Lake watershed management: Services ... - Wiley Online Library

Lakes & Reservoirs: Research and Management 2012 17: 207–223

Lake watershed management: Services, monitoring, funding and governance Hebin Lin1* and Kazuhiro Ueta2 1

Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies, Kyoto University, and 2Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, Japan

Abstract This study discusses some insights for adaptive lake management from the perspective of ecosystem services (ES). Based on evidence from 46 advanced Payments for Watershed Services (PWS) projects implemented in 16 developing countries, and an interactive governance interpretation of this evidence, three layers of services for watershed management are distinguished, including (i) ES provided by ecosystems; (ii) land-water conservation services (CS) provided by upstream citizens; and (iii) intermediary organizing services (OS) provided by watershed management organizations. The three-layer service perspective indicates the need for management regime shifts regarding monitoring, funding and governance. A multilayer regime shift between monitoring, funding and governance for lake management also is discussed, using a Bolivian PWS scheme as an illustration. It indicates how lake management organizations can provide intermediary OS to coordinate exchanges between upstream payees and downstream payers. Upstream payees provide land-water CS to obtain supply-side payments. Land-water CS improve water-related ES to enhance downstream land-water uses. Downstream payers provide demand-side payments and benefit from better land-water uses. This study was undertaken to broaden the vision of managing lakes and their watersheds and to guide policymakers, managers and other stakeholders in adopting adaptive management regimes for both locally and globally sustainable development.

Key words interactive governance, lake management, monitoring and funding, payments for ecosystem services, water resources.

INTRODUCTION ‘Globalization produces discord and requires effective governance, but effective institutions are difficult to create and maintain…Effective institutions must rely on self-interest…the meaning of self-interest depend[s] on people’s values and beliefs. The analysis of beliefs, and their effect on institutional outcomes, must therefore be integrated into institutional analysis (Keohane 2001, p.1)’. This logic of governance also applies to water resources management, particularly for the more vulnerable waterbodies, namely lakes. Consequently, lake management constantly requires adaptive strategies to cope with foreseeable disturbances and unpredictable uncertainties brought about by human activities, both locally and globally. Lake watersheds are inhabited by various types of stakeholders, many of whom may not be aware of what *Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] Accepted for publication 16 August 2012.

Doi: 10.1111/lre.12003

lake management is, what their impacts on a lake are and ⁄ or what their roles should be in regard to lake management. Current lake management schemes tend to prioritize the following: • Immediate benefits from ecosystems, such as harvesting in-lake fish, which are readily monitored and documented; • On-site management performances, such as storm water management downstream, which are substantially funded; and • Management scopes directed by government policies, such as earmarked restoration projects, which are regularly administered. Although these strategic priorities may facilitate solving recognized problems within short time frames for apparent rationales, they fail to specify how each stakeholder can better contribute to, or provide services for, local lake management schemes regarding the following: 2012 The Authors Journal compilation 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

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• The impacts of benefits, performances and scopes and • The needs for monitoring, funding and governance. To this end, this study discusses some insights for adaptive lake management from an ecosystem service (ES) perspective. It is intended to broaden the vision of managing lakes and their watersheds and to guide policymakers, managers and other stakeholders in adopting adaptive management regimes, for both locally and globally sustainable development. The recent global trend of incorporating the values of ES into watershed management efforts via developing Payments for Watershed Services (PWS) projects provides a fertile field from which to harvest insights directed to adaptive lake management. This study first presents key evidence from 46 advanced PWS projects implemented in 16 developing countries. To derive these insights for lake management, an interpretation based on their common structural elements and theories of governance is presented.

A SERVICE PERSPECTIVE FOR WATERSHED MANAGEMENT Evidence of payment for watershed services Originating from the notion of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), more than 150 PWS projects have subsequently been proposed or recognized in more than 30 developing countries. The pioneering PES programme was implemented in Costa Rica in 1997 through a new forestry law which ‘permits landholders to be compensated for providing four recognized ‘environmental services of forests’’ (Chomitz et al. 1998), including: • Carbon fixation; • Hydrological services; • Biodiversity protection; and • Provision of scenic beauty. Following Costa Rica’s pioneering institutional innovations in PES (Pagiola 2007), four types of PES have been developed on the basis of these four representative ES types (Landell-Mills & Porras 2002). PWS correspond to payments for hydrological services. To date, PWS have been most widely proposed or recognized among the four original PES types (Porras et al. 2008; Wendland et al. 2010). This trend is attributed to research and its implementation by a few international organizations providing funding for forestry, conservation and development. Forty-six advanced PWS schemes implemented in 16 developing countries up to the year 2008 can be identified. Table A1 in the Appendix I summarizes the key information regarding these advanced schemes by (i)

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project number; (ii) country; (iii) project name ⁄ project site;(iv) reference ⁄ documentation; (v) initiative year; (vi) water-related ES; (vii) land-water conservation service (CS); (viii) upstream payee; (ix) intermediary organization and implied intermediary organizing service (OS); and (x) downstream payer. A thorough review and a comparison of the 46 advanced PWS schemes reveal ten common structural elements of the PWS approach, as embodied in the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1. They include the following: • A contractual exchange (element 1) arranged by an intermediary (element 2) between a upstream payee (element 3) and a downstream payer (element 4); • The payee providing a land-water CS (element 5) and obtaining a supply-side payment (element 6); • The land-water CS improving a water-related ES (element 7), which in turn improves land-water uses (element 8) downstream; • The payer benefiting from the water-related ES for better land-water uses and providing a demand-side payment (element 9); and • The intermediary providing an intermediary OS (element 10) for executing the overall arrangement. Ecosystem services have generally been defined as ‘benefits people obtain from ecosystems’, encompassing four types of services being categorized, namely, (i) provisioning; (ii) regulating; (iii) cultural; and (iv) supporting services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005a). The PWS schemes reflect these four types of waterrelated ES. CS can be considered as similar to activities for ‘maintenance or restoration of ecosystem processes that support the provision of desired [ecosystem] services’ (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005b). The PWS schemes reflect land-water CS not only for ‘bluewater resource[s]’ in aquifers, lakes, wetlands and impoundments but also for such ‘green-water resource[s]’ as moisture in the unsaturated zone (Falkenmark & Rockstrom 2006). OS can be understood as being similar

Fig. 1.

Conceptual framework of payments for watershed

services (PWS).

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Lakes: services and governance

to activities for coordinating all the relevant stakeholders ‘to participate’ and ‘to agree on objectives and management plans and cooperate in their implementation’ (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005b). The PWS schemes reflect intermediary OS for not only top-down coordination but also bottom-up coordination. The PWS conceptual framework reveals its ideology as an interactive governance approach. According to Kooiman et al. (2005), interactive governance is the whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and to create societal opportunities, including the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable and control them. Compared with narrow definitions on governance (e.g. Rhodes 1997), Kjaer (2011) suggests this governance definition acknowledges social-political interactions as being essential elements of governance and recognizes broadly different natures or modes of governance. These interactive governance features are reflected by the PWS conceptual framework. A more detailed interpretation of this topic, providing more practical insights for lake management, is provided in the following section.

An interactive governance interpretation for PWS Interactive governance is conceptualized within three major components by Kooiman and Jentoft (2009), namely governance elements, modes and orders, characterized as follows: • Governance elements – intentional levels of governance interactions, consisting of images, instruments and actions; • Governance modes – structural forms, including self-governance, co-governance and hierarchical governance; and • Governance orders – societal rings of activities, containing first-order problem solving and opportunity creation, second-order design, care and maintenance of governance institutions and third-order formulation and application of the norms and principles for all other governance activities. From the perspective of watershed management, the PWS conceptual framework reflects the three governance elements in terms of three layers of services, from a lesser organized level to a higher organized level, as follows: • The image element is represented by the layer of a water-related ES (element 7 of PWS), which is provided by ecosystems and can benefit payers downstream for better land-water uses; • The instrument element is represented by the layer of a land-water CS (element 5 of PWS), which is provided

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by citizen payees upstream and can improve the waterrelated ES; and • The action element is represented by the layer of an intermediary OS (element 10 of PWS), which is provided by management organizations and can mobilize demand-side payments from payers downstream as supply-side payments to payees upstream. From the perspective of watershed stakeholders, the PWS conceptual framework also reflects the three governance modes in terms of newly formed payee– intermediary–payer relationships developed within the PWS schemes. The partners have social identities, which were not connected prior to the PWS schemes. In PWS18 (Costa Rica, Platanar River; Table A1), for example, this new relationship was evidenced between the landowner (upstream payee), a local NGO and a semi-governmental autonomous agency (collectively the intermediary) and the Platanar Hydroelectric Company (downstream payer). It represents the type of a co-governance mode. From the relationships between these three layers of services, the PWS conceptual framework implies a value aspect for the first governance order (opportunity creation). For the three layers of services (ES, CS, OS), each subsequent layer is valuable, particularly because it can improve the well-being of related human stakeholders in the preceding layers. CS are valuable because they can improve ES, benefitting downstream land and water users. Similarly, OS are valuable because they can improve CS to benefit both upstream and downstream land and water users. However, the PWS and PES approaches based on the current practices and research have not provided a consistent explanation for the full set of three governance orders. Rather, studies on PES tend to provide insights or criticisms regarding individual issues related to the central ideas of the governance orders. Examples are as follows: • Problem solving or opportunity creation order – attempts to develop policy tools based on direct or indirect economic incentives (Jack et al. 2008; Farley & Costanza 2010; Cranford & Mourato 2011) vs. overemphasis on an economic approach for conserving nature (Redford & Adams 2009), or attempts at reducing poverty with conservation payments (Bulte et al. 2008) vs. contradictions between local realities and development goals (Wunder 2008; McAfee & Shapiro 2010); • Institutional design or institutional care order – the importance and challenges of information, property rights, transaction costs and contract designs (Engel et al. 2008; Ferraro 2008; Wunscher et al. 2008; Kemkes et al. 2010; Kosoy & Corbera 2010); and 2012 The Authors Journal compilation 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

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• Norm formulation or principle formulation order – the importance and challenges of beneficiaries pay principles (Engel et al. 2008) and intergenerational equity concerns (Kosoy et al. 2008; Kosoy & Corbera 2010). The above analyses suggest the usefulness of the PWS approach for watershed management can be enhanced by reconceptualizing it as Payments for Improving Ecosystem Services (PIES), to directly address its essential role as an interactive governance approach for ‘improvement of services’. Such a reconceptualization would suggest the needs for management regime shifts regarding monitoring, funding and governance. The regime shifts for lake management are discussed in the next section and illustrated with a Bolivian PWS scheme (PWS02).

INSIGHTS FOR REGIME SHIFTS IN LAKE MANAGEMENT A multilayer regime shift The reconceptualization of PWS as PIES, with an emphasis on improvement in services, reveals visions that are dependent on people’s values and beliefs to improve lake management. Current lake management regimes tend to focus on the following: • Water-related ES – more on provisioning and cultural types of services and less on regulating and supporting types; • Land-water CS – more on the blue water types of services and less on the green water types; and • Intermediary OS – more on the top-down types of services and less on the bottom-up types. The PWS schemes indicate, however, that all types of ES, CS and OS have values for stakeholders. Thus, a regime shift to expand the current narrow focus would provide lake managers with more options for improving lake management. More specifically, a multilayer regime shift focusing on ES, CS and OS can support lake mangers with an adaptive strategy for consistently upgrading monitoring, funding and governance subsystems (Fig. 2) as follows: • Monitoring subsystem – a shift from applying contemporary techniques focusing on water-related provisioning and cultural ES to developing new techniques for waterrelated regulating and supporting ES can attract demandside payments from downstream land-water users, creating a new funding option; • Funding subsystem – a shift from primarily financing blue water CS to investing in blue and green water CS can encourage behavioural change by upstream land-water users, creating a new governance option; and


Fig. 2.

Regime

shifts

between

monitoring,

funding

and

governance for lake management. CS, conservation services; ES, ecosystem services; OR, organizing services.

• Governance subsystem – based on the aforementioned two shifts, a shift from strengthening traditional capacities for top-down intermediary OS to building new capacities for innovative bottom-up intermediary OS is possible, creating a ‘meta-governance’ option and a ‘metamonitoring’ option. According to Kooiman and Jentoft (2009), meta-governance, or governance of governance, is the governance order wherein values, norms and principles are advanced according to which governance practices can be formed and evaluated. It follows the meta-theorist thinking (Sklair 1988) that meta-considerations are cast in other terms than the subject itself (Kooiman & Jentoft 2009), or an effective meta-theory is one that manages to create a high degree of coherence between epistemology and the objects of knowledge (Sklair 1988). By analogy, meta-monitoring can be considered a new social infrastructure for monitoring not only ecosystem functions but also interplays between ecosystems and human societies.


Case study: a Bolivian PWS scheme The Bolivian PWS scheme implemented in the Los Negros micro-watershed (PWS02) is chosen to illustrate the ideas presented thus far in this study. Although this scheme is not a project on lakes per se, it does have a clear upstream–downstream stakeholder relationship that resembles the context for lake watersheds. Moreover, this PWS scheme is a relatively better-documented scheme than others, noting that, to date, there has been very little analysis of PWS in lake watersheds. For illustration purposes, the scheme, in terms of the ten common structural elements of PWS, is first described. The multilayer regime shift in the monitoring, funding and governance subsystems is then specified, focusing on ES, CS and OS. The Los Negros PWS scheme (Vargas 2004; Robertson & Wunder 2005) (Fig. 3) can be described as follows: • An intercommunity agreement (contractual exchange) was arranged by the local NGO, Natura Bolivia (intermediary), between the Santa Rosa Community (upstream payee) and the Los Negro Community (downstream payer); • The Santa Rosa Community agreed to conserve 10 ha of primary cloud forest in the headwaters in the Amboro Park (land-water CS) in exchange for obtaining one artificial beehive (supply-side payment); • Conversing, instead of clearing the cloud forests, it improved the water level of the Los Negro stream (waterrelated ES); • The Los Negro Community will benefit from the improved streamflows through better irrigation of downstream agriculture (land-water uses), and in exchange, they agreed to provide the beehives (demand-side payment); and

Fig. 3.

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• Natura Bolivia facilitated the overall arrangement between these two communities through a series of environmental committee meetings and training courses on bee-keeping, conducted from late 2002 to 2006 (intermediary OS). In the monitoring subsystem, the traditional option of constructing more irrigation channels (applying contemporary techniques), which would divert water flows available in the region (water-related provisioning ES), was not selected. Instead, a shift was made to conserve the cloud forests (developing new techniques), which would effectively capture more cloud-borne moisture (water-related regulating ES). This shift has attracted the attention of the downstream Pampagrande Municipality, encouraging it to provide payments (a new funding option). In the funding subsystem, the traditional option of maintaining more irrigation channels downstream (financing blue water CS) was not selected. Rather, a shift was made to protect the cloud forests upstream (investing blue and green water CS). This shift motivated the upstream farmers to stop forest clearing and start bee-keeping (a new governance option). In the governance subsystem, a previous intervention failed when local governments attempted to resolve the disputes (top-down intermediary OS) regarding water-use conflicts between the two communities. Natura Boliva, however, succeeded in developing a cooperative arrangement (innovative bottom-up intermediary OS) between them (Asquith & Vargas 2007) by conducting a PWS scheme. In September 2003, the first payment for the CS upstream was funded by the US Fish and Wildlife Service to represent the expected participation of the downstream payer, who had not yet agreed to participate. It also suggested a vision of bundling the hydrological, car-

Payment for watershed services

(PWS) Scheme in Bolivia (source of photographs: Natura Bolivia website).


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bon fixation and bird protection ES provided by the cloud forests into a financially viable package (Asquith et al. 2008). Consequently, the improvement in this habitat will benefit all the land-water users in the watershed (a metagovernance order). Monitoring of the performance of the upstream payees was implemented in early 2004, with the Pampagrande Municipality agreeing to fund the second payment, as initially envisioned in establishing this payment system (Robertson & Wunder 2005). To provide standardized streamflow measurements, the building cement channels and gauges were proposed during the early part of this arrangement. Some farmers, however, refused to allow construction of channels on their lands, being concerned that the purpose of the channels was to charge them for water. Furthermore, some of the gauges were stolen (Porras & Neves 2006). With Natura Bolivia’s continuous coordination and the success of the first two rounds of payments, a full-scale data collection programme was finally implemented in July 2005 to provide the scientific basis for a rapid hydrological analysis (Asquith 2006), with the consent of the upstream land owners. The Pampagrande Municipality facilitated a national municipalities meeting in 2006 to share the lessons of this PWS scheme. Natura Bolivia also planned to expand this PWS scheme (a meta-monitoring order) to three other municipalities in Santa Cruz Department (Porras & Neves 2006).

DISCUSSION The three-layer service perspective outlined earlier, and underpinned by the interactive governance interpretation, suggests a strategy for a three-layer regime shift between monitoring, funding and governance for the purpose of improving lake management. The service perspective identifies a theoretical rationale and a socially accepted notion regarding the important interplay between lake ecosystems and human societies residing in their watersheds. The theoretical rationale points out the economic value-added of CS and OS in delivering ES to human societies. In this regard, these services also are flow notions. Their values can change and should be incorporated into the more advanced accounting systems to be developed in the near future. The interactive governance perspective provides two meaningful contributions to two critical relationships in improving lake management, in terms of both a society and its actors, and governance, policy and management. The interactive governance perspective suggests a society is composed of a large number of governance actors who are constrained or enabled in their actions by struc 2012 The Authors Journal compilation 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

tures (Kooiman et al. 2008). It also clarifies governance as a more inclusive term for natural resources, followed by policy and then by management (Kooiman et al. 2008), as follows: • Governance considers long-term trends and requirements, based on an assessment of institutions and a discussion of the values to be attained; • Policy considers specific subjects in the shorter term; and • Management considers the practical dimensions of implementation. This study particularly emphasizes the importance of both the top-down and bottom-up intermediary OS provided by lake management organizations for catalysing local management regime shifts. In lake watersheds, both water sector infrastructure and lake management organizations provide OS to water users. It is traditionally a common policy to monitor and finance water sector infrastructure because of their role in delivering water services (OECD 1999). Furthermore, there has been little thought to institutionalizing the OS provided by lake management organizations. In the near future, however, our societies will need lake management organizations to play greater and more critical roles in governing lake watersheds, especially as both water quality and water quantity begin to play equal roles in determining the availability of water to communities. The intermediary OS provided by lake management organizations can be considered as a new public service or interactive governance for integrating deliberations by different stakeholders whose collective actions will affect a specific lake watershed management plan. Deliberation refers to a style and procedure of decision making without specifying which participants are invited to deliberate (Rossi 1997; Stern & Fineberg 1996; as cited in Renn 2006). Collective actions are contexts wherein individuals choose actions in an interdependent situation (e.g. Sandler 1992). Increasingly, studies have been conducted to argue that a theory of bounded rationale, norm-based human behaviour, is a better foundation for explaining collective action than a model of maximizing material payoffs to self (Ostrom 2010). Norms are comprised of both internal norms (i.e. a positive or negative internal valuation; Crawford & Ostrom 1995) and social norms such as reputation (Seabright 1993), reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) and trust (Cook & Hardin 2001). These studies on collective action theory also recognize the existence of complex linkages among structural variables at multiple levels that together affect reputations, trust and reciprocity, which in turn can affect levels of cooperation and achievement of joint benefits (Ostrom


2010). As an example of the interaction of social norms, Fukuyama (1995) found that individuals can learn to trust and cooperate with individuals that are trustworthy, that are able to acquire a reputation for using positive and negative reciprocity and that are willing to cooperate (cited in Ostrom 2010). Lake management organizations have traditionally been providing OS, which can be considered as a ‘collective consumption provision’ type of public services. Public services include collective consumption provision, social insurance provision and public administration (Dunleavy 1994; Kooiman 1996). Collective consumption provision includes those aspects of health, education, social services, transport, housing, infrastructure services, environmental improvement and urban planning organized or subsidized by government (Dunleavy 1994). In the near future, lake management organizations may be expected to provide intermediary OS to coordinate watershed stakeholders, and to identify and establish those cooperation-oriented core relationships (i.e. reputation; reciprocity; trust). In so doing, it is more likely that the more complex social-political interactive factors that explain and affect these core relationships will be revealed and better understood in specific watersheds, as the basis for developing effective policy measures and selecting suitable scientific approaches to obtain the optimal joint benefits. Moreover, intermediary OS provided by lake management organizations would be highly valuable and critical for good governance, regardless of regime shifts of a bottom-up or top-down nature. The main reason is that intermediary OS provides the essential function for vertical integration between ES provided by ecosystems and CS provided by citizens. An example of bottom-up integrated management is the Velhas River watershed in Minas Gerais State and the Itajai River watershed in Santa Catarina State, both in Brazil. Local watershed management organizations – a civic society committee and a river basin committee – significantly facilitated the integration for better governance among local actors by building their collective identities (Abers 2007), an action consistent with social movement theories (Melucci 1996). A contrasting example is ignoring the original intermediary OS in a top-down integrated management programme for the Oxunda River sub-watershed within the Lake Malaren watershed in Sweden. In implementing the Water Framework Directive promoted by the European Union since 2000, a new river watershed district authority was introduced to replace the unofficial original Oxunda Water Cooperation organization that existed for promoting good governance among local municipalities. Ignorance of the original intermediary OS, and the absence of any new

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coordination between land-use and water-use planning between supra-regional and municipal levels, has caused conflict between senior physical planners and environmental planners (Carter 2007; Andersson et al. 2012). The case has been interpreted as a problem related to the mismatch of vertical legislative scales (Moss 2004), which is typical in pursuit of the spatial fit governance theory (Ostrom 1990; Young 2002). To provide OS, local lake management organizations have a common mission to strengthen their capacity development. The nature of such capacity development may include the priority areas of implementation of professional training, initiation of new databases and promotion of organization mottos. Local lake management organizations also should strive to obtain support from external organizations, including global technical and funding organizations. This is because local lake management also contributes to improving the global hydrological function. Indeed, more than one half of the proposed PWS projects have obtained technical or financial assistance from international organizations. As intermediaries, lake management organizations also need to strengthen interactions between local and regional policymakers to cultivate a supportive institutional environment. At small scales, upstream and downstream stakeholders are likely to reside within the jurisdiction of the intermediary organization. Legislative boundaries must be considered, however, at larger scales. In such cases, policymakers at higher hierarchical levels would be required to contribute to the regime shift. In the foregoing examples, these levels included both the Brazilian and Swedish federal government. The three-layer service perspective has only been discussed in the light of water-related ES provided by lakes. They do not directly address other diverse types of ES identified as being provided by lakes and lake watersheds. Water-related ES, however, provides a pointer towards land-water CS provided by citizens in lake watersheds and OS provided by lake management organizations. To increase the effectiveness in realizing these more broadly based services, the contents of specific services should be diversified, connected and localized by limnologists, lake managers and other professionals. In terms of forming connections, ES, CS and OS pivotal to lakes and lake watersheds can be bundled with those provided by other ecosystems. National PES programmes are examples of such an extension. Assisted by advanced watershed planning, future research can apply the PIES conceptual framework at a specific watershed scale – micro, meso or macro – to take multiple types of ES, CS and OS into account. 2012 The Authors Journal compilation 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

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Although this study has emphasized a new role for lake management organizations, it has not discussed the economic nature of this suggested role. The traditional water sector infrastructure has a monopolistic economic nature in delivering water supply and wastewater treatment services in most countries, including both developed countries such as Sweden and developing countries such as Bolivia. The economic nature of lake management organizations as intermediaries in watershed management is a complicated topic involving a wider range of determinants and factors. One key policy factor is the property regime in a specific watershed, which can be represented by an existing governance structure that allocates both legal liabilities (e.g. taxes) in financing the resource base (e.g. lakes), and property rights (e.g. access, withdrawal, management) to different types of property right holders (e.g. residents, fishermen, fishery associations) that benefit from the resource units (e.g. water, fish) drawn from the resource base. Furthermore, this study has not touched on the deeper socioeconomic rationales behind the monitoring, funding and governance aspects, examples being as incentives, partnerships and institutional arrangements. These deeper aspects are all supported by a justification system based on values and costs. Should the potential value of a change become greater than the cost to make the change, these aspects will be forced by the concerned parties to effect the change. These deeper aspects require another treatment and will be discussed in a later publication. Finally, the interrelationships between services, values and accounting also are important, but beyond the scope of this study. However, not all the interrelationships between these three concepts are new. In fact, for provisioning ES, such as for withdrawing water and harvesting timber and certain species of fish, our societies have reflected their values in our general and more advanced accounting systems, such as the System of National Accounts (CEC et al. 2009) and the System of Environmental-Economic Accounts (SEEA) (UN et al. 2003; CEC et al. 2012). For water resources, the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting for Water (SEEA-Water), as a subsystem of the SEEA, was adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) in 2007. SEEAWater provides a conceptual framework for organizing hydrological and economic information in a coherent and consistent manner (UN 2012b). More recently, the International Recommendations for Water Statistics (IRWS), adopted by the UNSC in 2010, is designed to assist all countries in establishing and strengthening a multipurpose information system for water, in support of integrated water resources management (UN 2012a). 2012 The Authors Journal compilation 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd

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This current trend signifies the growing importance between services, values and accounting.

CONCLUSION It is clear that the monitoring, funding and governance aspects critical and fundamental for adaptive lake management should focus on a clearer, richer and more dynamic structure of services provided by ecosystems, citizens, water infrastructure and lake management organizations among other stakeholders. Three layers of services and their providers in lake management are distinguished in this study, namely ecosystems that provide water-related ES, citizens that provide land-water CS and management organizations that provide intermediary OS. We also recommend a three-layer regime shift for improving lake management, as follows: • Monitoring subsystem – developing new techniques for water-related regulating and supporting ES to attract demand-side payments from land-water users downstream; • Funding subsystem – investing in blue and green water CS to encourage behavioural changes by landwater users upstream; and • Governance subsystem – building new capacities for innovative bottom-up intermediary OS to cultivate a ‘governance for governance’ option. Monitoring, funding and governance aspects are only one surface dimension of adaptation strategies for lake management in a world facing global changes in ecosystem functions. Initiating investments realizing such a dimension will nevertheless be of tremendous benefit in addressing the deeper dimensions of socioeconomic rules and norms that govern the interactions between ecosystems and human societies. Indeed, via providing innovative top-down and bottom-up intermediary OS to catalyse local management regime shifts, lake management organizations are in a historical role to lead a new social revolution towards a both locally and globally more sustainable future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors are very grateful for the constructive comments on the previous drafts by the two anonymous reviewers. This study has benefited from discussions in the consulting meeting, review meeting and final review meeting (between November 2009 and November 2010) of the Integrated Lake Basin Management (ILBM) Governance project conducted by the International Lake Environment Committee Foundation (ILEC). The discussions presented herein are the authors’ personal views.


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APPENDIX I Table A1. A summary of 46 advanced payments for watershed services schemes Year of project No.

Country

01

Bolivia

02 03

Brazil

04

China

Project name ⁄ project site

initiation

References

La Aguada watershed, Eastern Training Institute

1993

Porras and Neves (2006)

Los Negros watershed

2004

Vargas (2004)

Piracicaba-Capivari-Jundiai rivers

1989

Lopes (2004)

Hengjin reservoir, Dongyang-Yiwu

2000

Li et al. (2006)

05

Meijiang watershed, Jiangxi

2003

Zuo et al. (2007)

06

Miyun reservoir, Beijing -Hebei

1995

Lu et al. (2002)

07

National, Forest Ecological

2001

CCICED (2006)

08

National, Sloping Lands Conversion

2002

CCICED (2006)

Cauca river

1991

Forest Trends (2007)

10

Cauca-Quindio valley

1999

World Bank (2001)

11

Lake Fuquene

2004


12

National, Plan Verde Forestry Program

2002

Becerra and de Leon (1999)

Aranjuez-Balsa-Cote-Virilla

2001


Compensation Fund 09

13

Colombia

Costa Rica

watersheds, National Power and Light Company 14

Barranca-Jesus-Maria-Guacimal rivers, Esparza

2002

World Bank (2001)

15

Monteverde, La Esperanza

1998

Rojas and Aylward (2003)

1997


2000


1999


Hydroelectric Power Plant 16

National, Payment for Environmental Services Program

17

Penas Blancas watershed, National Institute of Electricity

18

Platanar river, Platanar Hydroelectric Company

19

San Fernand -Volcan-Sarapiqui rivers, Energia Global

1997


20

Segundo river, Costa Rica Florida Ice & Farm

2001


21 22

Ecuador

Segundo river, Heredia Public Service Company

2002


Cayambe-Coca-Antisana reserves, Quito

2002


23

Palaurco river-Mountain Andean forest, Pimampiro

2001


24

Pedro Moncayo-Otavalo watershed-Lake

1998


25

Tomebamba river, Cuenca Municipal Water Utility

1998


El Imposible National Park,

2001


Mojanda, Pichincha 26

El Salvador

Conacastes-Cara Sucia 27

National, Environmental Services

2006


28

Ahuachapan, Public Utility Company of Tacuba

2002


29

Guatemala

30 31

Honduras

32 33

India

34 35

Indonesia

Las Escobas river-Cerro san Gil reserve, Puerto Barrios

2001


National, Direct Forestry Assistance Pilot

2005

Porras et al. (2008)

Cumes watershed, Intibuca

2002


Las Amayas watershed, Olancho

2000


Lake Sukhna, Sukhomajr-Chandigarh

1979


Oach Kalan-Kuhan, Himachel Pradesh

2005

Agarwal et al. (2007)

Brantas river, Brantas river Basin Operator

2004

Munawir and Vermeulen (2007)



219

Table A1. (Continued) Year of project No.

Country

Project name ⁄ project site

initiation

References

36

Cidanau river, Banten

2005

Munawir and Vermeulen (2007)

37

Lake Toba-Asahan river,

1985


38

Way Besai watershed, Sumberjaya

2000


Huehueyapan river, Coatepec

2003


National, Payments for Hydrological

2004


PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium 39

Mexico

40

Environmental Services 41

Nepal

42

Nicaragua

43

Kulekhani watershed, Nepal Electricity Authority

2006

Leimona et al. (2007)

Blanco river, Matiguas

2002

World Bank (2001)

Paso de Los Caballos watershed, San

2003


1995


Tigum-Aganan river, Maasin-Iloilo

2001


National, Working for Water Program

1995


Pedro del Norte 44

Philippines

National, Reforestation, Watershed Management, Health and Environment Enhancement Fund

45 46

South Africa

No.

Water-related ecosystem services

01

Water quality 1 (reduced contamination)

02

Water quantity 2 (increased stream flow)

03

Water quality 2 (reduced sediment)

04


05

Soil quality (reduced soil erosion)

06


07

Bundled water and soil services

08


09

Bundled water services

10


11


12

Other bundled services

13


14


15


16

Other bundled services

17


18


19


20


21

Water quantity 1 (stable stream flow)

22


23


24

Soil quality (reduced soil erosion)

25


26



220

H. Lin and K. Ueta

Table A1. (Continued) No.

Water-related ecosystem services

27


28


29


30


31


32


33


34


35


36


37


38


39


40


41


42


43


44


45


46


No.

Land-water conservation services

01

Enclosing and fencing

02

Conserving cloud forest

03

Plantation and maintenance of riparian areas with a reforestation

04

Water diversion project and conservation activities

05

Investors’ management during contracted period

06

Forestation organized by the government

07

Farmers’ planting, soil preparation, and forest tending; local forestry

plan and native tree seedlings provided by relevant environmental authorities

departments’ fire prevention, insect and disease control, and monitoring 08

Converting croplands or afforesting wastelands to ecological

09

Reforestation, erosion control, springs and waterways protection,

10

Recovering forest cover and protecting micro-watersheds, regenerating

11

Sustainable silvopastoral systems, i.e., three-layer vegetation cover (trees, bushes

protective forests, and planting economic forests or grasslands and development of watershed communities areas affected by forest fires and degraded mangroves and pasture), fast-growing timber-producing trees, and live hedges and other multipurpose bushes (nitrogen-fixing fodder) and shaded pastures 12

Sustainable silvopastoral systems

13

Agroforestry, reforestation for commercial plantations

14

Recovering forest cover and protecting micro-watersheds, regenerating areas affected by forest fires and degraded mangroves



221

Table A1. (Continued) No. 15

Land-water conservation services Conserving and protecting the existing forests, watching for and repelling land invasions, managing the forest area and the forest rangers who protect it, and attaining the economic means to fulfill its conservation commitment

16

Reforestation

17

Conservation and natural regeneration and reforestation

18


19


20

Protecting forests for permanence through a management plan

21

Conservation and natural regeneration and reforestation

22

Land acquisition and watershed management projects

23

Protecting native vegetation with a land management plan

24

Reforestation for commercial plantations using native species and agroforestry

25

Best management practices through protecting critical areas

26

Employing two extra park guardians for administration, operation and

27

Agroforestry, forest management and conservation, reforestation,

maintenance of the improved water supply system of park forestation and sustainable agricultural production 28

Construction of pipelines, crop-residue management, construction of water cut-off drains, hedgerows and improved agroforestry systems

29

Additional conservation measures including land acquisition and constructing buffer strip

30

Plantation and maintenance for landowners and setting up nurseries to supply trees

31

Using vegetation fences, irrigation ditches and terraces; establishment of agro

and ensuring the long-term reforestation work for municipalities forestry systems; production of organic fertilizers; recycling of coffee pulp and management of wastes from coffee processing 32

Soil and water conservation techniques including organic manure production

33

Protection of forestland from grazing, water harvesting on farmland, participatory

from coffee pulp processing with earthworm culture projects in rain-fed agricultural areas including construction of rain water collection dams 34

Grazing control to reduce soil erosion and construction

35

Agroforestry planting of identified critical land and placing high quality terracing

36

Replanting on critical land at a specified density

37

Rehabilitation of vegetative cover in critical lands

38

Multistrata coffee system (protecting remaining forests, planting

39

Reforestation for commercial plantations

40

Preserving original forest cover, reforestation for commercial plantations and agroforestry

41

Reforestation of the terraces along slopes and tree planting in agricultural land

42

Recovering forest cover and protecting micro-watersheds, regenerating areas

brushwood check dams to trap silt in stream

timber and fruit trees in coffee farms)

affected by forest fires and degraded mangroves 43

Natural regeneration and soil and water conservation measures including building rows of stone barriers in critical water infiltration points and stone ditches in creeks where there is a risk of erosion

44

Agroforestry and construction of erosion and flood control structural measures, and reforestation for commercial plantations


222

H. Lin and K. Ueta


Land-water conservation services

45

Agroforestry, reforestation for commercial plantations,

46

Removing invasive alien plants

natural regeneration and other vegetative measures

No.

Payee upstream

Intermediary organization

Payer downstream

01

Farmer

Local NGO

Resident

02

Farmer

Local NGO

Resident

03

Program participant

Local association (watershed consortium)

Resident

04

Local government

Local government

Local government

05

Farmer

Local government

Local business company

06

Local government

—

Local government

07

Program participant

Local government

Ministry of central government

08

Program participant

Local government


09

Forester

Local association (watershed council)

Local association

10

Program participant


International donor

11

Farmer

International NGO and international donor

Local government

12

Program participant

Local NGO

Representative

13

Program participant

Local NGO and semi-governmental autonomous agency

National utility company

14

Program participant

International donor

International donor

15

Community

—

Local utility company

16

Program participant

Semi-governmental autonomous agency


17

Farmer



18

Landowner



19

Program participant

Local NGO, semi-governmental autonomous


20

Forester


21

Landowner

Local NGO

Representative

22

Resident

International donor

Resident

23

Representative

Local NGO

Representative

24

Landowner

Local NGO and international donor

Representative

25

Landowner


Local government

26

Local NGO


Local government

27

Program participant


Partnership

28

Farmer


Representative

29

Resident


Resident

30

Program participant



31

Farmer

International donor

Representative

32

Farmer

International donor

Representative

33

Landowner


Representative

34

Community

Semi-governmental autonomous agency and international donor

Local government

35

Farmer

Local NGO and local association (watershed council)

Local association

36

Farmer

Local NGO and local association (watershed council)


37

Local government

Local NGO


38

Farmer

International donor


agency and Ministry of central government




223


Payee upstream

Intermediary organization

Payer downstream

39

Farmer

Local association (trust fund)

40

Landowner


Resident Representative

41

Resident

Community


42

Farmer

University (institute)

International donor

43

Farmer

International donor

Resident

44

Community


Partnership

45

Representative

Local NGO, local association and international donor

Representative

46

Program participant


