus is mainly to address the welfare of the very poor households (marginalised and most vulnerable) that are providing support (in cash or in kind) so as to help the beneficiaries spend the received resources on basic consumption goods, education and healthcare for family members [key informant from Amhara Region]. Definition 2: Social protection (Halewa mahberawi dihninet) is not only social insurance for civil servants and old age pensioners, but also for elders who have no other means of support, the poorest of the poor and other vulnerable groups (children and women) to protect them from going into deep poverty. For example, free medication, free school attendance up to grade 8 and the direct support component of PSNP which supports the disabled, elders, orphans, pregnant and breastfeeding mothers [key informant from Tigray Region]. Definition 3: Social protection (Dhimma Gargaarsaa fi hiikkaa rakkoolee hawaasa) is provision of social assistance, either material or financial, for marginalised groups of society. Social protection may include provision of free basic education, shelter, expansion of health services and foods [key informant from Oromiya Region]. Definition 4: Any arrangement to protect some group of a society from any social problem. Members of an association contribute some amount of money to get service. In addition to these contributions, the association finds resources from other sources to help people when they are in need of help. In Amharic, it is called Mahiberawi Wsatina [key informant from SNNP Region].

Status of Informal Social Protection in Ethiopia In Ethiopia, vulnerable groups are largely supported through ISP mechanisms, which differ by agro-ecology or livelihood, operational principles and social protection roles fulfilled. Table 1 provides a summary of selected ISP mechanisms along these parameters. Given that rural and urban communities have been facing considerable hardships (natural and man-made disasters; economic problems), the extent to which ISP mechanisms are vibrant and continue to provide the necessary support has been debatable for some time. Empirical evidence on their status is difficult to obtain but, according to key informants, some of the most common mechanisms (for instance, idir, iqub and mahiber) are still vibrant. Others, like gudifecha and dabarree have declined (for a definition of these local terms see Appendix 1). The chairperson of an idir attributed the decline to the political process of the Derg1 regime: The social support mechanisms do exist but are not as they used to be. There was a tradition that people used to invite people to stay with them; eat with them and even share clothing. There was love for one another. However, such mechanisms of sympathy for one another started to deteriorate during the Derg regime. People became conscious of many things. People were requested to register the people who are guests as the guests were suspected to be spies or thieves and threats to the revolution and there were a lot of reasons. People refrained from such acts and started to forget their culture. The ideological fighting between the EPRP2 and the Derg also developed cruelty among the people. [Chairperson of an Idir,


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Oromiya Region] Similar attributions are found in Gemechu (2001) who goes even further and blames the feudal system for undermining Oromo traditional governance and support mechanisms. Other key informants attributed the decline to factors such as financial constraints, lack of development orientation, lack of professional management, and change in work culture particularly in urban areas – if one has to work long hours to make ends meet, there is little time for participating in informal institutions.

HUNDEE, a local NGO operating in parts of Oromiya, found that Dabarree was diminishing in its operational areas. Some of the young generation have never heard of Dabarree. With a view to reviving the principles and practice of Dabarree, HUNDEE designed a project in which it played the role of a rich cattle owner and distributed heifers to poor households, as per Dabarree principles. In this way, HUNDEE helped revive an old concept and also helped the poor build their assets so that they could start supporting each other. HUNDEE could, therefore, exit as soon as Dabarree became the norm again (Amdissa 2011). Despite the challenges, there was general consensus among key informants that ISP mechanisms are performing useful purposes, but that they need to work on becoming more relevant to the changing situation.

Labour mobilisation mechanisms for the labour-poor, such as the elderly and female-headed households.

A membership-based get-together around a religious calendar (e.g. St. Mary Day, 21st of each Ethiopian Calendar Month). Its key role is to create social harmony within a group with the same beliefs. It is also an instrument for consoling each other in times of grief. In its modern form, mahiber is becoming a kind of alumni formed by educated people coming from the same area and who went to the same school.

• Debo/jigi

• Mahiber (association)

is based on family/friendship ties. It is designed to support a household whose son or daughter is getting married.

Mechanisms • Awraj/Muday A support mechanism that does not require membership but

Mainly Oromiya but also in other regions Most places

Mainly Amhara but also in other regions

Similar role to the Gada system in Oromiya but operates in Afar Afar Region and is based on clan/kinship.

• Afar Ada

Oromiya

Gada is a complex, elaborate and all-embracing social institution (Helland 2011) responsible for managing natural resources, resolving conflict and most importantly, ensuring support mechanisms such as the Dabare and Buussa Ganofa are functional in time of need.

Amhara

• The Gada system

• Awra Amba village

Institutions/systems A village with a population of 400 people (96 households) established in early 1970s perhaps in response to the drought then. In this village, there are no differences between men and women, in the sense that nobody is poorer than the other; all children go to school and all elders are assured of a home.

Table 1: Key attributes of selected informal social protection mechanisms in Ethiopia Informal Brief description Region or mechanism agroecology

membershipbased

Reciprocity/

Reciprocity

Reciprocity

Clans system

neighbourhood

ethnic/

Democratic/

Egalitarian

Operational principle

-

-

9

9

9

9

-

-

-

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

-

-

-

-

9

9

Protective Promotive Preventive Transfor--mative

104 Informal and Formal Social Protection Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa

Oromiya

Oromiya/ Afar

Afar/ Somali

Oromiya/ also institutionalised in government

Most highland areas

Most highland areas

This is common in most livelihoods. It plays a multiNational dimensional role including basic protection, prevention, promotion and transformation. Children, older persons, and persons with disabilities are supported by extended families.

Also known in some circles as revolving credit and saving associations (Verpoorten and Verschraegen 2010), this is a savings group. Households and business people use it to mobilise funds to start a new business, expand an existing business, or solve personal problems. This is a membership-based insurance scheme established to ensure a decent funeral. About 87% of Ethiopians in urban centres and close to 70% of Ethiopians living in rural areas belong to idirs, which makes them the most widespread type of self-help community group in the country (Ayele 2004). Ethiopians use different informal mechanisms to ensure the survival and development of their children. The most commonly known is gudifecha (adoption) where better-off families take one or two children (often boys) from a poor relative and bring them up as their own. Natural parents give up the right of parenthood. There are other informal child support mechanisms that do not require the natural parent to give up their right to the child. An Islamic tradition of giving to gain Allah’s blessing, zakat is believed to purify the property of the contributor as well as his or her heart from selfishness and greed. It also purifies the heart of the recipient against envy and jealousy, hatred and uneasiness and fosters instead goodwill and warm wishes for the contributors. It is obligatory upon all Muslims to give 2.5 % of their wealth and assets each year (in excess of what the giver needs) to the poor (see www. nnn.ac.uk/societies/islamic/societies/ about/Islam/charity.htm). A livestock-rich family gives a heifer to a poor relative to look after and consume and/or sell its milk and milk products. The female offspring of the dabarree animal remain the exclusive property of the owner. By keeping animals in different places, the giver minimises the risk of theft. During drought, herds in one area may have a better chance of survival than in another area (Gemechu 2001). Gonofaa is an obligatory contribution of animals to rehabilitate and re-establish families that have been rendered destitute through raids, epidemics, drought or any other calamity. Buussa is a voluntary contribution from various clan members. The end result could be that the receiver ends up having more cattle than some of the givers. Blood relation

Kinship/ reciprocity

Kinship/risk reduction

Religious almsgiving

Poverty/ child vulnerability

Membership

Contribution/ Reciprocity

Source: Compiled from inventory sheets and supplementary review of the literature

• Extended family

• Buussa Gonofaa

Dabarree/ Hantila

Zakat/Sadak

Child support

Idir/Afosha

Iqub

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

-

9

9

-

9

9

-

9

9

-

9

-

-

-

9

-

-

Informal and Formal Social Protection in Ethiopia 105

106


Status of Formal Social Protection in Ethiopia Government-led Formal Social Protection Formal social protection is institutionalised support to a given vulnerable group, either by government or by non-governmental institutions, or both. Ethiopia was one of the first countries in Africa to institutionalise contributory social security for civil servants, police and armed forces in 1963, following the ILO declaration on decent work and social security. According to the revised Proclamation No. 714 (FDRE 2011a), the total contribution for civil servants is 18% (7% employee and 11% employer), while the total contribution for the police and the military is 32% (7% employee and 25% employer). There are about 700,000 pensioners drawing social security and about one million presently contributing. The social security package for public servants includes six of the nine ILO minimum standards of social security (Teshome 2010; Brunori and O’Reilly 2010). The Social Security Agency manages the fund. In response to longstanding criticism that the social security system has been limited in scope and coverage, the government of Ethiopia (GoE) has introduced social security for private sector employees (FDRE 2011b), who enjoy the same packages as public sector employees and their contributions are also the same as for civil servants (7% employee and 11% employer). A special agency, known as the Private Organisations’ Employees Social Security Agency (POESSA), is established to manage the private social security fund. Whereas the social security system is largely, if not exclusively, for urban employees, the rural population has been left to rely on its own informal mechanisms, except when disaster strikes. Over the last 30 years (1981 – 2010), on average about 6 million people have received food aid annually (Degefa 2010), of whom 35% or just over 2 million are estimated to be children, pregnant and lactating women. However, humanitarian assistance is often unpredictable, untimely and inadequate, and occasionally subject to political manipulation. More fundamentally, it does not address the long term developmental needs of the population and the country. In response to these limitations, the GoE introduced the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 2005. The programme responds to the needs of chronically food insecure (CFI) rural households. Since 2005, 8.3 million people have been benefiting from the programme, of whom about 7 million are able-bodied participating in public works and the rest are older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant and lactating women, and child-headed households who benefit from the ‘direct support’ component without a work requirement. The PSNP’s primary goal is to fill the food gap of CFI households and stop them resorting to selling their productive assets to feed themselves. The public works component is also designed to create community assets, such as rehabilitating degraded environments and natural resource conservation. These broad government-led FSP programmes play different roles. The social security scheme is essentially insurance and is preventive in nature. The humanitarian response is protective while the PSNP plays multiple social protection roles. Its primary objective is to fill food gaps and smooth consumption over a longer period which makes it protective social protection. It also plays promotive roles through: creating community assets (for example, roads, watershed management); and spending on the education and health of children. Its preventive roles include: preventing household


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assets from depleting; and spending on idir, iqub and other social obligations (Devereux et al. 2006 and 2008). Apart from playing these important social protection roles, the PSNP has opened up the debate on social protection at the national level, including serious thinking on the future of direct support beneficiaries, the majority of whom are not expected to graduate from the programme (Devereux and Amdissa 2009).

Non-state Actor Social Protection Interventions Most non-state actors (NSAs) came to Ethiopia in response to the drought and famine of the 1970s. Since then, they have diversified their interventions into the provision of social services, rights issues, and development. Social protection is one of their strong points in terms of both actual implementation and advocacy. There are two aspects worth examining: provident funds for their employees and social protection interventions for the most vulnerable. The provident funds have the following features: •

• •

•

Contributions vary from agency to agency. The limited data collected show that the lowest employee contribution is 6% for a local NGO and the highest is 20% for an international NGO. The highest employer contribution is 20% and the lowest is 10% – both for international NGOs. On average, the non-government contributions are higher for civil servants but lower for the police and the military. The funds are flexible enough to be withdrawn at any time the employee wants or if the organisation closes down for any reason. This flexibility defeats the very purpose of a social security or pension scheme, which is to draw on the fund when one is unable to work for reasons of age, illness or disability. Employees in the UN system begin contributions after five years of employment.

Since the government launched the private sector social security fund, the future of these provident funds has been one of the most contentious issues. In order to ease contention, the government has invited the NGO/UN employees to join the private sector social security scheme on a ‘voluntary basis’. The NSAs are also important actors in the implementation of social protectionrelated projects at community level. There are NGOs implementing integrated urban and rural child support projects that have several components corresponding to the protection (cash transfers), promotion (education), prevention (saving groups) and to some degree transformation (advocacy) roles of social protection. UNICEF, as a lead agency on child protection, implements child support programmes in collaboration with BoLSA (Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs). Table 2 is a summary of selected formal social protection interventions using the same parameters as given for informal social protection in Table 1. The NSAs are also credited for monitoring the satisfaction of citizens with social services. For example, the Citizens’ Report Card (CRC) is an innovative monitoring tool devised to collect data on satisfaction with public services (PANE 2006; JeCCDO 2009). However, a review of this tool indicated that it did not sufficiently capture the views of the most vulnerable groups such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, children and various categories of women such as widows and single mothers. This calls for the development of an appropriate monitoring tool for social protection that uses a ‘social protection lens’.

• Basic social services

• PSNP

• Humanitarian assistance

• Social insurance (pension) for private and public employees

Government

Formal social protection

The government’s desire to provide social services (education, health and water) and meet the MDGs emanates from the commitment made in the constitution. Fee waivers, school meals and special needs education are the key social protection elements.

For the last 50 years, the social insurance scheme served the civil servants, the military and the police, which amount to 700,000 people. A new legal framework has established a private sector social security fund. With this provision, the government has responded to its constitutional obligation of treating citizens equally. Humanitarian assistance has been the first line of protection for the last 40 years in response to various disasters. But it has been unpredictable, untimely and inadequate, which prompted the government to introduce the PSNP with a view to addressing these inadequacies (see below). This is the major component of the food security programme. It provides 8.3 million chronically food insecure people in 318 woredas with predictable food/ cash transfers during lean seasons in order to smooth consumption. PSNP is designed in such a way that it is linked to household asset building facilities so that households eventually graduate from the PSNP.

Brief description

9

9

Targeting the chronically food insecure; ablebodied (public works); labourpoor (direct support)

Targeted based on chronic food insecurity, old age, disability

9

9

9

Role played Protective Promotive

Targeting the transitory food insecure

Contributory; compulsory for the public sector; voluntary for the private sector

Operational principle

Table 2: Key attributes of selected formal social protection mechanisms

9

9

Preventive

9

-

Transformative


Ethiopia has one of the fastest growing labour Unemployed job forces, which is both an opportunity and a seekers challenge. The informal economy remains the largest and fastest expanding sector and also the least protected. The government has introduced small- and micro-enterprise schemes to support unemployed persons to start their own business with loans and other incentives.

• Support to the elderly

• UNICEF cash transfer schemes

networking component. These are mainly for the education of children and the transfers are of two types: (1) direct cash for educational materials; and (2) full scholarships. Older persons make up about 4% of the population and the proportion is projected to reach 12% by 2050. In addition to the retired public sector pensioners mentioned above, a number of NGOs run schemes for older persons whereby they are supported in their homes with monthly cash, and/or in institutions with full boarding. However, Ethiopia is far from adopting a universal pension scheme.

Targeted in collaboration with local administration

Targeted based on vulnerability

• Non-government • Integrated These projects have such components as Selection done child and education (tutorials and educational materials by community community for poor children/orphans); and cash transfers to representatives development parents/guardians. They also have an advocacy/ programme

• Employment promotion

9

9

-

9

9

9

9

-

Informal and Formal Social Protection in Ethiopia 109

9 Targeted based The government has recognised the plight of these groups through its official documents which has facilitated the on observable formation of various disability associations, including disabilities often federations. These are actively engaged in promoting the in collaboration rights of people with disabilities. But there is very little with local practical help on the ground, apart from some NGOs administration running limited projects either as part of their development programmes or merged with older person schemes. • Alternative 9 NGOs have actively promoted these modes of education Education for all; and non-formal to reach out to out-of-school children in remote and universal primary education poor areas including pastoral areas, to the extent that education; MDG2 these modes of education have now been mainstreamed into the official education structure. 9 The government is playing a facilitative role in this Based on • Support to vulnerability orphans and process. Various NGOs are providing material and financial support to ensure these children attend school vulnerable and are fed. Therapeutic and supplementary feeding are children common during emergencies and also in chronically food insecure areas. Source: Compiled from inventory sheets and supplementary review of policy documents (including MoLSA 1996 and 2011)

• Support to persons with disabilities

9

9



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Principles and Values Governing Informal and Formal Social Protection Principles governing ISP and FSP vary considerably. ISP is largely guided by religious, cultural and other customary principles (Mpedi 2008), whereas FSP is guided by economic and social principles. In ISP, family and neighbourhood values are also important. It is often said that when a family faces economic shocks or illnesses, it is the next door neighbour who gives a helping hand before distant relatives. Having said that, some of the semi-formal mechanisms are also guided by economic or financial principles. Iqubs, for example, are formed not only to overcome short term financial difficulties but also to help members start or expand businesses. Members whose needs are greater can buy the ita (see Appendix 1) from those whose needs are less urgent, based more or less on the principles of buying and selling shares. The principles of reciprocity and exchange also feature strongly in ISP. One contributes to the wedding of another in anticipation that the recipient will do the same for him/her sometime in the future. However, reciprocity, exchange and contributions are some of the factors that exclude the poorest of the poor from joining the schemes. In contrast, FSP is guided by economic and social principles that are drawn from both theory and practice. For example, the PSNP is designed to overcome the perceived dependency on general food aid distribution. To this end, it introduced systematic targeting (see below) and mandatory public works requirements for the able-bodied. The PSNP also has a ‘cash first principle’ in order to stimulate local production and markets. Graduation from the programme is also an important guiding principle for PSNP. The social security programme is guided by the ILO minimum standards, although it only meets part of them. Since the introduction of the private sector social security scheme, transferability has become a major issue and may be the key principle that guides the two modalities, with serious implications for salary scales and duration of service.

Legal and Policy Frameworks Informal social protection mechanisms, by and large, operate within customary laws and are not required to register and are not subject to auditing. The semi-formal mechanisms are required to have by-laws and to register with the Ministry of Justice or the equivalent at local level. This process is believed to enhance accountability and protect public funds from mismanagement, embezzlement and corruption. There is a plethora of global, regional and continental conventions that encourage governments to design policies and strategies for social protection. The Ethiopian government has recognised the importance of these conventions and has domesticated them in local laws and regulations. For example, Article 9 of the Federal Constitution affirms that all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the constitution. Article 13/2 also affirms that the fundamental rights and freedoms specified in the constitution shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other provisions. There are also domestic laws governing some aspects of formal and informal social protection. For example, although gudifecha originated informally, presently it is institutionalised and highly regulated. Under Ethiopian law, single people (men or women) are not allowed to adopt children because of the general belief that a child is better brought up in a family unit (married couple). However, not all traditional child

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support mechanisms are subject to the law. In some cases, a poor family gives its child to a better-off family based on trust. In this arrangement, unlike gudifecha, the child can go back to its natural parents at any time and is not entitled to inheritance from or other claims on the ‘foster’ family.

Targeting Procedures Targeting is the process of identifying the most appropriate vulnerable groups for a social transfer programme and making sure they get the transfers they are entitled to receive. The underlying rationale for targeting is that resources are limited and they should be allocated as effectively as possible with minimum targeting errors. It is also believed that effective targeting could reduce dependency on social transfers such as food aid. Informal social protection, by and large, targets the most vulnerable groups in a community using customary laws and by-laws. For example, debo and jigi are designed primarily to help labour-poor rural households. Each labour-poor household takes turns until all the labour-poor households in the neighbourhood have cultivated their land. Child support mechanisms target vulnerable children from poor families. In rural communities, gudifecha targets mainly, but not exclusively, boys rather than girls partly because there is a general preference for boys to look after livestock. In urban centres, girls are preferred for help with household chores. In the case of formal adoption processes, the law gives both boys and girls an equal chance of being adopted. If adopting families express a preference for a boy or a girl, the reasons behind the preference are established. If justified (for instance, the household already has a girl and now wishes to adopt a boy), then the couple is allowed to adopt as per their choice. However, matching supply and demand or entertaining sex preference is not a priority for the law. The priority is to find suitable homes for vulnerable children whose parents are unable to bring them up for financial or other social reasons. FSP programmes such as the social security scheme, humanitarian response and the PSNP have well-established guidelines for targeting, with appeal structures in place. The humanitarian response and PSNP targeting guidelines make provisions for customary institutions to play a role in targeting and resource allocation. They have a seat on targeting committees and observe food/cash distributions. This is an example of how the two systems are collaborating to enhance effectiveness.

Institutional Arrangements, Rules and Regulations and Accountability Mechanisms As indicated above, semi-formal groups have institutional arrangements, rules and regulations and accountability mechanisms. Idirs fall into this category. They have a by-law which is legally binding and outlines the governance structure, composed of an Executive Committee, Chair, Secretary, Treasurer and Internal Auditor. Idirs are required to legally register with an appropriate government body. Figure 3 is an example of organisational structure for an idir. The religious and alumni-type mahibers may have by-laws but are not required to register as a legal entity. Support mechanisms such as debo and jigi are voluntary by nature and do not have an institutional or legal basis. But work norms are established by sex and age, following traditional divisions of labour.


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Gudifecha is an adoption process that involves the transfer of a child from its natural family to an adopting family. Therefore, it passes through a system that enforces accountability and the wellbeing of the child. This applies to both formal and informal systems of adoption. At the community level, local elders serve as mediators between the natural family and the adopting family. The elders take responsibility for ensuring the adopting family is suitable. If it is done in the court of law, there are legal procedures that both families must go through. The natural family must have clear and strong justification for giving up their child and prove that there is no alternative (for example, extended family to look after it). The adopting family (foreign or local) should prove that they are suitable (for instance, testimonies may be required). Formal social protection programmes are generally multi-sectoral and multistakeholder, indicating that they are institutionally more complex than informal social protection schemes. For example, the PSNP is housed within the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) but has a broader platform (Steering Committee) at federal and regional levels. The relevant line ministries, bureaus, donors and selected implementing NGOs are represented. The steering committee provides strategic guidance on the implementation of the PSNP and other food security programmes. It also has food security taskforces at woreda, kebele and sub-kebele levels that carry out targeting and other day-to-day operations of the programme. Figure 3: Organisational structure of Chilalo ‘Terara’ [Chilalo Mountain] Idir (Arsi Zone)

General assembly

Auditor Idir Dagna/Shum/ (Chair) Secretary Accountant Procurement Cashier

Store Keeper

The public sector employees’ social security scheme is managed by the Social Security Agency (SSA) which is overseen by a Board of Directors chaired by the State Minister of MoLSA. The agency has 52 principal offices and 20 field offices around the country to provide its services. In the near future, the agency plans to establish more offices with the aim of bringing services nearer to the beneficiaries. The Private Organisations’ Employees Social Security Agency (POESSA) has been established to manage the

114


recently launched private sector social security scheme. It is headed by a DirectorGeneral and is expected to open regional offices. It is overseen by a tripartite board composed of government, an employers’ federation, the labour union and other key stakeholders. However, neither the SSA nor MoLSA has grassroots social workers (SWs) or social protection officers (SPOs) that ensure the most vulnerable are aware of their constitutional rights. Conversely, the other social and economic sectors (for example, agriculture, health, and education) train and deploy their own grassroots implementers or facilitators. For example, the health sector has over 30,000 Health Extension Workers (HEAs), agriculture has about 60,000 Development Agents (DAs), and education has thousands of teachers.

Financing and Transfers Informal social protection mechanisms are financed either by member contributions or by community contributions. The contributions vary by area (urban or rural). Members of a typical urban idir, for example, contribute up to Birr 10 per month plus a registration fee of Birr 500 or more, depending on how old the idir is and the assets it has accumulated. These monthly contributions and registration fees are used to cover funeral expenses. Idirs’ transfer policy is based on two factors: •

how close the deceased is to the member; and

•

whether or not the person died at home or elsewhere and a message was sent (locally known as merdo).

The financing has become more stringent due to financial constraints which many believe is caused by an increased number of deaths. Mahibers also require monthly contributions but often this is not enough to pay out on death, illness or imprisonment. Therefore, members are often asked to contribute additional money.

Formal social protection (both state and non-state) in Ethiopia is financed by the public, either from taxation or external donation or by contribution. Although the government of Ethiopia spends up to 63% of its budget on the so-called ‘pro-poor’ sectors, actual spending on social transfers to the most vulnerable has been declining over time. Daniel (2010) defines social protection financing more broadly (to include, for example, disaster prevention, labour and social affairs, social rehabilitation fund, low-cost housing and justice) and finds that this declined from 13% in 2001/02 to 3% in 2008/09. As mentioned earlier, the social security system is financed by monthly contributions from both employers and employees. The system has a formula for calculating how much a beneficiary should be paid based on the level of contribution, age and number of years served. According to Teshome (2010), more than 700,000 pensioners (retired civil servants, the police and the army) throughout the country are drawing their pensions and, as of July 2010, annual payments reached more than Birr 1 billion. Presently, about a million people are insured under this scheme. The PSNP transfers are paid in cash, grain or both, depending on the market situation in the area. If food is easily available in the local market, cash is paid; if not, payment is made in food. Over its lifetime, the PSNP has increased its wage rate from


115

Birr 6 per person per day for five days a month to Birr 10 per person per day for the same period. The transfer policy is such that the entire family is targeted (full-family targeting) with a condition that able-bodied persons cover for those unable to work in the family, but should not work for more than 20 days per month. Despite the wage increase, beneficiaries have shown a preference for food donations because the cash does not buy the minimum ration or food basket of 15 kg of grain and other food items per person per month. Non-governmental agencies implementing social protection at the community level have their own transfer rates, depending on the nature of interventions. For example, a UNICEF cash transfer programme in Amhara Region makes a minimum payment of Birr 300 per person per year, and a maximum payment of Birr 665,717 per year for a full child scholarship. The distribution of the cost data of 224 interventions showed that nearly 65% of the interventions transferred up to Birr 1,000 per beneficiary per year and less than 10% of the projects transferred just over Birr 11,000 per beneficiary (see Figure 4). Figure 4: Percentage distribution of cash transfers in Amhara (n = 224)

Cost of interventions (Birr)

Greater than 11,000 10001-110000 9001-10000 8001-9000 7001-8000 6001-7000 5001-6000 4001-5000 3001-4000 2001-3000 1001-1000 0 - 1000 0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

%

Source: Based on data compiled from Amhara BoLSA/UNICEF project

How are Social Protection Mechanisms Responding to Changing Circumstances? Informal social protection mechanisms are rooted in traditional values and, by and large, remain narrow in vision and scope. For example, it is difficult to find idirs that have transformed into insurance companies or iqubs that have transformed into microfinance institutions. However, more recently, idirs have begun “turning their attention to the living” (FHI/USAID 2004; Brewster-Lee et al. 2010). They are providing homecare for people living with HIV/AIDS as well as educational and health support to orphaned children, mobilising communities to build or maintain houses for patients and taking them to clinics, and communicating with the kebele administration on behalf of patients to secure residence. On rare occasions, the idirs give regular cash transfers per month but as the number of HIV/AIDS patients and orphans has increased, it has become difficult to sustain such support.

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By the same token, FSP mechanisms need to adapt to changing circumstances, mainly because they are dependent on public funds and are vulnerable to economic and political crises facing both donor and recipient countries. The most recent financial crisis has forced developed countries to take austerity measures that involve reforming or cutting expenditure on social sectors, including social protection. However, in the case of Ethiopia, the PSNP, the major public-financed social protection programme, is not affected by the financial crisis because of donor commitment to the programme.

Conclusion and Recommendations Conclusions This chapter began by exploring perceptions of social protection and found that there is a major gap between the ‘standard’ definitions and definitions used in Ethiopian policy circles. This has significant implications for policy and strategy design. Social protection is broadly divided into two categories – informal and formal. Over time, some ISP mechanisms have demonstrated that they can operate as institutions with accountability mechanisms. Therefore, a third category known as ‘semi-formal’ mechanisms is justified. The situation of ISP mechanisms in Ethiopia is paradoxical. On the one hand, despite enormous economic difficulties, natural and man-made disasters, some informal mechanisms have survived the test of time. To some degree, they have demonstrated that they can adapt to changing circumstances. On the other hand, they have failed to curb the stream of beggars that flock to the cities, or reduce other vulnerabilities. PSNP has to some extent stabilised the rural community by providing unconditional ‘direct support’ to over a million labour-poor people, many of whom are older persons and persons with disability. The informal and, in particular, semi-formal institutions have the potential to contribute to policy and strategy design, provided they are aware of the national, continental and global social protection and humanitarian conventions. They already have volunteers and philanthropists who could be trained as social workers or social protection officers. The PSNP, the largest social protection programme, has been implemented at scale without the benefit of prior pilot studies; this is the source of some of its weaknesses. For example, some of the operational principles (for example, cash first, graduation) could have been modified and adjusted based on lessons learned from pilot studies. It could also have engaged better with micro-finance institutions from the start. With hindsight, piloting would have identified these and other constraints and contributed to better design and implementation. Finally, the non-state sectors are known for piloting innovative mechanisms but they rarely scale up or scale out. They usually continue on the same scale through a series of cost and no-cost extensions.

Recommendations •

Conceptual Issues: Clarity of concepts is crucial for common understanding between experts and policy makers, donors and governments, and social workers and the community. The government has recently aligned its national definitions with global and continental definitions. This is a significant change from the previous position that shifted the responsibility for social protection from the state


•

•

•

•

•

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to communities. The government should now focus on a systematic dissemination of its new vision and also give clear direction on the linkages between informal and formal social protection. Engagement of Semi-formal Social Protection Institutions in Policy Dialogue: The formal system should train and equip the semi-formal institutions with the concept of social protection and the most relevant conventions at global and continental levels, to enhance their engagement in policy dialogue. Growth and Social Protection Linkages: Promoting economic growth alone has a history of widening the gap between the poor and the rich. Such a system is not sustainable. The government should devise a systematic linkage between growth and social protection that allows the fruits of growth to be shared equitably by all citizens. To this end, social protection should be mainstreamed in all sectors – particularly in sectors where the lion’s share of growth is likely to be generated. To ensure this, the government will need to train and deploy social workers or social protection officers whose mission will be to ensure that economic and social programmes mainstream social protection. Since social protection is a sensitive area of work that combines needs with rights, the content and quality of the curriculum for social workers should receive special attention. These officers should also be equipped with appropriate monitoring tools. In view of the failure of conventional monitoring tools to capture the most vulnerable, it is recommended that they use a ‘social protection lens’, the content of which should be articulated in the curriculum. Graduation: Graduation has been and continues to be controversial. It is time to recognise that there is a need for social protection that is not focused on graduation and is not necessarily linked directly to economic growth. Not all poor or vulnerable people can participate in economic activities, and people who receive ‘direct support’ will continue to need some form of social welfare after the PSNP ends. Enhance the Role of the Mass Media in Raising Awareness about Social Protection: There are encouraging signs that the media, radio in particular, are engaging in raising awareness about social protection. Journalists should receive training in social work so that they can combine knowledge of social work with effective communication. Further Research: As an exploratory study, this research has generated several ideas that could be further explored. For example, the contribution of PSNP to curbing the number of people that join begging needs deeper study and analysis. Study needs to be made of the number of beggars before and after PSNP, with and without PSNP intervention, in order to assess the claims that PSNP has curbed the numbers of beggars on the streets. Similarly, the feasibility of a policy linkage between the ISP and FSP mechanisms needs to be tested more systematically.

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Appendix 1: Definition of social protection-related local terms Local term Origin Afosha Oromo

Awraj

Amhara

Buussa

Borena/Oromo

Dabarree Dagu

Oromo Afar

Debo/Jigi

Oromo

Gonofaa

Borena/Oromo

Gudifecha

Oromo

Idir Iqub

Amhara Amhara

Ita Mahiber

Amhara Amhara

Merdo Mudai Sahan

Amhara Amhara Somali

Uucha Uussa

Borena/Oromo Borena/Oromo

Z a k a t / Afar/Somali Sadak

Definition The Oromo version of idir (see below) that ensures decent burial for the dead but goes further and supports the survivors to stand on their own two feet. Assistance triggered to ensure the target household fulfils social obligations, mainly weddings. Literally means ‘contribution’ and in the present context is a voluntary contribution towards assisting a clan member (family or individual) to withstand shock. Derived from ‘dabarssu’, literally meaning ‘to pass on’. A traditional information-sharing system. According to Afar custom, it is obligatory to share news when any person passes through a village. News of drought, conflict and other disasters helps in preparedness and triggering traditional support mechanisms. Meaning ‘working together’. A labour-based cooperation and mutual support triggered during the peak agriculture season. Obligatory contribution towards assisting a clan member (family or individual) to withstand shock. Literally means to ‘bring up’ but also stands for ‘adoption’. This is the only child-focused support mechanism in which better-off families take on a poor child as their own. It may be legally binding or voluntary. A membership-based burial society. A membership-based saving society in which payments are made on a regular basis (weekly or monthly) and the money is given out in turns on a lottery basis. This is a ‘share’ that iqub members hold. An association formed by like-minded persons, often around a given Saint, but alumni-type non-religious associations also exist. The news that a relative has died. See awraj above. A traditional information system which serves both as an early warning mechanism and as a resource management system. Elders who have the wisdom to ‘predict’ shocks or disasters. Traditional early warning system in Borana that triggers traditional support mechanisms. An Islamic tradition of giving to gain Allah’s blessing.

Notes 1.

Derg is a local name for the Provisional Military Council that overthrew the Emperor in 1974 and ruled until 1991.

2.

EPRP is the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party. This was an opposition party that declared war on the Derg.

References Amdissa, T. 2011. Mapping and gap analysis of de facto social protection interventions in Ethiopia. Report submitted to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the National Social Protection Platform, Addis Ababa. AU (African Union). 2008. Social policy framework for Africa, First Session of the AU Conference of Ministers in Charge of Social Development Windhoek, 27–31 October. Ayele, Z. 2004. Case 14: The new roles of Iddirs in Dire Dawa. In B. Pratt and L. Earle (eds), Study on effective empowerment of citizens in Ethiopia. London: INTRAC. Brewster-Lee, D., Telilla, M., Clark, A. and Belay, D. 2010. Mobilizing Ethiopian Idirs: Capitalizing on traditional burial societies to serve the living, 18th International AIDS Conference Vienna, Austria, July 18–23. Brunori, P. and O’Reilly, M. 2010. Social protection for development: A review of definitions. Paper prepared for the European Report on Development 2010. CSA (Central Statistics Agency). 2008a. Summary and statistical report of the 2007 population and housing census. Addis Ababa: FDRE, Population Census Commission. 2008b. The national statistical development strategy (NSDS) for Ethiopia covers the period 2009/10 to 2013/14. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Daniel, H. 2010. The state prospect of social protection. Working Paper 11. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the United Nations in Ethiopia. De Coninck, J. and Drani, E. 2008. Social protection is centuries-old! Culture and social protection for the very poor in Uganda: Evidence and policy implications. In Social protection for the poorest in Africa, compendium of papers presented during the International Conference on Social Protection, 8th –10th September, 2008, Kampala, Uganda. http://www.chronicpoverty. org/events/ event/20090529-social-protection-for-the-poorest-in-africa-learning-fromexperience. Degefa, T. 2010. Vulnerability of girls and boys to various disasters in Ethiopia. Working Paper 03, Addis Ababa: MoFED. Demese, C., Berhanu, A. and Mellor, J. 2010. Policy and investment framework: A ten-year road map for the agriculture sector. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Devereux, S. and Amdissa, T. 2009. Options for social protection in Ethiopia: The case of direct support beneficiaries of the PSNP. Paper presented at the IGAD meeting on social protection, 25th June, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Devereux, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. 2004. Transformative social protection. IDS Working Paper 232, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Devereux, S., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Slater, R., Tefera, M., Brown, T. and Amdissa T. 2008. Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP): 2008 assessment report. A consultancy report for the Government of Ethiopia and the World Bank, Addis Ababa. Devereux, S., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Tefera, M. and Taye, H. 2006. Trends in PSNP transfers within targeted households. Final consultancy report for the Government of Ethiopia and DFID, Addis Ababa. Ellis, F., Devereux, S. and White, P. 2009. Social protection in Africa. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA (USA): Edgar Elgar. FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). 1995. The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: FDRE. 2011a. Proclamation No. 714/2011: A Proclamation to provide for public servants pension. Negarit Gazet, 17th Year No. 78, Addis Ababa. 2011b. Proclamation No. 715/2011: A proclamation to provide for pensions of private organisation employees. Negarit Gazet, 17th Year No. 79, Addis Ababa. FHI/USAID. 2004. Ethiopian burial societies turn their attention to the living. Success stories – HIV/AIDS. www.fhi.org and www.usaid.gov. Gemechu, M. 2001. Boran–Oromo traditional socioeconomic institutions and their relevance to present-day development. A consultancy report for Action for Development, Addis Ababa.

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Guhan, S. 1994. Social security options for developing countries. In J. Figueiredo and Z. Shaheed (eds.), New approaches to poverty analysis and policy. Geneva: ILO. Hatendi, N. 2011. Ethiopia: Social pensions. Presentation at a Workshop on Inclusive Growth through Social Protection, National Social Protection Platform, Addis Ababa, 3rd – 4th March. Helland, J. 2011. Institutional erosion in the drylands: The case of the Borana pastoralists. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Future of Pastoralism, organized by Future Agricultures Consortium and Tufts University, March 21st – 23rd, Addis Ababa. Hobson, M. 2008. The Productive Safety Net Programme as social protection in Ethiopia. In Social protection for the poorest in Africa, compendium of papers presented during the International Conference on Social Protection, 8th – 10th September, 2008, Kampala, Uganda. http://www.chronicpoverty.org/events/ event/20090529-social-protection-for-thepoorest-in-africa-learning-from-experience. Holzmann, R. and Jørgensen, S. 2000. Social risk management: A new conceptual framework for social protection, and beyond. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0006. Washington DC: World Bank, Social Protection Unit. JeCCDO (Jerusalem Children and Community Development Organization). 2009. Citizen report card on primary education services in six towns of Amhara, Oromia and Dire Dawa Regions. Addis Ababa: JeCCDO. Mamo, H. (this volume). “Giving is saving”: The essence of reciprocity as an informal social protection system among the Arsii Oromo, Southern Ethiopia.In Informal and formal social protection systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. Minas, H. 2010. A proposal for the introduction of the Social Development Fund of Ethiopia. First draft, Addis Ababa. MoFED (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development). 2008. Dynamics of growth and poverty in Ethiopia (1995/96–2004/05). Addis Ababa: MoFED. MoLSA (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs). 1996. Development social welfare policy. Addis Ababa: MoLSA. 2011. National social protection policy of Ethiopia. Final Draft, Addis Ababa: MoLSA. Mpedi, L.G. 2008. The role of religious values in extending social protection: A South African perspective. Acta Theologica 28(1): 105–25. Oduro, A. 2010. Formal and informal protections in sub-Saharan Africa. Paper prepared for the workshop, Promoting Resilience through Social Protection in sub-Saharan Africa, organized by the European Report on Development. Dakar, 28th – 30th June. PANE (Poverty Action Network Ethiopia). 2006. The pilot citizens’ report card: Pro-poor services in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: PANE. Pearson, R., Webb, D. and Ashenafi, M. 2010. Social protection and safety nets in Ethiopia. Presentation at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Ethiopian Society of Sociologists and Social Workers, March 26th – 28th , Addis Ababa. Sabates-Wheeler, R. and Devereux, S. 2007. Social protection for transformation. IDS Bulletin, 38(3): 23–28. Teshome, M. 2010. Social security provision in Ethiopia. Presentation at the Second National Consultative Workshop on the Revision of the Developmental Social Welfare Policy and Awareness Raising on Social Protection, National Social Protection Platform/IGAD, October 25th – 27th, Hawassa, SNNPR. UNCT (United Nations Country Team). 2011. Ethiopia United Nations development Assistance Framework 2012 to 2015. Addis Ababa: UNCT. Verpoorten, R. and Verschraegen, G. 2010. Formal and informal social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: A complex welfare mix to reduce poverty and inequality. In C. Suter (ed.), World Society Studies. Berlin: Lit Verlag. World Bank. 2003. Social risk management: The World Bank’s approach to social protection in a globalizing world. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Chapter 6 Social Protection amid Increasing Instability in Zimbabwe: Scope, Institutions and Policy Options Innocent Chirisa

Introduction Zimbabwe implements various social protection schemes, which can be classified into three broad categories: • • •

social security (inclusive of public and private pension and insurance institutions, being largely preventive in nature); income security (primarily mitigation measures such as public works programmes, price subsidies, low interest on loans, seed packs, heifer schemes, etc.); and social safety nets (comprising programmes that are of a coping nature, for instance health and education fee waiver schemes, drought relief and food distribution) (Dhlembeu 1998; Kaseke 2003).

The state administers the main formal social insurance and social assistance schemes in Zimbabwe. These include the state service pensions, war veterans’ pensions, war victims’ compensation, old age pensions, presidential pensions and retirement benefits, parliamentary pension, judges’ salaries, allowances and pensions and public assistance (Dhemba, Gumbo and Nvamusara 2002). Other schemes are managed by quasi-governmental bodies such as the National Social Security Authority, which administers the National Pensions, which Other Benefits Schemes and the Workers Compensation schemes, which protects those in the private sector. Also in the private sector, initiatives in social protection include the Zimbabwe National Insurance (ZIMNAT) and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) pension scheme for smallholder farmers. A host of other private occupational pension schemes are provided by insurance companies. Nonetheless, the role of informal social protection systems ought not to be underestimated: “…most Zimbabweans obtain whatever social protection they have through non-formal social security systems and only a minority are catered for by formal schemes” (Dhemba, Gumbo and Nvamusara 2002: 131). This has since become more pronounced, with the bulk of the population being out of formal employment. Overall, the scope and dimensions of social protection in Zimbabwe include aspects of employment, death, education, health (including HIV/AIDS), food security and disability (Chipika 1998; Dhlembeu 1998; Madembo 1998; Kaseke 1998; Kaseke 2003). Assuming a socially, politically and economically stable environment, perhaps there

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would not be much need to look into social protection. However, Zimbabwe, like most African and other developing countries, has been experiencing serious threats in the past 20 or so years. The concern for health, particularly of minors and youths, has been at the centre of the debate (UNICEF 2000; Hungwe 2009; Murisa 2010). Donor agencies including various United Nations bodies, like UNICEF, UNESCO, UNIFEM, UNDP, other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), like Save the Children and bilateral organisations, including DFID, DANIDA, USAID and SIDA, to name but a few, have always played a pivotal role in the promotion of social protection in the country. However, the government of Zimbabwe, under President Robert Mugabe, has sometimes politicised the interventions made by these organisations. Yet, during the zenith of the economic crisis, agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) were the source of food aid to many households across the country. In addition, the DFID-funded poverty alleviation programme has cushioned major sections of society from deep levels of poverty. In this chapter, little emphasis is given to such donor initiatives, although these should not be underestimated. It is important to highlight the country’s geographical location, its political economy in the last few years and the policies it has followed since 1980. Zimbabwe is a landlocked country bordering Zambia, Namibia, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. It attained its independence on 18th April, 1980. From 1980 to 1989, Zimbabwe followed a socialist ideology for socioeconomic development. This means that it followed the tenets of development statism. In the words of Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, this was “a strong policy framework”1 in terms of boosting social sectors, including health, education and support infrastructure development. A paradigm shift emerged, in keeping with what was fashionable in African countries in the 1980s and early 1990s (Masunungure and Chimanikire 2007). This involved adopting Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) policies in a bid to strengthen their weakened economies and to reduce the pronounced poverty that had become rife post-independence. Failing to sustain the socialist demands, Zimbabwe also, in 1990, adopted an economic reform initiative and termed it the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Evidence shows that this move was to have far-reaching consequences. ESAP deepened levels of poverty. Tsvangirai, in one of his speeches, has noted that instead of improving the economic situation in the country, ESAP, which he describes as a “major policy experiment ... reversed the gains of the 1980s in the social arena” (Ibid). Subsequently, there was a period of “crises and crises management practices ... a series of knee-jerk, fire-fighting reaction policies ... marked by policy inconsistencies, contradictions and reversals”. Gendering the debate, women and girls were hit hardest by these dire moves (Chirisa 2004). Specifically, the ESAP era was marked by increased retrenchments, hence shrinking employment opportunities. This resulted in a number of households embarking on informal sector activities for survival because formal employment became a rare opportunity for most (Chirisa 2004; 2007; 2009). Unfortunately, the degree of feminisation of poverty saw many women and girls without any room to manoeuvre. A number resorted to direct and indirect commercial sex work for survival. This placed them at greater risk of contracting HIV. A significant number of the population was decimated in the process (Magaisa 2001) and the overall effect has been growing numbers of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) in the 1

Nehanda Radio (30th June, 2011). Tsvangirai speech at ZCTU book launch, Nehanda Radio, http://nehanda.com/2.

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country. Today, Zimbabwe occupies an unenviable position with the third highest proportion of orphaned children in the world. Estimates by UNAIDS (2010) suggest that approximately 1.6 million children in Zimbabwe are OVC, 62% of them due to HIV/AIDS. In this context, the subject of social protection is critical and long overdue. Social protection aims to cushion communities and sections against the vagaries of poverty. The definition of poverty is contextual and goes beyond financial deprivation. According to the United Nations (2008), it is a denial of choices and opportunities and a violation of human dignity. It, therefore, means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It also means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, lack of health facilities, , lack of food and clothing, susceptibility to violence, voicelessness, living in fragile environments and lacking clean water and sanitation. One can deduce from this that poverty can be pronounced as deprivation in wellbeing, and comprises many dimensions. Chambers (1983) describes poverty as a trap with five linked areas of disadvantage: lack of assets (homelessness); physical weakness; isolation; vulnerability; and powerlessness. Over the years, these facets of poverty have been evident in Zimbabwe in one way or another. For more than ten decades, majority of black Zimbabweans had been made landless through land-grabbing by whites. Around 2000, many families were negatively affected by adverse unanticipated climate-based challenges including floods, drought and crop failure. Prostitution has been adopted by some as a means of survival – girls are turning to prostitution for food to survive because of increasing poverty (Thomson 2009). In May 2005, Operation Murambatsvina left hundreds of thousands of families homeless with urban evictees facing increasing vulnerability, malnutrition, starvation and disease. In June 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (Better Life) to provide housing to many of those who lost homes under Operation Murambatsvina. However, over one year after the programme was launched; the government had only built approximately 3,325 houses, to accommodate those left homeless from the destruction of approximately 92,460 structures (Tibaijuka 2005). In addition, the deteriorating living conditions compelled children to abandon school in order to contribute to the family income, putting them at risk of being exploited, according to ECPAT International (an NGO designed to end commercial sexual exploitation of children). Apart from increasing vulnerability among Zimbabweans, physical weakness is also noted as emanating from poor health and inadequate nutrition. This type of poverty is more dominant in rural areas, which have become a haven for operations by a host of NGOs in the fight against poverty. Quite a number of places in the country are also isolated; they lack access to services, information, markets, capital and infrastructure. The places and their populations suffer physical and social isolation or exclusion. Over the years, Mbire and Binga have been identified as typical examples. Isolation has also been noted as affecting mainly women who, in most cases, are denied education and certain goods and services. However, this issue is no longer as important as it used to be. Zimbabwe has gone for more than three decades now with Robert Mugabe as leader. Such a trend suggests that citizens are demonstrating powerlessness. According to Chambers (1983), powerlessness refers to individuals or groups having no say on all or some aspects of their lives, leaving them at the mercy of existing social, economic or political structures. Patron-client relations are synonymous with powerless weaker groups or individuals becoming dependent on more powerful groups or individuals

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to allow them access to good services. This explains why corruption is rampant in most African countries, Zimbabwe included. The coming in of the Government of National Unity (GNU) has, however, reduced powerlessness as some political liberty has been made available to the citizens.

Characterising the Political Economy of Zimbabwe (1990–2011) The business environment – both at home and abroad – has been subjected to a series of macro-economic instabilities since 1990, when the economy became more marketoriented with the adoption of ESAP. The period after 2000 saw increased economic challenges in the form of chronic inflation and hyper-inflation of over 50% a month (Mabhula 2010, 16). This came at a time when, globally, the economy had subdued GDP (gross domestic product) growth, high unemployment, a sinking banking industry, low levels of investment and the state playing an expanded role (labelled as state capitalism). In this changing economic environment, old certainties entailed in previous business models were no longer applicable. Zimbabwe suffered some structural changes, marked by a decline in commercial agriculture which used to be the engine of the economy. In 2001 alone, a notable shrinkage of the economy happened with a plunge to Z$ 4.75 billion from Z$ 12 billion (cf. (Mushipe 2003). Zimbabwe emerged at that time as the third smallest economy in SADC where, as of mid-2008, 80% of the population were living in extreme poverty (less than US$ 1.25 a day). There was a disappearance of the middle class and a destruction of the national savings base (looking at such aspects as bank deposits, corporate and household savings and pension funds). Government’s hyper-inflationary policies destroyed savings in pension funds, bank deposits, fixed investment and working capital. Savings thus collapsed significantly. Today, the country is facing a massive infrastructural deficit running between Z$ 15 and Z$ 20 billion in new and replacement investment. Zimbabwe used to be well endowed with skills, with a strong educational and training sector. Yet, over the years of difficulty, the economy has experienced a severe brain–drain. This has adversely affected the education sector which is now struggling to regain capacity to regenerate skills (Maphosa, Kujinga and Chingarande 2007). Also expanding on the discussion, the socioeconomic and political situation of Zimbabwe in the post-economic reform era justifies how social protection is a crucial issue. Since 1997, the country has been a brewing pot for instability and chaos, as already hinted upon. From this date to 2008, the political, economic and institutional fabric of the country was one of lethal fragility, turmoil, distrust and uncertainty (Masaka 2011). Indubitably, this translated into increased suffering of the Zimbabwean populace. A sizeable fraction of the population resorted to moving to ‘greener pastures’. Even though in most of the receiving areas, life was unbearable to migrants, the resolute ones decided to adapt to the new areas (cf. Dumba and Chirisa 2010). Internally, many household earnings remain subdued (Maphosa, Kujinga and Chingarande 2007). At both individual and organisational levels, poverty remains a serious challenge. The family fabric is at stake, with 85% of Zimbabweans reportedly living in severe poverty in the decade 2000 – 2010 (ACPDT 2006). The increased rate of rural–urban migration saw a subsequent increase in the urbanisation of poverty. In the face of increased unemployment, poverty was the inevitable challenge (Chirisa 2004; 2007). In


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2005, the government, overwhelmed by the emergence of the largely informal urban economy, mooted Operation Murambatsvina (also known as Operation Restore Order or Operation Tsunami). This left most households worse off than ever before (ICG 2005; Tibaijuka 2005; ACPDT 2006; Chirisa 2007; Maphosa, Kujinga and Chingarande 2007; Toriro 2007; Mufema 2008).

Both rural and urban areas suffered with the deterioration of social services, including health, education and social amenities (cf. Dhlembeu 1998; Chipika 1998; Madembo 1998; Kaseke 1998; 2003). In the health sector, the country has suffered serious blows inflicted by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. From August 2008 to July 2009, Africa’s largest cholera outbreak in 15 years struck Zimbabwe, resulting in nearly 98,600 cases and 4,300 deaths nationwide. The principle cause was the poorly maintained water and sanitation infrastructure. The country’s fragile health system could not cope adequately with the treatment of patients such that, in response, USAID/OFDA committed more than US$ 7.3 million in emergency assistance to support the provision of emergency relief supplies, WASH and health interventions, hygiene promotion and social mobilisation activities, and humanitarian coordination and information management to improve epidemiological reporting and analysis. Ironically, cases of cholera were fewer in rural areas than in urban centres. Changes in the environment, particularly climate change, have a strong bearing on the functions of a largely agrarian society like Zimbabwe. Serious and extreme climatic hazards (droughts, flooding and cyclonic weather conditions) also wreaked havoc in the same period. Observations from 32 meteorological stations for over the last 30 years have indicated trends in temperature changes signifying warming in the country. This change in climate has already had adverse effects, especially on farming. Water availability, human health, natural ecosystems, energy, manufacturing and habitability of places in the country have all become major causes for concern (GoZ/UNDP/GEF 2011).

Most rural economies in Zimbabwe are anchored in agricultural production, which remains the central source of livelihood for most families – urban and rural alike. Changes in climatic conditions, therefore, imply critical detriment to household livelihoods. That most communities cannot adapt to the effects of these changes puts them at serious risk. Food security in rural communities becomes undermined due to low yields in both crop and livestock production, attributed to increasing temperatures, shifting seasons and frequency of droughts. Apart from agricultural practices that are directly affected by environmental stresses, livelihoods, like gold-panning, tourism and firewood sales are also adversely affected by climate change. Government assistance, together with the supply of requisite knowledge to the rural poor – to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change to improve their livelihoods and economic security – becomes imperative. Instead, the government has been characterised by overt state failure over a period of more than two decades, while the private sector has remained paralysed by inconsistent policies and practices. At the same time, civil society has been treated with great suspicion and distrust by the government. The overall situation presents a messy reality, difficult to manage let alone to provide a strong social protection system. Yet, the strength of non-formal social protection systems is asserted by Kaseke (2003, 43) to be inadequate: The problem of social exclusion in formal social security forces excluded groups

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to turn to non-formal social security systems for their social protection. These include both traditional kinship-based networks and neighbourhood-based mutual aid arrangements. Whilst these are more inclusive than formal social security systems, they offer only the most rudimentary social protection. Most contingencies today call for the mobilisation of resources which most nonformal social security systems do not have. Thus, non-formal social security systems represent a second-best option for social protection and most people would ideally want to be covered by formal social security systems.

Political turbulence characterised Zimbabwe, particularly in the period 1998 – 2008, which can be confidently labelled a ‘lost decade’. It witnessed a number of disputed elections: the 2000 parliamentary elections, the 2002 presidential and local government elections, the 2005 parliamentary elections, and the 2008 harmonised elections. All these accentuated political impasse, violence, instability and subsequent polarisation, especially between the main rival parties – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)– ZANU (PF). Fortunately, a series of talks culminated in the implementation of a GNU in 2009 which ushered in some sanity that had become alien in the country. The GNU is a tripartite arrangement that spearheads the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDCTsvangirai and MDC-Ncube (formerly MDC-Mutambara), and ZANU (PF). ZANU (PF) governed the country as the ruling party almost single-handedly for almost three decades, until the emergence of the MDC as an opposition party in 1999. On the policy front, political wrangling has bedevilled decision-making. Thus, GNU has been marked by increased feuding and has become a bloated, dysfunctional administration (Chirisa 2010). Internationally, Zimbabwe has been also been at loggerheads with most of the international community, largely due to its controversial policies and programmes including: the Fast Track Land Reform Programme that spanned the years 1999 – 2002 and resulted in seizures of a multitude of White-owned farms; Operation Restore Order in 2005; and a host of other programmes associated with abuse and violations of human rights, including purported killings by the government in the Marange diamond fields. In 2009, the GNU adopted ‘dollarisation’ as a means of redressing the excessive inflation in the domestic economy (Nehanda Radio, 30 June 2011; Masaka 2011). Globally, at the same time, the after-effects of the financial global crisis in 2008/9 were still fresh in different economies around the world. The shaky government began implementing a controversial indigenisation policy. Some sections of society concluded that this policy has allowed many black Zimbabweans to become members of the business elite class, as most have assumed organisational leadership. Yet, others have argued that it has scared away both existing and potential investors in the economy, as the 51% stipulation in favour of indigenous blacks has been seen as unfair, if not draconian. Overall, the indigenisation policy has seen the rise of motley small enterprises by indigenous players as opposed to ‘big corporatism’. Added to this, Chinese and Nigerian enterprises have increased since 2000 when ZANU (PF) embarked on what it called the ‘Look East Policy’ (Maphosa, Kujinga and Chingarande 2007). In light of the social protection debate, the country has seen a rise in small enterprises whose meaningful contribution to the country’s GDP remains abstruse and less beneficial to majority of the population. In short, the bulk of the population


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lives below the poverty line, implying a dire need for social protection measures (Nehanda Radio, 30 June 2011). Families, households and individuals, in times of stress and shocks, rely on safety nets established by themselves, some of which have since become formally institutionalised. Informal social protection systems are more responsive than formal ones (Kaseke 1998; 2003). It is the bureaucratisation of formal systems that makes them less responsive. In the long run, however, institutionalised systems always mean increased certainty and consistency. Social protection has, in its ambit, a wide spectrum of the issues that define human life at both the individual and community or even societal levels. Informal institutions in social protection in the country include the family, community, traditional leadership, burial societies and faithbased organisations including churches. Most of these are said to be the constituency of ‘civil society’. Medical societies, funeral service societies, and NGOs are part of the formal institutions. Public/government formal institutions include, among others, departments and agencies, like the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MoHCW), the Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture which administers the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), the Civil Protection Unit (CPU). Policies for social protection in Zimbabwe have focused on issues including HIV/AIDS, disability, orphans and vulnerable children (OVC), old age and gender. Some known legislation includes the Children Act, Disabled Act and the NSSA Act – all trying to address issues of social protection. In this array of institutions and arrangements, is there a missing link?

Problem Setting and Study Purpose In the Zimbabwe terrain of seemingly well-articulated, laid-out and known social protection systems, the policy environment remains fuzzy and unclear regarding the formalised packages of the system (Harvey 2009; The Standard, November 15 2009; Tolmay and Morna 2010; ZES 2010). Piecemeal and haphazard social protectionist interventions persist, because there is no ‘one-stop shop’ for the deciphering of meaning and understanding of what should constitute a functional social protection system. The synergy existing between the formal, semi-formal and informal institutions has been underestimated, leading to a short-circuit approach to social life. Today, where there are sharp changes and shocks, including those related to climate change (droughts, famine and flooding), acute food shortages, market shocks and similar risks are quite evident, social protection becomes an issue of primary concern. The aim of this chapter is to make an analysis and synthesis of the existing social protection frameworks in Zimbabwe, in order to find policy options for effective social protection in the face of increasing risks and vulnerabilities. The study seeks to answer the following critical questions: •

•

What are the existing formal and informal social protection systems in Zimbabwe and how effective, adaptive or resilient are they in the context of brewing instability and chaos? What policy framework can be crafted for the harmonisation and sustainability of a more resilient social protection agenda and intervention?

There is no doubt that a policy dialogue on what exists can inform the next steps in the establishment of a solid social protection system in Zimbabwe. As it is now, there

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is a serious gap – the gap of disharmony in policy frameworks and the gap in the lack of innovations to cushion households against impending troubles, including climate change effects. This study is chiefly conceptual in nature, crystallising theoretical and experiential cases from the country’s historical and current standpoints. Social protection is, in general terms, a means of cushioning marginalised groups against the shocks and adverse effects induced by certain exogenous factors. A Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) may be the best method to use to understand social protection, as it looks at issues, like the vulnerability context and the role of capital or assets (social, political, spiritual, physical, human, financial and natural) in the production of a society that is resilient and/or adaptive to shocks. Covering a broad array of aspects of social protection in Zimbabwe, this discourse attempts a holistic and detailed analysis of the subject. Apart from the legal and constitutional considerations in dealing with specific matters affecting specific cohorts and groups of people, there are certain issues that can affect anybody, including accidents and disasters. The government has set up a CPU to look into the spectrum of cross-cutting issues from the angle of the local government sector. These are also a matter of social protection in that they look at issues to do with preventing harm and accidents to social groups. In Zimbabwe, social protection is simply defined as ‘a set of interventions to reduce social and economic risk and vulnerability’ (The Standard, 15th November, 2009).

The Definition(s) of Social Protection in Zimbabwe The identification and analysis of social protection initiatives in Zimbabwe is based on a common and agreed working definition of social protection – a product of consilience of definitions by various international agencies (Gandure 2009). The evolution and general understanding of social protection in Zimbabwe has followed global debates on poverty, particularly the World Bank thinking as embodied in their Social Risk Management framework. In Zimbabwe, there is no explicit definition of social protection provided by government policy documents, but social protection as implied by Gandure (2009: 18) generally refers to a set of public and private, formal and informal measures that assist people to manage risks and minimise the incidence and impact of welfare losses that might lead to unacceptable living standards, and/or a set of interventions whose objective is to reduce social and economic risk, vulnerability and alleviate poverty and deprivation for the welfare of the populace. In this chapter, social protection, therefore, refers to public and private, formal and informal initiatives instituted with the object of improving the general welfare of the populace. The first major study in Zimbabwe on social protection by Gandure (2009) identified six major gaps in knowledge: • • • • • •

the need for the development of a social protection framework; integrating humanitarian efforts with social protection; addressing social exclusion particularly for the elderly; improving the public works programme; scaling up livelihood interventions that provide social protection; and mainstreaming social protection in all sectors.


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Approaches to Social Protection Gandure (2009) notes three approaches to social protection mechanisms in Zimbabwe. •

•

•

The Sector Approach: This provides a springboard and benchmark for identifying key social protection mechanisms in the country under the six main sectors – education, health, food and nutrition, labour/formal sector, livelihoods and informal sector. The Delivery Systems Approach: This approach analyses the main players engaged in the delivery of social protection mechanisms (NGO, government, community and private). Category of Interventions Approach: Analyses the nature and degree of comprehensiveness of social protection mechanisms in terms of being protective, preventive, promotive and transformative (education sector, health sector, NGO interventions, private sector initiatives).

Types of Social Protection in Zimbabwe Social protection is Zimbabwe can be classified into two categories – formal and informal. Formal systems are established and institutionalised by acts of parliament. These include the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), Civil Protection Unit (CPU), others that are group-specific and some that are specialised and provided through government ministries, departments and programmes. The targets are normally certain vulnerable groups, including children, the youth, and women. The post-2000 economic and political instability in the country led to a fall in formal systems and an upsurge in informal social protection strategies. Although a number of formal social protection systems exist in the country, most are unreachable to most of the population. Informal systems depict characteristics of social insurance (support from friends and relatives, social or kinship networks, goodwill of employers, rotating savings and credit societies) as well as people’s own resources (for example, use of savings, sale of assets, sending children to work).

2. Social Protection in Theory The subject of social protection constitutes the sinew and marrow of the human rights concept. Since poverty is anti-human, Bitrán and Giedion (2003, 2) have observed that the world community “… is increasingly concerned about ways to combat poverty and to construct social safety nets that help the poor to get out of poverty while preventing the near poor from falling into it”. Lund and Srinivas (1999, vi) have argued that: A significant percentage of the population in the developing world – particularly those who work in the informal sector – is not covered by any type of social protection. This is because relatively few developing countries have publicly supported pension schemes, subsidised health care, or other social security schemes. Where they exist, they are often patently regressive favouring the privileged minority of the workforce who work in the formal wage sector. On the other hand, most low-income countries offer food price subsidies, food stamps, and public works.

Social protection, according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2003, 1), consists of “policies and programmes designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting

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efficient labour markets, diminishing people’s exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and interruption/loss of income.” Harvey (2009, 184) argues that social protection has also been presented as an agenda that can strengthen the legitimacy of the state, by allowing it to re-shoulder responsibilities for ensuring the basic survival of its citizens and so contribute to reducing political fragility and the risk of a relapse into crisis. Social protection can have the dual objectives of addressing both economic and social risks and vulnerabilities. There are five main areas in social protection (Kaseke 1998; ADB 2003): • • •

•

•

labour market policies and programmes designed to promote employment, efficient operation of labour markets and protection of workers; social insurance programmes to cushion the risks associated with unemployment, ill health, disability, work-related injury and old age; social assistance and welfare service programmes for the most vulnerable groups with no other means of adequate support, including single mothers, the homeless, and physically or mentally challenged people; micro- and area-based schemes to address vulnerability at the community level, including micro-insurance, agricultural insurance, social funds and programmes to manage natural disasters; and child protection to ensure the healthy and productive development of children.

Apart from the political and economic shocks associated with the need for social protection, there are also environmental risks and disasters that are associated with the increasing global warming, which induces the climate change challenge. In terms of what constitutes social protection, a number of theories may explain what it really encompasses. Sala-i-Martin (1995) advanced a ‘Positive Theory of Social Security’, which argues that social security programmes around the world link public pensions to retirement. He argues that the main idea is of pensions working as a means to induce retirement, “that is, to buy the elderly out of the labour force. The reason is that aggregate output is higher if the elderly do not work”. This is modelled through positive externalities in the average stock of human capital, given that skills depreciate with age with the elderly having lower than average skills, hence, having a negative effect on the productivity of the young. Sala-i-Martin observes that when the difference between the skill level of the young and the old is large enough, aggregate output in an economy where the elderly do not work is higher. Retirement becomes desirable in this case; hence social security transfers are the means by which such retirement is induced. Cooley and Soares (1999) took Sala-i-Martin’s (1995) theory a step further and talked about “A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation”. They constructed a general equilibrium model in which “a pay-as-yougo social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium” (Cooley and Soares 1999, 135) towards achieving some actuarial fairness. Earlier, Tabellini (1990) also wrote about the ‘Positive Theory of Social Security’. He observed that in many countries, while social security constitutes a large fraction of the government budget, at any moment in time the number of recipients of social security benefits is smaller than the number of contributors. His explanation was rooted in what he calls “an overlapping generations model in which all individuals


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currently alive vote on social security and that there is no commitment to preserve the legislation inherited from the past [and] that voters are weakly altruistic and there is heterogeneity within each generation” (Tabellini 1990, 1). Tabellini shows that, in equilibrium, the size of social security is larger than the proportion of elderly people in the population and the greater the inequality of pre-tax income. These three sets of theorists argue from the economic perspective, putting into light the issue of age and generational gap in social protection matters. Hinted at in their debates is the fact that social protection is a life-long consideration for households and an inter-generational matter of the state. But non-state actors can also have a role in the whole matter. For instance, Badelt (1999) has argued for the role of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in policies to combat social exclusion. Social exclusion in Badelt’s terms is a complex issue coming in many forms, including exclusion from: • • • •

•

goods and services, hence linked to the traditional concepts of poverty as measured by incomes or by expenditure data; the labour market, which has a monetary and an immaterial component; land, typically in developing countries and widely associated with poverty and social and economic insecurity; security, going far beyond the usual economic analysis of poverty where security typically refers to traditional ‘social risks’ like accidents, illness, and death but also to the physical security of individuals, in terms of safety or freedom from physical violence. This also extends to environmental security or to pure security of livelihood. In the broader subject of climate change, this component is very critical; and human (social) rights, where human rights or social rights are defined more broadly than in terms of material goods and services (health, legal, cultural, and so on).

Social policy should be devised to redress social exclusion, which by its nature is a complex reality. It is in this aspect that attacking social exclusion becomes a multistakeholder venture. However, the role of the state remains central. The whole aspect should be in the hands of the state with other players chipping in to complement state efforts. This is explained in the lines of Public Choice Theory (Howlett and Ramesh 1995). Carment (2003) refers to the 11th September, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in the United States of America, in light of the release of George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy in September 2002. He argues that the Bush strategy identifies the USA’s main threat as failing states, and discounts deterrence and containment as ineffective in a world of amorphous and ill-defined terrorist networks. Carment’s main argument is that “state failure is as much a matter of being able to generate an effective response as it is of getting the analysis right” (Carment 2003, 407). He then asserts that the process of “mainstreaming effective early warning practices into the operations of states and organisations will set in motion a process of effective operational responses and the implementation and evaluation of cost-effective structural and operational prevention strategies” (Carment 2003, 407). This is relevant to all forms of addressing social exclusion issues through social policy (cf. Badelt 1999). This testifies to the integral role that the state has in social protection matters.

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Informal social protection arises when households begin to do anything in the form of intra- or inter-household arrangements. In light of this, de Neubourg (2009) speaks of a “livelihood portfolio” theory of social protection in which he highlights what he calls livelihood portfolio decisions within the “welfare pentagon”. de Neubourg uses the basic economic assumption that individuals and households maximise income under constraints. He assumes that all households face the risk of becoming poor at a certain point in the future. He elaborates by saying they are assumed to face the risk that they may become unable to fulfil the needs of their members, today as well as tomorrow. de Neubourg (2009, 2) observes that: To prevent this risk from materialising, households smooth their consumption over time, setting aside part of their resources to finance future consumption. Additionally, when it becomes clear that income does (will) not suffice, households can seek alternative funding for the expenditures. When these measures are effective, households are able to maintain a particular welfare level, even when income falls short. Being able to generate income (wealth – ‘income’ in this context is not limited to monetary resources) reflects the most important dimension of wellbeing since it reflects households’ capacity to satisfy the needs of their members ‘today’. Being able to smooth consumption reflects another important dimension of wellbeing as it reflects people’s capacity to satisfy their (basic) needs ‘tomorrow’, despite the existence of risks and the occurrence of shocks. The welfare pentagon, according to de Neubourg, represents the five core institutions that households use to satisfy current and future needs in a given society, namely: family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and public authorities. Barrientos and Barrientos (2002, ii) suggest the possibility of covering those in the non-formal sectors of social protection practices in the context of globalisation, which they say is concomitant with increasing informalisation of economies. They point out that: A global value chain approach provides a handle to explore the linkages between informal workers and social protection in the context of a global economy. It facilitates this by allowing us to trace out the changing nature of supply relations between companies integrated into sectoral value chains that are increasingly dominated by large global buyers, and different forms of employment that exist at specific points along the value chain. It further allows us to examine particular social risks workers face arising both out of the nature of their employment and the functioning of the value chain. From the foregoing paragraphs, it is clear that there are inter-linkages between the formal, semi-formal and informal social protection systems. These need to be carefully analysed and integrated into a sustainable social protection framework. This is necessary for Zimbabwe where state failure has been evident over the past decade or longer, so that the dormant social protection systems can be rejuvenated. The country is not immune to the globalisation challenges which have been said to produce informal economies that are difficult to manage. The following section examines existing social protection systems in Zimbabwe.

Existing Social Protection Systems in Zimbabwe Social protection in Zimbabwe can be put into two categories, namely: the formal and the informal. This section begins by analysing the former and then comes back to the latter.


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Formal Social Protection Systems As noted above, several formal social protection mechanisms and agencies in Zimbabwe are institutionalised by acts of parliament, such as the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) and the Department of Social Welfare (DSW). The following paragraphs will outline and explain the issues and initiatives variously adopted with respect to different groups in Zimbabwean society.

Issues and Initiatives in General Social Protection: NSSA, DSW and CPU Formal employment in Zimbabwe has dwindled over the years. Quite a significant number of households have embarked on informal and small family business employment (Chirisa 2004; 2007; 2009). This implies increased exclusion of the bulk of the population from the productive sector. Unfortunately, the informal sector lacks formal recognition and hence falls ultra vires the existing institutionalised organisations, the NSSA included. This means that bulk of the population does not have a formal channel through which to make contributions or subscriptions towards social security against risks after retirement, leaving them vulnerable in old age and their families at risk in the event of their death. Income insecurity is rife among the population of Zimbabwe and this seems to closely correspond with the views of Lund and Srinivas (1999, vi) who point out that: Income insecurity is higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector. This is partly because the absence of labour protection compounds the absence of social protection. As much as 85 per cent of the workforce in low-income countries is outside the formal wage sector, unprotected by labour legislation and unorganised by labour unions. There is evidence to suggest that global competition is leading to increased income insecurity as noted earlier (as companies move from country to country) as well as decreased social spending (as countries try to compete for foreign investment).

The NSSA is a corporate body, established by an act of parliament in 1989. Its role is to administer social security schemes in the country. In October 1994, it started its operations with two schemes: the National Pension Scheme (NPS) and the Workers Compensation Insurance Fund (WCIF) (also known as the Accident Prevention Scheme). According to Rushwaya (2006), these two schemes cover members in formal employment. As such, they are referred to as occupational schemes. As well, Rushwaya (2006) points out that NSSA employs about 700 staff; it has a membership of 2.1 million insured workers, 52,000 registered employer organisations and 123,000 pensions in payment for its two schemes. Countrywide, NSSA has 16 offices in the country’s ten administrative provinces. While it is true that majority of Zimbabweans are outside wage employment (Chirisa 2009), it is also important to realise that a dysfunctional or non-performing economy has over the years eroded the contributions that members of the NSSA made before the crisis. Households have become worse off with or without having made contributions, thus forcing them to rely on informal social protection systems. The poor economy in the past decade or so has left the DSW depleted in both financial and experienced human resources, thus erecting a critical impediment to the social protection cause. Without an effective department of social welfare, great harm has been caused to the most marginalised – some have had to drop out from school; many

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have had to cope without much-needed health services, and some have even died from hunger. It is unfortunate that the ESAP opened the way for the challenges noted by Tsvangirai (2011), Kaseke (1994; 2003) and Chirisa (2009). When the economy continued to nose-dive, it was the poor who bore the brunt, marking the death of the welfare state and the demise of the efficacy of the formal social protection systems. Along the way, some programmes to cushion the poor, like the BEAM, also emerged, but their efficacy was in doubt, given the ever-worsening economy. In 1991, the government of Zimbabwe introduced the social development fund (SDF), which was administered by the Department of Social Welfare within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The idea behind the SDF was to cushion poor and vulnerable groups against the initial negative effects of the ESAP. The SDF had two components, namely: the Employment and Training Programme (ETP) and the Social Welfare Component (SWC). The SWC comprised three schemes: food money, school fees and health service user fees. A study by Kaseke (1994) concentrated on the schemes under the SWC of SDF; it did not analyse the ETP. Kaseke concluded that while government is to be credited for acting to alleviate the social costs of adjustment on poor and vulnerable groups, the SWC was unable to fulfil this function adequately. A number of challenges were noted regarding its administration. These include the following: • Most of the target populations were not reached by the SWC: the school fees scheme reached perhaps 20% of its target group; the food money scheme reached about 3%. • The high cost of applications compared to benefits received and the inaccessibility of DSW offices to large portions of the population explained the low proportion of the eligible population receiving benefits. Applicants had to go themselves to DSW offices and those who did not have the necessary documents were thus effectively (though inadvertently) discouraged from applying. Those who feared stigmatisation as ‘welfare cases’ were also discouraged by the system of selfselection of beneficiaries. • Application procedures and processing were paper-intensive and time-consuming. Approvals and payments were done only at head office in Harare with a normal lag of 6 – 8 months between application and payment. As well, the SDF’s targeting system involved identifying individual households for assistance. • The targeting system adopted was extremely administratively burdensome on the DSW. In the ESAP era, the DSW was given the extra SDF tasks without being given extra staff budgets to deal with them. The DSW staff reported that their traditional work had suffered because of the overwhelming burden of SDF work. • There was no simultaneous assessment of applicants for all the schemes for which they might be eligible, resulting in extra application and processing costs to both DSW and applicants. The food money, school fees and health fees schemes did not have a common application form or common eligibility criteria. The use of household income level as the eligibility criterion regardless of household size appeared to be inequitable. • Lack of standardised, written instructions on selection criteria and proper procedures to be followed led to inconsistencies in the implementation of the SWC schemes. Many individuals and areas were missed while others received double benefits.


• •

•

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Lack of training of headmasters and district-level DSW staff, poor communication between the DSW and other ministries compounded the problem of inconsistent implementation. No link was established between the size of the SDF budget, the level of benefits, and the size of the target population. Data collection and tabulation in the SDF was slow. Little attempt was made to use the collated data to determine whether services were reaching the intended beneficiaries. None of the DSW offices visited in the study could estimate the size of their target populations. There were serious ambiguities in the relationship between the DSW and the SDF Coordinating Unit; the relative responsibilities for the social welfare component were not clearly spelt out.

With these shortcomings in play, the DSW as a social protection ‘shop’ remains a nightmare to reach for many in the country, especially the deserving. Zimbabwe is prone to a number of disasters, including those relating to political and civil unrest, climate, health, transportation, industry and mining (see Table 1). For example, in 1991, the infestation of Lake Chivero with hyacinth weed, the water source for the capital city, Harare and neighbouring areas, resulted in one million residents being put at great risk. Also, the 1992 drought is estimated to have affected the lives of 10.5 million people. Responses to this included food imports, estimated at three billion Zimbabwean dollars. Losses included 20% of the national cattle herd, and wildlife. The drought was also accompanied by outbreaks of cholera and a host of other diarrhoeal diseases, as well as outbreaks of army worm. Other major hazards in Zimbabwe that have implications for social protection include: the anthrax outbreak of 1977/78 which affected both livestock and human beings; the drought of 1982/83 that affected mainly three provinces, and the 2002 national drought disaster; lightning injures or kills scores of people every rainy season; erosion and siltation result in severe damage to river systems particularly the Save River. There are many humanrelated epidemics including cholera, malaria, measles, dysentery and HIV/AIDS. There were flooding and drowning incidents in 1998 as well as the flooding emergency in Masvingo Province in December 2001. Other notable events have been the cyclone Eline flooding disaster of 22nd February, 2000; the flooding emergencies of Matabeleland North Province (Tsholotso District) and Mashonaland Central Province (Guruve and Muzarabani districts) in March 2001 and March 2003; the Zvimba District storm damage of 24th November 2004; and the Negomo Dam wall failure of 1997. Accidents also include work-based and leisure-related disasters, such as the CABS Millennium Towers Construction incident in 1999, the fire emergency at Elephant Hills Hotel, Matabeleland North Province on 24th July, 2001; the National Sports Stadium stampedes of 1998 and 9th July, 2000. Moreover, there have always been numerous transport-based accidents. These hazards are costly in many different ways. People are affected adversely in terms of the costs they incur. Their livelihoods are negatively affected and this calls for social protection measures. Depending on the scale of the disaster or hazard, informal or formal mechanisms would apply. Disasters have serious adverse physiological, psychological and economic impacts on society or the affected communities and hence warrant different forms of social protection.

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Civil protection cannot be the single actor, given the many forms that disasters can take whenever they occur. It is well established that most of the hazards, risks and disasters occur in certain localities and with different magnitudes. As such, the local government sector has a role in ensuring the safety of its citizens and must play a coordinating role in bringing relief to the affected populations. With this in mind, the government of Zimbabwe has created the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) as one critical component of social protection initiatives. It is national civil protection policy that every citizen in Zimbabwe should assist where possible to avert or limit the effects of disasters (see Table 1 and Appendix 1). Hazard reduction measures are administered by the central government through relevant line ministries, with the local administration taking responsibility for implementing and maintaining their effectiveness. The system uses the existing government, private organisations and NGOs whose regular activities contain elements of prevention and community development. These organisations are adapted structurally, materially and technically so that they can shift speedily from their regular activities to undertaking protective, relief and rehabilitation measures in times of disasters, in terms of intensity only, without drifting from their operational principles. The Ministry of Local Government and Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD) is charged with the coordinating role, as empowered by the Civil Protection Act No. 5 of 1989. The Ministry is helped to administer the Civil Protection Act and its policies by a series of administrative echelons extending from the national level to district levels. A National Civil Protection Coordination Committee (NCPCC) is responsible for the execution of civil protection functions and its mandate is derived from Section (41) (2) of the Civil Protection Act No. 5 1989. Permanent members of the NCPCC are senior officers selected from government ministries, departments, parastatals and NGOs. Other members, particularly those from the private sector, are co-opted as dictated by circumstances. The multi-sectoral representation is maintained at the provincial and district levels. However, there are marked variations in representation as some organisations remain centralised while others are decentralised; and within these, representation can vary in terms of staff grades. Unfortunately, there are reports that certain sections of the population have been denied appropriate social protection on the basis of their political affiliation. In the run-up to the presidential run-off elections of 27th June, 2008, many people were victimised by ZANU (PF) because they were deemed to be MDC supporters. Where political violence has erupted, the police and army have been accused of favouring ZANU (PF). Where food handouts and protection against assault are concerned, social protection for all the country’s subjects is in doubt. Discrimination on the grounds of political affiliation is unconstitutional, given that the constitution provides for social protection and freedoms to all citizens, without fear or favour. Having touched on these various issues under generic headings, we shall next look at group-specific issues and social protection initiatives regarding these groups.


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Table 1: A catalogue of potential disasters in Zimbabwe Sector

Phenomenon

Political and civil unrest

War and refugees

Climate

Health

Transport

Impact category Sudden

Service provider

Urban violence, e.g. soccer hooliganism and riots

Sudden

Police

Civil war and social strife Droughts

Sudden Slow

Army, police MLGRUD, MAgric

Urban water shortages

Slow

MET, MLW

Environmental degradation

Slow

MLRUD, LAs, MLW, MET, MLRUD, LAs

Floods

Sudden

MTMLRUD, LAs, MLW, MET, MLRUD

Lightning

Sudden

Cholera

Sudden

LAs MHCW, MLGRUD, MLW,

Diarrhoea and dysentery

Sudden

LAs

Plague

Sudden

AIDS

Slow

Anthrax Traffic accidents

Sudden Sudden

Transport hazardous materials

Sudden

Industrial Air pollution

Mining

Army, police

Slow

“ “

“

“

MT, MI & TeCH, MLGRUD, Police, LAs Mines, Police, MET MET, MI & TeCH,

Chemical explosions

Sudden

MLGRUD, Police, LAs,

Radioactive emissions

Sudden

MLW, MAgric

Water pollution Large mines collapse and explosions

Slow Sudden

“ “ “ MT, MI & TeCH, MLGRUD, Police, LAs,

Small mines collapse (gold panners)

Sudden

Mines, MET, LAs

Key: LAs

Local authorities

MAgric

Ministry of Agriculture

MET

Ministry of Environment and Tourism

MI & Tech

Ministry of Lands and Technology

MLGRUD

Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development

MLW

Ministry of Lands and Water

MT Ministry of Transport Source: CPU (1989) in Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing (MPCNH) (1996)

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Issues and Initiatives towards Protecting Children In Zimbabwe, a child is any person below the age of 18 years (UNICEF 2006). Children have borne the brunt of the effects of HIV/AIDS and other mishaps. As a result, a number of child issue programmes have been either introduced or expanded. At the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on children held in New York in May 2002, Zimbabwe committed itself to uphold the rights of the child to life and good health. Such a commitment is consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights and Welfare of Children (UNACRWC), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the discussion in the 27th Special Session of the General Assembly which advanced the World Fit for Children theme. Creation of a world in which children get the best possible start in life; and having access to education and an opportunity to develop their individual capacity in a safe and supportive environment, is at the centre of all these initiatives. A number of policies, legal and action plans and local government initiatives, including child budgeting, have been promulgated over the years (see Table 2). Since HIV/AIDS has been noted as one of the greatest national challenges threatening the wellbeing of every Zimbabwean, its impacts on the economy, population, healthcare and education systems are undisputed (Chirawu et al. 2007). The overall effects of the pandemic are multi-dimensional, extending into the economic, social and physiological fabrics of society (Zimbabwe Economic Society 2010). One positive point is that, according to the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, HIV prevalence is declining since 2000, for example from 26.1% in 2001 to 15.5% in 2007. Orphanhood prevalence linked to HIV/AIDS for the under-18 age group was 22.3% in 2003 according to a poverty study survey (MPSLSW 2003) and 23.9% in 2005/6 according to the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (UNICEF 2006, 4). The 2002 census found that 48,223 households were headed by children under 18 years of age. Most of the orphans were cared for by the extended family, especially grandmothers whose livelihoods are also precarious (Hebinck and Bourdillon 2001). The erosion of livelihoods and poor coping mechanisms resulting from increased poverty make orphans particularly vulnerable. Corollary to this, grandmothers and children have often assumed added responsibility to look after orphans. In particular, girls often drop out of school to provide home-based care. This has impacted negatively on the unity of the family; hence an increasing number of children are being affected by family breakdowns. Children orphaned and made vulnerable are often at greater risk of numerous and adverse outcomes. The most direct effects are both emotional and economic. Orphans and vulnerable children are stigmatised and discriminated against (SAFAIDS 2004). Following the death of parents, children often turn to child labour, become subject to abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence, and some become street children. Many lack birth registration.


Table 2:

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Programmes and actors in child issues in Zimbabwe

Programme National Immunisation Days Nutrition Programmes

Actors Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MoHCW) Civil Society and MoHCW

Village Health Civil Society and MoHCW Workers and Primary Care Nurse Programmes Early Childhood Civil Society and MoHCW Education and Care

Remark Conducted to improve coverage in addition to routine immunisation Took the form of child supplementary feeding programmes which have been continuous since 2000 – These included suitable complementary foods for HIV-exposed children at 6 months of age. Carry out community health works targeting vulnerable groups

In 2005, pre-school (popularly known in Zimbabwe as the zero grade) was introduced. This is a step in expanding and improving early childhood education and care- the first of its kind in Africa. Basic Education Funded through the National Established in 2001 for the Assistance Budget, the National AIDS education assistance of orphans, Module (BEAM) Trust Fund and now by NGOs the poor and other vulnerable Programme people – By 2005, approximately one million children had benefited from BEAM. Rural Schools Supported by government As the rural electrification Computers of Zimbabwe through the programme continues to expand Programme President’s Office to rural schools and clinics; to enable rural children to become computer-literate. Prevention of Civil Society and MoHCW Involves tracking the HIV status Mother-to-Child of the mother or baby and Transmission reminders for testing the child Programme at 18 months. Expanded Support The Government of A coordinated and collaborative Programme Zimbabwe, UN donors and approach to accelerate efforts Civil Society towards HIV/AIDS response. The Zero Government of Zimbabwe, An awareness programme Tolerance UN donors and Civil Society on prevention of sexual Campaign exploitation and abuse. Pilot Pre-trial Government of Zimbabwe, It seeks to address the situation Diversion Civil Society of children in conflict with the Programme law. Source: Adapted from UNICEF (2006, 17–27)

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Zimbabwe has scores of policies and laws that protect children against abuse, exploitation and violence. Major legal steps have been taken to coordinate, police and monitor the human rights of children. The Sexual Offences Act, Domestic Violence Act 2007 and the amendment of the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act 2006 were enacted to protect children. The amendment to the Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act has allowed nurses to examine and manage cases of abuse. Rehabilitation clinics have been established across the country. Although Zimbabwe has a well-defined policy and legislative framework to support children, a lack of resources has prevented full implementation of these policies (Muchabaiwa 2007). National resources should be allocated with social protection in mind. The national budget is the most important key instrument through which key policies are implemented using the available resources. In 1999, the government started developing a National Social Protection Strategy through the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. The strategy was designed to better target the poor and respond to major shocks which result from the deepening economic situation, worsening HIV/AIDS pandemic and orphanage crisis. The strategy had four major components: the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) which started in 2001 and whose aim is to assist very poor children with school fees and levies; the Public Works Income Transfer (PWIT) for vulnerable groups; the Children in Difficult Circumstances (CDC) programme; and the Assisted Medical Treatment Order (AMTO). It has become apparent that children’s issues and rights can be addressed if the basic issues of governance, poverty and HIV/AIDS are urgently addressed through the budgeting process. In 2006, an amendment to the Education Act saw the streamlining of BEAM. The amendment stated that education is a fundamental right of children and it aimed to make primary school education compulsory. In 2004, before the legislative amendment, the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture (MoESAC), with cooperating partners, developed a National Plan of Action. It sought to accelerate progress towards universal primary education and justified the introduction of an assistance scheme for those pupils failing to get education due to financial constraints. GoZ/UNFPA (2009, 23) has argued that BEAM is “the single largest safety net put in place by the government of Zimbabwe to keep OVC in primary and school levels. It assists 850,000 children in the country”. The BEAM is administered by the MoESAC. Again, due to the country’s poor economic performance, the BEAM has failed to withstand inflationary pressures. A number of children have remained outside school. In the ‘economic madness’ of 2007−9, with escalating costs and erosion of the power of the currency with regard to school fees, there was increased labour migration even by children, with some children resorting to being housemaids. Part of the explanation for child migration was HIV/AIDS, which forced many children out of school when they lost parents and guardians (GoZ/UNFPA 2009). A Labour Force Survey in 2004 by the Central Statistical Office (now ZimStats) revealed that 37% of children aged 5 − 14 years were in child labour (GoZ/UNFPA 2009). The BEAM fund has proved inadequate. Also, not all education costs are covered by the fund. The excluded costs are indirect and include uniforms, stationery and learning materials. GoZ/UNFPA (2009, 24) has observed that “due to frequent school fees’ increases, the number of BEAM beneficiaries has


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been declining”. This clearly indicates that the social protection programme targeting schooling for children has failed. The BEAM programme is often prioritised in the national budget to assist the very poor and orphans. However, since independence, the budgeting process has been a preserve of the executive arm of government, without meaningful input from the legislature and civil society. This also meant that the constituencies represented by parliamentarians, especially children, had no say in budget formulation until the Fifth Parliament in 2002, when parliamentary reforms were introduced (Muchabaiwa 2007). It is regrettable that children have not been adequately considered in budgeting processes. As a result, most young people still feel that their issues have not been adequately captured. The Child Friendly National Budget Initiative (CFNBI) created the Zimbabwe Child and Youth Budget Network (ZCYBN) as a space where children can influence budgeting processes. Outreaches are made to schools and other platforms where children can be consulted on their needs and how these should be prioritised in budgets. During the first decade following independence, Zimbabwe invested heavily in the right to education. The two education ministries received the lion’s share of the national budget (see Table 3). By 1990, Zimbabwe had neared universal primary education for every child. Table 3:

Budgetary allocations to key ministries (percentage of total budget)

Ministry 2002 Education 21.2 Defence 14.5 Health 9.5 Home Affairs 7.5 Source: Muchabaiwa (2007: 10)

2003 18. 8 13.2 12.7 8.5

2004 25.2 13.5 11.6 6.7

2005 24.6 13.5 13.3 11.0

2006 19.2 9.4 9.3 6.9

This was a direct result of the early reforms in budgeting commitment to people’s needs. The budget that addresses children’s needs also budgeted for the right to health. The health budget embodied the ideal of promoting universal access to healthcare. Budgeting has also focused on the right to food, gender equality and equity, the right to identity and to protection by the law. It is, however, imperative for Zimbabwe to prioritise social services delivery, especially in the areas of basic education, health and social assistance. Grants to OVC should be increased. It is especially unfortunate that in an economy where everyone is trying hard to ‘make ends meet’, the cherished value of funding education becomes devalued. Everyone seeks to deal first with the politics of the stomach. Some commentators have observed the existence of uneducated children born to educated parents. This is the extent to which a battered economy can erode the educational system in a country, setting up a vicious cycle of poverty among many members of the population. Whereas, Zimbabwe once prided itself on leading literacy rates on the continent, today it has experienced serious reversals, not least in terms of school drop-outs. This has in turn produced hordes of vulnerable youths, on whom social protection must also focus to restore social and economic stability.

Issues and Initiatives in Social Protection for the Youth In Zimbabwe, the youth are defined as those aged 10 − 35 years. According to the 2002 census (GoZ/UNFPA 2009), this cohort constitutes 51% of the population. They face

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the greatest of physiological, behavioural and employment-related challenges, risks and dangers. This is reflected in the country’s National Youth Policy, whose objectives are stipulated as: • •

•

to promote the health, wellbeing and potential of the youth as the world’s future human resources; to meet the special needs of adolescents and all youths, especially young women, with regard to their creative capabilities and participation in employment, political processes, education, health, counselling, family and community life; and to encourage youths, particularly young women, to continue their education for the enhancement of their quality of life and to achieve equality and equity.

The challenges are hinted at in these objectives. Central concerns of the youth include: high unemployment; poverty; increased orphanhood; involvement in child labour; sexually transmitted infections; teenage pregnancies; early marriages; sexual and physical abuse; alcohol and substance abuse; and the need to access education, recreation and information to improve their quality of life. Surveys by CSO indicated that the youth aged 15 – 24 years constituted 62% of the unemployed in 1994, 65% in 1999, 67% in 2002 and 60% in 2004 (GoZ/UNFPA 2009). This shows how important the social protection agenda is to this group. In light of these challenges, the government of Zimbabwe has put in place a number of measures towards enhancement of social protection for young people. These include: • •

• •

the establishment of a fully-fledged Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment (MoYDIE) in 2005; the establishment of a National Adolescent Sexual Reproduction Health Forum (NASRHF) in 2008, to strengthen coordination and the sharing of lessons and best practices among organisations serving the youth; the establishment of the GoZ/UNFPA (2009, 23); and the promulgation of a number of policies to deal with HIV/AIDS-related issues, including the Reproductive Health Services Delivery Guidelines, Maternal and Neonatal Health Road Map (2007–2015), the National Family Planning and STI Guidelines and the Zimbabwe National Action Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS.

Incorporated in the school and training curricula of the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture and the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education (MoHTE) are issues which pertain to reproductive health and life skills. One of the major achievements towards youth enhancement includes the establishment in 2005 of a Youth Development Fund (YDF) under the auspices of the MoYDIE. In 2008 alone, 335 youth projects were funded with 1,007 labour-intensive jobs being created in agriculture, mining and other economic sectors (GoZ/UNFPA 2009). In the education sector, young people have benefited greatly from life skills and vocational training programmes, with gender parity in youth literacy rates in 2003 being recorded at 97% (GoZ/UNFPA 2009). These efforts, however, could have attained even better outcomes if economic woes were not hampering every stride made. Given the country’s political turmoil, it is highly probable that many youths have remained excluded from the benefits of these programmes. In most societies, the youths are often used by political parties to advance the parties’ agendas. Given the political tensions that have characterised Zimbabwe from the year 2000, many young people are involved in violent political conflicts.


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Issues and Initiatives in Social Protection for Women Women constitute the majority of the poor; they have limited access to resources and are vulnerable to harmful cultural practices. The answer to curbing HIV/AIDS does not lie in changing or passing new laws but in gender equity and equality (Chirawu 2006). Cultural practices and norms view women as perpetual minors. Under customary law women are not allowed to own land in their own right but can only get user rights (Women in Law in Southern Africa – WILSA – 2001; Chirawu et al. 2007). This forces women to be dependent on men. The gender discourse is quite complex. Gender roles tend to relegate women and girls to lower educational levels than males. Even at work, favour tends to be skewed towards men, as women are culturally regarded as homemakers and carers. It is the same with other cultural practices like lobola which make women commodities that can be exchanged at market value. This takes away their rights. The Zimbabwe National Gender Policy seeks to mainstream gender issues into all sectors in order to eliminate all negative economic, social, and cultural practices that impede equality and equity of both sexes. At resource distribution level, it seeks to promote equal and equitable access, control and ownership of resources in order to address gender inequalities. At the institutional level, it seeks to deal with gender violence, inheritance and land property rights (GoZ 2004). Zimbabwe is a signatory to a number of regional and international gender instruments which advocate the increased or equal representation and participation of women in decision-making positions (Kazembe 1987; Tolmay and Morna 2010). These include the: • African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (African Protocol); • Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); • Beijing Platform for Action; • International Convention on Civil and Political Rights; • Equal Remuneration Convention; • Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour • Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and • SADC Protocol on Gender and Development. All these seek to protect women throughout life and to try to resist the feminisation of poverty, thus empowering women and girls. In keeping with the provisions of these international conventions, treaties and policies, Zimbabwe has crafted its national policies in a way that includes issues of housing, education, land ownership and other entitlements aimed at the advancement of women. For instance, bearing in mind the worst challenges affecting women due to HIV/AIDS, in 1999, the government adopted a National Aids Policy and National Strategic Framework on HIV/AIDS. This was geared towards forming an operational base for policy response to HIV/AIDS (Sikhosana 2000; World Health Organisation 2005; Chomutare 2007). The National AIDS Council (NAC) was also created by an act of parliament to coordinate all HIV/AIDS programmes in the country. An AIDS levy was also introduced at 3% of individual income and company tax. This was introduced as a social protection measure that would generate resources to support AIDS programmes and a National AIDS Trust Fund (NAST).

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Gender mainstreaming in workplaces has seen a considerable number of women taking up senior management posts. The state has also created space for advocacy organisations championing the cause of women (Chingarande 2007). The country now has a National Gender Policy as well as a Domestic Violence Act. In historical terms, a number of legal and institutional reforms aimed at empowering women emerged after independence. In 1982, a ministry that deals with women’s issues was established — the Ministry for Community Development and Women’s Affairs (Chirawu et al. 2007) — but it has remained under-funded, concentrating on incomegenerating projects for women on a micro-scale. In 1997, the country adopted the Southern African Development Community Declaration on Gender and Development and, in 1998, the Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children. In 2004, a National Gender Policy was launched (Chingarande 2007) that recognises and encourages the empowerment and attainment of equality and equity between men and women. Its main thrust is to mainstream gender in all sectors of the economy in order to eliminate negative economic, social and cultural practices that impede equality between the sexes. In legal terms, the country has made advances in the area of women’s rights, including inheritance and custody. For example, the law of succession gives widows the rights to guardianship of their children and to inherit their husband’s estate in intestacy, thereby helping to protect them against destitution (Chingarande 2007). As alluded to earlier, over the years, education policies in Zimbabwe have also recognised the basic and fundamental right of every child to access education. Gender and education has always been a grey area due to cultural limitations traditionally favouring and limiting the privilege of education to male children. CEDAW stresses equality in rights between men and women, by ensuring equality of both sexes in the enjoyment of housing rights among other entitlements, while obliging states to take appropriate measures to modify and eliminate prejudices and other practices based on the idea of inferiority of women and superiority of men (Loewenstern and Moyo 2003). In 2007, the government took a step towards reducing gender-based violence by enacting the Domestic Violence Act. Recognition of the gender dimensions of HIV/AIDS has lagged behind. The burden of care for people living with AIDS falls overwhelmingly on women, who are traditionally responsible for the health and physical wellbeing of household members (Johnson 2005). There is a realisation that law and policy reforms can play a meaningful role in the fight against HIV/AIDS, through criminalising and penalising certain undesirable forms of conduct. It can also play a protective function in defining the obligation to uphold the rights and interests of people living with AIDS. The legal framework is thus a useful avenue to explore. There are three pieces of legislation and one subsidiary piece of legislation that refer to HIV/AIDS (Chirawu et al. 2007). In addition, there are laws that have a bearing on HIV/AIDS, chief among them being the Constitution of Zimbabwe (see Table 4).


Table 4:

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Constitutional and legal instruments for the protection of women in Zimbabwe

Legislation/ Statute Constitution of Zimbabwe

Public Health Act (Chapter 15: 06) Domestic Violence Act (Chapter 5: 16) Customary Marriage Act (Chapter 5: 06)

Statutory provisions Assertions on social protection Contains justiciable Section 23(3) rights contains personal law and more broadly the Bill of Rights which provides complete, exclusive and universal rights to citizens of Zimbabwe. Describes and Penalises people for polices infection in infecting others relation to sexually transmitted diseases In the case of abuse, Criminalises acts of the offended party violence can apply for a binding-over order. A man married Protection is not under customary law binding. can marry as many wives as he likes.

National Lifts all forms of Gender Policy prejudice based on the inferiority of women and superiority of men Equal Pay Same job same salary Regulations irrespective of sex

Maternity Leave Regulations

Renders void all practices that discriminate on the basis of gender

Outlawed discriminatory practices based on gender Women can have up Outlawed to 90 days maternity discriminatory leave without losing practices based on their job. gender

Remark In the wake of HIV/ AIDS, women and children are the most vulnerable but personal law sometimes conflicts with cultural practices. Criminalising infecting others is in a way a social net against offenders Protects women’s consent to sex in the face of HIV/AIDS Majority of wives married under this act find themselves and their marriages unregistered within law, hence have no protection under the law. Its lack of legal authority jeopardises the hope of protection and presumed equality and equity. A viable means of protecting women against structural discrimination A viable means of protecting women against structural discrimination

Source: Adapted from GoZ (2004, 1–13) and Chirawu et al. (2007, 17–26) In the governance sphere, a study by Tolmay and Morna (2010) established that while there are more women employees, female councillors in local council administration are still in a minority, even more so at the management level. Even those few women who are involved in council administration are generally part-timers – proof that gender empowerment remains an issue not taken seriously by councils. There are

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many barriers to female participation, including patriarchal structures embedded in culture as well as a lack of resources to implement projects, most of which are initiated by women. Notwithstanding that Zimbabwe is a signatory to various international conventions outlawing discrimination against women, more effort still needs to be put in place for the majority of women to make greater strides (Chirisa 2004). In its economic turmoil, Zimbabwe was labelled as a ‘fragile state’ (Harvey 2009). It is on record as trying to defend its national sovereignty and it has justified its deterioration on this premise (Chirisa forthcoming). The increasing instability in the political economy of the state left many vulnerable and in deepening poverty. Harvey (2009, 184) contends that social protection “is increasingly being seen as an appropriate and affordable response to address long term poverty and vulnerability”. As a social protection measure, Harvey (2009) points to a multi-stakeholder approach to combat the challenges. Bilateral and multi-lateral organisations were pointed out as having had a major contribution in dealing with household poverty in both urban and rural areas of the country. DFID (2007) cited by Harvey (2009) points to the Protracted Relief home-based care programmes and also the WFP providing food aid integrated with other forms of support in different parts of Zimbabwe. Harvey has warned that: Even if social protection is provided primarily through non-state actors there may still be a need to respect state sovereignty and to attempt to involve the government, where possible. One way of approaching this is shadow systems alignment, which aims to ensure that the capacity of the state to deliver in the future is not undermined. Shadow systems alignment, in the short term, would organise aid delivery to be compatible with existing or future state structures rather than duplicating or undermining them.

Informal Social Protection Systems Although there are a number of formal social protection systems in the country, most are beyond the reach of most of the population. As Lund and Srinivas (1999, vi) have argued: In the absence of formal systems of social protection, the working poor rely on informal systems of social insurance (e.g. support from friends and relatives, social or kinship networks, goodwill of employers, sending children to work, and rotating savings-and-credit societies) as well as their own resources (e.g. use of savings, sale of assets, sending children to work). But the benefits from such informal sources are seldom adequate and often uncertain, especially during widespread economic crisis.

Kaseke (1998) has labelled some of the mid-way initiatives as semi-formal, and has argued that informal and semi-formal security arrangements “continue to evolve in response to the inaccessibility of formal schemes and also the inadequacies of traditional support systems. The proliferation of savings-and-credit schemes ... bears testimony to this” (Kaseke 1998, 71). In their study, Dhemba, Gumbo and Nvamusara (2002) found that burial societies, which exist in virtually all areas in Zimbabwe, were established to cater for deaths and death-related needs. They also established the critical role played by savings clubs (although their numbers in the country could not be established because they are not registered). Contingencies covered by savings clubs are many and non-specific; they are also both immediate and long term, dealing in such goods and services as clothes, school fees, death, illness and buying assets.


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Another source is the church. Dhemba, Gumbo and Nvamusara assert that social security provided by church groups is a very viable option as almost everyone belongs to some such group. Church groups contribute not only economically but also spiritually to individuals’ total wellbeing. In urban areas, the rise of the informal sector can be seen as a measure by households to cushion themselves against economic challenges. As such, the informal economy is an anchor for informal social protection.

Informal Economy as a Social Protection Measure The upsurge of informal sector actors in the Zimbabwean economy is explained by the decomposition and/or inelasticity of its formal economy. As already alluded to, this is largely a corollary to ESAP in the 1990s (Chipika 1998; Chirisa 2004; 2009; 2010; 2011a; 2011b). The objectives of ESAP were enshrined in four packages: trade liberalisation; budget policy and fiscal deficit reduction; domestic deregulation and monetary and interest rate policy; and social dimensions of adjustment. Chipika cited in Kaseke (1998, 52) has argued strongly that, “…the reform programme was generally a failure in part because of the way the components were sequenced – domestic decontrol and trade liberalisation were implemented first, with the fiscal deficit reductions and social programmes lagging behind. This sequencing is sometimes described as a ‘partial implementation’ of ESAP.” ESAP was perhaps half-heartedly implemented or, in keeping with Chipika’s argument, was methodologically flawed. It ushered in serious social insecurity among the nation’s households, both rural and urban. It left many organisations down-sized and large numbers of the population retrenched, with no employment and having to fend for themselves in terms of making a living.

The Informal Sector This pathetic situation for Zimbabwe was exacerbated by the increased macroinstability which spanned more than a decade, from about 1997 to 2009. By 2008, it was estimated that more than 80% of the population were in the informal sector. The government has formulated policies (including indigenisation, microentrepreneurialism and ‘black’ economic empowerment) in the past few years, but instead of fuelling economic growth as intended, these policies have in fact promoted more economic informalisation. The biggest challenge with the informal sector in any nation is with public taxation in which public coffers are starved of this all-important revenue. When an economy lacks sufficient revenue then social programmes, including social security, suffer such that households go without insurance against shocks and stresses. Inter- and intra-generational equities are stifled. Even if the economy is to recreate itself and transform from informality to formality, there are a number of socioeconomic challenges to grapple with. The rural to urban drift remains very high. The dearth of robust economic opportunities in rural areas because of declining agricultural productivity and environmental degradation has rendered rural life increasingly unattractive, especially to poor households. At least, there is some ray of hope in urban areas. When these individuals move to cities, they choose to be self-employed. Overall, there is an emerging entrepreneurial-minded urban population in sub-Saharan Africa and in Zimbabwe, in particular. However, the danger with the informal economy is the tendency by its players to thrive on ‘hand-

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to-mouth’ practices. This leaves households and families highly insecure, especially in times of shocks and stress (Chirisa 2004, 2011a).

The Family and the Community As already outlined, with the high rate of unemployment in the country, most underprivileged individuals motivated by the desire to have a decent living are involuntarily forced to engage in the informal sector. These include, among others, street-vending and self-employment including prostitution (Muzvidziwa 1997). In the past, before the agrarian revolution, some would opt to work on farms. According to Mugwetsi and Balleis (1994), farm workers in the period around 1994 constituted approximately a quarter of Zimbabwe’s formally employed workforce. A large labour pool was needed in tobacco, cotton and wheat farms, given the labour-intensiveness of these crops. Yet, most workers remained in the lower profile in terms of reward for their sweat. The chaotic land reform took away even the lower pay available, subjecting the former workers to a social protection crisis. Most have been doing without essential social services like medical aid, pension schemes and funeral policies. Every worker, according to Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” and Herzberg’s “two factor theory”, must feel protected socially, politically, and economically. This feeling has a motivating effect and increases productivity. Incentives have been eroded and some who have managed to grab pieces of land remain very vulnerable given lack of basic inputs and productive capacities. Even the general living conditions of the ‘new farmers’, as they are known, are pathetic. Majority of their housing structures continue to be pole, mud and grass constructions. They do not have access to proper toilets and safe water, putting them at risk of contracting and spreading highly communicable diseases like cholera and dysentery. Rural folk have often engaged in informal and semi-formal institutions which enable them to access social protection through social capital (religious groupings, burial societies, welfare organisations, among others). Reliance on the family and the community (fellow villagers and neighbours) in times of shocks and (di)stress is very high, if not increasing. It may be appropriate to dig deeper into how community groups in the form of religious groups, burial societies, social clubs and welfare clubs have played a pivotal role in addressing social protection needs among community members in both rural and urban areas of Zimbabwe.

Religious Groups Religious groups constitute one of the primary informal institutions in most communities. Their major role is the dissemination of spiritual faith. However, their role also extends to helping the sick, bereaved, impoverished and aged members of their congregations (Cormack 1983). Religious groups, thus, augment the social security of community members in times of need. They visit the sick in hospitals and homes. But such visits are sometimes limited to the members of such groups. Membership usually ranges from as few as 20 to as many as 300 (Cormack 1983). Zimbabwe has a range of Christian groups, including Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, and Reformed Church; a host of pentecostal churches like the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM), the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA), Family of God (FOG), to name but a few; the white garment sects including Johanne Marange, Johanne Masowe, the African Apostolic Church, and so on; and the Zionist churches.


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In recent years, a number of new churches of various forms have emerged. The need for social protection from ‘above’ is quite evident and the churches have been a source of great solace to members. One might also observe that the dominant participants are women. In some communities, church councils have been created to support cooperation and assistance in burial procedures by singing and meeting the costs of burial, including buying coffins and providing food and transport for mourners at funerals if a member has died.

Burial Societies Burial societies are found in many communities and attempt to meet various social needs. When one of their members or a member’s close relative passes away, they assist each other in supplying the coffin, mealie-meal, firewood (if it is in rural areas), and other goods that may be required at the funeral. More vibrant societies go to the extent of covering all the funeral needs, thereby giving social security to members. According to Cormack (1983, 67) “the majority of burial societies have constitutions which permit membership on a non-ethnic basis; in practice they are based on tribal or district ties”. Authorisation or registration of a constitution is ideal as it bestows respect on the society. Briefly, and in keeping with Cormack’s assertion, the functions of burial societies are to: • • • • • • •

advise members when a death occurs; console the bereaved family; meet the cost of burial, including buying a coffin and providing food and transport for mourners; assist the bereaved family financially; visit ill members; pay hospital fees; assist the unemployed; and organise social gatherings for members.

As a social protection tool, burial societies tackle a number of needs for their members in an endeavour to ameliorate the ordeal of social insecurity for individuals in the community. They offer the psycho-social support needed during times of stress and despair.

Social and Welfare Clubs Social and welfare clubs include youth clubs, women’s clubs, crèches and branches of societies concerned particularly with older persons and persons with disability. Cormack (1983) sees these as providing a priceless service to the community yet with little autonomy. Members of the community participate actively in search of common interests. Groups are often supported by church organisations in the form of grant aid, use of facilities and use of instructors (Cormack 1983). Many, sometimes, grow into self-managing interest groups concerned with the welfare not just of their members but also of the society/community at large.

Evaluation of Social Protection Systems in Zimbabwe Evident from the foregoing paragraphs is that informal social protection systems are vital to reduce the psychological burdens facing many communities in Zimbabwe

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today. Members may choose to belong to a host of groups; for instance, one person might be a member of a religious group and a burial society and a welfare organisation. This increases the space for manoeuvre for these individuals or households. In itself, such a move is an informal way to enhance social security. The flexibility with which informal security systems are defined is critical as a survival coping strategy for relief and recovery. Appendix 1 provides a synopsis of what has worked and what has not worked in Zimbabwe regarding social protection systems.

Towards a Sustainable Policy Framework for the Social Protection Agenda Having outlined the different forms that social protection takes in Zimbabwe, it is important to think towards a sustainable policy framework for the social protection agenda. Yet, the political and socioeconomic environments in the country remain uncertain and this may slacken progress. We hope to answer the critical questions of this study by way of a crystallisation of the issues and concerns raised. •

•

What are the existing formal and informal social protection systems in Zimbabwe and how effective, adaptive or resilient are they in the context of brewing instability and chaos? What policy framework can be crafted for harmonisation and sustainability of a more resilient social protection agenda and intervention?

Critical steps in the whole strategy, based on the existing formal and informal social protection systems in Zimbabwe, point to the need to reverse the adverse effects of poverty in the economy. The informal system has, in relative terms, been more effective, resilient and adaptive in times of economic instability. The formal systems failed due to both market and state failures. Since the bulk of the population is deriving its livelihood from the informal sector, it is important not to overlook this sector, if not to upgrade it. This implies considering managing the informal sector in the economy so that formal institutions begin to work again normally. The major step is that of ‘growing the economy’ so that benefits will trickle down to the poor on the urban streets and in the rural areas. Given the multi-faceted nature of poverty in the country, as elsewhere, the process requires attacking the challenge on many fronts and the involvement of many stakeholders. The policy framework for harmonisation and sustainability of a more resilient social protection agenda and intervention should be one which is holistic and in the words of Carment (2003, 407) that which hinges on “getting the analysis right”. This implies engaging in more rigorous research, perhaps spearheaded by the Ministry of Public Services alongside the national statistical division (ZIMSTATS). Without adequate research, it is difficult to make solid interventions. Such information can also lead to the establishment of a social protection unit which then takes over research and policy, making innovations whenever necessary, looking into issues of income, pensions, maternity, and so on as well as taking different generations into account. Reformalising the economy, after more than a decade of entrenched informalisation, is a mammoth task in its own right. The many challenges associated with this noble effort include the need to: break the negative culture associated with the informal economy (including aspects of tax evasion and avoidance, corrupt tendencies, and so on), create safety nets that would cover everybody involved in a more formalised way; provide physical protection from the elements (rain, wind, sun heat, cold);


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break the practice of police abuse of informal actors; and introduce sustainable and reliable institutions to manage the new sanity (Chirisa 2011b). Public institutions and thus, have a big role to play in devising mechanisms that will see the majority of the population on the safer side of life. Key stakeholders in this debate, apart from informal actors, are the Ministry of Small-to-Medium Enterprises (MSME), the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Economic Planning (MEP), the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the different city and town councils. These will, respectively, manage issues of: enterprise development, enterprise governance in space, financial advice and systemisation, future social insurance and assurance, taxation, technical advice, and space provision and management for enterprise growth. Clearly, the government has also been considering enhancing social protection systems amid growing poverty and challenges. The Standard (15th November, 2009) cited the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare as saying: “…Before the economic crisis, Zimbabwe had a well-diversified and viable social security system administered by both the public and private sector ... These systems in terms of design are still intact, however, in terms of delivering services they have practically collapsed”. There have been some short term efforts to address social protection matters in the country, after the GNU came into power. Yet, for a long-battered economy, a long term plan to harmonise the fragmented formal and drained systems is critical. Piecemeal approaches to social protection have little efficacy. In practical terms, creation of a one-stop shop can be part of the long term plan which will then assist in harmonising the process and the desired outcomes. This will echo the definition for social protection as put across by The Standard (15th November, 2009) which described it as “a set of interventions to reduce social and economic risk and vulnerability”. A well-constituted social protection system that is also functional must be one where there are no unnecessary overlaps that enhance efficient and timely service delivery to the recipients. In themselves, harmonisation and alignment are not a one-off event but a process that will see how the established social protection unit works. The unit building should house all the country’s social protection offices in order to attain efficiency, equity and functionality. Constituting it must involve all stakeholders who must formulate a broader and inclusive definition of what social protection is. This is to be done in the context of the risks, vulnerabilities, hazards and dangers experienced in the country and how these different actors propose to make a contribution for the betterment of society. The context here means taking into cognizance the entire historical, cultural and current debate about social protection. The government must spearhead the process so that collaboration of the players and the creation of a congenial policy environment all aim at the sustainability of the cause. Constitutionalising social protection has a key role in pragmatic and programmatic action against poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability.

Conclusion The subject of social protection in Zimbabwe has a history of a limited and disjointed approach by actors and players, and also between the formal and the informal systems in place. It is evident that the fragmentation of efforts has induced more exclusion than inclusion of would-be beneficiaries. Social protection has been understood mainly

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as a reactive management strategy. Populations on the margin of ‘falling’ have been caught up in the worst-case scenarios because no plans were in place to preserve satisfactory living conditions. The economic doldrums that characterised Zimbabwe from 1997, or as far back as the implementation of ESAP in 1991, have seen downward mobility (instead of upward mobility) for most of the population, including those who should be covered – that is, those in employment. The erosion in value of the local currency wasted all the hard labour of many workers over the years. The year 2009 brought with it some sanity with the dollarisation of the economy. However, majority of the population remain excluded from the formal economy. Social protection in the country has suffered more from economic and political strain than the growing need for it. Although the government has come up with the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment policy, acceptance of the policy as an economic remedy remains controversial. In addition, ZANU PF and the two MDC formations comprising the GNU have continued to have political squabbles. This has derailed efforts to create a sustainable base for an effective social protection system. The formulation of a one-stop shop in the form of a social protection unit, handling all social protection matters, can help overcome the inefficiencies, overlaps, duplications and other maladies that have perpetuated the social exclusion of the bulk of the population over the years. Overall, managing both state and market failures through effectively growing the economy will see many sectors of the population cushioned against the worst woes of poverty. Long term, as opposed to piecemeal, approaches to addressing social protection challenges are crucial.

Appendix 1: Evaluation of Social Protection Mechanisms in Zimbabwe: What works and what does not? De jure Evaluation of Social Protection Mechanisms Rating of Performance Type of Social Protection Negative Neutral Positive Formal Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM)

Rural Schools Computers Programme Civil Protection

Comment BEAM developed with the intention of being the most promising cash-based education assistance in Southern Africa, addressing vulnerability and poverty through building the human capital base. The aim was to enable rural children to become computerliterate. It was to be run by the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) to foster awareness and where possible to avert or limit the effects of disasters.


Type of Social Protection Zero Tolerance Campaign Pilot Pre-trial Diversion Programme Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission Programme National Gender Policy Informal Support from friends, relatives, social or kinship networks Goodwill of employers Rotating savings and credit societies Religious groups

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Rating of Performance Comment Negative Neutral Positive An awareness programme on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse It seeks to address the situation of children in conflict with the law with a view to rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into society. It is a requirement in all medical institutions that all pregnant women and children at 18 months undergo HIV testing. It renders void all practices that discriminate on the basis of gender. This provides support in the case of loss and family challenges.

The initiative provides groceries to employees as well as advance payrolls. Collective sharing of a negotiated amount for monthly incomes Faith-based initiatives and social touch programmes driven by the duty of care to improve the wellbeing of man as a spiritual being

De facto Evaluation of Social Protection Mechanisms Comment Type of Social Rating of Performance Ideally Protection Negative Neutral Positive Formal Basic Education BEAM is the most promising Assistance cash-based education assistance Module (BEAM) in Southern Africa, addressing vulnerability and poverty through building the human capital base. Rural Schools Its success was largely dependent Computers on the rural electrification Programme programme. However, the failure of that programme also impacted the computerisation programme.

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Civil Protection

Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission Programme National Gender Policy

Pilot Pre-trial Diversion Programme

Zero Tolerance Campaign Informal Support from friends, relatives, social or kinship networks Goodwill of employers Rotating savingsand-credit societies Religious groups

Largely run by the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) to raise awareness and avert or limit effects of disasters – But it has been largely reactive, especially in the case of flooding. It seems to be a success story in that it is a requirement in all medical institutions that all pregnant women and children at 18 months undergo HIV testing. It has fostered gender equality; however, its lack of legal authority jeopardises hopes of protecting presumed equality and equity. The fact that Zimbabweans are generally law-abiding renders success in this direction peripheral since there are few cases where juveniles are in conflict with the law. It was an awareness programme on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. General family acceptance was a major contributor to community wellbeing.

Fairly applied but not uniform across sectors Still active but subject to society corruption and deceit Faith-based initiatives and social touch programmes driven by the duty of care to improve the wellbeing of man as a spiritual being made a significant contribution in providing safety nets, especially between 2000 and 2011 when the political and economic health of the country was in tatters.

References ACPDT (Africa Community Publishing and Development Trust). 2006. Reviving our hopes: Community views on poverty and economic survival. Cape Town: Africa Community Publishing and Development Trust. ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2003. Social protection – Our framework, policies and strategies. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Badelt, C. 1999. The role of NPOs in policies to combat social exclusion. Social Protection Discussion Paper No 9912. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Barrientos, A. and Barrientos, S.W. 2002. Extending social protection to informal workers in the horticulture global value chain. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0216. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Bitrán, R. and Giedion, U. 2003. Waivers and exemptions for health services in developing countries. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0308. Washington, DC: World Bank. Carment, D. 2003. Assessing state failure: Implications for theory and policy. Third World Quarterly 24(3): 407–427. Chambers, R.J.H. 1983. Rural development: Putting the last first. London: Longman. Chingarande, S.D. 2007. An analysis of gender-related developments and challenges in Zimbabwe since independence. In F. Maphosa, K. Kujinga and S.D. Chingarande (eds.), Zimbabwe’s development experiences since 1980: Challenges and prospects for the future. Harare: OSSREA. Chipika, J. 1998. Macro-economic policies and social security in rural areas. In E. Kaseke (ed.), Social security systems in rural Zimbabwe. Harare: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Chirawu, S. 2006. Till death do us part: Marriage, HIV and AIDS and the law in Zimbabwe. Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender, 13(1). Chirawu, S., Murungu, G., Nzira, T., Chikwanda, R. and Zunguze, M. 2007. Challenging the status quo: Gender, HIV and AIDS and the law in Zimbabwe: A rights-based approach. Harare: Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust. Chirisa, I. 2004. Mainstreaming gender into economic empowerment: A study of the women in the informal sector in Harare. Unpublished dissertation. Harare: Department of Rural & Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe. 2007. Post-2005 Harare: A case of the informal sector and street vending resilience. What options do key actors have? Local Governance Development Journal 1(1): 53–64. 2009. The geography of informal sector operations (ISOs): A perspective of urban Zimbabwe. Journal of Geography and Regional Planning 2(4): 66–79. 2010. Inner-city revitalization and the poor in Harare: Experiences, instruments and lessons from Mbire. In Alonso Ayala & Ellen Geurts (eds.), Urbanising Africa: The city centre revisited – Experiences with inner-city revitalisation from Johannesburg (South Africa), Mbabane (Swaziland), Lusaka (Zambia), Harare and Bulawayo (Zimbabwe). IHS Working Paper 026, Rotterdam: IHS. 2011a. Gender, spatiality and urban informality in Zimbabwe: A case of women in the informal sector in pre-2005 Harare. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. 2011b. Dodging the police, reinventing time: Time use and the daily behaviour of street vendors in Harare CBD, Zimbabwe. Paper prepared for the 33rd International Association for Time Use Research (IATUR) Conference: Measuring and Mapping Activities, Oxford, UK. 31st July – 4th August. (forthcoming). National identity and the question of sovereignty in the SADC regional bloc: Rhetoric, experiences and the way forward. Dounia. Chomutare, G. 2007. The state of the national health system in Zimbabwe and its interface with the HIV and AIDS epidemic. In F. Maphosa, K. Kujinga and S.D. Chingarande (eds.), Zimbabwe’s development experiences since 1980: Challenges and prospects for the future. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. Cooley, T.F. and Soares, J. 1999. A positive theory of social security based on reputation. Journal

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Chapter 7 Social Protection and Climate Change Adaptation in Lesotho: Opportunities and Constraints Patrick Gwimbi

Introduction and Background Climate change is one of the biggest contemporary threats to livelihoods and is heavily linked to increased incidents of disaster occurrence in Africa (IPCC 2007; Gerten and Rost 2010; Ziervogel and Ericksen 2010). Vulnerability studies show that incidences of disaster linked to climate change are likely to increase under projected climatic regimes unless timely interventions are undertaken. While the impacts affect everyone, the poor are the worst hit owing to their weak economies, greater reliance on climatesensitive sectors and weak capacity to adapt (Slater and Matseliso 2008). These challenges exacerbate the already low levels of human development on the continent, threatening to stall poverty reduction initiatives and progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In Africa, vulnerabilities to climate change faced by the poor lie at the core of their inability to cope with climate risks (Johnson and Krishnamurthy 2010). Limited resources reduce their capacity to respond and adapt to the effects of climate change. Adger, Arnell and Tompkins (2005) argue that the resources available to enable poor people to cope with such exposures are often the major constraints. Within this context, social protection has been acknowledged as one important response to the constraints faced by the poor against shocks and stresses associated with climate change (Davies et al. 2008). Adaptation to climate change has been embraced by the climate change community as an opportunity to effectively integrate social protection and climate change adaptation in response to risks posed by climate change among the poor. The response to this challenge has been increasing calls for social protection funding in an attempt to meet the adaptation needs of the poor by governments. In Southern Africa, social protection support as a mitigation measure against poverty and the disadvantaged in society by both governments and welfare-oriented non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is well documented (Croome, Nyanguru and Molisana 2007; Devereux and Mhlanga 2008). Examples include Mozambique’s food subsidy programme for 160,000 people unable to work, Lesotho’s unconditional non-contributory pension scheme for 70,000 people over 70 years (Bello et al. 2007), Namibia’s unconditional universal old age pension scheme for 100,000 people, and South Africa’s old age pension scheme for 1.9 million people (Devereux 2010). Elsewhere in Africa, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia has

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been used to bridge food gaps in communities using cash or food transfers while building community assets at the same time. The PSNP delivers social transfers to some 8 million Ethiopians each year, either through public works activities or as direct support for households that are labour-constrained (Devereux and SabatesWheeler 2007). Nevertheless, most of these interventions lack comprehensive frameworks that point towards a convergence between social protection and climate change adaptation (CCA). This seems to stem from conceptual weaknesses that lack a holistic view of climate change, vulnerabilities, adaptation and social protection as an integrated strategy that can effectively address the vulnerability of poor people to climate change (Bonfiglioli and Watson 2011). Lesotho, a country with a population of 1.96 million (WHO 2009), 80% of whom live in rural areas and pursue rain-fed-related livelihoods, is vulnerable to climate change (LVAC 2008; Turner 2009). Considerable research on the impact of climate change has revealed that droughts, snow, strong winds and even floods are some of the consequences of climate change faced by the country. Efforts to lessen the impacts of these shocks and stresses on the poorest at-risk communities have largely, however, relied on disjointed interventions derived from the domains of social protection and National Adaptation Programmes of Action against climate change. In spite of these efforts, relatively little research has been done to assess how social protection and climate change adaptation can be integrated to increase the adaptive capacity of the poor to effectively respond to climate change risks. This chapter explores the role of social protection in supporting climate change adaptation among poor rural communities of Lesotho. The chapter presents the findings of an analysis of the linkages between livelihood vulnerability to climate change and intervention strategies meant to address the challenges in the rural communities of Lesotho. The gaps and opportunities between social protection and climate change adaptation are examined with the aim of promoting their integration. A range of secondary data sources including documents from relevant government ministries, NGOs, farmer organisations and the University of Lesotho provided the evidence used in the study. Government documents included those from: agriculture and food security; health and social welfare; the disaster management authority; natural resources agencies including meteorological services; Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC) Annual Reports from 2002 to 2009; and the Bureau of Statistics. Documents from NGOs engaged in hunger-alleviating activities in Lesotho included those from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, the World Food Programme (WFP), World Vision, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Reports from farmer organisations were also reviewed. To complement some limitations in the literature, key informant interviews were conducted with government and NGO officials working in the sectors mentioned above to solicit information regarding the evidence from secondary data sources. The informants were divided into three categories: those directly involved with formulating and implementing policies and programmes; those supporting the implementation of such programmes; and rural households vulnerable to climate change. Time constraints limited household informant interviews to selected members in one community, Manonyane, chosen because of its proximity to the place of research. The community has a population of 22,491 (Bureau of Statistics 2007) divided into nine administrative wards. At commune level, key informants selected for interviews

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included three councillors, three chiefs, five local village leaders, and four referred households that had received some aid in the past. Analysis of the data mainly involved collation of key informant interview results with secondary data collected earlier and interpretation of figures from secondary data sources. The following section defines the key areas of enquiry and the conceptual framework used to guide the research. The section is followed by the main findings, focusing on the country background and its vulnerability to climate change, risk of rural livelihoods to climate change, current responses to climate risk challenges, opportunities and gaps in current interventions and suggestions on the way forward. A conclusion marks the end of the chapter.

Key Areas of Enquiry and Conceptual Framework The emergence of the linkages between social protection and climate change adaptation can be viewed as a response to the increased awareness and concerns that people are not all equally vulnerable to climate change (Davies et al. 2008). Poor people are the most vulnerable and the first to lose their livelihoods when weather-related disasters strike, because of their limited resources and capacity to cope and adapt (Tanner and Mitchell 2008). Their livelihood sources are equally narrow and climate-sensitive (Apparusu 2011). The response to climate change challenges has witnessed the advocacy of a paradigm shift towards safeguarding the poor against climate change shocks (Davies et al. 2008). The ‘adaptive social protection’ conceptual framework is now increasingly viewed as one solution. This framework calls for an integrated approach that responds to climate change impacts among the poor by integrating social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. This section starts by defining the key terms leading to the adaptive social protection conceptual framework.

Vulnerability to Climate Change The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines vulnerability as “the degree to which geo-physical, biological and socioeconomic systems are susceptible to and unable to cope with adverse impacts of climate change” (Schneider et al. 2007: 783). Liverman (2001) and Cutter (1996) distinguish two general strands in studies of vulnerability, one bio-physical and the other social. Bio-physical vulnerability is viewed in terms of the amount of damage that occurs (Brooks 2003). Its primary focus is the characterisation of exposure to a hazard in bio-physical terms, with the spatial distribution of the hazardous condition, human occupancy of the hazardous zone and estimated impact magnitude, duration and frequency of the hazard as its main tenets (Leary 2010). The second strand gives primary attention to social vulnerability. The causes of vulnerability are sought in the social processes and conditions that place people in harm’s way and shape their capacities to cope with and adapt to change, and recover from harm (Leary 2010). Its essential feature is a focus on social aspects of the phenomenon, where access to resources that respond to hazard risks is based on the social and economic resources available to people. Social inequalities, therefore, shape the susceptibility of the poor to harm and also govern their ability to respond (Cutter, Boruff and Shirley 2003). Poverty, therefore, becomes an important issue to

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address in social vulnerability reduction, because the poor face great challenges with respect to resources that enable them to respond to climate change threats, and are more likely to live in marginal areas (Wisner 1993) where they are more susceptible to shocks because their assets are low. Resilience is often embedded within social vulnerability and refers to the capacity of the affected population, system, or place to buffer or adapt to hazard exposures. With reference to climate change, resilience is used along with adaptation to gauge how society responds to this threat source (Cutter et al. 2008).

Vulnerability Assessment Vulnerability assessment is a key aspect of anchoring assessments of climate change impacts to current development planning (Downing and Partwardhan 2002). A variety of methods of vulnerability assessment have been developed over the past several decades in natural hazards, food security, poverty analysis, sustainable livelihoods and related fields. In southern Africa, chronic and persistent vulnerability to climate change prevails and is worsened by the spread of HIV/AIDS that weakens the capacity of the poor to respond. As a result of this protracted crisis, several vulnerability assessments are conducted to provide a deeper understanding of food insecurity. In Lesotho, the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC) is a multistakeholder cross-sectoral committee under the wings of the Disaster Management Authority (LVAC 2008). It carries out annual vulnerability assessments throughout the country, providing details on food deficits in six livelihood zones in the country. The LVAC uses the Household Economy Approach (HEA) and its associated software package, RiskMap. The HEA identifies the main sources of food and income, and the main categories of expenditure, for each of the main livelihood groups in the country. Primary data are collected at the community and household level, applying different research methods and tools such as participatory rural appraisal, in-depth household interviews, and focus group discussions. Qualitative methods are mainly used for collecting and analysing data in community-based vulnerability assessment committees (VACs). Areas that are identified as likely to face food insecurity (for example, on account of poor crop performance due to poor weather indicators) are selected for further assessment to ascertain the situation on the ground.

Climate Change Adaptation To reduce vulnerability to climate change, an understanding of how individuals, groups and natural systems prepare for and respond to changes in climate is crucial. For developing countries like Lesotho, adaptation is an important response option to climate change. The IPCC defines climate change adaptation as, “Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Prowse and Scott 2008, 42). Burton et al. (2002) also view adaptation as the ability of social and environmental systems to adjust to change in order to cope with the consequences of change. Similarly, Smit et al. (2000) suggest adaptation to be the adjustments made in ecological–social– economic systems in response to actual or expected climate stimuli, their effects or


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impacts. Adaptation is, therefore, a process of deliberate change in anticipation of or in reaction to external stimuli and stresses. The notion of adaptive capacity, built on understandings of resilience, has a broader application in adaptation and encompasses deliberate changes in response to or anticipation of environmental changes, including drought and desertification. From a developing country policy perspective, the importance of climate change adaptation is confirmed by the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), mandated in the Marrakech Accords of the 2001 Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Osman-Elasha and Downing 2011). Under NAPA, each country identifies adaptation priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change. NAPA is an adaptation initiative aimed at building the adaptive capacity of the most vulnerable communities in least-developed countries (LDCs) through the identification and development of specific measures aimed at reducing the vulnerabilities to climate change of the different groups and sectors.

Social Protection Given the limited capacity of the poor to sustain themselves in the event of climate change shocks, the case for public intervention has been argued for. Social protection, defined by Holzmann and Jørgensen (2000) as public interventions or support to assist the critically poor better manage risks, has emerged as one of the best responses. According to Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2007), social protection can be understood in terms of four key measures. These include: • protective measures which provide relief from deprivation; • preventive measures that are designed to prevent deprivation; • promotive measures aimed at enhancing income and capabilities; and • transformative measures which seek to address concerns of social justice and exclusion. The guiding principles of social protection include; helping the poor maintain access to basic social services, avoid social exclusion and minimise the adoption of erosive coping strategies following livelihood shocks. As a rule, ex ante risk reduction is preferable to ex post risk management. Proactive interventions can mitigate or reduce the risk; for instance, irrigation reduces yield variability in rain-fed agriculture. Reactive interventions on the other hand can only support coping strategies, such as food aid after harvests fail. Where consumption transfers are introduced to compensate for declines in agricultural production, the question arises whether supporting agriculture might not be more sustainable and development-oriented than transferring food or cash to buy food (Devereux 2001). When tailored to climate change, social protection is intended to establish a framework that protects and strengthens poor people’s resilience to climate change risks by combining the key elements of social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation approaches, to promote climate-resilient rural livelihoods in both policy and practice (Davies et al. 2008).

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Adaptive Social Protection Adaptive social protection is a combination of social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in policy and practice (Davies et al. 2008). It is premised on the understanding that combining these three aspects simultaneously can effectively tackle the underlying causes of vulnerability and promote the ability of poor people to adapt to a changing climate (see Figure 1), through maximising the advantages that social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation each brings to poverty and vulnerability reduction. Figure 1: Adaptive social protection conceptual framework

‘Adaptive social protection’

Sp can increase resilience to disasters or rebuld assets after a disaster

Social protection

SP can suppert adaptive capacity through building assets, supporting livehoods, or increasing the rights of the vulnerable

Disaster risk reduction

Climate change adaptation

CCA is characterised by tackling vulnerability to changing distribution ot extreme climatic events

Source: Mitchell and van Aalst (2008) Davies et al. (2008) identify three key elements of adaptive social protection as: • •

•

reducing dependence on climate-sensitive livelihood activities through adaptive strategies; targeting actions based on the root causes of poverty in specific regions or sectors, covering multiple shocks and stresses and emphasising rights-based advocacy linked to climate change arguments; and long term social protection with adaptation to climate change risks.

The ultimate goal of adaptive social protection is to transform productive livelihoods as well as to protect and adapt to changing climate conditions (Cannon 2008). To achieve this, funding is needed for those areas and groups prone to climate change disasters. This is where social protection comes in. Examples of adaptive social protection in the literature include cash transfers disbursed directly to vulnerable households or delivered in exchange for work or fulfilment of certain conditions, covering the critical period leading up to the harvest in cases where severe droughts strike. Other examples include weather-indexed crop insurance, free input distribution and seed fairs, asset transfers and cash transfers, all of which can enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities against future climate-related shocks (Davies et al. 2008).


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Vulnerability of Rural Livelihoods to Climate Change in Lesotho Country Background Lesotho is a land-locked, mountainous country completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa, with an altitude of, at least, 1,500 metres above sea level (Chakela 1999). Of its 30,355 km2 land area, only 13% is deemed suitable for crop production (Mochebelele et al. 1992), the rest being predominantly rocky and mountainous. The climate is extremely variable, with temperatures ranging from -10° C in winter to 30° C in summer (Chakela 1999). The annual rainfall averages 750mm, but varies considerably according to area, with the highlands experiencing an average of 760mm. The normal rainy season runs from October to March. Lesotho is divided into four agro-ecological zones (see Figure 2): the lowlands (17%), foothills (15%), the Senqu River Valley (9%), and the mountains (59%). The cultivable land is largely confined to the lowlands and foothills to the west and the Senqu River Valley to the south, leaving the mountain region suitable only for grazing and, in recent years, for water and hydropower development (LVAC 2008). The vulnerability of crops to climate change is largely based on the exposure and sensitivity of the different zones and the nature of activities practised in those zones (Ministry of Natural Resources 2007). The southern lowlands and the Senqu River Valley are the most vulnerable to climate change, followed by the mountains and lastly the lowlands and foothills. Communities residing in the southern lowlands and the Senqu River Valley are mainly small livestock farmers (LVAC 2008). Figure 2: Ecological zones of Lesotho

rt No

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he

rn

w Lo

lan

he

r

nd

d Mountain Foothill

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Source: LVAC (2008)

la ow nL

alley River V

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Rural Community Vulnerability to Climate Change Lesotho’s Initial National Communication under the UNFCCC (Ministry of Natural Resources 2000) identified eight sectors as highly vulnerable to climate change: agriculture, water, rangelands, forestry, soils, health, bio-diversity, and Basotho culture. Agriculture, water and health are considered in this study as they are deemed to impact directly on rural communities – the focus of the study (see Table 1). Table 1:

Sector vulnerabilities to climate change as depicted by the NAPA report

Vulnerable sector Agriculture

Vulnerabilities Crop production is adversely affected by reduced rainfall and frequent droughts. Drought and high temperatures exacerbate incidences of disease and pests. Resultant crop failures lead to food shortages and famine. Livestock and rangelands Livestock production is deteriorating due to degradation of the rangelands. The net effect is increased livestock mortality and lowered quality of livestock products. Extreme weather conditions are conducive to disease and pest incidences. Water resources Groundwater resources are negatively affected by a shortened rainfall season. This results in inadequate annual recharge of aquifers, lower water tables and springs drying up. In the mountains, the wetlands are drying up, affecting the reliability of perennial streams. Health Frequent drought occurrences result in limited availability and quality of water, leading to disease out-breaks compounded by malnutrition and famine. Source: Ministry of Natural Resources 2007 The area of land under cultivation has fluctuated over the past decades, ranging from 450,000 hectares in 1969 to 122,808 hectares in 2009 (Ministry of Natural Resources 2000, 2007). The fluctuations have been largely attributed to rainfall variability over the years. Between 1990 and 1996, the total area under cultivation fluctuated between 136,500 and 300,500 hectares (Ministry of Natural Resources 2000). In 2009, 122,808 hectares of land had been planted on crops, representing a decrease of 18,778 hectares (13%) over the previous season (LFSMS 2010). Late rains, early frosts and erratic hailstorms have been key determinants of the area under cultivation and harvests each year (LMS 1999). The decline in land area under cultivation is reflected in the yield output of the staple crops – maize, sorghum and wheat. The production level of maize, for example, has been on the decline since 1999 (see Figure 3). The southern lowlands zone has been the worst affected and has experienced maize yield losses of more than 25% of the baseline.


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Figure 3: Maize production in Lesotho (1980–2005) Maize Production in Lesotho 300000

250000

Metric Tonnes

200000

150000

Series1

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50000

19 80 19 81 81 19 /2 82 19 /3 83 19 /4 84 19 /5 85 19 /6 86 19 /7 87 19 /8 8 19 8/9 89 19 /90 90 / 19 91 91 19 /2 92 19 /3 93 19 /4 94 19 /5 95 19 /6 96 19 /7 97 19 /8 9 19 8/9 99 20 /00 00 20 /01 01 / 20 02 02 20 /3 03 20 /4 04 /5

0

Year

Source: Matarira (2009) Rural communities, particularly the poor, are the worst hit by declines in staple crop output (see Figure 4). The factor that makes them more vulnerable is their incapacity to adapt. Part of this deficiency is the lack of infrastructure and resources to respond to climate change risks. Marake et al. (1998) highlight livestock owners’ vulnerability to climate extremes in the 1990s and 2000s. The authors observe that several years of drought and severe winter conditions have combined to drastically reduce pasture production, resulting in a massive reduction in the livestock population that contributes 55 – 65% of the country’s agricultural output. Water resources are also highly sensitive to variations in climate. Changes in rainfall patterns affect river flows, quality of drinking water, and sanitary conditions, thereby creating favourable conditions for the spread of diseases, such as diarrhoea and cholera (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2005). Research based on records in Lesotho shows that water-borne diseases are a major health problem in the country (World Health Assembly 2008). The World Health Organisation’s estimates of disease burdens already attributable to climate change identify malnutrition as one of the pre-eminent components of health impacts (World Health Assembly 2008). The 2004 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) for Lesotho showed that 19.8% of children under five were underweight, 38.2% were chronically malnourished and 4.3% were acutely malnourished (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2005). Additionally, chronic malnutrition was found to be around 42% in the 2007 National Nutrition Survey (Owusu-Ampomah, Naysmith and Rubincam 2009).

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Figure 4: 2008 vulnerability levels in different ecological zones Mountains: The very poor wealth groups(about 164,000 people) are likely to face a food and expenditure deficit (an expenditure deficit only for the poor group) that will need to be covered by M23,118,725 in cash, equivalent to 3,852 tonnes of maize

Foothills: The very poor wealth group (about 22,000 people) are likely to face a food and expenditure deficit that will need to be covered by M11,462,042 in cash, equivalent to 1,911 tonnes of maize

Northern lowlands: Not likely to suffer any food or expenditure deficit. However, approximately 49,000 people in the very poor wealth group will just be able to cover their minimum food needs, assuming no further food price increase

Southern lowlands:

Peka

Pitseng

Kolonyama Mapoteng Mamathe

Mazenod Roma Mantsebo Rothe Matsieng Kolo Morija Tsa-Kholo

Ha Lejone Mappholaneng Katse

Likalaneng Mantsonyane Marakabei Sehonghong

Matelile

Peri Urban:

Thaba-Morena

Senqu River Valley: The very poor and poor groups (about 41,000 people) are likely to face a food and expenditure deficit that will need to be covered by Mii,137,227 in cash, equivalent to 1,856 tonnes of maize

Sehlabathebe Ha Sekake

The very poor wealth groups(about 149,000 people) are likely to face a food and expenditure deficit that will need to be covered by M22,099,147 in cash, equivalent to 4,419 tonnes of maize

Phamong Mphaki Mount Moorosi Alwynskop

Source: LVAC (2009) Modelling studies consistently project that climate change will, on average, have a negative impact on food yields and the impacts on children will be severe (see Figure 5). Figure 5: Malnourished children under five years of age in Lesotho

Malnourished children under 5, in Lesotho 100

Thousanda

80 60 40 20 0 2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

Malnourished children under 5, pessimistic scenario Malnourished children under 5, baseline scenario Malnourished children under 5, optimistic scenario

Source: IFPRI 2010

2040

2045

2050


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The projected number of malnourished children in Lesotho between 2010 and 2050 remains relatively high, as shown in Figure 5. Although a decline in the number of malnourished children is projected, this cannot be guaranteed unless climate change impacts are addressed. The number of malnourished children is projected to increase from 68,000 in 2010 to 100,000 by 2020 before gradually declining to 86,000 by 2050 under the pessimistic projections scenario.

Interventions against Climate Change Challenges National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) The Government of Lesotho acknowledges that climate change is a serious issue (Ministry of Natural Resources 2007). To show its commitment to addressing climate change challenges, the country signed and ratified the UNFCCC and acceded to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. The country submitted its Initial National Communication on Climate Change (INC) in 2000 (Ministry of Natural Resources 2000). The INC details climate change impacts and adaptation options in eight sectors deemed vulnerable to climate change, as noted above. Lesotho is now in the process of preparing its second INC report. In 2006, Lesotho was also among the group of countries that embarked on the preparation of the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) against climate change. The Lesotho NAPA Report states that over 85% of its population is exposed to the risks of climate change (Ministry of Natural Resources 2007). It also states that climate impacts are exacerbated by the chronic poverty crippling the country, putting more pressure on livelihoods that are already dependent on nature. The report provides a prioritised list of activities aimed at poverty reduction through climate change adaptation initiatives. Eleven priority project areas are highlighted in the NAPA Report in response to the country’s key adaptation needs. The projects include: • livestock and crop production; • securing water supply; • enhancing food security; • improving flood-prone areas and wetlands; • improving early warning climate disaster systems; and • policy reform to integrate climate change into development. The report acknowledges that successful implementation of the activities requires active cross-sectoral participation (Ministry of Natural Resources 2007). Four barriers to the successful implementation of NAPA projects are highlighted in the NAPA Report. These include: • the absence of climate change policy in Lesotho’s government planning; • lack of financial and human resources to implement the activities; • inadequate institutional and systemic capacity for climate change initiatives; and • a lack of awareness on the impact of climate change on peoples’ livelihoods (Ministry of Natural Resources 2007). In assessing the sustainability of NAPA’s initiated projects, several challenges arise.

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Firstly, NAPA is forthright in identifying barriers to successful implementation of its identified adaptation measures. Most of the climate change adaptation strategies proposed in the NAPA Report to address climate change impacts are valid today and communities would be much less vulnerable if these strategies were already being implemented. But ensuring that the measures are in place is one thing; implementing them is another. Factors constraining the implementation of climate change adaptation strategies today are not likely to change significantly in the future, given the budgetary and climate change technical constraints across different sectors. Secondly, institutional and technological developments are also recognised as important, alongside education and financial mechanisms. However, efforts are being considered to equip individuals, institutions and communities with the technical knowledge, skills, information and resources to plan for and implement effective and timely climate change responses through the Africa Adaptation Programme (Ministry of Natural Resources 2007). Thirdly, despite the importance attached to climate change adaptation by the government of Lesotho, the country’s policy response is implied rather than stated. There is no comprehensive national policy and legislative framework on climate change and climate change adaptation. Instead, legislative and programmatic adaptation responses are found in a plethora of segregated development strategies and action plans of various government sectors. Finally, climate change adaptation is a multi-sectoral challenge that requires the attention of several arms of the government working on issues from poverty to agriculture and health. During consultations with informants from different government ministries, there was a general lack of understanding of climate change issues and questions to do with climate change were referred to the Department of Meteorology under the Ministry of Natural Resources. While clear leadership is important, climate change specialists in the different sectors of government are also needed to fully develop and lead the implementation of adaptation strategies in the different ministries.

Social Protection Interventions Informally, rural households in Lesotho respond to climate change shocks using diverse strategies such as brewing beer, collecting and selling firewood, selling livestock (mostly at low prices), and relying on less popular and cheaper foods (LNVAC 2002). Extended family and kinship networks also underpin many of these risk coping mechanisms, which are often reciprocal (Turner 2009). In cases where formal social protection initiatives have been applied, like foodfor-work programmes or cash transfers, most have been reactive, short-lived, selective and protective, and only meant as coping mechanisms for the shocks (LNVAC 2002; Devereux and Mhlanga 2008).

State-initiated Social Protection Interventions A number of official social protection measures have been instituted by the government of Lesotho since independence, with varying degrees of success. Among these are input subsidies, introduced in 1980 when the government of Lesotho adopted a policy of food self-sufficiency that sought to protect farmers against the high costs of agricultural inputs through the provision of subsidised inputs such as seeds and


171

fertilisers (Kingdom of Lesotho 1997). However, these were accessible to all farmers nationwide, rich and poor alike (Makoa 1996). This lack of pro-poor targeting created problems as the subsidies benefited the rich, and people connected to officers handling the input distribution often gained first priority by virtue of social connections and nepotism. Similar social protection programmes supported by the government included subsidised traction power, supplying tractors run by the Ministry of Agriculture, and subsidies for basic foodstuffs to make them affordable to the poor. Social protection for livestock farmers was also sought through subsidised veterinary services (Kingdom of Lesotho 1997). Although these measures were aimed at the poor, they mostly benefited those who already possessed the resources and thus defeated the social protection purpose of these initiatives. Lesotho’s Old Age Pension scheme is another social protection programme documented as a successful example of how social protection can be used to address poverty in rural communities (Bello et al. 2007; Devereux 2010). Introduced by the government in November 2004 for all persons aged 70 years and above to reduce poverty in this vulnerable group, the programme has supported households during times of climate risks. At its inception, those who qualified were paid 150 Maloti (US$ 25) per month (Bello et al. 2007). An increase to 300 Maloti (US$ 42) was approved in April 2009 (Devereux 2010). However, this social pension covers a very small proportion of the population and not those most vulnerable to climate change, such as farmers and people who are affected by climate change but below the age of 70 years. It has been argued that the benefits of the pension scheme are not limited to poverty reduction for the elderly, but also represent a form of insurance for poor rural communities against the adverse effects of climate change (Bello et al. 2007; Croome, Nyanguru and Molisana 2007). The elderly are also at high risk from climate changerelated impacts and in rural areas they can face restricted access to healthcare, as they are often unable to travel long distances to the nearest health facility.

Donor community-driven Social Protection Interventions Donors have sponsored emergency food and cash transfer schemes during droughts and other emergencies such as HIV/AIDS in Lesotho. However, most of these have been reactive, protective and of short duration. Examples of donor-driven social protection programmes include the six-month ‘Cash and Food Transfers Pilot Project’ that was implemented in response to the 2007/08 drought and supported by World Vision, an international NGO (Devereux and Mhlanga 2008). This was Lesotho’s worst drought in 30 years; it reduced maize yields by 42%, leaving an estimated 25% of the national population in need of food assistance (Devereux and Mhlanga 2008). World Vision provided cash and food transfers in response to food insecurity among the worst affected and most vulnerable households in the southern lowlands and Senqu River Valley in Lesotho. Cash beneficiaries received payments that were set at a level sufficient to purchase food rations at the local prices prevailing in 2007. Cash transfers were delivered by a private company to pay-points that were within walking distance for the majority of cash recipients (77%) but required the use of public transport by some (20%).

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Overall, the project assisted 41,200 people to survive the food crisis. Broken down by gender, 51% of beneficiaries were female-headed households and 49% were maleheaded households. Effects on communities included lowering the reported levels of begging, crime and distrust in project communities, and increased sharing of food between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (Devereux and Mhlanga 2008).

Adaptive Social Protection as an Opportunity to Integrate NAPA and Social Protection Interventions in Lesotho While climate change adaptation and social protection initiatives have been noted in this chapter, the absence of an integrated framework linking the two agendas also emerged clearly. Although the two agendas attempt to reduce vulnerability among the poor by promoting poverty reduction, each has a different focus in terms of their timing, purpose and target groups. This has created impermeable boundaries between the two, resulting in duplication of activities and competition for resources, yet they both aim to address the same problem of poverty among the vulnerable poor. Insufficient attention has been given to the role that social protection could play in mitigating the long term risks posed by climate change. While the need to develop climate-resilient strategies for all sectors, vulnerable regions and populations, and to strengthen existing social protection programmes, is acknowledged by the government of Lesotho, there is a need to integrate the programmes. Adaptive social protection would be a good starting point in narrowing the current gaps between social protection and climate change adaptation. There is a need to harmonise strategies and implementation plans related to social protection and NAPA projects. For a start, the institutional structures of climate change adaptation, social protection and food security should be assessed in order to make them efficient and avoid duplication of roles. NAPA is a good starting point in those instances when a more comprehensive social protection programme could be used to enhance the identified adaptation priorities. While some responses can be national, others can be local. Arguably, community-based adaptation can be used as an important pillar of climate change adaptation responses. To realise the goals of adaptive social protection, social funds for community-based adaptation designed to respond to climatic shocks and other disasters are needed , as well as skills development. Lesotho can take advantage of resources that are available within the donor community to support these initiatives in addition to its own budget for such programmes. The country can also learn from related projects elsewhere in Africa, such as Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, to gain guidance in the design of community-based climate change adaptation programmes that are supported by social protection initiatives. Current donor-driven social protection initiatives in Lesotho lie mid-way along the scale between humanitarian relief on the one hand and broader development agendas on the other. Whilst there are clear linkages between food insecurity as a problem and social protection as a solution to that problem, climate change adaptation that ensures long term access to food and not just short term emergency assistance is missing from most donor-driven projects. Most of the strategies proposed by NAPA to address climate change impacts are valid today, and communities would be much less vulnerable to such impacts if donors were to adopt the adaptive social protection conceptual framework to help poor communities engage in some of the adaptation programmes identified by NAPA.


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Conclusion This chapter has argued that rural communities in Lesotho are vulnerable to climate change, and social protection and climate change adaptation are central to addressing the challenge. The government of Lesotho recognises this issue and is fully committed to the global efforts to address climate change challenges. Our analysis finds, however, that existing social protection and climate change adaptation policies and programmes are not integrated, but instead run parallel to each other. Most adaptation measures seem to be more at the formulation than the implementation stage compared to social protection measures, some of which have been in place for some time. The chapter argues for the adoption of an adaptive social protection conceptual framework that can be used to enhance NAPA programmes. Strategies that recognise and enhance these synergies seem to offer the greatest potential for positive impact on vulnerable populations facing climate change risks. Donor agencies and the government – critical actors in social protection and NAPA programmes – can play a crucial role in ensuring the success of the adaptive social protection conceptual framework.

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Chapter 8 Social Protection Systems in Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of Fentale District, Oromia Region Endalew Addis and Samuel Assefa

Introduction Background Development throughout the world is highly challenged by economic instability, climate change, migration and insecurity – leading to stunted growth, poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion affecting various categories of people, including pastoralists. While eliminating poverty remains a core objective of development policy makers and practitioners, rapid economic, social and environmental change with intensified risk, vulnerability, inequality and exclusion, all necessitated the adoption of social protection (Cook and Kabeer 2009). Consequently, many formal social protection systems have been institutionalised in Africa, such as Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme, Lesotho’s Old Age Pension, Rwanda’s Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, South Africa’s Old Age Pension and Child Support Grant, and Kenya’s Home Grown School Feeding Programme (European Report on Development, 2010). In addition, humanitarian organisations, local and international donors, and private sector actors are also providing social protection.

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-348.64 183.81 1702.14

Household size (adult equivalent)

No. of milking cows owned

Education status (0= Illiterate, 1=Literate)

R = 0.753, R2 = 0.566

(F = 21.324, P = 0.000, df = 3 and 49)

1466.55

325.24

51.87

71.85

495.68

Std. Error

Unstandardised Coefficients

Summary of multiple regression analysis

(Constant)

Table 1:

.504

.345

-.464

Beta

Standardised Coefficients

5.23

3.54

-4.85

2.96

t

.000

.001

.000

.005

Sig.

.954

.935

.969

Tolerance

1.049

1.070

1.031

VIF

Collinearity Statistics


Social Protection Systems in Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia

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Informal Social Protection Systems The Karrayu pastoralists have a number of informal social protection systems. These can be categorised into: informal social assistance (Dabare, orphan support, Gussa/ Jiggi, Dhawo, Arga, Tirma, Dufna, Toya —– assistance for fetching water for animals from wells and ponds, and lending draught animals for transportation during mobility), mainly with a ‘protection’ function and some ‘transformation’ function; informal social insurance (Hirpha), primarily with a ‘prevention’ function; and informal social services (Ogessa/Ogetti), mainly with a ‘promotion’ function. The most often practised systems are briefly discussed in this section, focusing on their coverage, extent of community reliance, accessibility, stability and outcomes. As the purpose is simply to introduce all these systems, detailed discussion of their values, beliefs and norms is beyond the scope of this chapter. Dabare: This practice gives milking livestock to those households who lack them for various reasons such as drought. The recipient takes care of the animal and its offspring and uses its milk, returning the animal to the owner once it stops producing milk. Dabare is practised at the family, sub-clan and clan levels with the objective of smoothing the food consumption of poor households, particularly children. Although Dabare was regarded as the most important social protection system, only 13% (7) of the studied households received this social assistance in the previous year, as a result of the decline of livestock ownership by the better-off due to drought and livestock diseases. However, informants and participants claimed that Dabare is saving the lives of the most deprived people by protecting them from extreme food shortage. For instance, a development agent testified: “I know a widow who suffered from food shortage with her children last year. When she received a milking cow from a person of her husband’s Gossa [clan] she was relieved from her problem. Hence, it is a very important traditional of mutual support widely practised in the past, though it is declining these days”. Similarly, an elderly key informant from Haro-kersa, after mentioning the decline of such support, indicated that he has supported a household that suffered from the effects of Bonna [drought]. Orphan Support: This institution assists children who have lost their parents (father) for various reasons, such as conflict with neighbouring nations (Afar and Argoba). It is practised at both the household and clan levels, depending on the number of orphans in the household. If there are few orphans, a relatively better-off household may take responsibility of nurturing them, but if there are many orphans, the Gossa takes responsibility through the Demina (clan chief). The clan chief allocates the children to households that are willing to be foster parents. Orphans in 15% (8) of households surveyed received this support. This system has a protective function as it addresses the problems of poverty (extreme malnutrition), vulnerability (exposure to disease, exploitation, and so on) and social exclusion (lack of access to education and other societal institutions). For instance, one female FGD participant in Illala stated that “if the children of my deceased brother hadn’t been cared for by the Gossa, they would have either suffered from shortage of food and clothing or even died”. Gussa/Jiggi: This enables Karrayu pastoralists to work together to accomplish a certain task. It is a work party practised at the neighbour, sub-clan and clan levels. The Karrayu call Jiggi to prepare farmland, conserve soil and water, and harvest crops. It is widely practised among agro-pastoralists and agriculturalists. Participants in the work party will be served with food and drink by the hosting household. The

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food is prepared by the hosting household’s wife with the assistance of neighbouring women. It was indicated that reliance on Jiggi is increasing in recent years, with the introduction of the irrigation scheme. No less than 82% (44) of households reported they had received labour support through Gussa/Jiggi. Dhawo, Arga and Tirma: Data obtained from key informants and FGD participants indicate that Dhawo, Arga and Tirma are forms of social assistance offered in relation to marriage. Dhawo is a practice whereby relatives and Gossa members give cows or other gifts to the bridegroom for him to give to his wife’s family in the form of bride-price. The groom may also sell other gifts and buy a cow. Although Dhawo is regarded as one of the most important practices, only 32% (17) of the respondents had ever received such a transfer. Unlike Dhawo, Arga and Tirma are practices of giving different livestock to the groom and bride after the wedding. The gift given in the form of Tirma is fully controlled by the woman; the husband only has the right of use. Arga and Tirma are aimed at building the capacity of newly married individuals to lead a better life in the future. They have promotive (asset building) and transformative (women’s decision-making power) functions. Dufna: This is a resource-sharing institution that obliges better-off households to share one-fourth of their food items (particularly flour) with their neighbours. However, there is an expectation of reciprocity, in that the initial recipient will be expected to give to others in future. The food items could be obtained from a household’s own produce, purchased from the market or received via PSNP. It is crucial to solving immediate or acute problems of food shortage. Among the households interviewed, 67% (36) received Dufna support in the previous year. This shows the significant role of Dufna in protecting vulnerable households from acute food shortage. Hirpha: This is a practice of giving livestock to someone who has lost their own livestock due to raiding (in time of conflict) or drought. In this process, the person affected applies to the clan chief for assistance, who then coordinates clan members to contribute whatever livestock they are willing to give to the applicant. The clan chief may force members to contribute according to their wealth status. However, Hirpha is not given to people who lost livestock due to poor management, drinking alcohol or chewing chat (a leaf with stimulating effects). Even though Hirpha is perceived as the most important informal social protection system, only 4% (2) of households received this support. This indicates that currently many people do not have access to this form of social insurance, mainly because of the decline in household livestock ownership due to drought. Besides, a traditional leader from Gidara kebele added that “nowadays, nobody listens to elders. Particularly youngsters are becoming addicted to chat and alcohol, and highly attracted by the urban way of life. This forces some individuals to sell their livestock to accomplish these needs”. This is believed to increase Hirpha seekers among the Karrayu while there is a decline over time in the numbers of people who can provide Hirpha. Ogessa/Ogetti: These are traditional healers for humans and livestock, where Ogessa are male and Ogetti are female healers. Data obtained from respondents indicated that 35% (19) and 48% (26) of households received health services from Ogessa/Ogetti for people and livestock, respectively. This shows that many people rely on the services of these traditional healers. However, several informants and survey participants consider some of these services to be harmful. In general, the Karrayu believe that informal social protection systems are contributing to their livelihoods in a multitude of ways. Out of the studied households,


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7% (4), 75% (46) and 18% (11) reported that informal social protection systems have contributed to smoothing their food consumption patterns, protecting their household against selling assets, and enhancing their income capabilities, respectively. This indicates that the role of informal social protection is more significant in protecting pastoralist livelihoods against asset sales than in smoothing consumption or creating economic opportunities. However, 32% of the respondents indicated that informal social protection systems are gradually declining. These systems are mainly associated with livestock and factors that reduce livestock ownership, such as climate change and livestock diseases, and are practised among few households with minimal support. This is mainly due to urbanisation and modernisation, severe drought, and – not unrelated – declining numbers of livestock and milking animals (see Table 2). Table 2.

Households’ reasons for the decline of informal social protection systems

Effects Urbanisation and modernisation Severe drought Decline of herd size Decrease in number of milking animals Absence of better-off individuals or donors Presence of formal social protection systems Expansion of education Emergence of deviant behaviour

Responses N 54 24 15 9 3 3 3 3

% 37.4 21.0 13.1 7.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6

In addition, polygamous marriage among the Karrayu has the potential to produce more children, while frequent conflict with neighbouring nations increases the risk of death of bread-winners. This increases the number of orphans seeking support, yet informal systems have limited capacity and cannot support this burden. Karrayu households are also currently experiencing high increases in food prices while facing falling livestock prices. This weakens their capacity to purchase different food items that would be used in practising Dufna.

Formal Social Protection Systems In Fentale District, there are several de facto formal social protection systems. These can be categorised into: formal social assistance (the Productive Safety Net Programme), mainly with a protective function; and formal social services (education and health services, water supply, saving and credit schemes, improved market access, irrigation scheme, provision of agricultural inputs), mainly with promotive functions. Some of the most significant of these interventions are discussed in this section, focusing on their coverage, extent of community reliance, stability and outcome. Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP): According to data obtained from Fentale District Pastoralist Development Office (PDO), the PSNP covered 13 kebeles. Recently, one kebele (Gidara) has graduated and the programme is ongoing in the remaining 12. The other five kebeles are excluded from PSNP since they had commenced some kind of agriculture and are assumed to be food-self-sufficient. The programme has Direct Support and Public Works components. Beneficiaries are entitled to get food

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items and/or cash. The public works may be road construction or soil and water conservation. The husband and wife, and children aged 15 or above, of both sexes, participate in public works for five days per month or 15 days within three months. Participants receive 8 - 14 Birr per day, according to their work. The selection criteria for beneficiaries were set by the district PDO in consultation with the Disaster Prevention and Food Security Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD). The district PDO works in consultation with each kebele to select the poor and the vulnerable, but the number of beneficiaries is assigned by quota. An equal number of households is selected from each kebele. There is the risk of excluding the poor and vulnerable by including the better-off in the same district, as all kebeles are not equally deprived. Of the studied households, 89% (48) were participants in the PSNP. Key informants and FGD participants see both positive and negative effects of the programme in their area. Food items and cash provided through Direct Support and Public Works protect households from acute food shortage, prevent the sale of important household assets and promote the dignity of the poor, who would otherwise resort to local support. In fact, 27% (22), 60% (50) and 13% (11) of households said that PSNP has contributed in smoothing food consumption patterns, preventing asset sales, and enhancing income capabilities, respectively. The Vice-Chair of the PDO claimed that the programme enabled the construction of rural roads, tree planting and water conservation. Households interviewed regard the PSNP to be the third most important formal social protection system in their area (21% of 147 responses). However, informants and participants also said that the PSNP has several limitations, including: untimely distribution of foods or cash, inappropriate beneficiary selection procedures, insufficient cash payments, poor quality public works, and corruption. The Vice-Chair of the district PDO admitted that people prefer payment in kind to cash, as food is so expensive in the area. He added that the late arrival of food items and cash from the federal government is compelling the PDO to provide assistance. Furthermore, some informants stated that the programme is creating a sense of dependency and adversely affecting the working habits of the Karrayu people. The study shows that the mean annual PCI for non-participants of the PSNP (3,911 Birr) is greater than that of participants (2,489 Birr). The independent sample t-test shows that the difference between non-participants and participants is statistically significant (t = -2.594, p = 0.012, df = 52). Even though the PSNP has been implemented in the area for more than five years, the PSNP participants are still below the poverty line. Thus, it can be argued that the PSNP has had a very limited role in enhancing the income of beneficiaries. Also, some informants mentioned the inefficiency of public work activities. This could result in wastage of human and financial resources as the programme pays participants (in kind or cash), keeping labour away from household agricultural activities while generating unsustainable works. Educational Services: In this study district, there were 18 first-cycle primary schools (grades 1 – 4), one in each kebele, 12 second-cycle primary schools (grades 5 – 8), one high school (grades 9 – 10) and one preparatory school (grades 11 – 12). Among the studied households, 82% (44) had access to education for their children, at least, at the primary level. However, women’s access to education was very low due to traditional beliefs, workloads (reproductive as well as productive) and early marriage. The head of the Gender Affairs Office said that “among the Karrayu, women participate in all household and community activities except leadership”. She added


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that stakeholders are striving to empower women through education. One example is the Gudina Tumsa Foundation’s female student educational support and informal capacity-building training, run by the foundation’s integrated women empowerment programme (supporting 600 women). In addition, health extension workers are offering training to raise awareness among Karrayu households of how harmful traditional practices, like early marriage, can increase school dropout rates for girls. These educational initiatives have improved the employment opportunities for local people. Currently, there are many Karrayu children who, after completing their education at different levels (ranging from grade 10 to university degree), now work in government and NGO offices. Moreover, many women who have participated in informal education and learned how to read and write have been able to engage in income-generating activities. Even though it is at a very early stage, education has already started transforming the livelihoods of some individuals. The head of the Education Office mentioned school drop-out rates due to mobility and harmful traditional practices, and high turn-over of teachers (because of a lack of hardship allowance) as significant challenges in the district. But, unlike in the past, today, the Karrayu people regard education as important to increasing productivity and obtaining employment in urban centres. Households surveyed regard access to education as the most important formal social protection system (31% of 147 responses). However, the head of the Education Office argued that the Karrayu people only send their children to school as long as they do not experience labour shortages as a result. Even though young children are now able to attend school because of the efforts of stakeholders, they drop out when their labour is demanded at home. The government claims that the ongoing livelihood transformation (from pastoral to agricultural) will minimise mobility and thereby address school drop-out rates. Asked about the provision of mobile schools, the head of the Education Office said that this was tried some years back but was soon dropped because of pastoralist mobility. The Karrayu pastoralists are expected to settle in order to educate their children. Health Services: In Fentale District, there are 18 health posts (one in each kebele), four health centres and one hospital (at the Metahara Sugar Factory). Two health extension workers are assigned to each kebele. However, only 17% (9) of households said they had access to health services. In addition, refusal or low utilisation of family planning, harmful traditional practices, and shortage or lack of certain medicines and equipment, particularly in health posts, are the major challenges in the district. But the head of the District Health Office said some pastoral households have already started using family planning and other health services. The Karrayu pastoralists regard access to health services to be the second most important formal social protection system (22% of 147 responses). In order to minimise the effect of harmful traditional practices, the district Gender Office has designed a project aimed at creating alternative income for practitioners. The study households also had access to saving and credit services (22% of households), irrigation schemes (67% of households), livestock health services (20% of households), human water supply (11% of households), livestock water supply (19% of households), and provision of agricultural inputs (11% of households). Among these, water supply (12% of 147 responses) and irrigation schemes (8% of 147 responses) were reported as more useful social protection systems. On the other hand, some households regard family planning (24% of households), education (4% of households) and irrigation schemes (4% of households) to be unnecessary. This

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shows that some social services and complementary services are not accessible or valuable to the studied population. In particular, mobility places pastoralists beyond the reach of many formal social protection systems. On the whole, for 76% (41) of respondents, their reliance on formal social protection systems has not changed over time. However, while 17% (9) of respondents have decreased their reliance on formal protection systems, 7% (4) of respondents have increased their reliance. This shows that although government officials claimed their services had improved in the last few years, the study households argued that their reliance on these services had not changed. As indicated above, these instruments are de facto social protection systems. One limitation of such systems is the absence of coordination between different development actors: government and NGOs – such as Gudina Tumsa Foundation, Christian Children Fund and Care Ethiopia. There was a lack of integration institutionally as well as at the programme level. Even though NGOs have been implementing programmes with a social protection dimension, their programmes are ephemeral and not sustainable. This leaves such interventions without an institutional base and opens the way for misuse and duplication of stakeholder efforts.

Synergy between Informal and Formal Social Protection Systems In the preceding two sections, various informal and formal social protection systems have been discussed. These systems play supplementary and contradictory roles. Understanding these roles has practical importance in allowing policy makers to pay attention to the role of informal social protection systems, as well as to the duplication of efforts and misuse of public resources that could occur. Accordingly, both supplementary and contradictory roles have been identified for de facto formal and informal social protection systems. For instance, poor households get food assistance from formal social protection systems (particularly from the PSNP and Care Ethiopia’s emergency aid programme). They also get food items (milk and flour) through informal social protection systems (mainly through Dabare and Dufna). In this context, informal and formal social protection systems work in harmony to smooth food consumption patterns of vulnerable and poor households. Also, in the short run, the PSNP public work activities and Gussa supplement each other in building up community assets. Conversely, the PSNP was found to negatively affect Dabare and Dufna (informal protective mechanisms) and Hirpha (informal social insurance). The introduction of the PSNP reduced the commitment of the better-off households to support the poor and vulnerable, as people transferred responsibility for helping the poor to government and NGOs. The PSNP also has a negative impact on Gussa (an informal promotive social protection mechanism). Previously, households facing labour shortages called on Gussa to undertake various community activities. Today, people are not willing to participate in Gussa as they would instead prefer it to be carried out through the public works activities of the PSNP. The PSNP was also found to negatively affect the education of children. To get the maximum benefit out of the PSNP, more household members must engage in public works. This takes up adult labour, leaving household tasks to children and the elderly. This discourages children from attending school and encourages them to drop out when household labour demand increases, indicating a contradictory function within formal social protection systems.


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In addition, a supplementary and contradictory relationship was found between informal (Ogessa/Ogetti) and formal health services. In the absence of formal health services, the role of traditional healers and birth attendants is significant. Informants argue that some traditional healers are far better than professionals working in clinics. They offer remedies for many human and animal health problems. They can treat bone fractures and provide physiotherapy for muscle problems. Above all, they provide their services in the patient’s house. Unfortunately, the Ogessa/Ogetti cannot heal serious illnesses like malaria, so the community could benefit from the skill of both Ogessa/Ogetti and clinics. This is a good indication of a supplementary function. However, these systems also play contradictory roles as some Ogetti/Ogessa engage in harmful traditional practices. Water supply (human and livestock) and sanitation can be seen as another de facto formal social protection system. During this study, the government and a local NGO – Gudina Tumsa Foundation – promoted water supply and sanitation and hygiene programme in an attempt to provide water for humans and livestock in the area. Similarly, poor Karrayu households (particularly those suffering from labour shortages) rely on the institution of Toya for their water access, indicating the supplementary roles of formal and informal water supply institutions. Finally, the introduction of irrigation and settlement schemes would reduce the number of livestock owned per household, which would significantly affect informal social protection systems, many of which are linked with livestock and their products.

Conclusion This study attempted to uncover the role of informal and formal social protection systems in addressing Karrayu pastoralists’ vulnerability, poverty and risk. Individuals from the studied households were found to have an average daily income of less than US $1.25. Although these pastoralists are involved in food production, the food produced is not sufficient to meet year-round food demand for the majority of households, with over three-quarters having experienced food shortages in the study period. This indicates that they are poor and vulnerable to livelihood risks. Their historical economic, political and ecological marginalisation is one of the major factors of poverty and vulnerability in the area (Ayalew 2001; Girum 2007). In order to address poverty, vulnerability and risk, the Karrayu people employ a panoply of informal and formal protective (Dabare, orphan support, Dufna and PSNP), preventive (Hirpha) and promotive (Gussa/Jiggi, Arga, Tirma, PSNP, education, saving and credit schemes, irrigation, water provision and Toya) social protection systems. However, their impacts on food consumption and income are not significant. The findings of this research reject widely held assumptions and prove that both the PSNP and informal social protection systems are identified more with the protection of household assets (particularly livestock sales) than with smoothing food consumption, suggesting that households would protect their assets before satisfying their basic needs. This shows the limitation of the conceptual framework guiding this study, as it tends to confer specific roles on particular social protection systems. Of course, there is the possibility that households could use social protection systems for purposes other than those intended by development actors. However, aligned with the conceptual framework, other overlapping functions were also observed between various social protection components. For instance, orphan support has protective,

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preventive and transformative functions, and the PSNP has protective, preventive and promotive functions. The role of social protection systems should also be gauged by their impact on the causes of vulnerability and poverty. The study identified drought, shortage of pasture and water, and livestock diseases as major natural factors contributing to vulnerability and poverty. Lack of rain was seen as a triggering factor for other risks, suggesting the need for proper social protection interventions. Instead, some of the public interventions were counter-productive. This is best epitomised by the negative effects of Awash National Park and the Metehara Sugar Plantation. However, even though their efforts were far from adequate, the local government and some NGOs were at least attempting to provide water for both humans and livestock. The informal water provision system (Toya) covered a limited area and a number of households. It is clear that these systems fall far short of satisfying their intended promotive function. Similarly, both informal (Ogessa/Ogetti) and formal (animal clinics) livestock health services were insufficient to address livestock diseases or to serve a preventive function. It seems, therefore, that the existing social protection systems are not in a position to impact upon the natural threats in the area. Thus, development actors should devise and improve mechanisms for coping with natural hazards related to poverty and vulnerability. The study also showed that households that are large in size, polygamous, or headed by older or illiterate people were the most vulnerable and poor. These features represent inter-household differences. They partly serve as evidence for the absence (support for the elderly, raising awareness about the effects of polygamy) or insufficiency (family planning and education) of social protection systems. Some households considered family planning services to be trivial. Clearly, a thorough understanding of local perceptions and attitudes is required before intervention. Although education coverage has improved in the last few years, its quality was found to be poor owing mainly to pastoralists’ multi-directional mobility, early marriage and the lack of incentives for teachers working in remote areas. As education services would act as an important promotive mechanism, there is a need to improve them through mobile schools instead of waiting for settlement, improved incentives for teachers, and prevention of early marriage. Various household livelihood constraints were also identified as factors of interhousehold differences in the study area. Specifically, ownership of fewer milking animals, shortage of finance and skills, conflict with neighbouring nations, and non-membership of traditional leadership are major sources of vulnerability and poverty. In order to improve livestock productivity and partly to reduce conflict, the inadequate existing water, pasture and veterinary services should be expanded and improved. Conflict and associated animal raiding should be addressed with the active participation of stakeholders. Although irrigation schemes have been introduced and are supposed to promote and transform local livelihoods, different indicators show that agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists are as poor and vulnerable as pure pastoralists. The contribution of settlement and irrigation schemes was also insignificant. In order to derive the benefits of irrigation and settlement schemes, households should be provided with rigorous farming and business skills training, improved agricultural inputs, and seed money. In the current context, irrigation schemes only create difficulties for existing informal social protection systems by further reducing livestock ownership levels.


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Contrary to widely held beliefs, both supplementary and contradictory functions were identified between informal and formal systems. Specifically, supplementary protective functions (between the PSNP, and Dabare and Dufna), promotive functions (between PSNP public work activities and Gussa, and Toya and formal water provision) and preventive functions (between Ogessa/Ogetti and formal health services) were paramount. Contradictory functions were observed between: the PSNP and Dabare, Dufna and Hirpha; PSNP and Gussa; Ogessa/Ogetti and formal health services; and irrigation schemes and informal systems. Contradictory functions were further identified within formal systems (for example, the PSNP and the education of children). This shows that a system could simultaneously play supplementary and contradictory roles. This should not lead us to discard either formal or informal systems once they are found to be contradictory with each other. Instead, a formal social protection intervention requires meticulous prior understanding of its synergy with the informal systems. Specifically, identifying the social factors involved in each intervention is paramount. Emphasis should also be put on the synergy within informal and formal social protection systems. These would help to improve the management of the existing formal systems as well as maximise their supplementary roles with informal systems. In general, the role of informal social protection systems in addressing pastoralists’ poverty and vulnerability and their sources is minuscule. They are practised among few households with minimal support and they are declining over time. The formal systems were also patchy and far from adequate. Systems that have the capacity to enhance social equity are almost non-existent. These require the formation of a focal committee that would be responsible for monitoring vulnerability and poverty as well as coordinating the efforts of stakeholders (both formal and informal) at the district level.

References Ali, A. and Hobson, M. 2009. Social protection in pastoral areas. London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group. Amdissa, Teshome. 2010. Mapping and gap analysis of de facto social protection interventions. A paper prepared for Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the National Social Protection Platform for Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Ayalew, Gebre. 2001. Pastoralism under pressure: Land alienation and pastoral transformations among the Karrayu of eastern Ethiopia, 1941 to the present. The Hague: Shaker Publishing. Berg, B. 2001. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. Boston: Pearson Education. Bevan, P. and Pankhurst, A. 2008. A sociological perspective on the causes of economic poverty and inequality in Ethiopia. Paper presented at the Inter-Africa Group symposium on poverty, Addis Ababa. Cook, S. and Kabeer, N. 2009. Socioeconomic security over the life course: A global review of social protection. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Davies, M. and McGregor, J. 2009. Social protection: Responding to a global crisis. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Dawson, C. 2009. Introduction to research methods: A practical guide for anyone undertaking a research project. Oxford: How to Books. Devereux, S. 2006. Vulnerable livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Devereux, S. and Sabates-Wheeler, R. 2004. Transformative social protection. Working Paper 232, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Devereux, S. and Guenther, B. 2009. Agriculture and social protection in Ethiopia. Growth and Social Protection Working Paper, 03. Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium. European Report on Development. 2010. Social protection for inclusive development. A new perspective in EU cooperation with Africa. Brussels: European Community. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). 2007. A plan for accelerated and sustained development to end poverty (2005/06–2009/10). Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 2010. Growth and transformation plan 2010/11–2014/15. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Girum, G. 2007. Pastoralists’ perception of risk and coping strategies: A case study of Karrayu in Oromia Region, Ethiopia. MA thesis. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University. Holzmann, R., Sherburne-Benz, L. and Tesliuc, E. 2003. Social risk management: The World Bank’s approach to social protection in a globalizing world. Washington, DC: World Bank. Ministry of Health. 2006. Health and health related indicators. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Health, Planning and Programming Department. Mohammud, A. 2004. Pastoral development strategies/policies in Ethiopia: A critical analysis and evaluation. Proceedings of the Third National Conference, Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia. Pastoralist Community Development Project (PCDP). 2005a. Social analysis and indigenous livelihood strategies in Afar pastoral communities. Addis Ababa: Federal Project Coordination Unit. 2005b. Social analysis and indigenous livelihood strategies in Oromia pastoral communities. Addis Ababa: Federal Project Coordination Unit. 2005c. Social analysis and indigenous livelihood strategies in Somali pastoral communities. Addis Ababa: Federal Project Coordination Unit.

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PFE (Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia). 2000. Pastoralist development strategy in the future. Proceedings of the First National Conference on Pastoral Development in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia. 2002. Poverty reduction strategy and pastoral development. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Pastoral Development in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia. 2004. Pastoralism and sustainable pastoral development. Proceedings of the Third National Conference on Pastoral Development in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia. 2007. Opportunities and challenges in the new Ethiopian millennium: Millennium development goals and pastoral development. Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Pastoral Development in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia. Population Census Commission. 2007. Summary and statistical report of the 2007 population and housing census: Population size by age and sex. Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Agency. Shepherd, A., Marcus, R. and Barrientos, A. 2004. Policy paper on social protection. London: Overseas Development Institute. UNICEF. 2008. Social protection in eastern and southern Africa: A framework and strategy for UNICEF. Nairobi: UNICEF. World Bank. 2008. World development indicators 2008. Washington, DC: World Bank. Young Lives. 2008. Impacts of social protection programmes in Ethiopia on child work and education. Policy Brief 6. Oxford: Young Lives.

Chapter 9 Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Coping Strategies and Social Safety Networks among the Pastoralists of Narok District, Kenya Truphena Eshibukule Mukuna

Introduction Although climate change has a serious impact in pastoral areas, including increased severity of droughts, discussion of its impacts has often been simplistic and polarised between those who predict catastrophe and those who point to pastoralists’ ability to adapt. There is no attention to how risks associated with climate change might affect households; there is inconsistent use of key terms such as risk, vulnerability, and adaptation; and there is a lack of clarity on the relationship between the risks associated with climate change, adaptation, and vulnerability. Little is known about the rationality of local adaptation mechanisms because of insufficient documentation and awareness (IPCC 2007; Macchi 2008). Risks associated with climate change could increase household vulnerability to poverty, hunger, disease, mortality, displacement, and violent conflict in many developing countries. Threats to household wellbeing stem from both the direct risks (changes in climate variables) and the indirect risks (for example, increased prevalence of pests and diseases, degradation of natural resources, food prices and employment risks, displacement, potential conflicts) associated with climate change. Many interventions, however, tend to focus on direct risks and direct impacts, with insufficient attention to indirect risks and to impacts on households. There is a need to understand the management of risks caused by climate change so as to reduce the vulnerability of individual communities and households. This chapter seeks to address the needs facing poor households and their incomes, the effects on broader social outcomes and the need to know what has been done at the national, community and household levels. So far, little attention has been paid to how the risks affect households and their livelihoods. Climate change has become a major feature of development discussions about pastoralism, in two ways. Firstly, it is projected that climate change in the tropics will manifest itself in increased frequency and severity of droughts, and that pastoralists will inreasingly become victims of this, calling into question the fundamental sustainability of pastoralism as a livelihood.

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Secondly, some researchers assert that pastoralism, like other forms of livestock production, is an emitter of greenhouse gases, particularly methane, to the extent that is disproportionate to its economic value. The pastoral areas of northern Kenya are likely to experience decreased rainfall but longer or more intense rainy seasons in the longer term (Macchi 2008), and arid and semi-arid grazing systems in East Africa are seen as highly vulnerable to a combination of climate change and socioeconomic factors (Wario 2004). More generally, it is assumed that pastoral areas face an increased risk of drought events, due to increased variability of rainfall but also higher temperatures, even if mean rainfall is predicted to rise. These still evolving projections of future climate conditions in pastoral areas have led to a polarised discussion of impacts on pastoralists. On the one hand, there is a fear, widely publicised in the media, that pastoralist livelihoods are fast becoming unsustainable, especially in East Africa, more dramatically and more rapidly than other forms of rural livelihoods: pastoralists are in danger of becoming ‘the first climate refugees’. Such projections and judgements may be used, in good faith or otherwise, by governments and by donors, to justify withdrawal of support to pastoralism, forced settlement of pastoralists, and the turning over of rangelands to other uses. Climate change is a justification for increased attention to pastoral development, but it is a double-edged one. On the other hand, there is a view, presented by NGOs and others (Pavanello 2009) that pastoralists are by their nature adapters, and if left to themselves will adapt, quite possibly more successfully than dryland crop-farmers. Rather than fear for pastoralists under climate change, it is preferable to create for them the space, through more enabling policies, to adapt. It is also assumed that African countries that depend on natural resources and rain-fed agriculture are more vulnerable to climate change. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) has estimated that, by 2020, agricultural production could decline by 50% in some countries with rain-fed agriculture. Similarly, UNEP (2006) has predicted that 480 million people in Africa could be living in water-stressed areas by 2025, and that up to 40% of wildlife species habitat in Africa could be lost by 2085. According to CTA (2008), a recent study by the World Bank has also predicted that, given future climate change trends, many African farmers will shift from crop to livestock production, which might be rational ecologically and economically. In Kenya, it is estimated that the temperature has been increasing at the rate of 0.2°C annually over the past five decades. This has already led to a decline in agricultural production, and cereal production is expected to decline by a further 12% under moderate global warming (Oxfam 2008). Moreover, it has led to a decline in bio-diversity, shortages of food and increases in human and livestock health problems, rural-urban migration and dependence on external support. Factors compounding the impact of climate change in Kenya include rapid population growth, land degradation, widespread poverty, dependence on rain-fed agriculture, lack of awareness by policy makers and decision-makers about climate change and lack of appropriate policies and legislation (Government of Kenya - GoK) 2010). Pastoralism is one of the sectors that is most vulnerable to climate change. Climate change dynamics need to be understood by pastoralist communities in Kenya. Pastoralists constitute 13.2% of Kenya’s 30 million people.

Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Coping Strategies and Social Safety Networks

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Social protection describes all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor and the marginalised, with the overall objective of reducing their vulnerability. It encompasses: social services to groups who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks; and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination or abuse (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). The key objective of social protection is to reduce the vulnerability of the poor. The full range of social protection measures includes direct income transfers to vulnerable groups, safety nets in case of collapses in livelihoods, regulatory change and sensitisation campaigns to protect the rights of socially and economically disadvantaged groups. Social policy interventions are needed to promote the ability to manage risks associated with climate change at the household and local levels. This can be achieved through: • public health, food security, and nutrition; • clean water and sanitation; • access to skills, education and knowledge; • policies to help households stabilise consumption through strengthened labour, asset, credit and insurance markets; • improved access by the poor to those markets; • improved disaster preparedness and management, including better safety nets to prevent irreversible human damage and enable speedier recovery; • social and political conditions for collective action – helping the poor to develop voice and political capital to demand access to risk management instruments; • managing displacement and violent conflicts through, inter alia, strengthening the asset base of rural livelihoods; • arrangements for orderly migration; and • institutions for conflict resolution. (African Development Bank (ADB) 2009; Adesina 2010) People exposed to the most severe climate-related hazards are often those who are least able to cope with the associated impacts, due to their limited adaptive capacity. This in turn poses multiple threats to economic growth, wider poverty reduction, and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (ADB 2001; Stern 2006). Within this context, there is growing recognition of the potential role of social protection as a response to the multiple risks, short and long term shocks and stresses associated with climate change. Stern (2008) argues that social protection could become one of the priority sectors for adaptation in developing countries. To date, however, little is known about the linkages within and value of social protection for adaptation in practice. Adaptive social protection involves examining the role of social protection in strengthening adaptation, for example in developing more climate-resilient livelihoods. In Kenya, there has been little or no stock-taking of social protection interventions in the last ten years (Wario 2004; Arero 2005; UN OCHA 2006; GoK 2008). The objectives of this study are to understand current climate change impacts, vulnerability and coping mechanisms at the household, community and district levels, and to demonstrate the implications for government

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policy in Kenya. The study area covered Narok District, southwest Kenya, home to the pastoralist community of the Maasai. The author proposes and applies a social risk management and asset-based conceptual framework to help design interventions that can increase the capacity of the society to manage climate risks with a view of reducing the vulnerability of households, in order to maintain or increase the opportunities for development. This first section lays out the problem statement and methodology, followed by the theoretical framework and literature review. The third section presents the findings, followed by the conclusion.

Statement of the Problem Although there is sufficient evidence of climate change and its impacts, Kenyan government policy decisions have faced continued political hindrances. Kenya’s geographic exposure, low incomes and greater reliance on climate-sensitive sectors make it vulnerable to climatic change. The traditional top-down approach has failed to address the impacts of climate change and coping strategies. Not much is known about human vulnerability to climate change and how to mitigate the risks. Due to climate change, social networks have been weakened and coping strategies are no longer effective (Wario 2004; Arero 2005). What is more, a gender analysis of this impact on pastoralist communities in Kenya has not been done at the lowest levels of society — households, communities and districts. Modelling or predicting climate change impact on predominantly subsistence farming households at the international level is a very difficult task due to its lack of standard definitions, absence of or difficulty in obtaining benchmark data, its location-specificity, the household’s ability to integrate on-farm and off-farm activities, and finally farmers’ vulnerability to a range of stressors (Morton, Livingston and Mussa 2007). Kenya’s economic blueprint, Vision 2030, aims to accelerate the attainment of the MDGs. However, neither Vision 2030 nor the National Development Plan (NDP) 2008– 2012 recognise climate change and its adaptability as impediments to the country’s development. Climate change, therefore, needs to be mainstreamed in sectoral and development priorities. Moreover, social insurance and equity for pastoralists are practically non-existent in Kenya (GoK 2010). There is a need to understand the actual dynamics of climate change impact at the lowest levels of society (Deressa, Hassan, Ringler 2008) and in that way, enhance the relevance of top-down policy approaches (Ford and Smit 2004).

Methodology This study adopted a qualitative research paradigm with a descriptive research design. However, some mixed methods were used for clarity of issues. Purposive sampling of Narok District followed by multi-stage sampling technique were used to select divisions according to their population densities. Narok District covers an area of 15,088 square kilometres. It is situated in the southwestern side of the country, in the southern part of Rift Valley Province. Administratively, the district is divided into 8 divisions with 54 locations and 103 sub-locations. The divisions are: Narok Central, Loita, Mara, Mau, Mulot, Ohukurto, Ololulung’a and Osupuko’. Mau, Olukurto, Loita, Mara, Mulot, Ololulung’a and Osupuk’ are rural. The total population of the district was 365,750 in 1999. The district has a varying topography with altitude varying from


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3,098 metres above sea level (masl) in the highlands to 1,000 masl in the lowlands. The highlands, which consist of the Upper Mau, Olukurto and Mulot divisions, receive 1,200 - 1,800mm of rainfall and have high potential for wool sheep and dairy farming. The lowlands cover Osupuk’, Mara, Loita, parts of Ololulung’a and Mau divisions. The semi-arid lowlands have good potential for wool sheep, meat goat and beef production. Temperatures range from 5° C between June and September, to 28° C between November and February. Land ownership in most parts of the district is still either communal or family or group ranches. In the high potential areas, land is individually owned. The rangelands are largely used as group ranches; however, there is an increasing trend towards subdivision into individual holdings. Wildlife conflict is another factor contributing to the vulnerability of the community. Livestock diseases, especially malignant catarrhal fever, are common due to a large population of migrating wildebeest from Masai Mara Game Reserve. Inadequate food, unavailability of credit, high illiteracy levels, human illhealth, poor leadership, inadequate water and food insecurity are the main challenges facing pastoralists in the district. The main income comes from tourism, wheat farming and trade, charcoal burning, petty trade and business. The district has several primary and secondary schools. The author designed the work plan; sampled the scope of the study; trained local informants (research assistants); did a reconnaissance study; designed the research tools; visited the meteorological department to collect data on extreme events and their duration; and visited the Ministry of Special Programmes to check specific information for Narok District on recent responses to drought vulnerability and impacts associated with the above climatic events. The study was conducted using a combination of three main methods, namely: in-depth stakeholder interviews, a document review, and a household questionnaire. In-depth stakeholder interviews were conducted with government officials, donors, NGOs and researchers in Narok District and the Mau area. The community development worker also organised information from various sources including community groups, local, regional and international NGOs, government agencies, university departments, bilateral and multilateral development agencies. In-depth interviews were conducted, and data generated on a range of issues including, activitvities such as land, agriculture, livestock, water resources, diversely affected by climate change; action taken by the government, specific measures taken by the government (for example, watershed restoration, afforestation and reforestation, irrigation, rangeland management), the implementing group (government agencies, NGOs, community groups, individual farmers), intended beneficiaries (communities, nomadic groups, women and children, individual farmers) and location and duration of use. A household questionnaire was administered to 90 households that were selected using poor and non-poor matrices, adapted from the Quality of Life Assessment Matrix (Bond and Hulme 1992). The household questionnaire inquired about land productivity, water resources and quality, condition of vegetation, land carrying capacity, management of water resources, availability and accessibility of grain stores, management of pastures, income-generating activities, income levels, amount of credit given to individuals, insurance facilities, savings, availability of credit to

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the poor, ownership of assets, housing types, access to education, training needs and extension services, crop yields and access to services. Data on government policies in relation to taxes, market prices, land tenure, risks such as human and animal migration and pressures on rangeland by intruders were also generated. The document review method was employed and a number of documents were consulted including, government decrees on social policy interventions, sectoral interventions on social protection for vulnerable groups, adaptation interventions at different levels, weather forecasting, recovery strategies and insurance types and policies for pastoralists. Document analysis involved content analysis of government reports, newspaper articles, government and non-governmental development partners’ published and non-published data from the District Livestock Production Office, the Ministry of Water, Ministry of Agriculture, Drought Management Office, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, District Planning and Development Office, the Meteorological Station and the Ministry of Social Services. Furthermore, data on indicators from previous studies included are: land degradation condition of vegetation cover (stabilised or improved); soil/crop productivity (stabilised or increased); water supply (stabilised or increased); average income levels (stabilised or increased); food stores (stabilised or increased); migration (slowed, stabilised or reversed); plant species (natural or exotic); encroachment of nomads from other areas; percentage of women receiving credit; percentage of poor households receiving credit; funding per household; household income level; diversification of income; stability; income-generating activities and sustainability; availability of information on early warning for rainfall; support from local institutions; effectiveness on credit repayment; support from government policies; taxes charged by the government on VAT products; number of marginalised groups receiving social services; and data on other socioeconomic characteristics of households. Research assistants also collected data on vulnerability assessment, whose indicators include: landholdings; markets for goods; water availability; social interconnectedness; asset access; physical resources; human skills; social resources; beliefs and attitudes; climatic and environmental changes; health skills; access to capital; ways in which men and women in the community are vulnerable, physically and materially; who has access to and control over the available resources. The social structures of the community before the climate change crisis were also analysed. Furthermore, data was collected on how the social structure serves the community in the face of changes, and the impact of climate change on social organisation and participation of people in the organisation.

Literature Review Pastoralism in sub-Saharan Africa There is a consensus in the literature that the chronic vulnerability characterising many pastoral groups in the Horn of Africa (HoA) today is not merely related to environmental stresses but is a result of complex and multi-dimensional political, economic and social processes (Markakis 2004; HPG 2006; UN OCHA 2006; Morton 2008; Oxfam 2008; WISP 2008). In particular, the long-standing political marginalisation of pastoralist communities in the HoA is widely recognised to be a primary factor in their chronic vulnerability (Markakis 2004; HPG 2006; Oxfam 2008). According to Morton (2005, 1): “…there is an increasing acceptance that the major issues in pastoral development


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are related to policy and governance: issues such as conflicts and insecurity, livestock marketing, land rights, inadequate provision of services and infrastructure, drought and dependence on food aid”. Adverse policies and practices, unresponsive formal institutions and negative perceptions of pastoralism have progressively weakened pastoralists’ livelihood strategies. Their mobility and access to key natural resources have been severely restricted, and their ability to manage their livestock effectively has been persistently undermined. As a result, their livelihood system is increasingly vulnerable to external shocks. The increased frequency and severity of droughts in Kenya is leaving pastoralists increasingly exposed to shocks as the time needed to rebuild herds (15 – 20 years) is longer than the intervals between the occurrences of drought (Longley and Wekesa 2008). Unable to recover, pastoralists become trapped in a downward spiral of vulnerability and destitution and are increasingly dependent on international aid. Their dependency on relief assistance, however, can also be seen as related to “years of neglect and misunderstanding by central governments” (Grahn 2008, 2). Furthermore, pastoralists’ land is generally perceived by national governments as “marginal with little economic potential” (Oxfam 2008, 14). The fact that pastoralist groups usually represent a low proportion of the national population and are dispersed across different parts of the country means that politicians often consider pastoralists a “minority vote” and consequently have little interest in including pastoral areas in their electoral campaigns (Hesse and Odhiambo 2006). Pastoralism is often seen as an outdated way of living and a form of land-use which is inviable and even irrational (HPG 2006; Oxfam 2008).

Effect of Climate Change Climate change affects the two most important direct pasture inputs – precipitation and temperature (Deschenes and Greenstone 2006). Despite worldwide coverage of climate change impacts, there is intrasectoral and intersectoral variation in vulnerability depending on location, adaptive capacity and other socioeconomic and environmental factors. Climate change impacts on pastureland and agriculture are believed to be greater in sub-Saharan Africa (Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2007). Climate change impact will be of various sorts and at various scales, through effects on the availability of grazing and browsing lands, patterns of animal diseases, and possibly heat stress on the animals themselves (although this is less likely with indigenous breeds). There may also be impact on pastoralists of others’ attempts to adapt to or mitigate climate change: fears have been expressed of encroachment on rangelands for the cultivation of bio-fuels, especially jatropha, as a mitigation measure (Deressa, Hassan, Ringler 2008). All these impacts will be felt in the context of other trends and shifts – demographic, economic and political – many of them disadvantageous to pastoralists, such as rising populations, encroachment on rangelands, political marginalisation and continued conflict. These trends drastically limit pastoralists’ ability to adapt to climate change.

Pastoralists’ Management Strategies To attain positive livelihoods outcomes, pastoralists rely on specific strategies to manage effectively their livestock. Key strategies include accessing and managing natural resources, mainly grazing land and water sources, and maintaining high levels of mobility across large tracts of land to make the most effective use of scarce resources

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and in response to environmental conditions (Deressa, Hassan, Ringler 2008; Markakis 2004). These sophisticated and dynamic strategies have allowed pastoralists to cope with the threats and risks that characterise their environment and to maintain a viable production and livelihood system. Drought is a major external shock and a primary trigger of livelihoods crises in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Cyclical droughts are a defining feature of pastoralists’ way of life in this region, and “local livelihoods are sensitively adapted to the certainty that drought will come and can be overcome” (UN OCHA 2006). Several factors promote economic instability: diminishing grazing areas; dependence on markets to meet food and other requirements; restrictive policies on livestock marketing; insecurity; land tenure systems; breakdown of traditional governance that has weakened the capacity to manage crises like drought; increasing demand for land due to crop farming, bio-fuel production and an absence of land-use policy; negative perceptions and stereotypes by governments that view pastoralism as an unsuitable and inefficient way of using land; inadequate investment in drylands; failure to recognise the diversity of pastoralism; lack of formal insurance opportunities; poor access to social services; sedentarisation policies; low competition for pastoralist products at market; and poor control of trans-boundary animal diseases (Markakis 2004; Hesse and Odhiambo 2006; HPG 2006; Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn 2007; Deressa, Hassan, Ringler 2008; Oxfam 2008).

Social Protection Policy in Kenya Social protection systems enable societies to advance the wellbeing and security of their citizens by protecting them from vulnerability and deprivation so they can pursue a decent life. Kenya, through the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development, has developed a National Social Protection Policy that was awaiting cabinet approval as of late 2011. The policy aims at providing a national social protection programme focused on improving the lives of the poor and vulnerable (Mbithi and Mutuku 2010). Current policies for social protection include; the Constituency Development Fund, National Social Security Fund, the Hospital Fee waiver, Youth Empowerment Scheme, the Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) programme, the Kenya Roads Board Fund, the National Hospital Insurance Fund, community and family safety nets, the Women Enterprise Fund, the Hunger Safety Net Programme, the Local Authority Transfer Fund, the Civil Service Pension Scheme, the People with Disability programme, gender equity policies, the HIV/AIDS Global Fund, Occupational Pension Scheme, Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) scheme, among others. Kenya’s Vision 2030 was developed after the implementation of the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS), which ran from 2003 to 2007 (GoK 2003). The vision is founded on three pillars – economic, political and social – under which social equity falls (Mbithi and Mukutu 2010).

Household Vulnerability to Risks Associated with Climate Change Climate change can exacerbate chronic poverty by lowering the expected returns on assets, and it can increase transient poverty because of declining expected returns on assets and/or increased variance in returns. Unless risk management is improved, climate change-driven acceleration of these risks will increase household vulnerability and could erode development gains (DFID 2004; Ringer 2008). The most vulnerable


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households will be those with exposed assets and livelihoods sensitive to climatic risks and who have weak risk management capacity. This means that smallholders and households engaged in petty trade, tourism, waged income and livestock rearing will be particularly impacted.

Theoretical Framework The study of the impact of climate change on the livelihoods of local populations is increasingly advanced as an urgent research need (Smit and Pilifosova 2003; Morton, Livingston and Mussa 2007). Three concepts recur continuously in the methodological literature, and are also used in the analytical framework developed for this study, as explained below.

Impact Assessment Depending on the discipline, literatures use different terms and definitions for ‘impact’. Some of these terms are ‘hazard’, ‘risk’, ‘bio-physical vulnerability’ or general ‘vulnerability’ (ADB 2001; Brooks 2003). To limit the scope of the study to climate change impacts on livelihoods and society, we use the definition of bio-physical vulnerability by Deressa, Hassan, Ringler (2008), which refers to the extent of damage inflicted by climate change on livelihood and social systems. The impact on livelihoods (livestock tending and crop cultivation), and consequently on society, is analysed based on local climate data, impacts, vulnerability and coping strategies by employing qualitative research or using appropriate themes or indicators selected from previous literatures, like Pulhin et al. (2006). These might include livestock status, crop production, people affected by the impact, deaths, malnutrition cases, food and seed shortage, income shortage, production costs or ecosystem damage.

Vulnerability Assessment An impact study is most helpful when focusing on a single stressor, in this case climate change (Nkem et al. 2007). Impact alone is subtle and may not be sufficient to show the consequences of climate impact on different members of the same community or on different communities (Senbeta 2009). Therefore, to evaluate climate change impact in the context of multiple stressors that reduce adaptive capacity, many of which are not related to climate or climate change, vulnerability assessment is most helpful. Vulnerability assessment also “helps to inform decision-makers to facilitate the decision-making process of specific stakeholders of a sector about their options for adapting to the effects of climate change within the scope of their resources” (Nkem et al. 2007). Vulnerability in this study is defined as the likelihood that households and communities in Narok District will suffer from adverse climatic impacts on their livelihoods, and their inability to respond to stresses resulting from these impacts (adapted from Pulhin et al. 2006; Thornton et al. 2006). This definition is also in agreement with the IPCC definition, where vulnerability refers to “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes” (IPCC 2001). To assess the vulnerability of rural livelihood strategies in the context of shocks and other stressors, Ellis (2000) used indicators such as assets (markets, land-holding, water availability, biological resources, social interconnectedness, labour or human capital, savings and credit availability) and modified access to assets by social

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relations, institutions and organisations. Thornton et al. (2006) also used several ‘capitals’ – natural, physical, human, financial and social – to analyse vulnerability. As this study is exploratory, the selection of indicators or themes (or sub-indicators and sub-themes) is based on the analysis of responses from local communities about previous vulnerabilities, and analysis of how and why they are vulnerable.

Coping Strategies to Adverse Climatic Impact Societies are dynamic and they use all possible strategies to reduce vulnerability to climatic impact. There are two kinds of responses to crisis that overlap across the temporal scale – coping mechanisms and adaptive capacity. Coping mechanisms are the actual responses to crisis in livelihood systems, and are considered short term responses (Green Forum 2008). Adaptive strategies are the strategies by which a region or a sector responds to changes in livelihoods through either autonomous or planned adaptation. Coping mechanisms may develop into adaptive strategies over time (Burton 2004; Yohannes 2009). However, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between coping mechanisms and adaptations. This study considers both as coping strategies (Green Forum 2008). The resilience or robustness of coping mechanisms differs, depending on the availability of and access to resources and technology (Adger et al. 2007). In this study, both local and institutional coping strategies are assessed from the information collected.

Analytical Framework To assess the vulnerability of Arctic communities, Ford and Smit (2004) developed and proposed an analytical framework that employs focus group discussions and participant observations within the indigenous communities. Based on this analytical framework, the researcher developed a model that assesses the impact of climate change on livelihoods, societal vulnerabilities and coping strategies. Climate change (gradual changes and extreme events) impacts on livelihoods (livestock and crop production). However, “societies across the world have a long record of adapting to and reducing their vulnerability to the impact of weather and climate-related events” (Burton 2004). Thus, the coping strategies used to reduce impact, and the presence of other internal and external stressors, determine the societal vulnerability to climate change. Identification of current climate change, its impact on livelihoods, current coping strategies and the identification of vulnerabilities and stressors help to assess the future likely changes, impacts, coping strategies and social vulnerability. The two crucial information sources for regionally and locally specific climate change impact, vulnerability and coping strategies come from local stakeholders and decision-makers (Yarnal 1998) and data on earlier impact (Titus et al. 1991, cited in Yarnal 1998). Information can also be generated from content analysis of government reports, newspaper articles, and resource use managers (Ford and Smit 2004). In this study, the current impact, vulnerability and coping strategies are assessed by collecting primary data from respondents (interviews and observations) and secondary data (temperature and precipitation trends, and published and unpublished information). Data on climate change and its impact on livelihoods and society are also collected from interviews with local people, government officials, local experts and secondary data from government offices and other literature. The analysis is dependent on the


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timeframe – how far back the required data extends – and the quality and suitability of the required primary and secondary data.

Results and Analysis Results are divided into three sections, corresponding to the analytical framework developed. The first section shows the impact of climate change on livelihoods, and consequently on society. It combines both quantitative and qualitative data on gradual trends in precipitation and temperature, and on extreme weather changes. The second and third sections present the vulnerability of different social groups and the local and institutional coping mechanisms. Finally, the major stressors or constraints are presented based on the data gathered during the field study.

Impact of Climate Change on Livelihoods and Society Respondents were asked what effects they thought varying temperatures and rainfall had had on pastoralists in Narok District over the years. Their responses suggested that climatic changes have frequently imposed challenges to pastoralists’ livelihoods and has consequently affected socioeconomic activity. Drought and delay in the onset of rain leads to poor grass regeneration/forage, water shortages and heat stress to livestock, and consequently increases the mortality of the livestock, vulnerability to diseases and physical deterioration on account of having to travel long distances for water and pasture. Although further study is needed to identify the relationship between climate change and the emergence of specific livestock diseases in the zone, it was evident that the animals were more susceptible to tick infestation, pasteurellosis, anthrax, African horse sickness, sheep and goat pox, lymphangitis, coccidiosis and salmonellosis. The problem was further aggravated by the shortage of livestock clinics, experts and drugs in the district (NDDP 2009).This response corresponds with earlier research on the impact of climate change on pastoral livelihoods.

Impact on the Society Respondents were asked, in both the household questionnaire and the in-depth stakeholder interview guide, to list the effects on the community of rainfall and temperature variability. They reported food deficits, malnutrition, educational dropouts, increased susceptibility to diseases, failure to fulfil financial requirements, and lack of agricultural inputs. This finding supports Heltberg et al. (2008), ADB (2001) and Stern (2006), who reported similar findings for the impact of climate change on households.

Community Adaptation to Climate Change Respondents were asked to list and explain indigenous knowledge about the early warning signs of temperature and rainfall variability. Traditional Early Warning Systems: Pastoral communities have expertise on astronomical and climate change. Some knowledgeable elderly people base their predictions on observing the stars, wind and cloud formations. Others predict on the basis of the behaviour of different wild animals and the flowering and seeding of some indigenous trees. For weather prediction in rural Narok District, men slaughter a goat and investigate the intestines to predict a good or bad season. They warn their community about the situation and discuss what to do. The pastoral community

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still values such knowledgeable people very highly (World Vision representative). However, whereas some pastoralists move in response, others who are already vulnerable have to stay and deal with the reality on the spot. No doubt, livestock deaths could have been reduced by destocking through the market; however, there is little policy support for cross-border trade, and it is not common among pastoralists to sell livestock prior to an expected drought. Respondents added that the indigenous forecasting expertise helps some farmers to sell their livestock and save money. This minimises the risk of losing everything when drought strikes. Moving with Livestock: Respondents were asked to explain why they move with their livestock and the risks that this causes. They responded that, traditionally, there were no boundaries to livestock moving across the territories of different clans and sub-clans. However, with prolonged drought, pastoralists are now moving with other species of livestock. In many localities, this is acceptable while, in a few, it ends in conflict because of fear of spreading livestock diseases. This adaptation mechanism has been supported in a study by Scott (2008). Cutting and Carrying Fodder from National Parks: When asked to explain other arenas of conflict, majority reported that there are conflicts over the use of resources in the Masai Mara National Park. Until recently, there was agreement that the pastoralists could use the border areas of the park during drought; however, demarcation of the area was difficult and has always led to conflicts. Settlement around Water Points: Respondents were asked what they usually do immediately they realise they might lose their livestock to drought. The majority reported that they sell some of their livestock to be able to pay for water, which becomes very expensive during drought, and rear small stock. This adaptation strategy has been used in Ethiopia and Malawi (Devereux et al. 2006; Stern 2008). Interventions of Government and NGOs: Respondents were asked what the government and NGOs do to help them when drought strikes. During the field study, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders were held with government and NGO staff. Generally, they believe their interventions dealing with capacity-building, natural resource management, marketing, and conflict resolution and water development, among others, have direct relevance to dealing with climatic variability. Environmental issues need longterm commitment, while most NGOs are engaged on short-term projects. They are very weak in documenting community adaptation to climate change and incorporating this into their implementation planning. Nevertheless, a few pastoralists thought that, although some of the government and NGO interventions may be options to cope with climate change, these could also be threats because of the top-down planning approach, which could create a dependency syndrome (World Bank 2001; UNISDR 2004; DFID 2006). The Ewaso Nyiro Development Authority, the District Livestock Production Office, the Ministry of Water, Ministry of Agriculture, Drought Management Office, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, District Planning and Development Office, the meteorological station and the Ministry of Social Services are the main government agencies in Narok District. Pastoralists have been advised to scale up traditional water ponds to modern water harvesting technology (wind and solar-powered water pumps), and to apply agricultural inputs during climatic crisis. Community water harvesting was also stressed by less precipitation, water seepage and quality deterioration. During emergencies, NGOs and government provide emergency food, seed varieties and health services for the affected people. Trainings on water management for


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sustainable livelihoods have been instituted by the partner organisations and government ministries. NGOs also empower women by encouraging the upholding of women’s rights as per the constitution of Kenya, and by promoting income-generating activities through micro-finance. Responses to the household questionnaire revealed that climate change reduces pastoralists’ consumption and draws down their physical, human and financial assets. Households borrow to survive. This results in food insecurity, informal debts and child labour. All these setbacks increase household poverty. Respondents further added that at times, children dropout of school. However, poor households often hold onto their livestock despite government appeals to sell, while richer households sell willingly. When probed further, survey respondents reported that the poor lack assets and even if they have any, those assets are in poor locations. This makes it difficult for the poor to access insurance. Their only alternative livelihood is selling their labour. They also lack skills and education. this aggravates poverty. Respondents highly recommended education as an adaptation measure. Insurance: Respondents were asked if they take out insurance to minimise the risks attached to losing their livestock, and if not, why not. Most respondents answered in the negative. They said that farmers are not keen on insuring their livestock because it is too expensive. Some said that they do not have adequate knowledge about insurance for their livestock, while others said that they know about crop insurance but not weather-indexed insurance. In addition, they reported that they think they cannot be given any insurance due to lack of collateral and the fear by insurance agents that the poor cannot afford premiums. The government and NGO representatives reported that Kenya does not have a culture of insurance, nor a disaster insurance policy. Even if it existed, the pastoralists would take a long time to adopt it, because of their high level of illiteracy. Land Diversification: Selling wood is the third most significant coping mechanism; 63% of respondents reported charcoal burning as an alternative livelihood. Diversification to off-farm and non-farm activities also helps farmers to retain assets or withstand climatic shocks. The majority (78%) suggested mobility to places where pasture and water are available as a coping strategy; 84% mentioned social interconnectedness (relatives) as a coping strategy; while 42% supported the use of subsidised credit from the informal and formal sectors to restore destroyed livelihoods. Just over half (51%) suggested saving as a coping mechanism as this allows them to stock cattle feeds, drugs and food. However, savings kept in banks often run out before a drought ends, causing loss of cattle, and desperation. Selling wood taken illegally from private uncultivated plantations, game reserves and government forests was another coping strategy. Normally, 50% of pastoralists would sell two donkey-loads of firewood or two sacks of charcoal every week. The study confirms that dependence on the forest is definitely higher during climatic crisis. The poor and landless also earn from daily labouring on better-off farmers’ land, construction activities, petty trade and small-scale businesses. Credit: Respondents to the household questionnaire listed credit from informal social organisations and government institutions as an adaptation mechanism that reduces their vulnerability to climate change. NGOs support members during emergencies and also provide credit and cash transfers during crises. Farmers and credit association managers reported that the farmers organise themselves to take

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responsibility for an individual’s debt. However, there were many defaulters. Pastoralists complained that credit seems to help them in the first few months to revive their livestock and businesses, but, in the long term, they still lose cattle through starvation, cattle diseases and restrictive government policy. They end up selling their livestock to purchase food. The government also buys their livestock to reduce pressure on natural resources and strengthen the financial power of pastoralists.

Who is Vulnerable to Climate Change Impact and Why? Most survey respondents (84%) suggested that poor and landless households are most vulnerable to climatic shocks, followed by farming households. In terms of individuals, women and children were identified as most affected by climatic events, while the youth, the elderly people and men were regarded as least affected. In-depth interviews with Narok officials and experts concurred that the landless, women and children are more vulnerable than the other groups, followed by tenders of large livestock herds. These respondents added that farmers, particularly poor farmers, the elderly, children and women are highly vulnerable. Poor People: The poor depend on daily labour and have low income and few reserves to absorb climatic shocks. It was reported that middleclass farmers are also affected and they respond by selling assets, taking credit and leasing parts of their land. So, a climatic shock may also move middleclass farmers into the poor farmer class. Poor people are also not trusted as credit recipients because it is believed they cannot afford the repayments. In all study areas, households complained about humanitarian aid corruption and marginalisation of the poor during aid distributions. It was also understood that politicians and local representatives usually over-report the numbers of victims — that the aid is distributed among all groups, and in most cases the poor receive minimal amounts of aid. Livestock Tenders: The wealth and status of pastoralists are measured by their ability to cope with crisis and their ability to re-invest in livestock growth, but the prolonged drought of 2011 has challenged this. Usually, forest forage is available all year round and the pastoralists practise rotational grazing. According to officials and household respondents, households with fewer livestock were better able to cope due to their better fodder management, lower feed costs and lower efforts required to store or prepare fodder at home. Households with large herds could not manage to feed them and lacked other income sources or savings as livestock numbers dropped and market prices continued to fall. Furthermore, respondents stated that government intervention was slow and insufficient. However, currently the affiliated ministries and NGOs are advising households to increase feed saving, reduce herd sizes and focus on livestock quality. Vulnerability by Gender: Almost all respondents (90%) suggested that women are more vulnerable to climate change than men. Men’s vulnerability was explained in terms of their prime responsibility for income generation. In cases of crop failure or animal death the men are supposed to search for off-farm and non-farm activities and income sources, take credit and pay it off, and find seed and fertiliser for the next cultivation season. According to one respondent from Mara division, “man is the victim of the situation … it is his responsibility to feed his family, whether the crop fails or not, it is his own”. The vulnerability of women was explained in terms of their lack of access to property, confinement at home caring for children and family


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members, worry about feeding the family, poor nutritional status, having to travel long distances and endure long queues to collect water. According to respondents from Ololulung’a and Olukurto, women’s involvement in the family and confinement at home makes them suffer the most, because men can take a break by being away from home. During food shortages, women also look for alternative sources of income, like small businesses (Bartlett 2008; Brody, Demetriades, and Esplen 2008). Respondents indicated that the correlation between climatic impact and the vulnerability of widows or divorced women is particularly strong. Traditionally, women in pastoralist communities in Kenya are dependent on income generated by men, so they do not engage in agricultural activities like ploughing, sowing and crop harvesting, although they may do some weeding. However, in the case of death of the husband or divorce, the woman takes responsibility for the household by selling local drinks, leasing land, petty trading or selling firewood (charcoal). The situation becomes even more difficult to manage if she is landless and has no elders and/or has a high number of dependants. If she is old, the challenge is still greater. Very few, if any, are land-owners. On education, the ratio of females to males attending primary and secondary schools is 1:3. Similarly, the percentages of women teachers with a certificate, diploma or first degree were 32%, 22%, and 10%, respectively. This shows a declining trend of women at higher school levels and at higher ranks, demonstrating poor school attendance and low achievement and/or high dropout rates. Most girls drop out of school because of the need to fetch water and seek alternative livelihoods. Vulnerability by Family Size: Polygamy is a common practice and household size is among the wealth classification criteria. For instance, in Mara division, a household with 9 – 11 members or more is considered to be better-off. However, this tradition is backfiring with rising land scarcity, unemployment, high dependency ratios and increased climatic unpredictability. According to Konana, the head of a family of 20 in Suswa division, “we are always vulnerable because our family size can reach up to 20 to 30 persons per household, whereas the assets available are not even sufficient during surplus seasons”. The households interviewed ranged in size from 1 to 20 persons. This demographic composition shows that the majority of household members are young, so economically passive and susceptible to malnutrition and diseases; this exacerbates the situation as low numbers of economically active members means the household cannot support itself, or send children to school. Children: Most respondents (83%) suggested that children are highly vulnerable to climate change. Vulnerability of children to climatic crisis is apparent from cases of malnutrition, school dropout rates and poor academic achievement. Available data for 35 schools in Suswa and Mara showed that school dropouts increase from 5% during normal times to 29% during droughts. Low class attendance, late arrivals and early departures, low educational achievement and high teacher turnover were also indicated in the report (NDDB 2009). The same report also exposed high drop-out rates and poor educational performance in other divisions. Respondents reported that households are extended and more than one child per household is sent to school, so fulfilling the educational requirements for all is very difficult during climatic events. Long distances to collect water and to look after livestock also contributed to late arrivals or low class attendance or dropouts. The active growth stage and the immaturity of children’s immune systems also make them vulnerable to malnutrition.

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The household questionnaire further revealed that 67% of household land was overstocked and its productivity was very poor. The households attributed this to scarcity of water in the district. Only a few areas had water wells. Respondents also reported lack of grain stores in the poor households. Their source of livelihood was livestock which they sold on market days to buy other foodstuffs. Four in five respondents (80%) reported having no savings. The cattle belonged to men who are heads of the household. Almost all respondents (91%) live in semi-permanent houses – a mark of poverty. When asked about their access to education, training, and extension services, 12% responded in the affirmative while 73% said those facilities were not available to them. Asked about government policies geared towards helping pastoralists, 89% reported that they had never heard of any, while 11% reported that they had been fined for encroaching on the game reserve land as intruders.

Government Social Protection Interventions Document analysis revealed that the Government of Kenya has several measures in place to minimise risks to pastoralists. These include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

cash transfers; climate-indexed insurance; credit at lower interest rates; universal free primary education; subsidised medication; social insurance such as pensions, health services, and funeral credit; social equity; sensitisation campaigns for attitudinal change and awareness raising; resource transfers (cash or food hand-outs); abolition of health and education charges; retrenchment packages; minimum wage agreements; maternity benefits; anti-corruption legislation; developing a voice for the poor so they can demand risk management; ensuring that livelihood activities do not degrade natural resources; food security; arranging for orderly migration; access to knowledge and skills; development of political and social conditions for collective action; improving access of the poor to labour, assets and credit and insurance; and encouraging pastoralists to diversify their livelihoods through trade and agriculture.

There is a correlation between risks, vulnerability and adaptation that influences livelihood strategies.


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Community Perceptions of the Causes of Their Vulnerability to Climate Change Pastoralists were asked for their perceptions of the causes of their vulnerability to climate change. Most pastoralists believe that their vulnerability is attributable not only to drought but also to other fundamental factors. Prolonged Drought: In almost all communities visited, there is a clear perception that the amount and duration of rainfall are declining and the dry season is becoming longer, which has led to shortages of water and pasture, the spread of human and livestock diseases, and intensification of conflicts. Such drought has led to loss of livestock, and it has become difficult to restock because of the absence of a regular drought cycle. Expansion of Livestock Diseases: Usually, during drought, as the animals have less access to pasture and become weak, they are more susceptible to different diseases when they are concentrated around a few water-points. Moreover, after a long dry season, when the rain finally comes, many animals die. Shortage of Water Sources: Many pastoralists in Narok rural district stated that their main sources of water needed upgrading. Defective Marketing System: Kenya is the centre of cross-border trade in the Horn of Africa, yet cross-border trade is considered to be illegal. Moreover, with increasing inflation, the terms of trade between consumable commodities and livestock are deteriorating. Markets are distant and livestock mobility policies restrict pastoralists from selling their livestock. Private Investment: The pastoralists stressed that, in the name of ‘development’, the prime land on the river banks (the pastoralists’ sources of water, pasture and land for cropping) is given by the government and clan leaders to private investors for irrigation. This has also stimulated a shift from communal to private land ownership. Act of God: There is a widespread belief among the pastoralists that drought and famine are acts of God against sinful humans. Usually, the elderly pastoralists pray for rain during chat ceremonies.

Challenges in Social Protection Adaptation to Climate Change among Pastoralists in Kenya There is no doubt that climate change has affected pastoral livelihoods, and pastoralists have developed some strategies to cope with changes in their environment. However, several challenges in pastoral community adaptation to climate change were encountered. Segregation of Climate Change from the Complex Pastoral System: Drought is normal in a pastoral system, but pastoralists emphasised that their vulnerability to this calamity is highly attributable to their marginalisation with respect to drought response mechanisms. This marginalisation includes the allocation of rangeland to investors, expansion of irrigation schemes, a focus on crop production and settlement, and establishment of ‘community-based organisations’ that are not in harmony with traditional institutions. Therefore, in attempting to address climate change, attention should be given to the root causes of the vulnerability of pastoralists to any risk, including climate change. It is possible that focusing only on climate change as a challenge to the livelihoods of pastoral communities might underestimate the root causes and exacerbate the vicious cycle of poverty.

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Claiming to Address Climate Change: Climate change is a popular issue, and many organisations claim that they have been addressing it in their policy and development interventions. Yet, such attempts have their limitations in accommodating added values, including recognition of and support to local adaptation. Keeping Pace with Rapid Change: Very rapid changes (ecological, socioeconomic and political) are taking place at the grassroots level. Many organisations that claim to work at this level may soon be outdated if they do not follow up closely on interventions, and if they do not mainstream documentation to gauge changes and local adaptation to them. Temporal Perspective: Adaptation is a process that deals with both current and future vulnerability and strengthening of resilience. Some adaptation mechanisms might be good at the present time but not necessarily so in the future. This implies that assessments need to be made of local innovation in climate change adaptation by Kenyan pastoralists. Such assessments may be time-consuming and expensive. Microscopic Changes Remain Unrecognised: Because of the heterogeneity of communities and ecologies in the pastoral areas, recognition of local adaptation is difficult, if not impossible. Some of the adaptive innovations might be only by some individuals or among a few small groups, and may, therefore, remain unrecognised and undocumented. Policy Environment: The government of Kenya, through the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS), is committed to addressing climate change issues through the policy of decentralisation of power to the grassroots. The devolution of funds is expected to give districts budgets to manage their needs and priorities. This should help to ensure good governance as a component of efforts to alleviate poverty. However, government policies on land ownership and rights, investment policy, controlling cross-border trade and pushing for crop production and sedentarisation, rather than allowing alternative choices, still need very serious attention and reorientation. But, while implementing social protection programmes in Kenya, different initiatives are addressed through different sectors of the economy. The programmes are, therefore, fragmented with a high probability of duplication. The different sectors select their priority areas, increasing the probability of exclusion of beneficiaries who could be very vulnerable and highly deserving. The implementation sites are often directed by the donor or funding organisations, thus the resources may not be proportionately invested either geographically or sectorally. Other challenges faced in the implementation of social protection programmes include: • the government’s lack of adequate coordination and information-sharing between actors, leading to duplication of activities; • inadequate funding for most activities, hence delayed start times for some projects; • an increased number of social protection policies being implemented, which are often poorly implemented; • the HIV/AIDS pandemic; • identification of the targeted recipients; and • social protection initiatives not publicised to citizens, so learning and information are limited to the institutions undertaking specific programmes.


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Conclusion and Recommendations Conclusion According to this study of climate change impacts on livelihoods, vulnerability and coping mechanisms in Narok District, Kenya, the frequency of climatic change is increasing, in terms of both extreme weather events and gradual changes, and is aggravating the impacts on pastoralism and crop farming. However, there are local coping mechanisms to reduce the impacts, including saving, diversification of activities, mobility, social interconnectedness and credit. There are also institutional coping strategies such as emergency aid, credit services, safety nets, water harvesting and reservation, awareness raising on savings and the use of technology. But these coping mechanisms are not sufficient to address the challenges, and all the divisions within Narok District are vulnerable to climatic shocks. Vulnerability is most acute for the poor, landless and unemployed, for children, women, livestock tenders and large households. Wedded with and unemployment, water scarcity, unaffordable and unavailable agricultural inputs and other stressors, climate change is more likely to continue to pose risks to socioeconomic activities and exacerbate the society’s vulnerability. Respondents’ perceptions and meteorological data show that the trend in agro-ecology is towards a hotter and less humid environment. The meteorological data show a decrease in precipitation that is unevenly distributed throughout the year, which respondents blamed for the destruction of the Mau Forest. There is much that we do not know about the socioeconomic implications of climate change and how best to design policies to promote adaptation and reduce household vulnerability. Social scientists need to step up to this agenda. Meteorologists systematically monitor weather variables (defined and measured in a comparable manner) in specific locations over many years. Social scientists have little or no comparable monitoring of the impact of weather and how households and societies respond to it over time. To start to build that body of information, we propose a long term international monitoring programme on climate and related socioeconomic impacts and responses. This kind of data would be an important global public good and could greatly facilitate real-time monitoring of threats — such as, poverty, hunger, health, and conflict — and facilitate further empirical research on impacts and responses to climate change in poor communities and for particular vulnerable groups (by age, gender, ethnicity, disability, livelihood). Such research is essential to support community-led adaptation and the design and targeting of effective adaptation policies. Trying to link climate risk and impact to households is a step in the right direction. However, there is also a need to better understand and predict the socioeconomic impact of climate change at disaggregated levels, especially at the household and intrahousehold levels. Policy research should also consider issues of access and voice by the poor: do they gain from new technology and policy interventions, do they influence policy? This would help identify ‘no regrets’ opportunities, and improve the timing and targeting of interventions. There is a great need to assess policy implications across multiple sectors and types of interventions; for example, how should trade policies be affected by the changing risks to domestic and international food prices; what is the best way to design and finance safety nets and social insurance instruments for climate risks; what can community-based adaptation achieve; and what types of support may be needed?

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This study shows that climate change and its impacts on the livelihoods of Narok District pastoralists is exacerbating vulnerability in different socioeconomic activities in the society. Although gradual climate change is fostering crop cultivation in some highland areas, the water deficit in the mid and lowlands is likely to continue to constrain livelihood activities, and consequently exacerbate societal vulnerability. On the other hand, the frequent rain delays, erratic precipitation, drought, and heavy and unseasonal rainfall are also grave concerns for all communities in the zone. The current coping strategies are not sufficient. Institutional coping mechanisms are also predominantly top-down, and fail to bring the desired change. The overarching stressors that are enhancing societal vulnerability to crisis are land scarcity and unemployment, unaffordability and unavailability of agricultural inputs, and water shortage. As climatic and non-climatic stressors continue to degrade the natural resource base they are likely to exacerbate the society’s vulnerability. There is a need to reduce the vulnerability of pastoralists and protect their livelihoods in times of hardship. The government of Kenya, with its development partners, needs to strengthen pastoralist community capacity through implementation of the social protection policy at the household level, and to complement those efforts with effective traditional social protection mechanisms. Pastoralists in Narok District need a reliable water supply, conflict resolution, livestock insurance, education and health services, access to saving facilities and support for alternative livelihoods. Livestock insurance should be given to medium herders who can afford premiums. Cash transfers should be given to the poor, and there should be alternative livelihoods for non-pastoralists.

Recommendations for Policy Improvement Climate change will undoubtedly have significant impacts on pastoralists, but they need to be discussed in a sober way, without assuming either pastoralists’ absolute vulnerability or, conversely, capacity to adapt. There are important knowledge gaps about what forms these impacts will take and what can be done to help pastoralists adapt to them, and how pastoralists fit into discussions of climate change mitigation. •

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Since risks related to climate change can impact on household assets, livelihoods and wellbeing, directly and indirectly, a multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral approach to risk management is required. Climate risk management needs to be mainstreamed into the development agenda. An integrated risk management approach to climatic risks and climate change is called for and should be consistent with growth and poverty reduction efforts. The GoK should demand that donors and aid agencies design policies and programmes or projects that prevent pastoralists from falling into poverty due to the effects of climate change. This will alleviate poverty and reduce dependence on aid. Monitoring and evaluation and early warning systems should be set up for existing climate risks and socioeconomic responses. With ever increasing weather unreliability, strong dependence on climate-sensitive sectors and continued water deficits, the involvement of institutions in early warning and robust contingency planning is crucial. The government needs to include the traditional weather forecasters so that indigenous Maasai knowledge is used to attain best practice. The GoK should provide better education and health for pastoralists and their children as they move with their livestock. This will improve literacy and health


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at the household level and promote the understanding of disaster risk reduction tools meant to reduce their vulnerability and poverty. It will increase pastoralists’ understanding of climate change dynamics and need for livestock insurance. Social policy for adaptation to climate change should be scaled up through: public health; food security and nutrition; clean water and sanitation; access to skills, education and knowledge; policies to help households stabilise consumption through assets, credit, better social safety nets and social insurance; improved disaster preparedness and management, including better safety nets to prevent irreversible human damage and enable speedier recovery; social and political conditions for actions such as developing a voice for pastoralists; managing conflicts by strengthening rural livelihoods; making arrangements for orderly migration; and conflict resolution. Weather-indexed insurance for farmers should be implemented. It should be made less expensive and should compensate farmers for losses associated with extreme climate variability. There is a need to address water shortages, for example, irrigation using the Narok River that often floods, and scaling up traditional water harvesting. There is a continuing need to alleviate and unemployment by enhancing microfinance efficiency, creating employment opportunities and sustainable and well-studied resettlement programmes. The GoK should ensure social equity for pastoralists by enforcing their land rights. It should recognise the contribution of pastoralism as a source of livelihood and should stop discrimination against pastoralists. There is a need for research and programming on the dissemination of information on climate and climate impact – to pastoralists themselves and to a range of stakeholders involved in policy-making, governance and service provision, over various timescales from seasonal to long term. Ways to reduce vulnerability to climate risks can be achieved by presenting climate risks to pastoralists clearly, and they should be involved in discussing implications and responses. There is a need for research on the contribution of pastoralism (and extensive livestock production in general) to greenhouse gas emissions and economic and institutional mitigation measures through carbon sequestration. The notion that pastoralists add to greenhouse gases by keeping large herds is misleading and can lead the government to refuse to provide social safety nets through implementing policies to safeguard their livelihoods. There is a need to increase local climate projections, thinking about a wider range of climate impacts and making ways to use this knowledge to build adaptive capacity.

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Chapter 10 An Assessment of the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment Programme in Uganda Niringiye Aggrey

Introduction This chapter assesses the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) programme, a social protection programme that was launched in Uganda on 28 September 2010. There is no single definition of social protection. Countries and organisations use the term in different ways. The World Bank defines social protection as informal, market-based and public interventions that assist poor individuals, households, and communities to reduce their vulnerability by managing risks better (Holzmann, Sherburne-Benz, and Tesliuc 2003). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) defines social protection as interventions that strengthen the capacity of the poor to protect their consumption and to support household investment in the assets required to manage and overcome their situation (Blank, Devereux, and Handa 2010). As an example of a national government’s definition, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in Uganda defines social protection as all initiatives from the public, private and informal sectors that support individuals, households and communities in their efforts to prevent, mitigate, manage and overcome a defined set of risks and vulnerabilities (www.socialprotection.go.ug/). Social protection is therefore about the state sharing the burden of supporting the vulnerable in society, and is one of the Ugandan government’s strategies and key interventions outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP) for the period 2010 – 2015. The social protection objective in the NDP is to expand measures to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity of the human resources. In response to the social protection priorities outlined in the NDP, the government of Uganda launched the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) programme. It will provide policy support and implement a cash transfer pilot. According to the Uganda National Household Survey (2005/06), 15% of Ugandan children were orphans; 6% of the female population aged above 15 years were widowed; 7% of the population had a disability (of whom 20% had multiple disabilities); and 4.4% of the population were above 60 years. These high vulnerable population ratios have profound consequences at individual, community and national levels. The majority of these vulnerable groups tend to be poor. Although the poor and vulnerable in Uganda have always been cared for through family and community systems, with modernisation and urbanisation, these traditional systems cannot be relied upon. As

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a result, countries across Africa are now developing formal social protection systems as a core component of national development strategies. Indeed, social protection is a key component of the African Union’s Social Policy Framework for Africa, to which Uganda is a signatory. The literature on social protection systems in sub-Saharan Africa is not robust in terms of examining the complementary roles of existing informal and formal social protection systems, unpacking the challenges and prospects for social protection systems, and designing sustainable social protection programmes based on local capacities and social values. In addition, the issue of building on existing informal social protection systems and creating complementary links between the formal and informal systems is often neglected by policymakers in Africa. It is against this backdrop that this case study focuses on the status of the SAGE programme in Uganda, by assessing local sources of vulnerability, poverty and exclusion, and investigating the instruments developed by governments, communities and donors to reduce vulnerability and promote sustainable and inclusive development outcomes. To fill the literature gap, the study focuses on the following specific objectives: • • • • • •

examining the status of the SAGE programme and its synergy with other formal and informal social protection programmes; examining the scope, coverage, institutional arrangements, opportunities and challenges of the SAGE programme; assessing legal frameworks and the ‘political contract’ for social protection between governments and citizens under the SAGE programme; highlighting the role of actors, like the government, the community, the family, NGOs, donors and the private sector in the SAGE programme; investigating the relevance and acceptance of the SAGE programme, including accountability, credibility and sustainability; and addressing the political implications of the SAGE programme as well as the fundamental policy dilemmas facing policymakers.

This case study is based on a desktop review of existing literature. The chapter is organised as follows. Section two covers the theoretical framework and empirical literature review, the third section discusses the results and the last section concludes.

Conceptual Framework This section does not attempt the ambitious task of providing a comprehensive theoretical framework for the analysis of social protection programmes. Instead, it builds on existing attempts and approaches to conceptualising social protection analysis. While social protection frameworks are relatively well articulated, there is very little conceptual work in the literature that is specific to the analysis of social protection as regards its scope, coverage, relevance and acceptance. This chapter starts to fill this literature gap by formulating a social protection analysis framework that is derived from synthesising existing attempts and approaches. The ‘social protection analysis framework’ is a useful way of organising the analysis of the SAGE programme. The framework is organised along the themes of scope, coverage, relevance and acceptance. This framework will both facilitate analysis of social protection activities and provide pointers as to how these activities can be improved.

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The scope and coverage of social protection is concerned with issues such as benefit eligibility, targeting and coverage rates. Benefit eligibility refers to the criteria used to determine access to social protection. The criteria are: need, financial contributions (from insurance and the employer), citizenship (or residence), and membership of a specified occupational category. In the literature, the scope of social protection programmes is usually estimated by the poverty targeting rate (PTR), that shows the percentage of the poor that receive social protection transfers or other social protection benefits (Baulch, Wood, and Weber 2006). A common objective of overall social protection policy is to provide assistance to the poor and hence to raise PTRs. The achievement of a 100% PTR constitutes the long term goal for this indicator. Analysis of programme-specific PTRs allows who is and who is not being reached by these programmes to be assessed. However, a high poverty targeting rate indicates that a large proportion of the poor is receiving social protection transfers but the value of these transfers may be either substantial or negligible in relation to the poverty line. With a limited public budget for social transfers, it seems sensible and fair to target or allocate these transfers to those who need them most. This implies excluding less needy individuals or households, which raises the problem of how to target. The question of targeting versus universalism is important when considering social protection as a human right within the resource-constrained economies of poor countries. Low-income countries must begin by focusing scarce resources on the most vulnerable and chronically poorest, with a gradual expansion to the entire target population as economies grow and public revenue increases. This is consistent with the human rights approach, which emphasises the importance of focusing first on the poorest and most marginalised people. The case against targeting is that it is expensive to achieve accuracy and can be socially divisive. Wealthier people might also resent paying for programmes (through taxes) that do not benefit them. For these reasons, a categorically targeted transfer programme, reaching an easily identifiable vulnerable group (such as older people or young children), has clear advantages in terms of coverage, administrative simplicity and acceptance. Relevance and acceptance of social protection programmes are concerned with issues such as adequacy, acceptability, equity, accountability, social cost burden, and sustainability. A system of regular cash grants will guarantee that poor people can afford to buy basic necessities, like food, uniforms and scholastic materials for their children, as well as facilitating access to health services. A well-designed programme needs to set transfer amounts at a level that increases beneficiaries’ income just enough to enable them to meet a basic standard of living, and possibly to invest in productive activities. Cash transfers that are intended to guarantee market access to food must take food price variability (seasonality or inflation reflecting constrained food supplies) into consideration. For effectiveness and equity reasons, it is essential to calibrate social transfers according to household size (‘per capita’) and ideally also according to household composition (by ‘adult equivalents’), although for practical purposes, a per capita allocation might be adequate. In terms of the social cost burden, the focus is on how much Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is actually devoted to social protection. The expenditure indicator is used to show what percentage of a country’s GDP is spent on social protection activities (Baulch, Wood, and Weber 2006). Higher values of the ratio of social protection expenditure to GDP are likely to constitute an overall policy objective.

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However, unlike the coverage and poverty targeting indicators where 100% coverage is theoretically achievable, there is no such obvious benchmark against which the expenditure indicator can be evaluated. A high expenditure indicator, for example, could reflect either a large number of people receiving minimal social protection transfers or a few people receiving large benefits. However, comparisons of the expenditure indicators for countries with similar levels of GDP per capita will provide an idea of how a country is performing relative to its ‘peer’ group. The social protection analysis framework as formulated provides the starting point for the analysis of existing social protection programmes and to identify key issues concerning their level and effectiveness. A more detailed analysis using this framework can identify where there are major problems in a national social protection system, what the reasons are for this, and how the situation could be improved.

Results and Discussion Scope and Coverage SAGE is a national flagship programme supported by the government of Uganda and development partners. The grants are divided into Old Age Grants (OAG) for the poorest citizens above 65 years, and the Vulnerable Family Support Grants (VFSG) for labour-constrained households such as those headed by the disabled, orphans and widows. The OAG and VFSG approaches are more resistant to fraud than other forms of targeting, because the targeting criteria are based on easily identifiable and difficult to manipulate objective categories, such as disability, widowhood, and old age. The design of the SAGE programme was influenced by a field trip organised for ministers and key government officials to Malawi and Zambia in 2007. The programme received cabinet approval in June 2010, thus paving the way for its roll-out. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in Uganda, with funding support from UK’s DFID and the Embassy of Ireland, is committed to piloting a cash transfer scheme targeting chronically poor households, including those headed by older persons. UNICEF is providing substantial technical support. For a long time, it has been recognised that lack of cash among people in chronic poverty makes it difficult for them to benefit from mainstream development programmes. The scheme will be piloted in 14 districts before the whole country can be covered, but it began with a pre-pilot project in three districts — Kyenjojo, Kaberamiado and Kiboga — from May to October 2011. The pilot programme was originally to be implemented in six districts. However, following the splitting of districts in 2010 and the provision of additional funding from development partners, this has increased to 13 districts: Kyenjojo, Kiboga, Kabaramaido, Nebbi, Apac, Katakwi, Moroto, Nakapirpirit, Amudat, Kyegegwa, Kyankwanzi, Zombo, and Kole. SAGE will be implemented in every sub-county of the targeted districts. The districts were selected on the basis of their poverty rates as well as the following six indicators: • proportion of children in the district population; • proportion of older persons in the district population; • number of orphans and vulnerable children as a proportion of the total child population; • incidence of risky births;


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proportion of households living more than 5km from health facilities; and school attendance rates among children aged 6 – 12 years.

However, since SAGE is intended to pilot a nationally representative programme, the selection of districts has also been done so as to incorporate all regions in Uganda. SAGE will reach approximately 95,000 households – around 600,000 people – during the five-year pilot period. This is approximately 15% of all households in the 14 targeted districts. Each of the targeted people will receive UGX 22,000 (US$10) a month. The aim of the pilot is to develop and test sustainable, scalable, cost-effective and accessible delivery mechanisms for social grants – including targeting, registration and payment mechanisms – and to generate evidence to support building government commitment to the social protection policymaking process. The pilot also aims at promoting the social and economic empowerment of some of Uganda’s most vulnerable households through provision of small but regular and reliable social grants. In addition, the pilot aims to provide policy support to strengthen leadership on social protection issues across the government of Uganda and to develop a national social protection framework, including policy, institutions and structures in government.

Institutional Arrangements At the institutional level, there was the question of which ministry should manage social protection. The choice was between the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development which is the most powerful institution responsible for resource allocation, and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development which has the constitutional mandate to spearhead social development in the country. The biggest concern was the former ‘accusing’ the latter of having limited capacity for financial as well as technical management to implement social protection in Uganda. This was made worse by the lack of a common understanding of social protection by the different ministries. It was finally agreed that the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development should manage the SAGE programme. Within the government of Uganda, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) is charged with the mandate to deliver community empowerment, protection and promotion of rights of the specified vulnerable groups for social protection and gender-responsive development. A Social Protection Secretariat has been established directly under the ministry’s Directorate of Social Protection to implement SAGE. The secretariat is responsible for day-to-day management of SAGE, and reports to a multi-institutional steering committee through the Permanent Secretary of the MGLSD. The programme steering committee will comprise the ministries of Finance, Local Government, Health, Education, the Office of the Prime Minister, National Planning Authority, civil society and development partners. SAGE offices will be established within existing local government structures (up to subcounty level) in each of the pilot districts. Most studies clearly show that identifying and reaching only the poor involves high administrative costs and requires capacity that may simply not exist in many developing countries. Over the first three years, capacity will progressively be built in government so that full responsibility for funds can be handed over to the government of Uganda. SAGE is funded by DFID, Irish Aid, UNICEF and the government of Uganda. The programme is designed to absorb funding from other donors, and additional financial and technical assistance will be provided by the World Bank, UNICEF and,

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potentially, other development partners. Government has committed staff and office space while decisions on further funding will be made throughout the lifetime of the programme. If the government decides to scale up the programme, it will need to mobilise resources for the future. By the end of three years, the intention is to move to a sector budget support arrangement, with the necessary safeguards put in place. SAGE cash grants were set at UGX 22,000 (US$10) per month when the pilot commenced to roll-out in 2011, and will be increased by 5% per year to account for inflation and maintain the purchasing power of the grant. This benefit level is based on the criteria of long term affordability, acceptability and adequacy. The value of the grant is in line with similar cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa. The programme evaluation will consider whether the benefit level is appropriate before national scale-up. Cash deliveries to beneficiaries will be via MTN payphones (MTN is a leading private mobile telephone service provider in Uganda), using cutting-edge technology to ensure accountability and transparency in the payments system. The management contract to support implementation of this project has been awarded to Maxwell Stamp PLC. The lessons learnt from the districts will be used to expand the project to more districts in a planned, controlled and systematic manner. One argument has been that SAGE should “desist from channelling funds to individuals on the basis of their poverty status” and quite rightly pointed out that “there are no set, clear and fair criteria for identifying who rightfully deserves such support” (Lwanga-Ntale, Namuddu and Onapa 2008). It is widely recognised that attempting to select the poor based on their income and assets is extremely difficult to do accurately, prohibitively expensive, disincentivises productivity, undermines social cohesion and stigmatises the poor. For this reason, SAGE will not try to select beneficiaries according to their poverty status but rather identifies individuals and households based on universally accepted forms of vulnerability such as old age, disability and orphanhood. The Old Age Grant targets older people aged 65 years and above. However, this grant, which is supposed to specifically target the poor may end up ‘leaking’ to non-poor older persons when this criterion is used. The Vulnerable Families Support Grant uses a scoring mechanism which allocates different scores to household members based on their age, sex and disability status. The highest scoring (that is, most vulnerable) 15% of households will be enrolled in the programme. The VFSG beneficiary households will be re-assessed for eligibility every three years. In adopting this approach, it is expected that a large proportion of the very poorest will be reached by the programme. But, equally importantly, the SAGE programme builds on the principle of non-discrimination and on Ugandan traditions of supporting the elderly, the sick and children. Beneficiary households are free to choose how they use the money. Evidence from similar social protection programmes in the region has consistently demonstrated that beneficiaries tend to use cash transfers for purchasing food and other basic necessities, accessing health and education, and investing in small business enterprises. A monitoring and evaluation system will be put in place to gather information on how beneficiaries use their cash grants.

Local Sources of Vulnerability, Poverty and Exclusion Poverty rates in Uganda remain high, although the poverty headcount has fallen in recent years, from 56% in 1992 to 26% in 2010. So, around one-quarter of all households remain in chronic poverty, characterised by the presence of vulnerable people such


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as those living with disabilities or long term illness, the elderly and young children. Many more are in danger of falling into poverty as a result of events ranging from drought to death of family members, illness and unemployment. Social protection is not only critical for reducing poverty but has also been shown to support a wide range of national development objectives, including increased access to health and education services, improved food security and child nutrition, strengthened livelihoods and local economic development. Social protection maximises the impact of other areas of government expenditure and service delivery by ensuring that the most vulnerable are able to access services and other opportunities presented to them.

Instruments Developed to Reduce Vulnerability and Promote Sustainable Development The National Development Plan identifies weak public sector management as one of the binding constraints to the attainment of national development goals. Specifically, it outlines, among others, weak policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, institutional structures, and the limited social protection and support systems, as key areas to be addressed. The social protection objective in the NDP is to expand social protection measures to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity of human resources. The strategy identified is to diversify and provide comprehensive social protection measures for different categories of the population. Social protection objectives in the NDP include, among others: • • • •

formulate a social protection policy; strengthen mechanisms for coordination of social protection programmes; establish a data management system for vulnerable groups; and develop and implement social transfer programmes.

The government has also championed interventions such as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), Pension Scheme, and Universal Primary Education (UPE), among others. These, however, have often been limited in coverage and scope. For example, Uganda’s national social security scheme only reaches 4.8% of the total population (and only targets those in the formal sector), in complete negation of the fact that most of Uganda’s economy is informal with over 73% in agriculture, who, therefore, have no form of protection at all. Similarly, the National Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children only reaches 1.7 million OVC, representing just 23% of the total estimated OVC in the country.

The Legal Frameworks and Political Implications of the SAGE Programme The government of Uganda endorsed the Livingstone ‘Call to Action’ (2006) which sets out commitments to social protection and calls on countries in Africa to put in place costed plans for the implementation of social transfer programmes. Uganda is also a signatory to the African Union Social Policy Framework (2008), which calls on governments to recognise that social protection should be a state obligation, with provision for this in national legislation. As such, Uganda aims to put in place relevant national social protection policies and mechanisms and to provide adequate resources to ensure inclusive development and social protection for the most vulnerable communities. This calls for the formulation of a clear strategic vision, a robust policy framework and development of institutions at the forefront of promoting and delivering

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social protection interventions across the country. Since 2006, the MGLSD – working with the Social Protection Sub-Committee – has championed efforts to promote a coordinated approach to social protection in Uganda. These efforts culminated in the design of a five-year Expanding Social Protection (ESP) programme. The goal of the ESP programme is to reduce chronic poverty, and the risk of women, men and children falling into poverty, across Uganda. The purpose is to embed a national social protection system, including social assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable, as a core element of Uganda’s national planning and budgeting processes. The programme is designed to provide policy support, focusing on strengthening leadership on social protection across government, developing a national social protection framework, generating evidence on the impacts of social protection, and building government commitment and investment in social protection. One of the key objectives of the ESP programme is to achieve greater coordination of social protection initiatives in Uganda, in particular, by strengthening the national Social Protection Sub-Committee. ESP encourages all agencies – both government and non-government – to engage with the Social Protection Sub-Committee to improve coordination. SAGE will also engage with the relevant coordination bodies, such as the Karamoja Working Group and the Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. The data systems being established for SAGE also have the potential to improve coordination of social protection initiatives by promoting the identification of coverage gaps and duplication of efforts. However, much of this information is self-reported and should be viewed as the basis for further indepth research into particular schemes. SAGE complements other social protection interventions in Uganda by catering for vulnerable groups that are not currently covered by formal social protection programmes. The recently launched NDP for the period 2010 – 2015 identifies social protection as one of the strategies for protecting people from becoming vulnerable, reducing vulnerability to enhance human capital productivity. Specifically, it emphasises the need for harmonisation of provision of social protection measures, through: formulation of a comprehensive social protection policy; diversification of social security measures to cover more people, especially those in the informal sector; liberalisation of the provision of national social security services; implementation of a social cash transfer programme; and supporting comprehensive community response programmes for vulnerable persons. Currently, there is no policy framework to guide the implementation of social protection. The Social Protection Sub-Committee comprising key stakeholders (government, donors and civil society) in social protection is expected to play a key role in the development of the social protection policy. Although there is a great deal of experience and information about social protection in other countries in the region, there is a high demand among Ugandan policymakers to see evidence in Uganda itself from which policy can then be developed. Lack of understanding of the impact of cash transfers among policymakers, opinion leaders and the general public is still a challenge. The SAGE pilot, therefore, includes a strong monitoring and evaluation component, which is specifically designed to generate evidence and learning that will inform the design of a policy to embed social protection into the fiscal framework.


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Although there is theoretical support for the realisation of social protection objectives, their implementation is highly politicised and largely influenced by delivering on political outcomes or campaign promises, rather than results for the poor. Planning for SAGE started in 2007 but the programme design was only approved by cabinet in 2010. In order to avoid any politicisation of the programme, no cash disbursements were made until after the 2011 elections.

The Role of Actors in the SAGE Programme The government of Uganda has played a leading role in preparation and implementation of the SAGE programme. The Expanding Social Protection programme was initially conceived by the MGLSD in 2005. The MGLSD has since nurtured the design of the programme and sought funding from various development partners. Currently, at the national level, the government of Uganda is contributing senior civil servants to lead and coordinate the Social Protection Secretariat as well as providing office space. At the local level, the SAGE programme will be implemented within and through government of Uganda structures at district, sub-county and parish levels. A financial contribution to the programme is anticipated in the next financial year. Donors have also played a critical role, especially in the funding and provision of technical assistance. DFID has committed a grant of £ 32.7 million for five years, and the Embassy of Ireland has also pledged € 7.5 million for the same period. UNICEF is providing substantial technical support and, therefore, acts as an intermediary for the diffusion of ‘best practices’ in the country. A private sector company, Maxwell Stamp PLC, has been contracted to deliver payments to SAGE beneficiaries. The management consultant is responsible for delivery against an annual workplan to be agreed by the steering committee and signed off by the Permanent Secretary of MGLSD, DFID’s and Irish Aid’s lead advisers. Civil society is expected to play an oversight role. The communities are not directly involved in the formulation and implementation of the programme, yet, they ought to play a leading role in the selection of beneficiaries because of their superior local knowledge. The local community should also be instrumental in designing robust social protection programmes that are based on local social values and also linked to informal social protection systems.

Relevance and Acceptance of the SAGE Programme The amounts to be distributed have been carefully calculated against parameters of adequacy, acceptability and sustainability. Firstly, as far as adequacy is concerned, the amount transferred should be sufficient to make a difference to people’s lives. The figure arrived at was UGX 22,000 (US$10), which is 1.5 times the average income for the poorest 10% of Uganda’s population and as such is expected to make a tangible difference to people’s lives. Similar initiatives in other countries have shown that even small amounts of money, paid reliably and regularly, can make an enormous positive impact. Conversely, the size of the grant is too low to create dependency. SAGE has been specifically designed to target individuals and households who have limited ability to make a living through work, or should not be forced to work – such as children, older people and people with disabilities. Without a minimum level of income security, such vulnerable people are unable to pull themselves out of poverty.

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Secondly, there is the issue of acceptability, which is concerned with whether the amount transferred is acceptable to the communities in which the transfer is being made. It was agreed that UGX 22,000 (US$10) is sufficient to provide useful income support but will not cause tensions within communities. Lastly, there is the issue of affordability. SAGE is a pilot programme, financed by donors, and designed to generate lessons so that the scheme may be scaled up nationally. Based on the lessons learned, there will be a need to undertake further calculations on the amount to be distributed under the SAGE programme, taking into account government budget constraints and national coverage to ensure sustainability. It should be noted that living costs are lower in rural areas (no rent or electricity bills) than in urban centres, and that rural people also grow some or all of their food while most urban residents are entirely market-dependent. Giving a uniform grant may not be appropriate given the differences in cost of living between rural and urban areas. As the programme expands, there will be economies of scale that will contribute to keeping overall administrative costs low. The programme is also anticipated to be integrated into existing line ministries, as a regular government programme after the five-year pilot period. This might increase the prospects for sustainability and institutionalisation. In addition, the Ugandan economy continues to grow at an impressive pace. Per capita income grew at about 4% per annum over the past decade. The impact of the global economic crisis on the Ugandan economy has been less severe than originally expected and growth has remained impressive. In this context, a basic social protection system is entirely affordable and could feasibly be established over a 5 – 10 year period. Moreover, the cost of not implementing social protection – in terms of lost human capital formation, continued high poverty rates, and continued economic stagnation in poor rural areas – would surely outweigh the cost of not implementing it. Other low-income countries have found ways to deliver domestically financed programmes (for example, Bolivia, Lesotho and Nepal). However, Uganda is likely to require support from development partners as it scales up its social protection system, in much the same way that development partners help to finance basic health and education services. Development partners currently put significant funds into many fragmented humanitarian aid projects. Reallocating the same resources to scaled-up national social protection initiatives would be more efficient and would increase state capacity.

The Complementary Role of Existing Social Protection Programmes and the SAGE Programme Social protection is not new to Uganda. The poor and vulnerable have always been cared for in Ugandan society through family and community systems. Unfortunately, as Uganda modernises and becomes more urbanised, these traditional social protection systems are struggling to cope. This is evident from the continuing high levels of poverty among vulnerable households. As a result, Uganda – like other countries across Africa – is now developing formal social protection systems as a core component of national development strategies to complement the role of existing informal protection measures. The SAGE programme also builds on the principle of non-discrimination and Ugandan traditions of supporting the old, the sick and children.


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SAGE is complementary to other social protection programmes that are already in place, but are inaccessible to a distinct group of vulnerable and poor people who are targeted by SAGE. Formal social security (National Social Security Fund (NSSF), Public Service Pension, and so on), covers only 5% of the total population. SAGE aims to deliver non-contributory pensions, or old age grants, to older persons, and vulnerability grants to households with limited labour capacity. If it achieves sustainable results, it will introduce into national planning and budgeting processes a provision for allocating resources to older persons, persons with disabilities, orphans and other vulnerable children. This is in line with the specific objectives of the National Development Plan. It is widely recognised that many development initiatives do not effectively reach the most vulnerable households and individuals, because they (particularly children, older people and people with disabilities) lack the resources to make the most of the opportunities offered and are not formally employed. SAGE fills this gap by specifically targeting these vulnerable groups. In time, it is hoped that the income security offered by SAGE will actually support these households to access other government and non-government programmes and reduce the inter-generational transmission of poverty. In doing so, SAGE – and social protection more broadly – will make a critical contribution to achieving Uganda’s vision of prosperity for all. However, it is not clear whether transfers made by SAGE will ‘crowd out’ private informal transfers. The beneficiary could have survived without this transfer, and it might distort and undermine traditional values of reciprocity and informal social support. A type of dependency effect could occur if the beneficiary comes to depend on the cash transfer, in the sense that they lose their previous sources of informal support. If SAGE is not taken forward by the government of Uganda after five years, when donor financing is expected to end, the beneficiary may fail to re-establish a relationship with their previous benefactor, and might be left worse off than before. This highlights the need for the cash transfers under SAGE to be taken as a ‘social contract’ between the government and citizens that must be upheld – not just another donor-driven experiment to be abandoned when the project cycle ends. There is also a need to establish whether the transfers during the pilot scheme are crowding out informal transfers, and ensure that SAGE complements rather than displaces existing informal transfers.

Challenges Universal old age grants tend to be popular and, therefore, receive significant funding from governments, which further increases their impact on poverty. Cash transfers entail lower transaction costs than in-kind transfers. These advantages are likely to enhance the success of SAGE. However, since its launch in Uganda in 2010, several issues have been raised about funding, sustainability, fears of corruption and mismanagement, among others. The following are some of the challenges facing SAGE that have been documented. There is a general concern (both in government and among the general public) that social protection may create dependency, which is usually understood as a tendency for recipients of regular social transfers to become permanently reliant on these ‘handouts’, and to lose any incentive to improve their circumstances using their own initiative and resources. Social protection has sometimes been castigated

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as a Western-driven agenda, unaffordable for Uganda and a catalyst for dependency among the poor. The elites have a relatively benign image of the poor, a strong sense that such people “are deserving and, therefore, need to be assisted” but are also quick to apportion blame to the poor, in particular citing laziness and a lack of innovation or poor attitude towards work (Lwanga-Ntale, Namuddu, and Onapa 2008). A recent workshop report by the MGLSD showed that there is limited knowledge about what social protection is, its benefits and how it is implemented and also a lack of understanding of the impact of cash transfers among policymakers, opinion leaders and the general public. There is also a general concern among the public that there is insufficient knowledge and experience to manage large-scale social assistance programmes effectively (particularly how to identify beneficiaries and transfer money efficiently). This is a common perception among some stakeholders, including those implementing social protection programmes. In the same workshop, participants expressed concerns about the possible misuse of cash transfers by beneficiaries. The public and media have also expressed scepticism in terms of the potential for mismanagement of operational funds and cash transfers. In addition, one workshop participant expressed the feeling that there is still a long way to go to make the case for social protection to be financed nationally, and supported by the ministry of finance. The common perception among policymakers and the general public is that social transfers are not sustainable. Another participant brought up the concern that targeting some sections of the population can divide communities – targeting only poor older people undermines social cohesion, and attempting to separate poor older people from the rest of their communities risks damaging Uganda’s social fabric even further – especially when it is likely that poverty targeting would be inaccurate, as this leads to accusations of discrimination and political manipulation. When programmes are targeted based on poverty status, beneficiaries are also often stigmatised by their fellow community members. It is often argued that targeting only poor older people disincentivises productivity. Despite their age, many older people in Uganda would like to continue working and contributing to their families for as long as they can. Targeting only poor older people would encourage them and their families to stop working in order to qualify for the programme. In other words, targeting according to poverty status can create dependency and poverty traps. Conversely, ‘punishing’ older people who are productive by excluding them from SAGE would hinder wealth creation and prosperity. Identifying and distinguishing the target groups for distinct policy interventions is hard, because the poorest, transitorily poor and vulnerable non-poor groups are fluid and fuzzy rather than static and crisp categories. Conventional means of identifying the poor in a policy context depend on a significant measure of indeterminacy about the categorisation of individuals and households into chronically and transitorily poor, or extremely and moderately poor. This often leads to an over-reliance on income or consumption measures of poverty that neglect its multi-dimensionality and ignore the significance of measurement error. There is no clear formula in place to determine the optimal amount of transfers. Similarly, there are no consistent rules and procedures for the inclusion of new beneficiaries or for ‘graduation’ from these programmes. Lack of local participation is another challenge for SAGE. Experiences from the region show that local communities are often in a better position to identify beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes than are programme administrators.


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Besides, they understand the local social values better than the administrators and would, therefore, provide useful inputs to the design of a robust social protection programme, well-grounded in local tradition. However, the design of the SAGE programme does not allow for the full participation of local communities.

Conclusion This chapter assessed the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment programme (SAGE) in Uganda. There is a need to design and implement a sustainable SAGE programme, based on local capacity and social values. The following recommended measures are based on best practices elsewhere. It is suggested that there is need to engage communities to identify SAGE beneficiaries. This approach would be costeffective and would lead to the selection of genuinely deserving people, because local communities have more information on such people than programme administrators. This practice has been used in many countries such as Zambia, Rwanda and Malawi and has proved to be effective. There is a case for implementing categorical targeting of old age grants, based on principles of citizenship and rights as enshrined in the constitution, to support social cohesion. Although old age grants are key to reducing poverty in old age, their universal character recognises the fact that all older people have contributed to their country’s development throughout their lives and are entitled to live in dignity and with a minimum level of income security. The age limit could also be lowered over time as more funds become available. In addition, to minimise capture of the benefits by non-poor older people, the following mechanisms could be used: • recovering old age grant payments from rich older people through the tax system; • introducing a ‘pension test’ which reduces payment of old age grants to those with other pension income; and • introducing an ‘affluence test’ which excludes the rich older people. The challenge of limited understanding of the impact of cash transfers among policy makers, opinion leaders and the general public, and poor perceptions by the public and media about the SAGE programme, can be addressed through implementing an Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy. A series of formal and informal meetings or workshops should be organised, targeting different stakeholders with different messages. This should be backed up with the production of various resources including policy briefs, discussion papers and IEC materials. There is need to demonstrate in the communication strategy that social protection is not a foreign concept but is rooted in local traditional systems and practices. This can change people’s attitudes and pave the way for the revival of traditional systems and practices for extending mutual support to persons in need. There is a need to assess the effectiveness of SAGE in addressing poverty and vulnerability. This requires the establishment of monitoring and supervision systems that allow third party verification, and feedback loops for self-correction and learning, to increase the effectiveness of the programme and increase the credibility of SAGE in the public eye. The cash transfers through SAGE should be calibrated according to household size (that is, transfers should be calculated on a ‘per capita’ rather than ‘per household’ basis). Since this may create incentives for potential beneficiaries to exaggerate

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household size, rigorous verification mechanisms must be devised and incorporated into programme implementation to minimise these risks, for example, by using local community leaders to verify household sizes. Women should be registered as recipients of the SAGE cash transfers that are intended to benefit households, even when these women are not household heads, unless there are strong practical or sociocultural reasons not to do this. A gender analysis should be undertaken before full SAGE programme implementation, to elicit the views of programme participants on this issue, and to predict the positive and negative consequences on gender relations of transferring resources to women rather than to men. The value of grants under SAGE is supposed to be increased by 5% per year to account for inflation and maintain the purchasing power of the grant. However, 5% may not match the annual inflation rate; instead this grant should be automatically indexed to inflation. In addition, since living costs are lower in rural areas than urban centres, urban beneficiaries should be given higher grants compared to their rural counterparts. There is a need to design cost-effective, timely and accurate mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the SAGE programme. While there has been a general increase in demand for evidence to inform policy, this evidence must also communicate the non-technical benefits of social protection to achieve political acceptability. Lastly, there is a need to prepare and implement a social protection policy to guide the implementation of the SAGE programme.

References Baulch, B., Wood, J. and Weber, A. 2006. Developing a social protection index for Asia. Development Policy Review 24(1): 5–29. Blank, L., Devereux, S. and Handa, S. 2010. The case for social protection for children. In S. Handa, S. Devereux and D. Webb (eds.), Social protection for Africa’s children. London: Routledge. Holzmann, R., Sherburne-Benz, L. and Tesliuc, E. 2003. Social risk management: The World Bank’s approach to social protection in a globalizing world. Washington, DC: World Bank, Social Protection Department, The Human Development Network. Cited at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ SOCIALPROTECTION Publications/20847129/SRMWBApproachtoSP.pdf (accessed 12th August, 2011). Lwanga-Ntale, C., Namuddu, J. and Onapa, P. 2008. Social protection in Uganda: A call for action. Discussion Paper No. 1/2008. Kampala: Chronic Poverty Research Centre.

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Chapter 11 The Impact of Health Insurance on Household Access to Healthcare in Eldoret, Kenya Nicholas Walter Otieno Ajwang’

Introduction Healthcare is essential for the socioeconomic development of a nation, and has been at the top of the public policy agenda since Kenya’s independence. Making healthcare services accessible to everyone is a duty imposed by Kenya’s constitution, yet this remains a great challenge. Health services and policies to promote health are said to have developed as part of modern welfare states and the form they have taken has been shaped by the social structure and institutions in different countries as well as by sociodemographic and economic factors (Allsop 1995). In Kenya, as in other developing nations, health facilities are concentrated in urban areas and are used mainly by higher income groups (Westendorf and Ghai 1995). Although Kenya remains, as it has always been, the best-off country in East Africa, it has the most unequal income distribution in the region (Ellis and Freeman 2007). This diversity and disparity of incomes poses a great challenge to comparable global standards for human wellbeing and safety. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) indicates that the percentage of hard core poverty has increased in urban areas and that inequality in the country remains high (Republic of Kenya 2007). According to the Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital (MTRH), as far as financial and health sector resources are concerned, a large proportion of Kenya’s population has limited access to affordable and adequate healthcare services (MTRH 2005). The Kenyan government acknowledges in its national development plan that unfavourable distribution of health services continues to widen, with observed disparities in access and affordability across the country (Republic of Kenya 2002a). It further states that disparities also exist in the distribution of medical personnel, distance to healthcare facilities and expenditure allocated to rural and urban areas. In addition to this unfavourable distribution, retention of medical personnel in the public health facilities has remained a major challenge, due to poor remuneration. Furthermore, the health sector faces significant constraints due to inadequate funding and poor distribution of human resources (Republic of Kenya 2009). Odada and Ayako (1988) note that access of Kenyans to medical services continues to be limited, since the numbers of people in medical training have also been increasing too slowly. On service provision, fees were reinstated for public health facilities, because the government could no longer afford to provide medical care free of charge (Bedi et al. 2004). However, user charges have had mixed results. They have either had a

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positive effect on utilisation of health facilities by increasing the funds available to the facility, or a negative effect by deterring poor clients from using services (National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (NCAPD) et al. 2005). Kloos (1990) indicates that prohibitive hospital fees are often a significant barrier to utilisation, especially among poor patients. This severely limits access to care by the very poor, who may not be able to afford fees and who are also least likely to have access to alternative financing. Social and material inequalities within a society generate health inequalities. A central task, therefore, is to identify, through research, the underlying political, social and behavioural determinants of these health inequalities (Leon and Walt 2001). Although access to healthcare has been extensively researched and evaluated, the issues facing households in Kenya’s urban areas regarding health insurance (as a social protection system) and access to healthcare have received scant attention. ‘Urban’ healthcare has generally not been distinguished from ‘national’ healthcare, and many policies developed at the national level have simply been transferred. Empirical evidence shows that there are factors that influence access to healthcare services, and for each service component, there is a set of factors that determine how well these services will be utilised. Williams and Torrens (2008) list these factors as finance, culture, and geography as determining household access to these services. Freeman, Levine and Reeder (1994) list other influences, including age and sex, incidence of illness, education, proximity of healthcare facilities, family income, health insurance coverage, residence, and perceptions of both providers and recipients. Formal social protection through health insurance coverage has always been seen as the answer to prohibitive healthcare costs. It is a means of financial protection against the risk of unexpected and expensive healthcare (Preker and Carrin 2004). It has been a longstanding public policy issue in many countries. According to the 2009 census, of 38 million Kenyans, only an estimated 700,000 have medical insurance cover, largely provided by employers (Republic of Kenya 2010). In the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) 2008–09, medical insurance is reported to provide peace of mind and, most important, necessary care to save the life and/or wellbeing of the enrolee (KNBS and ICF Macro 2010). However, the report found that only 7% of women and 11% of men aged 15 – 49 are covered by medical insurance, with the largest category of insurance being employer-based policies. The Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) (2003) and Owino and Were (1997) reported that user charges were introduced, among other factors, to ensure vigorous pursuit of the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). However, the World Bank (2006) reports that while the insurance scheme (currently considering major reform) is supposed to pay for hospital stays, treatment, and drugs for the whole population, the reality is completely different. Often, the NHIF covers only board and lodging expenses and patients have to pay all other treatment costs themselves. Only a small percentage of the population is insured (Republic of Kenya 2002a; Mwabu et al. 2004; Muga and Kerich 2010). This study, therefore, sought to look into health insurance as a form of formal social protection that cushions the poor from the burden of high healthcare costs. Despite the fact that health insurance is essential for improvement of overall household health, little is known about the factors that influence its use in Eldoret, Kenya. This study aims at filling this gap, using data collected in Eldoret. The study was guided by the following specific objectives:

The Impact of Health Insurance on Household Access to Healthcare

• • •

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to establish the proportion of households with health insurance; to examine the socioeconomic characteristics that influence household enrolment into health insurance; and to determine the influence of health insurance on household access to healthcare.

To achieve these objectives, three research questions guided the study: • • •

What is the proportion of households with health insurance? Which socioeconomic characteristics influence household enrolment into health insurance? What is the influence of health insurance on household access to healthcare?

It is hoped that the results of the study will help to improve policymakers’ understanding of the influence of health insurance on household access to healthcare services, and also serve as an important tool for any possible intervention aimed at improving household access to healthcare.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework Situating the Research Along with other countries of eastern Africa, Kenya endorsed the worldwide social aim of ‘Health for all by the year 2000’ (WHO 1978). The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity in an individual”. Kitts and Roberts (1996) observe that the WHO definition of health emphasises the significance of the social welfare of populations and not merely the medicalisation of disease. It allows for consideration of the complex set of social and economic components that influence the health and wellbeing of populations. This broad definition acknowledges the role of social structures and human economic activities to good health. This definition is valuable to this study in its attempt to look at health insurance and household access to healthcare. Health insurance is described as a means of financial protection against the risk of unexpected and expensive healthcare (Preker and Carrin 2004). Risk still looms large in present-day society (Zinn 2008). Health insurance originated in Europe in the early 1800s when mutual benefit societies were formed to reduce the financial burden associated with illness or injury (Gapenski 2009). Gapenski further reports that health insurers fall into two broad categories: private insurers and public programmes. Private insurance is administered by private insurance companies whereas public insurance is administered by the state. Public insurance is also referred to as social health insurance (SHI) or national health insurance (NHI). This study focuses on the analysis of the impact of social health insurance on household access to healthcare services, because the notion of ‘healthcare’ is returning to the core of the human development debate in both local and international forums (Preker and Feachem 1996; Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 1997). Besides, this has been necessitated by the spread of illness and the need to make treatment available to everyone in the face of growing populations and rising costs of healthcare. At the global level, the United Nations has declared the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), setting targets, among other goals, to improve access to healthcare (World Bank 2007). Research findings have demonstrated that healthcare has come to

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epitomise many of the critical dilemmas that confront contemporary societies. Lena, Helmreich and McCord (1992) reported that issues in healthcare are salient not only because they touch us individually in important respects, but because they expose many of the political, economic, social and ethical dilemmas of our time. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (1991) reported that health for all remains inaccessible due to poor quality, unresponsiveness of services, inadequate funding and staff. In the United Kingdom, O’Reilly et al. (2001), cited in Heenan (2006), states that increasing distance from the healthcare centre reduced the likelihood of using the service. In India, access to healthcare is reportedly guided by notions of efficiency rather than equity, and the issues are centred on supply, rather than demand (Iyer 2005). Iyer reports that in such a context, access to healthcare is a double-edged sword. Not having it is dis-empowering and amounts to denial of one’s rights, but the consequences of having accessed and paid substantial sums for healthcare could also be detrimental to the economic and social wellbeing of the household. This cannot be far from the truth, even in Kenya, and calls for implementation of social protection systems in order to make healthcare accessible. It is acknowledged in various works that the need to treat and cure disease is universal. As a result, access to healthcare services has generated considerable debate and discussion, and a number of studies have formulated frameworks or models to represent the influences on it (Andersen and Newman 1973, Penchansky and Thomas 1981, Andersen 1995, Arksey et al. 2003), all cited in Heenan (2006). Indeed, access is a shorthand term referring to the timely use of health services to achieve the best possible health outcomes (Patrick and Erickson 1993). March, Smyth, and Mukhopadhyay (1999) report that access to a resource refers to the opportunity to use it. They acknowledge that these opportunities are socially constructed and constrained by structural inequalities. Healthcare service, on the other hand, is broadly defined by Oleske (2001) as a physician or other individual healthcare professional services, facility use, prescription use, or even the use of medical devices. This research study adopted the perspective of access to healthcare as ‘use of healthcare services’ and as ‘socially constructed’ to assess the role of health insurance as a social protection system in access to healthcare. Currently, the issue of access to healthcare is critically important to households experiencing the effects of economic and health sector reform. Iyer (2005) reports that it is now common knowledge that such reforms have benefited the rich and middle classes, but not the poor. In addition, some of the poor people may lack health insurance coverage or may not have financial entitlements. In addition, he notes that individuals may lack an acceptable source of healthcare or may face other barriers, including financial, to receiving services (they may have no health insurance or may be under-insured). Considering the magnitude of health problems in Kenya and the global concern for health for all, the research is not merely curious, but an important practical guide to understanding health insurance coverage and access to healthcare.

Socioeconomic Situation and Healthcare Access to healthcare is now widely recognised as a basic human right, and the urgency of some global health issues has pushed global health policy to the top of the international agenda (World Bank 2006). However, the participation of households in healthcare depends on both external and internal factors. Factors external to the household would, be difficult to control. Studies show that socioeconomic


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circumstances are perhaps the major determinants of how people respond to health concerns (Dorling and Simpson 1999). They report that there is a clearly established relationship between socioeconomic factors and health. According to Dina and Law (1998), the socioeconomic status affects access to healthcare, and poverty is associated with the receipt of little or no preventive or therapeutic healthcare. The Ministry of Health (MoH) in Kenya reports that socioeconomic factors do not operate in isolation but in conjunction with access to healthcare services (MoH 1997). Heller (1982) reported that access to healthcare is influenced by an individual’s economic circumstances. According to Detels et al. (2004) components of the socioeconomic status are intertwined with crucial features of life that affect health. They state that age, sex, and the ethnic structure of a population, along with its geographical and occupational distribution, are likely to determine levels and patterns of need for, and use of health services. Alongside the literature on barriers to access, there is a growing body of research on the socioeconomic influences on service utilisation of gender, age, disability, ethnicity, poverty and local social and cultural conditions (Heenan 2006). It is claimed that health varies with social class, and an individual who is disadvantaged in one area of life is likely to be disadvantaged in others (Scambler 2003). Cockerham (1986) reports that until recently it was generally believed that lower class persons tended to underutilise health services because of the financial cost and/or sub-culture of poverty that failed to emphasise the importance of good health. He further reports that when actual need for health services is taken into account, low-income persons appear to use fewer services relative to their needs. This could be explained by their lack of enrolment into a social protection system. In reporting on socioeconomic aspects of a household, various studies report on the disadvantaged position of females within the household. According to WHO (1999), being born female still means having fewer opportunities than males for work and living conditions conducive to good health. In addition, women and girls often face discrimination and specific obstacles in accessing healthcare. Feminist discourse has shown that the social status of women in the household affects healthcare needs and access (Batliwala et al. 1998 and Madhiwalla et al. 2000, cited in Iyer 2005). Iyer (2005) states that gender has been identified as one of the social pivots around which access to healthcare is configured. According to Scambler (2003), gender plays a significant role in health and utilisation of health services. Whereas both health and gender depend on biological circumstances, they are also socially constructed (Lorber and Moore 2002). In Naidoo and Wills (2001), it is reported that gender affects access to material resources and provides both a context for and a set of constraints on people’s lives. O’Keefe, Ottewill, and Wall (1994) state that, generally, women have less control than men over household issues. In a study on health services and slum residents in Mathare, Nairobi, gender, as a social aspect, was found to be significantly related to both health facility preference and health facility utilisation (Owino 2005). However, despite the fact that the use of healthcare is essential for further improvement of household and personal health, little is known about how much gender influences health insurance enrolment within a household. In other literature, education is not only considered as a basic human right that should not be denied for whatever reason, but it also goes hand in hand with health. Detels et al. (2004) assert that education may be the most basic aspect of socioeconomic status. Kitts and Roberts (1996) state that poverty of education creates a vicious circle of myth and misinformation that perpetuates health-damaging behaviours and

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harmful practices. In Kenya since independence, the express purpose of education, other than to forge national and social unity, has been to reduce social inequities and imbalances, and compensate for individual or sectoral disadvantages (Obura 1991). Grandea (1994) observes that the call for better educational opportunities for women is often premised on the fact that educated women are better mothers who raise fewer, better educated and healthier children. Schwartz, Akin and Popkin (1987) found that low educational achievement contributes to putting the poor into higher health expenditure categories. In addition, he found that the mother’s education has a positive effect on choosing a modern facility for birth-related services. The World Bank (1994) concurs that greater education for women increases women’s ability to benefit from health information and to make good use of health services. It also increases their access to income and enables them to live healthier lives. Leonard (2000) found that education relates strongly with choice of service provider. Patients at well-equipped private and mission facilities tended to be better educated than the population in general. Those who choose traditional healers tended to be less well educated. In addition, he asserts that better-educated patients are aware of the medical skills that different providers possess and how these skills apply differently according to the medical condition from which they suffer. Hence, they might be able to induce more effort than the average person. Similar findings are reported by Moonie (2000), who found some evidence that medical practitioners spent more time with wealthy, educated people and less with poor people. However, he notes that most medics probably do not intend to give a variable quality of healthcare service to different people. It may be that more confident and well-educated people can persuade doctors to take greater interest in their needs. Currently, the influence of education on enrolment in health insurance needs to be discussed and documented separately. This is the gap that this study addresses.

Health Insurance According to Musgrove (2004), health is a peculiar asset because, unlike almost anything else, including even some other forms of human capital, it is almost entirely inalienable. He further states that the character of health makes it harder to insure than other assets, especially since the value of one’s health and the financial risks are not correlated with one’s capacity to pay. Around the world, healthcare costs are rising (Baeza and Packard 2006). These include treatment costs; cost of productive time lost from work, and opportunity costs due to days spent taking care of ill family members. Furthermore, the combined costs of healthcare and loss of income for a serious illness or injury can force individuals and households to cut non-medical consumption. For the already poor, these costs perpetuate poverty. Studies have shown that a significant proportion of households that have become poor resulted so due to serious illness, which led to their liquidating assets to pay for healthcare services (Liu, Rao and Hsiao 2003). In Kenya, Krishna (2004, cited in Iyer 2005) has shown that medical expenses are invariably among the three most important reasons why households fall into poverty. In addition, such expenditures also exacerbate the vulnerability and deprivation of households that are already poor. This is now even more the case as the cost of providing healthcare has increased dramatically over the past few decades in sub-Saharan Africa (Maliyamkono and Ogbu 1999). While every product and service has steadily increased in price over the years, Mitchell and Haroun (2002) report that healthcare costs have grown at a faster rate than almost everything else. This severely


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limits access to care for the very poor – who may not be able to afford fees and who are also least likely to have access to alternative financing. MTRH reports that a large proportion of Kenya’s population has limited access to affordable and adequate healthcare services (MTRH 2005). This is especially the case for low-income populations and other groups of special concern or the vulnerable atrisk populations. This calls for intervention by all stakeholders to redress the extensive direct and hidden costs of healthcare through health insurance. However, there are concerns that fees for healthcare services at the point of delivery, or costly membership of insurance schemes, could deny the poor access to modern healthcare services (Bedi et al. 2004). According to Patrick and Erickson (1993), although geographic, cultural and educational barriers limit access to healthcare, financial barriers dominate. Those without public or private insurance find it difficult to obtain healthcare services. Even those with high incomes may experience problems in access if their insurance does not cover certain conditions or needed services. The financial burden is attributed to the healthcare organisations (HCOs) being businesses (Cleverly 1986). Although they are basic providers of health services, and are organised as not-for-profit corporations rather than for-profit investor-owned businesses, for financial viability HCOs must receive payments from the community at least equal to the payments they make to suppliers. Health insurance schemes are increasingly recognised as a tool for financing healthcare provision in low-income countries (WHO 2000). Among other factors, economic pressures have been key to bringing about healthcare financing reform in various countries. One way of doing so is through health insurance schemes – either compulsory or voluntary (Preker and Carrin 2004). What is more, given the high utilisation of health services in several countries, it has been argued that social health insurance may improve access to acceptable quality healthcare. There is also some evidence that neither purely statutory social health insurance nor commercial insurance schemes alone can significantly contribute to an increase in coverage rates and thereby broaden access to healthcare. Despite the great importance attached to medical insurance as in the case reported for Kenya by KNBS and ICF Macro (2010), Preker and Carrin report that large proportions of people in Africa are not covered by formal health insurance, and access problems are reported in terms of financing and geographic outreach. This research identifies how, among households with coverage, health insurance influences choice of a healthcare provider and specialist. At its inception, the NHIF in Kenya aimed to assist government employees gain access to higher quality private hospitals, thereby relieving congestion in the free public hospitals (Owino et al. 2000). However, several studies have shown that NHIF members contribute to, yet hardly benefit from, the fund. In fact, healthcare use may not rise in response to an increase in the availability of medical insurance. There is evidence to suggest that, even with insurance, access may be difficult. For example, Mwabu et al. (2004) report that government health centres and dispensaries cannot be reimbursed by the fund, as NHIF is restricted to use in hospitals. Furthermore, most of the health facilities registered with the fund are rarely used by the poor. They use local clinics and dispensaries, which are not registered by the fund. Therefore, they do not get reimbursed for the medical expenses they incur even when they are members of the fund. In addition, members of the scheme do not fully benefit from the fund because of cumbersome reimbursement procedures. Similarly, the increase in the number of people covered by private insurance is hampered by the high risks resulting from administrative inefficiency (Hook and Werner 2003). Insurance firms are burdened by an overload of

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correspondence with healthcare providers about claims. The current study goes further and examines the relationship between health insurance and the probability of and consistency in accessing care. In other literature, Lorber and Moore (2002) report that health insurance centres on males. For women, having financial resources does not guarantee good healthcare. Even with private insurance, it is often difficult to get payment for preventive procedures (Dina and Law 1998). Furthermore, because insurance coverage is often linked to employment and because women are more likely to be part-time employees, temporary or service workers, or unemployed heads of households, they number prominently among the uninsured. However, in a study conducted in four districts in Kenya, Mwabu et al. (2004) observe that women and men have the same tendency to use medical services. On the other hand, gender emerges in the same study as a key determinant of the use of insurance to pay for medical care. Men are more likely than women to pay for medical care using insurance. The authors further observe that educated women are more likely than men to use insurance as a method of paying for medical care. The present study went further and examined the relationship that exists between health insurance status and medical facility preference and utilisation. Given reduced government funding for healthcare, Musgrove (2004) reports that under the present economic circumstances, a government would like to recover some part of the cost of healthcare from the consumers or beneficiaries, while compromising its principles as little as possible. However, this view can only remain viable and relevant among households that have not experienced significant medical needs, accompanied by abject poverty. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that poor quality of services and low incomes of most of the population limit people’s willingness to pay for government health services. At the same time, many users who are able to pay avoid paying because public user fee schemes are poorly administered and exemptions exist for non-indigent persons (USAID 1995). No doubt this represents a significant restriction on access to healthcare services. Yet, according to IPAR (2003), waivers and exemptions were introduced as a social protection system to cushion the poor and medically vulnerable groups against the adverse effects of user charges. Addressing the cost of healthcare through health insurance is, therefore, extremely important. The extent to which health insurance influences access to healthcare services is perhaps the ultimate question currently facing the healthcare sector. Hence, this study sought to address health insurance and access to healthcare services, examining how health insurance cover influences the use of waivers and exemptions in public health facilities.

Conceptual Framework This study adopted and modified the ‘Health Delivery System in Kenya’ framework of Ndetei, Khasakhala, and Omolo (2008). The framework emphasises the relationships between different actors and focuses on how insurance entities influence access to healthcare, while also indicating that socioeconomic factors influence household enrolment into health insurance programmes (see Figure 1). There is a clear consensus in the research literature that health insurance influences access to healthcare in a number of ways and that health insurance schemes are an increasingly recognised tool for financing healthcare. The conceptual framework captures the vital link between socioeconomic status and health insurance in household access to healthcare. After family consultations, a household may go to a public medical facility (structured in a step-wise manner so that complicated cases are referred to a higher level) or to faith-


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based or private medical facilities that fill the gaps in public care. The choice of any facility is determined by the health insurance cover (private or public). Figure 1: Conceptual framework

Source: Adapted and modified from Ndetei, Khasakhala, and Omolo (2008)

Methodology Study Area The study area is Eldoret Municipality, the capital and administrative centre of Uasin Gishu County, Rift Valley Province, Kenya (see Figure 2). The town has undergone rapid economic development since 1974, leading to rapid population growth and physical expansion (Nyakaana 1996; Republic of Kenya 2002b). The total county population was counted as 622,705 people in the 1999 census (Republic of Kenya 2001). The urban population in the three districts that make up the county has increased to 144,223 in Eldoret West District, 80,729 in Eldoret East District and 120,607 in Wareng District, according to the 2009 Kenya census (Republic of Kenya 2010), while the number of urban households is recorded as 88,956 in Eldoret West, 51,486 in Eldoret East and 61,866 in Wareng districts. But despite rapid urban growth, economic gains have not benefited everyone as real incomes have decreased substantially and disparities between the rich and the poor have increased. Eldoret’s public health facilities are over-utilised (Republic of Kenya 1997). Many people are unable to afford private hospital charges and so resort to public facilities. The county is characterised by high under-five mortality rates, and there are substantial distances between health facilities (Republic of Kenya 2008a; 2008b). Like other urban centres in the country, the municipality is better served than rural areas with both government and private hospitals and health centres. It was selected for the study due to its easy accessibility, its relatively static population and its numerous healthcare facilities (Republic of Kenya 2005).

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Figure 2: Map of Eldoret Municipality (from a drawing by Eldoret Municipal Council) SUDAN

36oE

40oE

ETHIOPIA N

ELDORET TOWN

SOMALIA

UGANDA

Lake Turkono

KENYA

Kisumu

0o

Lake Victoria

Nairobi KEY

Internation boundaries

INDIAN OCEAN 4oS

STUDY AREA 0

100

MOMBASA

Tanzania

200 Km

Location of Eldoret Town in Kenya

MOI UNIVERSITY CHEPKOILE CAMPUS

KINGIONGIO

ver

NNE

Sergoit Ri

MAILI

KIMUMU KINGIONGIO

KAMUKUNJI

HURUMA ELDORET WEST ni

sia

So r ve

Ri

WEST INDIES

KIPKENYO

CBD KAPSOYA

KIPKARREN

PIONEER

KAPSOYA GARDENS EATEC

YAMUMBI

Ol ne

Da

KEY Town boundary KIMUMU

ELDORET POLYTECHNIC

Town eastates Railway

k pu Sa

Major roads

LANGAS

r ve

Ri

Otherroads CBD

Central Business District

HEALTH FACILITIES District Hospital Eldoret Hospital Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital Sub-district Hospital Dispensary 0

1

Municipal Council Clinic 2 3

4 Km

Source: Eldoret Municipal Council (E.M.C)

ELGON VIEW


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Research Design The study employed a quantitative research methodology. Quantitative research seeks measurement as the basis for forming generalisations concerning social reality, and employs survey methods which are concerned with establishing statistical associations between variables (Ridsdale 1998; Mwanje 2001). Data for the study were derived from primary sources through survey methods. Primary data were created using a pre-tested interview-administered schedule. It was both closed-ended (structured, fixed response) for quick and easy response, and open-ended (unstructured, free response) to help learn how a respondent thinks, to discover what is really important to him or her, or to get an answer to a question with many possible or sensitive answers. The study strove to identify the heads of households within Eldoret Municipality among the urban population as the unit of analysis. A household represents the most important unit in terms of time and resources invested to attain health. In the study, the research questions for the quantitative survey were pre-defined so that the study investigated a precise set of research questions.

Sampling Procedure In order to obtain representative samples of households belonging to different groups and economic classes, as well as their distribution across geographic locations, a fourstage sampling procedure was adopted. The first stage involved obtaining representative samples of households by stratification. This divided the population into mutually exclusive sets or strata to ensure that all classes of estates were adequately represented and no bias prevailed. The municipal residential type is low, medium and upperincome. An equal number of three estates was drawn from each stratum. The estates are Huruma, Kamukunji and Langas (low-income), Pioneer, Kapsoya and Kimumu (middle-income), and Elgon View, West Indies and Garden Estate (upper-income). The second stage of selection involved the systematic sampling procedure. In this case, units for the study were selected directly. This procedure was used to select 20 household heads (male or female) from each of the estates at a constant interval of ten – every tenth household head was selected in a circular systematic fashion, with equal probability, after a random start. The sampling strategy allowed for substitution of the households in the field, if they were not available despite repeated attempts to contact them, or if they refused to participate in the survey. The procedure resulted in a sample size of 180 household heads from the nine estates. In the third stage, healthcare facilities were purposively selected to obtain two government hospitals, two private hospitals, two health centres and two dispensaries. Purposive sampling (also known as deliberate or judgemental sampling) enabled selection from all cadres of healthcare service outlets located in the study area. Lastly, based on ease of access, convenience sampling (also called haphazard or accidental sampling) was applied to obtain ten household heads seeking healthcare services in each facility for an in-depth interview that included patient exit interviews. This procedure generated an additional 80 household heads. Therefore, the total sample for the study was 260 household heads.

Strengths, Limitations and Ethical Considerations The study faced certain limitations but efforts were made to ensure they were adequately addressed, to limit their impact on the findings. The study was restricted to residents of Eldoret. This excluded the population that commutes to the town every day for

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work, business and healthcare. Respondents were initially reluctant and sometimes suspicious but, after learning the study objectives, they were receptive and provided the information. In addition, the study was limited by the self-reporting accuracy of the participants. Ethical issues in social science research were considered, including the importance of voluntary and informed participation and the preservation of the participants’ anonymity. The work aimed at projecting an ethos that encouraged trust; hence permission to carry out the study was sought from Eldoret Municipality’s Medical Officer of Health (MoH), the Uasin Gishu County MoH and the Uasin Gishu County Hospital Medical Superintendent.

Data Presentation and Analysis Results Table 1 profiles the households that were selected for this study. Household-level data were merged with healthcare facility-level data. While the data collected from households in the residential areas had 20 heads from each sampled estate, data collected from the sampled healthcare facilities contained varying numbers of respondents from the sampled estates. The survey contains information on 260 interviewed households, and a data set on 1,349 persons from nine estates within Eldoret. Male household heads accounted for 79% and female heads for 21% of all the surveyed households. The males mostly headed married families. However, due to changes in gender relations and family patterns that could be said to jeopardise the institutional underpinnings of the traditional male breadwinner family, females headed separated, divorced and widowed families, as well as families where males had migrated for various reasons including migrant labour. The survey reveals that female adults (29.5%) were the majority followed by male adults (27.4%). In terms of age, 88.4% of the respondents were below 55 years while 11.6% were above 55 years. As for religion, the large majority were Christians, constituting 84% of the survey population, while Hindus constituted 8%, Muslims 7% and other religions 1%. Respondents from upmarket residential areas constituted 29% of the sample, 32% were from middle-income estates and 39% came from low-income estates. In terms of education, the majority of respondents (87.3%) had attained at least secondary school education. Respondents with no formal education represented 2.3% of the total distribution. Table 2 presents information about chronic illness, illness prevalence and treatment in the household during a four-week recall period preceding the survey. The majority of households (81.2%) had no incidence of chronic illness, while 18.8% of respondents did report presence of chronic illness in the household. Two-thirds (66.5%) reported incidents of illness four weeks prior to the survey while one-third (33.5%) had no incidents of illness in this period. A higher proportion of females (82.2%) than males reported illness – higher than the distribution of females (51.5%) in the overall sample, which could be explained by the fact that women generally report illness more than men do. Furthermore, more children than adults were reportedly ill. Of the households who had been ill during the four weeks preceding the survey, 62.3% had sought healthcare outside the home. Three-quarters of these households (73.5%) had experienced only one treatment episode, while one-quarter (25.4%) had two or more episodes of treatment in the four weeks prior to the survey.


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Table 1: Socio-demographic data Characteristics Household head

Category Yes No Gender of head Male Female Age (years) 18–39 40–54 55–70 Over 1 Total household Female adults population size Male adults Female children Male children Marital status Single/(separated/ divorced/ widowed) Married Education level None Primary Secondary Tertiary Religion Christian Muslim Hindu Other Residence Upper-income Middle-income Low-income H o u s e h o l d 1–5 population size 6 and above Source: Fieldwork data (2010)

f 260 0 205 55 160 70 29 70

% 100.0 0.0 78.8 21.2 61.5 26.9 11.2 0.4

398 369 297 285

29.5 27.4 22.0 21.1

92

35.4

168 6 27 74 153 219 17 21 3 74 84 102 161 99

64.7 2.3 10.4 28.5 58.8 84.2 6.5 8.1 1.2 28.5 32.4 39.2 61.9 38.1

Table 2: Households’ illness and treatment characteristics Characteristics Number of sick members with chronic illness

Presence of illness in previous month Gender of the invalid Treatment episodes in previous month

Source: Fieldwork data (2010)

Category None 1 2 Yes No Male Female None 1 ≥2

f 211 45 4 173 87 31 142 2 119 41

% 81.2 17.3 1.5 66.5 33.5 17.8 82.2 1.2 73.5 25.4

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Proportion of Households with Health Insurance The research sought to establish the proportion of households with health insurance as a form of social protection. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for health insurance status among the 260 households surveyed. Overall, the number of households that reported having purchased health insurance (either social or private, or both) was 155 (59.6%), while 105 (40.4%) had no health insurance cover of any kind. A small proportion has private insurance (11.9%) while a larger share has social insurance (44.6%) and another small percentage has both private and social insurance (3.1%). About 40% of the sampled households have no health insurance cover of any kind. Table 3: Distribution of health insurance Insurance coverage Social (NHIF) Private Social and private None Total households Source: Fieldwork data (2010)

f 116 31 8 105 260

% 44.6 11.9 3.1 40.4 100.0

As indicated in Table 4, of the households with health insurance, the state-run NHIF has the highest percentage of the insured households (74.8%), followed by private health insurance (20%) and both social health insurance and private health insurance (5.2%). Almost two-thirds (63%) of insured households interviewed in the survey said all individuals living in the household had been enrolled. In the remaining households, individuals not enrolled were usually young adults above the age of 18 years, who are supposed to enrol independently. The monthly contribution to the NHIF is currently Ksh320 (about US$3). It is a compulsory contribution for all workers in formal employment. For households in informal employment, the NHIF runs an alternative scheme at premiums of between Ksh30 and Ksh230. The insurance scheme is theoretically supposed to pay for hospital stays, treatment and drugs for the whole population, but the reality is completely different. Programme contributions are not enough to cover medical expenses and facilities, and in most cases only cover bed fees for in-patients. Private healthcare costs in Kenya are significantly higher. For this reason the cost of private health insurance is higher and varies from one provider to another, depending on the extent of coverage and the number of family members covered. Table 4: Distribution of health insurance Insurance coverage Social (NHIF) Private Social and private Total households Source: Fieldwork data (2010)

f 116 31 8 155

% 74.8 20.0 5.2 100.0

The overview of the distribution characteristics of health insurance purchase and nonpurchase is presented in Table 5. The survey found that those with health insurance were


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younger in age, mostly in paid employment. They had a higher percentage of presence of chronic illness; higher levels of education; and were mostly headed by males. The results indicate that the purchase group tended to be from married households while single, widowed or divorced heads were less insured than their married counterparts. Households with fewer than five members were more likely to be insured than larger households. In terms of place of residence, although respondents from low-income areas were a majority in the survey, they are the least represented among households that have health insurance. Residents of higher and middle-income estates had higher representation among insured households. There was also a significant variation in the ownership of healthcare insurance by religion. Although they were fewer, those who follow the Hindu and Islamic faiths exhibited higher percentages for private insurance membership than members of the Christian faith. Table 5:

Distribution of household health insurance status (% by column)

Health insurance Variable

Category

Social % of 116 69.8 30.2

Private Social and None % % of 31 Private % of 8 of 105 71.0 37.5 71.4 29.0 62.5 28.6

Gender of household head

Male Female

Age in years

18–39 40–54 55 and above Christian Muslim Hindu Single/

58.6 30.2 11.2 90.4 6.9 2.6 32.7

29.0 35.5 35.5 29.1 19.4 51.6 38.7

75.0 25.0 65.0 25.0 12.5 37.5

61.5 21.0 4.8 92.4 2.9 4.8 37.2

widowed/ divorced Married

67.2

61.3

62.5

62.8

Residence

Upper-income Mid-income Low-income

30.2 44.9 25.0

77.4 6.5 16.2

37.5 50.0 12.5

11.5 24.8 63.8

Household size

5 and below 6 and above

61.2 38.8

51.6 48.4

62.5 37.5

65.8 34.2

Paid employment Yes No Education None Primary Secondary Tertiary

96.5 3.4 3.4 27.6 69.0

96.8 3.2 16.1 83.9

87.5 12.5 12.5 87.5

81.0 19.0 12.4 15.2 34.3 38.2

Presence of Yes chronic illness No Source: Fieldwork data (2010)

82.5 17.2

54.8 45.1

75.0 25.0

87.6 12.4

Religion

Marital status

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4.3. Household Socioeconomic Situation and Health Insurance Enrolment The survey asked which socioeconomic factors influence household enrolment in health insurance, and the chi-squared test was used to analyse the answers to this question. The results show that age, education, occupation, income, house tenure, house structure, place of residence, religion and household size were all found to significantly predict enrolment into health insurance programmes (p < 0.05). Contrary to expectations, gender and marital status did not significantly predict take-up of health insurance – p > 0.05 – (see Table 6). Table 6: Socioeconomic situation and health insurance cover Characteristics

c2

Gender

p value df 1.42

0.710

Age

33.46

Education level 58.60

0.000

Occupation

phi

Cramer’s V

3

0.074

0.074

0.000

9

0.359

0.207

24

0.475

0.274

76.43

0.000

24

0.542

0.313

1.17

0.000

15

0.671

0.388

0.000

6

0.318

0.225

0.000

3

0.381

0.381

Residence

1.68

0.000

24

0.804

0.464

Religion

1.16

0.000

18

0.669

0.389

Marital status

20.00

0.333

18

0.277

0.160

Household size

64.52

0.030

45

0.498

0.288

Income House tenure

26.23

House structure 37.69

Source: Fieldwork data (2010) Significant at 5%

Access to Healthcare Based on Health Insurance Status Table 7 displays the results for the choice of provider according to the type of health insurance cover. Several important findings emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the majority of private healthcare sector users have private insurance cover (77.4%), hence very few households with private insurance cover access public healthcare outlets. Secondly, there are insured households that use the dispensary. Of these, 2.6% have social health insurance and 3.2% have private insurance cover. It is presumed that these categories of health facilities are not strict about serving only those who prove that they are legitimate non-health insurance beneficiaries, given that social health insurance in Kenya is only used in hospitals. Of the households with social health insurance, 14.7% access the sub-district healthcare facility. Thirdly, the majority of Ministry of Health users are people who do not have health insurance. Overall, those with social health insurance cover (57.8%) mostly access the public healthcare facilities while about 34% access private healthcare outlets. Fourthly, self-treatment is prevalent among households that do not have health insurance cover of any kind – up to 28.8% of respondents in this category. There is a lower percentage of self-treatment among those with social health insurance and private health insurance cover, at 8.6% and 6.5%, respectively.


247

A chi-square test was conducted to broaden the conclusions to the entire population. The test statistic, in general, finds that there is a relationship between household insurance cover and access to healthcare services. The difference between the observed results (the data) and the expected results is smaller than 0.05 (p = 0.000). This indicates that there is a high positive and significant relationship between household health insurance cover and access to healthcare services. Table 7:

Choice of provider according to health insurance beneficiary status

Healthcare outlet

Dispensary

None Social (NHIF)

Private

Social and Private

Total

Count

13.0

3.0

1.0

0.0

17.0

%

12.4

2.6

3.2

-

6.5

Sub-district

Count

17.0

17.0

0.0

0.0

34.0

hospital

%

16.2

14.7

-

-

13.1

District

Count

29.0

31.0

2.0

2.0

64.0

hospital

%

27.6

26.7

6.5

25.0

24.6

Parastatal

Count

3.0

16.0

2.0

1.0

22.0

hospital

%

2.9

13.8

6.5

12.5

8.5

Private

Count

6.0

28.0

15.0

3.0

52.0

hospital

%

5.7

24.1

48.4

35.5

20.0

Private

Count

7.0

11.0

9.0

1.0

28.0

clinic

%

6.7

9.5

29.0

12.5

10.8

Self-

Count

30.0

10.0

2.0

1.0

43.0

treatment

%

28.8

8.6

6.5

12.5

16.6

Total

Count

105.0

116.0

31.0

8.0 260.0

c = 89.750, df = 30,phi = 0.588, Cramer’s V = 0.339, p < 0.05 (p =0.000) Source: Fieldwork data (2010) 2

As indicated in Table 8, an analysis of healthcare outlets preferred by households based on health insurance status showed that private care was preferred by 93.5% of those with private insurance, by 75% of those with both social and private insurance, and by 55.2% of those with social insurance. Among the uninsured, over half (52.4%) of them preferred public to private care. Self-care or treatment recorded the lowest preference level although, overall, it was found to be highly prevalent among the households surveyed in the study. It, therefore, seems that although self-treatment is highly used by residents, it is the least preferred, even by the non-health insurance members. A further analysis of the data using the chi-square test of association indicates that there is an association between health insurance cover and healthcare outlet preference. In this case p = 0.000.

248


Table 8:

Healthcare facility preference based on health insurance status

Health insurance (% by column) Category Social Private Social and Private None Public Count 51.0 2.0 2.0 55.0 % 44.0 0.0 6.5 52.4 Private Count 64.0 29.0 6.0 43.0 % 55.2 93.5 75.0 41.0 Self-care Count 1.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 % 0.9 6.6 Total 116.0 31.0 8.0 105.0 χ 2 = 33.032, df = 9, phi = 0.356, Cramer’s V = 0.206, p < 0.05 (p = 0.000), χ 2 = 33.032 Source: Fieldwork data (2010) When households’ preference of specialist was compared with health insurance coverage, it was found that health insurance membership influenced the specialist accessed by households under cover (see Table 9). The findings indicate that access to a medical doctor increases from 30.5% for the uninsured to about 55% for those with social insurance, 87.1% for those with private cover and 62.5% for those with both social and private cover. Self-care is highest among the uninsured. Going beyond the sample results to conduct the chi-square test, the p value is found to be less than 0.05. The test indicates that there is a positive and significant relationship between health insurance cover and the medical specialist sought in a given healthcare facility, whereby p = 0.000. Table 9: Healthcare specialist sought based on health insurance status Health insurance (% by column) Category None Social Private Social and Private Doctor Count 32 64 27 5 % 30.5 55.2 87.1 62.5 Nurse Count 10 5 1 0 % 9.5 4.3 3.2 Clinical officer Count 33 37 1 2 % 31.4 31.9 3.2 25.0 Self-care Count 30 10 2 1 % 28.6 8.6 6.5 12.5 Total 105 116 31 8 χ 2 = 78.629, df = 15, phi = 0.550, Cramer’s V = 0.318, p < 0.05 (p = 0.000) Source: Fieldwork data (2010)


249

Table 10: Sought waivers and exemptions as a function of health insurance status Health insurance (% by Column) Category Social Private Social and Private None Yes Count 24 3 4 26 % 20.6 10.5 50.0 25.0 No Count 92 28 4 79 % 79.4 89.5 50.0 75.0 Total 116 31 8 105 χ2 = 4.476 df = 3 phi = 0.193 Cramer’s V = 0.193 p > 0.05 (p = 0.214). χ2 = 4.476 Source: Fieldwork data (2010) The use of cushioning services (waivers and exemptions) in healthcare outlets for those who are unable to pay for care is lowest among the insured households. Table 10 shows that the insured households have a lower tendency to use cushioning services in MoH facilities, where only 20% of those with social insurance and 10.5% of those with private insurance used the cushioning services. On the other hand, when the test statistic is involved (chi-square) in the test for independence, the sample of the observed data indicates that p value is larger than 0.05 (p = 0.214). There is, therefore, no relationship between household insurance cover and the probability of using cushioning services. Table 11: Access to provider as a function of number of health insurance dependents Coverage (% by column) Healthcare Entire household Couple outlet only

Couple and children below 18 yrs 1.0 1.9 10.0 18.5 11.0 20.4

Total

Count 2.0 1.0 4.0 Sub-district % 2.3 25.0 9.7 hospital Count 4.0 3.0 17.0 District hospital % 4.6 33.4 18.8 Count 18.0 6.0 35.0 Parastatal % 20.7 25.0 22.0 hospital Count 15.0 1.0 3.0 19.0 % 17.2 4.2 5.6 9.0 Private hospital Count 34.0 0.0 12.0 46.0 % 39.1 0.0 22.2 20.4 Private clinic Count 8.0 0.0 13.0 21.0 % 9.2 0.0 24.1 11.1 Self-treatment Count 6.0 3.0 4.0 13.0 % 6.9 12.5 7.4 8.9 Total Count 87.0 14.0 54.0 155.0 χ 2 = 59.058, df = 21, phi = 0.617, Cramer’s V = 0.356, p < 0.05 (p = 0.000), χ 2 = 59.058 Source: Fieldwork data (2010)

250


Another important variable looked at in the context of the research question is how the number of health insurance dependents in a household affects choice of provider. Table 11 shows the distribution of households who sought treatment in the various healthcare outlets covered by the study. Access to private healthcare among households with fewer members increases with health insurance cover. The results show that a greater proportion of households who had the entire household covered with health insurance seek treatment from a private hospital. Households that had couples and children below 18 years covered by health insurance use public and private care almost equally, at 46.4% and 46.3%, respectively. Over half of households where only the couple were members of health insurance cover accessed private healthcare. The table shows that most of the households whose insurance covers the entire household access private hospitals (39%). About 24% of the households whose insurance covers a couple and children below 18 years of age access private clinics. About 33% of households that had insurance coverage for a couple only accessed the sub-district hospital. In all the categories of health insurance coverage, there are respondents who still make use of self-treatment – about 9% of all households with health insurance coverage of any kind. The calculated chi-square value was found to be positive and significant at the 0.05 significance level. The p value was smaller than 0.05 (p = 0.000). This indicates that the number of health insurance cover dependents within a household influences access to healthcare services. Table 12 shows that healthcare access differs in terms of consistency based on health insurance coverage. Among those with health insurance cover, there is a higher consistency in healthcare provider access. This implies that the number of dependents with health insurance cover within a household determines not just the provider chosen, but various aspects of the service provision. Among households that reported consistency in accessing a particular healthcare provider, it was found that this differs based on health insurance status. Comparing consistency in accessing healthcare as a function of health insurance status shows that the percentage increases from 74.1% for social insurance to 87.5% for both social and private insurance, while a higher percentage is recorded among those with private insurance at 93.5%. However, looking at measures of the strength between the two variables using the chisquare test, there is no relationship between health insurance cover and consistency in accessing healthcare, as the p value is greater than 0.05 (p = 0.066). Table 12: Consistency in access to healthcare based on health insurance status Health insurance (% by column) Social Private Social and Private None Count 86.0 29.0 7.0 75.0 % 74.1 93.5 87.5 71.4 No Count 30.0 2.0 1.0 30.0 % 25.9 6.5 12.5 28.6 Total 116.0 31.0 8.0 105.0 c2 = 7.183, df = 3, phi = 0.166, Cramer’s V = 0.166, p > (p = 0.066) Source: Fieldwork data (2010) Category Yes

0.05


251

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations Summary The main aim of this research was to conduct an analysis of the impact of health insurance on household access to healthcare. The study was motivated to examine health insurance as a form of social protection, because healthcare is becoming increasingly inaccessible to many households (Maliyamkono and Ogbu 1999). To achieve the study aims, the proportion of households with health insurance was established; various socioeconomic characteristics that influence enrolment into health insurance were identified; and the influence of health insurance on household access to healthcare services was examined. The study is based on household access to and utilisation of healthcare services at the municipal level in Eldoret, Kenya. The data used for this particular analysis of household access to healthcare services can be considered unique in terms of the currency of the data, their content and geographic coverage. The interview schedules were well answered and yielded data with the desired level of detail and accuracy. This section reviews the status of each of the study’s research questions and discusses the principal findings. A first observation from analysis of the data is that over half of the respondents have one type of health insurance cover or another (59.6%), while less than half (about 40%) have no health insurance cover of any kind. A small proportion has private insurance (11.9%) while a larger share has social insurance (44.6%) and a small percentage has both private and social insurance (3.1%). It is evident that many households are aware of the importance of health insurance as a means of social protection. This finding is consistent with Mwabu et al. (2004), where it was found that the greater majority of households believe that a health insurance scheme could be useful, as is the case in Kenya where it is highly regarded as a source of mental peace and overall wellbeing of the enrolee (KNBS and ICF Macro 2010). Households’ concern that they could have a disease and unforeseen need for healthcare compels them to enrol in health insurance plans as a social protection scheme, to enable them to access healthcare when needed. Secondly, the study identified a number of socioeconomic factors that influence household enrolment in health insurance. Review of the literature had suggested that the social and economic conditions of a household are key factors determining access to appropriate healthcare services (MoH 1997; Dina and Law 1998; Dorling and Simpson 1999; Detels et al. 2004). The study findings indicate that finances (ability to pay), education, age, religion, household size, place of residence, house tenure and house structure (at 5% level) are independent predictors for the uptake of health insurance. Young adults are the individuals who are mostly in employment and those in well-paid employment are able to reside outside the low-income areas, so they are more highly represented among the insured. Human capital in the form of education level is a key determinant of access to health insurance, as it is also linked to employment. The findings on place of residence, house tenure and house structure are consistent with Iyer (2005), who found that aspects of social class are an important predictor of care, and with Scambler (2003), who found that health varies with social class. The low number of the insured in the low-income areas should be a cause for alarm to policy makers who intend to make healthcare accessible to all. Carr (2004) observes that poor communities typically face multiple health risks related to their location in remote areas lacking infrastructure, services and trained

252


personnel. In addition, he states that health services and trained health personnel are less accessible to the poor than to better off groups. Contrary to expectation, marital status and gender were found not to influence household enrolment in health insurance. The finding that the majority of the households with health insurance were headed by males could be explained by the high number of male-headed households in the sample. In the literature, however, Lorber and Moore (2002) report that health insurance centres on males. According to Dina and Law (1998), because insurance coverage is often linked to employment and because women are more likely to be part-time employees, temporary or service workers, or unemployed heads of households, they number prominently among the uninsured. They, therefore, face hindrances in accessing care. This could also explain why 82% of ill people were female and only 18% were male in the four weeks preceding the survey. Thirdly, one objective of this study was to identify and critically examine the influence of healthcare insurance on household access to healthcare services. The principal finding of the study is that people with health insurance have better access to healthcare services than the non-insured. This implies that barriers to access to healthcare can be overcome by health insurance and that an increase in health insurance coverage will positively increase access to healthcare services, as part of social protection. The results suggest that households with either private or public health insurance coverage show a higher frequency of access to healthcare services compared to the uninsured households. The expected effect of health insurance coverage is an increase for both the social and private healthcare insurance holders in the proportion of people seeking healthcare outside the home, as opposed to self-care. The research findings confirm that health insurance continues, not only to be a determinant of the likelihood of using healthcare, but that it also increases access to higher quality care. This is indicated by the majority of privately insured households accessing private healthcare which is considered superior to public healthcare in the country. In addition, health insurance increases access to better-qualified medical personnel. A higher percentage of households with health insurance were able to visit medical doctors, rather than visiting clinical officers or nurses or using selfcare. The use of waivers and exemptions in hospitals for those unable to pay for care is also low among the insured households. This indicates that increased access to health insurance as a social protection system will reduce the burden on other social protection systems, including waivers and exemptions. The evidence supports the conclusion in the literature that health insurance schemes, whether compulsory or voluntary, increase access to healthcare (Preker and Carrin 2004). Given the fact that there are insured households that use the dispensary and private clinics, it seems that these categories of facilities are not strict about serving only those who prove that they are legitimate non-health insurance beneficiaries, given that public health insurance in Kenya is only used in hospitals. Hence, there is a need to hasten reforms in the NHIF to enable it to cover patients in all categories of care. As indicated in Muga and Kerich (2010), this should include provision for coverage of both in-patient and out-patient services, and should enlist various levels of care providers – dispensaries, health centres, mission hospitals and employers with in-house clinics.


253

Conclusion Conceptual Framework Conclusion The conceptual framework for this study is premised on the ‘Health Delivery System in Kenya’ framework, adopted and modified from Ndetei, Khasakhala, and Omolo (2008) to explain the study results. The framework postulates that health insurance enrolment and access to healthcare services are both determined by a single gateway – a household’s socioeconomic status – which is at the core of its access to healthcare and enrolment into health insurance. Households will enrol into a health insurance programme based on their socioeconomic condition and, subsequently, the health insurance cover influences access to healthcare services – that is, the different levels of public facilities or private providers.

Empirical Conclusion The empirical part of this study shows that enrolment in health insurance is an asset in accessing healthcare. While the study covered various residential estates in Eldoret, based on social class, a number of common observations emerged. The findings illustrate that urban households often have similar characteristics (such as higher education, residence and occupation) that determine uptake of health insurance. The results show that in terms of individual characteristics, age, religion, education and occupation positively determine enrolment into health insurance. These variables increase the probability of accessing health insurance in urban households. In terms of household characteristics, income is found to significantly influence a household’s enrolment into health insurance, while household size is not a very strong factor. Household income in particular increases the probability of accessing health insurance. This finding should provide avenues for intervention through household economic empowerment programmes to increase their enrolment into health insurance. Furthermore, the results indicate that in terms of community characteristics, area of residence, house tenure, and house structure are associated with health insurance enrolment. These variables may be considered as proxies for wealth in an urban area. Households from high-income areas, owner-occupied houses, and more permanent house structures are more likely to have health insurance. Marital status was not found to determine health insurance enrolment in the study area. Overall, health insurance enrolment sharply increases access to healthcare facilities and positively predicts access to healthcare services. Therefore, health insurance membership may, be considered as an appropriate social protection system in extending access to healthcare services. Indeed, health insurance can be an important tool in realising the Ministry of Health’s vision of “An efficient and high quality health care system that is Accessible, Equitable and Affordable for every Kenyan” (Republic of Kenya 2008a). Although insurance provides access to healthcare, it does not ensure a good quality service. The NHIF covers only board and lodging expenses – patients have to pay all other treatment costs themselves. The programme is poorly administered and the contributions are not enough to cover medical expenses and facilities. This perpetuates a two-tier health system, where the poor get poor quality services even if they have social health insurance.

254


Recommendations Social science research aims at evolving new possibilities for action. These research findings are made available for the attainment of social action and change. Therefore, the main recommendation to policy makers is to focus attention on improving access not only to public healthcare services, but to health insurance as well. The study found that most households in urban areas rely on public healthcare facilities. However, the majority of these households are from the lower-income quartiles and are without health insurance plans. An implication is that the majority of poor people (who already have multiple health needs and are vulnerable) are not able to access proper healthcare in the private sector, so they rely on public sector outlets, which are considered to be of ‘low quality’. This is indeed a double tragedy. Consequently, access to ‘good quality’ private healthcare is skewed towards the well-off in the community. Making health insurance available to people on low incomes could be an important avenue to extending better care to them as a social protection scheme. Promoting access to healthcare clearly needs a broad and holistic approach. Various measures and interventions related to household socioeconomic status would play a significant role in addressing access disadvantage and inequality. Measures aimed at overcoming socioeconomic barriers that can slow or block access to healthcare and improve accessibility through comprehensive health plans are vital. Healthcare is expensive and its cost can only be reduced through the pooling of risks that can be provided by an insurance scheme as part of a social protection system. A significant measure of improved social protection would be a rising proportion of people who have health insurance. This can be further achieved through improving socioeconomic conditions. Although the lack of health insurance is a factor impeding access to care, having the cover does not guarantee that healthcare will be accessible to households. Health coverage or payment policies should enable people to make payments when they go to any non-hospital facility. Reimbursement for the lower cadre of healthcare facilities should be made possible, as the majority of respondents accessing them include some with health insurance cover. Once it is operational, the long awaited National Social Health Insurance Fund (NSHIF) has the potential to make healthcare accessible to the majority of households by making healthcare universally available to all. However, it is likely to face the existing implementation challenges, including issues of governance that affect the present NHIF. Studies should, therefore, be conducted on how best to make the NSHIF work efficiently before it is rolled out. Further research is needed to delineate which health insurance design and implementation characteristics allow for better access of households to healthcare services. This will be more attractive to more households, especially from the lower social classes, and will allow more of them to participate. The work, however, is far from done. Indeed, many studies on health insurance have been conducted in the past. In recent years, the results of various research studies have taken centre stage in the popular media. More informed policies can be formulated as a result. There is a hope that the findings of this present study, along with those of several others, will now stimulate greater interest in this line of inquiry. Hopefully, the findings from this study will be used to help focus and prioritise interventions aimed at improving household access to healthcare through health insurance programmes as part of formal social protection. This is all the more important as healthcare is a basic human right that should not be a mere pipe-dream for households.

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2005. Uasin Gishu district strategic plan 2005–2010 for implementation of the national population policy for sustainable development. Nairobi: NCAPD 2005. 2007. The planning bulletin, July–December 2007. Nairobi: Government Printer. 2008a. Eldoret West district development plan 2008–2012. Nairobi: Government Printer. 2008b. Eldoret East district development plan 2008–2012. Nairobi: Government Printer. 2009. End term review of the economic recovery strategy for wealth and employment creation (ERS) 2003–2007. Nairobi: Government Printer. 2010. The 2009 Kenya population and housing census: Counting our people for the implementation of vision 2030. Nairobi: Government Printer. Ridsdale, L. 1998. Evidence-based practice in primary care. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone. Scambler, G. (ed.) 2003. Sociology as applied to medicine. 5th ed. London: Saunders. Schwartz, B.J., Akin, J.S. and Popkin, B.M. 1987. Price and income elasticities of demand for modern health care: The case of infant delivery in the Philippines. North Carolina: Carolina Population Centre, Chapel Hill. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 1991. Community financing of primary health care: The Bamako initiative in Kenya. Nairobi: UNICEF. USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 1995. Setting priorities for research, analysis and information dissemination on health sector financing and sustainability in SubSaharan Africa: Health and Resources Analysis in Africa Project. Washington, D.C.: USAID. Westendorf, D.G. and Ghai, D. (eds.) 1995. Monitoring social progress in the 1990s. Brookfield: Avebury. Williams, S.J. and Torrens, P.R. 2008. Introduction to health services. 7th ed. New York: Thomson Delmar Learning. World Health Organization (WHO). 1978. Primary Health Care: Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6–12 September. Geneva: WHO. 1999. Programming for adolescent health and development. Geneva: WHO. 2000. World health report 2000: Health systems – Measuring performance. Geneva: WHO. World Bank. 1994. Monitoring and evaluating social programmes in developing countries. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2006. African development indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2007. Private voluntary health insurance in development: Friend or foe? Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Zinn, J.O. (ed.) 2008. Social theories of risk and uncertainty: An introduction. Malden: Blackwell.

Chapter 12 Implementation and Outcomes of Secondary Education Bursaries in Kenya Constance R. Ambasa-Shisanya

Introduction Social protection has expanded in recent years, from a relatively narrow focus on safety nets in the 1980s and 1990s to a present-day definition that takes into account long term mechanisms designed to combat chronic poverty as well as short term interventions to reduce the impact of shocks and vulnerability for the people concerned. Social protection measures are attempting to move beyond mere protection by focusing on preventive, promotive and transformative interventions. As in other parts of the world, African countries have embraced social protection mainly through the Social Protection Framework (SPF) that provides guidelines on strategies that nations ought to adopt with a view to protecting vulnerable and poor people. Kenya is a signatory to international and regional conventions that promote human rights, advocate achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and adoption of social protection measures outlined in the SPF. In response to these requirements, Kenya has already developed and enacted some key policies and has also begun implementing social protection strategies as she strives to achieve the MDGs. The government of Kenya (GoK) has demonstrated a long history of partnership between the government, households and individuals. The GoK adopted the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that donors introduced to developing countries in the 1980s. The GoK opted to sponsor educational administration and professional services, while parents and communities provided physical infrastructure, textbooks and exercise books as well as other consumables (Republic of Kenya 1980). Despite subsidies provided by the government to support secondary education, evidence showed that a great majority of poor students could not afford the necessities required to keep them in school (Republic of Kenya 1980). Many poor students were sent away from schools due to lack of uniforms, textbooks and other resources that schools needed in order to be operational. To mitigate this limitation, the GoK introduced a secondary school bursary scheme within the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoES&T) in 1993 to provide access to secondary education to all poor and qualified students (MoES&T 2010). The Ministry of Education disbursed funds directly to schools based on enrolment levels. Currently, the GoK disburses secondary school bursary schemes through the Constituency Development Fund (CDF).

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Private sector actors such as Equity Bank and Cooperative Bank also support poor students to access secondary education through bursary schemes, with the expectation that human capital will be developed to enable Kenya to achieve Vision 2030 and ultimately eradicate poverty. Beneficiaries and stakeholders also have expectations that determine their level of involvement in secondary school bursary programmes and the nature of the expected outcomes. Despite the massive amount of cash that various organisations seem to invest in secondary school education bursaries in Kenya, there is limited empirical evidence on implementation strategies and outcomes of these programmes. Yet, policy makers need empirical evidence on such pertinent issues to inform decision making and the scaling-up of best practice in the implementation of secondary school bursary schemes. The guiding question for this research was: how do secondary school bursary schemes in the public and private sectors compare in terms of design; stakeholder satisfaction; scope, structures, finances, human and innovation capacities; challenges and opportunities; networks and linkages with other development partners; accountability, credibility and sustainability; and outcome measures? This chapter attempts to fill the gap in knowledge by comparing the disbursement models and outcomes of secondary school bursaries by the public and private sectors in Kenya, with a view to establishing their efficiency and efficacy. Such empirical evidence could guide policy makers regarding models that are best suited in order to scale-up to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable students benefit from bursary schemes in Kenya. Data for this chapter were collected from three counties: Kakamega, Kiambu and Nairobi. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used. A cross-sectional survey was conducted with 156 students using an open-ended questionnaire. Indepth interviews were conducted with six key respondents, including principals of selected schools and officers in charge of secondary school bursary schemes in the public and private sectors. A stratified random sampling procedure was used to select students from school forms one to four, while purposive sampling was used to select key respondents. Quantitative data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), while content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data. This chapter is organised into four sections: introduction; theoretical framework and literature review; presentation of results and discussion; and the conclusion.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of human capital in stimulating economic growth and social development (United Nations Development Programme – UNDP – 2010). Investing in the human capital of the poor is widely seen as crucial to alleviating poverty in the long term (World Bank 1990; Ranis, Stewart, and Ramirez 2000). Social safety nets were used mainly in the 1980s to protect poor households from poverty and sometimes to contribute directly towards economic growth through improved human capital (Morley and Coady 2003; World Bank 1997). In the 1990s, many people in developing countries experienced extreme poverty due to economic crises, structural adjustment programmes and globalisation (Barrientos 2010; World Bank 2010). Safety nets were heavily criticised as residualist and, instead, social protection was perceived as a better policy framework for addressing poverty and vulnerability. Social protection refers to a sub-set of interventions that seek to address risk, vulnerability and chronic poverty, which can be carried out formally by

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the state or the private sector or informally through community or household support networks (UNRISD 2010). Another definition sees social protection as consisting of “public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society” (Conway, de Haan and Norton 2000). Social protection has also been conceptualised as a range of public institutions, norms and programmes that aim at protecting individuals and their households from poverty and deprivation related to labour and employment standards, maternity, old age, unemployment and work-related injuries (Barrientos and Shepherd 2003). This traditional paradigm has, however, changed and social protection is now perceived as a more appropriate framework for addressing rising poverty, vulnerability and inequality in the context of current conditions in developing countries (de Haan 2000; Lund and Srinivas 2000; World Bank 2001). Social protection emphasises different perspectives in developing and developed countries. In the former, social protection focuses on poverty reduction and provision of support to the poorest (de Haan 2000; Barrientos and Hulme 2005), whereas in developed countries, emphasis is on income maintenance and protection of living standards for all, but particularly workers (Barrientos 2010). Social protection in developing countries assumes that reduction of risk or protection of the poor against income and consumption variability could result in investment and the eradication of poverty (World Bank 2000). In the absence of evidence to demonstrate how social protection eradicates poverty, many governments and donors perceive these interventions as comprising fiscally unsustainable ‘consumption’ transfers to the economically inactive or unproductive poor, which diverts scarce public resources from ‘productive’ investment for economic growth, and, therefore, deserves lower priority as a poverty reduction tool. In addition, social protection interventions still perpetuate the ‘safety net’ approach through an emphasis on ‘economic’ protection rather than ‘social’ protection, since less focus is put on equity and social rights (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). In an attempt to transcend the World Bank’s Social Risk Management framework that favours a ‘safety net’ approach to managing vulnerability, Devereux and SabatesWheeler (2004) developed a ‘transformative social protection’ framework that recognises social equity as well as protection against livelihood risks. The framework emphasises four interventions, namely: protection, prevention, promotion and transformation. Protection focuses on providing relief from deprivation (for example, disability benefits). Prevention averts deprivation (for example, through savings clubs, insurance or risk diversification). Promotion enhances real incomes and capabilities (for example, through inputs transfers). Transformation seeks to address concerns of social equity and exclusion (for example, through anti-discrimination laws and sensitisation campaigns). Many developing countries have adopted various types of social protection programmes to support the poor to meet expenditure needs such as education and health (Morley and Coady 2003; Skoufias 2005; Raynor and Wesson 2006; Holmes 2010). The programmes incorporate some or all of the four objectives of social protection mentioned above: protection, prevention, promotion and transformation.

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A wide range of interventions are used for social protection, including educationfocused tools such as scholarships, vouchers and school-based feeding programmes. The links between social protection and education run in both directions. Education is one route through which poverty could be prevented from passing from one generation to the next, while social protection aims to address the problems of poverty and inequality that act as barriers to universal education in many countries (Eldis n.d). Social protection interventions can help to improve education outcomes for poor people by addressing the underlying poverty and inequality that prevent poor children accessing education. Table 1 gives empirical evidence relating to social protection programmes that strive to improve the education of poor people. Many such social protection programmes appear to have positive effects on school enrolments and other education outcomes. The results in Table 1 indicate that the intervention process is crucial because it determines the nature of social protection outcome measures. Cash transfers translate into education benefits for the poor only when the quality of education is improved. This chapter is guided by the ‘expectancy theory’ that was proposed by Victor Vroom through his study of the motivations behind decision-making. The theory states that a person can only be motivated when effort, performance and motivation are linked (Rotter, Chance, and Phares 1972; Bandura 1977). The theory is based on three variables that Vroom calls valence, expectancy and instrumentality. Valence means that the individual will consider the outcomes associated with various levels of performance, from an entire spectrum of performance possibilities, and elect to pursue the level that generates the greatest reward for him or her. Expectancy refers to the strength of a person’s belief about whether or not a particular job performance is attainable. Instrumentality is the belief that if one performs well a valued outcome will be received (AICPA n.d.). “Expectancy theory emphasises the need for organisations to relate rewards directly to performance and to ensure that the rewards provided are those deserved and wanted by the recipients” (Montana, Charnov, and Bruce 2008). In our case, do beneficiaries of bursary schemes obtain what they deserve?

Mexico

Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania

PROGRESA

Evaluation of the cost of basic social protection benefits

Outcomes Empirical evidence demonstrates that CTE programmes effectively reduce poverty and improve educational outcomes.

Critique Source CTE does not address Morley & all the potential Coady (2003) structural causes of poverty for which other safety nets might be more appropriate.

mismanagement of funds allocated to social protection programmes.

CTE assumes that low education enrolment is a demand-side problem rather than a supply-side one. Skoufias Quality of education A combination of IFPRI evaluated whether (2005) is lowered with PROGRESA was functioning education, health, increased enrolment. and nutrition as designed. interventions into one A significant effect on integrated package has the human capital of children can only be a significant impact achieved if quality of on the welfare and human capital of poor education is improved. rural families. Pal et al (2005) Lack of political Basic level of social ILO estimated the cost commitment to protection could be of basic social protection allocate funds to social benefits (education, health, affordable within a reasonable timeframe. protection could be a pensions) for a selected limitation Donor aid would be number of developing needed initially but countries in sub-Saharan Corruption that phased off gradually. could lead to Africa.

Method A book that compiles published and unpublished material on existing CTE programmes and evaluates their ability to advance poverty reduction and education goals.

Social protection programmes promoting education and outcome measures in developing countries

Programme Country Conditioned transfer Mexico, Brazil, Bangladesh, for education (CTE) Nicaragua, Honduras, and Chile

Table 1:

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The Female Stipend Programme (FSP), widely acclaimed as a model for achieving gender parity of enrolment was created in 1982 to help increase the enrolment and retention of girls in secondary schools, delay their marriage and motherhood, and increase girls’ income-earning potential.

Female Stipend Programme (FSP)

Bangladesh

An innovative approach to reduce poverty, enhance the human capital of the poor and combat child labour by providing cash transfers on condition that all children attend school regularly through a MISA.

Minimum Income for Latin America School Attendance (MISA) initiative Very successful experience of the Bolsa Escola scheme in Brazil, that could be adopted in Africa - Cash transfer programmes are successful but work more efficiently and effectively when the quality of education is good. A pilot study in Malawi showed that the income effect led to better school enrolment and attendance but not the conditionality. FSP has clearly had impact in terms of increasing enrolment but less is known about life after school, for example the percentage of girls who are employed in the private and public sector after graduation in comparison to their male counterparts. ILO/UNCTAD Advisory Group (2001)

Stipend programmes Raynor & are expensive and may Wesson (2006) not yield the required results unless quality issues are addressed.

There could be a likelihood of some households utilising cash for education on food because, in Africa, hunger is a challenge to school attendance


The impact of one form of demand-side policy option – social transfers, particularly cash transfers and vouchers – on access to health and education services by the extreme poor.

This briefing paper focuses on the contribution one main social protection instrument – child-oriented cash transfers – can make to reducing childhood poverty and vulnerability.

Using social transfers Latin America to scale-up equitable access to education and health services

The role of cash transfers in tackling childhood poverty

Experience from middle-income countries suggests that social transfers can make an important contribution to human development outcomes for the extreme poor. The experience from lowincome countries is limited, but does justify wider pilot testing of cash transfers and vouchers in different settings, and scalingup and evaluation of promising programmes. Child-oriented cash transfers and wider social protection strategies can play an important role in reaching various MDGs, including those on health, education, and nutrition and income poverty. The strategy cannot reduce poverty alone unless other sectors such as the supply side and political commitment are equally strengthened.

Pilot exercises are expensive yet necessary to inform policy formulation.

Marcus (2004)

Chapman (2006)

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Source: Author

Improving the provision of basic services for the poor in fragile environments

Abolishing school fees in Africa

DRC, Northern Uganda

Liberia

DRC

Northern Uganda

Income transfers, such as cash grants or cash for work are used for paying school fees, among other basic household necessities, and small-scale productive investments.

Indirect and direct costs of education to families often represent the single most important factor excluding children from poor households from accessing school in fragile and conflictaffected countries. High enrolment in school does not translate to good quality education because the increased number of students may not tally with the available human and other resources. This is of course There are other factors dependent on the that influence school functioning of participation levels the supply-side besides reduced cost interventions, but it of access to education supports evidence and improved quality from other recent of education services. studies (in stable Unless the holistic countries) that have welfare context is demonstrated that, addressed, participain the short term, tion in schools cannot school participation succeed. Need arises levels rely more on for peace, availability reduced cost of access of food, gender to education than on mainstreaming and improved quality of control/management of education services. diseases, among other factors.

Where costs of education are reduced or eliminated, enrolment increases significantly.

Pavanello & Othieno (2008)

Fredriksen (2009)


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The expectancy theory proposes that a person will decide to behave or act in a certain way because he or she is motivated to select a specific behaviour over other behaviours due to what they expect the result of that selected behaviour to be. The theory has been criticised by scholars who perceive it to be too simplistic (Porter and Lawler 1968; Lawler 1971). Despite these criticisms, the expectancy theory has been adopted in this chapter because it best explains the motivations, expectations and outcomes of various stakeholders in the secondary school bursary schemes that are implemented by the public and private sectors in Kenya – and this is the focus here. To assess the efficacy and efficiency of bursary schemes in Kenya, the following operational definitions are used. • Efficacy refers to the capacity of secondary school bursary schemes to change the current situation, where some poor students fail to access secondary school education due to poverty. The focus is on the eligibility criteria for sponsorship, structures used for disbursement of funds and the ability of funds to reach targeted beneficiaries. • Efficiency refers to the extent to which secondary school bursary schemes are well used for the intended purpose. The focus is on timeliness of disbursement of bursaries, disbursement procedures, and amount of disbursed resources compared with the education needs of students.

Presentation of Results Results are presented using descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations and inferential statistics, specifically chi-square tests. The use of inferential statistics is justified because over 30 respondents were interviewed in each district or county, as demanded for scientific analysis of quantitative data (Kitchin and Tale 2000). The results answer our research question that seeks to understand better the social protection interventions implemented by the public and private sectors in the education sector in Kenya, that support poor students to access secondary education. The results compare the implementation of secondary school bursaries by the two sectors in terms of: design; stakeholder satisfaction; scope, structures, finances, human and innovation capacities; challenges and opportunities; networks and linkages with other development partners; accountability, credibility, sustainability; and outcome measures. First, the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents are presented.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Respondents A total of 156 students were interviewed in various counties or districts: Nairobi (37, 23.7%), Kiambu (47, 30.1%) and Kakamega (72, 46.2%). More male students (96, 62%) than female (60, 38%) were interviewed (Table 2). Female students were not interviewed in Nairobi County because the management of the selected school did not allow us to interview students. Table 2: Number of students interviewed in each county County of Study Male Nairobi County/District Kiambu County/District Kakamega County/District Total Source: Fieldwork data (2011)

Female 37 26 33 96

Total 0 21 39 60

37 (23.7%) 47 (30.1%) 72 (46.2%) 156 (100%)

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The youngest male and female students were 13 years old and were interviewed in Kiambu County (2, 1.3%). The median age of students was 16 years (19, 12.2%) and the oldest was a male aged 25 years old, who hailed from a semi-arid region that faces unique socioeconomic challenges such as cattle rustling. While we commend the GoK for allowing older people to access education, they could easily get frustrated when they compete against younger students whose only focus is learning. In addition, the ability to comprehend issues is influenced by many parameters, including the psychosocial development of individuals. Younger students, for example, could grasp information technology much faster than older people. Surprisingly, the oldest student was highly motivated to work hard due to the great economic and social outcomes he expects to reap from excellent performance in education. The student expected to score grade A in his final examination to enable him to access opportunities that will help reduce poverty in his household. Indeed, empirical evidence demonstrates that education-related social programmes have transformed the lives of beneficiaries and contributed towards poverty reduction (Morley and Coady 2003; Marcus 2004; Pal et al. 2005; Skoufias 2005). The data were subjected to a chi-square test, which revealed a significant difference in the ages of students who are currently sponsored to access secondary school education by the public and private sectors in Kenya (chi-square = 5.169E2, p