Mill's Critique of Bentham's Utilitarianism

International Journal of Philosophy Study (IJPS), Volume 4, 2016 www.seipub.org/ijps doi: 10.14355/ijps.2016.04.003

Mill’s Critique of Bentham’s Utilitarianism Abdul Latif Mondal Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India Email: [email protected] Abstract Millʹs famous essay ʺUtilitarianismʺ to begin with an almost is true of the hedonism of Bentham. First and most important, it is Millʹs unwillingness to accept the Benthamʹs view holding that all pleasures are qualitatively on a par. On the contrary, Mill argues, we must differentiate between ʹhigher and lowerʹ pleasure. Utilitarianism, the ethical doctrine that the good of any action is tested by its contribution to the results, especially human happiness. It should be focused on what brings happiness to the greatest number. It tries to prove rational and scientific foundation for morality. Rational based on calculation, and scientific is based on observation. Bentham thinks an action is right if it produces the greatest amount of pleasure rather than pain. Mill thinks an action, if only it conforms to generally accepted rules, creates most pleasure for most people. Bentham considers quantitative pleasure, and Mill considers qualitative pleasure, not just quantitative pleasure. Keywords Bentham’s Utilitarianism, Mill’s Utilitarianism, Qualitative, Quantitative Approach

Introduction Jeremy Bentham According to Bentham, “nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters – pain and pleasure. So it is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do.”1 In his book “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, Bentham says, that a motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner. The motive is always some pleasure, or some pain. Some pleasure of the act in question is expected to be a means of producing; some pain is expected to be a means of preventing. Therefore, according to Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only possible motives to action, the only ends of which we can aim. Similarly, J.S Mill says “Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful are phenomena entirely inseparable, rather two parts of the same phenomena; to think of an object as desirable, and to think of it. As pleasant, they are the same things; to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.”2 J.S. Mill claims we always desire that pleasure is the only object of our desire. Ethical Hedonism: according to Ethical Hedonism, we ought to seek pleasure; it is the proper object of our desire. Many hedonists base ethical hedonism on psychological grounds. Bentham and J.S. Mill do so. But Sdgwick rejects psychological hedonism and advocates ethical hedonism. According to him, pleasure is the reasonable object of our desire. According to Altruistic hedonism universal or general happiness, “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” is the ultimate moral standard. Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill both advocate this view. But Bentham advocates quantitative pleasure while Mill advocates qualitative pleasure. This view is called utilitarianism. This theory judges all action according to utility. Gross or Quantitative Utilitarianism of Bentham: Dimensions of pleasure: Bentham says that the value of pleasures is quantitative. But quantity has many forms. It has seven dimensions of value. 1. Intensity 2. Duration 3. Proximity 4. Certainty 5. Purity (freedom from pain) 6. Fecundity (fretfulness) and the last 7. The number of person affected. Psychological Hedonism: Bentham is an advocate of psychological hedonism. He says, “Nature has placed man

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under the empire of pleasure and pain. We owe to them all our ideas; we refer to them all our judgments and all the determination of our life. His object is to seek pleasure and shun pain. The principle of utility subjects everything to these two motives. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.”3 “It is for them alone to point what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do.”4 Bentham argues that as we do desire pleasure, we ought to desire pleasure. His ethical hedonism is based on psychological hedonism. Hedonistic Calculus In hedonistic calculus, he says “weigh pleasures and weigh pains and as the balance stands, there will stand the question of right and wrong”. Here, the main question is of right and wrong. According to him, if an action gives more pleasure than pain, then it is right. If an action gives us more pain than pleasure, then it is wrong. Here, rightness stands for pleasurable ness and wrongness stand for painfulness. Gross Utilitarianism Bentham’s utilitarianism may be called gross or sensualistic or quantitative, because he does not hold qualitative differences among pleasure. 1)

Altruism

Bentham’s hedonism is altruistic, because he takes into account of the extent of pleasure, i.e. the number of persons affected by it. If a pleasure is shared by many persons, it has a great extent and as such it is to be preferred to a pleasure that can be enjoyed by only one person. Thus Bentham by introducing “extent” as a dimension of pleasure introduces more pleasure for more people as the moral standard. 2)

Egoism

Although Bentham is an advocate of altruistic hedonism, he clearly recognizes the natural egoism of man. He says “To obtain the greatest portion of happiness of himself is the object of every rational being. Every man is nearer of himself than he can be to any other man and no other man can weigh for him his pleasure and pains. He himself must necessarily be his own concern. His interest must, to himself be the primary interest.”5 3)

Moral Sanctions

If we look at Bentham’s account from egoism to altruism, he had seen to have given four external sanctions: physical or natural sanction, political sanction, social sanction, and religious sanction. They naturally operate by the pleasure or pain, the state, the society and god. John Stuart Mill John Stuart Mill (1806‐1879), the second utilitarian educated at home by his father, is a prominent economist and member of the philosophical radicals. In fact, they used young Mill as a kind of guinea pig on whom they could try out some of their novel pedagogical theories. The influence of Bentham is clearly apparent both in the career and in the thought of Mill. Throughout his life, Mill devoted himself to programs for social reform, carrying on the tradition of the philosophical radicals. His essay on Liberty is a classic defence of the rights of the individual against society. Mill, like Bentham, found in hedonistic ethics a theoretical justification for his political views and practices. However, his famous essay “Utilitarianism” commences with an almost reaffirmation of the hedonism of Bentham. Yet Mill was far from being a mere slavish disciple of his tutor. First and most important, it is Mill’s unwillingness to accept the Bentham’s view holding that all pleasures are qualitatively as par. On the contrary, Mill argues we must distinguish between ‘higher and lower’ pleasure. He makes the distinction in the often quoted passage, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied”6. The fact that the fool and the pig enjoy more pleasure than Socrates cannot, Mill believes, offset the fact that the quality of Socrates’ pleasure is almost infinitely higher than theirs. Mill is in effect abandoning the hedonistic theory. On the question of psychological hedonism Mill both agrees and

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disagrees with Epicurus and Bentham. Although he believes that we are able to desire things other than pleasure‐ virtues for example, he maintains that in doing so we must consider these things to be a part of pleasure, hence in desiring them we really still desire only pleasure. We may summarize Mill’s account of utilitarianism in the following five statements. These are: 

The only thing which we can desire is pleasure.



The proof of this is the fact that people do actually desire it.



Pleasure or happiness of his or her own person is good to that person. And general happiness is good to everyone.



Men do desire other objects, but they desire them only as means of pleasure.



If one of two pleasures is preferred by those who are related with both pleasures, we say that preferred pleasure is superior in quality to the other.

Utilitarianism is a teleological theory, which stands for the more pleasure for more people. In Bentham’s phrase, one should seek “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”. By contrast, ethical egoism is a teleological theory where pleasure is the only thing having intrinsic value. Bentham and Mill were hedonists; therefore, their view of utilitarianism was that performing all those actions which would maximize pleasure for as many people as possible. There are three kinds of utilitarianism: (i) Act utilitarianism (ii) General utilitarianism and (iii) Rule Utilitarianism. 1)

Act Utilitarianism

First, there is act utilitarianism. It holds that in general or at least, where it is practicable, one is to tell what is right or obligatory by appealing directly to the principle of utility. In other words, what produces the greatest balance of good over evil in the universe? It is a form of utilitarianism associated with Bentham that treats each moral situation as unique and each ‘act’ is deemed to be right or wrong based on the consequences it produces. One must ask “what effect by doing this act in this situation will have on the general balance of good over evil” not “what effect everyone’s doing this kind of act in this kind of situation will have on the general balance of good over evil.”7 Generalizations like “Telling the truth is probably always for the greatest general good”, or “Telling the truth is generally for the greatest general good.”8 may be useful as guides based on the past experience, but the question is that telling the truth in his case is for the greatest good or not. 2)

General Utilitarianism

The second kind of utilitarianism is the general utilitarianism. It holds that one is not to ask in each situation which action has the best consequences, but it does not talk about rules. According to general utilitarianism, one is not to ask “what will happen if I do so and so in this case?” or “what would happen if everyone were to do so and so in such cases?”9 The idea behind general utilitarianism is that if something is right for one person to do in a certain situation, then it is also right for anyone else who is similarly situated to do, and hence that one cannot ask simply what effects one’s proposed action will have in a particular case. One must rather ask what the consequences would be if everyone were to act likewise in such cases. This view has been best stated by M.G. Siegen? The General utilitarian’s final answer must be an appeal to the principle that if an action is right for me to do in my situation, then it is right for everyone to do who is similarly situated in relevant respects. 3)

Rule Utilitarianism

It is a rather different view of utilitarianism based on general principles or rules of behaviour. It is a view associated with J.S. Mill. Rules like ‘respect the property of others’ or ‘do not’ steal would help to keep the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.’ So they should be obeyed. The act of utilitarianism may allow rules to be used, but if he does, he must conceive of a rule like “Tell the Truth” as follows: “Telling the truth is generally for the greatest good.”10 By contrast, the rule must conceive of it thus: “our always telling the truth is for greatest good” or thus “It is for the greatest good if we always tell the truth.”11 This means that

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according to Rule utilitarianism it may be right to obey a rule like telling the truth simply because it is so useful to have the rule, even when in the particular case in question, telling the truth does not lead to the best consequences. Utilitarian theory advocated by Bentham received several attacks by other contemporary philosophers. However, here the most important one is Mill. Mill tries to save utilitarianism by giving his own version of this doctrine. Mill was not so happy with the type of utilitarianism given by Bentham. He holds that there were certain problems in Bentham’s ethical theory which must be removed. Only by removing those difficulties can we make a perfect utilitarianism theory acceptable to all. Therefore, he tries to reform and refine Bentham’s utilitarianism. He tries to put his own ethical theory. Like other hedonists, Mill holds that ‘pleasure’ is the ultimate goal or end of life. He says utilitarianism focused on the fact that man wants pleasure and he also wants to remove pain. This is the only desirable thing. If any other things are desirable that will only be a means to the promotion of pleasure and to remove pain. Actions are judged to be right and wrong on the basis that they tend or do not tend to produce happiness and reduce pain. So, here Mill agrees completely with Bentham. But Mill also differed from Bentham vitally. Bentham did not offer any strong proof, whereas Mill put strong real proof for utilitarianism. “The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it, and is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend the sole evidence that it is possible to provide anything desirable that people do actually desire it.”12 Mill further says that people actually not only desire pleasure, but also they never desire any things else. It is a fact that virtue which is desired by people is only a way of attaining pleasure over pain. Now, if it is so, the pleasure must be regarded as the ultimate end. Mill says that virtue is not something which is different from happiness. It is a part of happiness. Mill holds that virtue is a desired instrument for happiness its own sake. But if it is so desired, desire is a part of happiness and not different from the desire of happiness. It may be said in this connection that Mill is a hedonist if he accepts anything as the final object of desire other than happiness. By saying that virtue is a part of happiness, Mill just explains it. Mill affirms utilitarianism by offering a psychological proof. His proof is, however, somewhat fallacious. Mill identified the word ‘desire’ with ‘the good as end in itself’ But this was incorrect. Mill is confused on the use of the word ‘desirable’. The mistake in Mill’s proof is very obvious. It seems surprising how Mill wrote standard text book on logic. About Mill’s proof, Moore remarks: Mill has, then, smuggled in, under the cover of the word ‘Desirable’ the very notion about which he ought to be quite clear. Further, Mill attempts to show that all men desire pleasure and avoid pain. The pleasure and freedom from pain are the natural object of desire. We desire pleasure naturally and we avoid pain also naturally. In other words, Mill’s argument passes from psychological hedonism to ethical hedonism. Like Bentham, Mill also commits fallacy here. Sedgwick remarks: “No cogent inference is possible from the psychological generalization that the agent’s pleasure and pains are the universal motives, to the ethical principle that his own greatest pleasure is for each the ultimate national end.”13 Mill was not so happy with Bentham’s view that pleasures were different only in quantity. According to Mill, quantity being the same, the pleasure of a scientist cannot be equated with those of a debauch. Some pleasures are superior and some are inferior. Mill thus advocates the view that pleasures were different both in the quantity and quality. He gave more importance to quality than to quantity. According to Mill, it is not correct to say that ‘Push pin is good as poetry’. Mill therefore, introduced qualitative distinctions in pleasures. According to Mill, human beings are higher than animal’s beings. Mill holds that the mental pleasure is higher than physical pleasure. He holds that with the principle that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable than others it cannot be said that pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. Mill recognizes the kinds of pleasure or qualitative difference among pleasures. Here a question may arise: what does the difference of quality in pleasure means or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another? Mill says, qualitative distinction among pleasures, is that some pleasures are higher than others of their quantity. It is not the quantity but superiority which makes one pleasure different from the other. Now, the question is that which of the two pleasures is better than the other?

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Here Mill says that only those who have experience of both would be competent to decide the issue. If they prefer the one, then certainly the preferred one is regarded higher. Further, some pleasures are so intrinsically superior that they outweigh any quantity of other pleasures. Mill says human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a premise of the fullest allowance of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of beast’s pleasure. “It is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.”14 However, sometime it is seen that though men have capacity for higher pleasure, they choose the lower ones. But intrinsic superiority of higher pleasure cannot be denied. For instance, even though men know that health is a greater good than enjoyment, they sometimes pursue sensual enjoyment to the injury of health. But according to Mill, these are not done voluntarily (willingly). Man does not voluntarily choose the lower pleasure in preference to the higher one. According to him, capacity for nobler feelings is the tenderest. Therefore, it can easily be killed by bad influences. It dies speedily in the majority of younger persons since the occupations which their lives are devoted to and society in which they are thrown are not favourable for the exercise of higher capacities. Further, people having no time and opportunity for their higher aspirations and intellectual taste addict themselves to inferior pleasures. And this is not because they deliberately prefer them. It is because they are either the only ones which they have access to or they are only ones which they are capable of enjoying. According to Mill, it is questionable whether any one equally susceptible to both would prefer the lower. Thus, by introducing qualitative distinctions in pleasures, Mill hoped that he would reform the utilitarian theory as advocated by Bentham. He thought he would remove the inherent defects in latter’s ethical theory. But it appears Mill has not succeeded in his mission. While removing one defect he brought in another. Johan Laird remarks in this connections, “It is sometimes supposed that this doctrine is one of Mill’s acute and honourable inconsistencies one of the instance in which, setting out to support the doctrines of his father and his father’s friend’s he elaborates in their place something richer but passing strange; and theory a part the doctrine has been declared to be either downright impossible or at least inconsistent what hedonism.”15 Now if pleasure is the sole good and if it is really pleasure that is desired, there should not be a distinction or preference among pleasures. If pleasure is to be regarded as the ultimate goal, then qualitative distinction should be the only relevant consideration. That is to say, if pleasure differs only in quantity and if it is asked which of the two pleasures is more desirable, the answer should be given in terms of intensity of duration on productiveness of the one compassed to the other. “If pleasure is the only thing, we owe to others, then it is its quantity only and not its quality which we must consider.”16 Again, when Mill talks of pleasure as more or less preferable, he does place the criterion of rightness or wrongness of an act somewhere. He has then to leave hedonism. Here, one pleasure is more desirable than another. Because something not of its nature is pleasurable, but because of some other quality that it possesses beyond its pleasantness. Janet observes that if, on the contrary, you say of two pleasures that one is in itself, and by its own nature better than the other, then there must be something aside from the pleasure itself which gives one this superiority over the other. Thus, we believe that by introducing his qualitative distinction in pleasure Mill has not succeeded in refining and reforming the doctrine of utilitarianism. Let us take an example: one person is reading a good book and another person is listening to a good music. According to Mill how can we decide which of the two pleasures is superior? Mill says that in such case to seek advice of a skilled judge, there is no answer to the objection raised. In answering the objections, Mill ultimately leaves his own field. So, in spite of his best efforts, Mill has not materially improved the position. Coming to the central point of Mill’s utilitarianism namely ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, he did not differ much from Bentham. Like Bentham, Mill also was a great humanitarian. He was also interested in the promotion of the general happiness of society. But Mill was not prepared to go the whole hog with Bentham. Since he was quite aware of the charge of egoism brought against Bentham and it was held by many Bentham’s theories which did not provide a satisfactory motive for obeying the utilitarian rule, Mill, therefore, attempted to give a more comprehensive account of the theory.

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Mill also says it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is ultimately desirable and that the rightness and wrongness of acts are to be judged by reference to it. The end for the sake of which everything is done, is not the agent’s happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. Mill supports his view by a proof where Bentham accepted the formula ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. Mill offers the following proofs: “No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable except that each person so far as he believes it to be attainable, and desires his own happiness. However, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, the happiness is good; that each person’s happiness is good to that person and the general happiness, therefore, it will be good to the aggregate of all persons.”17 But though by offering this proof, Mill has been able to reform the theory: his proof suffers from two fallacies, namely the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division. Mill’s argument is this: a.

X’s happiness is good to X, Y’s happiness is good to Y, Z’s happiness is good to Z, therefore, happiness of X, Y, and Z is good to X‐Y‐Z. The argument is fallacious since here we pass from distributive to collective use of the term. Mill’s argument misconceives the fact that pleasure can be made into an aggregate in the same way where a building is an aggregate of bricks. This argument is invalid with the fallacy of composition.

b. The general happiness is good to the aggregate of all‐persons. Therefore, the general happiness is good to each person. Such an argument is invalid with the fallacy of division. The fallacy committed by Mill was put forth by Moorhead, thus this is as though one were to argue, that because each pig desires for himself the greatest amount of happiness and a limited quantity of pigs, each necessarily desires the greatest quantity for every other or for all. In the book Utilitarianism, Mill says that one’s own happiness or that of many cannot be a rational object of human life. Pleasure is ultimately impossible. Men can do nothing without happiness. Renunciation is the first condition of all nobleness of character. Mill points out that this does not differ us from utilitarian position. Even if happiness is supposed to be impossible, the avoidance of unhappiness would still remain an object which is made of utility. There is no denying that in life there are many evils. They must be removed if mankind is to live in this world. The utilitarian who maintain happiness to be the end of life does not use the term ‘happiness’ in this sense. Mill himself says on the moments of such an existence made up of a few transitory pain, many and various pleasures with a decided predominance of the whole are not to except more than life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of many during some considerable position of their lives. In every properly brought up human being there is an inherent element for the good of others. He holds that public affection is important for satisfactory life. Naturally, the life of those who have no social affections in them would be very unsatisfactory. Life would have no charm for them. But those who have cultivated feelings would retain interest in life. Thus, selfishness, according to Mill, is the principal cause of unsatisfactory life. According to Mill, there are many instances where people have sacrificed their lives for happiness of the others. Mill says that. “The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own great good for the good of the others. It only refuses to admit that sacrifice is itself good. A sacrifice which does not increase or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted.”18 For the nearest approach to the ideal perfections of utilitarian morality, Mill suggested two ways. The first kind is that utility should enjoin that the laws and social arrangement should place the happiness of every individual in the society on its agenda. The object must be the happiness of the whole. The second kind of ideal perfection of utilitarian morality is that education and opinions should be so used in the mind of the individual, and that his own happiness and the good of the whole are attained together. The happiness of the individual is not to be opposed to the general happiness. However, whether ‘people always act out of regard for happiness of others’ is a doubtful preposition. Mill holds that there is no moral standard which judges an action to be right or wrong on the basis of the goodness

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or badness of persons. According to Mill, the performance of a good action is only proof of the goodness of a man. Thus, the consideration of quality is irrelevant to the estimation of actions but of persons. Mill again and again comes to the same conclusion that men have friendly social tendencies. They have natural attraction towards the general happiness. Men find their own greatest pleasure in the pleasure of others. According to Mill, in man there is a feeling that everyone is an integral part of the society. This is what Mill called internal sanction. Bentham already pointed out certain external sensations which led men to work for others. But these sanctions are not moral. Mill therefore added as internal sanction the friendly felling in every individual. This sanction would be really ethical and moral. According to Mill, actions are often done out of fear of punishment. If man seeks the pleasures of others due to the force of some external causes, the question of blame and moral responsibility would become irrelevant. The external sanction, therefore, accounts for how we behave. Morality is a matter of heart. According to Mill, the internal sanction is an internal feeling. A pain more or less intense is always attendant on violation of duty. This is the social feeling of mankind. Mill regards the social feeling more necessary and most natural. Except in some extraordinary circumstance. One agrees with Mill that man is not exclusively selfish. But it is difficult to agree with him that every man possesses inherent interest for the happiness of others. Mill argues that since man desire his own happiness, he ought to desire the happiness of others also. But we see that if each man desires his own happiness he would not necessarily desire the happiness of the others. This he will do this only if his own happiness is involved. Now so long this idea runs in his mind, he would be said to act friendly to desire other’s happiness since only he can secure his own in that way. This would act out of self‐interest. Mill believed in the gradual growth of sympathy for the happiness of others. There will be no conflict between the good of one individual and that of another. But this is possible only if we could hypostatize the community and treat it as an individual. But community is made up of units separating feelings and actions from one another. Further even we accept, according to Mill, the men have advanced towards kindly act or benevolence, it cannot be maintained that the concepts of men’s ideal completely change, so as to identify all goodness with kindness. Again Mill holds that an individual should work for the welfare and enlightenment of society, though it seems that the promise dissolves when we take a close view of this duty. Let us take an example. A man called John woke up in the morning and asked himself: what I am going to do for my country’s welfare today? If it happens that the country is in need of engineers, whether John can go one fine morning and build a bridge or construct a machine which otherwise requires years of training. Therefore, the most advisable course for John is to train till he acquires sufficient proficiency. But suppose that John is not good at mathematics and he hates army life. Then actually he will prove a burden rather than asset to his country and he will have wasted his years when he trained. Under this circumstance, what is preferable is that John should choose the profession for which he is most gifted. He will be much better at a job he loves for its own sake and regardless of its ultimate usefulness. It seems to us a poor excuse if a man says no better of his life’s employment than it is useful. In this connection Pepita Haezahi observes “certainly nothing great or lasting is achieved in this beneficiary which is wrought by and ought to be credited to men who had followed their natural gifts the duty to humanity defeats itself qua duty.”19 To those who object to the utilitarian principle on the ground that man has no sufficient time to calculate and weigh the effects of actions, Mill answers them by pointing out that it would be like saying that since one has no time to read the Bible which cannot guide one’s conduct on the principle of Christianity. But the objection cannot be so easily disposed of. However, we turn back to our main points. We cannot compare the pleasantness and unpleasantness of different persons of the community.”20 Conclusion Mill’s critique of Bentham is mainly anchored on his emphasis on quality of pleasures. For Bentham, it is quantity of pleasure that counts as a criterion of justifiability of a given action. It is the intensity, fecundity, immediacy and extent of pleasure which decide our execution and appropriation of a given action. Mill, on the other hand, underscores the quality of pleasure. Quantitative dimensions of alternative actions remain the same, we must be guided by the considerations of quality of pleasure while committing ourselves to one of the alternatives. While

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Bentham and Mill both were hedonists, the former is designated as a quantitative hedonist and the latter is designated as a qualitative hedonist. Both, of course, were utilitarian underlining the criterion of the ‘greatest good of the greatest number of people’. However, here Mill again, would emphasise the quality of pleasure or happiness available or accessible to people across the spectrum. So, while Bentham is an unqualified hedonist or utilitarian, Mill is a qualified hedonist or utilitarian. Bentham’s pure hedonism or utilitarianism is drastically qualified by Mill’s emphasis on quality of pleasures. In view of the same, Mill has been accused of trespassing the jurisdiction of hedonistic ethics. By the emphasis on the quality of pleasure, he has watered down the applicability of the hedonistic criterion. For, emphasizing the quality of pleasures, he has proliferated numerous unanswerable methodological questions of abiding relevance, including what do we mean by the quality of a pleasure? Or what is the quality of pleasure? Who is to authentically and competently decide on the ‘qualityʹ of a pleasure? How is one pleasure qualitatively superior to another pleasure? etc. Furthermore, Mill has watered down the democratic orientation of Bentham’s hedonistic calculus. With the introduction of the criterion of quality, Mill’s qualified hedonism is saturated with elitism and even authoritarianism. More importantly, both Bentham and Mill will perennially face the deontological standard advanced by Kant before the advent of their utilitarianism in nineteenth century. For Kant, an action is ethically justified of as it is inspired by our sense of duty. The good or bad consequences of an action are essentially irrelevant to the ethical justification of an action. A moral law is a categorically imperative and we have to submit to it but irrespective of pleasure or pain, profit or loss, empowerment or disempowerment emanating therefrom or thereof. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my sincere and hearty thank to my guide Prof. Jalalul Haq, the Head, the Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, and also thanks to My parents, Dr. Sanaullah Mir, SK Najimul & Mahamuda, Faizan Ahmed, Shamim Aktar Munshi, Md. Qutub Uddin, Arup Mondal, Chittranjan Dey and who inspire me in writing of this paper. REFERENCES

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Madhumita, P. (2013). “Philosophy.” Seventh Edition, New Delhi, 114‐115.

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Madhumita, P. (2013). “Philosophy.” Seventh Edition, New Delhi, 115.

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Johnson, Oliver. A. (1958). “Ethics: Selection from Classical and Contemporary Writers.” First edition, New York, 232.

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Frankena, William. K. (1982). “Ethics.” Second edition, New Delhi, 35.

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[10] Frankena, William. K. (1982). “Ethics.” Second edition, New Delhi, 37. [11] Frankena, William. K. (1982). “Ethics.” Second edition, New Delhi, 37. [12] Mill, J. S. (1907). “Utilitarianism.” Fifteenth edition, New York, 53. [13] Mackenzie, John. S. (1929). “A Manual of Ethics.” Sixth edition, London, 168. [14] Mill, J. S. (1953). “Utilitarianism.” New York, Ch. II, p. 41. [15] Laird, John. (1925). “A Study in Moral Theory.” London, 110. [16] Carrittee, E.F. (1928). “Theory of Morals.” Oxford, 43. [17] Mill, J. S. (1907). “Utilitarianism.” Fifteenth edition, New York, 12. [18] Mill, J. S. (1907). “Utilitarianism.” Fifteenth edition, New York, 24. [19] Haezrahi, P. (1892). “The Principle of Morality.” London, 266. [20] Carrittee, E. F. (1928). “Theory of Morals.” Oxford, 43.

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About Author Mondal, Abdul Latif was born at Burdwan near Kolkata, India. He is a research scholar in the Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh (U.P) India. His field of specialisation is “Philosophy of Mind”. Presently he is working on “Russell’s Philosophy of Neutral Monism” for his Ph.D. programme. He has been participating in various National and International seminars and conferences held at Aligarh Muslim University and other Indian Universities as well. He has made presentations on “Sufi Philosophy” and “Philosophy of Religion” at the seminars held at Department of Islamic Studies and Faculty of Theology, AMU Aligarh respectively.

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