Marketing Systems and Insurgency in Western Guatemala

Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 17, No. 1, 65–78, March 2006

Marketing Systems and Insurgency in Western Guatemala WILLIAM YAWORSKY University of Texas at Brownsville ABSTRACT Guatemala is a nation with a history of severe political and socioeconomic problems. These crises contributed to the growth and durability of insurgent movements, which from 1961 to 1996 were endemic in certain regions of the nation, particularly western Guatemala. This paper examines insurgent activity in the four marketing subsystems described by Smith1 found in western Guatemala: dendritic, primate, top-heavy and interlocking. Peasants are said to be severely disadvantaged in the dendritic marketing systems, disadvantaged in primate markets, and relatively capable of making a decent living in top-heavy and interlocking systems. If this is so, support for system changing revolutionary movements should predictably be highest in dendritic systems, significant in primate systems, and only marginal in top-heavy and interlocking systems. An examination of the political-military situation in western Guatemala from 1976 to 1996 supports this thesis.

Explaining when, where, and why peasant2 rebellions occur has intrigued social scientists for decades. The variables examined as potential factors contributing to the generation of rebellion have included agrarian structures and land tenure;3 regime composition;4 the role played by outside agitators;5 and ethnic discrimination.6 Other scholars have focused on rational decision making and cost/ benefit analysis or acknowledged a multiplicity of variables.7 Perhaps the most recurring explanatory themes involve notions of the relationship between peasants and the global marketplace. Often these explanations advance notions of capitalist penetration into previously subsistence oriented groups, which may cause some sort of disruption of the moral economy or peasant livelihood.8 For example, Wolf wrote that capitalist penetration into peasant communities precipitated middle-class peasant revolts against threats to subsistence agriculture. According to Wolf, the poorest peasants couldn’t afford to participate in Correspondence Address: William Yaworsky, Behavioral Sciences Dept., 80 Fort Brown, Brownsville, TX78520, USA. ISSN 0959-2318 Print/ISSN 1743-9558 Online/06/010065–14q 2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09592310500456437

66

William Yaworsky

insurgency while well-to-do peasants had no incentive to rebel, because they enjoyed some of the benefits of capitalism.9 Scott agreed with Wolf that the penetration of capitalism into peasant communities created conditions ripe for violence. But in his view it was specifically the disruption of the moral order of reciprocal obligations and conventions that precipitated peasant revolt. Contractual laws and purely market relationships that transferred all risk to peasants replaced age-old systems of patron-client reciprocity that protected peasants from market risk. If the moral imperative of the previous system guarding the peasants’ bare subsistence minimum was broken, outrage and rebellion among the peasantry often followed.10 Other scholars provide similar explanations, all invoking theories of market disruption of the moral order.11 Wickham-Crowley attempted to test these theories of peasant rebellion in a careful and systematic way. He employed a Boolean algebra procedure to review data from 20 regions in ten Latin American nations to test the above theories of insurgency. He found that peasant support for insurgency was garnered under a variety of circumstances, and that no single social condition predicts that support in every case.12 While these theorists reviewed by Wickham-Crowley concentrated on the capitalist penetration into previously subsistence-oriented peasant communities, all seem to assume that the market itself is an undifferentiated, monolithic structure. Analysts building on both the empirical findings of ethnographers and the theoretical models of Christaller have demonstrated that this is not so.13 For example, Smith discerned four regional marketing systems commonly found in western Guatemala: dendritic, primate, interlocking and top-heavy.14 Each of these regional systems produces vastly different economic conditions for the peasants embedded within them. As described by Smith, top-heavy and interlocking markets are competitive; that is, they are arranged in a way that undercuts attempts by elites to form monopolies. Hence, they are adequately structured to allow peasants to make a decent living. Primate (and especially dendritic) markets produce severe restraints on peripheral peasant communities, primarily due to the highly monopolistic natures of these marketing systems. The communities located in such regional systems are structurally locked into trading networks where all the cards are stacked against them.15 It is my thesis that in agrarian regions of the developing world, the economic pressures that contribute to the emergence of popular insurgencies vary depending in large part upon the types of marketing systems into which people are forced to operate. Peasant communities located in dendritic systems are the worst off, and insurgent movements should be strongest in these areas. Primate systems, which also throw up significant blocks to peasant advancement, should have low-key but

Marketing Systems and Insurgency in Guatemala

67

endemic insurgencies. Interlocking and top-heavy markets allow a fair degree of latitude for peasants to make a good living. It is in these regions that insurgency should be sporadic or insignificant. Let me state outright that the regional marketing system is only one factor involved in the complex generation of political violence and peasant rebellion; this study is in no way meant to be a monocausal explanation. The valuable contributions of the luminous antecedents cited above remain pertinent. However, I do contend that by examining the layout of the regional marketing system in which a peasant rebellion occurs, an important variable may be given its rightful consideration. I am also obliged to point out that assessing accurately, region by region, year by year, popular support for rebel movements in Guatemala during the civil war is extremely problematic. I know of no systematic study or reliable methodology to accurately gauge this phenomenon during the times and locations under consideration.16 While it is tempting to assign the remote and subsequently devastated Indian villages of the western highlands the status of bases of popular support for the insurgency, geographic isolation alone made these communities useful zones for rebel presence, regardless of the preferences of the inhabitants. The greater destructiveness unleashed by the army in the western highlands may simply reflect the absence of valuable infrastructure of this periphery as well as the lack of political repercussions attendant with perpetrating mass terror on the region’s powerless and ethnically distinct underclass.17 For example, Falla reports that the state security forces operating in the region did not distinguish among guerrillas, their sympathizers, the indifferent, or their opponents, a situation which may have contributed to the population’s reputation for sympathy towards rebels.18 Finally, inadequate government intelligence and the failure of earlier campaigns of selective killings elsewhere in the country made the strategy of mass terror most attractive to the government. Nevertheless, anthropologists conducting fieldwork in the western highlands and guerrillas themselves report variation in popular attitudes that is highly relevant to the question at hand. Given the paucity of reliable quantifiable data on popular attitudes towards rebel movements, the more subjective accounts of these long-term ethnographers and rebels of the region play a central role in the ensuing analysis. In particular, I ask the reader to carefully consider Carmack’s and Smith’s19 assessments of public opinion around Totonicapań (discussed on pages 71 and 72) while evaluating the thesis presented in this article. The remainder of this article is divided into three main sections. First, I begin with a general description of the marketing systems in the western highlands of Guatemala. Next, I analyze the albeit limited

68

William Yaworsky

qualitative data region by region in western Guatemala, demonstrating that evidence exists to support the notion that popular support for insurgency correlated with market systems in predictable ways. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this analysis. Marketing Systems Anthropologists working in the highlands of Mesoamerica (and elsewhere) have encountered a bewildering variety of regional marketing systems.20 These systems differ from each other in terms of their physical layouts and the distances between adjacent marketplaces; the numbers and types of participating communities; and in terms of the commodities sold. They also differ in terms of market periodicity, market articulation, and the degrees to which they are influenced by monopolies and other strictures imposed by regional elites. One common typology for delineating regional marketing systems involves documenting the levels of marketing centers within the system.21 For example, some systems display a single large market center with no intermediate markets and many smaller markets (e.g. market ratio 1:0:20), while others systems lack a major center and have few intermediate level markets and many smaller ones. E. V. Johnson was the first to describe the latter system while studying the Tiv ethnic group in western Africa.22 Other scholars soon documented similar regional marketing systems, which came to be known in the literature as ‘dendritic marketing systems’ due to the branch-like layout of communities orienting their trade to one higher level market center.23 These markets typically open only once per week. Highly monopolistic and poorly articulated, these systems providing poor remunerations for rural producers. Dendritic systems lack major central marketplaces within, while low-level centers are numerous (e.g. 0:3:25). Oftentimes monocropped products (e.g. sugarcane and cotton) are procured for a bulking center on the edge of the system prior to their disbursement into foreign venues. Smith24 identifies four distinct dendritic marketing systems in western Guatemala. Their locations are as follows (with corresponding market orders in parentheses): northern Quiche (0:3:27); northern Huehuetenango (0:3:28); southern Huethuetenango (1:3:39); and northern San Marcos (0:3:25). Similarly monopolistic are primate systems. These marketing systems may be thought of as ‘solar systems’ because they involve a number of communities that orient their trade to one central marketplace, much like planets revolving around the sun. Intermediate centers are lacking (e.g. market order approximates 1:0:12). Instead, smaller centers ring a large central market. Solar systems may come into existence either by either executive fiat or due to practical considerations imposed by


69

geographical strictures and have been well documented in both Asia and Central America.25 They often have poorly articulated periodic markets: in southern Mexico and Guatemala they tend to open only on Sundays. Because of the lack of competition (producers may only sell their goods to elites in one center), peasant communities embedded in such systems encounter unfavorable economic conditions. Primate marketing systems are found in the south coast plantation region of southern San Marcos (1:0:18); Retalhuleu (1:0:13); and Suchitepeuez (1:0:18).26 In contrast, interlocking marketing systems typically provide rural producers access to three competing intermediate market centers as destinations for their products. Market order approximates the classic ratio (e.g. 1:3:12). Collusion among urban wholesale buyers is far more difficult to organize; if sellers dislike the price in one center they may take their goods elsewhere. Interlocking systems are found in southern Quiche´ (1:3:12); Chimaltenango (1:3:11); Solola´ (1:2:19); and Quezaltenango (1:2:18). Similarly, ‘top-heavy’ marketing systems afford a large number of intermediate-level marketplaces (e.g. 1:5:5) in which rural producers may sell their goods. In western Guatemala the top-heavy system is centered on Totonicapań and economic conditions here permit rural producers to make a decent living.27 Given these striking contrasts in market conditions, which largely shape the economic prospects of resident rural producers, it becomes a reasonable hypothesis to argue that popular support for revolutionary movements should be higher in the dendritic and primate systems and lower in the interlocking and top-heavy systems. Before surveying the evidence for and against this thesis, I provide a brief overview of Guatemala’s civil war. A History of Rebellion Guatemala began experiencing insurgency in 1961, when dissident military officers founded the M-13 Movement and the Edgar Ibarra Revolutionary Front. These early movements experimented with foquista strategies, while later organizations tended to practice prolonged popular war. Among the more enduring movements were the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Eje´rcito Guerrillero de los Pobres, or EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (Organizacioń Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas, or ORPA), and the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, or FAR). Most of these emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. These movements ebbed and flowed over the years and then experienced a sudden dramatic growth during the early 1980s. In 1982– 83, a heavy-handed counterinsurgency campaign featuring atrocious violence directed at guerrillas and civilians

70

William Yaworsky

alike effectively broke their power. This campaign was later augmented by a system of civil patrols, model villages and development programs. The guerrillas nevertheless persisted in certain regions of the country up until December 1996, when a peace accord was finally reached. The EGP, FAR and ORPA guerrillas, since 1982 loosely allied under the banner of the National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (Unioń Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteco or URNG), remained in the field until the 1996 peace treaty but were militarily and politically significant in only certain areas: the FAR in the Peteń jungle; the EGP in the northwest highlands, principally northern Quiche´ and Huehuetenango; and the ORPA around Solola´, San Marcos and Esquintla, with a very small presence in Huehuetenango as well. That they endured in these regions despite the defeat of their allies in El Salvador and Nicaragua is one indication of some degree of popular support. I will now examine the marketing structures of western Guatemala to see how the insurgents fared in each system. Dendritic Marketing Systems and Insurgency Dendritic systems are the absolute worst environments for peasants to prosper economically. It is in these systems that one would logically expect the strongest peasant support for system-changing revolutionary movements. I have found evidence to support this thesis. Both Carmack and Smith provide maps in which they identified, in Carmack’s words, ‘areas of concentration’ of the EGP and ORPA.28 What is striking is that the area of concentration for the EGP was located exclusively in the dendritic region of northern Quiche´ and Huehuetenango. This is the only area of the country where the insurgency openly administered villages, totaling as of 1992, approximately 17,000–23,000 individuals.29 These ‘Communities of Population in Resistance’ (CPRs) were concentrated in the northern Quiche´ highlands (Ixil country) and even further north in the Ixcan jungle. Manz cites CPRs of up to 400 inhabitants each.30 An army offensive conducted by some 2,000 soldiers in 1987 failed to eliminate the CPRs.31 Heavy fighting was reported between the EGP and the army in 1989 as the latter tried to cut supply lines between the Ixcań jungle and Mexico.32 Stoll estimates that 15,000 Ixil Indians died in massacres or starved in the nearby mountains and jungles.33 Near Nebaj, two columns of the EGP regularly probed the army’s defenses.34 Seven hundred Guatemalan soldiers were permanently stationed in Nebaj, the major town in Ixil country, a commitment of troops that underlines the regime’s concern with the governability of the region.35 One Indian religious authority estimates that at least half the population of the ‘Ixil Triangle’ (the 888-square-mile area around the Ixil towns of Nebaj,


71

Cotzal and Chajul) gave material aid to the EGP between 1979 and 1986, with a further 30 per cent secretly sympathetic.36 The EGP is said to have fielded two fronts (200 combatants apiece) and six 20-man columns in northern Quiche´. The Ho Chi Minh Front operated in two sections, with the assistance of the independent columns, in the Ixil Triangle. At least seven villages were under its control as of 1989. Further to the north in the Ixcań jungle was the area of operations for the Ernesto Che Guevara Front. Smaller detachments operated in the Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz and Huehuetenango, reportedly foraging as far south as Chimaltenango and Sacatepequez.37 Most of the 150,000 refugees who fled to Mexico reportedly originated from the dendritic regions of Huehuetenango and Quiche´. Manz38 lists 46 abandoned villages in northern Huehuetenango alone, the inhabitants fleeing to escape the Guatemalan army. Although exact levels of support are impossible to verify, the available evidence indicates high levels of support for the EGP in the dendritic regions of northern Quiche´ and Huehuetenango. I will now turn to the neighboring top-heavy system of Totonicapań to examine evidence of the insurgency’s fortunes in that system. Top-Heavy Marketing Systems and Insurgency ‘Totonicapań played little active role in the most recent revolutionary struggle’, wrote Smith, who goes on to note that unlike most Indian communities, Totonicapań is relatively wealthy.39 Totonicapań is the center of the top-heavy marketing system of western Guatemala. Few Indians have to seek seasonal employment on the south coast and no anti-market or anti capitalist counter-hegemony exists in the region.40 Carmack reports that in the town of Momostenango the Indians expressed no sympathy for the guerrillas of the 1960s, and that during the 1970s the townspeople were described as ‘strongly anticommunist’.41 In the 1980s, ‘Momostenango’s involvement in the politics of insurgency and counterinsurgency has been limited compared to that of many other highland communities.’42 Carmack does report that during the early 1980s ORPA operatives sometimes came to Momostenango to paint slogans at night. Some sympathy was reported among rural schoolteachers and cooperative movements. Buses traveling between Momostenango and San Francisco were sometimes stopped by ORPA. ORPA activity occurred both north and south of the town. An Indian from southern Quiche´ with a brother in the EGP reported that a Momostenango battalion existed within the ORPA. Momostenango officials claimed that two ORPA bands operated in the region. Carmack mentions rumors of rural Indian support for ORPA.43

72

William Yaworsky

Despite some ORPA activity in the region, the available evidence indicates far less popular support for insurgency in the top-heavy market system of Totonicapań than in the neighboring dendritic system of northern Quiche´. Both Smith and Carmack exclude Totonicapań from their maps of intensive insurgent activity.44 I have found no authors who mention Totonicapań as a hotbed of revolutionary fervor. Primate and Interlocking Systems Both Carmack and Smith diagram the ORPA as having operated in the volcanic mountain range that straddles both primate and interlocking market areas.45 This renders it problematic that of the two, primate systems are more conducive to the growth of insurgency. But what data I have indicate that the peoples of these regions were more proinsurgency than the top-heavy area and less supportive of the revolution than residents of dendritic regions. This finding is consistent with my overall argument. Both Jonas and Payeras speak of these regions as being more difficult than the dendritic (Quiche´) area for guerrillas to organize, recruit and penetrate.46 Payeras, a founder of the EGP, in particular recognized the differences in popular support found in these regions: ‘The news that an army of the poor was being formed in the Quiche´ mountains spread and many villages asked us to come to them... a constant stream of peasants sought out our local cells... our presence was a secret known to thousands’.47 In a striking contrast, Payeras’ description of organizing support in the primate region of the south coast reveals constant difficulties. He states that ‘our organization in the city, despite initial success, had not prospered...and on the southern coast implantation work was barely under way, despite many attempts to create an underground structure’.48 The EGP had the reputation of being the most singleminded in courting and organizing civilian constituencies. It was regarded as being the most powerful of Guatemala’s guerrilla armies.49 It operated primarily in the dendritic region. The ORPA, which had been more active in the primate south coast and interlocking Solola´, was regarded as being both militarily and politically weaker than the EGP. These observations are all consistent with my argument. How important were marketing systems in determining guerrilla activity? Payeras states that ‘we were in a world completely governed by the laws of commerce, and we soon discovered that the principle consequence of these laws was annual migration...on the coast the Indians picked coffee and cotton, cut cane, and returned to the village for the feast day, speaking Spanish, dressed like ladinos, and just as poor as when they left’.50 It is not surprising that the home areas of these


73

Indians show the strongest support for insurgency. On the coast, where migrant Indian laborers resided seasonally, the movement existed but was weaker. ORPA support was probably stronger in interlocking Solola´ than in top-heavy Totonicapań. Thousands of residents reportedly supported the ORPA51 in Solola´ with over 1,000 residents of nearby Santiago Atitlań dying violent deaths during the war. As late as 1987, well past the peak war years, gunshot wounds were listed as the third leading cause of death in Santiago Atitlań.52 Forty-odd ORPA guerrillas formed the Javier Tambriz Front and set up camp on the lower slopes of two nearby volcanoes, Toliman and Atitlań. In 1984 they blew up Atitlań’s municipal building, and in 1985 they killed the local military commissioner.53 In 1985 a British journalist spent time with the Xavier Tambriz Front on the western slope of Atitlań Volcano, reporting about 50 resolute guerrillas. Two years later a Norwegian adventurer confirmed their continued presence in the region. In 1989, 100 insurgents from the front occupied San Lucas Toliman, precipitating a minor skirmish with the army. The news of this skirmish was enthusiastically received by many Atiecos.54 In 1989 the Tambriz Front left the area and set up a new area of operations around Acatenango Volcano near Antigua. In 1992, guerrillas, presumably from ORPA, blew up the power lines in Solola´ and stopped buses around Antigua and Esquintla.55 At its peak in 1982, ORPA had over 1,500 militants concentrated primarily in Solola´.56 By 1993, their number had dropped to about 500 combatants.57 Both the EGP and ORPA tried any and all strategies to draw Indians into the struggle.58 As both groups tried various recruiting strategies, the EGP’s superior power was most likely a result of its more fertile area of operations: dendritic Quiche´. Discussion and Conclusions There is evidence that in Guatemala the insurgency had greatest popular support in the dendritic marketing region. I attribute this to the poor economic prospects of Indian peasants enmeshed in this system. Support for revolution appears to have been endemic but less powerful in the primate and interlocking systems. This was because Indian peasants were in the primate region only seasonally, and the interlocking region gave them fair economic prospects. Popular support for insurgency was clearly weakest in the top-heavy marketing system of Totonicapań, where Smith documents considerable economic vitality among local Indians. It is relevant to question if these correlations may indeed be spurious. The British military theorist of counterinsurgency, Robert Thompson,

74

William Yaworsky

offers a perspective that may partially explain Guatemalan guerrilla deployments. Thompson distinguishes three phases of insurgency. First is a ‘latent’ build-up phase characterized by quiet organizing and unwillingness on the part of insurgents to undertake armed action. The second ‘guerrilla’ phase commences when insurgents begin initiating limited ambushes and armed strikes. The third ‘conventional’ phase occurs when insurgents are powerful enough to fight the government out in the open in set-piece battle.59 Thompson also distinguished three zones of operations: urban populated areas, rural populated areas, and remote scarcely populated areas. There is a geographic factor in the division of the areas related to the distance from the power center. The first zone is the closest, the third is the furthest away. These zones of operation correspond to zones of control: the first zone is under army control, the second zone is disputed and the third zone is under control of the guerrillas. During the latent phase, Thompson recommends deploying counterinsurgency units in the third zone.60 Guatemala’s wartime balance of power roughly paralleled Thompson’s model. The FAR operated in the remote Peteń jungle, far away from populated centers. The EGP had its main presence in the remote Ixcań jungle and northern Quiche. ORPA operated in the high volcanic mountain range on the fringe of populated areas. Hence, one could argue that these deployments are just coincidental with marketing systems. Thompson never pretended to explain in which zones we may expect insurgent movements to gain the most support. For example, Thompson’s model would offer no guideposts for explaining the conservative attitudes displayed and concomitant rejection of ORPA in Totonicapań; nor would his model address the issue of why the rebels were popular in neighboring districts. A market-based analysis helps explain these riddles while also providing a context that has been undervalued in the published literature of peasant rebellions. Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank Ross Hassig for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.

NOTES 1. Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp. 117–46. 2. The ‘peasant’ concept remains problematic in contemporary anthropological theory. Traditionally defined as subordinate, subsistence agriculturalists in state-level societies whose surpluses are transferred to elites, most observers now acknowledge that many rural


3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

75

agriculturalists hitherto categorized as peasants actually rely on a strategy of occupational multiplicity, especially that involving petty craft production and migratory wage labor. See de Janvrey et al., Mexico’s Second Reform, pp. 203–205; Silverman, ‘Peasant Concept’, pp. 49–69; and Wolf, ‘Vicissitudes’, pp. 325–9, for critical discussion of the peasant concept. Jenkins, Why Peasants Rebel, pp. 467– 514; Paige, Agrarian Structure, pp. 1–71. Skocpol, States, pp. 201–205. Leites & Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, pp. 28–45; Stoll, Between Two Armies, pp. 2–21; Stoll, Rigoberta Menchu, pp. 63–6. Burgos-Debray, I, Rigoberta Menchu, pp. 122 –3. Grenier, ‘Etiology’, pp. 1 –3; Popkin, Rational Peasant, pp. 17–31; Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas, pp. 302– 26. Scott, Moral Economy, pp. 1–17; Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 169. Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 169. Scott, Moral Economy, pp. 1– 17. E.g., Williams, Export Agriculture, pp.129–34. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas, p. 305. Johnson, The Organization of Space, pp. 83–91; Wolf, Peasants, p. 41; Christaller, Central Places, pp. 14–26. Smith, ‘Examining Stratification Systems’, pp. 95 – 122; Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp. 117 –46. Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp.117–46. Don Hamilton, former director of public relations in the US embassy in wartime El Salvador, states that some largely accurate polling was conducted in that nation documenting public attitudes towards the insurgents (personal communication to the author, 10 Jan. 2005). However, neither of us knows of any similar data available for civil war era Guatemala. Ball, Kobrak & Spirer, State Violence in Guatemala, pp. 1 –10; Lovell, Surviving Conquest, pp. 25–57. Falla, Massacres, p. 183. Carmack, Rebels, pp. 368–73; Smith, pp. 205–29. Beals, Oaxaca, pp. 114– 33; Hassig, Valley of Mexico, pp. 67–84; Kyle, ‘Burros to Buses’, pp. 411– 32; Malinowski & de La Fuente, Economics, pp. 82–92; Yaworsky, Nongovernmental Organizations, pp. 82–95. See Christaller, Central Places; Hassig, Trade, Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, p. 120. Johnson, The Organization of Space, pp. 83–91. Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp. 117–46. Ibid. p. 124. Skinner, ‘Marketing in Rural China’, pp. 3 –43; Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp. 117–46; Wolf, Peasants, p. 41. Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, p. 124. Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp. 117–46. Carmack, Rebels, p. 370; Smith, ‘Introduction’, p. 11. Stoll, Between Two Armies, p. 233. Manz, ‘Epilogue’, pp. 191–211. Ibid. Stoll, Between Two Armies, p. 7. Ibid. p. 233. Ibid. p. 6. Manz, Refugees, p. 99. Perera, Unfinished Conquest, p. 86. The assertion that the population displayed long-standing, high levels of sympathy for the rebels is challenged by Stoll, Between Two Armies, pp. 2–21, who contends that popular support was fleeting at best and largely confined to the years of 1980–82. By the time of his fieldwork (1989), Stoll finds Indian peasants in a state of guarded neutrality. Stoll’s analysis has been referred to as a ‘coercion-conquest’ model (following Leites & Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, pp. 28– 45) for emphasizing guerrilla intimidation of potential recruits. Arias, ‘Changing Indian Identity’, p. 254. Manz, Refugees, p. 89. Smith, ‘Class Position’, p. 209.

76 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

William Yaworsky Ibid. p. 217. Carmack, Rebels, pp. 368–70. Ibid. p. 369. Ibid. pp. 372–3. Ibid. p. 370; Smith, ‘Introduction’, p. 11. Carmack., Rebels, p. 370; Smith, ‘Introduction’, p. 11. Jonas, Battle for Guatemala, p. 133; and Payeras, Days of the Jungle, pp. 67–72. Payeras, Days of the Jungle, 71– 72. Ibid. Jonas, Battle for Guatemala, p. 137; Arias, ‘Changing Indian Identity’, p. 254. Payeras, Days of the Jungle, pp. 67; 72. Perera, Unfinished Conquest, p. 179. Ibid. p. 171. Ibid. p. 186. Ibid. p. 209. Yaworsky, ‘Central American Journal’, p. 8. Perera, Unfinished Conquest, p. 191. Ibid. Smith, ‘Conclusion’, p. 267. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 104. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 50; 104; 111 –13.

References Arias, Arturo. ‘Changing Indian identity: Guatemala’s violent transition to modernity’, in: Carol A. Smith (ed.), Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540 to 1988, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990. Ball, Patrick, Kobrak, Paul and Herbert F. Spirer. ‘State violence in Guatemala 1960–1996: a quantitative reflection’, Internet document accessed online at http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ ciidh/qr/english/index.html (accessed 16 August 2004). Science and Human Rights Data Center, 1999. Beals, Alan, The Peasant Marketing System of Oaxaca, Mexico, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975. Burgos-Debray, E. (ed.), I, Rigoberta Menchu´: Indian Woman of Guatemala, London: Verso, 1984. Carmack, Robert, Rebels of Highland Guatemala: The Quiche Mayas of Momostenango, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995. Christaller, Walther, Central Places in Southern Germany, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966. De Janvrey, A., Gordillo, G. and E. Sadulet, Mexico’s Second Agrarian Reform: Household and Community Responses, 1990–1994, La Jolla, CA: University of California Press, 1997. Falla, Ricardo, Massacres in the Jungle: Ixcań, Guatemala, 1975– 1982, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Grenier, Yvon. ‘From causes to causers: the etiology of Salvadoran internal war revisited’, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol.16, No.2,1997. Hamilton, Donald, Pers. comm. to the author, 10 Jan. 2005. Hassig, Ross, Trade, Tribute, and Transportation: The Political Economy of the Sixteenth Century Valley of Mexico, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985. Jenkins, J. Craig. ‘Why do peasants rebel? Structural and historical theories of rebellions’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol.88, No.3,1982, pp.467–514. Johnson, E., The Organization of Space in Developing Countries, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.


77

Jonas, Susanne, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Kyle, Chris. ‘From burros to buses: transport efficiency and economic development in Guerrero, Mexico’, Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol.52,1996, pp.411–32. Lovell, W. George. ‘Surviving conquest: the Maya of Guatemala in historical perspective’, Latin American Research Review, Vol.23, No.2,1988, pp.25–57. Malinowski, B. and J. de la Fuente, La economia de un sistema de mercados en Me´xico, Mexico: Escuela Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, 1957. Manz, Beatriz, Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala, Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1988. Paige, Jeffrey, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World, New York: The Free Press, 1975. Payeras, Mario, Days of the Jungle: The Testimony of a Guatemalan Guerrillero, 1972–1976, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983. Perera, Victor, Unfinished Conquest: the Guatemalan Tragedy, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. Popkin, Samuel, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979. Scott, James, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976. Silverman, Sydel. ‘The peasant concept in anthropology’, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.7, No.1,1979, pp.49–69. Skinner, G. William. ‘Marketing and social structure in rural China’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.24,1964, pp.3– 43. Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Smith, Carol. ‘Examining stratification systems through peasant marketing arrangements: an application of some models from economic geography’, Man, Vol.10,1975, pp.95 –122. Smith, Carol. ‘How marketing systems affect economic opportunity in agrarian societies’. in: Halperin, R. and J. Dow (eds.), Peasant Livelihood: Studies in Economic Anthropology and Cultural Ecology, New York: Saint Martins Press, 1977. Smith, Carol. ‘Introduction: social relations in Guatemala over time and space’. Carol A., Smith (ed.), Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540 to 1988, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990. Smith, Carol. ‘Class position and class-consciousness in an Indian community: Totonicapan in the 1970s’, in: Carol A. Smith (ed.), Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540 to 1988, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990. Smith, Carol. ‘Conclusion: history and revolution in Guatemala’ in: Carol A. Smith (ed.), Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540 to 1988, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990. Stoll, David, Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Stoll, David, Rigoberta Menchu´ and the Story of all Poor Guatemalans, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. Thompson, Robert, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, London: Chatto and Windus, 1974. Wickham-Crowley, Timothy, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

78

William Yaworsky

Williams, Robert, Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central America, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. Wolf, Eric, Peasants, Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966. Wolf, Eric, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Wolf, Eric ‘The vicissitudes of the closed corporate peasant community’, American Ethnologist, Vol.13, No.2,1986, pp.325–9. Yaworsky, William, Central American Journal, Unpublished manuscript, 1992. On file in author’s archives. Yaworsky, William, Nongovernmental organizations in the highlands of Guerrero, Mexico, PhD dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 2002.