lessons from the convergent evolution of TURFs in ...

Bull Mar Sci. 93(1):13–33. 2017 https://doi.org/10.5343/bms.2016.1006

Mote Symposium invited paper

Two lobster tales: lessons from the convergent evolution of TURFs in Maine (USA) and the Juan Fernández Islands (Chile) University of Maine, School of Marine Sciences, Darling Marine Center, Walpole, Maine 04575. 1

2 Centro para el Estudio de Sistemas Marinos, Centro Nacional Patagónico – CONICET Blvd. Brown 2915, U 9120 ACF Puerto Madryn, Chubut, Argentina.

Departamento de Oceanografia, Universidad de Concepción, Casilla 160-C, Concepción, Chile.

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Corresponding author email: .

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Date Submitted: 21 January, 2016. Date Accepted: 9 May, 2016. Available Online: 12 August, 2016.

Robert Steneck 1 * Ana M Parma 2 Billy Ernst 3 James A Wilson 1 ABSTRACT.—Overexploitation plagues common property marine resources in a seemingly endless replay of the tragedy of the commons. Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) counter this by controlling access and reducing incentives to compete for larger shares of the resource. Two lobster TURF systems evolved convergently in Maine, USA, and Juan Fernández Islands, Chile. The Homarus americanus H. Milne-Edwards, 1837 lobster fishery in Maine has informal group territories, whereas the Jasus frontalis (H. MilneEdwards, 1837) fishery in the Juan Fernández Islands has individually-owned fishing spots called marcas. Both fisheries use small day boats, both have a long history of protecting reproductive and juvenile lobsters, and both evolved informal fishing territories. Although TURFs limited new entrants in both cases, fishing effort grew, prompting both fisheries to support formal limited-entry regulations. Both lobster populations have expanded in recent decades. Maine’s 30-yr increase in lobster landings stimulated fishers to use larger boats with increased fishing capacity and range to exploit offshore lobsters that have been increasing in abundance, but where territorial rights do not exist. Nevertheless, trap limits have led to more equitable access. In Juan Fernández, power winches increased trap-hauling rates, leading some fishers to advocate trap limits. The TURF system of marcas appears to have limited effort, but it has not prevented the accumulation of marcas by individuals. We conclude these TURFs have addressed the problem of exclusion and have growing lobster populations. It is unknown if TURFs can respond effectively to external factors, such as climate change, that may lead to declining populations.

We can learn much by studying how unrelated organism evolved similar functions convergently. For example, placental and marsupial mammals evolved remarkably similar functions as flying squirrels, cats, wolves, mice, and anteaters. These convergences suggest that for any given body plan, there are only a handful of adaptive solutions. We compare two distant and unrelated lobster fisheries; the spiny lobster, Jasus frontalis (H. Milne-Edwards, 1837), from Chile and the clawed lobster, Bulletin of Marine Science

© 2017 Rosenstiel School of Marine & Atmospheric Science of the University of Miami

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Bulletin of Marine Science. Vol 93, No 1. 2017

Figure 1 The distribution of the two lobster species (Homarus americanus in Maine, USA, and Jasus frontalis in the Juan Fernández Islands, Chile). Modified from Ernst et al. (2013).

Homarus americanus H. Milne Edwards, 1837 from Maine, with the intent of understanding the current convergent endpoints of how and why both have evolved successful territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs). Specifically, we ask: “Do TURFs cap or reduce fishing effort equitably?” “Do they enhance social/ecological resilience?” We also explore the possibilities and constraints in scaling up the drivers of these TURFs to larger scale and to other fisheries. In both fisheries, TURFs have addressed two problems characteristic of common pool resources: the difficulties of excluding potential users and the impact that each user has on the welfare of others (Berkes et al. 1989). They create exclusive access for a relatively small group; and they may limit the ability of members of that small group to indefinitely escalate their fishing effort. We examine how both of these methods of restraining fishing evolved in both fisheries and we consider whether they are still viable today and likely to remain so in the future. Elements of Convergence Despite their large tails, Jasus and Homarus are not closely related decapods (i.e., shrimp, lobsters, and crabs). They evolved from a common ancestor at the time of the group’s initial evolutionary diversification in the Jurassic. Genetic studies determined that phyletically, they are no more closely related to each other than they are to hermit crabs (Wahle et al. 2012). Both species prefer to live in shelters, possibly because both species were or are susceptible to predation from predatory fishes (Steneck and Wahle 2013, Petit et al. 2015). However, neither is thought to be a strong interactor capable of limiting their prey populations. Further, both lobsters attain very large size [64 cm long excluding claws, 20 kg for H. americanus (Wolff 1978) and

Steneck et al.: Lessons from the convergent evolution of TURFs

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48 cm for J. frontalis (Holthuis 1991)] and live in relatively shallow water. Therefore, similarities in body plans and ecologies of these two species are the result of convergent evolution. Obvious differences are that Homarus is a clawed lobster that lives as a solitary adult, while the clawless Jasus lives in aggregations (Butler et al. 2006). The clawed lobster lives exclusively in the cold waters of the western North Atlantic Ocean, while the spiny lobster J. frontalis is endemic to temperate waters of the South Pacific Ocean, several hundred kilometers off the central coast of Chile (Fig. 1; Holthuis 1991). A linear distance of 8700 km separates these two lobster fisheries. These fisheries are both what has been described as “S fisheries,” meaning they are small scale (small boat), spatially constrained, and structured fisheries that target sedentary resources (Orensanz et al. 2005). Both species are also economically important and in both places, the fishery is the dominant source of income. As a result, the fishing communities are strongly dependent on the sustainability of their lobster species for their livelihood. They evolved remarkable parallels in both regions since the 1800s (Table 1). Importantly, both fisheries use specialized passive gear that is not well suited for other species. Rectangular traps are currently the sole means of catching both lobsters species. This type of fishing, ideal for the relatively sedentary rock crevice–dwelling lobsters, facilitates partition of fishing territories (Acheson 1988, Ernst et al. 2013). Also, because of the strong habitat affinity in nearshore environments for both species, they can be fished from relatively small boats launched from local fishing villages. It is likely because of all of the above reasons that both fisheries evolved territoriality and informal use rights well before the phrase “territorial use rights in fisheries” had been coined (Christy 1982). Convergent management measures evolved in Maine and in Chile with only a few minor divergences for the two lobster species. Both fisheries prohibited the harvest of egg-bearing lobsters and created a minimum harvestable size early in their history. Eventually, both fisheries became trap-only (other US states allow other methods of fishing for lobsters, but their landings are low and declining so we will not focus further on them). Nevertheless, there are differences between the Maine and Chilean lobster fisheries (Table 1). Despite the similarities, these are two very different fisheries biologically, culturally, and spatially (the spatial scale of their distribution). Although H. americanus is distributed from the mid-Atlantic states of the US to Newfoundland in the western North Atlantic, comparison focuses on only the fishery in Maine, USA. Nevertheless, the Maine lobster fishery is much larger in geographic extent (5600 km coastline in Maine vs 105 km total of the Juan Fernández archipelago), total landings (56,000 t in 2014 vs 100 t for Juan Fernández), and licensed fishermen (5800 licenses vs 57 boats for Juan Fernández). Nevertheless, TURFs operate at a very fine scale, and there are also significant differences between the two systems. While in Maine, TURFs function within fishing grounds informally held by groups or cooperatives, in Juan Fernández, territories are discrete spots “owned” by individuals. We focus on these two fisheries at a fine scale to understand the conditions that led to and sustained the formation of TURFs in these two fisheries. In the following section, we describe the two fisheries and detail the evolution, advantages, and limitations of their respective TURFs.

×

Trap limits implemented

1998

Lobster zones established (8)

Syndicate of artisanal fishers created

1997

×

♦

×

1987

Improved trap design (7)

Trap only (not diving for lobsters) (6)

1980

Fishers independent, formed cooperative*

1980s Improved trap design (wire traps) (7) 1982

Escape vents

1979

1967

Traps only (6)

No Sunday fishing during summer*

1961

1967

Traps become prevalent

×

♦

♦

×

Ban on harvesting eggers (2)

Introduction of motors* (4)

Seasonal closure

Minimum harvestable size (3)

Fishery initiated (1)

Hydraulic pot haulers (5)

Summer daylight only fishing*

Maximum size ban*

V-notch protects reproductive lobsters Motor boats used (4)

1960

1957

1934

1933

1920

1917

1915

1900

1900

1883

1874

Minimum harvestable size (3)

Wood traps used instead of baskets

Ban on harvesting eggers (2)

1872

1830

Juan Fernández Islands, Chile

Maine, USA Fishery initiated (1)

Year 1820

Increase fishing effectiveness ×

Intent of fishers

♦

×

×

× ♦

×

♦

♦

×

×

Conservation

×

×

×

♦

×

×

×

×

×

Governance: co-management

Governance: co-management

Protect juveniles and increased trap efficiency

Governance

Reduce part-time fishers

Reduce illegal fishing at night

Protect reproductive stock




Modified 9 times until 1989


Reduce illegal Reduce Reduce or activity competition cap effort Notes

Intent of management regulations

Table 1. Timeline of convergences in fisheries evolution between two lobster fishery. Shaded events were periods of increasing landings (see Figs. 2 and 8). Numbers after events (in parentheses) reflect 10 key elements of convergence between the two fisheries. Management intent does not imply compliance (see text).

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2014

Participatory governance (8)

Coastal marine protected area

Biological sampling program

Enforcement officers

Logbooks program (10)

Moratorium on licenses (9)

Juan Fernández Islands, Chile Hydraulic winches (5)

Intent of fishers

Increase fishing effectiveness ♦

** indicates those implemented by lobster zones.

* indicates those initiated by fishers.

Most management changes were legislative.

References for Chile (♦): Ernst et al. 2010, 2013, B Ernst pers obs.

♦

♦

♦

♦

×

×

× ♦

×

Avoids conflicts with industrial vessels Governance: co-management

Monitoring

Monitoring

Reduce illegal Reduce Reduce or activity competition cap effort Notes

Intent of management regulations Conservation

References for Maine (×): Acheson and Steneck 1997, Acheson 2001, Maine DMR 2015, Martin and Lipfert 1985.

Underlined events function to conserve resource (even if not the original intent).

Logbooks required (10)

2014

2011

2008

2007

2006

2004

Limited Entry (reduce fishers) (9)

Reduced trap limit**

2000

1999

Maine, USA

Year 1998

Table 1. Continued. Steneck et al.: Lessons from the convergent evolution of TURFs 17

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Figure 2. Lobster Homarus americanus landings and management measures. Data from Maine DMR (2015).

Maine Case Study: Homarus americanus The trajectory of Maine’s lobster landings is globally unique. No other fishery in the world has been targeted for over a century, but is doing better today than ever before. In fact, since 1985, there has been a five-fold increase in lobster landings (Fig. 2). However, between 1920 and 1940, lobster stocks collapsed. This period is called “the bust” (Acheson and Steneck 1997). Leading up to the bust, illegal fishing was widespread, well known in the community, and well documented (Acheson and Steneck 1997). Importantly, “the bust” was viewed as self-inflicted by the fishing community. As a result, a series of new measures were introduced at the urging of the lobster fishers to conserve their resource. For example, during this period, the maximum legal size for harvested lobsters was introduced. This created a “slot” fishery that allowed harvesting only lobsters larger than 83 mm on the carapace (CL) and smaller than 127 mm CL. Perhaps more important was the transformation that occurred within lobstering communities during the bust period; they evolved a strong conservation ethic (Acheson and Steneck 1997). Rampant and openly illegal practices of selling short lobsters or reproductive lobsters that had their external eggs removed ceased and the local fishing communities “policed” activities within their territories (Acheson 1988). As lobster landings were declining to their lowest levels in the late 1930s, a number of new and effective conservation measures were adopted. Maine pioneered a novel practice for preserving lobster broodstock by cutting a “V” notch into the tail of all egg bearing lobsters. So long as the notch is visible, the lobster cannot legally be sold. Although the initial v-notch legislation was passed in 1917, there was little or no compliance (Acheson and Steneck 1997). However, during and following the bust period (1920–1940; Fig. 2) compliance with the no-sale provisions of the regulations


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and voluntary observance of v-notching improved. This was confirmed in a study conducted between 1998 and 2002, in which 50%–67% of all egg bearing lobsters caught were v-notched (Maine DMR 2015). That is a remarkably high number for an industry that lands well over 100 million lobsters annually and because fishers are simply required to return an egged lobster to the water; there is no requirement that they v-notch. In more recent years, other conservation measures have been implemented, such as escape vents, allowing undersize lobsters to escape. Traps must also have panels that rust and fall out if a trap becomes derelict. All of these add up to effective conservation. Following the implementation of a maximum harvestable size and the evolution of a strong conservation ethic, lobster landings rose sharply in the 1940s, and remained remarkably stable for 40 yrs until the mid-1980s (Fig. 2). This stability reinforced the tradition of maintaining conservation because there appeared to be such a strong link between the change in conservation rules and the increase and then stability of landings. During this period, several new management measures were introduced, such as fishing only during daylight hours, fishing with traps only, and no Sunday fishing. All of these were instituted primarily to minimize competition with other fisheries and to improve legal fishing practices. During this time, the Maine Lobstermen’s Association formed and grew to become one of the largest fishery organizations in the United States. Beginning in 1985, lobster population densities began to increase. Remarkably, almost every year since 1985 has resulted in record harvests (Fig. 2) and is referred to as “the boom” (sensu Acheson and Steneck 1997). During this period, several important changes occurred, which first strengthened and then codified Maine’s traditional and informal community-based management into seven legislatively-established lobster zones that span the entire state. Maine’s seven lobster zones were established in 1995 and implemented in 1997 during the boom period (Acheson et al. 2000). The lobster zones provided an opportunity for the more than 6000 licensed lobster fishers to vote on some of the management measures affecting them. The formal “Lobster Zone Management Law” evolved from a long tradition of informal area management that functioned as TURFs, but was known by some as the “lobster gangs of Maine” (Fig. 3, Acheson 1988, 2001). Each community of fishers (usually organized around co-ops or harbors) had a territory where they fished and from which they would actively exclude other fishers from the area by cutting off the buoys that mark their traps (Fig. 3A). In some areas, lobster territories were further subdivided among individuals within the community. All lobster territories are informal except a few that surround islands having permanent (year round) inhabitants such as Monhegan (see Fig. 3A) and Swans islands. Each of the seven formal lobster management zones contained approximately equal number of fishers at the time they were established (Fig. 3B, C). Each zone is represented by an elected official and is given limited co-management authority. Between 1995 and 1999, lobster zones acquired the rights to limit effort by limiting the number of traps and the number of fishers (Acheson et al. 2000). The “limited entry” of fishers involved a ratio of new entrants to retirees in each zone. All of the zone actions were recommendations to Maine’s Commissioner of Marine Resources who, if the recommendations are deemed reasonable, enact them by rule to become new regulations. During their first vote in 1998, the lobster zones voted to reduce the

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Figure 3. (A) Informal lobster territories in Maine plus the exclusive territory surrounding Monhegan Island (Acheson 2001). (B) The lobster zones of Maine. (C) The state of Maine and the Gulf of Maine.

number of traps from 1200 to 600–800 in all zones. Five of the seven zones also voted for limited entry during the summer of 2000. A sixth zone joined them a few years later. Changes for entry into the fishery and trap limits are continually discussed. Maine’s Lobster Zones: Scaling up TURFS, Measures of Success or Failure The 30-yr rise in lobster landings is unprecedented (Fig. 2). There is a growing consensus that three factors drive this pattern: first, the management measures of fishing a slot and protecting broodstock lobsters which, along with compliance, has demonstrably increased the abundance of reproductive lobsters (Steneck 2006, Steneck and Wahle 2013); second, climate change resulted in ideal thermal conditions for larval and adult lobsters (Steneck and Wahle 2013); and third, a functionally “domesticated ecosystem” exists along the Maine coast today (Steneck et al. 2011). This “domestication” results from overfishing creating a relatively predator-free and because lobster bait provides a considerable trophic subsidy that is known to increase the growth rate of Maine lobsters (reviewed in Steneck and Wahle 2013). For example, more than one million pounds of lobster bait is used daily during the summer off the coast of Maine (Steneck et al. 2011, Steneck and Wahle 2013).


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Figure 4. Lobster Homarus americanus landings and per unit price since the start of the boom period in 1985. Numeric notations signify (1) implementation period for Lobster Zones, (2) the Great Recession, and (3) the Oceanographic Heat Wave (see text). Data from Maine DMR (2015).

To assess the efficacy of scaling up TURFs via lobster zones, we focus on changes that have occurred in the lobster fishery since 1985 (the boom period), because this includes about equal time before and after implementation of Maine’s lobster zones. During this time, two events occurred that tested the resilience of the lobster fishery; the Great Recession beginning in 2007 dropped demand for lobsters, and 2012’s Ocean Heat Wave (sensu Mills et al. 2013) caused lobsters to molt early and flood the market. During the lobster boom from 1985 to 2008, landings and per-unit price increased in tandem (Fig. 4). However, the per unit price declined sharply with the Great Recession and with the Ocean Heat Wave (Fig. 4). Nevertheless, the overall volume of lobsters landed minimized the impact of those two economic disturbances (i.e., landings and value correlate linearly; R2 = 0.91). Thus, there was only a modest dip in the total value of landed lobsters overall at the time of the Great Recession (Fig. 5). Lobster zones were established as a means of democratizing the fishery by giving harvesters a vote for representation and to affect some of their management. However, they were also established to limit or cap fishing effort. At the time, groundfish stocks were in steep decline so those fishers sought to enter the lobster fishery. As a result, from 1985 to 1995, the number of licenses in Maine increased from slightly more than 4500 licenses to 7500. There was a collective sense among fishers and managers that something must be done to stem this increase (Acheson et al. 2000). Since the establishment and implementation of Lobster Zones (#1 in Fig. 6), the number of lobster licenses has steadily declined and is below 6000 today. After the initial Lobster Zone votes and implementation period, the number of traps fished per fisher has declined (Fig. 6).

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Figure 5. Total value of Maine lobster landings and the impact of the Great Recession. Numeric notations as in Figure 4. Data from Maine DMR (2015).

Figure 6. Maine lobster fishing effort in number of traps and number of fishers (i.e., licenses). Numeric notations as in Figure 4. Data from Maine DMR (2015).


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Figure 7. Maine lobster catch per unit effort (trap hauls). Data from Maine DMR (2015).

Despite the decline in lobster licenses and traps, effective effort continued to rise. The increase was mostly the result of larger boats with larger crews fishing more efficiently and farther offshore, where territoriality is relatively weak and difficult to enforce. Specifically, the number of boats exceeding 12 m length has increased as have the number of “LC3” licenses that allow two crew members, in addition to the captain, to fish (Dayton and Sun 2012). In fact, in 1999 most lobstering licenses were LC1 (only the boat owner fished) and LC3 were relatively rare. By 2004, this had reversed with most licenses in the LC3 category. Therefore, with highly efficient fishing practices and a larger boat, more traps were fished daily, each trap was hauled more frequently and thus fishing effort was relatively high. Since 2008, managers required fishers to keep logbooks. In the 5 yrs after the logbook requirement, the number of “offshore” lobster fishing trips (i.e., >20 km from shore) nearly doubled from 550 to more than 1000. Offshore landings increased from 140 to 375 t (Maine DMR 2015). Despite increasing effort, the catch per unit effort (CPUE) has steadily increased over the past 30 yrs with a sharp acceleration occurring after 2007. However, recently CPUE may be leveling off (Fig. 7). The social-ecological resilience of the Maine lobster fishery appears robust in that both landings and value have effectively weathered economic and oceanographic disruptions (i.e., recession and temperature anomalies; Figs. 4–7). Scaling up local lobster gangs to a statewide program spanning >5000 km (e.g., Fig. 3) appears to have functioned well. However, over the past 30 yrs, warming seas (Pershing et al 2015) have resulted in landings increasing to the north and east over time. This may be masking a bigger climate change related problem if the region is trending toward a state with a significantly reduced capacity to produce lobsters (Steneck and Wahle 2013).

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Juan Fernández, Chile Case Study: Jasus frontalis The Juan Fernández archipelago located 700 km off the mainland of Chile is the country’s main lobster producing region (Fig. 1, Ernst et al. 2013). The archipelago is comprised of several islands, including Alexander Selkirk, Robinson Crusoe, and Santa Clara. Relatively few people live in the archipelago. Robinson Crusoe Island population is about 630 people (2002 census) and it has not changed much over the past century. Selkirk’s fishing community is comprised of around 30 fishers. The small population and extreme isolation makes the fishing community very tight. The key attributes of the Juan Fernández lobster fishery are described in several papers that summarize considerable social, ecological, and historical information about this fishery (e.g., Ernst et al. 2010b, 2013, Petit et al. 2015). Most importantly, access to the resource has been regulated by an informal, but well-structured, traditional TURF system, which effectively constrained growth of the fleet and potential to overfish the resource (Ernst et al. 2013). Here we will highlight key events in the social-ecological evolution of this fishery into effective TURFs. The Juan Fernández lobster fishery began in the 1880s, but it evolved remarkably little over the years. For example, open doubled-ended wooden outboard-powered boats from the 1910s have been only recently replaced by similar size fiberglass boats, maintaining a similar design and configuration over the years (Table 1). Fishing methods also changed only slightly over several decades. During the early years, a variety of methods were used, but baskets were most prevalent until 1950, when traps became the dominant gear. In 1982, diving was no longer allowed and only traps could be used (Fig. 8, Table 1). Importantly, other fisheries did not develop. This was possibly due to the long distance marine resources would have to be transported. This gave a distinct advantage to the live transport of lobsters to the Chilean mainland.

Figure 8. Juan Fernández lobster landings and management 1930–2014 (after Ernst et al. 2013).


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Figure 9. Fishing spots or “marcas” around Robinson Crusoe and Santa Clara islands (left) and Selkirk (right). White dots (October–December) and black dots (January–May).

The most unique attribute of the Juan Fernández lobster fishery is their informal spatial access rules. Explicit fishing spots called marcas are owned and fished only by a fisher or family members. These fishing spots cannot be purchased, but they are transferred with the sale of the boat that fishes the spots. Only one trap is set per spot. The origin of this informal system of TURFs is unknown (Ernst et al. 2013). Logically, the density of marcas scales with the quality of the lobster habitat and the abundance of lobsters (Fig. 9). Fishers identify their spots by triangulating with shore-side landmarks. This form of spatial ownership clearly constrains fishing effort. Even if more fishing licenses were issued, owners could fish without owning marcas. One of the greatest changes in the fishery in recent decades was in ownership and governance. Before 1960, fishers worked as employees for those who owned the boats. In the 1960s and 1970s, fishers became gradually independent and formed a cooperative (Fig. 8, Table 1). The cooperative functioned in the region through the early 1980s, and in 1987, a formal syndicate was formed that still functions today. The syndicate has been very active in promoting a participatory monitoring program

Figure 10. Rise in the number of traps hauled per boat per trip (i.e., hauling rate) over the past 30 yrs in the Juan Fernández lobster fishery.

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Figure 11. Historical trends in average nominal catch per trap (CPUE) in the Juan Fernández fishery. Information from Ernst et al. (2013, 2016).

initiated in 2006 (Ernst et al. 2010b) and, in the process, launched in 2014 to develop a Fishery Management Plan, as required by the National Fisheries Law (Table 1). Despite spatial access constraints imposed by the marcas system, in recent decades, fishing pressure escalated and has become an important concern for both fishers and managers. While the number, size, and performance of boats remained largely unchanged over the past 30 yrs (Ernst et al. 2013), the rate at which traps can be fished (number of traps hauled per boat per day) increased roughly by 70% since the introduction in the 1990s of power-winches (Ernst et al. 2013; Fig. 10). Concern over increasing fishing effort grew following the precipitous decline in CPUE (catch per trap haul) in the 1970s immediately after the formation of the cooperative (Fig. 11). For data-poor fisheries, CPUE is often used as an index of local abundance. This application is particularly suitable for the Juan Fernández lobster fishery because the core fishery is spatially fixed so fishers are not serially depleting local stocks to give a false impression of stable abundance (as has occurred in other fisheries). In the mid-1980s, the CPUE had increased slightly, but it generally was below one lobster per trap haul. This could have resulted from changes in the trap design that increased efficiency. Nevertheless, the CPUE increased slightly during scattered sampling periods (Fig. 11). Beginning in 2004, however, the CPUE began to steadily increase and reached about the level recorded in the 1970s (Ernst et al. 2013, Fig. 11). Such a protracted increase in CPUE is unlikely to result from increased trapping efficiency and more likely reflects a real increase in lobster population density (especially since total number of traps fished was also increasing; Fig. 10). The main product of the Juan Fernández fishery is live lobster. Total export revenue of this product has tripled over the past 9 yrs (Fig. 12), partly due to the increase in landings and to a notorious expansion of exports to the Chinese market (>95% in recent years). Landed value (called “beach price”) has also increased from about 11 US dollars per kilogram in 2005 to 25 US dollars per kilogram in recent seasons (P Manríquez, Sindicato de Trabajadores Independientes Pescadores Artesanales, Isla Robinson, Archipiélago de Juan Fernández, Chile, pers comm).


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Figure 12. Total landings of Juan Fernández lobsters and total revenues (million US dollars) from live lobster exports (source: http://www.prochile.gob.cl and http://www.sernapesca.cl).

In a retrospective study, Eddy et al. (2010) concluded that there had been a significant reduction in lobster abundance over the last century. They suggested that stocks had hit a low point in the year 2000, and that with stewardship and a 30% no-take reserve, lobster populations could increase again. The reserve was never established, but stocks recovered just the same. Over the past 15 yrs (i.e., since 2000), the overall trend of increasing landings (Fig. 8) and CPUE (Fig. 11) suggests the J. frontalis stocks are being fished sustainably. This was recently reinforced by the Marine Stewardship Council report recommending that the trap fishery be certified as meeting the criteria for sustainable fishing (Arana and Scott 2014). Common Denominators: Learning from Lobster Tales Both Maine’s H. americanus and Juan Fernández’s J. frontalis fisheries began over a century ago. The two fisheries were intensely targeted and driven to low abundance, but have populations and landings that have been increasing for more than a decade (Figs. 2, 8). This is contrary to the trend of declining (or in some cases stable) relative biomass of exploited fish and invertebrate stocks observed in many regions of the world (Costello et al. 2012, Worm and Branch 2012). To stop overfishing, counter measures of marine protected areas and annual catch limits (e.g., “catch shares”) have been proposed and implemented over the past decades (e.g., Roberts 1997, Edgar et al. 2007, Costello et al. 2008). However, neither of these management measures was applied to these two lobster fisheries. Here we explore biological, social, and ecological characteristics that may have contributed to the relative successes of these fisheries. A few biological and ecological characteristics, along with current management practices, synergistically contributed to the resilience of the two lobster fisheries. Both species are conspicuously large shelter-dwellers that live in relatively shallow water (127 mm CL. This has contributed to the growing abundance of reproductive lobsters in Maine (Steneck 2006) that can continue to reproduce for decades and thus is a hedge against conditions that limit larval recruitment in some years. The Juan Fernández fishery has a closed season during the J. frontalis reproductive period. That would be impossible for Maine’s H. americanus fishery because eggs are retained for 9–11 mo, so there is almost never a time fishers do not find egg bearing females. Instead, the Maine fishery provides additional protection for the lobster broodstock by prohibiting the sale of female lobsters with a v-notch on their tail. This is a measure lobstermen believe keeps the stocks healthy so compliance with voluntary notching of broodstock lobsters is high (discussed above). Effective management measures took a while to catch on in both fisheries. The evolution of area-management for both species originated out of conflicts for access rather than as conservation measures. However, by limiting the fishing areas, the stake in those areas increased. With time, this led to high compliance with measures such as Maine’s v-notch program or the conservative size limit and high compliance with the ban to keep egg-bearing females in the Juan Fernández lobster. Both fisheries are imbedded into local communities that have a shared interest in the success of


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the resource they depend on. The strength of the dependency on the resource may be central to the success of these two lobster fisheries. Both fisheries depend on one lobster species for their livelihood. Effectively, they have low resource diversity. Traps are designed exclusively for lobsters. In Maine, this is because the naturally low diversity was made even lower by intense fishing on all large predatory fishes (especially Atlantic cod, Gadus morhua Linnaeus, 1758). In Juan Fernández archipelago, it relates to the few species that can be caught and delivered to the Chilean mainland in a cost-effective way. The high market value of this lobster that is transported live keeps fisher benefits to costs high. Highly valuable marine resources often attract increases in fishing effort. In Chile, this pressure is moderated by the marcas system. Both the Maine and Juan Fernández fisheries introduced a moratorium on licenses, which constrained the number of fishing boats (Table 1). The number of traps that can be fished limits fishing pressure. In Maine, a trap limit of 1200 traps per fisher was introduced by legislation, but all seven lobster zones voted the limit down to 800. Some local areas have lowered the number of allowable traps to 600. These measures have resulted in a reduction in fishing effort. After the establishment of lobster zones, both number of fishers (i.e., number of licenses) and number of traps have declined (Fig. 6). Nevertheless, concern persists that fishing effort is expanding offshore with larger boats, but the steadily rising CPUE (e.g., Fig. 7) suggests that lobster stocks are outpacing the rate at which they are being fished. No specific trap limit exists in the J. frontalis fishery. While in principle, fishing effort per boat could be constrained by the number of marcas fishers own, in practice the number of marcas is not a limiting factor for the boats that have been active in the fishery. The effective fishing effort per boat is more likely controlled by the number of traps they can service per day under current operational conditions (e.g., Fig. 10). While the number of marcas has not increased over time too much, the number of traps fished per capita has increased, as explained above (Fig. 10). This has prompted some fishers to advocate the introduction of effort limits (number of traps). However, over the past decade, stocks appear to have increased (i.e., higher CPUE over the past decade than during the early 1980s) (Fig. 11). Short-term and Long-term Tests of Social-ecological Resilience Both fisheries experienced physical and social disturbances. The Maine fishery suffered a severe drop in demand as a result of the Great Recession of 2007 and 2008. This suppressed both the price of lobsters and the total value of the resource (Figs. 4, 5). The second crisis was also economic, but this time driven by a climate anomaly. In 2012, there was an “ocean heat wave” (sensu Mills et al. 2013) during which bottom water temperatures spiked in April, causing lobsters to molt into harvest size in great numbers, but at a time when there was little domestic demand. Lobster processing was located in Canada, but they closed their doors to “cheap Maine lobsters” causing an international crisis. Again, the price of lobsters declined (Fig. 4), but because landings were so high, the total value of the fishery did not suffer (Fig. 5). Arguably, the Maine lobster weathered these two stress tests well, suggesting the fishery, or at least the market, is resilient. In Juan Fernández, a devastating tsunami destroyed significant fishing infrastructure (boats and buildings) in February of 2010 (Ernst et al. 2010a, 2013). Quite

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remarkably, government and non-government organizations helped the fishing community in rebuilding. Within 2 yrs, the most devastated fishing areas were fully functional. As a result, the impact of the tsunami was not evident in landings (Fig. 8) or in the CPUE (Fig. 10). Again, a strong case can be made that this is an economically resilient fishery. Resilience does not mean permanence. At least in Maine, where lobster abundance has been tracked for some time, there is good evidence that the optimum temperature conditions for post-larval settlement and adult lobsters are moving north (Steneck and Wahle 2013). For example, Steneck and Wilson (2001) documented lobster abundances at 10 m depth from 1989 to 1999. They observed steady movement in the peak abundance of lobsters spanning 175 km over that decade. Landings reflected that temperature-induced shift in abundance over that period so that today, peak landings are farther to the north. The projected sharp increases in sea temperatures in coming decades (Pershing et al. 2015) will likely become too stressful to maintain the current high abundance of lobsters in the Gulf of Maine (Steneck and Wahle 2013). While we cannot predict future lobster stocks in Maine or in the Juan Fernández archipelago, an important point may be that these local fisheries depend on local stocks. This has allowed the fisheries to evolve means to limit effort and so far have maintained landings. How these fisheries could evolve if factors outside their control (such as climate change) drive stocks down is unknown and likely unknowable. Looking at the larger lessons in co-management of these two TURFS, we see five phases of convergent evolution (Table 1). The first, strongest drive is for fishers to increase their fishing effectiveness. This is followed by a series of measures of conservation and by the evolution of informal rules to avoid conflicts resulting from crowding on the fishing grounds. The spontaneous partition of fishing territories among individual fishers (Juan Fernández), or groups or cooperatives (Maine) is a natural outcome favored by the use of passive fishing gear (traps) that facilitates enforcement of territories (Acheson 1988, Ernst et al. 2013). Because TURFs were less effective at constraining individual fishing efficiency, the most recent fisher-supported regulations (Maine) or proposals (Juan Fernández) related to reducing competition and effort. In both fisheries, measures have also been implemented to reduce illegal activity. These two lobster tales provide an excellent example of how adaptive capacity and the evolution of an effective combination of formal and informal rules may be favored by a high level of community dependence on the resource and by the nature of these “S fisheries,” in which space plays a dominant role. The relatively sedentary nature of the target resource facilitates local assessment of resource status and learning, and the spontaneous partition of fishing territories. This approach is worth emulating for other fisheries, but of course this will not be a panacea for avoiding future tragedies of the commons (e.g., Ostrom 2007). Acknowledgments The passion and insights of Lobo Orensanz stimulated our interest in pursuing this topic. Funding for research in Maine came from the National Science Foundation Program in Coupled Natural and Human Systems (Project 0909449), Maine Sea Grant, and the Pew Fellows in Marine Conservation. We also thank the fishers of Maine and of Juan Fernández archipelago, and to acknowledge their dedication in participating in assisting data collection used in this study and several monitoring projects. Funding for the Chilean research has


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come over the years from CREO (Conservation, Research and Education Opportunities) and several SUBPESCA grants. To all we are grateful.

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