initial state of alaska response to the exxon valdezoil ...

INITIAL STATE OF ALASKA RESPONSE TO THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL Randolph Bayliss, John H. Janssen, Albert Kegler, Marshal Kendziorek, Daniel Lawn Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation P.O. Box O Juneau, Alaska 99811 Erich Gundlach Arthur D. Little Acorn Park Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140 ABSTRACT: The first weeks of the Exxon Valdez oil spill were critical to the defense of state resources. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) implemented the state spill response plan upon notification in the early hours of March 24, 1989. A local AD EC representative boarded the vessel within three and one-half hours of grounding. Experienced AD EC spill response staff, other state agencies, and two cleanup contract firms were notified that morning and were arriving through the first day. The Governor of Alaska and the Commissioner of AD EC surveyed the wreck that same day. Within 33 hours, ADEC had 30 persons on site. The state notification procedure and plan functioned effectively. Key roles undertaken initially by the state were aerial and computer spill tracking; liaison with fishing groups and local villages; and protection of sensitive habitats, especially salmon hatcheries. Notably, ADEC worked with the Cordova District Fishermen United (CDFU) to defend a critical salmon hatchery directly in the path of the spreading oil. Using the Alaska Air National Guard, two Alaska state ferries, and fishing boats, CDFU volunteers, local Chenega villagers, ADEC staff, and contractors used miles of boom to defend the hatchery. The hatchery was spared from oiling just as millions of salmon fry were released.

tunities for response to five large crude oil spills on land, of between 100,000 and 600,000 gallons each. 5,7 In the 1980s, the Glacier Bay and Lee Wang Zin oil spills provided opportunities for ADEC to respond to similarly sized spills on water.4 A close call of a tanker grounding in Prince William Sound in 1980 and several other large TAPS oil tanker spills outside Alaskan waters served to support ADEC's Oil Spill Response Team.

The first hours of the Exxon Valdez spill TAPS Marine Terminal staff telephoned ADEC's Valdez District Office Manager, Dan Lawn, about 1:00 a.m. on March 24,1989, about 30 minutes after Captain Hazelwood radioed the Coast Guard of oil cargo leaking from the Exxon Valdez. Lawn telephoned his superior in Anchorage and asked that the Oil Spill Response Team be activated. Within an hour, Lawn and two Coast Guard investigators boarded the high-speed pilot boat Silver Bullet for a 28-mile trip to the grounding site at Bligh Reef. By 3:38 a.m., Lawn had boarded the Exxon Valdez, where he spent the next 15 hours. 1 Also by that time, other members of the Oil Spill Response Team were moving towards Valdez. Joe LeBeau, a specialist in investigation and evidence gathering, drove 200 miles from his normal duty station in Wasilla over two mountain ranges to Valdez.8 Doug Lockwood, specializing in aerial spill tracking, flew in from Soldotna. Lockwood and LeBeau met at 9:30 a.m. and flew to Bligh Reef by float plane. LeBeau boarded the Exxon Valdez about 10:30 a.m., and Lockwood continued to track and report spill movement. John Janssen, a field operations specialist, drove 400 miles from Fairbanks, arriving in Valdez in mid-afternoon. Janssen called in two East Coast A D E C spill consultants, inventoried cleanup equipment, and later acted as liaison at the Exxon command post. While aboard the Exxon Valdez, Lawn had arranged for aircraft charters, high-altitude photographs, and gauging of tank contents, and had acted with the Coast Guard in decision making for ballast pumping, lightering, and so forth. ADEC Commissioner Dennis Kelso, Governor Steve Cowper, and Lockwood boarded the Exxon Valdez just after 4:00 p.m. In Valdez, ADEC staff began planning for VHF repeater systems, requisitioning cars and aircraft, and mobilizing cleanup equipment. Other ADEC response staff continued to pour into Valdez. Within 33 hours of the grounding, 26 ADEC staffers were in Valdez, supplementing the resident staff of four. ADEC cleanup contractors Bob Hull of Northwest Enviroservice and Larry Safford of VRCA had also arrived on the scene.

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) acts as the primary State of Alaska oil spill response agency. ADEC's actions in the first hours and days after the Exxon Valdez oil spill played crucial roles in the response and defense of public resources. This paper highlights several success stories of this response and presents some lessons learned for future responses.

History of ADEC's oil spill response team Shortly after the 1976 Santa Barbara incident, NOAA invited two ADEC staffers to join them in training and preparing for future spills. A month later, the Argo Merchant grounded, spilling 7.7 million gallons of No. 6 fuel oil. A D E C staff traveled from Juneau and Fairbanks to Nantucket Island to assist with spill response. 9 NOAA commended the agency and both of the individuals for their efforts. Meanwhile, construction of the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline focused agency attention on oil spill contingency planning and response. ADEC staff in Valdez and Fairbanks planned, trained, drilled, and responded to oil spills in anticipation of catastrophic spills.3 Pipeline sabotage, pump station explosions, and pipeline leaks provided oppor321

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Tracking and mapping Computerized AD EC aerial reconnaissance reports of spill size and movement became one of the standards relied upon by other agencies and the public in the early days and weeks of the response. Observations from low-flying fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters as well as highaltitude photographs were used to track the spill. Float planes landed in oil slicks to sample and measure the depth of oil. This information proved valuable to corroborate high-altitude photographs. ADEC staff and consultants catalogued and digitized this information into a portable geographic information system (GIS) to produce maps of oil slick size and movement. ADEC distributed the first maps on March 27. These maps were used to deploy cleanup equipment, plan shoreline surveys, and schedule fishery openings. The maps were updated within hours of aircraft return. ADEC maintained aerial surveillance throughout 1989 and 1990.

The battle for Sawmill Bay ADEC represented the interests of fishermen and locals in the early days of the response. Commissioner Kelso began by inviting the fishermen into the decision-making process. ADEC's Colleen Burgh set up early liaison with both fishermen and local villagers of Tatitlek and Chenega. As oil approached several salmon hatchery sites in lower Prince William Sound, Jack Lamb of the Cordova District Fishermen United (CDFU) urged ADEC to help protect the Sawmill Bay hatchery, where 150 million salmon fry were scheduled soon to be released. ADEC and CDFU agreed to work together in cleanup efforts. This predawn decision on March 28 (Tuesday, Day 5) heralded the onset of a two-week defensive battle to exclude oil from a small bay on Evans Island, 60 miles South-Southwest of Bligh Reef. ADEC had learned to rely on fishermen's local knowledge of currents and weather in predicting oil spill movement. By Tuesday morning, ADEC and fishermen predicted that they had three days before oil reached Sawmill Bay.6 By Tuesday afternoon, ADEC's Kegler and contractor Bob Hull had met with hatchery workers and nearby Chenega village residents. Using local knowledge of wind and current patterns, ADEC designed three tiers of boom, arranged to deflect oil from entering Sawmill Bay, funnel the oil into natural collection sites well outside the hatchery area, and protect the rearing pens at the hatchery.6 Equipment lists were relayed in while anchor points were being constructed. But fog had grounded supply helicopters in Valdez. However, during the day, the first of several dozen CDFU fishing boats began to arrive from Cordova. A somewhat relieved hatchery operator, Eric Prestegard, recalled that Cordova fishermen had built the hatchery in the 1970s. By late Wednesday afternoon (Day 6), two helicopters flew in a small supply of boom and more ADEC staff.6 With breaks in weather and oil slicks five miles away, airborne convoys of Alaska Air National Guard Skycranes began to rumble into Sawmill Bay. With each huge helicopter came another 10 tons of boom and equipment. Skyvans circled over Sawmill Bay and dropped boom into the water. ADEC and contractors, Alaska State Troopers, and CDFU fishing boats worked together to set the tiers of boom. By nightfall on Thursday (Day 7), one primary boom and several secondary booms had been set in place.6 On Friday (Day 8) more boom arrived, but it was lightweight, old, and easily ripped. Several hundred feet had to be replaced each day. Some currents exceeded seven knots. Various anchoring systems and boom angles were tested. Heavy duty boom was expedited for the deflection site at the mouth of Sawmill Bay. By late Friday, as predicted, the first oil struck the deflection boom. The boom worked and most of the oil had been diverted back into the channel, as planned. CDFU boats and crews worked overnight to capture traces of oil that approached the primary exclusion boom. On Saturday morning (Day 9), CDFU seiners began to corral oil with boom in a fashion similar to that of setting seine nets for salmon. Some seiners operated inside the primary exclusion boom to contain oil that had penetrated the defenses. Other seiners operated outside the boom to herd the oil back into the channel downcurrent from the bay entrance. By late Saturday, ADEC contractors had set up a repair station

capable of rebuilding 300 to 400 feet of boom per day. Shortages of critical equipment, including hand-held VHF radios, battery-powered hand drills, and nuts and bolts, developed. Storage of oily sorbent material and incompatible boom connectors also became problems. At sunset, ADEC located the thickest oil slicks upwind and placed floating beacons in them to mark oil movement at night. Also that night, fishing boats patrolled with radar and quartz lights to prevent stray vessels from running over booms. Boats with hydraulics repaired boom defects and reworked chafed boom near anchor sites. At mid-morning Sunday (Day 10), the Alaska State Ferry Bartlett arrived with fresh reinforcements and supplies from Valdez and Cordova. From the Bartlett's stern loading ramp, volunteers offloaded two dozen aluminum skiffs to augment 16 CDFU seine boats. The Bartlett, and later her replacement the Aurora, became crucial to cleanup efforts in the response. They provided berthing, food, and showers for workers, storehouse and repair space, and general shelter and utility otherwise not available in this remote area. On mid-day Sunday (Day 10), high tide brought in the first serious oil slicks. The same high tide ripped open the weakened deflection boom. CDFU crews quickly repaired the boom, and used other boom to drag oil away from the bay. During the tidal surges, windrows of oil penetrated the primary defenses, but the ADEC "mosquito fleet" of aluminum skiffs and the CDFU seine boats deflected and contained the oil before it reached the secondary boom. By the end of Day 10, Sawmill Bay looked like the Alamo of the oil spill. Crews worked overnight in their most desperate hours to fight relentless winds and currents from pushing brown globs of oil over and under exclusion booms. State and CDFU crews deflected, contained, absorbed, corralled, and dragged oil away from the hatchery. No oil penetrated the interior defenses.6 On Monday and Tuesday (Days 11 and 12), skimmers, barges, industrial work boats, and heavy-duty ocean boom arrived. Skimmers picked up oil and quickly filled their small storage tanks. ADECcontracted "Supersucker" vacuum trucks on boats and barges lightered skimmer storage tanks and directly sucked up oil corralled in booms. Deflection boom was replaced, and other defenses were doubled and shored up. On Monday night, the weather brought relief. Jim Hayden, ADEC contract coordinator, reported that heavy winds blew a lot of oil out of Sawmill Bay. Main Bay and Esther Bay—both hatchery sites north of Sawmill Bay—and Eshamy Bay were all still free of oil. The pressure was off. Throughout the rest of the summer, the Sawmill Bay booms deflected and excluded sporadic oil slicks. The area near the hatchery remained untouched by oil, and the hatchery fish were released as planned and on schedule. Over 60 ADEC staff and contractors, 50 Cordova fishermen and nearly 40 vessels, the Alaska Air National Guard and State Troopers, and two vessels from the State ferry system participated in the battle for Sawmill Bay. In the first two weeks of the response, the only clear successes in the cleanup came in defense of salmon hatcheries—an improvised effort carried out primarily by fishermen.

Cleanup with Supersuckers ADEC contractors had brought two Supersucker vacuum trucks down from Prudhoe Bay in an 800-mile high-speed trip under Alaska State Trooper escort. In Prudhoe Bay, Supersuckers (5,000 cfm, 8-inch or 10-inch suction hoses, 17-cubic-yard storage, 10-micron baghouse air cleaner) had been used to transfer drilling muds to disposal sites. ADEC placed one truck on the ADEC-contracted rig tender Cape Douglas and the other on the barge Long Harbor. As described before, both Supersuckers first saw duty in Sawmill Bay to empty skimmer tanks, which until that time was the critical bottleneck in the cleanup process. Later, ADEC moved the Supersuckers north to Herring and Northwest Bays on Knight Island. Oil was thick enough there to allow the Supersuckers to pull oil directly from the water.6 ADEC recovery often exceeded 1,000 barrels of mousse per day, sometimes more than Exxon's recovery rates. From April 3 until ADEC turned the Supersuckers over to Exxon in early May, ADEC measured and estimated the Cape Douglas Supersucker recovery to be over 450,000 gallons of mousse, not including water or oily seaweed or debris.

CASE HISTORIES Other ADEC responses ADEC takes pride in several other innovations and later actions in the Exxon Valdez response. ADEC cleanup and scientific monitors oversaw beach treatments and application of chemicals. The fall shoreline survey assessed the inadequacies of 1989 cleanup and strengthened the case for 1990 cleanup. ADEC developed and used a computerbased system to catalogue all documents, tapes, photographs, notebooks, and records related to the Exxon Valdez incident. Since these do not relate to the initial response, they are only noted here. Likewise, it is not possible to acknowledge by name all of the ADEC Oil Spill Response Team involved.2

Lessons learned Some of the lessons learned here will sound familiar. They have been learned before and probably will be relearned in the next spills. Other lessons learned may be of more site-specific application, especially in remote areas or in regions of large commercial fishing activity. • Local residents and fishermen have valuable information on weather and currents and may be able to predict oil movement better than computers. Fishermen can also provide information about radio communications and logistics. • Lightering skimmer storage tanks is a frequent bottleneck in the cleanup process. • Equipment will not work as well as one hopes. More will be needed. • Equipment that works well on Day 3's oil will probably not work well on Day 23's oil. • Booms will not easily connect to each other. • Equipment that has not been maintained will break down quickly. • On radio communications, give early thought to repeater systems. Hand-held VHFs will be in short supply.

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· A portable geographic information system to quickly generate oil spill maps can play a significant role in response.

References 1. Alaska Oil Spill Commission, 1990. Spill: The wreck of the Exxon Valdez. Final report. February 2. Bauer, J., R. Bayliss, E. Gundlach, M. Kendziorek, and S. Provant, 1990. Response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Proceedings of Specialty Conference, Oil Spills Management and Legislative Implications, ASCE, Rhode Island. May 3. Bayliss, R., \ 7 . Fisken, G. Perkins, H. Purdy, 1979. Valdez superport of the future. Proceedings of the 1979 Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C. 4. Bayliss, R. and R. Spoltman, 1981. The wreck of the Lee Wang Zin. Proceedings of the 1981 Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C. 5. Buhite, T., 1979. Cleanup of a cold weather terrestrial pipeline spill. Proceedings of the 1979 Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C. 6. Hull, B., 1989. Exxon Valdez Spill Report. Northwest Enviroservices 7. Janssen, J. H. and D . L. Kane, 1987. Underground oil spill at Kotzebue, Alaska: Unknown cause, elusive cure. Proceedings of the 1987 Oil Spill Conference, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D . C , p 593 8. Kelso, Dennis, 1989. Commissioner, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation. Testimony. National Transportation Safety Board hearings, May 9. Winslow, R., 1978. Hard Aground—The Story of the Argo Merchant Oil Spill. W. W. Norton, New York