ance they called themselves the Second National Front.24They managed to stage numerous demonstrations during the rescheduled Majlis {the Iranian.
HN 5704NOTE
ON THE
EDITORS
Manfred Berg is Curt Engelhorn Professor of American History at the University of Heidelberg. Andreas Etges is Assistant Professor of American History at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University of Berlin.
John F. Kennedy and the 'Thousand Days' New Perspectives on the Foreign and Domestic Policies of the Kennedy Administration Edited by MANFRED ANDREAS
BERG ETGES
Universitatsverlag WINTER
Heidelberg
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Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet Ober http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
The publication of this book was made possible by a grant of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C.
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7
Andreas W Daum "Atlantic Partnership" or Simply "A Mess"? Performance Politics and Social Communication in the Western Alliance during the Kennedy Presidency..................
17
David C. Geyer Setting the Stage: John F. Kennedy, Willy Brandt, and the Origins of Ostpolitik. .
39
Erin Mahan Delaying Detente: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Limits of Alliance Politics
Jede Verwertung auBerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulassig und strafbar. Das gilt insdie Einspeicherung
Andreas Etges Introduction.......................................................
Systemen.
und
···
· 57
Peter Busch "Fateful Decisions": Kennedy and the Vietnam War..............
77
Matthew Jones Lost Opportunities or False Expectations? The Kennedy Administration and Indonesia, 1961-63..................
99
Arne Kislenlw Perhaps Vietnam: United States Foreign Policy and Thailand During the Kennedy Administration......................
121
Mark A. Lawrence Kennedy's Cuban Dilemma: The United States and Castro after the Missile Crisis.. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. ..
153
Bradley Zakarin "Cliches of Our Forebears": The Kennedy Administration, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Monroe Doctrine
175
RolandPopp Benign Intervention? The Kennedy Administration's Push for Reform in Iran
197
Manfred Berg "Ink for Jack": John F. Kennedy and the Promise of Racial Liberalism
221
Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp Kennedy and Central Appalachia: Fighting Unemployment and Poverty
243
Georg Schild John F. Kennedy and the American Social Welfare Debate in the 1960s
261
Winfried Fluck The Fallen Hero: John F. Kennedy in Cultural Perspective............
277
In his commencement address at Yale University in June 1962 John F. Kennedy declared that "( ... ) the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie - deliberate, contrived, and dishonest - but the myth - persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Too often we hold fast to the cliches of our forebears. We subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations.,,1 While the President went on to talk about myths regarding the size and shape of government, fiscal policy, and confidence, from retrospect his statement may appear as a surprisingly accurate prediction of the problems historians of the Kennedy presidency have been facing. During his lifetime, his father and his family, his advisors and his political and personal friends, journalists, World War II comrades and last but not least John F. Kennedy himself created his legend: It included the war hero, the healthy and athletic man, "the Senate's gay young bachelor,,,2 the intellectual who won the Pulitzer Price, the happy family man with a most attractive wife and wonderful children, the presidential candidate with movie star qualities, and the visionary and courageous politician. During the White House years Kennedy 3 became the first political pop star and even appeared in Superman comics. After his violent death many worked hard to cement his image against hostile attacks and criticism. His widow Jackie Kennedy who was crucial in stage-managing her husband's funeral as that of a martyr also gave the Kennedy myth its name. No one had talked of "Camelot" during the presidency, but a week after the assassination Jackie Kennedy found a journalist ready to deliver her message to the world. In an interview conducted by Theodor H. White for LIFE she compared Kennedy's time in the White House to the mythical Camelot, quoting from the then popular Broadway
1
John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Yale University, II June 1962, in: John F. Kennedy, 1961-1963,3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961-1964; hereafter cited as PP, Kennedy) 1962: 471. Paul F. Healy, "The Senate's Gay Young Bachelor," Saturday Evening Post 13 June 1953: 26-27,123-129. Kennedy appeared three times in Superman comics, once before he died. See Action Comics No. 285 (Feb. 1962), and No. 309 (Feb. 1964). In "Superman's Mission for President Kennedy," Action Comics No. 170 (July 1964), which had been planned in cooperation with the Kennedy administration, Superman helps Kennedy to improve the physical fitness of America's youth. Public Papers of the Presidents:
2
3
which apparently assume that words will suffice without weapons, that vituperation is as good as victory and that peace is a sign of weakness." Americans' understanding of the nation's history and rise to power made these voices all the more persuasive. He planned to add a specific example of his point: "I realize that this nation often tends to identify turning-points in world affairs with the major addresses which preceded them. But it was not the Monroe Doctrine that kept all Europe away from this hemisphere it was the strength of the British fleet and the width of the Atlantic Ocean.,,61 To this day, no president has confronted the myth of the doctrine in public. John F. Kennedy's willingness to do so in 1963 demonstrates that his rhetoric in the summer of 1962 and his policies that fall were part of a broader commitment to revising the axioms of US foreign relations.
Benign Intervention? Reform in Iran
The Kennedy Administration's
Push for
In 1971, a decade after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy as president of the United States, the memories of the difficult relationship between his administration and the Shah of Iran were very much alive. Inside the State Department it was still remembered that there "was never much love lost between the ruling Pahlavi dynasty and the two late Kennedys in those days.") Shah Mohammed Riza Pah1avi never forgot what he perceived as ill-treatment between 1961 and 1963. He later referred to the time as the "worst period" and complained to an American interviewer about "your great American 'liberals'" who wanted "to impose their way of 'democracy' on others.,,2 He even suspected the administration of having secretly worked on his removal to put into power a reformist government consisting of opposition elements formerly associated with Mohammed Mosaddeq.3 Scholars disagree over the purpose and importance of Kennedy's push for reform. Writings on the United States' reformist actions in Iran fit well into the familiar dichotomy of Kennedy historiography, albeit concentrating most of the time on the conduct of major crises. Controversies on his policies toward the Third World revolved predominantly around the gap between style and substance in Kennedy's statesmanship. Early accounts accepted - often uncritically - the administration's view of itself which portrayed its policies as benevolent and altruistic. Revisionists criticized the Kennedy administration for not fulfilling the promises they made to Third World states. As in other cases, Kennedy's unwavering determination to wage the Cold War and his fear of Communist penetration led his administration to drop their long-term goals of fostering social change and
1
2
3
Deptel #115232 to Tehran, 26 June 1971, State Department Central Files, SubjectNumeric File (hereafter cited as CFSN) 1970-1973, POL 1RAN-US, RG 59, National Archives (hereafter cited as NA). James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale UP, 1988) 137. Mohammed Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York: Pantheon, 1981) 72.
political democracy in favor of supporting authoritarian regimes to safeguard in the short term against Communist-inspired insurrections.4 The interpretations of Kennedy's policies in Iran developed along these lines. One school regards his actions as "good faith efforts" and argues that there "is little doubt that during the Kennedy presidency the United States pressured the shah's regime to begin a program of dramatic selective and controlled reforms."s For those who adhere to this perspective, the policy in Iran pursued by the Kennedy White House was simply an adaptation of their program for Latin America - the Alliance for Progress which emphasized change and development.6 Others deny any benign intentions and, instead, emphasize Iran's role in overall U.S. Cold War strategy.7 They define the year 1963 as a "watershed in U.S.-Iranian relations, a time when the United States accepted the shah's credentials as a reformer and the shah overwhelmed his opponents, [...]',8 In their view, U.S. policy toward Iran in 1963 tilted in favor of the more conservative forces, paralleling U.S. policy shifts in other parts of the Middle East and signifying a departure from Kennedy's more "even-handed" approach. 9 4
5
7
8
9
James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence: UP of Kansas, 1991) 221-54; Burton 1. Kaufinan, "John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature," Diplomatic History 17 (Summer 1993): 449, 465-7; for a useful introduction to U.S. policy toward the Third World see David S. Painter, "Explaining U.S. Relations with the Third World," Diplomatic History 19 (Summer 1995): 525-48; for a brief review of the Kennedy historiography see Mark J. White, "Introduction: A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. Mark J. White (London: Macmillan, 1998) 1-17. Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford UP, 1980) 107; Bill, Eagle and Lion 149. For critical views on the Alliance for Progress see Stephen G. Rabe, "John F. Kennedy and the World," Debating the Kennedy Presidency, ed. James N. Giglio and Stephen G. Rabe (Lanham: Rowman, 2003) 45-54. Mark J. Gasiorowski, u.s. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in /ran (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991) 95-9; Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: a Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1988) 260-3; Shahram Chubin, "Iran," The Cold War and the Middle East, ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) 216-49. James Goode, "The United States and the Shah: Checkmating the Opposition," Diplomatic History 17 (Fall 1993): 646-7; see also Goode, "Reforming Iran during the Kennedy Years," Diplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991): 13-29; the latest assessment is April R. Summit, "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran," Middle East Journal 58.4 (2004): 560-75. Giglio, Presidency of John F. Kennedy 232; Douglas Little, "Gideon's Band: America and the Middle East since 1945," America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge UP, 1995) 492-3. A book-length study of Kennedy's Middle East policy is Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the US.-Israel Alliance (New York: Oxford UP, 2003). Bass concentrates almost exclu-
The two positions are not as incompatible as they may seem. There is clear evidence that Kennedy sympathized with Third World nationalism and tried to instigate conservative governments to implement meaningful social and economic reforms. In the Middle East, he recognized (pan- )Arab nationalism as an independent force which he wanted to "channel [...] along constructive lines."lo He pledged a departure from Eisenhower's tendency to deal with the region "almost exclusively in the context of the EastWest struggle" and from Dulles' anticommunist "pactomania.,,11 Alarmed by Khruschev's designation of the emerging areas as the new battlefield for the Cold War the Kennedy administration thought of new ways of defusing this danger. Instead of sticking to the Eisenhower/Dulles approach of military alliances and anti-nationalist gunboat diplomacy a la Lebanon 1958 it tried to face the Communist menace by using U.S. power and prestige to bring about reform in the economic and political life of the Third World countries. This form of "benign intervention" - the promotion of a liberal and democratic vision of national development as an answer to Marxist and Leninist approaches to modernization - served the purpose of directing nationalist energies towards reform instead of revolution, thereby minimiz12 . • f ing threats to U.S. national security. Furthermore It was an expressIOn 0 a deep-seated belief in American exceptionalism. Nobody in the Kennedy administration doubted that the U.S. path to modernity was the role model for the rest of the world. It could be said that the U.S. was propagating a unique and linear way of modernization. 13However, Kennedy and his aides were also aware of the dangers posed by the aspirations of Third World nations for U.S. national security interests. Che Guevara stressed one of the main weaknesses of this approach in a conversation with an American
10
II
12
13
sively on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The best overview on general U.S. Middle East policy is by Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2002). Douglas Little, "The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism," Journal of American History 75 (September 1988): 501. Kaufinan, Kennedy as World Leader 466; Douglas Little, "From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed: Seeking Order in the Middle East," Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford UP, 1989) 155-8; Little, American Orientalism 137. For an (apologetic) overview on "reformist intervention" see Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992); for a very critical view on U.S. interventionism in the Middle East see Irene L. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958 (New York: Columbia UP, 1997). Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2000); for an elaboration on 'national development' see Mark T. Berger, "The Rise and Demise of National Development and the Origins of Post-Cold War Capitalism," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 30.2 (2001): 211-34.
counterpart when he stated that by "encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses, you might set loose forces beyond your control, ending in a revolution which would be your enemy.,,14 To cope with this possibility, Kennedy adopted counterinsurgency programs, the militant side of nation-building. Training Third World police forces in riot control and counterinsurgency was designed to counter Communist subversion but also bolstered existing authoritarian regimes. The main purpose of the Kennedy administration's modernization program was also its main weakness: Because it was originally designed to prevent Communist expansion in the Third World it naturally tended to prefer "revolutions from above" because they promised to develop in a controllable and orderly fashion thereby avoiding instability. In the end, Kennedy's efforts were designed to deny the Soviet Union influence in the Third World. Kennedy was primarily an anti-Communist, albeit perhaps an "enlightened" one. In this paper I will describe how the incoming Kennedy administration perceived the overall situation in Iran and what measures it took to defuse the ongoing crisis in the country. In analyzing U.S. policy during the "Amini experiment" and in the early stages of the Shah's "White Revolution," I will demonstrate changes in the Kennedy approach toward Iran and, moreover, investigate in detail what caused them. The main questions are: why did the U.S. pursue a policy of reform in Iran in the first place? What means were used to interfere in internal affairs? And why did the U.S. depart from its program of creating political alternatives to the Shah's rule and also from its aim of building "a decent democratic regime" in the future? Finding answers to these questions will not only help to shed light on general U.S. policy toward the Third World in this period but also provide us with a greater insight into Kennedy's overall performance.
Intervening in Iran's interior affairs was nothing new. As a result of its decisive participation in the Coup d'etat against popular Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq on 19 August 1953, the Eisenhower administration became deeply involved in Iranian politics. IS In the years following the
restoration of the Shah, the U.S. tried to stabilize the political situation in Iran. They attempted to achieve this by giving large amounts of economic and security assistance. Between 1953 and 1960 the U.S. provided Iran 16 with $567 million in economic aid and $450 million in military aid. From 1955 on, the Eisenhower administration strengthened U.S. commitment by developing a new approach which sought to transform Iran "fr~m ~ weak nation traditionally seeking a 'neutralist' position in world affaIrs IlltO an anti-Communist asset.,,17 As a result, Iran's informal alignment with the West was formalized by its adherence to the U.S. sponsored Baghdad Pact in 1955.18After the Hashemite Monarchy was overthrown during the Iraqi Revolution in July 1958, the U.S. hastened to allay the Shah's fears. In March 1959 they signed a bilateral defense agreement with Iran and fostered the Northern Tier defense system, now called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).19 At the same time, the Eisenhower administration tried to encourage the Shah to carry out reforms. U.S. observers feared that ongoing corrupti?n, economic hardship and a lack of political freedom would lead to growlllg unrest. John Foster Dulles was convinced that the "problem is very much like that earlier in Iraq, and we should try to persuade the Shah to undertake reforms while there was yet time.,,20 In June 1959 the Operations Coordinating Board defined the "extent to which the largely personal regime of the Shah, with which the United States is closely identified, can cope successfully with Iran's growing internal problems" as the main pr~bl.e~ for the achievement of U.S. objectives in Iran. The report was peSSImIstic as regards the Shah's willingness to institute "meaningful politic~l, soci~l a~d economic reforms," to reduce his military spending and stop Illterfenng III day-to-day government operations. Nevertheless, the report reaffi~ed that "there is no alternative to the Shah which would not be retrograde IIIterms of U.S. interests under present circumstances.,,21 In early July 1960 Eisenaccount on the coup see Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003); see also Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup In 16
17 18
14
15
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective," Latin America: The Search for a New International Role, ed. Ronald G. Hellman and H. J an Rosenbaum (New York: Wiley, 1975) 73. In 2000, the internal CIA history of the coup was leaked to the New York Times. The document shows that earlier claims of the limited role played by American and British intelligence were false; see Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The CIA Looks Back at the 1953 Coup in Iran," Middle East Report 216 (Fall 2000): 4-5; for a very readable
19 20 21
Iran (New York: Syracuse UP, 2004). Bill, Eagle and Lion 114; Gasiorowski,
u.s. Foreign Policy and the Shah 92-4,
101-
13. Gasiorowski, u.s. Foreign Policy and the Shah 95. James Goode The United States and Iran: In the Shadow of Musaddiq (New York: St. Martin's, '1997) 156-8; for Western policies on regional defense see Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992 (New York: Simon, 1992) 52-81. Bill, Eagle and Lion 118-9; Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions 102. Quoted from Little, American Orientalism 217. . OCB, "Operations Plan for Iran," 3 June 1959, Lot 62 0 430, Records Relatmg to State Dept. Participation in the Operations Coordinating Board and the NatIOnal Security Council, 1947-1963, IRAN 1959-1960, Box 21, RG 59, NA.
hower approved NSC-6010 which stressed similar viewpoints but was rather cautious regarding possible actions. U.S. policy continued to rely heavily on the Shah. At least, NSC-6010 also stipulated that Washington should seek to reduce U.S. identification with the Shah, should it become apparent that he would not undertake major reforms and should the likelihood of his overthrow increase.22 But the Eisenhower administration was not ready to take any risks and left the potentially explosive Iranian problem to the incoming Kennedy administration. The Middle East was hardly a priority for the Kennedy White House at that time, as it was preoccupied with a series of crises in Laos, Berlin, Cuba and elsewhere. Even when Kennedy's aides had a look at Middle Eastern problems they concentrated on what they perceived to be more dangerous trouble spots such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the ongoing coups d'etat in Arab countries like Syria, Iraq and the Yemenite Civil War which had greater potential of inviting Soviet intervention. That said, Kennedy and his aides were aware of the importance ofIran for U.S. interests. As one Policy Planning Council document put it: "There are countries more vital to the free world, e.g., West Germany; and countries more vulnerable, e.g., Laos. But the product of vulnerability and importance may be near its peak in Iran. In consequence it may be said that a major US policy goal, worldwide, is denial of control over Iran by the USSR.,,23 As early as February 1961 reports were received which foresaw future trouble. In July 1960 the former Mosaddeqists, consisting mainly of liberal constitutionalists, had managed to found a new alliance with other similarminded groups and student activists. Following Mosaddeq's former alliance they called themselves the Second National Front.24 They managed to stage numerous demonstrations during the rescheduled Majlis {the Iranian parliament} elections in early 1961 and temporarily tried to spread the rumor that the new U.S. government was sympathetic towards them taking over government in Iran.25 The Shah had similar fears. He was worried that the new administration would suspend U.S. assistance and might even encourage Iran to adopt a neutralist stand in order to better chances for a de-
tente.26 In order to assess what to expect from Kennedy, he sent General Teimur Bakhtiar, the chief of SAVAK, Iran's Security and Intelligence 27 Organization, as a special emissary to Washington. In conversations with Secretary of State Rusk and the President, Bakhtiar repeated well-known Iranian complaints about the shortcomings of U.S. support in the face of Soviet pressures and "extensive economic assistance" and the delivery of advanced military equipment to countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, "which represent a threat to Iran, [...]." He also stressed the importance of . . 28 being informed as soon as pOSSibleabout the leve I 0 f fu ture assistance. The Shah reiterated these demands in a letter which Bakhtiar delivered to the President. If these actions were designed to win the favor of the young President they were ill-advised. Kennedy shared the convictions of many of his aides that Iran's problems were actually internal and not external. By emphasizing in his letter that "our potentialities are great whilst our difficulties are, with good will, susceptible to easy solutions," the Shah confirmed American fears that he was "unlikely to take any vigorous action to promote economic reforms," as a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran put it.29When the Shah reverted to transparent blackmailing tactics to influence the administration's decision-making on aid, it did not help to improve the poor opinion Kennedy already had of the Iranian monarch. In any case, .the Shah's threats to leave the CENTO organization or to turn to the Soviets were simply not credible.3D Iran's false start with the new administration worried not only the Shah. Many officials in the State Department and the Defense Department favored the continuance of Eisenhower policies in Iran. While accepting the urgent necessity for reforms in Iran they were nonetheless satisfied with the status quo in the country and wanted to hold on to the policy of relying primarily on the Shah. They were convinced that in the case of Iran there were "no grand slam solutions to its deeply-rooted problems.,,31 Secretary Rusk, Edward Wailes, the ambassador in Tehran, and his successor Julius
26
22
23
24
25
NSC-6010, 6 July 1960, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-60, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986 - 1996; hereafter cited as FRUS) vol. XII 680-8. Policy Planning Council, "Iran: A Test Case in Policy Formation," pp. 12-3, 11 Feb. 1960, drafted by N.S. Barnes, Lot 67 D 548, Records of The Policy Planning Staff 1957-1961, Box 141, RG 59, NA; on the organizational background of Kennedy's Middle East policy see Bass, Support any Friend 10-4. Gasiorowski, Us. Foreign Policy and the Shah 177-8; Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran (London: Tauris, 1999) 227-9. Tehran Despatch #433 to State, 11 Feb. 1961, State Department Central Files, Decimal File (hereafter cited as CFDC) 1960-1963,788.00/2-1161, RG 59, NA.
27 28
29
30
31
Belk Memo to Bundy, 24 Feb. 1961, "Iran General 1/61-2/61," National Security Files (hereafter cited as NSF): Countries, Box 115, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston (hereafter cited as JFKL); attached is a paper entitled "Position Paper on Iran" presumably written in the Directorate of Plans of the CIA. Jones Memo to Rusk, 15 Feb. 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XVII, 25-6. Memcon Rusk-Bakhtiar, 21 Feb. 1961; Memcon Kennedy-Bakthiar, 1 Mar. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 31-4, 38-41. Letter Shah to Kennedy, 26 Jan. 1961, "Iran General 1/61-2/61," NSF, Countries, Box 115, JFKL; NIE 34-61,28 Feb. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 37-8. The Iranian Prime Minister announced a state visit to Moscow. Tehran Telegram #1071 to State, 18 Feb. 1961, CFDC 1960-1963, 788.5-MSP/2-1861; Jones Memo to McGhee, 23 Feb. 1961, CFDC 1960-1963,788.5/2-2361, RG 59, NA. Summary of Proceedings ofa Meeting of the Iran Task Force, 7 Sept. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 245-53.
Holmes and John W. Bowling, the Iran Desk officer in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the State Department all belonged to this group.32They were disquieted by the "sort of [...J 'crusading' aspect of some of the people around Kennedy.,,33 These "traditionalists" tried to soften up and delay White House decisions to pursue more vigorously reformist policies in Iran.34 The Kennedy advisors in the White House rejected the careful approach of the State Department. One particular 'bete noire' of the "traditionalists" was Robert Komer, Bundy's assistant for Middle East affairs.35 Komer feared that "the continued slide towards chaos in Iran could result in as great a setback as in South Vietnam".36 With respect to Iranian issues, his main ally inside the administration was Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Hansen had first-hand experience of Iran after spending several years in the country as chief of the Harvard Advisory Group. He was especially close to a group of American-trained economists in the Iranian Plan Organization, known as the "Ford Mafia" because they had been sponsored by the Ford Foundation.37 The President also relied on the advice of his brother Robert who was said to have been influenced by several contacts he had with Iranian students in the U.S. who were critical of the Shah's regime.38 The two opposing camps clashed in the early months of the administration. John Bowling prepared two long memoranda on the situation in Iran, summarizing the views of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He identified the isolation of the Shah from the main opposition groups, which were gaining in strength, as being the main problem in Iran. Bowling argued that the Shah should try to enlist the support of the urban middle-class and intellectual classes instead of continuing to rule through the security forces and the support ofthe traditional elements of society. He also asserted that the Shah could only capture the loyalty of the "semi32 33
34 35 36 37
38
For this group see Goode, Reforming Iran 16-7. Oral History Interview (hereafter cited as OH) with Theodore L. (Teddy) Eliot, Iranian-American Relations Oral History Project (hereafter cited as IAROHP), Federation ofIranian Scientists, Bethesda, Md., 1--35. See Goode, Reforming Iran 17. OH Teddy Eliot, IAROHP 1--14. Komer Memo to Kennedy, 4 Aug. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 212-5. OH Teddy Eliot, IAROHP 1--7, 1--11; see also Hansen Memo, 20 Mar. 1961, "Iran General 3/1161-3/20/61", NSF, Countries, Box 115, JFKL; Komer at one point mentioned the difficulties arising "from the rather abrasive personality of Ken Hansen [...] The trouble is that Ken is often right, which further gravels people," Komer Memo to Bundy and Rostow, 28 Oct. 1961, "Iran. Iran Task Force. 161. White House Memoranda," NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 426, JFKL. OH Col. Gratian Yatsevitch, IAROHP 2--154; for Bobby Kennedy's contacts with Iranian students see Bill, Eagle and Lion 133; William Douglas Oral History Interview, 13 Nov. 1969, JFKL 8-9.
Westernized elements" by "abandoning the military as his internal political base", by "giving up much of his power" and by :'aba~doning his openly pro-Western foreign alignment." Bowling th?ugh~ It unlIk.ely that the Shah would move in this direction. However, despIte thIS, Bowlmg was also very critical of the view that the United States could use its aid programs as leverage to induce reform in Iran which "would r.es~lt in politic.al tranquility." He discarded all possible alternatives to the eXlstmg U.S. polIcy on Iran. He was especially critical of the "most forthright and extreme suggestion" that the U.S. should support the takeover of the Mosaddeqist opposition ..In h~s view, the "long-range advantages of a more popular~y based regIme m Iran" would not be worth the "short-range" costs lIke the breakup of CENTO, the return ofIran to neutralism, a great blow to the global prestige of the U.S. and possible Soviet penetration. He concluded that the U.S. would be best advised to continue with its present policy of reassurance to the Shah and continue via the Ambassador's "persistent but delicate inferences" to the effect that the Shah should devote his attention to internal 39 rather than to military affairs. Bob Komer criticized the State Department for what he called "DoNothingism in Iran." He criticized Bowling's analysis for correctly d~scri.bing the problems but proposing nothing to resolve them. He .sa~ a bIg dIfference between "pushing the Shah so hard he goes ne~tra~lst m d~speration and telling him frankly that we are with him but III hIS own mterest urge that he face up to stark realities of life.,,40 Some officials in the a~ministration even contemplated going much further and demanded that It would be better to withdraw support from the Shah and look out for alternative leadership. Komer later remembered that these ideas were given a "fair run" but it was decided that the Shah was still the best bet.,,41
The deliberations on future U.S. policy were overtaken by events in Iran itself. A nation-wide school-teachers' strike in early May 1961 accompa39
Morgan Memo to Bundy, 27 Mar. 1961, Attachments "The Current Internal Political Situation in Iran" and "Political Characteristics of the Iranian Urban Middle Class and Implications thereof for U.S. Policy," drafted by Bowling, FRUS, vol. XVII, 5674.
40
41
Komer Memo to Bundy and Rostow, 27 Mar. 1961, "Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer 3/15/61-3/29/61," NSF, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 321, JFKL; there was also criticism from the CIA regarding the pessimistic outlook in Bowling's papers should the opposition take over. See Amory Memo to McGhee: 3 Apr. 1961, FRUS: Near East. Africa, Microfiche Supplement, No.59; see also Little, Even-Handed to Empty-Handed 167-8. OH Komer, IAROHP 1--16.
nied by a demonstration of 50,000 in Tehran led to riots. When the police opened fire, killing one teacher, the situation threatened to get out of control. Observers in Tehran warned that - given the questionable loyalty of the security forces - the outcome of a scheduled National Front demonstration "may gravely threaten the Shah's regime.,,42 The Shah reacted by dismissing Prime Minister Sharif-Emami and appointing former Iranian ambassador to the U.S., Ali Amini, to the pOSt,43Amini, coming from one of the old landowning families, had the reputation of a conservative reformer, and was generally seen as the most favored candidate in the eyes of the Americans. He earned his reputation in the U.S. because of his role as head of the Iranian delegation in the 1954 Oil Consortium negotiations. Naturally, there were rumors that the U.S. had pressured the Shah to appoint Amini but whether this is true or not remains a bone of contention.4 Both the traditionalists in State and the Komer-Hansen group welcomed the premiership of the thought-to-be-capable Amini. Startled by the riots in Tehran and alarmed by remarks by Khrushchev to veteran journalist Walter Lippmann that Iran was an example of the inevitability of Communist revolutions in the near future, Kennedy set up a Task Force on Iran which was designed to look into the "potentially dangerous situation" in the country.45 On 19 May 1961 the Task Force presented its report to the National Security Council. The NSC decided that the U.S. would undertake "a major effort to back the new Government in Iran as the best instrument in sight for promoting orderly political, economic and social evolution in Iran." In addition, it was stated as a U.S. aim to support "the Monarchy as the symbol of unity and a stabilizing influence 42
Clifton Memo for the Record, 4 May 1961 and two attached messages from USARMA Tehran, 5 May 1961, "Iran General 5/1/61-5/14/61," NSF, Countries, Box Il5, JFKL; see also FRUS, vol. XVII, 98; for the teachers' strike see Katouzian, Musaddiq
43
44
45
230.
Tehran Telegram #1366 to State, 6 May 1961, CFDC 1960-1963,788.13/5-661, RG 59, NACP; for Amini's role in the so-called "Qarani affair" in 1958 see Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1993): 625-44. See Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions 106; Bill, Eagle and Lion 143; Gasiorowski, Us. Foreign Policy and the Shah 181. The Shah later stated that he had been pressured; see Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein, 1980) 22; U.S. documents recount several meetings of the Shah with SAVAK chiefs who convinced him of the necessity to appoint Amini. See Iran Task Force Report, 15 May 1961, Part: Basic Facts, p.3, "IRAN 5/15/61," NSF, Countries, Box 115, JFKL; The CIA station chief Yatsevitch remembered that the appointment was "tactfully" but "not forcefully" suggested to the Shah. See OH Yatsevitch, IAROHP 1--63. See FRUS, vol. XVII, 99; Summit, White Revolution 563, gets the circumstances surrounding the creation of the task force wrong as well as confusing a later assessment by task force chairman Phillips Talbot of 14 October 1961 with the actual task force report dated 15 May.
in Iran" but the recommendations of the report also envisaged to "encourage the Shah to move toward a more constitutional role." In addition to the provision of cash grants to solve immediate problems, the report also c~n~ tained a long-term outlook. The United States was to encourage AmInI "positively but discreetly" to "construct a broad political synthesis.,,46 The task force report had even gone as far as claiming: "We ourselves can no longer afford to rely so heavily on the Shah.,,47 Hidden behind the ambiguous wording of the Task Force Report was the fundamental disagreement between State and the White House about the best way for the U.S. to proceed. For Bob Komer, the "gut issue was how far we should really go in supporting Amini, and even risk the Shah's displeasure by pressing him to do the same." He criticized the State Department for its reluctance in the past which had allowed the Shah to undercut the power of previous prime ministers. Komer was unsatisfied w~th the ambiguity of the report regarding how far the U.S. was ready to .g~ In su~port of the reformist Prime Minister and warned that the "AmInI expenment" was "the best, and Eerhaps last good chance of forestalling Iran's slippery slide into chaos." 8 Kenneth Hansen also saw an "improvement over past policy statements on Iran." He saw that the time had come for the U.S. "to change its policy of planning our hopes on actions to bolster the Shah personally as our chosen instrument in Iran.,,49Komer was successful in keeping the Task Force in existence to assure further White House influ50 ence on the State Department's actions in Iran. In the ensuing months Prime Minister Amini announced comprehensive reform measures which aimed at resolving Iran's growing economic crisis. He also started a land reform program under the direction of Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Arsanjani, well-known for his leftist views.5~.He began an anti-corruption campaign which led to the arrest of several mIlItary officers and officials. Unsurprisingly, he soon faced the combined opposition of the traditional landlord class, the conservative religious leaders and 46
47
48
49
50
51
Record of Action No. 2427, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," NSC, 19 May 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 120-2; this NSC action replaced above-mentioned NSC 6010 of July 1960. See Iran Task Force Report, 15 May 1961, p.l, FR US: Near East, Africa, Microfiche Supplement; No.61; the first pages of the copy of the report in the Kennedy library are heavily sanitized; the quote is from an unsanitized version of the report in '?ran (12)," White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-61, Disaster File Series, Box 66, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. Komer Memo to Kennedy, 18 May 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 118-9 [emphasis in the original]. Hansen Memo to Komer, 18 May 1961, "Iran. Iran Task Force. 1961 (Folder 2 of 2)," NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 426, JFKL. . Komer Memo to Bundy, 22 May 1961, "Iran 5/16/61-5/22/61," NSF, Countnes, Box 115, JFKL. On Arsanjani see Bill, Eagle and Lion 144-6.
Benign Intervention? The Kennedy Administration's Push for Reform in Iran
rightist military members. He was unsuccessful in wooing the Mosaddeqist opposition due to his delay in holding new elections.52 In the meantime, the U.S. helped as much as possible. Emergency financial assistance helped to relieve Iran's short-term financial difficulties. The U.S. also warned the dismissed former SAVAK chief, General Bakhtiar, who was also leader of the rightist opposition that it would "even take steps to prevent a coup" against the Amini government.53 The U.S. intelligence community saw the greatest danger for Amini in his relationship with the Shah. They predicted that his present "uneasy collaboration will develop into a struggle for power between them.,,54To prevent any unfortunate moves by the Shah the State Department advised the ambassador in Tehran to convince the Shah to continue with his support of Amini. The Shah promised to do so but warned at the same time of U.S. flirting with the Mosaddeqist opposition which he described as "willing dupes" of the Communists. In case of a government takeover of the National Front he threatened to resign and leave the country.55 The situation in Iran improved only slightly, triggering a renewed attack of the Komer-Hansen group on State Department policy. Komer criticized the department's interpretation of the Task Force recommendations. In his view, State's main idea to solve the crisis in Iran was "to subsidize budget [... J deficits.,,56He pleaded for a more activist approach. Without "an effective political corollary to our economic support" there was little hope of keeping the Amini government in power, "which still seems by far the best bet for achieving a 'controlled revolution' in Iran." He demanded that Iran must be treated "as a crisis situation [...J as [...J South Vietnam" and warned: "At a time when we face crises in Berlin and Southeast Asia, can this Administration afford not to take every step to avert a setback in Iran?" Komer wanted stronger pressures exerted on the Shah but also on Amini to induce the latter to speed up the reforms. Komer particularly saw a possible U.S. role in supporting Amini to build his own power base by doing whatever necessary to help him to split the National Front and draw the moderate flank into his camp. He also wanted the U.S. to subsidize Amini's ef52
53
54
55
56
See Gasiorowski, u.s. Foreign Policy and the Shah 181-83; Tehran Telegram #1374 to State, 10 May 1961, CFDC 1960-1963,788.00/5-961, RG 59, NA. Critchfield Memo to Talbot, 25 May 1961, FRUS: Near East. Africa, Microfiche Supplement, No.62. Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 34.2-61, 23 May 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 122-5. Deptel #1304 to Tehran, 3 June 1961; Tehran Telegram # 1471 to State, 6 June 1961, ibid., 152, 153; for the Shah's threats see Tehran Telegram #1390 to State, CFDC 1960-1963,788.00/5-1361, RG 59, NACP. Komer Memo to Bundy, 4 Aug. 1961, "Iran. Iran Task Force. 1961. White House Memoranda," NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 426, JFKL; Paper prepared for the Iran Task Force, n.d.., FRUS, vol. XVII, 199-206.
forts in strengthening his political camp.5~How~ver, the State Depa~ment stalled. It was claimed that there was no Immediate threat t~ the regime ~t that moment. Regarding the long-te~ policy of helping ~~nI .broaden. his political base, possible courses of actIOn for the U.S. ,:,,~re limited and In a very sensitive area of internal politics.,,58 The oppositIOn of the State ~epartment was strengthened by the arrival of the new ambassa~or. Juh~s Holmes in Tehran who deeply resented White House interventIOnIsm In Iran and became the main opponent of the Komer-Hansen group. Holmes complained to embassy staff about the "Komer cables" coming from Washington and joked about Komer's lack of knowledge "about that part of t?e world.,,59 Holmes strongly advised against any role for the Mosaddeqlst opposition. He was against "political pre.ssures :-vhichcou~d have the eff~ct of stirring up the middle class and arouSIng their expectatIOns, thereby dls:, turbing the stability and equilibrium of a pro-Weste~ government [...]. Underlying his arguments was a deep distrust of the middle class elements and a paternalistic view of Persians in general: The political history of Persia, and the character of the Persian people, lead me to the conviction that the most likely and probably the most SUItableform of government for this country is one where the people are firmly and resolutely guided by a central authority not subject to the daily whims of repre~entatlves of the diSunited, higWy individualistic, and uncooperative people of thiS nation.
. fi h b t ,,60 In summary, Holmes pleaded to "play for time and hope or tees .. Others in the State Department doubted the reasonableness of hiS approach. Iran expert John Bowling was strongly pessimistic abou.t the o~ds in Iran. In Bowling's view Iran "was politically and psycholo?lcally sick unto death." The Shah himself was unable to "provide effe~tlve mo.dern political leadership." He had not matured with age and .BowlIng predicted that "on the day before he is overthrown, the Shah Will un?oubted.ly ~e primarily concerned over the absence of esoteric military eqUipment I~ hl~ Army or over what some obscure French newspaper has to say about him. He continued: As we make a continuing decision to support a government accepta~le to the Shah, we run great risks. We support a doomed regime, one which by ItSnature cannot provide cynical and disturbed young PefSlans with the spark of enthusIasm, hope, and confidence. The degree of success of Iran's economic development programs cannot reverse this trend, although economic failure. would hasten the denouement. Our global prestige is tied to a government which Will fall,
57 58 59 60
Komer Memo to Kennedy, 4 Aug. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 212-5. Battle Memo to Bundy, 11 Aug. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 222-3. OH Eliot, IAROHP, 1--14. Letter Holmes to Meyer, 27 Aug. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 234-42.
while the prestige of the USSR is increasingly tied to the revolutionary element which wIll sooner or later come to power.
B?w.ling estimated the likelihood that the Shah would be overthrown wlthm 5 years as being as high as 70% and within 10 years as 90% 61Komer sens~d this "fatalistic resignation about Iran" in the State Dep:'rtment and h~ hlms.elf ~~essed that they would have to live with a "chaotic Mossadeqlst re¥lme III the future, but he still hoped "that we may yet squeak through With a 'controlled revolution' as opposed to an uncontrolled one.,,62 Ambas~ador Holmes worked in the meantime on the reversal of the ~greed poli~y. In Sep~ember 1961 he proposed a U.S. initiative to modernIze the Irallian army III exchange for a substantial reduction in the overall personnel strength of the !ranian ~rmed forces. His motive was to please both the Sh~h and the Irallian public at the same time. He offered a remarkable reas~nmg. He claimed that internal stability and public order were of foremost Importance for the chances of success of the Amini government. 63 But Holmes soon h~d to scale back his support for the Shah when it became clear.- as ?re~lc~ed by the Komer-Hansen group - that the Shah was contemplatmg dlsmlssmg Amini and assuming personal rule.64 ~n ~he meanti~e, Komer abstained for the time being from pushing the baSIC.I.ssues ~nd mstead concentrated on the immediate issues - the amount of military al~ fo~ Iran. an? a possible state visit by the Shah. Komer was unable to attam hiS objectives on either count: After months of hesitation Kennedy .appro~ed an early visit of the Shah. Komer was also unable to prevent diSCUSSIOns reverting back to the Shah's preoccupations with military matters ~nd the external dangers for Iran. Taking on Holmes earlier rec?mmendatlOns, State, AID and Defense proposed a five-year military assistance package of $330 million in exchange for a 25% force reduction Holmes argued for $424 million, scared by the Shah's threats to resign and leave the country in chaos.65
During preparations for the April visit, Komer tried to reemphasize the importance of discussing "not merely his military preoccupations but also the domestic programs which we think are key to Iran's future stability.,,66 He wanted Kennedy to make clear to the Shah that the U.S. assistance programs were predominantly geared toward "development and reform, together with improved counter-insurgency capabilities.,,67 Ken Hansen was disturbed by the emphasis of the State briefing papers on the emotional state of the Shah. He reminded the president that U.S. policy was to look "to the present regime of Prime Minister Amini rather more than to the Shah-to provide the impetus toward faster economic progress, reform, and the beginnings of a political synthesis which will speed the process of modernization." The fears of the Komer-Hansen group were well founded. Most of the conversations during the visit of the Shah concerned military questions. When Kennedy congratulated the Shah on having found "such an excellent Prime Minister" and for the support he gave him, the Shah countered that Iran needed time and security to succeed economically.68 Only an "honest, first-class army" could guarantee the security necessary to "build the country into a showcase." The Shah reluctantly agreed to a reduction in his armed forces but left Washington with the feeling that "short of atomic weapons of course, 'you want us to have a hard-hitting mobile and modem force.'" 69 The Shah was reported to have been generally pleased with his reception in the U.S. while Komer suspected that the Iranian monarch ~Ianned to accept the new modem hardware without reducing his forces.7
66 61 62
63
64
65
Bowling M:mo, 2 Nov. 1961, "16.U.S.-Iran relations," NENGTI, Records of the Iraman Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 3, RG 59, NACP. Komer Me~~ to Bundy, I I Aug. 1961, FRUS, vol. XVII, 228-9. Komer Memo 7 Sept. 1961, Iran. Iran Task Force. 1961, White House Memoranda" NSF Rob'rt W. Komer, Box 426, JFKL. ' , e Holmes Letter to Rusk, 13 Sept. 196I, "Iran General 9/10/6 I- 10/13/6I "NSF C tnes, Box 116, JFKL. ' , oun For the near dismissal of Amini see FRUS ' vol . XVII , 303 -,6' Fa ramer K 'hs opes see K orner Memo to Bundy, 28 Oct. 1961, "Iran General 10/28/61-11/9/61 "NSF C tnes, Box 116, JFKL. ' , oun Komer Memo to Kaysen, 19 Jan. 1962, Battle Memo to Bundy, 8 Mar. 1962, FRUS, vol. XVlI. 428-31,516-8; Komer Memo to Kennedy, 9 Mar. 1962, "Iran Subjects Shah VISit, 1/31/62-3/21/62," NSF, Countries, Box 117; Komer Memo, 20 Mar:
67
68
69
70
1962, "Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 3/62," NSF: Meetings & Memoranda, Box 322, JFKL; on the Shah's threats see Tehran Telegram #693, 7 Mar. 1962, FRUS, vol. xvn, 508-11; back in August 1961, the administration had already reassured the Iranian monarch that it regarded the possibility of an attack on Iran by either Iraq, Afghanistan or the UAR as "extremely remote"; see Deptel #5458, 9 Aug. 1961, "Iran General 8/1/61-8/14/61," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL. Komer Merna to Kennedy, 3 Apr. 1962, "Iran General 3/27/62-5/21/62," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL. Komer Memo to Kennedy, 6 Apr. 1962, "Iran Subjects, Shah Visit, 4/6/62-4/9/62," NSF, Countries, Box 117; Komer regarded the Shah's visit as "largely an exercise in psychotherapy"; Komer Memo to Salinger, 21 Mar. 1962, "Iran Subjects, Shah Visit 3/21/62-2/24/62," NSF, Countries, Box 117, JFKL. Over ten years later the Shah commented to a confidant: "That idiot Kennedy [...] once told me that Dr Amini was the only hope for lran [...]"; Alinaghi Alikhani, ed. Asadollah Alam: The Shah and I: the Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court. /969-1977 (London: Tauris, 1991) 384. MemCon Kennedy-Shah, 12 Apr. 1962, FRUS, vol. XVlI 590-8; MemCon KennedyShah, 13 Apr. 1962, ibid., 606-10; MemCon Shah-Rusk, 13 Apr. 1962, ibid., 610-22. CIA Telegram, 14 May 1962, "Iran General 3/27/62-5/21/62," NSF, Countries, Box 116; Komer Memo to Kennedy, 18 Apr. 1962, "Iran Subjects. Shah Visit 4/16/625/14/62," NSF, Countries, Box 117, JFKL.
The preferential treatment in Washington bolstered the Shah's self confidence. Back in Tehran, he continued to quarrel with Prime Minister Amini. Despite being partially successful on his reform program, especially land reform, Amini was in a weaker position than before. Agitation from right and left against his government continued, despite his successes in splitting the National Front.71 When a budgetary crisis turned up in June 1962, many observers saw another crisis on the horizon. Given the Shah's refusal to accept budget cuts - in the meantime he demanded a much greater military assistance program than agreed on during his visit - as well as U.S. reluctance to bailout the Iranians once again, many observers now saw Amini as a "spent force". Komer feared that Amini "seems to have lost control of situation" while the Shah "sits back doing nothing: he reputedly said Amini is a US man so the US can support him."n The Embassy in Tehran hesitated to pressure the Shah.73 While Amini was desperately trying to balance the budget and prodded the Shah to cut military expenditure, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi wrote to Kennedy demanding an increase in the military assistance package for about $100-135 million.74 Left with no options the Amini government resigned on 17 July 1962. Amini publicly put the blame partly on the U.S., which supposedly was too reluctant to grant emergency aid but Komer was convinced that Amini just did not dare to mention the "real cause - the Shah's refusal to back him in cutting the military and civil budget.,,75 Amini's successor as Prime Minister was Asadollah Alam, a life-long friend and intimate of the Shah. Holmes accurately predicted that this would "represent the closest thing to direct rule by the Shah.,,76
71 72
73
74
75
76
Tehran Dispatch #368,8 Feb. 1962,788.00/2-862, CFDC 1960-1963, RG 59, NA. Komer Memo to Bundy, I June 1962, FRUS, vol. XVII, 700; Komer Memo to Bundy, 15 June 1962, "Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 6/62," NSF: Meetings & Memoranda, Box 322, JFKL. Tehran Telegram #15, 4 July 1962, "Iran General 7/1/62-7/17/62," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL. Komer Memo to Kennedy, 18 July 1962, "Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 7/62," NSF, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 322, JFKL; Komer Memo to Kennedy, 16 July 1962, FRUS, vol. XVIII, 9-10. Komer Memo to Kennedy, 18 July 1962, FRUS, vol. XVIII, II; CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, 18 July 1962, "Iran General 7/18/62-7/23/62," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL; see also Habib Ladjevardi, ed., Memoirs of AU Amini, Prime Minister of/ran, /96/-62 (Bethesda, MD: IranBooks, 1995) 132-7. Tehran Telegram 86, 19 July 1962, "Iran General 7/18/62-7/23/62," NSF, Countries, Box I 16, JFKL.
Selling and Buying the "White Revolution" If the Shah had calculated before his dismissal of Amini that the U.S. would not dare turn its back on him, he was right. Shortly after the chan.ge in prime minister, an internal analysis of the situatio.n stated that with "Amini out of the picture, the Shah is the principal bastion of pro-Weste.rn strength and even of political stability in Ir~n',~t is now even more esse?tJaI that we retain his confidence and good Will. Even Bob Komer admitted that at "this juncture even I would hesitate to sap [the] Shah's confidence by too blunt a rejection of his demands.,,77 The CIA expect~d the Shah to continue with Amini's reforms, at least on the surface. But It doub~~d the Shah's ability to make painful concessions and concluded that st~~ warnings appear to be in order.,,78 In. the mea?time the rs-ennedy admlmstrati on had for a while lost much of Its enthusiasm for. a controll~d revolution" in Iran. Discouraged by the Shah's dilatory tactics and outnght opposition and disappointed by Amini's lack of success th~y low~red the reformist pressures. Holmes and CIA station chief Yatsevltc~ f01I~d ~rther attempts to pressure the Shah as desired .by Kon:er and his allies m the White House.79 The White House sent Vice PreSident Johnson to Iran to reassure the Shah of the ongoing commitment of the U.S. and to uphold the reformist momentum.80 Given the unwillingness of Holmes to oppose the Shah's wishes, the visit went by almost without effect. He eve~ managed, despite strong resistance from Komer, to push. through some mmofl alterations in the agreed military assistance program m fav~r of the S?ah. Reassured by Ambassador Holmes, the Shah contmued at ?IS own. p~ce. To demonstrate his independence to the U.S., he even organ.lzed a limited rapprochement with the USSR and in September issued a umlateral pledge . b ase d' III Iran. 82 to prohibit foreign missiles bemg
77
78
79 80
81
82
Brubeck Memo Bundy, 27 July 1962, "Iran, Security 1961-1963," :.resident's Office Files, Countries, Box 119; Komer Memo to Bundy, 27 July 1962, Iran. 1961-1962. White House Memoranda," NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 424, JFKL. " CIA, Memo for the Director, 16 Aug. 1962, "Iran 1961-1962, (Folder I of2), NSF, Robert Komer, Box 424, JFKL. OH Yatsevitch IAROHP 1--104. . See FRUS, vol. XVIII 72; Tehran Telegram #296, 27 Aug. 1962, "V.P. Tnp to the Middle East 8/62-9/62," NSF, Trips & Conferences, Box 243, JFKL. Talbot Letter to Gilpatrick, 13 Sept. 1962, FRUS, vol. XVIII, 90-2; MemCon ShahHolmes, 19 Sept. 1962, ibid., 100-5. Holmes apparently disregarded some of his instructions. See Kaysen Memo to Bundy, 5 Oct. 1962, "Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen, 8/62-12/62," NSF, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 320, JFKL. " Memo Hilsman (INR) to Rusk, 21 Sept. 1962, "Iran, 1961-1962 (Folder I of 2), NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 424, JFKL.
Bob Komer was unimpressed by these demonstrations of independence. He was convinced that "we underestimate our leverage with" the Shah who "needs us and knows it." Therefore Komer recommended forcing another reform-minded Prime Minister on the Shah or even calling for the return of Amini. He also doubted the ability of Ambassador Holmes to implement U.S. policy in Iran and recommended his replacement. Moving in the Shah's pace "means just bottling up revolution, we're again postponing the inevitable." 83 The Shah might have gotten rid of Amini but renewed U.S. pressures on reform loomed on the horizon. Threatened with another experiment like Amini, he decided to start his own initiative. In January I963 he propagated a broad set of reforms which he called the "White Revolution" (enghelab-e sefid). It consisted of an expansion of the land reform program, a workers' profit-sharing program, the nationalization of forests and pastures, the enfranchisement of women, and a literacy program.84 Holmes and the State Department strongly supported the Shah's newly found interest in reforms. Holmes deemed the Shah's land reform program "truly revolutionary." John Bowling saw a general shift in the political situation in Iran. For him, the Shah had given up his alliance with the old land-owning elite supported by the Army and security services in favor of an alliance with the peasantry and the urban proletariat.85 White House officials were all too readily willing to buy into the Shah's new image as a "revolutionary monarch." Komer seemed to believe that the Shah had decided to "have his own revolution without US advice." He still had doubts about some aspects of the reform program but, having invested a great deal of energy "in encouraging the Shah to take reform track" he was sure that "we're going to have to ride this tiger.,,86 Proud to finally have encouraged the Shah to courageous actions, Kennedy administration officials were ready to overlook the darker sides of the White Revolution. 83
84
85 86
Paper by Komer, 20 Oct. 1962, FRUS, vol. XVIlI, 189-95; Komer Memo to Robert Kennedy, 20 Oct. 1962, "Iran. 1961-1962. White House Memoranda," NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 424; Komer Memo to Bundy, 5 Nov. 1962, "Iran. 1961-1962. White House Memoranda," NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 424; Komer Memo to Bundy, 27 Nov. 1962, "Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer, 11162-12/62," NSF, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 322, JFKL. Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, (New York: Oxford UP, 1988) 72-74; there are several studies on land reform; see e.g. Ann K. S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969); Eric J. Hooglund, Land Reform and Revolution in Iran (Austin: U of Texas P, 1982); Fatemeh E. Moghadam, From Land Reform to Revolution: the Political Economy of Agricultural Development in Iran, 1962-1979 (London: Tauris, 1996). Memo for the Record, 5 Nov. 1962,FRUS, vol. XVIII, 201-2. Komer Memo to Bundy, 15 Jan. 1963, "Iran General 1163," NSF, Countries, Box 116; Komer Memo to Bundy, 29 Jan. 1963, "Iran General 1163," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL.
The Shah ordered the arrest of all of the leaders of the National Front without any protest by the administration. Ambassador Holmes rega.rded the opposition leaders as nothing more than "politically frustrated P.ersJan~,who essentially protesting manner in which country was governed m past and recommended ignoring their plight. 87 The Shah subsequently staged a fraudulent nation-wide referendum in support of his reform program, .resulting in a 99.9% "yes"-vote. President Kennedy.w:ote to the Shah statmg how "gratifying" it was to "learn that a vast maJonty has supported yo~r leadership in a clear and open expression of their wil!.,,88There were omInous signs of future trouble when sections of the NatIOnal Front and members of the Shiite "clergy" started cooperating with one anothe~. There was also renewed unrest at the university and in tribal areas. Bowlmg nonetheless insisted that the Shah's efforts had greatly diminished earlier dangers to internal security.89Komer backed this view: Obvious even to superficial observer that country undergoing intensive political social revolution imposed from above. Feudal landholding, religious elements which dominated Iranian scene being rapidly shorn of power; not clear what WIll take their place. Remarkable fact, despite dislocations causc:d,is comparative absence of effective opposition or violent response. Tnbal dISSidenceand OP~OSItion of mullahs seem vestigial remnants of yesterday's business, not today's. 0
The last voice of warning was that of Ken Hansen. When the President ordered a review of the U.S. policy program in Iran, Hansen warned of what he perceived as only "appearances of forward movement." H~nsen criticized the "de facto change" in policy which abandoned the deSife to define the pace of Iranian development and succumbed to the Shah's pace. He also did not want to abandon the aim of limiting the role of the Shah. He pressed his colleagues to think of alternatives to this "high risk polo
ICy. 87
88
89
90
91
,,9\
Tehran #670, 5 Feb. 1963, "Iran General 2/63," NSF~ Countries; ~?x 1~6, JFKL; another embassy memorandum commented on the NatIOnal Front s pohtIcal bankruptcy"; Schwartz Memo to Tiger, 13 Apr. 1963, CFSN 1963, POL IRAN, RG 59; see also Tehran #20,6 July 1963, "Iran General 6/1/63-7/10/63," NSF, Countnes, Box 116, JFKL; in retrospect, many Nationalists criticized the National Front's behavior as a lost opportunity; see Katouzian, Musaddiq 242-4. . CIA Telegram, 23 Jan. 1963, "Iran General 1/63," NSF, Countnes, Box 116, JFKL; Hilsman (INR) Memo to Rusk, 11 Feb. 1963, FRUS: Near East, Africa. Microfiche Supplement, No.104; Deptel #560, 29 Jan. 1963, FRUS, vol. XVIlI, 334. Tehran Telegram #628 to State, 23 Jan. 1963, FRUS, vol. XVIII, 328; Memo for the Record 28 Feb. 1963, ibid., 373-4. Beirut Telegram 924 to State (from Komer), 10 Apr. 1963, "Iran General 4/1/634/19/63," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL. NSAM 228, 14 Mar. 1963, FRUS, vol. XVlII, 424-6; Hansen Memo to Komer, 7 May 1963, "NSAM 228, Review ofIranian Situation, Report on US strategy for Iran, 5/63," NSF, Meetings & Memoranda, Box 340; Komer Memo to Bundy, 16 May
Benign Intervention? The Kennedy Administration's Push for Reform in Iran
In May 1963 the NSC Standing Group once again debated a more active approach to Iran but was unable to come to a conclusion. The Chairman Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, warned that "the U.S. should not become involved in a revolution in Iran to the extent that our entire future relations with this country would be put in jeopardy if the revolution got out of control or if the Iranians turned against us because of our extensive intervention in their internal affairs.',92 Given the general weakness of Mosaddeq's political heirs organized in the Second National Front, the leadership of the opposition movement against the White Revolution fell to the Shiite "clergy." This time their positions differed from earlier instances of political activity by parts of the "clergy" when religious leaders had joined the nationalist or democratic opposition in order to defend the constitution. The most outspoken of the religious critics and future leader of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, denounced the government's initiatives as an attempt to abolish Islam. While some of the religious opposition could be explained by the fear that land reform would also affect the wealth of religious foundations, most were likely motivated by their anger at the secularist contents of the Shah's program as well as by the enfranchisement of women.93 When Khomeini was arrested by the government in early June 1963 after a fiery speech against the Shah's rule, the country broke into rebellion. Mullah-led crowds rioted in the cities and were brutally attacked by the security forces, after the American-trained police force failed to control the situation.94 There were hundreds of casualties.95 American observers were quick to 1963, "Iran, 1/63-11/63" White House Memoranda, NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 424, JFKL. 92 Summary Record ofNSC Group Meeting No.6/63, 21 May 1963, FRUS, vol. XVIlI, 548-9; Komer disagreed: "We are directly involved in Iran; we will be blamed just as much if the Shah's revolution fails with us sitting on the sidelines as ifit fails with us in there pitching. We just can't afford 19th Century diplomacy in Iran." See Komer Memo to Bundy, 16 May 1963, ibid., 539-40. 93 See Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown 85; Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979 (New York: NYU P, 1981),226-7; part of Khomeini's motivation was the competition among leading Shiite clerics for the position of paramount leader in the hierocracy after the death of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi in 196I; the US embassy interpreted his behavior along these lines; see Tehran Airgram A-708, 17 June 1964, CFSN 1964-1966, sac 12-1 IRAN, RG 59, NA. 94 Grant Memo to Special Group (CI), 30 Apr. 1963, FRUS: Near East, Africa, Microfiche Supplement, No.106. 95 Talbot Memo to Rusk, 6 June 1963, FRUS, vol. XVIII, 570-1; Tehran Telegram #1076,6 June 1963, "Iran General 6/1/63-7/10/63," NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL; Tehran Airgram A-44, CFSN 1963, POL IRAN, NA; Cottam, Iran and the United States 129.
dismiss the demonstrators as "reactionaries" and explained the riots as a "logical" reaction to the Shah's reform program which, by its "fun~ament~~ and revolutionary nature," could not "indefinitely escape some vlOlen.ce. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Dep.artment explame? the riots as just "another in the long series of confrontatIOns between rel~gious conservatism and a modernizing government." In the same rep~rt, It was guessed that "the standard bearers of Shia Isla~ [...] are fightmg a loosing battle." The Kennedy White House was convmced that the door to modernization and progress was now open. In July 1963 Kennedy wrote to the Shah and referred to the riots as "recent unfortunate attempts to block ,,96 your re fiorm programs. . . As James Goode put it, the White RevolutIOn had co-opte? the ~ew Frontier.97 There wouldn't be any further U.S. demands for polttlcal ltberalization in Iran until the revolution started in 1978.
Conclusion In ignoring the visible signs of mass dissatisfaction ~~ich had let to ~he riots of June 1963 as well as the importance of reltglOus leaders lt~e Khomeini the Kennedy administration's policy in Iran had come full circle. U.S. interference was decisive in pushing Iran tow~rds reform. Confronted with the alternatives of a strengthened dictatorship of the Shah and a government consisting of the liberal opposition elements, the U.S ..finally opted for, what they regarded as, the less~r of two e;,ils - s~r~ngthenlng t?e Shah's authoritarian regime. The memones of the chaotiC ~osaddeqlst period in the early 1950s strengthened the administrati?n's bel~~f that the Iranian opposition was unable, single-handedly~ to bnng st~b.lltty to the country. Their neutralist leanings would prOVide opportunities for the Communist side and also weaken the U.S. position in Iran. In the case ~f a takeover by the Mosaddeqists, there would possibly be dema~ds to Withdraw the U.S. military missions.98 When the S~ah fina~ly declde~ to play the role of "revolutionary monarch," it looked ltke the Ideal solutIOn. The 96
97 98
Tehran Airgram A-723, 13 June 1963, CFSN 1963, POL IRAN, RG 59, NA; Denne~ (INR) Memo to Acting Secretary, 26 June 1963, "Iran 1/63-11/63 (Folder 1 of 2), NSF, Robert W. Komer, Box 423. JFKL; Depte1#32 to Tehran, 16 July 1963, FRUS, vol. XVIII, 644-7. Goode, Reforming Iran 25. .. It may be argued that the decision to look for alternati.ves to the oppOSitIOnforces organized in the National Front was also due to the.realizatIOn on the part of the administration that the Front was lacking in leadership and was hmdered by factional struggles. A more determined program and less indecisiveness amongst I:S leaders might have strengthened the argumentation of the Komer-Hansen-group mSlde the Kennedy administration.
Shah's leadership could provide much wanted stability and ensure that the "revolution from above" would be a "controlled" one. In fact, it could be argued that the Kennedy administration chose the Shah's side a long time before the failure of the "Amini experiment" by strongly supporting the regime's security forces. Ambassador Holmes, commenting on the successful oppression of the opposition in December 1963, said that the heavy emphasis on counterinsurgency and police training paid "off handsomely.,,99 The "White Revolution" was the beginning of broad social transformation in Iran, which was led by the Shah and based on a Western-style "high modernist vision" of development. 100What was missing from this vision was a political corollary emphasizing democratic representation and liberalization, resulting in the alienation of large sections of the population. The Kennedy administration's meddling in the internal affairs of Iran also strengthened the identification of the U.S. with the Shah's oppressive regime in the eyes of the Iranian people, laying the foundations for the strong anti-Americanism expressed during the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79. Looking at Kennedy's record in Iran, there can be no doubt that the analysis of the Iranian situation in the first months of the administration convinced White House officials that U.S. leverage had to be used to start necessary reforms in Iran. The main reason for this policy was the seemingly imminent collapse of the "client regime" in Iran with possible exploitation of the situation by the USSR. Because White House officials strongly doubted the Shah's leadership qualities, the U.S. supported the concept of a strong reformist Prime Minister, which also included the middle-term option of building a political alternative to the Shah's authoritarian rule. Disillusioned by Amini's lack of success in co-opting the Mosaddeqist opposition, the intransigence of the Shah, and the slow pace of reforms, the administration - blocked by its own bureaucratic differences acquiesced in the dismissal of the Prime Minister. The hardening of the Shah's dictatorship was accompanied by the implementation of reforms through a "revolution from above." It is unsurprising that the administration adopted the "White Revolution" with great enthusiasm: Underlying Kennedy's efforts in Iran were not benevolence but the search for stability in the context of the Cold War. The fortunes of the Kennedy administration's reformist initiatives in Iran as well as in other Middle East countries such as Libya, Jordan and Saudi Arabia resembled its efforts in Latin America with the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy was even less prepared to take risks in the Middle East Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 6 Dec. 1963, FRUS, vol. XVIII, 831-32. 100 Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three Possible Paradigms," Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000): 561-4.
99
than he was for example in British Guyana or Brazil where it was mu~h easier for the United States to project military power in case of Commumst advances.101 The heavy emphasis on counterinsurgency was always regarded as reinsurance in case the movemen.t towards. reform. got o~t .of co.ntrol. Despite massive support for the Iraman secunty services, It IS qUite accurate to say that "the Kennedy administration tried ~ard to pers~ade the shah to embark on real political and economic reforms mtended to Improve the lot of the Iranian people across the board and so sta~e off a revol~tion.,,102Nevertheless, it must be added that, after meamngful economIC reforms had got under way, the administration quickly acquiesced and the questions of political reform and democratization took backsta~e.. . . All things considered the interference ?y the Kennedy admI~~stra~IOn. m Iranian domestic politics can hardly qualIfy as an example of ~emgn ~~tervention.,,103While it did playa key role in convincing the Iraman polItIcal elite and finally the Shah of the necessity for far-reaching social ~nd economic reforms it also - through its repeated guarantees and maSSIve military, financial 'and political support - upheld the very poli.tical system with its autocratic structures whose democratic transformatIOn It had hoped to achieve in the beginning. It thereby also played a decisive role in keeping the more democratically-minded opposi~ion of the ~a~i~nal Front o~t of power. Increasing oil wealth since the ~.ld-1960s dIm.mIs~ed Amenc.a~ influence in Iran considerably and a repetItIon of somethmg lIke the Ammi experiment was impossible from then on.
Both cases demonstrate convincingly the prevalence of Cold War considerations over preferences for democracy and social reforms in the Kennedy era. The Umted States helped to subvert the democratically elected governments of Goulart and Jagan because of their cooperation with leftist elements and their refusal to support anti-Castro policies. See Rabe, "Controlling RevolutIOns: Latm Amenca, the Alhance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism," in Paterson, Kennedy's Quest for Victory 118-21; idem, u.s. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2005). . . 102 This is the formulation used by Kenneth M. Pollack; see hiS The Perszan Puzzle: the Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random, 2004) 138-9. 103 For a political scientist using the Kennedy intervention in Iran and other cases as examples of progressive influence exerted by the U.S. m the Third World see Douglas J. Macdonald, "Anti-Interventionism and the Study of Amencan Foreign Policy in the Third World," Security Studies 2.2 (1992): 225-46; see also the response by Jerome Slater, "Reassessing Third World Interventionism: a Response to Macdonald," Security Studies 2.2 (1992): 247-59; and the continuation of the debate m Security Studies 3.1 (1993): 163-73. 101
