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Incommensurable paradigms, cognitive bias and the politics of marketing theory Mark Tadajewski Marketing Theory 2008; 8; 273 DOI: 10.1177/1470593108093557 The online version of this article can be found at: http://mtq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/3/273

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Volume 8(3): 273–297 Copyright © 2008 SAGE www.sagepublications.com DOI: 10.1177/1470593108093557

articles

Incommensurable paradigms, cognitive bias and the politics of marketing theory Mark Tadajewski School of Management, University of Leicester, UK

Abstract. This paper examines the treatment of paradigm incommensurability in marketing theory. It is not the first to tackle the issue, although I will argue that existing attempts to negotiate the incommensurability thesis fail on their misunderstanding of Kuhn’s work. I then highlight Kuhn’s own shifting position regarding the incommensurability thesis. Despite Kuhn’s proposal that incommensurability can be overcome, such a strategy would be risky in an environment where cognitive bias indicates a continued subscription to logical empiricism and behavioural scientific modes of inquiry. Key Words marketing theory multiple paradigm research paradigm incommensurability

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Introduction In the last 60 years, marketing theorists have on numerous occasions expressed concern regarding the scientific status of marketing. Central to the efforts of marketing theorists in making the discipline more scientific have been attempts to develop grand theories of marketing (e.g. Alderson, 1965), with theoretical contributions usually described in Alderson and Cox’s (1948) terms as the development of ‘general or abstract principles underlying the body of facts which comprise the field’ (1948: 137). Again and again, similar echoes about the nature of marketing theory can be found throughout the literature. MacInnis (2005) frames her account of the constitution of marketing theory in these terms: ‘There is general agreement in the philosophy of science that data or ideas are used to advance a theory, which is tested by data, which in turn leads to theory revision and additional testing through relevant methods and acquired data’ (MacInnis, 2005: 14; cf. Holbrook and O’Shaughnessy, 1988: 399). Extending this further, Hunt (1971) depicts marketing theory, citing Rudner, in terms of ‘systematically related sets of statements, including some law-like

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marketing theory 8(3) articles

generalizations, that . . . [are] empirically testable’ (1971: 65). On this interpretation, the successful end result of all scientific research should be the demonstration of ‘underlying uniformities or regularities among the phenomena that comprise its subject matter. The discovery of these underlying uniformities yields empirical regularities, law-like generalizations (propositions) and laws’ (Hunt, 1976: 26, emphases in original). While this perspective is widely subscribed to among the marketing community, marketing theory has not, Leone and Schultz (1980) lament, generated the number or variety of empirical generalizations found in the natural sciences. What is interesting about this theory development perspective is its widespread nature and the extent to which adherence to this logical empiricist approach is justified on the basis of ‘social consensus’ (Thompson, 1991, 1993). This strategy raises all kinds of questions that are not often explored in the marketing literature, with Thompson (1993) describing this justification, following Wittgenstein, as a type of ‘conjuring trick’. That is, certain beliefs are appealed to on the basis of their conventional sanction, with the result that ‘their socially contingent nature is obscured’ (Thompson, 1993: 330). ‘Marketing Theory’ does not have to refer to the charting of underlying regularities and the development of law-like generalizations (O’Shaughnessy, 1997; O’Shaughnessy and O’Shaughnessy, 2002). This is an approach to theory building that is based on a very specific philosophy of knowledge. It is, moreover, one that is rarely subject to critical scrutiny. As Whetten (1989) points out, this type of theorizing views the world as consisting of ‘objects’ and ‘causal relations’ about which it is possible to derive testable propositions and, in turn, develop comprehensive, falsifiable theory. Certainly, moves to falsify hypotheses or a given theory can, by and large, be applauded. Whether this actually occurs or should happen in practice is more contentious (Feyerabend, 1975; Ravetz, 1990). Despite such an uncritical reception, this logical empiricist, fallibilistic view represents ‘normal science’ in marketing theory (see Tadajewski, 2006a, 2006b). And lest there be any confusion, the type of ‘arrows and box’ theorizing seen to date has been useful in certain domains but it is only one approach to theorizing, not THE approach (Whetten, 1989). Testament to the limitations of this type of theorizing and theory development process has been the importation of philosophical and methodological approaches based on phenomenology, second and third wave feminism, hermeneutics, Critical Theory, post-structuralism and postmodernism. More recently, we are witnessing a new shift in this epistemological turn with various calls demanding research that refuses the limitations of mono-paradigm research in favour of multiple paradigms in a single study (Davies and Fitchett, 2001, 2005). The rationale behind the use of multiple rather than mono-paradigm analysis in developing marketing theory is that it is believed to facilitate conversations across research paradigms and in so doing provide a more comprehensive view of the foci phenomena than would ordinarily be available. If we bracket for the moment the incommensurability thesis (discussed below), multiple paradigm research, it is argued, can enable researchers to oscillate backwards and forwards between paradigms, reflecting on the research object (e.g. green consumer behav-


Incommensurable paradigms, cognitive bias and the politics of marketing theory Mark Tadajewski

iour) through a diverse range of paradigmatic lens (Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Kelemen and Hassard, 2003; Lewis and Grimes, 1999; Lewis and Kelemen, 2002). Despite the widely acknowledged support for multiple paradigm analysis among a burgeoning cadre of organization theorists, marketing theorists have yet to acknowledge the politics that lay behind Burrell and Morgan’s (1992 [1979]]) postulation of their version of the incommensurability thesis or the potential political issues that derive from negotiating incommensurability, in particular, Kuhn’s semantic incommensurability. This paper aims to rectify this state of affairs. I do so in the following way. I begin with a review of the available multiple paradigm research strategies. This review is necessary to provide the theoretical context that should, if Marsden and Littler’s (1998) argument that marketing and consumer research is less theoretically sophisticated than research in organization studies, is valid. Having outlined the way in which the incommensurability thesis and multiple paradigm analysis are currently being engaged with in organization studies, I turn to examine the treatment of incommensurability in marketing theory by paying close attention to three recently published papers: Davies and Fitchett (2005), Lowe et al. (2004) and Lowe et al. (2005). I outline the arguments made in these papers and return to the incommensurability thesis as it was presented initially by Kuhn – the view often used as the touchstone for problematizing incommensurability. I then chart the development of the incommensurability thesis in Kuhn’s middle and late period, showing how Kuhn gradually became aware of the awkward nature of his incommensurability argument. This excursion into the later Kuhn’s work is extremely timely given the lack of engagement with Kuhn’s more recent work across the management disciplines. As Weaver and Gioia (1994) argue, this ignorance of Kuhn’s later work is particularly embarrassing, given the extent to which Kuhn is invoked in the organization studies literature and, I would add, the marketing literature. In working through Kuhn’s later work, I critique the assumption made by Lowe et al. that arguments to ‘transcend incommensurability’ have not yet been put forward by showing how Kuhn increasingly graduated towards a position that espouses support for superempirical values that he suggests can be used to evaluate and compare theories. More specifically, I take issue with their representation of the incommensurability thesis, as well as their interpretation of Kuhn’s, and Burrell and Morgan’s work. I suggest that their interpretation of Kuhn, in particular, makes a number of claims that are problematic. Having examined the attempts to negotiate the incommensurability thesis put forward so far and found them wanting, I refrain from following Kuhn’s view that incommensurability can be negotiated and suggest that his attempt to bring super-empirical values into theory adjudication takes theory adjudication into the realm of underdetermination and politics. This, I conclude, makes theory adjudication an inherently questionable strategy, if we value pluralism, in a discipline wedded to logical empiricism.



Multiple paradigm analysis Because Davies and Fitchett (2005) have attempted to engage in a version of multiple paradigm analysis and that this is a new direction for marketing theory, it is perhaps best that I devote some time to review a representative sample of the more important studies and direct the reader to appropriate criticism. In general, the organization studies literature parses the available multiple paradigm research strategies in three distinct ways. First, the empirical research is undertaken in parallel or sequential fashion. Parallel multiple paradigm research applies each paradigm concurrently ensuring that each paradigm remains, due to the incommensurability thesis postulated by Burrell and Morgan (1992 [1979]), ‘mutually exclusive’. Each paradigm is used to contribute its own brand of insight and the researcher refuses to privilege one view as the correct perspective, thereby preserving the conflicts highlighted by each paradigm (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). Sequential studies, on the other hand, assume that paradigms are mutually complementary and that the representations developed from one paradigm can be used to inform the research undertaken from an alternative paradigmatic stance. This process is said to provide sequential levels of understanding that either build up on each other or otherwise cast a critical perspective on the previous analyses (Lewis and Grimes, 1999; Lewis and Kelemen, 2002; Schultz and Hatch, 1996). The exemplar study here is provided by Gioia et al. (1989) who used a functionalist, positivist framework to analyse communication and cognition in performance appraisal interviews. Having registered the limitations of this type of approach, Gioia et al. (1989) supplemented their initial functionalist research using an interpretive stance as a means of triangulating their original findings and thereby provide a ‘more complete’ view of the discursive and non-discursive mechanisms involved in performance appraisal (Gioia et al., 1989: 509). The problem with the above strategies that Lewis and Grimes diagnose is that existing empirical ‘studies often give limited methodological detail and seldom build theory from their efforts’ (Lewis and Grimes, 1999: 673). As a counterweight, Lewis and Grimes present a theory-building strategy that draws insight from multiple paradigms by exploring ‘divergent theoretical views, challenging taken-for-granted assumptions, and portraying organizations in new light’ (Lewis and Grimes, 1999: 673). In methodological terms, this theory-building process requires researchers to work their way through the various paradigmatic perspectives while trying to entertain the ‘conflicting’ and often ‘paradoxical’ views that each presents. This is done in order to explore the divergent themes that emerge from the literature and empirical data and in so doing, to stimulate a certain degree of ‘internal dialogue’ (within the researcher or among the research team) between paradigms (Schultz and Hatch, 1996). Lewis and Grimes (1999) provide us with an example of this approach in a case study of a ‘complex and multifaceted’ phenomenon, namely, Advanced Manufacturing Technology1 (AMT). This topic is used by Lewis and Grimes as their focus because they argue that it is suited to multiple paradigm research, since AMT has been examined across the range of paradigm literature (functionalist, interpretive,



radical humanist, radical structuralist) and there had yet to be any ‘agreed consensus’ across this intellectual terrain as to the central features of the AMT process. Adopting a ‘metaparadigm’ perspective, they first examined the available literature using the Burrell and Morgan (1992 [1979]) typology as a framing mechanism. Following this, they turned to existing case studies, applying each paradigm lens in turn, reporting each case study according to ‘paradigmatic convention’. This process, they posited, enabled them to produce ‘multidimensional theory’ (for a full description of the actual ‘metaparadigm’ theory-building approach see Lewis and Grimes, 1999). Such a radical approach to theory building was likely to attract its fair share of criticism (see Burrell, 1997; Deetz, 1996; Kelemen and Hassard, 2003; Lewis and Grimes, 1999; Lewis and Kelemen, 2002; Parker and McHugh, 1991; Scherer, 1998). What is important to note at this time, however, is that multiple paradigm analysis has not to date actually negotiated the incommensurability thesis in any ‘serious philosophical fashion’ (Hunt, 2003); Hunt is quite correct, therefore, where he notes in reference to Ozanne and Hudson’s (1989) examination of the incommensurability thesis, that incommensurability only becomes problematic when a choice has to be made between the outputs of paradigmatic inquiry. To take one example from the multiple paradigm approaches above: sequential multiple paradigm analysis does not raise any specific issues in relation to the incommensurability thesis discussed by the early Kuhn (1962), in that there is no attempt to translate the theory produced according to the dictates of each paradigm on a point-by-point basis and from this, adjudicate between knowledge claims. Nor would a sequential analyst engage in a radically different anthropological movement through the various paradigms from Burrell and Morgan (1992 [1979]), who themselves moved through each paradigm in turn, outlining the possible contribution of each. Having indicated the rationale and various approaches utilized in relation to multiple paradigm analysis in organization studies, I will now focus attention on the most recent attempts to question the incommensurability thesis in marketing.

The treatment of incommensurability in marketing theory In their recently published series of articles, Lowe et al. (2004, 2005) have examined the paradigm concept and the incommensurability thesis. In their first paper, they state the purpose of their work to be a review of ‘the notion of paradigms within marketing . . . We review Kuhn’s (1962) original conception and comment upon the seminal contributions of Arndt (1985)’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1057). Now, given the ambiguity of Kuhn’s paradigm concept we might expect Lowe et al. to have some difficulty defining it; they do not, providing a definition that equates a paradigm with ‘one dominant theory’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1057). Their interpretation does, we should note, differ somewhat from Kuhn’s. While I will discuss Kuhn’s paradigm concept in detail below, for now I want to point out that Kuhn defines a paradigm as a theoretical structure that is comprised of a



network of conceptual, methodological and theoretical assumptions (Kuhn, 1962). Returning to Lowe et al.’s work, the central argument in their 2004 and 2005 papers is that they believe it is possible to ‘map’ the epistemic organization of marketing theory as a form of ‘living system’ whose essential characteristics require clarification, so that greater conversation between incommensurable paradigms can take place. Using Capra’s ‘triad of process, pattern and structure’, they argue that mapping existing contributions to marketing theory onto Capra’s triad ‘enables us to readily see how contributions to various topics in marketing have been paradigmatically informed and we can readily see the “spaces” that are untouched and unvisited by previous contributors to the field’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1059). Lowe et al.’s most important statement for our purposes is that ‘paradigmapping enables the researcher to implement research strategies that can transcend damaging “incommensurability” arguments and include strategic options that can be characterized as “paradigm parochialism”, “paradigm planting”, “paradigm sliding”, “paradigm crossing” or “paradigm transcendence”’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1062). Parochialism, of course, refers to the idea that each paradigm community will support their own paradigm in the face of opposing paradigms. Planting is Lowe et al.’s label for noting further avenues for research (i.e. where new ‘paradigms’ can be introduced to marketing). Paradigm sliding ‘involves [the] attempted integration of contributions . . . to create new knowledge’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1062). Drawing from Schultz and Hatch (1996) and Lewis and Grimes (1999), Lowe et al. then outline ‘paradigm crossing’. What this entails is that researchers register that, contra Kuhn (1962), oscillation between multiple paradigms is possible (Lowe et al., 2004: 1062). Their final strategy is ‘paradigm transcendence’. This approach marks a ‘conscious attempt to transcend the “incommensurability” debate in management subjects’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1062). Capra’s approach, they suggest, ‘draws our attention to the fact epistemes are themselves culture bound’ (Lowe et al., 2004: 1062), that is, paradigmatic beliefs are characteristically shared and systematic. Having drawn out the main points of the 2004 paper, let us turn to their more recent publication and see how they further extend their initial ideas. In contrast to their first paper, Lowe et al. (2005) shift their focus away from the work of Thomas Kuhn and pay much greater attention to that of Burrell and Morgan. This is perhaps not surprising given the importance of Burrell and Morgan’s (1992 [1979]) work. Contrary to their earlier analysis, which ignored Burrell and Morgan entirely, Lowe et al. now make the case that ‘[t]he debate in the discourse over paradigms and their incommensurability owes much of its framing and origin to a work by Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan’ (Lowe et al., 2005: 186). They continue, ‘It was this work that stimulated a discourse in organization studies . . . that appropriated Kuhnian terms (Kuhn, 1962) “paradigm” and “incommensurability’’’ (Lowe et al., 2005: 186). Now, this raises the issue of heritage. Who is appropriating what in this instance? Are Burrell and Morgan appropriating Kuhn’s terms and their content? Or simply the terms? Or are other people misreading Burrell and Morgan as



appropriating ‘paradigm’ and ‘incommensurability’ in this way? Burrell is quick to respond to any assertion that he and Morgan appropriated the content of Kuhn’s concepts. As he has repeatedly argued, his and Morgan’s interest in Kuhn’s writings stemmed from his providing a politicized vocabulary at whose centre was the idea that a once dominant and seemingly insurmountable paradigmatic group could be overthrown (Burrell, 1997). In adopting Kuhn’s concept of paradigm, but ‘not using Kuhnianism in any faithful way’ (Burrell, 1997: 33), Burrell and Morgan asserted that they broadened Kuhn’s definition to ‘emphasise the commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social theory within the bounds of the same problematic’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1992 [1979]: 23). In a further movement away from Kuhn, Burrell and Morgan do not see the paradigm concept as referring to opposing substantive explanations, but instead to ideal types of opposing meta-theoretical assumptions. Nor do they envisage their version of the incommensurability thesis as a problem in itself. Rather, Burrell and Morgan made the case for the mutual exclusivity of their four paradigms in order to protect the less theoretically and politically developed paradigms from the imperialistic tendencies that they associated with functionalism. Despite such ambiguity in their attempt to theoretically situate the paradigm concept and incommensurability (which therefore operate on an entirely different register from their first paper), Lowe et al. (2005) continue by calling into question the incommensurability thesis as it is represented by Burrell and Morgan (1992 [1979]), arguing that Burrell and Morgan’s parsing of social theory into four distinct and mutually exclusive paradigms produces a ‘condition of incommensurability’ (Lowe et al., 2005: 187). Here, then, Lowe et al. (2005) are discussing incommensurability as it was presented by Burrell and Morgan (1992 [1979]) and not, as Lowe et al. (2004) attempted to discuss it, against Kuhn’s work (1962). Putting this nuance aside, Lowe et al. (2005) then draw upon an argument presented in Hassard (1990) and Phillips (1977) when they suggest that Wittgenstein’s discussion of language games provides a further basis for a critique of incommensurability. Their point is simple, but apparently decisive, in that they suggest Wittgenstein argues that we engage in language games where language is a product of human activity and, simultaneously, is a producer of meaning. Such thinking might suggest that paradigms represent a particular language game, but they are capable of being straddled because they are derived from the more generic and primitive everyday language games [i.e. everyday language]. (Lowe et al., 2005: 187)

The linkage of Wittgenstein and Kuhn here is interesting. It is interesting because it replicates a similar movement made in the organization studies literature and in equal measure conflates Kuhn’s conception of paradigm with that of Wittgenstein’s language games. Kuhn’s paradigm concept was meant to indicate that paradigm communities are separated by, among other issues, the view of the world subscribed to by paradigm adherents – hence Kuhn’s repeated ontological gestures (i.e. the world changes thesis). Wittgenstein’s concept of language games,



on the other hand, is used to sensitize his reader to the use of language. So, in this conflation, Lowe et al. neglect to register that although ‘there are similarities to be found between Kuhn’s (1970a) notion of “paradigm” and Wittgenstein’s (1958) notion of “language games” there is as much separating them as uniting them’ (Mauws and Phillips, 1995: 328). In this move from paradigm to language games, Lowe et al. reduce issues of ontology to the use of language. But they do not stop there. Taking this point further, Lowe et al. emphasize that since we have an everyday language which forms the bedrock for any other activities, including the learning of scientific ‘language games’, then ‘incommensurability can be seen to be both epistemologically and ontologically unsustainable’. This will, of course, depend upon whose interpretation of incommensurability we decide to focus upon (i.e. Kuhn’s or Burrell and Morgan’s). What is fundamentally questionable in Lowe et al.’s (2005) argument, if we take their invocation of Wittgenstein as serious, is their move to overcome incommensurability at an empirical, language-learning level, so that the original Kuhnian interpretation of incommensurability as involving issues of meaning attribution is reduced to a problem of two individuals hailing from different paradigms understanding each other. They neglect to note that Kuhn (1970a) proposed that an individual can comprehend an account of scientific practice provided by someone who had adopted a different paradigmatic perspective. What is at issue, therefore, in relation to incommensurability is the extent to which people with very different belief systems can possibly reconcile their differences and whether or not – presumably not, given the social constructionist orientation seen to underpin the use of the language games concept in organization studies (Böhm, 2006; Mauws and Phillips, 1995) – the politically powerful have greater opportunities to define the nature of intellectual discourse. This is an issue that Davies and Fitchett (2005) also neglect to consider in detail in their methodological comparison of ‘positivist’ and interpretive studies.

Methodological comparison = negotiation of incommensurability? Davies and Fitchett’s (2005) study is novel in that they attempt to examine the incommensurability thesis at the ‘work-bench’ level (Anderson, 1986). They acknowledge that the different research traditions can communicate and understand each other – Anderson’s (1986) ‘weak’ incommensurability – while registering that paradigm disagreements are often as strong inside research communities ‘as they are between them’ (Davies and Fitchett, 2005: 276). While they and other marketing scholars support the possibility and potential benefits that accrue from multiple paradigm analysis, Davies and Fitchett are aware of the difficulties associated with the use of multiple paradigms. Perhaps the most important of these relates to the task of ‘assigning equal value and weight to different traditions and methods [which] is often considered problematic due to arguments regarding the apparent lack of common criteria to judge their quality’ (Davies and Fitchett, 2005: 275).



This issue is made more complicated by the fact that within marketing there is an ‘absence of a unified or authoritative paradigmatic position and subsequent lack of a commonly agreed consensus to define mechanisms of evaluation’ (Davies and Fitchett, 2005: 278). This absence means that difference of opinion has escalated into conflict and paradigm ‘war’. This conflict would appear, Davies and Fitchett opine, to be consistent with what the history and philosophy of science would lead us to expect. They assert that ‘current debates in the philosophy of science would seem to imply that positivists and interpretivists should be at odds, in everyday practice this is not necessarily the case’ (Davies and Fitchett, 2005: 276). An error of omission here is that historically these groups have indeed been ‘at odds’ even on a practical level. We could point to Hirschman’s (1989) comments on the acrimoniousness of the paradigm debate, Hunt’s (1991) reference to the ‘spirited nature’ of this debate or the problems interpretive researchers have faced in actually getting their research published or ‘fairly’ evaluated (e.g. Belk, 1995; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1993) and the strategies they adopted in the face of such pressures (e.g. Shankar and Patterson, 2001). There are indeed, as Anderson (1986) argued, intellectual disagreements that cannot easily be resolved. As a means to ameliorate such fractious intellectual argumentation, Davies and Fitchett continue in their journey away from the history and philosophy of science towards a methodologically driven exercise intended to overcome incommensurability. As they outline their project, ‘The primary methodological motivation is to address the issue of incommensurability in two research traditions by employing a data-driven agenda’ (Davies and Fitchett, 2005: 278). By comparing and contrasting the research outputs of two different paradigmatic ‘bases’, they emphasize their desire to ‘compare respective assumptions and justifications, and to identify agreement and disagreement in the main findings’ (Davies and Fitchett, 2005: 278). The two approaches they use were consistent with the paradigmatic orientation frequently adopted in multiple paradigm research studies in that study A was positivist and study B was interpretive. Their strategy for determining whether the incommensurability thesis was valid or not was to analyse the textual output of these two studies by way of a discourse analytic identification of the ‘common “codes” or tropes’ in said material. Now what could be problematic about the use of discourse analysis to examine the incommensurability thesis? The major issue which flaws their attempt to critique the incommensurability thesis is that they do not compare and contrast the whole set of assumptions that underpin one paradigm against another at a theoretical level. They switch their attention to methodology, arguing that it is the methodologies that they adopt, i.e. a quantitative modelling approach and interpretive approach, which are incommensurable. Specific methodologies are not necessarily connected with a particular paradigmatic perspective, but there will be philosophical assumptions operating under any research project that will, as a matter of course, influence how compelling the theoretical and empirical arguments proffered will be to an intellectual gatekeeper. Certain methodologies will, for specific paradigmatic positions, not be compelling and thus will falter in the evaluation process.



Moreover, the values that scholars will use to evaluate the empirical content will differ. In other words, Davies and Fitchett (2005) privilege discourse – the specific words – without factoring in their earlier analysis of the structure of the academy to draw out the political nature of theory choice. They therefore elide the importance of the values incommensurability operating under the evaluation of empirical analysis, that is, how the value of a particular form of paradigmatic inquiry is determined, how a contribution to knowledge is established and how certain forms of inquiry are marginalized. When a situation of values incommensurability exists, the main issue is not whether different value-codes are incommensurable, that is, whether the terms of one code cannot be translated into other codes. The debate about the incommensurability of value focuses on whether it is, at least in principle, possible to measure and rank all options and items with regard to their value. And if not, how should we deal with incommensurable options? Do incommensurable options preclude rational choices? (Hoyningen-Huene and Schaber, 2003: 7)

These are some of the issues that I will begin to explore in this paper. The next section will examine Kuhn’s discussion of incommensurability in his middle and late periods. I demonstrate how Kuhn argues that researchers can oscillate between paradigms and offers paradigm independent criteria for theory adjudication between the outputs of two paradigms.

Incommensurability In its original incarnation, Kuhn’s formulation of incommensurability was based on the assumption that there was no ‘neutral algorithm of theory-choice’, that is, no ‘decision-making procedure which, when properly applied, must always lead each individual in the paradigm community to the same decision’ (Kuhn, 1970a: 200). It is this presupposition that there will be some conflict between paradigms that is of central importance for Kuhn. However, if paradigms are indeed rivals, as Kuhn likes to assert, such rivalry would require a shared perspective that identifies them as rivals and this, Davidson (2001: 184) has argued, demands that there will be some semantic and methodological continuity. Here, then, we would appear to be at an important point in the argument for multiple paradigm analysis and theory adjudication. It is Kuhn’s later work that will, as I shall show, shed light on the issue of incommensurability; writings which have hitherto been largely ignored in marketing and consumer research (although Holbrook [1997] is an exception). In his later work, Kuhn registered the problems highlighted by Davidson (among others) and sought to negotiate them. For example, Kuhn (1990) undermines the original version of his incommensurability thesis. He does this by explicitly drawing the relationship between language learning and paradigm education even closer, stressing the similarities between the practice of science and learning and using an everyday language (Von Dietze, 2001). However, we cannot simply translate the language of one taxonomical lexicon into that of another à la Davies and Fitchett (2001, 2005). Instead what we need to do is learn a new



language entirely, because even if the terms may appear the same, the meaning system in which they are embedded will differ (Sankey, 1997; Sankey and Hoyningen-Huene, 2001). What Kuhn suggests here is not that incommensurability poses intractable problems (Kuhn, 1970b), but that scientists actually try to learn languages that would otherwise appear foreclosed to them, assuming of course, that paradigm subscription were really as ideologically binding as some believe (e.g. Hirschman, 1986). There is more pragmatism to knowledge production than Hirschman (1986) would like to acknowledge and on occasion we have no choice but to shift paradigms. Thus Kuhn asserts that what we need here is a (marketing) theorist who is lexically bilingual and understands the historical development of the debates they comment upon and can help others to comprehend alternative modes of thought (Kuhn, 1970b). Talking about the transmission of theoretical concepts from one generation to another, Kuhn says we inherit our current theory and practices from our immediate predecessors and these concepts are ‘a historical product, embedded in the culture to which current practitioners are initiated by training’ (Kuhn, 1991b: 122). It should come as no surprise that these concepts are not wholly incommensurable; they can be understood and there will be some degree of translation by virtue of the lexicons that are learned via scientific training. This means that it is possible for scientists to become adept at the hermeneutic decoding of a range of taxonomical lexicons in much the same way as ‘anthropologists and historians’ immerse themselves in ‘alien cultures’ (Kuhn, 1970b). Consequently, a scientist will not move from one paradigm to another in one direction only, but will retain the ability to shift forwards and backwards, from one lexicon to the other, and back again (Kuhn, 1987). Although, I should add that Kuhn (1970b) does say that only the ‘most able’ scientists will be able to do this. The implication of Kuhn’s later work is that the incommensurability thesis is consequently transformed from the way it is generally depicted in marketing theory where a strict incommensurability is generally assumed (e.g. Lowe et al., 2004). In contrast, Kuhn supports a far more limited version of the incommensurability thesis namely, semantic incommensurability (Nola and Sankey, 2007; Sankey, 1994, 1997; Von Dietz, 2001).

Semantic incommensurability In diluting his methodological incommensurability thesis so that some comparison of frameworks is possible, Kuhn moves us closer to comparing different paradigms. Rather than seeing incommensurable languages as untranslatable, Kuhn maintains that this process is extremely complex, but is still possible in certain respects (Kuhn, 1970b; Sharrock and Read, 2002). No longer does he place the stricture on theory comparison that this must take place through the use of a theory neutral algorithm or otherwise be reducible to a common language (Sankey, 1994). Instead, Kuhn asserts a weak version of semantic incommensurability, so that there may be some limited meaning variance between taxonomical lexicons,



which means, in turn, that there might be certain terms that are untranslatable (Kuhn, 1970b, 1983). Nonetheless, even if this is so, it still remains the case, Kuhn argues (1970b, 1990, 1991a), that despite the untranslatability of certain terms on a one-to-one correspondence, it is still possible for the scientist to understand the general thrust of the statement made (Kuhn, 1991a). A failure to translate one language into another, in other words, does not necessarily mean that we fail to understand what has been said (Kuhn, 1970b; MacIntyre, 1989; Sankey, 1994), but simply that this process of translation and understanding is complicated, since logically, if an attempt is made to provide, as evidence of untranslatability, various examples of expressions of the untranslatable language, then such an attempt will undermine the claim of untranslatability (Davidson, 2001). In practice, what this suggests is that scientists will have a substantial number of ways by which they can compare competing theories (Nola and Sankey, 2007; Toulmin, 1972). These will range from the various values that Kuhn (1977) discusses (accuracy, consistency, scope, fruitfulness, etc.) to the use of old theory that can be used to assess the approximate contribution of new perspectives (Nola and Sankey, 2007; Sankey, 1994). As an example of the kinds of values he means, Kuhn proposes that those puzzle solutions that are likely to be appealing across taxonomical lexicons are those which demonstrate their simplicity and are ‘self consistent, . . . plausible, [and] compatible . . . with other theories being deployed’ (Kuhn, 1970a: 185; cf. Feyerabend, 1978). These kinds of criteria facilitate theory choice while still retaining a certain degree of interpretational flexibility. It is this interpretive flexibility that will make these judgments more complex, since judgments ‘of accuracy are relatively, though not entirely stable from one group to another and from one member to another in a particular group’ (Kuhn, 1970a: 185). More difficult are ‘judgments of simplicity, consistency, plausibility, and so on [which] often vary from individual to individual’ (Kuhn, 1970a: 185). Here Kuhn cites the debate between Einstein and Bohr, which he appears to suggest highlights how fundamental epistemological and ontological differences may stultify debate (see also Toulmin, 1972: 103–4). His use of the paradigmatic transformation of classical physics to quantum physics is of interest here precisely because what it highlights is contrary to what Kuhn suggests, in that it gives us an exemplar case of productive dialogue. Indeed, Bohr and Einstein discussed every step in this debate (Feyerabend, 1999a; Hoyningen-Heune, 1995; Toulmin, 1972).

Towards values incommensurability Having now demonstrated how Kuhn moves away from his restrictive ‘methodological incommensurability’ (Sankey, 1994) thesis towards a less restrictive argument that leaves room for the learning of multiple languages, we are now in a position to show how this inter-paradigm movement can be augmented with the ability to adjudicate between theories. What I have argued so far is that Kuhn attempts to distance himself from his original incommensurability thesis in the



direction of a far more diluted semantic form. This changing emphasis on incommensurability highlights the extent to which certain values may frame the entire discipline rather than, as Kuhn (1962, 1970a) originally supposed, only within the mutually exclusive bounds of the research specialty. Despite Kuhn’s postulation of more global intellectual ‘values’, we are still in the precarious position of having theory choice underdetermined by empirical evidence, that is, any number of different theories or interpretations may fit a finite data set. What we require in this case is the ability to appeal to certain super-empirical values that can be used to adjudicate where the empirical evidence can support multiple interpretations (see Kuhn, 1970a, 1977; Popper, 1976, 1979; Toulmin, 1972). Kuhn asserts that these values can be ‘found’ by looking at those already in circulation in the intellectual community and he thereby brings us into the domain of politics. As Hirschman (1993) pointed out, marketing and consumer research is generally positivistic in tenor, and logical empiricism represents the philosophical assumption base of the largest group of scholars in the academy (Brown, 1998; Burton, 2001; McDonagh, 1995). In organization studies and, to a certain extent in consumer research (e.g. Calder and Tybout, 1987; cf. Holbrook and O’Shaughnessy, 1988), there have already been attempts to ‘manage’ pluralism via proposals that empirical falsification could determine the ‘correct’ paradigmatic view (e.g. McKelvey, 1997, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; cf. Calder and Tybout, 1987: 138). The difficulty with evaluation attempts such as those launched by McKelvey is that recent research in the psychology of science indicates that theory choice is not determined wholly on the basis of the ‘truth value’ of the findings; our own paradigmatic affiliations will be equally important in determining whether we accept the findings of a given argument or not, often in a very decisive way, and which is further compounded by one paradigm community possessing a dominant institutional position. Let us examine the evaluation of knowledge in marketing and tease out the consequences of the structure of the academy for theory choice.

The evaluation of knowledge Stephen Brown has been one of the most prolific commentators on the state of the peer review system and the politics that he sees operating in the academy. ‘Every published paper’ in the top tier of marketing journals, he writes, ‘is an outcome of political horse-trading’ (Brown, 2000: 365). The supposed objectivity of the peer review is no more than a chimera: higher ranking authors such as members of the professoriate have greater publishing success than post-doctoral students; men publish more frequently than women; and Western scholars, especially US based academics, find access to publication outlets easier than ‘non-nationals’ – particularly ‘third-world’ academics (Brown, 1998). Publication opportunities are further enhanced by institutional affiliation, (i.e. when a journal is published at a specific university, scholars at the institution garner more publications in that outlet) and the nature of the findings will also be important to subsequent acceptance or



rejection (Brown, 1998; Mahoney, 1977), especially with regard to the extent that they support the paradigmatic presuppositions of the reviewers. Finally, well known academics are likely to be better received by editors than the unknowns of the academy (Brown, 1995b; 1998). If this seems too harsh, Brown is quick to affirm that some editors do permit ‘radical experimentation’ (Brown, 1995b; Staelin, 2005; cf. Holbrook and Hirschman, 1993: 43–59). ‘Social influence’ is not, as Easton (1995: 441) registers, ‘a monolithic force’. There will be people whose philosophical and methodological approaches diverge from those viewed as acceptable or appropriate by mainstream marketing scholars, but who still get their papers published (see Svensson, 2006). Nonetheless, this is a philosophical, conceptual and methodological pluralism that extends only so far, as we shall see. As Easton quite rightly acknowledges, there ‘are clearly forces for uniformity and forces for the diversity of opinion in any human population’ (Easton, 1995: 441). Despite Brown’s and Easton’s slight optimism about the state of intellectual ‘conversation’ in marketing, the peer review process, which will, of course, be the central mechanism in the evaluation of a particular paradigmatic perspective and/or any attempt at adjudication between ‘incommensurable’ paradigms, will be less helpful in determining what will count as a contribution to knowledge when scholars are competing for scarce resources (i.e. space in prestigious journals, see McAlister, 2005; Thompson, 2002). Beyond the illusion of objectivity in the peer review system, what we need to recognize in addition is that the attributes associated with a ‘marketing scientist’ (and I am not restricting this criticism to subscribers to logical empiricism) are also likely to be equally ephemeral as objectivity in peer review. What, then, are the attributes that many scientists and science teachers associate with the ideal scientist? Mahoney lists a number of characteristics that will cohere with most people’s mental image of a truth seeking scientist: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Objectivity and emotional neutrality; Rationality as evidenced by superior reasoning skills; Open-mindedness (suspension of judgement and willingness to change one’s opinion); Superior Intelligence; Integrity in data collection and reporting; and Communality (open and cooperative sharing of knowledge). (Mahoney, 1977: 350, emphases in original)

These are characteristics debunked by Mahoney (1977) as well as Feyerabend (1975, 1999a, 1999b) and Kuhn (1970a). We could point to the treatment of scholars such as Galileo, Velikovsky, Semmelweis and Kammerer to call into question the objectivity, emotional neutrality and open-mindedness of scientists of many persuasions (see, De Grazia, 1978; Fuller, 2005a, 2005b; Mahoney, 1977; Tadajewski, 2005). Certainly, it is hard not to feel at least some sympathy, particularly when we are on the receiving end of a bad review, for Horrobin’s (1982) view that the peer review system is the perfect opportunity for the ‘crooked’ to shoot down material competing for journal space without affording it the opportunity for wider circulation.



Most authors are aware that the chances that publication opportunities will be denied increase as they deviate from the rules of discursive formation that are adopted as common sense, received wisdom, ‘appropriately scientific’ and so on. By violating these rules of formation (i.e. epistemologically, methodologically, stylistically and so forth), an author does not move intellectual discourse onto a new plateau, more likely they will ostracize themselves (Feyerabend, 1999a; Shapin, 1995). Or to paraphrase Kuhn (1962, 1970a), their work will no longer be read or viewed as credible. While unusual, cases of intellectual closure and occasional mistreatment can be found in the marketing literature. The exemplar case is that of Gould (1991) and his subsequent treatment in the pages of the Journal of Consumer Research. As Brown (1998) saw the development of this case, the more I think about it, the more I am convinced that Steve Gould’s (1991) paper on selfmanipulation is the only authentic work of genius in the entire marketing canon. An introspective account of his sexual proclivities and their perceived relationship to product use, Gould’s paper has been condemned, derided, dismissed, belittled, mocked and held up as an exemplar of how not to write up a research project . . . Steve Gould, however, paid a very heavy price for this breakthrough (I understand his paper all but cost him tenure). What’s more he didn’t have the opportunity to defend his work against a critique that was . . . hostile and ill-informed. (Brown, 1998: 212, emphasis in original)

What this case should signal is that intellectual debate is governed by certain rules of discursive formation which ‘discipline the research process and condition what is to count as so-called scientific knowledge’ (De Cock and Jeanes, 2006: 22). That marketing theory should be mediated by politics is hardly surprising. All data require some form of interpretation and ‘whether scientific or not, [interpretation] is value-laden and hence political’ (Deetz, 2000: 735). All research will be political, Deetz posits, because it is value-laden, and if it was not invested with our personal, scientific, ethical and other values, it would not be a product of human endeavour. We each invest emotional energy in our research projects and as a result it would be distinctly naïve to believe that non-epistemic goals such as fame, academic prestige and career enhancement did not influence our decision making when evaluating other researchers’ papers. Perhaps we, as marketing scholars, have been less willing to accept such power/knowledge relations because of the traditionally scientistic nature of marketing theory (Willmott, 1999). Certainly, it appears that the disconnection of scientific activity and politics is a theme which runs deep in marketing. It would apparently be the case that apart from Davies and Fitchett (2005), who gesture to the politics of intellectual debate, the politics that underpin theory development and adjudication in marketing and guide paradigm affiliation are ignored, especially by Lowe et al. (2004, 2005). Given that marketing theory is predominantly logical empiricist in orientation inasmuch as representations of marketing thought have become more ‘scientific’ by adopting ‘the symbolism of advanced mathematics’ and the careful justification of research objectives (Kernan, 1995), there is concomitantly far less enthusiasm to attend to the processes of discovery or the power relations that mediate the acceptance or rejection of divergent paradigmatic thought (Murray and Ozanne, 1991, 1997). In this movement, the antag-



onistic dimension of marketing theory, the competition and the rivalry, is subject to elision. Failure to acknowledge the antagonism that can be found in many forms of scientific endeavour is, MacIntyre (1989: 184) indicates, an ‘impoverished view of the types of social and institutional circumstances’ that will, in this context, affect theory adjudication and the negotiation of the incommensurability thesis. Continuing in this vein, MacIntyre gestures towards the political nature of theory adjudication where he notes that The multiplicity of mutually irreconcilable standpoints concerning justification is one that each of us tends to recognize easily and even scornfully in other academic professions. But from within our own profession each of us characteristically views and describes the situation only from the specific point of view of his or her own commitments, judging the success and failure of other points of view from the standpoint afforded by standards of justification internal to our own. (MacIntyre, 1989: 197)

Nor is this a particularly radical view outside of the marketing academy (see also Svensson, 2005, 2006; Svensson and Wood, 2006). As MacIntyre sees it, one consequence of the multiplication of positions in relation to a wide variety of standpoints (i.e. paradigmatic positions in relation to their object/subject of interest) has been that none have been able to convincingly ‘provide the resources for their own final vindication and the overthrow of their own competitors’ (MacIntyre, 1989: 196). This is not to say that such attempts are not periodically undertaken. As Brown points out, It’s a well known fact of academic life that the rules apply to everyone but ourselves. We demand objectivity, neutrality and disinterestedness from our peers – and express outrage when these norms of academic etiquette are broken – yet as individuals we are willing to trample others underfoot in our ceaseless pursuit of publications and self-advancement, we take every available opportunity to settle old scores, invariably under cover of the so-called double blind review process, and shamelessly seek and expect personal favours in return for the most minor acts of collegial courtesy. (Brown, 1995a: 157)

Likewise, Churchill notes, Reviewers, along with editors, tend to serve as gatekeepers for the discipline. They judge what is worthy to be published and consequently what is worth being consumed by the marketing academy at large. Though some reviewers are very eclectic and tolerant of divergent viewpoints, others maintain a particular philosophical posture. The posture may involve firm notions about the most appropriate conceptual foundation for the ideas in a paper, the appropriate analytical tools for investigating the problem and so on. (Churchill, 1988: 28)

This issue becomes more troubling when we acknowledge that ‘star’ researchers and reviewers often serve on multiple editorial boards and when this is the case, ‘we may be restricting the range of perspectives, issues and approaches we allow in our journals’ (Churchill, 1988: 28; see also Bagozzi, 1976, 1992; Lynch, 1998). Such sentiment has not ebbed. In a recent Journal of Marketing themed section, we find a number of scholars making similar comments. MacInnis (2003, 2005) sums up the present state of intellectual certification well where she maintains that:



Depth training in a certain methodological perspective can lead to beliefs about the “right” way to do research and to disrespect and disregard research that is limited on the very characteristics we regard as critical to our own methodological paradigm (e.g. internal versus external validity). This attitude may perpetuate some of the “meanness” in our field that Wilkie describes (see also, Holbrook, 1995). It may lead us to adopt rigid rules about what constitutes “valid” research (e.g. homogenous versus heterogenous samples, single versus multiple informants), “important” research (e.g. those that demonstrate interactions versus those that advance generalizations; see Leone and Schultz, 1980) and research that advances theory versus practice and to use our expertise as reviewers to evaluate research more on the fit with our own methodological approach than on its capacity to yield intellectual insights that help us to understand a substantive domain. Another potential source of the current status is fear of accepting something unknown or unfamiliar. The problem is magnified when that unfamiliar thing is studied by people with whom we are not familiar. (MacInnis, 2005: 15; see also Deighton, 2005; Holbrook and Hirschman, 1993; MacInnis, 2003; McAlister, 2005; Shah et al., 1998; Singh, 2003; Woodruff, 2003; Wilkie, 2005)

MacInnis’s comments are not atypical. All of this – reviewer ‘meanness’ (Wilkie, 2005) and bias (Easley et al., 2000; MacInnis, 2005; Singh, 2003; Svensson, 2006) – indicates that subscription to ‘naïve realism’ is widespread in marketing. What I mean by this is that there appears to be an ‘asymmetry in perceptions of bias’ among marketing scholars, in that we ‘assume’ that ‘our own take on the world enjoys particular authority and will be shared by other open-minded seekers of the truth’ (Pronin et al., 2002: 369). Those who do not agree with us are evidently incorrect and should be dealt with accordingly (as the comments in Scott (2007) occasionally intimate). Of course, simply because reviewers share a similar paradigmatic perspective does not necessarily mean that they will all come to a consensus position with regard to the contribution that a given paper will make to the literature. There is, after all, no algorithm that determines theory choice, or intellectual contribution. There will be some shared values across a paradigmatic community and this can result in a similar interpretation of a given text. As Nola and Sankey put it, ‘Shared values (with the same interpretation) and shared weightings of these values will be sufficient for sameness of judgement within a community of scientists’ (Nola and Sankey, 2001: 28). While notions of acceptable research have shifted to permit a degree of paradigmatic variegation, critical perspectives are still marginalized in the marketing literature (Burton, 2001; McDonagh, 1995; Morgan, 2003). One reason for this, as Stern and Barley (1996) have argued in relation to organization studies, is that young scholars face tenure and Research Assessment Exercise pressures that generally demand publication in high ranking journals (see Schroeder, 2007). Getting material published in such outlets necessitates that the research submitted is perceived to be acceptable by the journal reviewers and editors (Summers, 2001). Wittnick (2004: 5) is under no illusions in this regard: ‘Journal editors face the problem that most reviewers have adopted a specific research paradigm that makes it difficult for them to accept papers that challenge conventional research approaches or empirical evidence’. What, then, is it reasonable for doctoral students and other less powerful researchers to do in the face of such pressures, especially if they are risk averse? Adherence to the established



boundaries of an acceptable contribution would probably be the best course of action. However, just because researchers have adopted a particular paradigmatic position as neophytes does not necessarily mean that they will be forever wedded to that research style. There are numerous cases of very prolific researchers in marketing and consumer research who have shifted paradigmatic perspective over the course of their careers. Holbrook and Belk (among others) would be the exemplars here. They are, even so, unusual cases. After getting tenure it may indeed be plausible that researchers will find themselves in the enviable position of being able to dictate their research direction. As Stern and Barley (1996) are quick to point out, tenure does provide some researchers with a degree of intellectual freedom. Institutional pressures and career progression (i.e. to full professor) still require, in the interests of productivity, that researchers stay close philosophically and methodologically to their area of specialty. They argue, ‘it may be unrealistic to believe that pressures for quantity decline with tenure. Not only do tenured associate professors face a similar review on promotion to full professor, but by the time scholars achieve tenure, their identity is often tied to their publication record’ (Stern and Barley, 1996: 156). This is no less true in marketing (Sheth, 1992). What this means in the long term for critical perspectives only time will tell. At this point, the opinions voiced by O’Guinn and Phillips (in Scott, 2007) leave me less than secure that an extensive critical turn in marketing will be wholeheartedly welcomed. Based on an analysis of the demographic characteristics of editors and editorial boards at top-tier marketing journals and on a close reading of the content in these outlets, this point has very recently been empirically demonstrated (Svensson, 2005, 2006; Svensson and Wood, 2006). As Goran Svensson has indicated in much stronger terms across a series of publications, within the very top-tier of publication outlets there is an overwhelming bias towards behavioural scientific, quantitative approaches (Svensson, 2005, 2006; Svensson and Wood, 2006). On this point Svensson is clear. Generally these journals publish research based on ‘mainstream topics’ and there ‘has been little space for counter-intuitive, broadminded and/or challenging approaches, however there are a few articles that are truly innovative and ground breaking’ (Svensson, 2006: 1161). ‘This’, he writes, ‘has caused frustration among researchers in the marketing discipline in their quest for innovativeness, challenging topics, openness and broadmindedness. The ambitions of unusual, rare and counterintuitive research efforts may have been suffocated’ (Svensson, 2006: 1163). Despite such ‘academic xenophobia’ (Svensson and Wood, 2006), ‘reviewer meanness’ (Wilkie, 2005) and ‘paradigmatic inertia and research myopia’ (Svensson, 2005), let us hope that journals such as Marketing Theory will increase the institutional stature of critical perspectives in marketing, however we define critical. Hopefully, then, marketing scholarship will get the respect that it deserves.



Conclusion In this paper I have explored the recent discussions regarding incommensurability in the marketing literature. Via a close reading of three papers, I questioned the interpretation and conflation of Kuhn’s and Burrell and Morgan’s work in Lowe et al.’s (2004, 2005) recent publications. Following this, I suggested that Davies and Fitchett’s (2005) attempt to overcome incommensurability at the methodological level was problematic inasmuch as specific methodologies are not necessarily tied to any single paradigmatic perspective. By turning to Kuhn’s later writings I made the case, contra Lowe et al., that Kuhn did suggest various ways of overcoming incommensurability. However, when we factor in the political structure of the academy it remains the case that any attempt to overcome incommensurability using Kuhn’s criteria will necessarily run into the realm of politics due to underdetermination. Given that a preponderance of academics in the academy subscribe to logical empiricism, that reviewer ‘meanness’ and bias are well documented aspects of the peer review process, it seems likely that these will operate to skew the certification of knowledge along lines consistent with the dominant paradigm in marketing, namely logical empiricism. As Feyerabend and many others have registered, by radically questioning the assumption base of a discipline we may move the boundaries of what constitutes an appropriate contribution. However, they add, it is more likely that our work will be ignored or remain unpublished.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the three reviewers for their comments on a previous draft of this article. I would also like to thank Craig Thompson for his comments on this paper.

Notes 1. The study of the interaction between operator tasks and computerized machinery in a production process.

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Mark Tadajewski is Lecturer in Critical Marketing in the School of Management at the University of Leicester. His research interests are wide-ranging and include the history of marketing theory and thought, and the philosophy of science as it relates to marketing, along with the possible interaction of critical theory and consumer research. His work has been published or is forthcoming in Organization, Marketing Theory, Journal of Macromarketing, and the Journal of Marketing Management, among others. Address: School of Management, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester, LE1 7RH. [email: [email protected]]
