Kashmir and Chechnya

Kashmir and Chechnya: Issues in Terrorism Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapapa*

T h e present paper looks into terrorism in Kashmir and Chechnya in a comparative perspective, and seeks to draw similaritiesbetween the two thesituations. India and Russia, bothmultiethnic and pluralist societies, have sought to forge common stand on terrorism as both are victims of this menace. The issue has gained wider momentum after the 9/ 11 as it, earlier almost confined to national boundaries, got internationalised.The global powers such as the US showed increasing concern on terrorism and its menace world-wide. As a result, Kashmir and Chechen problems were seen in a new and broader context. The paper has also attempted to study the role of Pakistan in the global fight against terrorism, particularly in Chechnya and Kashmir. The international network and extremist agenda of world terrorist organisations and their implications for India and Russia have also been analysed in the paper. The paper has mainly adopted historical-analytical method whiIe delineating the major themes. The first and second Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Regioiinl Studies, University of Jamniii, Jammu.

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sections of the paper analyse the issues of Kashmir and Chechnya in a historical perspective. While the third section analyses the role of Pakistan in Kashmir and Chechnya, the fourth section focuses on international dimensions of terrorism. The final section summarises main conclusions of the paper.

The Kashmir Issue Jammu and Kashmir U&K) was one of 565 princely states of India on which the British paramountcy lapsed on 15August 1947.As per the terms of the British withdrawal and partition of India, the rulers of all the princely states were given the option of joining either of the dominions - India or Pakistan, basing their decisions on considerations of geographic embedded-ness in or contiguity to India or Pakistan and the wishes of their population.' However, despite seeming simplicity of these principles, in fact, they were not easily applicable to J&K. The state had a predominantly Muslim population and a Hindu ruler. Though Junagarh and Hyderabad too posed the same problem of ruler and majority of subjects pursuing different religions, yet their issue was resolved in the due course of the t h e e 2In case of J&K, which abutted both neighbouring countries and was claimed by both, the problem was complicated. Apart from territorial claims, the po$session of J&K, a Muslim-majorityregion, had significance both for India and Pakistan though for different reasons? The issue of Accession acquired further complexity due to the political situation as it had evolved within the state from the beginning. The reigning Maharaja of J&K, Hari Singh, was facing a significant opposition from his own subjects, primarily from the majority Muslim population! The simmering discontent against the rule of the king had been politically organised with the establishment of the All

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J&K Muslim Conference (MC) in October 1932. This movement, though representing the Muslim elite interests to begin with, gradually got sccularised. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah came under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru who were leading the freedom struggle at the national level and changed the name of the party in 1939 as All J&K National Conference (NC). Following the national Quit India Movement in 1942, the NC launched Quit Kashmir Movement (QKM) to overthrow the Dogra r n o n a r ~ h yThe . ~ leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Pt. Jawahar La1 Nehru espoused the cause of the people of J&K seeking political freedom from the autocratic rule of Hari Singh. Things within J&K became further complicated when Maharaja evaded the question of the political future of J&K. He was wooed by both the newly-independentcountries and at the same time was facing a formidable challenge from the people. However, his indecisiveness became a problem and laid the foundation of the subsequent conflict. Hari Singh requested for a Standstill Agreement to both the newly-independent states. According to it ”the existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details.”6While the Government of India asked for further negotiations on this request of the Dogra ruler, the Government of Pakistan agreed to the Agreernenk7Under this Agreement, Pakistan assumed charge of the post and telegraph system of the state. It also undertook the supply of foodstuffs and other essential commodities. Much is disputed about the events that preceded the signing of the Instrument of Accession by the Maharaja. Many of the legal and moral arguments underlying Indian and Pakistani claims regarding J&K ‘flow from differing interpretations of the historical events. It is argued that to put pressure on the Maharaja indirectly, Pakistan many times

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stopped the regular supply of the material to the state. Faced with situation arising out of repeated violations of the Standstill Agreement by Pakistan, the Maharaja set Sheikh Abdullah free on 29 September 1947.However, this step was noted with disapproval by Pakistan due to the proclaimed proximity of the Sheikh and his party, NC, with India and Indian leadership3 Meanwhile, the uprising in Poonch against the ruler and subsequent infiltration of armed groups from Pakistan complicated the problem. India contended that Pakistan intending to "grab J&K by force"g sent its troops disguised as local tribesmen.1° Pakistan, however, argued that the atrocities perpetrated by Maharajas' forces against the Muslim population of Poonch provoked spontaneous reactions both within the state and from ethnic as well as religious kin across the border." Amidst these competing claims, the invaders occupied Muzaffarabad on 22 October 1947 and then they advanced towards Srinagar.12 This development forced Hari Singh to send his troops that, however, proved incapable of stemming the ~nslaught.'~ Even after the troops that were borrowed from the Maharaja of Patiala failed to halt the column, Hari Singh appealed to the Lord Earl Louis Mountbatten (Britain's last viceroy in India in 1947 and Governor-General of India, 1947-48)for help. Prime minister Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then home minister Vallabhbhai Pate1 and Mountbatten all were of the view that the Indian troops could be committed only if Hari Singh acceded to India. Maharaja sent a letter to GovernorGeneral in which he stated:

...with theconditionsobtainingatpresent inmy state and the great emergency situation exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally, they cannot send the help asked by me without my state acceding to the Dominion of India.

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I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your government.I4

As Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, Indian troops were sent to J&K on 27 October 1947; and this led to a full-scalewar between India and Pakistan. The Indian troops succeeded in arresting the advance of the Pakistanbacked forces. On 30 October 1947, a n emergency governmentwas formed in the state with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as its head. This government supported the decision of Maharaja to join India and helped combat advancing Pakistani forces.I5 Conflict over the question of J&K flared up once again in a full-scale war between India and Pakistan in 1965. The first major engagement between the regular armed forces of the two sides took place on August 14,1965. The initial gains of India led the Pakistan to mount 'Operation Grand Slam' on September 1, in Southern J&K, to take the Akhnoor bridge and cut off the lifeline of supplies to southwest of the state. On 5 September 1965, the Pakistan army launched a major assault on J&K and penetrated 14 miles into Indian territory. To relieve pressure on the J&K front, Indian forces counterattacked in the Punjab, near the Pakistani of Lahore, and crossed the international border.I6 By mid-September 1965, the war had reached a stalemate. The UNSC unanimously passed a resolution on 20 September, calling for a ceasefire and consequently the war ended on 23 September 1965.17 After the imposition of the ceasefire, the Indian prime minister, La1 Bahadur Shastri met with the Pakistani president in the Central Asian city of Tashkent on 4 January 1966to negotiate a settlement.The Soviet-brokeredTashkent Declaration was signed on 10January 1966. Under the terms of the Tashkent Agreement not only did the two sides agreed

civ

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to a ceasefire and return to the status quo but also to abjure from the use of force to settle outstanding disputes.

By the end of 1971, India and Pakistan again were involved in a war. Though this war was not directly fought over J&K, yet the fight did spread to it. This third war between India and Pakistan began after a civil war broke out in the East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) over the demand for regional autonomy.18 It is argued that under the code name of ‘Operation Searchlight’on 25 March 1971, the Pakistani army began a crackdown on now Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.19 Shortly after the crackdown, thousands of refugees fled from East Pakistan into West Bengal, the adjacent Indian state. By mid-May 1971, the refugee population had grown to an estimated ten million.” Despite repeated appeals to the international community, Indian government failed to elicit any response. The failure of several diplomatic attempts to arrange the return of the refugees then made prime minister Indira Gandhi decide in April 1971 to help Bengali freedom fighters to liberate East Pakistan. Consequently, India began providing the Mukti Bahini (LiberationForce), the East Pakistani armed resistance fighters, with sanctuaries, training, and weaponry.21By November 1971, the Mukti Bdiini was attacking military installations in East Pakistan from bases along the Indian border. This led to another war between the two states on 3 December 1971. Pakistan launched an air attack on India’s northern air bases. The Indian air force retaliated the next day, striking a number of West Pakistani air bases. In the meantime, the Indian navy effectively established a virtual blockade between East and West Pakistan.” By 16 December, the Pakistani forces were routed and the Indian Army entered Dhaka. Pakistan’s defeat in the war led to the creation of Bangladesh. On December 17, both India and Pakistan

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declared ceasefires. They signed the Shimla Agreement on 2 July 1972, agreeing to settle disputes through bilateral talks and negotiations. This agreement committed both countries to work for a final settlement of J&K. Since Shimla Agreement, India took a stand against the involvement of any third party in the issue. It contended that the truce agreement on plebiscite had been superseded by the Agreement. Despite India's strong objections to introduction of J&K issue in any international forum, be it at the UN, the Commonwealth or in meetings with other foreign leaders, Pakistan's occasional attempts in this direction had many times led to increase in the tensions. Notwithstanding all this, the Shimla Agreement provided a comprehensive framework for normalisation of relations between the two countries. It, despite tension from time to time, largely succeeded in preventing major clash between India and Pakistan for a long time until 1999. The almost thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations received a set back as Pakistan made an intrusion into the Kargil sector in the Indian side of the border in 1999. This Pakistani misadventurism was challenged by the Indian forces despite not in an advantageous position, and finally with US putting pressure, Pakistan forces withdrew from Kargil after sufferinghuge casualties. In 13December 2001, the Pakistanlinked terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked Indian Parliament, thus compelling India to adopt coercive diplomacy by positioning forces alongside border. Then came the famous promise of the military ruler of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf not to allow Pakistani territory for terrorist activities in January 2002. However, the ongoing peace process involving civil societies of the both the sides of Kashmir and opening of borders appear to steer the peace process in an irreversible manner.

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The Chechen Issue Chechnya occupies the northern slopes of the middle Caucasus Mountains and extends into the flood-plains of the Terek River in southern European Russia, comprising an area of 16,088 sq. km.(6,210 sq. miles). The Chechens, who call themselves Nakh or Nakchuo, are a Caucasian nation comprising 128 clans. As per 1994 figures (before the war between Russian army and Chechen fighters) its population was 1,020,000.The demographic composition was: Chechen 71 per cent, Russian 20 per cent, Ossetian 2 and Ingush 1 per cent, while Ukrainians and Dagestanis constituted 5 per cent of the population. About 75 per cent of the people are S u n n i Muslims, adhering to the Shafi rites. With an urbanisation rate of 40 per cent, Chechens retain a high birth-rate. The major languages include Chechen and Russian. The Chechen language (a dialect of Vienakh, the north-eastern branch of the Caucasian languages) developed as a literary language around nineteenth century?’ The Chechen language and civilisation is about 5000 years old.= While Islam entered the region in the 17thcentury AD, the presence of Christianity was older as the existence of old churches reveal. Most of the time, Chechnya has been in conflict with Moscow. Revolts in the 19th century, especially the revolt led by Shamil Sheikh againsl the Czarist authority, were some of the bitter moments in Russo-Chechenconflict. The real low came with the massive deportation of the Chechens by the Stalin regime in 1944. Nikita Khrushchev who succeeded Stalin was critical of this. In his secret speech at 20th CPSU congress, he termed those policies as . “rude . violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policies in the Soviet state.”26He started the process of rehabilitation of the deported people. Similarly, the Supreme

Debidatla Aurobindu Mahupatra

Soviet of the SovietUnion in 1989passed a resolution terming the policy of deportation illegal and repressive.27 With the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Union Republics became independent. But the autonomous republics like Chechnya were not granted the right to independent statehood. Rather, they were incorporated in the Russian Federation. On 1 November 1991, the Chechen leader Dzokhar Dudayev declared independence of Chechnya. Dudayev, a former major-general in Soviet air force had, it seemed,sheltered this ambition even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For instance, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union when Gorbachcv sent troops to Baltic states to deal with secession problems they failed to reach Estonia because the local air-base commander, Dudayev did not allow landing rights to the Soviet air planes to undertake the operation.= After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Dudayev took advantage of the fragile character of the Russian polity and declared independence. To streamline the functioning of the federal polity and meet the demands of separation from various republics, Russian president Boris Yeltsin adopted the federal treaty on 31 March 1992. Chechnya, under the leadership of Dudayev, refused to sign the treaty. According to the provisions of the federal treaty, the republics were given the status of “sovereign republics within the Russian Federation” with property rights over land and natural resources on their territory.29The federation treaties recognised two different categories of ’subjects of the Federation‘: twenty-one republics and sixty-eight administrative territorial regions.The republics were given rights over their natural resources, external trade and internal budgets. Two republics, Chechnya and Tatarstan refused to sign the treaty as they insisted on a fuller statement of

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independence from Moscow. Yeltsin could handle the Tatarstan demand by signing a treaty with it in February 1994. By the end of 1995 Moscow had signed similar documents with six other republics - Kabardino-Balkaria, Bashkortostan, North-Ossetia, Sakha/Yakutia, Buryatia and Udmurtia. Moscow could tackle the separatist demands from various republics successfully but it failed in the case of Chechnya. Regarding the Tatarstan model as a framework of relations between Russia and Chechnya, the late Chechen leader, Aslan Maskhadov pointed out that it was an ideal prototype at the economic level but an additional component accommodating the Chechen‘s right to Islamic self-identity was required. The question of Islamic identity was an obvious concern for Russia. Maskhadov, in a letter, writes about the stand he took with Yeltsin: The problem started again after my second meeting with Yeltsin when he asked me with surprise: ‘Aslan Alievich I was told that you agreed to a Tatarstan model thereby remaining a part of the Russian Federation?’ I replied that after such a bloody war the Chechens would never acquiesce to a Tatar formula?’ Realising that the Chechen separatist movement could not be tackled without armed intervention, the Yeltsin administration, after much vacillation, started the military campaign against the Dudayev regime in November 1994. Yeltsin justified the attack on the ground of Russia’s territorial integrity and, that any grant of independence would convert it into a ’seat of international t e r r ~ r i s m . ’ ~ ~ Russian defence minister Pave1Grachev’s claim that Grozny, the Chechen capital, would be occupied “in two hours with

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an air base regiment” ended in a nightmare because of stiff

Checheri resistance.= The struggle continued for about two years; and largely due to a lack of any strategy and adequate preparation, the Russian forces suffered humiliation at the hands of the Chechen guerrilla fighters.u There are conflictingreports about causalities in the Chechen war. Sergei Kobalev, minister for human rights affairs in Yeltsin government, estimated that more than 25,000 civilians died in Grozny alone. The Russian government claimed that it lost fewer than 2000 personnel; other estimates range between 1800 and 5000.j5Krusnya Zveda ( the Russian military newspaper) on 12October 1996published a list of 2941names of soldiers who died during the Chechen conflict.* Some time in 1997, the authors representing the MVD Internal Troops published another list of 1087 internal troops; the two lists thus combine Russian casualties at 4028, which is slightly less than the figure of 4379 given by ’Memorial Society’, the Russian Human Rights Organisation in January 1997.37Be that as it may, the military campaign of 1994-96 tarnished Russian reputation and elicited international criticism as large-scale violation of human rights were reported. Instead of resolving the crisis, the military campaign further accentuated the level of animositybetween the Russian Federation and C h e h y a . Dudayev got killed in a Russian missile attack in 1996 and Aslan Maskhadov was elected the Chechen president. Soon after, on 31 August 1996, the Khasavyurt agreement followed that was signed between Maskhadov and the Russian General, Alexander Lebed.%The Khasavyurt agreement set forth four provisions: ”Rules for Clarifying the Basis for Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen republic.”39The first section dealt with a treaty, based on the norms and principles of international law, for

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governing relations between both the parties to be arrived before 31 December 2001. In this agreement there was no reference to the federal Constitution. The second section created a joint commission comprisingRussian and Chechen officials to facilitate complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechen territory; initiated and implemented measures to control crime and prejudice; made proposals for developing monetary and budgetary mutual relations; developed programmes for the Russian government to rebuild the socio-economic infrastructure of Chechnya, and supervise agreements concerning supply and distribution of food and medical aid."' The third provision described the basis of the Chechen legal system, including the "right of nations toward self determination" and the "principles of equal rights of nations." Finally, the fourth provision provided that the joint commission would continue as long as both the parties wanted it. There was a provision in the agreement that talked about moratorium on the status of Chechnya until 2001. By popular vote, Aslan Maskhadov was elected the Chechen president in January 1997. The Chechen leader signed a second, short peace agreement with resident Yeltsin on 12 May 1997.

.

Many questions have been raised on the various aspects of Khasavyurt agreements. Regarding the principles of international law that were to be applied, Russia argued that international law is a component of the Russian Federation's legal system; hence a part of the Russian domestic law. Regarding the right of self-determination, the Russian constitution denied any such right to its republics. Article 4.1 of the constitution states that the "sdvereignty of the Russian Federation shall extend to its entire territory." This grant of de facto independence to Chechnya could prove a great lever towards larger autonomy or possibly

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independence, had the Chechen leadership developed and consolidated the values of democracy and civil society. However, that did not happen in reality. Rather than showing any sign of development of democracy and civil society, the interveningperiod of 1996-99witnessed Chechnya further slipping into the vortex of instability. Instead of any coherent state mechanism, many national assemblies emerged headed by local warlords. In September 1997, the Chechen government publicly executed four convicted criminals by firing squad in violation.of the Russian moratorium on capital punishment. Loot, arson, murder reigned over the Chechen people and became a regular feature of the society. The prevailing lawlessness and disorder’came to be highlighted by the killing of six Red Cross workers in Grozny, kidnapping of two Western journalists, Camilla Carr and John James, and the beheading of four British telecommunication engineers-all in 1996.4l In one case, the kidnapping gang of Arbi Barayev was found to be under the protection of his relative, vice-president Vaqa Arsanov. Without any control of the Chechen polity by the Maskhadov government, Chechnya turned into a ‘gangsters’ paradise’u and a ‘hub of international terrorism.’ By 1999 more than 1300 - Russians, Dagestanis or Ingush -had fallen victim to the lawlessness and disorder.u This is when Chechnya also became a centre for training young terrorists. Chechnya became the centre of activity for Abdurrahaman Khattab, an Arab terrorist who had fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan. According to one estimate, Beneficence Islamic Charity, found under the guidance of Al Qaeda, sent $700,000 to the separatistsin Chechnya in 19 electronic transfers within four months in 2000; and the money was cashed in Tbilisi and Riga.qdVarious gang leaders stole oil and sold it to fight

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local feuds and finance terrorist activities; and several criminals also revived the ancient retrograde system of slave trade. Sergei Yastrzhembsky argues that the Russian step of granting de facto independence to Chechnya faiIed to bring real independence because the political extremists, ’soldiers of fortune,’ and fanatics from Afghanistan, the Middle East, and other regions immediately filled the power vacuum.(5 This was accompanied by ethnic cleansing. According to the last census held in 1989, the Republic’s population stood at 1,270,000 people, including 336,000 ethnic Russians. By the time the counter-terrorist operation was undertaken in the fall 1999, there were only 20,000 Russians left in Chechnya. With the rise of the Dudayev-Maskhadov regime, executions at town squares, decapitations, and attempts to restore law and order on the basis of Shariah perturbed both the population of the neighbouring Republics and the Chechen people themselves. In almost eight years of DudayevMaskhadov rule, more than 21,000 Russian civilians were murdered and over 46,000 people were forced into slave labour. In 1995-99, as many as 2000 hostages were deported to Chechnya from other Russian regions. Measures backed by the Maskhadov regime - including in the sphere of criminal punishment, for instance, dismemberment - were not only crimes punishable under the Russian criminal code, but also violated the rights and freedoms guaranteed international law and covenants. The first Chechen war by the Yeltsin government was dubbed a failure but the second campaign, launched under the then newly-appointed prime minister Vladimir Putin in August 1999, was considered legitimate. It was supported by a large number of Russians.* It was deemed necessary as a group of terrorists-under the leadership of radical

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Islamists, Shamil Basayev, Khattab and Jadauddinlaunched an attack on the neighbouring Dagestan in August 1999with the ostensible objective of declaring it a free Islamic republic much against the will of the Dagestanis. Putin launched a massive attack against the terrorists and their bases with the promise to bring the region under control within fifteen days. After routing them from Dagestan, he ordered military strikes on the terrorist bases in Chechnya. The bombing of Moscow apartments in September 1999, in which hundreds of people died, further strengthened the popular belief in Russia that military action is necessary to resolve the terrorist problem in Chechnya. The terrorist siege of one Moscow theatre in October 2002 further eroded the faith of Russian people in any genuine cause of the Chechen radicals. According to one string of argument, despite religious revival in Chechnya, initially Islam played a marginal role in the ideology of Chechen separatists. It was after nearly ten years of conflict and chaos that both, political and radical Islam, have become part of the ideology and working method of many Chechen fighters and politicians; these trends are quite alien to the Sufi traditions of Che~hens.'~ The internal impetus toward Islamisation of the Chechen separatist movement did not come from the Chechen population in general but rather from a group of warlords and politicians who acquired prominent positions in Chechnya because of the separatist war. The more prominent separatist group that included Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduev, Arbi, Movsar Baraev, Movladi Udugov and Zelimkhan Yandarabiev, underwent a process of Islamist radicalisation during the first war (1994-96). They justify the Islamisation of the separatist movement. Yandarabiev, in an interview to a Russian journalist in 2001, stated: "Islamic fundamentalism

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is not dangerous. It’s partnership, international relations. You don‘t consider a problem that Western investors tour Russia, do you? One cannot divide help into help from Wahhabis and help from others....”@ Chechnya‘s status as a republic within the Russian Federation was affirmed by the new constitution in 2003.In 2002, especially after the terrorists besieged one Moscow theatre, Putin announced a referendum to be held in Chechnya in March 2003 on a proposed new constitution that affirmed Chechnya‘s status as a republic within the Russian Federation. As per official estimation, there was higher voter turn-out and majority of the voters were in favour of the new constitution, which allowed Chechnya autonomy and an elected government under federal law>9 The Beslan tragedy on 1September 2004 in which over one thousand children in the North Ossetian town were held hostage, along with their parents and teachers, brought into focus the terrorist resolve to use all kinds of methods to fulfil their demands. The rescue operation by Russian forces left 326 dead, including 159 children, and some 540 wounded. The Kavkaz-Centrer Website, seen as a voice for rebels loyal to Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, said it had received a short message claiming responsibility for the attack on behalf of the Caucasus Front. It said the group was part of .the Chechen rebel armed forces.%Among the children taken hostage in the school in Beslan was a 13-year-old Sasha Pogrebov, who made an eyewitness statement: “These fighters began to mock and torture us from early morning. We were almost naked and one of them saw a little cross on my neck.”51The boy was beaten by the rifle butt and ordered to pray. When he shouted, “Christ be resurrected!” the terrorists began to throw grenades into the over-crowded sports gym. Sasha realised that he had nothing to lose and

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jumped out of the window amid blasts and shouts. One Russian writer commented: “The events in Beslan could be qualified as a religious, ritual crime. The killing of children in the name of religion accompanied by the shouts ‘Allah Akbar!‘ is a satanic action, as it was said in a message of Patriarch Alexy I1 to President P ~ t i n . The ” ~ ~terrorists’ ambition to buckle Russia failed as Putin refused to negotiate with the ’child-killers‘ and vowed not to compromise with the territorial integrity of Russia.u The process of normalisation of life in Chechnya started with the election of Akhmad Kadyrov as president in October 2003. With full backing of Putin administration Kadyrov, a former Muslim cleric and warlord, attempted to normalise the situation, However, the killing of Kadyrov while watching a victory parade in May 2004 further complicated the peace process. In the parliamentary electionsin Chechnya on 29 August 2004, the pro-Kremlin United Russia party dominated winning around 60 per cent of the votes.= Alkhanov was elected the president of Chechnya. The killing of Aslan Maskhadov, former president of Chechnya and separatist leader, in March 2005 has led to different interpretations. Some argue that this has led to the end of moderate elements in the rank of separatists. Whatever be his failure on political front, Maskhadov was constantlyofferingpeace talks to Kremlin and denied having participated in any terrorist acts. At one time, he was considered one of most wanted man in Russia and had a $10 million dollar on his head. He had led the Chechen separatist movement in the 1990suntil a cease-fire was negotiated with the government of president Boris Yeltsin. Maskhadov ran against Basayev in 1997election for Chechen presidency and had won. The Russians later drove Maskhadov out of office when he declared Chechnya an independent state. Nikolai

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Patrushev, the head of Russia’s FSB domestic- security service, confirmed that Maskhadov was killed during a security raid in the town of Tolstoi Yurt in C h e ~ h n y a . ~ ~ Moscow had accused the separatist leader of involvement in a string of deadly operations in Russia, including attack on a Moscow theatre, bombing opposite the Kremlin and attack on a school in Beslan. Moscow also linked Maskhadov, and field commander Shamil Basayev, to groups that conducted attacks, such as the 11September 2001 attacks on the us. There are other analysts who argue that the death of Aslan Maskhadov, leader of bandit groups operating in Chechnya and outside its borders, is the greatest achievement of the Russian security forces so far. According to Yevgeny Kozhokin, Director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies and member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, Maskhadov’s death has radically changed the political situation for the underground terrorist in Chechnya, as he was the only major political figure who served as a political and, to a degree, ideological cover for the terrorists and for devising their schemes in the West and Russia.56 According to reports, Chechen separatists have named Abdul-Khalim Saidullayev, a local religious leader, to succeed Maskhadov.Saidullayevis little-known in Chechnya itself and has neither Maskhadov’s stature nor is backed by kind of popular following. Though Russia has brought the security situation in Chechnya by and large under control, the violence has spilled over into the neighbouring territories. A network of Chechenled militant groups -Jamaats -mounted nearly 80 armed attacks in Dagestan beginning of the year 2005 - an increase of 230 per cent from the previous year. For the first time, Dagestan has beaten Chechnya for the number of rebel

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strikes. Dagestan has become the target of Chechen rebels since 1999 when they staged a massive armed incursion into it. The terrorist violence has spread into Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, North Ossetia, and Ingushetia. Igor Dobayev, a terrorism expert with the Russian Academy of Sciences, reported that about 2,000 Islamists, including 300 "instructors and treasurers" from other countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Jordan, and with links to Al Qaeda were involved in terrorist activities in the North Caucasus. Russia's interior minister Rashid Nurgaliyev told the Parliament that the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus region was emerging as "a breeding ground for Wahhabism."n It is worth mentioning here that Russian Federation is not an ethnically homogeneous polity. Some of its republics have clearly separate ethno-linguisticor religious identities. These are Adygei, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Chechnya, Chuvashia, Degestan, Garno-Altai, Ingushetia, Jewish Republic, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachevo-Cherkees, Karelia, Khakassia, Komi Republic, Mari Republic, Moldovia, North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia and Yakutia.58 Six or seven of them have a concentration of Muslim population. The Russian motivation in suppressing the Chechen rebellion is obvious. It is feared that a separatist victory would herald the disintegration of Russia. Besides, autonomous republics like Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan are rich in natural resources; losing them would lead to economic instability. Russia's action in Chechnya is also influenced by the evolving political and ideological trends in the Central Asian republics.

The Pakistan Factor Kashmir and Chechnya being the worst victims of terrorism

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are special focus of attention by scholars. Narrowing down the focus, the view can be held that both are victims of crossborder terrorism, which poses a grave danger to peace and stability in both India and Russia. Pakistan’s role in promoting and patronising terrorism has become a matter of common concern because while India is situated in direct vicinity of Pakistan, Russia is not far from Pakistan. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (1%) has welldeveloped instruments in orchestrating instability and disorder in the region. In its system, there are three levels of terrorist training camps imparting different kinds of military training to recruits. Yossef Bondansky, Staff Director to US House of Representatives’ Task Force on Terrorism and Conventional Warfare revealed in a 30-minute documentary in 1995entitled ’Terror Incorporated’ that the camps around Muzaffarabadin Pak-occupied Kashmir train inmates in hitand-run tacticss In another kind of camps under the direct control of ISI, training is given to create havoc in India. The third kind of camps is more sensitive, meant to train terrorists for world-wide operations. Piinjab Keslrari (Hindi newspaper) reported on 2 August 1996 that several special training camps were established in the Chitral region in north-western Pakistan. Earlier, such camps were runin large numbers in the Khost and Jalalabad regions in Afghanistan. Later, camps were organised in Muzafarrabad, Aliabad, Kahuta, Hazira, Mirpur, Rawalkot, Rawalpindi, and in some other places in the occupied Kashmir and Pakistan. Among the terrorist organisations, the Al-Badr has been meant for trainees from Arab and Bosnia. In these camps, lessons are imparted on bombmaking, use of automatic weapons, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns. There are religious classes instructing trainees in the nature of Jihad.61As regards the number of

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military training camps for recruits, by 1992, the IS1 was operating 13 permanent, 18 temporary and 8 joint training camps for Kashmiri youth.g Other sources revealed that an official secret report submitted to the government of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan admitted that 38 military training camps existed in Pakistan from where trained terrorists were being dispatched regularly to Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine, and some African countries for ‘Jihad’ campaigns. At the end of 1996, the number of active military training camps was given as 73 in Pak-occupied Kashmir, 23 on Pakistan territory and 12 in Afghanistan.63 In 1995 Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) claimed credit for having trained, since 1987,more than4000militants including Pakistanis, Indians, Arabs and a small number of Americans in making bombs, using grenades and assault weapons. According to an official Afghan source, there were about 8000 members of HUA in 1994 that were supporting the Kashmir struggle.64 The terrorist activities emanating from Pakistan are not limited to Kashmir alone; they are spread out to the CIS, an obvious threat to peace and stability in the region. Under the patronage of ISI, informs a Pakistani monthly Newsline of February 1995, Pakistani religious organisations have close contacts with clandestine Islamic movements in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As in Kashmir, Pakistan’s machinations in Chcchnya are also guided by religious fundamentalism and terrorist outlook. Engaged in a war of total secession from Moscow, Chechens have been receiving various kinds of help and assistance from Pakistan. Citing Russian intelligence reports, Zizdian Express disclosed that Pakistani instructors imparted subversive training to Chechen rebels.65 Russian officers alleged that hundreds of Afghans from refugee camps in Pakistan were recruited to fight the Russian forces in

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Terrorism

Chechnya. Leaders of Pakistan’s Jamaat-I-Islami confirmed “their volunteers have been fighting alongside Dudayev’s forces.”&The menace of terrorism, as promoted by Pakistan, is not confined to India and Russia but it has rather wider ramifications.Apart from providing ideological and military training to the militants in Xinjiang, Pakistan is said to be extending various kinds of assistance to Uighur Muslims of the north-westem Chinese province. Prof. Sergei Lounev talks about the ’united net of Islamic terrorism’.67He remembers how, a year ago, Russian TV broke the sensational news that the Chinese citizens from Xinjiang were supporting the Chechen terrorists, and how the noted terrorists, like Basayev, went to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and further south to spread fundamentalism and terrorism. To cite another case, in a letter to the UNSC, the Ethiopian government stated that most of the terrorists, who took part in an unsuccessful murderous attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Adis Ababa in June 1995, resided in Pakistan and were recruited Taking all these factors into account, J.N. Dixit commented that ”herein (terrorism) lies the most significant‘of the emerging New Delhi-Moscow perceptional convergence.”m

International Dimensions Describing the intentions of A1 Qaeda, Yevgeny Primakov, former Russian foreign minister and later prime minister said: ”the threatening goal of this organisation has been explicitly expressed by its leader Osama bin Laden to create a single Islamic caliphate”, and “the method for achieving the declared goal is to destroy the secular regimes in the Moslem-populated countries (such as Turkey, for example), as well as the moderately secular states (Saudi Arabia).”’]

-

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He pointed out that Bin Laden, leader of the organisation has declared a “merciless war” on the US. International terrorism has acquired a new form and is linked with many traditional threats: the threat of WMD proliferation, which has been aggravatedby a real possibility of its coalescence with international terrorism; unsettled regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East, which create an attractiveground for the spread of international terrorism; the ominous existence of ‘failed states’ where the authorities are incapable of preventing humanitarian catastrophes, genocide, mass exodus of refugees, etc; narco-trafficking as a source of financing international terrorism; religious extremism (not fundamentalism, but precisely extremism), which in some countries is teaming up with international terrorism, and thereby inflaming separatism (this factor has already had its destabilising effect in some states and may lead to even more disastrous consequences); the threat of the world being divided along the civilisational-religious axis, which has manifested itself in sweeping attacks against Islam as a ’dangerous’ religion splitting the world community, spurring terrorist acts and undermining efforts to counter international terrorism. Primakov expressed concern that the terrorist may utilize the modern developments in the era of globalisation such as information technology and scientific tools for their purposes. The apprehensions of Primakov have proven true. The Chechen warlord Khattab, a Jordanian-bornfighter who was killed in Chechnya in April 2002, had direct links with Osama bin Laden. Khattab met Laden while they were fighting against the Soviet Union in 1979-89. The US ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, shortly after September 11 said, “We have long recognised that Osama bin Laden and other international networks have been fuelling the flames

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in Chechnya, including the involvement of foreign commanders like Khattab."R Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Army of Liberation), a broader radical Islamist movement established by a Palestinian Arab in Jordan in 1952, calls for the establishment of an Islamic Shari's state in the Ferghana valley, which borders Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. It also stands for the establishment of a united and absolutist Islamic state, a Caliphate, throughout Central Asia, which would acquire vast natural resources and technology and, if possible, weapons of mass destruction.n Besides, 20 million citizens of Russia (mainly comprising of Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, the peoples of Daghestan, and others), another 80 million Muslims (primarily of Turkic origin) reside from Azerbaijan on the shores of the oil-rich Caspian sea and farther east to the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Islamic charity organisations with radical ideas come to Russia through the porous borders. These developments have become matters of special concern to Russia in recent years. In order to fight the threats of radical Islamist groups, Russia and the countries of the Common Security Treaty of the CIS have created a CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. One of the basic objectives of the arrangement was to create a rapid deployment anti-terrorism force of 1,500-1,700soldiers. President Putin successfully utilised the 9/11 incident to Russia's advantage. He linked the incident and the terror situation in Chechnya. "Weface a common foe," he told the German parliament. As a result, there was a discernable difference in the American policy towards Chechnya before and after the 9/11. Before the incident, the US was harsh in

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criticising the human rights violation in Chechnya and the mid-level Bush administration officials were in contact with the representativesof the Chechen separatist groups in hopes of understanding their approach to a political settlement to the conflict. After the 9/11 incident, president Bush and the US officials somewhat mellowed their criticism of Russia’s policy on Chechnya: “While Western governments have generally supported Russia’s right to keep itself in one piece and subdue the Chechen rebellion, they have also said that Russia has committed massive human rights abuses in Chechnya-a theme that‘s now being downplayed.” However, the Russia-US relations have become trickier in the aftermath of the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Regarding the Iraq issue, they have differences. Russia, like India, has emphasised the role of the UN to resolve the issue, while the US prefers to tackle the issue single-handedly. Russia, in May 2002, approved the UNSC resolution to implement ‘smart sanctions‘ against Iraq that increase the flow of consumer goods to the Iraqi people while blocking items that could aid the military. Russia looks at the continued presence of the US in Central Asia with suspicion because it considers this to be its own sphere of influence. President Putin, to a large extent, has succeeded in impressing the European powers to extend their support to his policies in Chechnya. French president Jacques Chirac observed: “in Chechnya, a political solution is essential;” and “that is what Russia is striving for. It is completely open to any discussions about a political The UNSC condemned the hostage-takers in Beslan ”in the strongest terms;” and president Bush was said to have offered ”support in any form.”

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Chechen separatism has attracted the attention of the Muslims elsewhere too. AZ-Juzeeru, the influential Arabic satellite news network, frequently telecasts reports of Russian abuses, often accompanied by graphic footage of dead or wounded Chechen civilians. Many Islamic charities, such as the Global Relief Foundation-which the US officials accuse of being a conduit for terrorist financing - have been active in Chechnya and are reportedly a major source of financial support for Chechen militants. The US, according to the observation, is working with Russia and other countries to staunch the flow of terrorist-related financing. The Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism, signed in November 2001 during Indian prime minister A.B. Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow, emphasised, among other things, that “in multiethnic and democratic countries such as India and Russian Federation, violent actions being perpetuated under the slogan of self-determination, in reality represent acts of t e r r ~ r i s m . ”Both ~ ~ countries agreed to continue effective interaction on Afghanistan in the framework of the Indo-Russian Joint Working Group on Afghanistan, established in October 2000, so that the spill-over of the conflict beyond the boundaries of the region could be averted.’6 “Thespread of radical Islam from Afghanistan into the bordering Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan often referred to as Russia’s ‘soft under belly‘- something Moscow fears, especially as its war against Islamist insurgents in Chechnya continues.”n The Moscow Declaration was a testimony of joint endeavour of both the countries to fight the terrorism menace. The siege of the Moscow theatre by Chechen rebels in October 2002 and their threat to blow up the theatre with hostages if their demand for an immediate roll-out of the Russian army from Chechnya were not met, further

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confirmed Moscow's resolution to fight the terrorist onslaught with an iron-hand. Rejecting the demands for a political dialogue with the Chechen terrorists, Putin said," Osama Bin Laden, Taliban supreme Mullah Omar and their like minded are calling shots in Kashmir, West Asia, Chechnya and elsewhere in the World."n He cautioned that anybody, at home or abroad, urging for talks with the terrorist leadership in Chechnya would be seen by Kremlin as "an accomplice of terrorist." Professor Alexandra Safronova of the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University defended Putin's stand. After analysing the terrorist bomb blast near her Institute ,on 9 December 2003 in which some of the innocent students died along with many injured, she told the author, "after that what can we say to negotiate, with whom? How to negotiate with the killers?... when I think about the situation in Kashmir, I think the same."" She reported that about 300 Russians were killed in the terrorist attacks in the year 2003.so The heightened situation of international terrorism provided the base for Russia and India to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG)on counter-terrorism during the visit of president Putin to India in December 2002. The aim of JWG was to put an "end to this common threat through preventive and deterrent measures nationally and bilaterally."8*This JWG was necessary, as "terrorist acts in various parts of India, in Moscow, Bali, Mombassa and elsewhere, have shown that terrorism is seeking ever-new targets." The Group, in its first meeting held in Moscow 01129-30 September 2003, examined the matter relating to mutual interaction between India and Russia in this area (terrorism)in the United Nations and other internationalfora, and gave special attention to "the progress in the United Nations on India's Draft Comprehensive Convention on international terrorism and Russia's Draft

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International Convention against acts of Nuclear terrorism.”82President Putin during December 2002 visit agreed with the Indian position that for the normalisation of relations to be successful, it is not only important that Islamabad check the infiltration into Kashmir through the control line but also increase its work to liquidate the whole terrorist infrastructure acting in this region. President Putin endorsed the Indian stand by emphasising that the renewal of the peaceful dialogue between India and Pakistan would have value when both parties adhere to the principles of Shimla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999. Among the areas of convergence between India and Russia, the issue of international terrorism has become prominent. Both the countries have suffered the menace of terrorism. “Why, then, the Kremlin make exorbitant spending and channel tremendous efforts to Chcchnya, while the economy was in a fragile condition,” asked The White Paper and replied that, “it was hard to foresee the results of secession.”83Both, India and Russia, are the staunchest allies when the issue of secession comes and especially, when both suffer due to this menace in their territories. Both stand to gain to a large extent when they are united on the issue, and their differences on the issue would likely fasten divisive tendencies not only within their territories but also outside. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow in November 2003 further confirmed the Russian support to India’s position on cross-border terrorism. The Joint Statement issued on 13 November 2003 at the end of the visit urged Pakistan to “implement in full its,assurances to prevent infiltration of terrorists across the line of control,” and “to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled territory as a prerequisite for a purposeful dialogue between

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the twocountrie~.”~ Hence, in this background, it is expected that both the countries would continue to adopt common position on issues like terrorism, whether it is terrorism in Kashmir or in Chechnya. The Moscow theatre hostage crisis of October 2002 made deep impact on the counter-terrorismpolicy of Russia. It was a major terrorist operation, which brought into picture the terrorists’ objectives in clear terms. Russia utilised the occasion and pronounced its right on extra-territorial use of force against terrorists and their supporters. The terrorist bravado “We are more keen on dying than you are keen on living,” definitely puzzled the Russian leaders, though Putin handled the situation with apt strategy and his KGB background might have helped him in this regard. The October incident impacted Russia’s neighbours. Azerbaijan shut down a Chechen representative office in Baku. Georgian politicians were nervous lest the Russian troops cross the border and enter the Pankisi Gorge. US expressed concern that a sweeping Russian operation in the Pankisi Gorge, where the Chechen terrorists established bases or elsewhere in Georgia, could further undermine Georgian sovereignty. Yuri N. Maltsev holds the view that the post-October attack situation, further compounded by other terrorist attacks on Moscow-backed Chechen government, has made the chances for a future settlement in Chechnya grim, including the possibilities of emergence of an independent Chechen state or even a para-~tate.8~ According to Ariel Cohen, after the 1996 Russian troops withdrawal, organised crime and Islamic militants have turned Chechnya into a haven for kidnappers for ransom, slave traders, and murderers of nuns and foreign aid workers. Shamil Basaev pushed president Maskhadov into adopting repressive Shuri’u laws. Sources in the US State


Department said that Maskhadov failed to prevent over $100 million funnelled to Chechnya by radical Islamist networks. He could not forestall the invasion of Dagestan in July 1999 led by Basayev and Khattab an invasion, which ended Chechnya‘s de-facto independence.

-

Besides the political implications, the October attack also had wider economic &plications. The leaders in Moscow were apprehensive of such terrorist strikes in future; moreover, any possible entity of a Caliphate, as dreamed by Islamic extremists spreading from Black sea to Caspian sea, led to a great concern regarding energy security of Russia in the region. The rhetoric about creation of a Chechen-led Caliphate ‘from sea to shining sea’ i.e., from the Black Sea to the Caspian created panic among the leaders in Russia, Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. A radical and impoverished Islamic state in Europe, on the door-step of Russia and the weak south Caucasus states would unquestionably be dangerous as it would act as a destabilising factor, and scare off foreign investments in energy and minerals in the region. Ariel Cohen believes that in this background, the US should expand anti-terrorism and security cooperation with Russia bilaterally and through NATO-Russia council and other European states.

Shamil Basayev, Chechen separatist leader, posted a message on the Chechen website, Kaukaz Tsenfron 17May 2004 taking credit for the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, then Chechen president and dubbed the action ”Operation Revenge,” and hinted at an impending attempt on the life of Putin or prime minister, Mikhail Fradkov. On 21-22 June 2004 the terrorists attacked a Russian interior ministry command post in Ingushetia, killing 54 police officers. A total of 950 fighters were alleged to have taken part in the operation. Citing a press release issued the previous day by

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president Maskhadov‘s staff, chechenpress.com reported on 27 July: ”Chechen field commander Aslan Maskhadov lauded the operation, code-named Ekkkham (Retribution), as proof of the unity and discipline of his resistance forces.” The press release gave the number of fighters that took part in the raid as 950, of whom only six were killed. SomeRussian experts criticised Moscow for not adopting effective measures to tackle separatism and terrorism in Chechnya. RIA-Novostimilitary commentator,Viktor Litovkin, pointed out that the special operations command has not been created, and there are no reliable reconnaissance systems, precision-guided weapons, and the possibility of quickly delivering troops, etc. In the changinginternational context in which terrorism has become a major concern for countries, India and Russia have found common grounds for cooperation. Sergei Ivanov, Russian defence minister, during his visit to New Delhi in October 2005 talked about the common enemy, namely terrorism and fanaticism and emphasised that there are similarities between Kashmir and Chechnya. Stating that both the countries were fighting the scourge of terrorism much before international attention was drawn to this problem some years back, he said that extremism backed by internationalfinancing and cross-border terrorism bore some identical features between Kashmir and Chechnya. He also said, thesecommon featureswere similarto Afghanistan and Iraq in the context of US and UK.&

Terrorism is not confined to areas of Chechnya and Kashmir alone. Afghanistan under the Taliban-rule became a haven for drug dealers and the country had surpassed the whole of Latin America in drug output. Besides, it had emerged as a safe haven for terrorists and extremist organisations, which found refuge there to propagate terror as a means of political

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struggle. It had become a source of threat to the political stability in Central Asia which has witnessed a sharp rise in the activities of extremist groups, such as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, the Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami-ul Tulaba, and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir which in the pursuit of establishing an Islamic caliphate in Ferghana valley is involved in direct invasion of the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Sergei Yastrzhembsky states that Khattab, Maskhadov, Basayev, and their followers are not merely bandits but international terrorists dreaming to impose their will on the whole world, dreams which they openly stated in 1999before the aggression against Dagestan.87 First, in the line of control comes the northern Caucasus, then the trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. They want to have a stronghold in Chechnya from where offensives throughout the world can be successfully launched. The special advisor emphasises that Chechen terrorism is not Russia’s headache alone.

In the case of Russia, a trend that has been increasingly in vogue is the assertion of the Orthodox Church as the supreme religious authority and as a force to be reckonedwith. During the second Chechen campaign, Russian Orthodox priests were present in the units of the federal forces. After the introduction of Perestroika in 1980s hundreds of Orthodox Churches, mosques, Armenian-Gregorianchurches, Catholic churches, synagogues, etc. were built. The recent rise of Islamist extremism seemed to have wrecked the religious balance in the Russian society. The conflict in Chechnya has intensified religious sentiments among the local Russian inhabitants. The emergence of militant Islamist ideas (Wuhhabisrn)in the North Caucasus, as well as the intensive Islamisation of Ingushs, Chechens and Dagestanis, are sources of anxiety for Russian Christian population. Chechen

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Muslim militants have waged a fierce struggle against Russian Orthodox priests by kidnapping, torturing and killing them.88 This trend of inter-religious rivalry may further worsen the situation in Russia, and for Putin it may bring more difficult problems.

Conclusion The following conclusions emerge from the above discussions. First, both India and Russia face similar challenges from the menace of terrorism. Both the countries are multi-ethnic and pluralistic in nature; therefore, any threat to thiscommon fabric is an obvious concern for both. The formation of JWG on terrorism and the Moscow Declaration on international terrorism in 2001 are some of the common steps taken by India and Russia. Second, terrorism, whether in Chechnya or Kashmir or any other area, has become increasingly inter-mingled with Islam, so much so that several groups now put forth the idea of an Islamic Caliphate. The wider international terrorist network is maintained not mainly by the Islamist militants operating in Chechnya or Kashmir but broader participants, such as A1 Qaeda or patronised by states such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Third, the role of Pakistan has become negative in both the areas of Kashmir and Chechnya, especially regarding measures to curb terrorism. Though Pakistan remains under international scrutiny to dismantle and discourage militant outfits, as in the past nothing certain can be said under the circumstances. Fourth, terrorism assumed an international dimension only after the attacks on US though countries like India and Russia have suffered the scourge for many years. Dualism in defining terrorism has proved costly; and such concerns are not confined to Kashmir aqd Chechnya alone. Lastly, while India has remained by

260


and large successful in checking the communal fall-outs of terrorism, Russia has been recently witnessing clashes between two major religious communities belonging to Orthodox Church and Islam. The threat of inter-religious divide and violence might cause serious strains and instability to the Russian society and pose severe tension to the Russian leadership.

Endnotes 1. Saumantra Bose, Kushmir: Roots ofConJict, Paths to Peace (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 2003), p. 30. 2.

For details on the accessionof the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagarh to the Indian Union see, Josef Korbel, Danger in Kushmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 12; Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 41.

3.

The profoundly divergent conceptions of nation-building underlay the Indian and Pakistani nationalist movements wherein Indian nationalist movement was committed to the notionofcreatinga secular and democraticstate,thePakistani nationalist movement, in contrast, sought to create a religiously-based state that would serve as a homeland for South Asian Muslims.Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kushrnir: Portents of War, Hopes ofPeace (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1993,p. 8.

4.

The British sold the valley to Gulab Singh, a Hindu ruler of Jammu, in 1847 through the Treaty of Amritsar, which established the modem political unit of J&K. Alistair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-2990 (Hertingfordbury: Rexford Books, 1992), p. 8.

5.

Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire:India, Pakistan and the Unending War (New IMhi Viva Books Pvt. Ltd., 2004), p. 24.

6.

See, ”Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan,” in Verinder Grover, ed., The Story of Kashmir: Yesterday and Today,

261

Debidana Aurobinda Mahapatra Vol. I11 (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), p. 106. 7.

H. S. Gururaja Rao, Legnl Aspects of the Knshnrir Problem (New Delhi:Mineiva Press, 2002), p. 63.

8.

On release, Sheikh deputed his close aide Kh. G.M. Sadiq to Pakistan to tell leaders of Pakistan about the sentiments of the people who cannot be taken for granted and coerced to join Pakistan. Afsir Khan, Cozrnter-Terrorism: The Pnkistnn Factor (New Dew Lancer International, n. d.), p. 139.

9.

Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kmhrnir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2000), p. 85.

10. They included Hazara and Afridi tribesmen from the northern areas of Kashmir, paramilitary forces such as the Muslim League National Guards, and regular Pakistani army personnel disguised as tribesmen. Sumit Ganguly, Coilflict Unending: Indin-Pakistan Tensions Since 2947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 17. 11. Bose. n. 1, p. 34.

of Utrsolued Conflick, Vol. I (Odense: Odense University Press, 1998), p. 76. The main raiders, estimated at 5,000, 'consisted of tribesmen - Afridis, Wazairis, Mahsuds, Swathis, and soldiers 'on leave' from the Pakistani army- led by regular officers advanced from Abbottabad in the North West Frontier Province (NWFF) along the Jhelum Valley Road. Rao, n.7, p. 64.

12. Lars Blikenberg, Indin-Pnkistnn: The History

13. Jagmohan, n. 9, pp. 85-86. Maharaja Hari Sin& had initially requested help from the neighbouring Maharaja of Patiala and the latter sent a battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain artillery to Kashmir. The troops from Patiala too proved to be inadequate. 14. See Hari Sigh's letter to Mountbatten as cited in Grover, n. 6, p. 105. 15. It needs to be mentioned here that until the troops arrived, it

262

Kashmir and Chechnya: Issues in Tmorism were mainly the Muslim volunteers under the command of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who resisted invaders. Indeed, BaIraj Puri, a veteran political commentator on J&K, has observed that many Kashmiris were 'outraged' by the Pakistani attempt to secure accession firstly by wooing the hated Maharaja, and after that failed, "to decide the issue by force." Balraj Puri, "Kashmiriyak The Vitality of Kashmir Identity," Conternporay South Asia, vol. 4, no. 1,March 1995,

p. 57. 16. Gulab Mishra Prakhar, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From Tashkent to ShimIa (New Delhi:Ashish Publications, 1989,p. 117. 17. Gangly, n. 10,p. 45. 18. The revolt began in 1970, when after the general elections, Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was thrown behind bars. 19. Although estimates of casualties vary, it is widely held that well over 100,000 Bengali students, intellectuals, and professionals were killed in the first several days of this military crackdown.

20. Gangly, n. 13,p. 61. 21. Ibid. 22. Ranjit Rai, A Nation and its Navy at War (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989). 23. From Surprise to Reckoning: Kurgil Review Committee Report (New Delhi:Sage Publications, 2000), p. 53.

24. JamesMinahan, Nations without States: A Historical Dictionay of Contemporary National Movements (Westport: Greenwood . Press, 19!36), p. 120.

25. Ben Fowkes, ed., Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis (London: Mamillan, 1998), p. 2. 26. Quoted in William Fleming. "The Deportation of Chechens and Ingush People: A Critical Examination", in ibid, p. 63.

263

Debidana Aurobinda Mahapatra 27. ibid. 28. John Colarusso, ”Chechnya: The War without Winners”, Current History, vol. 94,no. 594, October 1995,p. 329. 29. Quoted in Steven Solnick, “Will Russia Survive? Centre and Periphery in the Russian Federation,” in Bamett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building, (London: Routeledge, 1998), p. 64. 30. Yeltsin in fact had adopted three different kinds of federation treaties to deal with different kinds of constituents of the Russian federation: one with autonomous republics, another with lesser autonomous okrugs, and another with oblasts and krais. 31. Asian Maskhdov, ”Open Letter to the French Philosopher Andre Glucksman,” CenfralAsian Survey, vol. 19,no. 34,2000, p. 310.

32. Aleksei Volin and Michael Margelov, ed., Chechnya:The W d e Paper (Moscow:RIA Novosti and Russian Information Centre, 2000), p. 95. 33. Quentin E. Hodgson, “Is the Russian Bear Learning? An Operationaland TacticalAnalysis of the Second Chechen War, 1999-2002”,The Journnl of Strategic Studies, vol. 26, no. 2,June 2003,p. 68. I 34. ibid. According to Hodgson, ”the Russian high command put very little thought into the planning and organisation of the first Chechen campaign in 1994,partly due to President Boris Yeltsin‘s late decision to go ahead with a military solution”. President Putin acknowledged this fact when he said, concerning the first Chechen campaign, “we pay heavy price for the weakness of our state and inconsistence (sic) of our actions”. Quoted in Vladimir Maksimenko, “War and Peace in Chechnya”, Russia and the Moslem World, no. 11, no. 137, 2003,p. 34. 35. John B. Dunlop, “How Many Soldiers and Civilians Died during the Russo-Chechen War of 1994-1996?”,Central Asinn Survey, vol. 19,no.34,2000, p. 329.

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36. ibid. 37. ibid. 38. For important principles of the agreement see, http:,’l www.caucasus.dWpublication9.htrn (A.O. 10 September 2004). 39. Quoted in Wendy Turnoff Atrokhov, ”The Khasavyurt Accords: Maintaining the Rule of Law and Legitimacy of Democracy in the Russian Federation Amidst the Chechen Crisis”, Cornell International Law Joirmnl,no. 367,1999,p. 377. 40. ibid. 41. John Russell, “Exploitationof the ‘Islamic Factor‘ in the RussoChechen Conflictbefore and after 11 September 2001,” in Rick Fawn, ed., Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass, 2003),p, 96.

42. Alexander Chubarov, Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity: A History o j the Soviet nnd Post-Soviet Erns, (New York: Continuum,2001), p. 257. 43. Robert Seely. Russa-Chechen Conflict, 2800-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2001),p. 305. 44. RIA Nouosfi Daily Review, vol. 59, no. 33(13131), 19 February, 2003, p. 8. 45. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, ”International Terrorism and Extremism: Lessons from Chechnya”, http:// www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/ trialog/ trlgtxts/ t55/yas.htm (A. 0.12 September 2005). 46. Lilia Shvetsova emphasises this point. She argues that “while the majority of the Russians considered the first Chechen war (1994-1995)criminal ... by contrast, in November and December 1999, between 61% and 70% of those polled approved of the operation in Chechnya.” Lilia Shvetsova, Putin’s Russia, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 3. 47. Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The

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Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement”, EuropeAsia Sticdies, vol. 57, no. 1, January 2005, p. 35.

48. Quoted in ibid, p. 40. 49. http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia~761580544~1/ Chechnya.htm1 (A.O. 17 August 2005). 50. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 10 March 2005, p. 12. 51. Quoted in Andrei Kurayev, “How Should We Treat Islam After The Beslan Tragedy?,“ Russia And The Moslem World, no. 11(149), 2004, pp. 12-13. 52. ibid, p. 13. 53. http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsPackageArticle.jhtm? type=topnews&storyID=578414§ion=news, (A.O. 12 September 2004). 54. The Asian Age (New Delhi), 29 November 2005. 55. http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/070555.php,March 08, 2005 (A.O. 4 April 2005). 56. RIA Novosti, 10 March 2005, http://www.cdi.org/russia/ 3 4 5 - 9 . h (10 April 2005). 57. Vladimir Radyuhin, “Threat to Russia’s hold on Caucasus”, The Hindu (Delhi),1August 2005. 58. J. N. Dixit, “Chechnya and Kashmir: Western DoubleSpeak,” Indian Express (New Deb), 31 January 1995. 59. Cited in P. B. Sinha, “Pakistan: The Chief Patron Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism”, Sfrdegic Analysis, vol. 21, no. 7, October 1997, p. 1017. 60. ibid. 61. A report by Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional

Warfare by US House Research Committee, Washington D. C., 1February 1993, cited in %id, p. 1019. 62. ibid.

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Kashmir and Chechnyu: Issues in Tmorism

63. A Ministry of Home Affairs document, quoted in Times of Zndin (New Delhi), 5 January 1997.

64. Znternntional Hernld Tribune, 10March 1995,quoted in Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul, "Politics of Islamic Terrorism in West Asia: Internal and External Dimensions, "SfrntegicAndysis ",vol. 19, no. 3, June 1996,p. 448. 65. A December 1995report in the Russian daily Zzuestin, cited in a M1 report in Indinit Express (New Delhi), 22 May 19%. 66. ibid. 67. Personal interview with Sergei Lounev, Major Research Fellow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow on 13 January 2005. 68. ibid.

69. Tinres of Zndin (New Delhi), 20 June 1996. 70. n. 58. 71. Yevgeny Primakov, "The United Nations: Challenges of Our

Time", Rtrssia it1 Global Aflairs, no. 1, January - March 2005, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/10/826.html (A.O. 19 May 2005).

72. Quoted in

h ttp:/ /groups.msn.com /Uni ted AgainstTerrorism/ terroristgroups.msnw? action=get-rnessage&mview=O&ID_Message=4183& LastModified=4675437613027745643 (A.O. 17 August 2005).

73. Ariel Cohen, "Russia Islam, and the War on Terrorism: an Uneasy Future", Gus Martin, ed., The N& E m of Terrorisnt: Selected Readings (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), p. 195.

74. "Putin Points the Finger in The Wrong Direction", 2 September 2004, www.eco nomist.com/ displayStory.cfrn?Story-ID=3150096 (A.O. 17 September 2005). 75. For the text of the Declaration see, Sfrntegic Digest,vol. 31, no. 11, November 2001, pp. 1474-1475.

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DebidatfaAurobinda Mahopatra 76. ibid. 77. Thomas Withington, ”The Other Allies: Russia, India, and Afghanistan’s United Front,” Crrrrent History,vol. 101, no.651, January 2002,p. 41.

78. Times ofrndia (New Delhi), 10 November 2002. 79. Personal interview with Alexandra Safronova, Department of South Asian History, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University, on 11 December 2003. 80. The Hindu (Delhi), 6 December 2003. 81. See, Strategic Digest, vol. 32,no. 12, December 2002,p. 1420. 82. Newsfrom Russia, vo1.6, no. 21,3October 2003,p. 20. 83. n. 32,p. 57. 84. Quoted in Hindti (Delhi), 14 November 2003.

85. Ariel Cohen, “Chechnya, Terrorism and U.S.Security Interests”, http://www.inmenationalinterest.com/Articles/ Vol2Issuel/Vol2IssuelCohen.hbnl (A.O. 17September 2005). 86. “Kashmir to Chechnya: Terrorism Must Be Jointly Defeated”, The Pioneer (New Delhi), 17 October 2005. 87. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, “International Terrorism and Extremism: Lessons from Chechnya”, http:// www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/ trialog/ trlgtxts/ tSS/yas.htm (A.O. 12 September 2005). 88. Vyachslav Avyutsky, Confessional Geopolitics in the South of Russia and the Norfh CIIucasus, Russia and Moslem World, no. 3 (141), 2004,p. 7.

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