mk apla report

The reintegration into civilian life of demobilised Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian People’s Liberation Army ex-combatants

Centre for Conflict Resolution (University of Cape Town) Editor: Guy Lamb Authors: Lephophotho Mashike, Mafole Mokalobe, Guy Lamb and Jacklyn Cock

March 2003

This report is part of a Centre for Conflict Resolution (University of Cape Town) research project titled: Defence Rationalisation, Demobilisation and Reintegration in South Africa, which is being undertaken in collaboration with the South African Department of Defence. Funding for this project has been provided by the World Bank.

Table of Contents

Page Number Acknowledgements

3

Introduction

4

Section 1: Background to the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Members of MK and APLA

6

Section 2: Aim, Key Questions and Methodology

13

Section 3: Key Terms and Definitions

18

Section 4: Social Characteristics and Military Background

22

Section 5: Education and Training

31

Section 6: Economic Reintegration

36

Section 7: Public and Private Economic Reintegration Programmes

47

Section 8: Social Reintegration

55

Section 9: Political Reintegration

64

Section 10: Ex-Soldiers Organisations and Veterans’ Affairs Bodies

68

Section 11: Understanding the Needs and Expectations of ExCombatants

76

Section 12: Analysing Reintegration

82

Section13: Recommendations

85

Bibliography

103

Appendix 1: Questionnaire Appendix 2: Profile of Mandla Hlatshwayo

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Acknowledgements We wish to acknowledge and the thank the following people who provided the research team with invaluable assistance: •

Dumi Matabane, Maruseng Moyo, Frans Mohlala, Andile Nketsha, Tankiso Lempe, Lebogan Mosiane, Trevor Pitso, Comrade Mahlomola, Mofihli, Geneva Morake, Meshack Mochele, Matlakubele Tseka, Mbuyiselo Mdaka, Mrs April, Nomathemba Zokwe, Dan Hatto, Sister Mbanjwa, Conrad Motebe, Dywanisi Nqaba, Lebakeng Makatsa, and James Maqhela, Alfred Willie and Mgabalala Mgabala, Thami Makalima, Jama Matakata, Afrika Kehlapho and Sasha Gear.

•

Mr. Tsepe Motumi, Rear-Admiral Lukas Bakkes and Colonel Barnard (Rt.) all of the Department of Defence.

•

General A. Masondo (Rt.), Lt. Col. Mokonoto, Lt Col. Ramasodi, Major Matome, Lt Ramolemogi, Lt. Col. Seloane and Capt. Modise (all of the Service Corps).

•

Patrick Thabo (Mandla) Hlatshwayo, Nqaba Bucwa and Steven Nakana for their assistance in terms of conducting interviews in Gauteng, the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape respectively.

•

Norman Hooper, Dion Rossmeisl and Craig Mason-Jones for the Lateral Alternative Computer Consultancy.

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Introduction South Africa has been described as “the most important experiment in democracy since the end of the Second World War”1. The consolidation and sustainability of this democracy depends in part on how the new government deals with the legacy of thirty years of war and militarism in the region. The successful integration of ex-combatants is a crucial aspect of this challenge. The South African transition to democracy between 1990 and 1994 was the result not of a “miracle” or a seizure of power, but rather accommodation and appeasement of two sets of interests – those of white power and privilege and those of domestic and international capital. It was widely believed that this pattern of appeasement was unavoidable firstly, to prevent civil war, and secondly for South Africa to survive economically in the context of globalisation. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of high levels of political violence. This dramatised the fear of civil war or a coup from the security forces. The result was that the African National Congress (ANC) agreed to an amnesty which allows human rights violators to evade criminal and civil action court cases – on the conditions that amnesty seekers fully disclose their crimes and demonstrate that they acted on the orders of a recognised political authority. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established as the least potentially destabilising mechanism to pursue human rights abuses. One of the fundamental objectives of the liberation struggle had been the seizure of state power through popular armed struggle. However, “instead of seizing power, the democratic movement negotiated its partial transfer. Instead of taking over and transforming the state, the movement found itself assimilated into it.”2 The quintessential example of this process was the formation of the SANDF, where all statutory (former homeland militaries and the South African Defence Force - SADF) and non-statutory armed forces (the African National Congress (ANC)’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe3 – MK, the Pan African Congress (PAC)’s armed wing, Azanian People’s Liberation Army APLA) were essentially absorbed into the structures of the SADF, under the guise of “integration”. This process of integration resulted in the demobilisation of thousands of combatants, the majority of which were from MK and APLA. These individuals, who were almost exclusively black, were subsequently obliged to return to civilian life. However, the political transition has not been projected into the economic sphere, apart from a shrivelled notion of black economic empowerment which has created a small rich black elite. Vast discrepancies in wealth and income between black and white South Africans still remain intact, with more than half of all black families living below the official poverty line. National unemployment currently stands at 36%, there is a housing shortage of approximately three million units, and close to 60% of households do not have access to running water in their homes. Hence, most demobilised soldiers returned to impoverished communities where opportunities for employment were severely limited.

Smith 1996: 31. Marais, 1998: 12. 3 This means “spear of the nation”. 1 2

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For many, this was not the life they were anticipating as they had made positive contributions to the liberation struggle. To date three substantial studies on the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life have been undertaken, namely, Cock (1993), Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) and Gear (2002). Of these studies, Cock (1993) was the only one the focused exclusively on members of the non-statutory forces, while the other studies considered ex-combatants from both statutory and non-statutory forces. Cock (1993) found, from a survey of 180 respondents during the informal demobilisation process of the period of transition, that most were unemployed. Many indicated that they had been unable to find employment due to poor education and/or no skills base, and a lack of work experience. Cock also found that a substantial number suffered from psychological problems. Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) undertook a questionnaire based study, and used a sample of 307 ex-combatants (of which 66% of their sample stated that they were from MK or APLA). They found that 37% of respondents to be unemployed. Gear (2002) undertook a study that was based on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Gear concluded that many ex-combatants were experiencing major difficulties integrating into civilian life, and perceived themselves to have been “wished away,” as “former superiors and respective communities now tend to distance themselves from the people who not so long ago, they urged into armed action.” However, none of these studies have undertaken a detailed account of the quality of life and socio-economic needs of previously demobilised members of MK and APLA post 1994. Consequently, this report was envisaged. This report is comprised of 13 sections. Section 1 provides an overview of the background conditions of the South African integration and demobilisation processes in the 1990s. Sections 2 and 3 include the aim, key questions, methodology and definitions employed in this report. Sections 4 and 5 present and analyse the data on social characteristics, military background, education and training of ex-combatants. Various aspects of reintegration are the focus of sections 8 through 12, while section 13 provides a number of detailed recommendations.

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Section 1: Background to the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Members of APLA and MK 1.1) Introduction In the early- to mid-1990s, parties responsible for negotiating South Africa’s future were faced with the problem of how to deal with a variety of armed forces, namely MK, APLA, the former homeland armed forces and the SADF, all of which had the potential to destabilise the country. A two-fold strategy was eventually agreed upon. First, a new representative national armed force would be created, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which would be comprised of all the armed forces. Second, thousands of combatants would be demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life. This section provides an overview of the background conditions to the integration and demobilisation processes, such as the nature of the liberation struggle, the 1993 military negotiations, as well as an analysis of these two processes. 1.2) The Nature of the Liberation Struggle A year after the banning of the ANC in 1960, and following intense repression of ANC members and other black South Africans by the apartheid state, the ANC announced its decision to adopt a strategy of armed struggle. MK subsequently engaged in sabotage attacks on government installations, police stations and electric pylons. Following the Rivonia trial (1965), most ANC activities within South Africa, including armed struggle, ground to a halt. But in the early 1970s, following a revision of the ANC’s strategy and tactics at the Morogoro conference (1969), armed attacks against the apartheid state slowly regained momentum. In the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto uprisings the numbers of sabotage attacks dramatically increased, which included: bombings of perceived strategic targets; the laying of landmines in rural areas where the SADF regularly patrolled; and the elimination of those who were perceived to be government collaborators. Armed activities continued during the 1980s with armed struggle being incorporated into the strategy of “making the townships ungovernable”.4 In the early days of armed struggle an extensive rural-based guerrilla strategy was envisaged, however, this vision was never fully realised. The ANC was not able to engage in significant unilateral conventional warfare against the South African security forces, nor was it able to establish liberated zones within South Africa, largely due to the enormous resources that the South African security establishment had at its disposal. For the ANC, armed struggle was not their sole form of resistance. In fact it was viewed as merely one pillar of a “four pillar” strategy, with the other three pillars being: mass mobilisation, underground organisation and international solidarity work. The objective of employing armed struggle was elegantly summarised in the 1978 Politico-Military Strategy Commission’s (1978) report: The armed struggle must be based on, and grow out of, mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage be guided by and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim of progressively weakening the enemy's grip on the reins of

4

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 1998: 326-366.

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political, economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military action.5

In line with many other liberation movements, the armed wing, and the strategy of armed struggle, was subordinate to the political leadership. When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force (...) It is important to emphasise this because our movement must reject all manifestations of militarism which separates armed people’s struggle from its political context.6

Consequently, as armed struggle was not the ANC’s primary means of resistance, MK was relatively small and unsophisticated in comparison to the SADF. However, MK operatives did, to a large extent, engage in active military combat. In Angola, from the mid-1970s, MK collaborated with the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), Angolan government soldiers and Cuban troops in armed attacks and conventional warfare against the South African security forces and Uniāo Nacional para a Indepêndecia Total de Angola (UNITA). In Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), MK joined forces with the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in armed attacks against the Rhodesian/South African government forces in the late-1960s. In Mozambique, MK collaborated with the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in a military campaign against Portuguese colonial rule.7 The ANC suspended the armed struggle on 1 August 1990. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed in 1959 by a radical youth faction that had broken away from the ANC. The PAC was banned by the South African government in 1960 and most of its senior leadership were arrested, with many others fleeing into exile. In September 1961 the PAC made the decision to establish underground cells and engage in armed struggle. The PAC’s armed wing, Poqo was subsequently established. Poqo was later renamed the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). In the 1960s the PAC’s armed wing engaged in armed attacks against policemen, representatives of traditional authority in the former black homelands, perceived PAC dissidents and white civilians.8 In the late-1960s the PAC fought along side the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) against Portuguese forces in Mozambique. Links were also established with other southern African liberation movements such as the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In the 1970s the PAC embarked on a Maoist strategy of a protracted people’s war, and APLA members infiltrated certain rural areas, with sporadic attacks being launched against members of the security forces. By the mid- to late-1980s APLA was launching attacks against security force members from urban townships, such as Alexandra. Also in the 1980s, APLA members engaged in armed robberies in order to provide additional funding for the armed wing.9 Following the unbanning of the PAC, APLA bases were established in the Transkei from which they launched a series of attacks against police, military and civilian targets between 1992 ANC, 1978. ANC, 1969. 7 ANC. ND, History of MK. (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/mk-history.html). 8 TRC, 1998: 370-1. 9 TRC, 1998: 372. 5 6

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and 1994.10 At its height, the total personnel strength of APLA was estimated to be between 6 000 and 8 000. The PAC was constantly plagued by internal divisions and leadership conflicts, a number of which revolved around how armed struggle should be envisaged and conducted. The result was that the effectiveness of the PAC as a liberation movement was significantly undermined. 1.3) Military Negotiations In 1989, a conference was held in Lusaka (Zambia) in which senior ANC leaders, officers from the homeland armies, an unofficial SADF delegation and academics broadly agreed that the new South African military should be: subordinate to civilian control; operate within the rule of law; non-partisan and non-racial; as well as a professional organisation with high standards of efficiency. There was also consensus that the size of the South African military would be substantially reduced over time.11 In December 1991, nineteen parties gathered at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa to negotiate the future of South Africa. Given their differences, negotiations proved difficult, but by the end of 1993, parties had reached consensus on a number of critical issues, including a date for the first democratic elections. In April 1993, military negotiations between the SADF and MK were initiated. The negotiations focused on the control of the defence force during the transition, the creation of a new defence force and the integration of the various armed forces into this new defence force (the SANDF). The SADF were able to take control of the negotiation process as they had a team of specialists and presented their arguments in a functional and rational way, which overshadowed the much smaller, less experienced MK delegation.12 This state of affairs was reiterated by an ex-combatant who was interviewed as part of this study: I was part of the integration committee on intelligence dealing with transformation. At the end, the SADF dominated and controlled the process.13

During negotiation process, the SADF argued that the Interim Constitution should make provision for the new defence force to be a “balanced, modern, and technologically advanced military force,” and that “all members of the National Defence Force shall be properly trained to comply with international standards of competency.”14 This provision was later included in the Interim Constitution, as well as in the Defence White Paper (1996). Initially, it appeared as though the argument was put forward to minimise the chances of having the defence budget further reduced. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears as though this provision was intended to ensure that former members of the SADF would retain power and influence within the SANDF. This was because many MK combatants were infantry-based, and had not received training in the use of technologically advanced weaponry.15 TRC, 1998: 376; Lodge, 1995: 113. Creative Associates International (CAI), (http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox7.htm). 12 Seegers, 1996: 32. 13 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No. 31 FS, 04 January 2002. 14 Shaw, 1995: 19-23. 15 Batchelor and Willet, 1998: 60. 10 11

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Consequently, it is highly probable that due to the dominant position of the SADF during the negotiations, MK’s ability to influence the process of the integration and demobilisation, and hence secure the best possible conditions for its members, was severely undermined. The end result of this negotiation process was that instead of all armed forces being integrated into a new military structure, non-statutory and TBVC armies were merely absorbed into the SADF, which was then renamed, the SANDF. APLA, on the other hand, did not participate in the military negotiations, and only formally suspended the armed struggle in 1994. 1.4) Integration into the SANDF and Demobilisation of Ex-Combatants Between 1993 and 1994, all South African statutory and non-statutory armed forces had to submit a list of their personnel to a centralised list called the Certified Personnel Register (CPR), which was administered by the Department of Defence. This list was to form the basis of the integration and demobilisation process in South Africa. However, MK and APLA experienced difficulties in compiling their relevant lists as they had not kept detailed records of their members, many ex-combatants had used pseudonyms during the armed struggle, and MK and APLA experienced difficulties in determining those categories of members that could be defined as “combatants”. The CPR was eventually finalised in August 1995, but its content was controversial as many ANC and PAC members who had not been included on the list claimed that they had served in MK or APLA. There was also speculation that MK and APLA had deliberately overrepresented their numbers to strengthen their bargaining position during the military negotiations of 1993. The numerical breakdown of the CPR by type of armed force is presented below: 16 Armed Force Statutory forces: Former SADF (excluding part-time forces, but including civilians) Former TBVC defence forces Subtotal Non-statutory forces: MK APLA Subtotal TOTAL

Number 90 000 11 039 101 039 28 888 6 000 34 888 135 927

Following the completion of the CPR, integration began. It consisted of four stages:17 i) ii)

16 17

Ex-combatants were regionally mustered and then assembled at certain military bases (Wallmansthal and De Brug). Ex-combatants then appeared before the placement board that was comprised of different armed forces and the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT). Those without formal military training or sufficient military qualifications did not undergo integration and were released from the military. Motumi and Mckenzie, 1998:189-190. Mokalobe, 1999: 13.

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iii) iv)

If required, ex-combatants were provided with bridging training and orientation. Ex-combatants were placed into different arms of service.

The official integration process began in April 1994, following intensive negotiations with the Joint Military Co-ordinating Committee. During this negotiations it was decided that the SANDF would include the following numerical breakdown of armed forces: MK (17 000), APLA (6 000), Homeland militaries (10 000) and the SADF (85 000). Clearly, integration was going to be a challenging process as former enemies now constituted the same military, and there were also differences in terms of language, military culture, military competence and training.18 The integration of MK and APLA was characterised by dissatisfaction over ranks, conditions of service and salaries. MK and APLA soldiers were receiving lower salaries and ranks compared to their white counterparts. In addition, former non-statutory soldiers were initially not issued with uniforms, had to endure substandard living conditions, and were not provided with pensions as had been previously promised. More than 2 000 MK and APLA members that reported for integration were excluded from the SANDF because their names had not appeared on the CPR. Consequently, 7 000 MK soldiers left the military bases and engaged in protest actions. For example, in 1995 two protest actions were staged by several hundred MK ex-combatants in Durban and Cape Town, with the Durban protest turning violent. One of the leaders of the Cape Town march stated: They used us for their political gains and then threw us in the dustbin19.

5 000 of the 7000 returned to military bases following President Nelson Mandela’s personal guarantee that their grievances would be addressed. Those who did not return were discharged, while some faced court martial.20 On 21 April 1995, the demobilisation of ex-MK and APLA combatants was announced by the Minister of Defence at the time, Joe Modise. The aim of this process was the voluntary release of ex-combatants who were members of the SANDF, but either did not wish to or were unable (due to physical disability) to serve in the full-time force.21 In December 1996, the South African Parliament passed the Demobilisation Act, which extended demobilisation to SANDF members who could not be integrated because of their age, level of education, health, or individuals who chose not to integrate because of dissatisfaction with their rank after placement in the SANDF. It involved the provision of gratuities, which varied according to the number of years served in MK and APLA.22 In terms of the actual demobilisation and reintegration process, soldiers were encouraged to participate in 2 weeks of voluntary counselling and 18 months of vocational training through the DOD’s Service Corps (SC).23 A total of 3 770 soldiers were formally demobilised from the SANDF. There were a number of problems with the general process of demobilisation and reintegration. Most of the difficulties stemmed from the lack of adequate planning, coCreative Associates International (CAI), (http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox7.htm). Patrick Laurence, P. “Scapegoats for the Country’s Ills,” Focus No.10, April 1998. 20 Creative Associates International (CAI), (http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox7.htm). 21 Motumi and McKenzie, 1998: 194. 22 Defence Review, 1998: 72. 23 Defence Review, 1998: 90. 18 19

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ordination and implementation of the process. The process was also decided in a topdown manner without much involvement of ex-combatants and civil society organisations.24 In addition, there was also an absence of feasibility studies to determine the social and economic needs of former MK and APLA combatants and their dependants. Most researchers who have worked on the issue of demobilisation suggest that this state of affairs did not provide ex-combatants with sufficient opportunities for successful reintegration into civilian life.25 Motumi and Mckenzie (1998: 181) summarise the problem as follows: South Africa’s demobilisation process…has not effectively provided for the reintegration of ex-combatants into society. Demobilisation has been poorly planned, badly executed and wholly inadequate in meeting the needs of ex-combatants.

Following these processes of integration and demobilisation, the SANDF initiated a process of downsizing or rationalisation in which it sought to reduce its personnel numbers to 70 000. 1.5) Integration Problems Soon after the process of integration had been completed, there were a significant number of incidents of alleged racial discrimination by white soldiers against their black counterparts. These incidents allegedly took the form of unfair punishment, assaults, slurs, discrimination and unfair dismissals. According to one of the ex-combatants that was interviewed during this study: When we came back to South Africa, we were pointed with guns by the SADF members, we were abused. Integration was absorption and unfair. Integration was run by the SADF and BMATT. People were given low ranks despite their stature in MK. This was discrimination.26

Other ex-combatants decided to resign due to alleged incidents of racism. During the research process, an interviewee made the following comment: I requested counselling in the SANDF. Because of racism I encountered, I left. It was not worth it. In the consultation room there was a filing cabinet with files written blacks, whites, coloureds and Indians. How could you expect such a racist person to counsel you.27

BMATT was aware of racial tension and discrimination within the SANDF and had brought these incidents to the attention of the Ministry of Defence in a number of reports. In its reports BMATT criticised the integration process by claiming that “attitudes had hardened” among ex-SADF members towards ex-combatants and warned that this state of affairs could have “far-reaching” implications. On 16 September 1999, BMATT’s warning was realised when Lieutenant Sibusiso Madubela murdered six of his white colleagues and a white civilian woman, at Tempe military base near Bloemfontein. Other shooting incidents subsequently took place at the Phalaborwa 7 SA Infantry Motumi and McKenzie, 1998: 197. Motumi and McKenzie, 1998; Shelton et al., 2001; and Gear, 2002. 26 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No. 4 WC, 23 October 2001. 27 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No. 23 NC, 22 February 2002. 24 25

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Battalion and Simon’s Town naval base where black soldiers shot and killed white SANDF members. Incidents of shootings between black and white SANDF members were also reported during the recent South African peace support operation in Burundi.28 Following the Tempe shooting, a Ministerial Inquiry was established to determine the direct and indirect causes of the shootings at Tempe military base. According to the interim report, the SANDF's management at operational levels is predominantly white, and hence ignores the general representivity of the SANDF. This state of affairs was fuelling racial tension and contributed to overt racist incidents between white and black members of the SANDF.29 In December 2001, the South African Parliament passed the Termination of Integration Intake Act (No. 4 of 2001). The Act is intended to terminate the integration of ex-MK and APLA combatants who were unable to integrate due to imprisonment. 262 excombatants were subsequently integrated into the SANDF. Those who were integrated under this Act have allegedly been faced with problems of racial discrimination. Confidential reports compiled by MK and APLA representatives, alleged that there had been a deliberate process by ex-SADF members “to rig, disrupt and undermine the integration process” with the intention of excluding many ex-combatants from successfully integrating into the SANDF. It was reported that more than 100 excombatants, who showed up for integration in Kimberly, were excluded from joining, whilst others were not allowed to serve in key positions in the SANDF.30 Consequently, it is entirely possible that many former MK and APLA members may have been dissuaded, or even prevented, from pursuing military careers, due to perceived racial discrimination and abuse within the SANDF. Subsequently these individuals were only able to secure minimal demobilisation packages due to their short periods of service.

Pretoria News, 06 March 2002. Ministerial Committee of Inquiry, 2001: 65-81. 30 Mail & Guardian, 22 February 2002. 28 29

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Section 2: Aim, Key Questions and Methodology 2.1) Aim The aim of this research project is to determine the quality of life and socio-economic needs of previously demobilised members of MK and APLA. 2.2) Key Questions In order to fulfil the above-mentioned aim, the following key questions need to be addressed: a) Have ex-combatants found employment in the formal and informal sectors? b) If unemployed, do they have marketable skills? c) Have they undergone further education and training, and would they like to do so in the future? d) How well have they been socially integrated into their communities? e) How do they define their needs and grievances? f) Do they experience post-traumatic stress, and do they receive any psychological support? g) What formal organisations and informal networks exist to support ex-combatants, what are their main activities and what are their strengths and limitations? h) Are their any “success stories” that could be replicated by other ex-combatants? 2.3) Methodology The methodological approach of this study was comprised of five components, which are as follows: a) The preparation of a detailed, semi-structured questionnaire, which formed the basis of interviews with ex-combatants. b) The determination of a representative sample of ex-combatants from MK and APLA. c) The administration of the questionnaire by means of personal interviews with excombatants. d) Undertaking interviews with representatives of organisations and networks that support ex-combatants. e) The review of government policy on ex-combatants. Details on these five approaches are provided below. In addition to these five approaches, a survey of the relevant literature on demobilisation and reintegration was also undertaken. 2.3.1) Questionnaire Preparation Between June and September 2001 the questionnaire for this study was developed, a process which involved extensive consultation between the various members of the research team. The questionnaire consisted of 30 pages and was made up of the following seven sections: a) Personal information 13

b) c) d) e) f) g)

Education and training Employment status and income generation Military background Service corps Social reintegration Needs and expectations

The questionnaire included both qualitative and quantitative questions, with assistance being provided by psychologists from the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in terms of formulating the questions to determine if excombatants are experiencing psychological problems. The questionnaire was tested with a small group of ex-combatants in the latter part of September 2001, the results of which led to some of the questions in the questionnaire being refined. See Appendix 1 for a copy of this questionnaire. 2.3.2) Sampling Sampling Strategies A sample can be thought of as a picture of a population. All that can be known about the population must be inferred from the sample. The goal therefore is to establish a sample that represents the population on all relevant and important characteristics. An ideal sample is one that differs from its population only in size. At the onset of the project, the research team were aware that determining a representative sample of former members of MK and APLA would be a major challenge because no publicly accessible comprehensive database of these ex-combatants exists. In fact, even the exact number of ex-combatants from MK and APLA is unknown.31 Consequently, the research team initially adopted two strategies in an attempt to overcome the problem of a lack of perfect information, namely: consulting the Certified Personnel Register, which is held by the Department of Defence; and reviewing the membership lists of the MK and APLA veterans associations. Certified Personnel Register (CPR) As the first logical step to gain access to the relevant sections of the CPR, the research team contacted the MK and APLA Integration offices in the Department of Defence. The APLA Integration Office was unable to provide the research team with a list of demobilised APLA members, while the MK Integration Office took over a month to compile a list of 80 names. After numerous discussions with Department of Defence officials, the research team was finally able to gain access to the MK and APLA components of CPR from the Department of Defence’s Integration Office at Walmansthal. However this turned out to be a fairly fruitless exercise as this CPR list does not indicate the addresses of former MK and APLA combatants, nor gender and age specifications. In fact, it is just a list of names, which is inaccurate as an unknown This problem of obtaining a reliable sampling frame is not unique to this study. Sasha Gear (CSVR) and Ian Liebenberg (University of Pretoria) and Garth Shelton (University of the Witwatersrand), all experienced researchers who had undertaken research on demobilised soldiers, indicated in discussions with members of the research team that they had also experienced major difficulties in determining a representative sample of ex-combatants from MK and APLA. 31

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number of ex-combatants have died since the CPR was compiled. Hence the CPR is not a reliable source on which to base a representative sample, other than to provide an indication of the total ex-combatant population size. MK and APLA Military Veterans Associations Following weeks of inquires and phone calls, it became clear that the national offices of the MK Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) and the APLA Military Veterans Association (APLAMVA) do not have accessible membership lists. The reason for this is MKMVA and APLAMVA are under-resourced both in terms of financial and human resources, and in the case of MKMVA, highly decentralised, which has resulted in communication problems between branches and the Head Office. With both these two sampling strategies being relatively unsuccessful, the research team had to make compromises with respect to devising a representative sample, details of which are provided in the sub-section below. The Way Forward In terms of a way forward, and given the above-mentioned constraints, the research team decided to employ a combination of two purposeful sampling strategies, namely maximum variation and snowball sampling. This would allow for flexibility, as well as accommodate multiple interests and needs. Maximum variation sampling involves selecting a wide range of variation on dimensions of interest. This documents unique or diverse variations that have emerged in adapting to different conditions. It also identifies important common patterns that cut across variations.32 Snowball sampling identifies, cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are information rich, that is good examples for study and good interview subjects. This is commonly used in studies that may be looking at issues where there is a lack of reliable information. An example would be studying the conditions under which homeless people live. In practice this means that research identifies a relevant research subject, who then provides the researcher with information on where other relevant research subjects can be found, and so the process continues.33 In implementing these sampling approaches, influential individuals in the ex-combatant community were consulted, in particular the Chairpersons of MKMVA and APLAMVA offices, and representatives from community organisations and non-governmental organisations, such as UMAC (U Managing Conflict) and Khulumani, for two reasons. First, to ascertain their opinions on the variation in gender; age, geographical distribution, language; income levels and employment, so that a maximum variation strategy could be employed. Second, request their assistance in identifying appropriate ex-combatants to be interviewed. The research team decided to interview a total of 400 ex-combatants in all nine of South Africa’s provinces. As a rule, the team resolved that the number of interviews per province would be guided by the percentage of the total population in each province. 32 33

Schatz, P. Research Methods in Psychology, (http://schatz.sju.edu/methods/), 3/10/02. Schatz, P. Research Methods in Psychology, (http://schatz.sju.edu/methods/), 3/10/02.

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This implied the following: 64 interviews in the Eastern Cape: (16% of population ); 28 interviews in the Free State: (7% of population); 72 interviews in Gauteng: (18% of population); 80 interviews in KwaZulu-Natal (20% of population); 28 interviews in Mpumalanga (7% of population); 32 interviews in North West (8% of population); 8 interviews in Northern Cape (2% of population); 48 interviews in Limpopo (12% of population); and 40 interviews in the Western Cape (10% of population). In addition, the CPR would be used as an indication of the relative numbers of MK and APLA excombatants, as well as a guide with respect to the percentage split between these two organisations. Hence, of the total number of respondents, the team sough to achieve the following split: 83% MK and 17% APLA respondents. However, strictly adhering to this distribution would be difficult with snowballing being employed. 2.3.3) The Administration of the Questionnaire Questionnaires were administered in all nine provinces of South Africa and in both rural and urban areas, between October 2001 and June 2002. On many occasions, in order to facilitate the process more efficiently, arrangements were made for ex-combatants to meet in a central venue, and if necessary the transport costs of the ex-combatants was paid for by the research team. On average it took 45 minutes to an hour to administer one questionnaire. In addition, experience has shown that employing a wide range of interviewers has tendency of producing inconsistencies as interviewers have different styles and approaches with respect to interviewing respondents. Thus in order to reduce the occurrence of inconsistency, only two primary interviewers, Mafole Mokalobe (CCR Researcher) and Pops Mashike (Lecturer/Researcher, Wits University) were used. They were assisted by in a small number of cases by Steven Nakana (CCR Research Assistant), Nqaba Bucwa (CCR Associate) and Mandla Hlatshwayo (former MK ex-combatant). In a number of circumstances MKMVA and APLAMVA branch officers, as well as individuals from community and non-governmental organisations were very helpful in identifying research subjects, this was particularly the case in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng and Mpumalanga. However, in certain provinces, certain military veterans associations were suspicious of the research project, uncooperative or unreliable. For example, in the North West Province, one of the research team visited Lethabong (Haartebeesfontein) outside Rustenburg, on the invitation of an ex-MK soldier who heard about the study. On arrival, the researcher was confronted with 18 ex-combatants assembled at one of the ex-combatant’s home. Some of the outspoken ex-combatants demanded that the researcher must first go through the MKMVA provincial office located in Mafikeng, the capital of the North West Province. After two hours of interrogation and negotiations, which included calling the Provincial General Secretary of MKMVA, the researcher agreed to go to Mafikeng. The researcher then travelled to Mafikeng, but the Provincial General Secretary of MKMVA in Mafikeng referred the researcher to a regional official in Dinokana (Zeerust). The official proved to be uncontactable. Some months later, the researcher was again invited to interview excombatants in Lethabong. The researcher found ex-combatants assembled at another house, not the one used for the initial visit. Again the researcher was interrogated for an hour, this was mainly because some of the ex-combatants who were not around during the first visit demanded a briefing and asked questions. Some of the ex-combatants refused to answer certain questions while others responded to questions reluctantly. In total, 410 questionnaires were administered.

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2.3.4) Organisation of the Data A database was designed to accommodate the quantitative data in which Microsoft Access was used. The data was then inputted into this database, and then various quantitative reports were generated, which assisted in the analysis of the data.

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Section 3: Key Terms and Definitions This section provides details on the key terms and definitions, which are employed in this report. The following terms and definitions will be considered below: demobilisation; reintegration; demobilisation and reintegration programmes; and ex-combatant. 3.1) Demobilisation Demobilisation is a planned process by which the number of personnel under arms and in military command structures are significantly reduced. It includes the reduction in size of the regular military, paramilitary forces, as well as rebel groups (sometimes after their integration into new regular armed forces). In short, it is the process by which the military personnel leave the armed forces. 3.2) Reintegration Reintegration is the process by which former soldiers make the transition from a military life to a civilian life, where the ex-combatants and his/her dependants achieve financial independence through involvement in paid employment or productive activities. Former soldiers may also have to make psychological adjustments given the top down approach of the military, which is often unsuitable in civilian life. Reintegration is generally a longterm process, as it may take several years for ex-soldiers and their families to adapt to a civilian way of life. A distinction is often made between economic, social and political reintegration.34 3.2.1) Economic Reintegration Economic integration is the process through which retired or demobilised soldiers secure a livelihood for themselves and their dependants through production or gainful employment. Economic integration is often difficult in areas where unemployment is relatively high, poor economic growth exists, lack of available agricultural land and housing and the individuals in question do not have marketable skills. 3.2.2) Political Reintegration Political integration is the process through which retired or demobilised soldiers participate in the political life of their communities. Political integration has two components. First, it means that former soldiers assume or are elected into leadership positions in the community, such as local councils, school committees and neighbourhood watches. Second, it involves former soldiers participating in political processes in their communities, such as voting for local elections and making themselves available when consultation with community members is required. 3.2.3) Social Reintegration Social integration is the process through which former soldiers and their dependants consider themselves to be part of, and are accepted by the communities in which they live and society at large. The attitudes of communities towards categories of former soldiers is often dependent on the perceptions of the historical role these individuals 34

This is a reworked definition by Kingma (2000).

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played, and, if a major armed conflict had taken place, then the degree of general reconciliation in that society.35 The transition from civilian to military life is particularly challenging for many excombatants in Africa, as a typical ex-combatant is semi-literate, unskilled, has few personal possessions, often has no housing or land, and frequently has many dependants. Some ex-combatants are also physically and psychologically handicapped by wartime experiences. Many find it difficult to take independent initiatives and to cope with the ordinary demands of civilian life.36 3.3) Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes Demobilisation and reintegration programmes generally require reliable data for the purposes of effective planning, realistic logistics and management, and the necessary resources to implement the programmes. The most common demobilisation and reintegration mechanisms are: cash payments, counselling (employment and psychological), vocational training, apprenticeship, formal education, job generation, support for job search, access to land, credits, technical assistance, and support in identifying market needs.37 3.3.1) Factors Affecting Successful Integration into Civilian Life Based on a number of comparative studies, there are ten factors that have the capacity to affect the successful outcome of ex-soldiers’ integration into civilian life. These factors38 are as follows: General economic conditions Integration programmes tend to be successful when there are relatively stable levels of economic growth, low rates of unemployment, and a small business sector that is not overly competitive. Skills of former soldiers The lower the skills and education level of former soldiers, the higher the probability that they will struggle to secure employment. Labour market flexibility Where labour markets are relatively rigid, former soldiers have tended to be discriminated against due to their age and the fact that they did not follow prescribed patterns of employment. Counselling The provision of pre-discharge counselling, outplacement services and other services rendered by the armed forces help individuals to find civilian jobs (as has been the case in Belgium, United Kingdom and United States) dramatically increases the chances of success of integration programmes.

Kingma, 1998. Ball, 1997: 86. 37 Ball, 1998. 38 Many of these factors are drawn from Brzoska, 2000. 35 36

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Reintegration support The existence of relevant and well-resourced reintegration support programmes improve the possibilities of ex-soldiers finding civilian employment. Personal motivation of ex-soldiers The transition to civilian life requires individuals to be highly motivated and able to adapt to different environments. Health status of former military personnel The healthier former soldiers are from a physical and mental perspective, the greater the chances of them successfully integrating into civilian life. Difficulties adapting to civilian life The extent to which ex-soldiers can conform to civilian norms, values and approaches, the higher the probability that integration will be successful. Receptiveness of the community Integration stands a good chance of being successful if the civilian community is receptive to, and accommodating of, former soldiers. 3.4) Ex-Combatant In order to define the term “ex-combatant”, one has to first define the term “combatant”. Combatant is a contested concept in South Africa, even within the former liberation movements, due to the manner in which the ANC and PAC chose to engage with the South African security forces. Between the early-1960s and the early-1990s, the ANC and PAC employed unconventional warfare tactics against the South African government. This involved irregular armed clashes between MK/APLA and the South African security forces, and acts of sabotage by members of APLA and MK. In addition, there were members of MK and APLA that had no experience of armed conflict, other than hurling a stone at a South African police vehicle or hiding a MK or APLA insurgent. As a consequence, it becomes difficult to determine who qualifies as an “combatant” within the ranks of APLA and MK. Ascertaining who was entitled to call themselves a “combatant” within the MK context is a fairly complicated affair, as there are essentially six groups who lay claim to the title combatant:39 a) Individuals who went into exile in other countries where they received extensive military training, and were deployed on military operations from these countries; b) Individuals who resided in South Africa and who received a few weeks of training either in South Africa, Swaziland or Botswana; c) Individuals who provided support to MK, such as the provision of safe houses, courier work and reconnaissance; d) Those who did non-military tasks such as building underground structures. e) MK members who were detained on Robben Island for a substantial period of time. f) Members of the Self Defence Units (SDU) who were trained by returning MK combatants at the beginning of the 1990s to provide security for the local communities during the volatile political transition.40 39

Cock, 1993: 40.

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In the APLA context, there appears to be no sense of categorisation of combatants. However, military training was the key defining element. In this study a “combatant” refers to a member of APLA and MK who received some form of military training under the political leadership of the PAC and ANC. By implication, members of the SDU’s, Robben Islanders and those people who worked in supportive roles are not considered to be combatants. Neither the duration and intensity of the military training nor the experience of combat is taken into consideration by this definition. The most important consideration is the possession of some form of military skills. Hence an ex-combatant is a former or demobilised member of APLA and MK who received some form of military training either under the political leadership of the PAC and ANC. This definition is useful in emphasising one of the main concerns of this study, namely: that soldiers who spent many years in the military possess skills of violence, and should the needs of soldiers not adequately be addressed following their demobilisation, they then have the potential to use violence in order to survive. All respondents in this study received military training at some point whilst serving in either MK or APLA. This training included: anti-aircraft gun handling, guerrilla warfare, infantry battalion, instructor’s course, military combat work, military engineering, military First Aid, military intelligence, rangers course, reconnaissance, sabotage, anti-tank gun handling, explosives, suicide commando, surveillance and counter-surveillance, target identification, topography, VIP protection, weapons handling, working with landmines, artillery, military police course, logistics, basic military training, commander’s course, communication, enemy identification, firearm handling, extracting information using torture, and many more. This military training was undertaken in various countries, such as: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, People’s Republic of China, Russia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

The Constitution of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) former SDUs members, as it defines an MK soldier as someone who joined MK before the suspension of the armed struggle. However, some SDU members were integrated into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). 40

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Section 4: Social Characteristics and Military Background Apartheid affected all South Africans: women and men, young and old, educated and less educated, married and single. The social characteristics of ex-MK and APLA combatants outlined in this section bear testimony to these variations. This section also considers the military background of the respondents. 4.1) Gender In many liberation struggles women fight alongside men as equals. This was the case in Eritrea, Uganda, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. South Africa was no exception. Both women and men were part of the liberation struggle. The struggle was not only against apartheid, but all forms of discrimination, including gender inequalities. Initially there were very few women combatants, but as the liberation struggle became more protracted, increasing numbers of women joined MK and APLA. Cock41 estimates that by the time the armed struggle was suspended, women made up 20% of MK membership. In the case of APLA, approximately 200 women served as combatants.42 Data in Table 4.1 reveals that predominantly men were interviewed (87,56%), while there were only 51 women (12,44%) interviewees. Table 4.1: Gender Variations Gender Variations Men Women Total

Number of Respondents

Percentage 359 51 410

87,56 12,44 100

Women were a significant part of the liberation movement community. Women excombatants participated in both training and armed struggle activities. In the words of some women ex-combatants: In the army people come to respect each other. It’s only in the army that I’ve seen equality practised. In terms of endurance and discipline women have been outstanding in MK. Because of that - because of what we’ve been doing on the ground – we’ve been recognised as equals. We are more disciplined than men. We make better drivers. Also women are good sharpshooters – in training we really excelled. This made the men respects us. In mock attacks or ambushes the behaviour of women won respect…Once I was out on a march in Tanzania when someone said they’d seen a lion. I didn’t run away, though I was very afraid…In MK I feel I’m respected, but you have to prove yourself over an over again…. True. Even though there were separate sleeping places and so on, there were no gender differences between our male comrades and us. We undertook joint operations and did the same work. Some of our female comrades were better at other things than males such as intelligence gathering and analysis, map reading and offering counselling.

1991: 162. This information was provided by a senior APLA Veterans Association official at its headquarters in Johannesburg, 14 August 2002. 41 42

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4.2) Age Table 4.2: Age Variations Age Variations Between 25 and 30 Between 31 and 35 Between 36 and 40 Between 41 and 45 Between 46 and 50 Between 51 and 55 56 and above Not specified Total


Percentage 114 93 48 43 26 17 58 11 410

27,80 22,68 11,71 10,49 6,34 4,15 14,15 2,68 100

There is a relatively even distribution by age. However, just more than half of the interviewed ex-combatants are 35 or younger, which meant they joined the armed struggle from the mid-1980s (at the earliest), only a few years before its conclusion. Significantly, close to a quarter of respondents are older than 46, and hence were veterans of the armed struggle. Demobilisation experiences elsewhere also point to similar trends. In Uganda, over one third of ex-combatants were younger than 30 years old. In Ethiopia, many ex-combatants were under the age of 25.43 4.3) Housing Variations There is a serious housing shortage in South Africa. By the beginning of 2000, it was estimated to be between three to four million units.44 Table 4.3: Housing Variations Type of Accommodation Staying with Parents Staying in Own Houses Staying with Relatives Staying in Rented Accommodation Staying Government Accommodation Staying on MKMVA Farm Accommodation not Specified Total

Number of Respondents Percentage 160 39,02 159 38,78 14 3,41 56 13,66 1 0,24 1 0,24 19 4,63 410 100

Like many other South Africans, a significant number of ex-combatants have no shelter of their own. 39,02% stay with their parents. While 13,66% stay in rented accommodation, 3,41% stay with relatives. 38,78% have their own accommodation, which on the surface appears to be a positive sign, but many of these homes are in fact shacks45, mostly in informal settlements, with some being in the backyards of their parents’ or relatives’ houses. According to the 1999 October Household Survey, 12% of Colletta, Kostner and Wiedehofer:1996: c2. SA Institute of Race Relations, 2001: 164 45 A shack is a form of a housing structure constructed from corrugated iron. Others are erected using wood. 43 44

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Africans, 4% of Coloureds and only 1% of Indians stayed in shacks in informal settlements.46 4.4) Number of Rooms Table 4.4: Variation in the Number of Rooms Accommodation Number of Rooms One Room Two Rooms Three Rooms Four Rooms Five Rooms Six Rooms Seven Rooms Eight Rooms Nine Rooms Ten Rooms Eleven Rooms Twelve Rooms Fourteen Rooms Not Specified Total

Number of Respondents 43 57 46 152 44 23 20 5 4 4 2 1 1 8 410

Percentage 10,49 13,90 11,22 37,07 10,73 5,61 4,88 1,22 0,98 0,98 0,49 0,24 0,24 1,95 100

The majority of respondents live in houses of two rooms or more. Nearly all of these houses are either former apartheid government-build “matchbox” houses or shacks. Well over a quarter of interviewees, (37,07%) stay in a four-roomed accommodation. Just over 10% live in a one-roomed accommodation, some of which have their families living with them. 4.5) Number of People Living in the Household Table 4.5: Variation in the Number of People Living in the Household Number of People Living in the House One Person Two People Three People Four People Five people Six People Seven People Eight People Nine People Ten People Eleven People Twelve People Thirteen People Fourteen People Fifteen People 46

Number of Respondents 28 22 48 74 58 47 39 32 12 9 11 2 3 1 2

Percentage 6,83 5,37 11,71 18,05 14,15 11,46 9,51 7,80 2,93 2,20 2,68 0,49 0,73 0,24 0,49

SA Institute of Race Relations: 2001:163.

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Sixteen People Not Specified Total

3 19 410

0,73 4,63 100

Closely intertwined with the number of rooms in different types of households is the number of people who live in those dwellings. The vast majority of respondents (more than 70%) share their homes with four people or more. Only 12% share accommodation with two people or less. 4.6) Access to Water Table 4.6: Variations in Access to Water Access to Running Water Yes No Total



88,54 11,46 100

Most combatants have access to running water. Those 47 who do have access live in rural areas. This picture applies to many South African households. In 1999, of the 11 million households in urban areas, 59% had running tap water in their dwelling, 30% in their yard and 9% had access to public taps. Despite these positive strides, there is still a lot of work to be done in non-urban areas where access to water remains a problem for many South Africans.47 4.7) Access to Electricity Table 4.7: Variations in Access to Electricity Access to Electricity Yes No Total



87,07 12,93 100

Most respondents (87%) said that they have access to electricity, which is higher than the general percentage for South Africans of 66%.48 The 13%, without, live predominantly in rural areas. 4.8) Television Sets Table 4.8: Variations in Ownership of Television Sets Own Television Set Yes No Total

47 48



71,71 28,29 100

SA Institute of Race Relations, 2001:152-153. SA Institute of Race Relations, 2001:170.

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Table 4.8 suggests an encouraging indication of some household wealth, as a large number of interviewees owned a television set (71,71%). 4.9) Marital Status Table 4.9: Marital Status Marital Status Single Married Widowed Divorced Not specified Total


Percentage 210 152 20 16 12 410

51,22 37,07 4,88 3,90 2,93 100

Just over half the interviewees, 210 (51,22%) are not married, more than a third are married, while less than 5% are widowed and divorced respectively. The nature of the marriage status of respondents also varies. Whilst some respondents are married through traditional ways, while others had been married in a Christian church. Nevertheless, traditional marriage seems to be predominant among interviewees. Many respondents stated that they are proud of their traditional customs and want to preserve tradition. They considered custom and tradition as part of their struggle against apartheid. In terms of divorced ex-combatants, some respondents stated that they had separated from their spouses informally. Others have formally separated with their spouses in accordance with western marriage. 4.10) Number of Children Table 4.10 below shows that 77% of respondents have at least one child. 26% of interviewees have two children; 23,41% have only one child; and close to 16% have three children. 12% have four children or more, while 23% have no children. Table 4.10: Number of Children Number of Children No Children 1 Child 2 Children 3 Children 4 Children 5 Children 6 Children 8 Children 9 Children Total


Percentage 93 96 108 64 26 20 1 1 1 410

22,68 23,41 26,34 15,61 6,34 4,88 0,24 0,24 0,24 100

Many of the children are born outside of marriage. In these situations, children often stay with one partner, parents or relatives.

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4.11) Language All South African language groups were represented in both MK and APLA. The dominant home languages are isiZulu (30%) and isiXhosa (29,02%). Sesotho and Setswana is a home language of 14% and 11% of interviewees respectively. Only 5% or less of the remaining respondents spoke another South African language. Table 4.12: Home Language Home Language Afrikaans English IsiZulu IsiXhosa IsiSwati Sesotho Setswana Sepedi Xitsonga Isivhenda IsiNdebele Not Specified Total


Percentage 10 3 123 119 17 58 47 21 3 3 3 3 410

2,44 0,73 30 29,02 4,15 14,15 11,46 5,12 0,73 0,73 0,73 0,73 100

This diverse picture bears testimony to the extent to which all South African language groups were represented in the liberation movement. The only difference between the two liberation movements was that MK was composed of all racial groups as opposed to APLA, whose membership was limited only to Africans.49

The word Africans here refers to Blacks, Coloureds and Indians. In 1966, the exiled leaders of the South African Coloured People’s Congress dissolved this organisation and merged with the PAC “as Africans and equals” (Karis and Gerhart, 1997: 371). 49

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4.12) Multilingualism Table 4.12: Variance in Multilingualism Multilingualism Afrikaans English IsiZulu IsiXhosa IsiSwati Sesotho Setswana Sepedi Xitsonga Ndebele Portuguese Russian

Number of Respondents Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part Full Part

Percentage 120 74 339 21 133 75 135 60 12 15 91 64 82 44 38 24 4 17 4 16 14 60 4 32

29,27 18,05 82,68 5,12 32,44 18,29 32,93 14,63 2,93 3,66 22,19 15,61 20,00 10,73 9,88 5,85 0, 97 4,15 0, 97 3, 90 3, 41 14,63 0, 97 7, 80

Table 4.12 indicates that many ex-combatants can speak several of South Africa’s official languages. Most respondents (82,68%) speak and understand English, while between 33% and 20% can speak, with varying degrees of proficiency, one or more of the following languages: isiXhosa, isiZulu, Afrikaans, Sesotho and Setswana. Others also learned foreign languages while in exile. Fourteen of the interviewees are fluent in Portuguese. Another 60 have some working knowledge of Spanish. Thirty-six respondents have some proficiency in Russian. 4.13) English Proficiency Table 4.13: Variances in English Proficiency English Proficiency Excellent Good Fair Poor Very Poor Total


Percentage 43 147 156 54 10 410

10,49 35,85 38,05 13,17 2,44 100

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Although English is widely understood by many ex-combatants, their level of knowledge of this language differs significantly. Table 4.13 indicates a varying degree of the knowledge of the language. 10% of ex-combatants said that their English is excellent; 36% claim that their English is good. 38% indicated that they have a fair understanding of the language. The remaining 16% said that their English is poor. Since English is the common language of communication, ex-combatants who do not have a good understanding are keen to learn the language. They view the knowledge of English as an essential precondition to employment opportunities and understanding the world around them. 4.14) Geographical Location Table 4.14: Variance in Geographical Location of Former Combatants Province Eastern Cape Free State Gauteng KwaZulu-Natal Limpopo Mpumalanga North West Northern Cape Western Cape Total


Percentage 76 22 106 81 19 21 19 32 34 410

18,53 5,37 25,85 19,76 4,63 5,12 4,63 7,80 8,29 100

Ex-combatants were interviewed in all nine provinces. As stated in the section on methodology, the research team sought to base the number of interviews per province on the total population distribution throughout South Africa. The research team was relatively successful in adhering to this target, but there were over-representations from Gauteng and the Northern Cape, and under-representations from the North West and Limpopo Provinces. However, strictly adhering to this distribution was difficult due to snowball sampling. 4.15) Military Affiliation 84% of the respondents claimed that they had served with MK, while 14% indicated that they had been APLA combatants. 2% did not specify the liberation army to which they belonged. Consequently, the research team was able to closely adhere to the percentage breakdown between MK and APLA as described in section 1.3. 4.16) Year of Joining MK Table 4.15: Variance in the Years Respondents Joined MK/APLA Years Pre-1960 1960-1972 1973-1976


Percentage 9 51 31

2,2 12,44 7,56

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1977-1982 1983-1989 1990-1994 Total

53 166 100 410

12,93 40,49 24,39 100

There was a fair degree of variance of the years in which respondents claimed to have joined either MK or APLA. More than 50% claimed to have joined MK or APLA between 1977 and 1989 which is not coincidental. Those who joined the liberation armies between 1977 and 1982 were largely motivated by the brutal response by the South African security forces to the 1976 Soweto uprisings and subsequent student protests. Those who joined between 1983 and 1989 did so as a result of intensive oppression of black South Africans by the apartheid security forces. MK and APLA were only formally established in the early-1960s, so those respondents who fall into the pre1960 category, equate joining the liberation movement with joining MK/APLA. 4.17) Military Joining Age Table 4.16: Variance in Military Joining Age Ages Younger than 15 15-17 18-25 26-35 Older than 35 Not Specified Total


Percentage 37 88 182 69 9 25 410

9,02 21,46 44,39 16,83 2,20 9,02 100

Most of the respondents were 25 or younger when they joined the armed struggle. Critically, close to a third of the total number were under the age of 18 when they became members of either MK or APLA.

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Section 5: Education and Training This section provides information on various aspects of education and training that relate to the respondents. Information on the following is provided: level of education and training; education and training after leaving school; education and training opportunities provided by MK and APLA; and the educational and training ambitions of the respondents. 5.1) Level of Education and Training Education is supposed to provide individuals with opportunities for self-advancement and access to gainful employment. However, in South Africa, education was used by the apartheid government to exploit and control black people, as they were deliberately provided with an inferior type of education compared to what white South Africans received. This policy was resisted by Africans, leading to number of student uprisings throughout, the most notable being the 1976 Soweto uprising. Many young South Africans chose to forgo their formal education and joined the liberation struggle, which is reflected in Table 5.1 below. Table 5.1: Variance in the Level of Education and Training Level of Education and Training Sub A-Standard 5 Standard 6-9 Standard 10 Standard 10 and a Diploma(s) A Postgraduate Degree No Education Not Specified Total


Percentage 29 216 105 21 9 5 25 410

7, 07 52,68 25,61 5,12 2,20 1,22 6,10 100

Close to 60% of respondents do not have a matric certificate. The lack of a matric certificate (Standard 10 or Grade 12) is a serious barrier to entry into the formal job market, which generally discriminates against individuals who did not finish high school. 26% have standard 10, while 5% have standard 10 and a diploma, and 2% have a postgraduate degree or diploma. Only 5 ex-combatants have no formal education at all. Limited formal education opportunities as a result of disrupted education are not unique to South African ex-combatants. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique reported that 37% of ex-combatants in that country had their education disrupted. Upon demobilisation, 34% of soldiers had no formal education at all, while 32% had only primary level education.50 The level of education of ex-combatants in Uganda was also low. Some three-quarters of ex-combatants were reported to have not gone beyond primary education and few possessed marketable skills.51 5.2) Education and Training after Leaving School Despite limited education opportunities, certain ex-combatants were able to obtain some form of education and training inside the country and/or in other countries. Just over 50 51

Dolan and Schafer, 1997: 76. Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer: 1996: 3.

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half of interviewees received some form of education or training after leaving school, while 43% did not. The reason for this is that it appears as though MK and APLA gave ex-combatants opportunities to study. Material and moral support were offered to those who wanted to study, but education and training was a matter of choice. Others pursued study through the Service Corps (see the section on the Service Corps) or on their own initiative. 5.3) Education Opportunities in MK and APLA 33% of respondents got some form of educational/skills training opportunities while in MK and APLA, but the nature of the education and training received differs between respondents. There are ex-combatants who are in possession of degrees and diplomas in various fields of study. Others continued to improve their high school education. Many ex-combatants received some form of vocational training, such as bricklaying, electronics, motor mechanics, carpentry, welding, dressmaking, computer courses, office practice, business skills and security. In exile, respondents indicated that they had received education and training in countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria. Relevant comments by respondents are provided below: [I] studied at the University of Dar E Salaam, University of Transkei, University of Ethiopia [I also] trained as a town clerk by the department of local government.52 I did agriculture in Tanzania.53 [I studied for] Grade A certificate in primary level education [in] Tanzania, Koroko College of Education.54 I did receive education but not in South Africa. I was able to receive my standard 9 in exile [in Angola].55 [I did] motor mechanics in Nairobi [and] it lasted for 3 years.56 I did a Nursing Diploma in Durban and an Accounting Diploma in Kenya.57 [I studied] senior secondary 1 and 2 [in Nigeria].58

Countries such as Russia, China, German Democratic Republic, India and Britain also provided education and training opportunities to a number of ex-MK and APLA combatants. Most of these countries had good relations with either MK or APLA or both. They provided these liberation movements with military, financial and moral support. I have an LLM in International Law and LMC in International Relations. LLM from Moscow in Russia and LMC from Australia.59 [I studied] electronics in China.60 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.16 EC, 30 January 2002. Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.38 EC, 02 February 2002. 54 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.46 EC, 02 February 2002. 55 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No139 MP, 23 April 2002. 56 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.10 WC, 16 November 2001. 57 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.52 KZN, 27 February 2002. 58 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.10 KZN, 25 February 2002. 59 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.26 FS, 02 January 2002. 60 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.88 GP, 12 January 2002. 52 53

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[I did] sewing in German Democratic Republic.61 I did fitting and Turning as well as Topographic Printing. The ANC send me to the best Topographic school in the UK, the London School of Topography.62 After matriculating I received training in India in Management.63

However, 60% chose not to study, either because they prioritised their military careers over education and training, or were simply not interested in studying. Comments by respondents are provided below: I was a soldier and my priority was to fight. I was interested in fighting only not studying. Others who wanted to study were given the opportunity.64 Opportunities were there. However, I was more interested in military work than anything. I also had too much organisational responsibilities.65 My duties in the military camp were demanding hence I could not even start to think about studying.66

There are mixed feelings as to whether the education and training respondents received while serving as members of MK and APLA was useful in helping them to find employment or start their own businesses, while others disagreed. Relevant respondents’ comments are provided below: Yes, I am making my living out of my training now [tailoring and dressmaking].67 Most of my training had to do with Business Administration and the skills I obtained are very helpful. At the moment I run all my businesses by myself and I am able to administer 32 employees under my employment.68 Yes, because I am now running my own project in fashion design.69 No, because if that was the case, I would be on the better side in terms of employment.70 I have not benefited in anyway from my training. They say that the course was too short. I still feel that I did not learn anything valuable. Therefore, I don’t think the training prepared me well for employment opportunities. I have a lot to learn.71

Many South Africans are also faced with similar difficulties of limited employment opportunities despite some form of education and training. According to the 1999 October Households Survey, about 70% of unemployed people in South Africa had less than a standard ten qualification, 25% had a standard ten qualification, and about 5% had a higher education qualification.72 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.53 GP, 19 December 2001. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.15 WC, 18 December 2001. 63 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.01 MP, 23 April 2002. 64 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.11 FS, 30 December 2001. 65 Interview with ex-MK combatant, 31 FS, 04 January 2002. 66 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.93 GP, 15 February 2002. 67 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.45 KZN, 27 February 2002. 68 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.77 LP, 01 February 2002. 69 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.24 GP, 21 November 2001. 70 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.144 NW, 04 June 2002. 71 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.32 FS, 03 January 2002. 72 SA Institute of Race Relations, 2001: 254. 61 62

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5.4) Interest in Furthering Education and Training Enthusiasm to get some form of education and training is relatively high among excombatants, with 61% of interviewees eager to receive further education and training. 34,15% said they were not interested in studying further due to various reasons. Interests in numerous fields of study were expressed by the respondents, which vary from vocational training skills to academic education in science, arts and commerce. Comments by interviewees are as follows: I would like to complete my high school education on a part-time basis. This would enable me to study while working to support my children.73 Leather work at any college in South Africa to acquire a skill that I can use to earn a living.74 I would like to continue with this electrician course in a Technical College in Bloemfontein.75 Agricultural studies anywhere in South Africa so that I can acquire the skills to run a farm.76 I want to be advanced in electronics so as to be up to date with new developments in electronics. I want to study in Japan, if I can secure a bursary. I prefer the Japanese because they are the leaders.77 Yes, I would like to study Business Administration to enable me to run a business which cannot take off because of financial constraints. Technikon or UNISA [University of South Africa] are ideal institutions for my studies because they offer the best.78 Law, I was involved in trade unions and I was a political commissar and responsible for handling complaints. I want to continue along the same lines. I would like to study in Cape Town, UWC [University of the Western Cape].79

The main reasons offered by those who indicated that they had no interest in studying further was that they we responsible for providing food and security for themselves and their families, which prevented them from studying. I have responsibilities and I need to work and put bread on the table. But is also difficult because sometime I have mental depression. I am sick.80 I can’t study. I have kids and I have to provide for them.81

Old age, ill health, lack of interest and lack of sufficient schooling foundation were also indicated as impediments to study. Many indicated that it would be appropriate if their dependants were provided with education and training. Comments by respondents on this issue are as follows: Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.142 MP, 23 April 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.153 NW, 04 June 2002. 75 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.08 FS, 08 November 2001. 76 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.109 LP, 24 January 2002. 77 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.03 GP, 11 November 2001. 78 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.05 MP, 23 April 2002. 79 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.11 WC, 16 November 2001. 80 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.49 EC, 02 February 2002. 81 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.42 EC, 02 February 2002. 73 74

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I suffer from heart disease and high blood pressure, thus I cannot start to think about studying.82 I think I am too old and the money could rather be spent on educating my children.83

82 83

Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.41 GP, 18 December 2001. Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.05 FS, 09 November 2001.

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Section 6: Economic Reintegration South Africa has relatively high rates of unemployment and poverty. According to Statistics South Africa, the unemployment rate is estimated to be 29,4%, but the South African Institute of Race Relations suggests that it may be as high as 36%.84 The Global Insight Research Company recently reported that nearly half of all South Africans live in poverty, with the poverty rate rising from 40,5% in 1996 to 48,9% in 2001.85 Taking these general conditions of economic hardship into account, this section considers the following socio-economic issues: demobilisation packages received; sources of income that are available to former members of MK and APLA; employment strategies that have been used; employment discrimination and unemployment dynamics; as well as the level of entrepreneurial initiatives. 6.1) Demobilisation Gratuities Table 6.2: Variance of Demobilisation Gratuities Type of Gratuity No Gratuity Less than R12 000 R12 000 – R23 999 R24 000 – R31 999 R32 000 – R39 999 More than R40 000 Total


Percentage 149 49 117 21 26 48 410

36,34 11,95 28,54 5,12 6,34 11,71 100

Former members of MK and APLA who were officially demobilised by the Department of Defence were entitled to a demobilisation gratuity. The amount of this gratuity was dependent on the length of time served in either MK or APLA. The breakdown was as follows: 22-23 years (R40 657); 18-21 years (R34 276); 12-17 years (R28 721); 5-11 years (R20 201); and 0-4 years (R12 734).86 More than a third of the respondents indicated that they did not receive a gratuity for various reasons, such as: not being part of the official integration and demobilisation process; joining the SANDF and then resigning or being dismissed; administrative problems; and being informed that they did not qualify for the demobilisation package. Of the respondents who received a demobilisation gratuity, most only received a payout of less than R24 000.

SAIRR. 2001: 333. City Press, 3/11/2002. 86 Motumi and Mckenzie, 1998: 195. 84 85

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6.2) Overview of Employment Status Table 6.2 below provides a breakdown of the employment status of the respondents. Table 6.2: Employment Status of Ex-Combatants Occupation Waged/salaried employment Self-employed (formal sector) Self-employed (informal sector) Disability grant Voluntary (unpaid) work Student Supported by family/relatives Pension Remittances Supported by friends Unemployed: looking for work Unemployed: not looking for work No response Total

No. of Respondents

Percentage

31 19 18 6 7 6 9 32 1 3 249 23 6 410

7,56 4,63 4,40 1,46 1,71 1,46 2,20 7,81 0,24 0,73 60,73 5,61 1,46 100

66% of respondents indicated that they were unemployed, 9% are directly dependent on some form of pension or government grant, and 3% are supported by family or friends. Critically, only 16% are involved in income generating projects, such as wage/salary employment or are entrepreneurs, while a very small minority engage in volunteer work or are students. 6.3) Unemployment Dynamics The level of unemployment is alarming as it is more than double the official unemployment rate. Table 6.3 provides more information on the severity of this problem. Table 6.3: Variance in Length of Time Unemployed Number of Years Spent Unemployed and Looking for Employment Less than a Month One Month Two Months Three Months Eight Months One Year Two Years Three Years Four Years Five Years Six Years Seven Years Eight Years Nine Years


Percentage 2 1 3 2 2 12 15 27 47 35 24 30 14 10

0,49 0,24 0,73 0,49 0,49 2,93 3,66 6,59 11,46 8,54 5,85 7,32 3,41 2,44

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Ten Years Eleven Years Twelve Years Not Specified Total

30 3 1 152 410

7,32 30,73 0,24 37,07 100

More than 60% of respondents have been looking for employment for four years or more, with in excess of 50% of that figure being unemployed for ten years or more. However, some of the unemployed respondents have been able to secure ad hoc part-time employment, which has lasted anywhere from one day to three months. This type of employment includes gardening, plumbing, car guarding, cleaning, washing cars, painting, construction work, security guarding, hawking and administration work. However, this type of employment does not bring in a steady income, and does not stabilise the living conditions of ex-combatants. Two relevant comments by ex-combatants are as follows: Generally, I have had numerous jobs like been a security guard or working in construction company. The problem is that they are part-time jobs and at most lasts for three moths. Today you have something and tomorrow you don’t have anything. That is why I need something stable.87 I have never worked [for five years] except [to do] jobs like cleaning people’s yards and doing some gardening.88

6.4) Strategies to Secure Employment Unemployed ex-combatants have used various strategies in an attempt to secure employment. A commonly used strategy is door-to-door searches, which includes asking friends or relatives, as well as formal businesses about any employment opportunities. Other strategies entailed: sending application forms and curriculum vitae to various agencies or companies, either unsolicited or as the result of advertisements being placed in newspapers. In the words of three ex-combatants: I try to do door-to-door jobs search. Sometime I try my friends or relatives if they know of any place where people are needed.89 I keep on asking my acquaintances about vacancies and also visit the Department of Labour offices on a regular basis to find out about available jobs anywhere. Further, I read newspaper advertisement and contact company managers in person to look for employment.90 I search for a job through written applications but also depend on friends to introduce me to their work place or inform me about vacancies at their workplace.91

6.5) Failure to Secure Employment According to ex-combatants, there are various reasons for their inability to secure employment, with the most common being: a lack of education/skills; insufficient employment experience; a lack of personal contact with influential individuals who can Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.14 WC, 16 December 2001. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.31 KZN, 26 February 2002. 89 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.10 FS, 09 November 2001. 90 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.01 LP, 25 January 2002. 91 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.57 GP, 09 November 2001. 87 88

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facilitate access to employment; and the lack of job opportunities in the public and private sector. In the public sector, the lack of job opportunities was blamed on the privatisation of certain state companies. Others could not provide an explanation as to why they were unemployed. Examples of some of the comments are as follows: You can only get a job depending on who you are. You have to know somebody. You can apply and apply, they won’t give you a job.92 It is difficult to say. Maybe it is because of qualifications, but there are many people without those in government who are working. It is a question of nepotism.93 The economic situation in the country is not favourable. People are losing their jobs through retrenchments and privatisation.94 I ask myself the same question. But I don’t know. Maybe there is no work. It is not only me looking for a job. Many people are unemployed.95

6.6) Job Discrimination There is a perception among 40% of respondents that ex-combatants are discriminated against in the job market. 24% perceived there to be very little discrimination, while 35% provided no comment on this issue. Two examples of comments by those respondents who perceived there to be discrimination against ex-combatants are provided below: Every time they see my military qualifications they ask questions. I always have to explain where I am from, what I have done. When I answer with all honesty, I don’t get the job. I am discriminated because I am a former guerrilla.96 Whites control the economy of this country and they don’t like guerrillas. They say we are killers. Things will never be fine as long as they are in control.97

A few respondents indicated that they have been dismissed from jobs after their employer discovered that they are ex-MK or APLA combatants, with examples of relevant comments as follows: I was employed as a builder, until the company discovered that I was from exile. Then life with the manager at Rooderpoort changed to bad. My contract was terminated. I was told that it was meant to be part-time.98 Every time employers discover that I am an ex-MK member they terminate my contract.99

To avoid possible discrimination from potential employers, many ex-combatants said that when applying for employment they do not mention their military background. Some said they keep two curriculum vitae, one with a military background and another without. According to two of the respondents: Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.18 NC, 22 February 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.27 NC, 22 February 2002. 94 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.14 KZN, 26 February 2002. 95 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.32 FS, 03 January 2002. 96 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.51 KZN, 27 February 2002. 97 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.29 FS, 04 January 2002. 98 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.33 GP, 11 December 2001. 99 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.142 MP, 23 February 2001. 92 93

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I used to state [that I am an ex-MK combatant] on my CV, but I no longer do that.100 I don’t tell them that I am a former guerrilla when looking for a job. People don’t like APLA. They think we are criminals especially whites. I know some of my friends who disclosed their [military] status were not offered jobs. If I want a job, then I have to forget about telling people I am a former guerrilla.101

6.7) Formal Sector Employment As indicated in section 6.1, only 7.56% stated that they are in waged or salaried employment in the formal sector. However, a significant number of those respondents who currently indicate that they are unemployed, have at some point in their postmilitary careers been employed in the formal sector, but generally for short periods of time only. Table 6.4 below provides examples of the types of formal sector employment that excombatants have undertaken, which range from a private security officer to a chief executive officer of a private company. The employers of ex-combatants also vary. They include government, private businesses and political parties. Table 6.4: Type of Employment and Job Function Type of Employment Private Security Officers

Part-time Soldier Police Officer Information Security Officer

Police Superintendent Housing Constructor Drivers

Plumber Electricity Inspector Handy man

100 101

Job Function • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Guard buildings and houses Guard and transport money Provide security in trains Provide security to government officials Perform military duties as required Provide support to the police Compile statistics Register vehicles Detect fraud and corruption Detect theft of state property Protect sensitive information Provide legal advice to the police Build houses Provide housing maintenance services Transport goods Provide transport services to officials Transport commuters Fix toilet and water taps Inspect electric supply faults Fix electric supply faults Repair infrastructure Install sanitation pipes

Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.36 EC, 02 February 2002. Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.03 FS, 05 November 2001.

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Painters Traditional Chief

Shop Assistant Accounts Inspector Supervisor Administration Clerks

Provincial Party Co-ordinator

Projects Facilitator Researcher Sales Representative Nurse

Advisors in the Premier’s Office

Members of Provincial Legislature

Chief Executive Officer

Business Manager

Director

Operations Manager

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Provide painting services Provide building renovations services Provide leadership to the community Deal with community disputes Ensure the delivery of services Liase with the government on behalf of the community Provide assistance in a shop Serve customers Ensure that clients settle their accounts Provide administrative support Manage staff Ensure delivery of goods Provide administrative support services Communicate with clients Ensure clients’ satisfaction Maintain membership statistics Maintain party records Maintain membership data Facilitate development projects Promote development projects Conduct transport research Provide advice Promote and represent the company Market company products to clients Provide care to patients Provide healthcare education Manage illnesses Provide advice on traditional matters Provide advice on old age pension Deal with traditional leaders’ grievances Provide advice on matters of interest and importance to the province Promote the interests of the party Ensure party members’ needs are addressed Provide advice development issues Prepare budgets Control finances Ensure the delivery of services Provide cleansing services Provide security service to government and businesses Ensure the delivery of services Manage the office Provide support and advice to colleagues Provide marketing services Ensure agricultural empowerment Oversee agricultural operations Oversee training of co-operatives

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Salary scales of employed ex-combatants differ according to their professions. Table 6.5 indicates that the lowest paid ex-combatants are part-time soldiers and shop assistants who earn between R300 and R400 a month, respectively. At the upper level, excombatants who occupy senior government and managerial positions earn between R5 000 and R33 000 a month. Table 6.5: Salary According to Type of Employment/Profession Type of Employment/Profession Private Security Officers Part-time Soldier Information Security Officer Police Officer Police Superintendent Drivers Housing Constructor Plumber Electricity Inspector Handy man Painters Traditional Chief Shop Assistant Accounts Inspector Administration Clerks Supervisor Provincial Party Co-ordination Projects Facilitator Researcher Sales Representative Nurse Advisors in the Premier’s Office Member of Provincial Legislature Chief Executive Officer Business Manager Director Operations Manager

Salary Per Month ±R600 - ±R2200 ±R300 ±R6000 ±R3000 ±R3000 ±R2000 - ±R4000 ±R3000 ±R3000 ±R3500 ±R1200 ±R1400 ±R1500 ±R400 ±R4000 ±R3000 - ±R5000 Payment Varies ±R12000 ±R2000 ±R7000 Payment Varies ±R2500 ±R5000 - ±R14000 ±R16000 ±R33000 ±R5000 ±R20000 ±R8000

Due to the respondent’s military background, a significant number are employed or have been employed at some point in their post-military careers, as private security officers. In South Africa, the private security industry is one of the leading employers, particularly for people with limited education. In January 2000, 163 545 people were employed in this industry, which has an estimated annual turnover of approximately R12 billion.102 Despite the fact that this high risk industry, in terms of the personal security of the employees, the private security industry is notorious for paying low salaries. With some exceptions, private security officers earn less than R800 a month, work long hours and have no employment benefits. In terms of the relationship between qualifications and the current nature of employment, 70% of ex-combatants employed in the formal sector indicated that their 102

SA Institute for Race Relations, 2001: 141.

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qualifications coincide with the work that they are undertaking. 30% stated that there was little or no correspondence between their current jobs and qualifications or the lack thereof, with ex-combatants either being under-qualified or over-qualified. Of those respondents who work in the formal sector, 42% indicated that they work with other ex-combatants. 6.8) Self-employment Initiatives: Formal and Informal Sectors Nearly half (46%) of interviewed ex-combatants indicated that they have made an effort to start their own businesses, while 48%, due to limited skills and access to resources, had not considered the entrepreneurial option. Of those that had tried to establish their own businesses, very few were successful in converting them into going concerns. Generally these business initiatives were shortlived, mainly due to a lack of business skills, funds and profitability. Indicative comments by respondents are as follows: My comrades (from MK) and I came together to form a close corporation. However, the endeavour failed due to lack of finance and information on how to go about starting a close corporation.103 I was selling beer. Since I did not have a license, my business was shut down.104 I tried selling fruits and vegetables but the money cannot sustain us.105

9% of respondents are currently running their own businesses, with a relatively even split between the formal and informal sectors. Such initiatives include: catering; construction; transport; selling groceries, liquor and agricultural products; cutting hair; hawking and providing security services. The most common form of self-employment initiative is hawking. This includes selling vegetables, fruits, cigarettes, sweets, soft drinks and clothes. Table 6.6 below provides more detailed information on these initiatives. Table 6.6: Self-employment Initiatives Self-employment Initiative

Functions

Owns Catering, Stationary, Construction and Transport Businesses Shop Owners

• •

Sell groceries Manage the business

±R158 000

• •

Sell groceries Manage the business

±R2 000 - ±R6 000

Clothes Designers and Dress Makers

• • • • • • •

Design clothes Sew clothes Market clothes Manage employers Cut hair Style hair Sell seeds and fertiliser

Barber Shop Owner Agricultural

Monthly Income

±R200 - ±R1 000

Very little ±R3 000

Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.01 LP, 25 January 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.29 NC, 22 February 2002. 105 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.11 FS, 30 December 2001. 103 104

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Tavern and Sheeben Owners Trainer

Welder

• • • • • • •

Herbalist

Hawkers

• • • • • •

Carpenter

• • •

Private Security Officers

•

Motor Mechanics Caterer

• •

Driver

•

Constructing Houses

• •

Sell liquor and cigarettes Sell food Develop material Train and facilitate Recruit workers Manufacture antiburglary material Manufacture various type of stands Sell traditional medicine Sell clothes Provide health advice Sell vegetables, fruits and soft drinks Sell cigarettes, sweets and ice creams Sell clothes and household items Sell toys Design and fit wardrobes Design and fit kitchen units Protect businesses and houses Fix cars Sell food

±R400 - ±R4 000

Provide transport service to people Build houses and other buildings Repair and renovate houses and buildings

±R2 000

±R2 500 ±R2 000

±R1 500

Varies

±R1 000 - ±R2 000

±R1 500 ±R800 - ±R1 500 ±R1 200 - ±R2 000

Varies

Monthly incomes generated from these activities vary considerably. At the lowest level it is R100 a month, and the highest it is R158 000 a month. However, owning one’s own business can be risky and insecure, as many of those respondents with their own businesses indicated that in certain months they did not make enough money to live off. 6.7) Other Means of Livelihood and Income Status As indicated in section 6.1, the other means of ex-combatant livelihood include: support from family members, relatives and friends; as well as pensions and government grants. Even though only 3% of respondents indicated that their main source of income was charity from family and friends, it became clear during the interview process that the majority of those who said they were unemployed actually relied on financial and material support from family and friends. Many of these ex-combatants are supported by their elderly parents or grandparents, who either work as domestic workers/labourers or are pensioners. Two relevant interviewee comments are as follows:

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We depend on my grandfather’s pension. The whole family.106 We depend on my mother’s pension. We are a family of five and we all depend on her pension.107

Those interviewees who receive a disability grant or old age pension, generally do not receive more than R600 a month. 8% of respondents receive special pensions (which are specifically designed for MK and APLA military veterans), which range from R500 to R5000 depending on their age. The reason for this is that in terms of the Special Pension Act No. 69 of 1996 (Subsection A of Section 1), only those who were 35 years or older on the commencement date of the Act are entitled to apply for a special pension. Hence, more than half the sample population is not entitled to a special pension. However, a number of those who do qualify have not been able to secure a pension yet. The relevant respondents claimed that this was due to: the laborious application process; insufficient information; government inefficiency; and the lack of essential personal documentation, such as birth certificates, identity documents, proof of military background, permanent home address and bank details. Due to the high unemployment rate among respondents, 88% reported that they would like to have access to a special pension, but a number felt that all ex-combatants should be entitled to it. Two relevant examples of comments by respondents are as follows: Cadres brought change to this country and should be rewarded for their service. Factors that should be considered should be age, lack of employment and education. This will help alleviate possible crime by cadres. Projects should be created for them to earn money too.108 Yes, everybody who participated in the activities of APLA and MK must get those pensions. We sacrificed our lives for this democracy.109

8% of ex-combatants stated that ex-combatants should not necessarily receive special pensions, as there were other South Africans who made sacrifices for the liberation of South Africa were not receiving pensions: We were all the same in the struggle against oppression. Ex-guerrillas are not special.110 This is not a good idea because all of us, those who were left inside the country and those who went to exile are all struggling. We do not need a special treatment. This can create a division amongst ourselves.111

Only 3 (0,73%) of the respondents openly admitted that they were involved in criminal activities. On this issue, one of these respondents made the following comment:

Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.03 FS, 05 November 2001. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.37 FS, 09 January 2002. 108 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.03 WC, 09 October 2001. 109 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.33 FS, 03 January 2002. 110 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.71GP, 03 November 2001. 111 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.36 GP, 18 December 2001. 106 107

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I have my own way of getting money. I use some military experience because our jobs are still in a white man’s hands. Crime is my friend, I work once, and I get paid once, not because it was my wish, but because I faced many difficulties when I reached home.112

112

Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.60 GP, 08 November 2001.

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Section 7: Public and Private Economic Reintegration Programmes There have been numerous reintegration initiatives in South Africa, from large to small, and from ad hoc to sustainable. This section considers two major reintegration initiatives, namely the Service Corps (SC), a public sector project located in the Department of Defence; and Shaft 17, a private sector company set up by former MK members. 7.1) The Service Corps 7.1.1) Background The establishment of the Service Corps (SC) was negotiated by the Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) prior to the general elections in 1994, with its structure and role to be determined by the newly elected Minister of Defence.113 Details about how the SC was actually established are sketchy, but in January 1995, Cabinet provided a motivation for the SC to be created, and by March 1996 had approved the mandate for the planning of a National Service Corps. An Interdepartmental Committee was also tasked to investigate the extension of the SC to train the youth and unemployed people. The interdepartmental committee consisting of the Department of Defence, Department of Labour and the Department of Public Works never became fully operational due to the lack of a political will and the reluctance of other departments to take responsibility for the SC.114 In 1997/1998, with the SANDF embarking on a process of rationalisation, it became apparent that there was a need for a mechanism to facilitate the resettlement of members of the Department of Defence (affected by rationalisation) into civilian society. A DOD working group identified the SC as the official resettlement agency of the DOD, which was approved by the Staff Council in March 1998.115 The SC sought to target four categories of trainees (SC officials use the term client): demobilised soldiers (i.e., former members of APLA and MK); retiring/resigning members of the DOD members of the DOD who are being separated on the basis of employer initiated retrenchment (EIR) packages; civilians who wish to undergo vocational training at the SC centres. The first category was defined at its primary target group. It was anticipated that the SC would train close to 22 000 personnel between 1995 and 2001, of which 10 000 would be former members of MK and APLA.116 7.1.2) Functions and Structures of the Service Corps The Service Corps has two functions, namely, to facilitate various training options, both internally and externally (with private and other public sector training institutions); and to assist trainees to either find employment or start their own enterprises. The SC Head Office is located near Pretoria, and has two main training centres: the Centre for “Insight into the Service Corps and You: Your Guide to the Brighter Future, A Service Corps,” information booklet. 114 Interview with Service Corps key informant 1, 26 August 2000. 115 Interview with Service Corps key informant 1, 26 August 2000. 116 Cabinet Memorandum, No. 1 of 1995 (DD 18 January 1995). 113

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Advanced Training (CAT) (outside Pretoria); and the Practical Business School (PBS) in Mankwe (outside Rustenburg). CAT is the main vocational training centre of the Service Corps, and provides technical and non-technical training. Non-technical training includes; drafting, hospitality service, nature conservation, office automation, garment making, garment painting, dress design, fork lift operation, literacy and numeric skills, entrepreneurial training, auto electrical, refrigeration and air conditioning repair (domestic and industrial), and ceramic and pottery (including clay work and glazing). Technical training includes; domestic appliances repair, electronics (computer technician training), and motor mechanics and welding. PBS is a misnomer as no practical training is provided. PBS offers Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) from level 1-4 and driving only, both of which are outsourced. Apart from the two centres there are nine regional offices, namely: Pretoria (Gauteng), Bloemfontein (Free State), Durban (KwaZulu Natal), Polokwane (Limpopo), Cape Town (Western Cape), Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape), Kimberly (Northern Cape), Potchefstroom (North West) and Nelspruit (Mpumalanga). There are no regional offices in the North West Province and Mpumalanga. General Painter attributes this to the lack of proper military veteran structures on the ground to assist in the identification of potential Service Corps trainees. Thus in order to avoid opening redundant offices the Limpopo office services Mpumalanga Province as well, while the Gauteng province office is responsible for the North West Province. General Painter, Deputy Chief of the SC, states that as a result of the withdrawal of funding in 1998, the Service Corps has lost two training centres, one in Durban and another one in Queenstown. He notes that the Queenstown centre had excellent facilities including accommodation. 7.1.3) Reintegration Programme It was envisaged that a trainee would spend a maximum of 18 months with the SC. The length of time spent at the SC Is dependent on the literacy and numeric skills of each trainee. A trainee with low levels or no basic literacy and numeric skills spends six months on ABET, six months on vocational training and the last six months on practical experience. Trainees have an option of an early exit if they find employment or lose interest. Training is divided into five consecutive phases, namely, Orientation, Introduction (ABET), Vocational Training, Practical Experience and After Care. During the Orientation phase, prospective trainees are assessed in order to assist them to choose an appropriate career path. This process takes no longer than a week. ABET, as well as life skills and computer literacy is compulsory for those individuals with little or no numeric and/or literacy skills.117 In terms of the Vocational Training phase, trainees are given a number of training options to pursue (as mentioned in the previous sub-section). The practical experience phase was only implemented in 1997, and became fraught with problems. The reason for this was that trainees were deployed in the formal sector to gain practical experience. However, they were not paid a salary, but rather a R20-a-day living allowance, which resulted in dissatisfaction among trainees. According to a Service Corps officer: 117 Interview with Service Corps Officer 1, 26 August 2000, and with General Andrew Masondo, 16 August 2000).

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You find that people were placed among motor mechanics who earned R1000 a week and they got a total of R600 per month in allowance. This created problems when our trainees discovered that they earned far less than people they were working with.118

In addition, it appears that in certain instances, trainees were exploited, verbally abused and physically assaulted by the managers and owners of the businesses they worked for. Some trainees were removed from practical training after they complained about the treatment they received from these businesses. There were also accusations by some SC trainees that friends and relatives of SC personnel made use of “free labour” from the SC.119 In the early stages of the SC, many SC graduates did not find employment and/or did not have start-up capital to start their own business120. The Service Corps did not have the necessary resources, nor had it negotiated with banks to assist SC graduates to obtain small business loans. Consequently, the After Care phase was introduced as an attempt to deal with these problems. 7.1.4) Ineffectiveness and Under-performance121 SC sources estimate that between 1995 and 2002, the Service Corps trained between 3 000 and 4 000 former APLA and MK soldiers.122 This is a far cry from the 22 000 that was envisaged at the creation of the SC. These figures should be treated with caution for two reasons. First, it is not clear whether the figures relate to people who registered for training or people who actually completed the training. The figures do not indicate the drop-out rate. Second, the SC does not keep records of which training centre provided training, but rather which SC office referred students to training123. Despite the best intentions on the part of the Department of Defence, the SC has been plagued by numerous problems since its inception. First, the Service Corps was established without effective planning, and training programmes were designed without an adequate analysis of existing skills among demobilised soldiers, as well as their career aspirations and socio-economic needs. Second, no labour market analysis was undertaken, which resulted in some trainees acquiring skills, with which they could not get jobs in their place of residence. For example, a former soldier trained in rustproof spray-painting (relevant for people who 118 Interview with Service Corps Officer 2, August 26, 2000. 119 Interview with a former Service Corps trainee in Polokwane. 120 Interview with Service Corps officer 2, 26 August 2000. 121 It is very difficult if not almost impossible to get information out of the Service Corps Head Office. First because it seems no information is readily available because every time a researcher asks for information the response is, ‘we need time to collect that information from various departments [within the Service Corps]’. The second reason relates to the negative publicity (what General Painter calls ‘Service Corps bashing’) that the Service Corps has received. The worst was e-TV’s Third Degree documentary in which the host, Debora Patta quoted sources that reported “mismanagement of almost criminal proportion.” 122 General Painter, “Presentation to the Military Veterans’ Leadership Programme Workshop”, Broederstroom, 4 December 2002. 123 Telephonic conversation with Lt. Col. Mothun of the Service Corps, November 2002

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plan to settle in coastal areas), but planned to settle in Polokwane in the Limpopo Province. Third, the SC only offers training that is accredited by the Department of Labour, which is not entirely applicable or profitable for small businesses or the informal sector. 124 For example, in garment making training sessions, trainees were only taught how to manufacture work uniforms. According to a SC official: To make uniforms is not profitable if you are a small-scale producer. This is handled by factories, which produce hundreds of units per day. Thus you cannot sit down in a garage at home to manufacture overalls.125

Third, tensions emerged between the SC Head Office, which was administered predominantly by former MK soldiers, and regional offices, which were run by former SADF and TVBC soldiers. During interviews with officials at the SC Head Office, complaints were made about the lack of commitment of officials at the regional offices, including CAT and PBS, to carry out instructions from Head Office. In interviews with officials at the regional officers, criticisms were directed at the Head Office due to the perceived lack of resources being provided to the regional offices. Fourth, the maintenance of a military culture within the Service Corps tended to undermine a culture of learning. All members of the SC wear military-type uniforms, which were inherited from the former Venda Defence Force. Officers retained their military titles while working in the Service Corps, and trainees had to salute senior officers. According to a former SC trainee: If you are training a person for reintegration into society, you cannot treat him like a subordinate, I am no longer a soldier, I have demobilised”126.

There have been a number of official inquiries into the performance of the SC, all of which have found the SC to have significantly under-performed and been ineffective in fulfilling its mandate. In 1999, the Inspector General reported that the SC employed 252 staff members, while there were 202 trainees. In addition it was reported that a major component of the SC training was being out-sourced.127 As at the end of November 2000, CAT had only trained 1049 trainees, 815 of these were from category one (former APLA and MK soldiers) and 234 were from the civilian population (category four). In a Defence Portfolio Committee meeting (5 June 2001), General Masondo reported that over 400 ex-combatants had been discharged from the SC programme, but did not provide any reasons for this. During a visit to CAT, one of the members of the researcher team observed many empty training rooms, which had modern equipment and training aids. According to one of the instructors who was interviewed at the time: Most training institutions in this country would like to get hold of this equipment. We have the equipment, but no one to train128

124Interview

with key informant 2, 26 August 2000. with Service Corps key informant 1, 26 September 2000. 126Interview with former MK soldier, 8 December 2000 (not part of the present sample). 127 Report by the Inspector General, 1999: 2). 128 Personal conversation between Lephophotho Mashike and a training instructor, CAT, 1 December 2000 125Interview

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In terms of the data provided by the survey research, only 45% of the respondents knew about the Service Corps when they were demobilised, and only 25% of respondents joined the Service Corps for vocational training. Only 9% of respondents indicated that the training they received with the SC helped them to create their own income generating projects or to find jobs. There are nine possible reasons for this state of affairs. First, in the first two years of the demobilisation process (1994 - 1996), the Service Corps was not operational. Hence these individuals had no option but to take their demobilisation package and go home. However, many of the former soldiers returned to the Service Corps in 1999 and 2000 to demand training, this was after they had exhausted their gratuities. Second, it appears as though the services of the SC were not widely advertised, as a significant number of the respondents claimed that when they were demobilised they were not informed about the SC. Some respondents reported that they only found out about the SC after an exposé of the SC was screened on eTV’s current affairs programme, Third Degree in July 2001. Third, ex-combatants opted to look for employment directly after demobilisation, as SC trainees/trainees only received R600 per month as a living allowance, which was supposed to be a supplement to the demobilisation gratuities, to cover transport costs and buy basic necessities. However, most ex-combatants used the gratuity to set up a home, which included erecting a shack, buying furniture, food and clothing for their families. R600 was not seen as sufficient for ex-combatants and their families to survive on. Fourth, physical and psychological disabilities prevented certain ex-combatants from taking advantage of the Service Corps training. However, there is no evidence to suggest that disabled ex-combatants would have been turned away from the Service Corps. Fifth, many ex-combatants had expectations that they would become members of the SANDF, and when they were demobilised, they became disheartened, and took their demobilisation payment and left the military. Sixth, some respondents indicated that they were not willing to subject themselves to further military culture within the SC. When the Service Corps finally became operational it had no facilities of its own, and consequently between 1994 and 1997, all Service Corps trainees were housed within army engineer units in all the regional military commands. In retrospect, a Service Corps officer notes that this was an inappropriate arrangement and contributed to the poor performance record of the Service Corps: You cannot provide skills to someone who is migrating to civilian society inside the military environment. All it said was that they had to do what all the soldiers in the units did. This had to take place because the Service Corps had no facilities129

Seven, many ex-combatants did not participate in the SC process because they did not want to be instructed by “a former enemy” and/or many of the courses were only offered in Afrikaans. According to two respondents:

129

Interview with Service Corps Officer 2, 26 September 2000.

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I took a Security course and carpentry for a period of 6 weeks. I attended Service Corps training in Pinetown (Durban) and in Cape Town. We were treated badly especially in Durban. At some stage the police were called in and they set dogs on us. We were treated like dogs. Our instructors were rude to us. They spoke to us in Afrikaans; we could not understand each other130. I enrolled for motor mechanics but did not complete the training. I only spent seven months. The training quality was poor. The former enemy dominated the Service Corps and I was dismissed from the Service Corps by a former enemy named Captain Snyman based at the Service Corps Headquarters131

General Masondo, former SC Head conceded that the use of Afrikaans by instructors was a problem, but argues that at the beginning there was nothing that could be done since the process of integration was still in progress. We have had problems because sometimes you may find that the poor instructor was only taught in his mother tongue, so if he has to teach in English, he finds if difficult. So we have to change that. We did not have at the time, because chaps were still integrating, we didn’t have black instructors. So as time went on we began to have them. The principal of the Army College is a black person from MK132.

Eight, many were not formally demobilised and therefore did not have a force number to indicate that they have gone through the process of integration-demobilisation. There are some APLA and MK soldiers who initially joined the SANDF on short-term contracts, whose contracts were not renewed. Meanwhile others joined the Permanent Force of the SANDF and left either through dishonourable discharge or resignation. These groups could not join the SC programme because, for most of its existence, the SC has only had a mandate to train category one trainees (demobilised APLA and MK soldiers). Nine, the perceived low quality of the Service Corps training may have discouraged excombatants from participating in the SC process. According to two respondents: I studied motor mechanics repair for 18 months but only as far as theory is concerned. There was no practical training and at the end I received A Repair Assistant Certificate. Although training was offered on a regular basis it was of poor quality because you were trained to become an assistant and not a fully qualified motor mechanic. I am still unemployed despite the fact that I spent 18 months at the Service Corps133. I spent 18 months at the Service Corps but received training for ten days only, after which I was awarded a diploma. The training was offered by two separate institutions and it did not include any practical training. As a result my training qualifies me as an assistant only134 A SC officer concurred that the quality of the training offered by the Service Corps make it difficult for Service Corps trainees to compete with graduates from other institutions.

Interview with respondent no. 54 KZN, 7 February 2002. Interview with respondent no. 156 MKNW, 4 June 2002. 132 Interview with General Andrew Masondo, 16 August 2000. 133 Interview with respondent no. 157MKNW, 4 June 2002. 134 Interview with respondent no. 99MKLP, 25 January 2002). 130 131

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Our clients on completion of training could not compete with civilians in the formal sector, who have gone through three to four years of formal training while our clients only got six months training135

7.2) Shaft 17 Conference and Training Centre The Shaft 17 Conference and Training Centre is managed by Steven Corry and Parker Mamabolo. Corry owns 49% of shares at Shaft 17 while Parker Mamabolo owns 51%. Steven Corry, a professional soldier was born in New Zealand, and after marrying a South African woman, he immigrated to South Africa. He joined MK after the suspension of the armed struggle.136 Parker Mamabolo started his political activities in the Black Consciousness Movement in 1976 and later joined MK. Mamabolo claims that, between 1985 and 1986, he carried out military missions in Botswana and South Africa. Following the suspension of the ANC armed struggle, he opted for demobilisation instead of joining the SANDF, and received R35 000 as a demobilisation gratuity. He appears to be dissatisfied by the manner in which the SANDF was created.137 In 1992, Corry and Mamabolo bought a disused gold mining compound south of Johannesburg, close to Soweto. Initially this facility was used to host conferences for the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African trade Unions (COSATU). The presence of the ANC leadership during conferences necessitated the provision of tight security, and consequently Corry hired private security officers to work at the conference centre. Following discussions with an ex-MK soldier, Corry decided to establish a training programme/company for unemployed former MK soldiers to become security officers/guards. This led to the establishment of Trans Sizwe Security Company. Corry raised R3.5 million from the British Department for International Development (DFID) for this initiative. To date Shaft 17 has trained approximately 1000 security officers who are all employed by Trans Sizwe, which has a contract to guard Metrorail property. Ninety percent of the security officers are formerly from APLA and MK. According to Corry, many APLA and MK soldiers suffer from severe psychological problems, with some of them being beyond rehabilitation, hence they cannot be employed as armed guards.138 Consequently, Shaft 17 established skills training courses in basic carpentry, plumbing, bricklaying, plastering and tiling. At the time the research for this project was undertaken, 1 100 people have been trained, of which approximately 50% are former members of APLA and MK, while 75 ex-combatants are about to undertake training. Shaft 17 has recently received R1.5 million from the National Lottery, and according to Corry, Shaft 17 has applied for more funding including R1.8 million from Umsobomvu Fund139 and an undisclosed amount from the Ford Foundation. They hope to raise R22 million by the end of 2002.

Interview with Service Corps key informant 2, 26 September 2000. Interview with Steve Corry Co-director, Shaft 17, 26 November 2000 137 Interview with parker Mamabolo, Shaft 17, 19 June 2001. 138 Interview with Steve Corry Co-director, Shaft 17, 26 November 2000. 139 The fund was established with receipts valued at about R800 million following the demutualisation of two of South Africa’s mutual societies-Old Mutual and Sanlam. Sowetan - Business Section, May 30, 2001. 135 136

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Data from the survey indicates that ex-combatants who were trained at both the SC and Shaft 17 perceive Shaft 17 to be more efficient than the state-run SC. There has been some collaboration between Shaft 17 and the SC, but this relationship has been problematic at times. Comments by Corry on one particular incident are provided below as an example of this difficult relationship between the SC and Shaft 17. I raised R1.2 million from a foreign government and thus two years ago; I approached the Service Corps to offer training to demobilised soldiers using the money I have raised. The understanding was that after I had trained them, the Service Corps would find jobs for them. I managed to train 80 ex-Service Corps trainees who were classified as undertrained. I was contacted by a labour broker who promised 80 jobs for people we have trained at Shaft 17. I was told to pay R20 000 to secure the jobs, which would be available at a construction site in Atteridgeville outside Pretoria. I contacted the Service Corps Head Office and put them in touch with the labour broker. I advised them to probe the credentials of the labour broker and to report to me to deploy the trainees as soon as they had finished with the investigation. They gave me a go ahead, however, it seems that there was no proper probing. The trainees were deployed before the Pretoria City Council approved the building of houses on the identified site. The ex-soldiers were deployed in August [2000] and in October it was clear to me that nothing would happen at the site. However, nobody listened to me, both the labour broker and the Magae A Bana Construction kept on promising that jobs would be forthcoming. The guys received employment contracts and pay slips but were never paid. I visited the guys every week for eight months and gave them some money to live on. In all I spent R60 000 to maintain the guys in Pretoria.140

According to Corry, it has been difficult to secure appropriate funding for ex-combatant training programmes, particularly following the e-TV exposé of the SC in July 2001. At one point, Corry was approached by a Chinese citizen who wanted to invest $1.5 million in horticulture in South Africa and wanted to include Shaft 17 in the production and export of vegetables. No deal was secured as Corry was concerned about the sustainability of the project.141 At the time the research for this report was conducted, some of the compounds at Shaft 17 had been converted into two bedroom apartments, which were to be used by certain ex-MK and APLA soldiers and their families who would then be trained to join Trans Sizwe Security.142. Shaft 17 plans to acquire empty office blocks and convert them into residential areas for ex-MK and APLA soldiers. These ex-combatants would have to renovate these houses using the skills they had gained at Shaft 17.

Interview with Steve Corry Co-director, Shaft 17, 19 June 2001. Interview with Steve Corry Co-director, Shaft 17, 19 June 2001. 142 Interview with Steve Corry Co-director, Shaft 17, 19 June 2001. 140 141

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Section 8: Social Reintegration This section focuses on the extent to which APLA and MK ex-combatants have reintegrated into civilian life. It considers the family, psychological and community aspects of reintegration. 8.1) Reintegration into Family Life International experience has shown that ex-combatants are encouraged by governments to settle in their home regions. The expectation is that once in their home regions, families and relatives take over the responsibility of looking after these ex-combatants. Thus if there is no proper economic reintegration strategy, it is the families and relatives of ex-combatants that have to shoulder the burden of helping ex-combatants make the transition to civilian life. 57% of the respondents indicated that they were received as heroes by their families. 5.3% reported that their families were shocked to see them, while 3.4% stated that their families were indifferent about their return. As one respondent put it, “my mother acted as if I just went behind the house and came back.” Less than one percent of the respondents were rejected by their families. 27% provided no response. As heroes, ex-combatants were expected by their families to provide material wealth. The reason being that the struggle was fought with a promise of basic social rights for all South Africans. For the majority of impoverished black South Africans, the return of excombatants meant that the achievement of these ideals was now within reach. Even after the majority of respondents have been unable to obtain secure employment since the 1994 elections, 68% indicated that their families were supportive of them. In such cases it was because families understood factors behind ex-combatants’ failure to achieve economic reintegration: My family is very supportive. However at the beginning they had expectations that I will bring home money at the end of the struggle. I had to explain to them that the struggle was not about money but about democracy.143 Members of my family are very supportive. However, initially they were expecting a lot. They thought I was going to get a high government position or a lot of money. They were disappointed but I explained the situation to them.144 Members of the family help me with money. They do not want to see me in the streets [begging]. If I need something, they try to give it to me.145

However, 10.7% of the respondents claimed that relations with their families became negative following their return to their original communities after a short period of time, while 3.9% reported that their families had completely rejected them. In both cases, combatants consistently cited their inability to generate income as the major contributing factor for this state of affairs:

143 Interview

with respondent no. 52KZN, 27 February 2002. Interview with respondent no. EC5, 29 January 2002. 145 Interview with respondent no. 7WC, 25 October 2001. 144

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My family expected me to provide materially. Since their expectations were not met, my family members’ attitude towards me has changed and our relationship has become conflictual146 I was forced to leave my home to find a place to call my own. This is because when I had money my family was always accommodative and happy for me. However, when I did not have money I had to sleep outside the house. They locked me outside and would always hide away from me. I had to sleep on an empty stomach on many occasions147 They always ask me about “your ANC” and enquire why it does not give me a job. They ask what use it was for me to go to exile. However, when I receive money from my Special Pension grant they pretend to love me. I don’t even visit them because we exchange unpleasant words…148 If I miss one month without paying my rent my family threatens me with eviction and the threat is often accompanied by the question “where is your ANC?” This explains why sometimes I think of killing myself, but I always feel sorry for my six-month old boy.149 Sometimes my parents chase me and my two kids away because I do not bring any money home.150

There were three other factors which certain ex-combatants attributed to the negative reception they eventually received from their families. Many of these factors emerged following the ex-combatants’ inability to generate significant levels of income for their families. First, a number of the respondents experienced negative relationships with their families because of perceived xenophobia. In most African cultures in South Africa, inter-ethnic group marriages are discouraged. A number of ex-combatants married people from other African countries, and many started families in exile. While some of the ex-combatants left their wives in the wives’ home countries, others chose to bring their foreign wives to South Africa, which often resulted in a negative reception from the ex-combatant’s family: Members of my family hate my Tanzanian-born wife. There was always conflict in the family as I was told to take her back to Tanzania. Thus I was forced to move from home and search for a room to rent.151 I had problems with members of my family and relatives because I brought home a Zambian-born woman as my wife. When I arrived my family had already arranged a woman for me to marry. Family members used to ask me “don’t you know there are women in South Africa looking for marriage?” This forced me to leave home in Soweto to settle in Orange Farm.152

Second, the negative stereotype of “terrorist” or “killer” that was perpetuated by the propaganda machinery under apartheid still persists in a number of social sectors, and Interview with respondent no. 149MKNW, 4 June 2002. Interview with respondent no. 25MKGP, 7 November 2001. 148 Interview with respondent no. 60MKGP, 18 December 2001. 149 Interview with respondent no. 51MKGP, 11 December 2001. 150 Interview with respondent no. 147MKNW, 4 June 2002. 151 Interview with respondent no. 118APLAGP, 19 February 2002. 152 Interview with respondent no. 15MKGP, 1 November 2001. 146 147

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served as a reason for the rejection of some of the ex-combatants by their families. This stereotype is closely associated with the perception that ex-combatants are “criminals”: Members of my family think that I am criminal because I am a former APLA soldier. Now relations between us are tense, I live by myself away from them and I feel I am better off by myself.153 I am born of a Coloured mother and a white father. The latter disapproved of my political activities. On my mother’s side they were very happy. Thus I never had a close relationship with my father’s family. They regarded me as a terrorist.154

Third, in KwaZulu-Natal, a number of respondents indicated that they were rejected by their families due to an incongruence of political affiliations. This development appears to be unique to this province, as the power struggle between the ANC and the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) has left a number of families divided: When I returned from exile I discovered that the whole family is affiliated to the IFP [Inkhata Freedom Party]. How they recruited them I don’t know. Before I came back my family was misled that I died in Angola in 1986. Under such circumstances I just packed my things and left home.155 My family is divided between the ANC and IFP. It is hard; our discussion about politics always ends in conflict. Hence I decided to stay away from them. However, we do meet and talk.156

However, of those ex-combatants who have been rejected by their families, many indicated that they have found their community, or at the least fellow ex-combatants, to be accommodating. One ex-combatant remarked that his fellow ex-MK combatants “are the only family I have”. In other cases, ex-combatants are accepted by their families but are regarded as worthless by members of the community. In extreme cases, some excombatants report that they find both the family and the community to be less accommodating than fellow ex-combatants. However, it should be noted that very few of the ex-combatants who have achieved economic reintegration care about their unemployed “comrades”. The remaining 18% of respondents did not specify the nature of family relationships. 8.2) Psychological Problems 8.2.1) Overview of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder One of the problems that impede social reintegration relates to the psychological problems experienced by ex-combatants. War situations subject soldiers to traumatic experiences and stressful conditions. Apart from injuries that may be incurred during armed combat or training, soldiers also run the risk of developing psychological problems. These result from a number of sources, which include anxiety, constant fear of attack from the enemy and combat experience. In South Africa, it seems this was not taken seriously during the process of demobilisation. Again this relates to the nature of Interview with respondent no. FS2, 7 November 2001. Interview with respondent no. 15WC, 18 December 2001. 155 Interview with respondent no. 76KZN, 28 February 2002. 156 Interview with respondent no. 45KZN, 27 February 2002. 153 154

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the conflict that took place in South Africa. As argued earlier, the lack of continuous armed clashes between organised armed groups made it difficult for some people to define the conflict as a war. However, if not addressed psychological problems might pose serious problems for ex-combatants as well as receiving communities and families. Trauma refers to a nervous shock, which results from exposure to a life-threatening incident. The shock is characterised by feelings of fear, helplessness, or horror157. In most cases, people who have gone through traumatic experiences develop problems that they never experienced before the traumatic event. However, as Carlson and Ruzek argue, the seriousness of the symptoms of a traumatic experience depends on a person’s life experiences before the trauma and a person’s ability to cope with stress; the seriousness of the trauma; and the kind of help a survivor receives from family, friends and professionals immediately after the trauma. Since fear overwhelms most people during trauma, survivors often have particular symptoms that begin soon after the traumatic experience. The main symptoms are reexperiencing of the trauma - mentally and physically - and avoidance of trauma reminders. Together, these symptoms create a problem that is called Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)158. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is: A psychiatric disorder that can occur following the experience or witnessing of lifethreatening events such as military combat, natural disasters, terrorist incidents, serious accidents, or violent personal assaults like rape.159

Symptoms of PTSD include re-experiencing the event through nightmares and flashbacks, having difficulty with falling asleep, and feeling detached or estranged. Reexperiencing means that the survivor continues to have the same mental, emotional and physical experiences that occurred during or just after the trauma. Trauma survivors find themselves feeling and acting as if the trauma is happening again: feeling as if they are in danger, experiencing panic sensations, wanting to escape, getting angry, thinking about attacking or harming someone else. Because they are anxious and physically agitated, they may have trouble sleeping and trouble concentrating. These experiences are not usually voluntary; the survivor usually cannot control them or stop them from happening160. Starting in the late 1980s, there has been a growing interest in research on PTSD among demobilised soldiers. Although PTSD is not a new disorder, as careful research and documentation of PTSD began to take centre stage in war veterans’ affairs after the Vietnam War. The National Centre for PTSD (NCPTSD) in the United States notes that following the findings of research into PTSD among Vietnam War veterans, PTSD has subsequently been observed in all veteran populations that have been studied, including those from World War II, the Korean conflict and the Gulf War. More striking is that PTSD symptoms have also been found among United Nations peacekeeping forces who have been deployed to war zones around the world. The NCPTSD notes that PTSD also appears in military veterans in other countries with similar findings – that is, Australian Vietnam veterans experience much the same symptoms as American Vietnam veterans.

Carlson E.B and Ruzek J. “Effects of Traumatic Experiences” from http://www.ncptsd.org/facts/general/fs_effects.html. 158 ibid. 159 “What is PTSD?” from http://www.ncptsd.org/facts/general/fs_what_is_ptsd.html 160 Carlson E.B and Ruzek J. 157

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8.2.2) Incidences of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder A significant number (38.7%) of the respondents indicated that they suffer from psychological problems. However, those who were interviewed never referred to the term “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)”. They used different names to refer to the condition, and some of the symptoms they identify are similar to the ones discussed above. Table 8.1 below indicates the extent to which respondents are suffering from the various typical symptoms of PTSD. Many respondents reported that they suffer from a combination of these symptoms. Table 8.1: Frequency of PTSD Symptoms among Respondents Symptom of PTSD Trouble falling asleep Trouble staying asleep Other things remind me of the event Any reminder about of the event brings back feelings I generally feel irritable and angry I avoid letting myself get upset by the event I feel as if it had not happened or was not real I stay away from reminders about it (including people) Pictures about the event pop into my mind I am jumpy and easily startled I try not to think about it I do not deal with the feelings My feelings about it are kind of numb I find myself acting or feeling like I was back at the time I have waves of strong feelings about the event I try to remove the event from my memory I have trouble concentrating I have physical reactions such as sweating, trouble etc, I have dreams about the event I feel vulnerable and hence am watchful and on guard I try not to talk about the event I rely too much on alcohol and/drugs I feel no love/affection to any human being I think of/ have attempted to commit suicide I have physical pains I have a malfunctioning digestive/urinary system I have some sexual deformations

Number % Total 33 8 410 25 6 410 37 9 410 47 11 410 66 16 410 26 6,3 410 25 6 410 26 6,3 410 47 11 410 27 6,5 410 47 11 410 37 9 410 12 3 410 27 6,5 410 27 6,5 410 30 7,3 410 24 5,8 410 9 2 410 28 6,8 410 11 2.,6 410 14 3,4 410 11 2,6 410 5 1,2 410 5 1,2 410 6 1,4 410 6 1,4 410 2 0,4 410

While some respondents were not prepared to discuss details of their conditions, others were more open. A revealing comment was provided by a former MK soldier from Soweto in Gauteng province: If you are detached from a family for a long time, when you return it becomes very difficult to live with members of your family. If you were exposed to incidences of violence the problem becomes worse. This is because you can take a soldier out of the bush but you cannot take the bush out of the soldier. Most [former] MK soldiers suffer from the Angolan Syndrome. The Boers call it “Bossis”. This is the tendency to

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always want to kill even though you cannot identify a clear enemy. Sometimes you feel like killing the whole family.161

Some of the ex-combatants who were prepared to discuss their condition reflected on how they continuously re-experience the traumatic event: When I look at my feet and hands I remember the day of an ambush in Angola and when I think about it I cannot fall asleep at night. Even fireworks affect me a lot because they sound like guns at the beginning of a war. I tried to write a letter to Madiba [Nelson Mandela] to find out what I can do to avoid this. I was told to keep myself busy in order to forget about the incident, but for me it is very difficult.162 While in exile I was deployed in a kitchen when comrades were poisoned by an enemy agent. I was locked up and tortured for almost three and half months. To this date I can still feel the pains from the torture. Memories of the event [torture] trouble me. I also dream about the torture and this affects me. What really left me stressed until today is that when it was discovered that I was not responsible for food poisoning, they [comrades] never had the decency to apologise. All that they said was that I was a lucky person. However, I am living with the trauma from the torture.163 I hate the sound of a diesel engine. It reminds me of the sound of the SADF military vehicles when in Angola. On one occasion I broke an anti-burglar door with my bare hands on another I broke a table from merely hearing the sound of a diesel engine. Sometimes I wake up from a dream of a war situation. Thus when you wake me up, you must make sure not to touch me or stand nearby or else I will mistaken you for an attacker and thus harm you.164 In 1987 we were moving from the West to the North of Angola when Savimbi’s bandits attacked our convoy. The sound of gunshots and grenade explosion ring in my mind to this day. I am old [65 years] and suppose to enjoy the last days of my life. However, I cannot even go out of the house once I hear the sound of a gunshot. Sometimes I become so nervous that I break things in my house. I feel like fighting but have no one to fight against. I generally feel irritable and angry. My children are now used to my behaviour. No one can cure my condition except death.165

A number of respondents indicated that they abuse the use of alcohol regularly. Of this number, many claimed that they did this in an attempt to forget about past traumatic events: Sometimes when I am not taking beer, I have dreams of the time when the TNT blew me up. I normally jump up forgetting that I lost one leg in the incident. Those wars in Angola come to my dreams. Sometimes I scream thinking that war is taking place inside my house. This is why I opened a tavern so that I can have people talking so as to keep my mind occupied. I always remember how I used to hate beer, but now I am a Professor of beer [drinking] and this was not out of choice, but was forced upon me by the situation166

Interview with respondent no. 1MKGP, 9 October 2001. Interview with respondent no. 73MKGP19 December 2001. 163 Interview with respondent no. 113APLAGP, 13 February 2002. 164 Interview with respondent no. 1MKGP, 9 October 2001. 165 Interview with respondent no. 78MKGP, 4 January 2002 166 Interview with respondent no. 71MKGP, 19 December 2001. 161 162

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The wars I was involved in both in Angola and Mozambique always come back to haunt me. Sometimes the sound of guns and bombs ring in my mind. When I am alone in the house I keep on thinking about these wars. When this happens I feel like screaming and normally drink brandy to calm myself down. When I think about how we have been used in other countries by our own leaders, I become depressed. These people who used us today have forgotten us. They are eating on a silver plate while we have to scavenge from the garbage167

The psychological problems outlined above affects both men and women. However, women are the most disadvantaged because apart from exposure to war-related violence, some were the victims of sexual abuse by commanders: When I remember my first three years I of exile I feel like crying because I had sexual intercourse with more than 20 MK commanders. I also saw this happening to other young female students who joined MK in the 1970s and 1980s. The female comrades were used as sex slaves but if a young male comrade was found having an affair with a female comrade, he was punished in some cases killed. The killing would be justified by arguing that the comrade was an enemy agent. All these affect me now because every time I see those young girls who work in offices they bring back bad memories. I always think that they found their jobs by exposing themselves to sexual abuse by those in authority168 As a woman in [military] camps for your protection to be guaranteed you had to become a sex slave. When I look at my first son I am saddened by the fact that I cannot identify his father. This is because each day you had sexual intercourse with a different commander. There was nowhere to report. If you reported the matter, you were labelled an enemy agent169

Not all the respondents who indicated that they suffer from major psychological problems were the victims of violent acts. Some ex-combatants experience psychological problems because they were perpetrators of violence against other people, either comrades or enemies. The high incidence of perceived infiltration of the liberation movements, especially in the 1980s, resulted in many senior members becoming paranoid. Security mechanisms in both APLA and MK camps were tightened and in the process a number of people suspected of being enemy agents were either tortured or killed. Some ex-combatants responsible for security committed violent acts against their countrymen. This perpetration of violence left the perpetrators with deep psychological scars, which haunt the perpetrators today. When in Angola I was based at the Quattro camp where we tortured apartheid regime’s spies. We also used to kill them and it was not a nice way of killing them, it was the most brutal way of killing a person. Pictures of the events pop into my mind. The events at Quattro camp affect me a lot. Sometimes I dream about what happened and when these dreams come, I scream. I am too afraid to go to the doctor because I can’t even explain why I am like this. That is why I have to drink beers if I want to fall asleep. Even today comrades do not trust me in their discussions.170 When in exile I was deployed in the security division where we used to kill innocent comrades who were suspected of being enemy agents. After we had killed about 80 comrades we discovered that the enemy set us up and we fell into the trap [of killing Interview with respondent no. 87MKGP, 16 January 2002. Interview with respondent no. 82MKGP, 4 January 2002. 169 Interview with respondent no. 72MKGP, 19 December 2001. 170 Interview with respondent no. 51MKGP, 11 December 2001. 167 168

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innocent people]. Sometimes I hear voices of innocent children screaming, I can also hear the sounds of gunshot similar to the one I heard when we killed the innocent comrades. The main thing that distresses me is when families try to enquire about the whereabouts of their children. All these give me bad dreams and frustrate my life. I try to avoid thinking about it but I can’t when it starts flashing in my mind.171.

None of the respondents experiencing psychological problems have received treatment and/or counselling for their problems. These psychological problems make social reintegration at both the family and community levels very difficult: The family is not that supportive, rather they do not understand my situation [that I am mentally disturbed]. They do not support me in terms of getting medical help. I have experienced problems with my family, especially grandchildren who see me as useless. They do not understand my situation rather they take me as a stupid person172 Sometimes when the sickness attacks me, I do some disgraceful things unaware. All these make me appear like I am a mad person. I only realise later when I am told what I did, that my behaviour is not acceptable to the community. Now even when I am normal no one trusts me because they think that I am a terrorist. Sometimes I feel like killing173 I was a commander during the Spolilo operation. We were bombarded from 11h00 until 19h00 non-stop and the enemy [SADF Air Force] was using ten warplanes. The bombing went on non-stop and I normally have some flashbacks of the event. When we were detained in prison we spent lot of time thinking about how to correct our mistakes. This paid off and we once brought down a military plane in Vienna. Hence every time I see an aeroplane I immediately look at the possibilities of how to shoot it down. It does not matter whether it is a civilian or military plane including helicopters all I see are the possibilities of shooting it down with ease. This is because all aircrafts remind me of the Spolilo bombing. I think that shooting down a plane is a nice art. After my return from exile the South Air Force held some acrobatic exercises over Seshego [township outside Polokwane] one evening. I was so terrified that the next morning I approached the commander of the Far North Command in Polokwane and warned him to stop the exercises. I warned him that most of us think that a war is beginning and thus could not out rule the possibility of shooting down the warplanes. The commander obliged and this never took place again174.

8.3) Community Integration 75% of respondents indicated that the way the community had treated them prior to joining the armed struggle compared to how they are currently viewed has not changed, despite the fact that most (88%) of the respondents reported that their community were aware of their military backgrounds. A small but significant minority (8%) said that they had encountered a change, with some claiming that they are ridiculed or reviled by members of the communities in which they live: They laugh at me because most of us (ex-MK soldiers) are unemployed after spending years fighting against Apartheid. Initially we were treated as heroes, but now members of the community laugh at us and say Umkhonto we Sizwe soldiers are useless…175 Interview with respondent no. 120APLAGP, 20 February 2002. Interview with respondent no. 139MKMP, 23 April 2002. 173 Interview with respondent no. 27 MKGP, 7 November 2001. 174 Interview with respondent no. 102MKLP, 31 January 2002. 175 Interview with respondent no. 20 MKGP, 3 November 2001. 171 172

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They think and say that we are thugs. This has to do with the language of the Apartheid government that we are rebels and terrorists. It is even worse because we have been unemployed for many years. They regard us as thugs with no future176

In Limpopo Province, where the provincial government is one of the main sources of economic power, either as an employer or provider of business tenders, relevant respondents reported the existence of tensions between ex-combatants and members of their communities, as some community members perceive ex-combatants as getting preferential treatment in terms of government jobs. As discussed in the previous subsection, the tension between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal has contributed to deep social divisions between people. Some of the exMK combatants face rejection in their communities because they are affiliated to the ANC while residing in IFP-dominated areas, and members of their communities do not see any tangible benefits gained from these ex-combatants’ affiliation to the ruling party. Research data also shows that in others areas of the country where the ANC is the dominant political party, people feel that the ANC has abandoned ex-combatants. However, instead of sympathising with them, community members chose to laugh at excombatants: They laugh at me because they say I wasted my time in exile without education while they finished schooling. Now they have perfect jobs... They laugh at me saying that I am useless as I am not working rather I am begging. I think they have changed their attitude because they do not see any future for me and I do not match them [economically]177 Members of my community ask questions and say that the ANC has done nothing for me178

Interview with respondent no. FS25, 2 January 2002. with respondent no. 127MKMP, 23 April 2002. 178 Interview with respondent no. EC41, 2 February 2002. 176

177Interview

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Section 9: Political Reintegration This section provides details on the various aspects of ex-combatants political reintegration (or the lack thereof), and considers the following issues relating to excombatants: membership of community organisations, such as church groups; interaction with veterans’ organisations; relationships with veterans’ organisations; and incidents of protest. 9.1) Membership Community Organisations Most (83%) respondents belong to community and/or political organisations, 75% claim to be active in community/political organisations, which are predominately ANC or PAC structures and/or community policing forums. Participation in these organisations ranges from simply being a dedicated member of an organisation to holding leadership positions. Leadership positions range from holding a position of a chairperson at a street committee level to being a chairperson of an ANC or PAC branch office. Respondents indicated that they had different reasons for belonging to these organisations. In some cases ex-combatants become involved so as to remain busy because they are unable to secure employment. Others claim that they are motivated out of a sense of civic duty: I am a member of a Street Committee and I am participating a lot. I am the chairperson of the Street Committee and am responsible for calling meetings to discuss street problems. If I don’t have money community members help me out.179 I am a member of the Community Police Forum (CPF) and am involved in street patrols and conducting workshops on community policing.180

Some of the respondents, due to sense of obligation and/or sentimental reasons, were motivated to become actively involved in ANC/PAC structures. This is because many ex-combatants literally grew up within either the ANC or PAC in exile, where their basic needs, and those of their families, were catered for. However, this was a “double-edged sword”, which created, what a staff member at the national office of MKMVA called, a “dependency syndrome”, where individuals loose the ability to fend for themselves, and become entirely dependent on the party for their survival.181 9.2) Military Veterans Associations 77% of respondents indicated that that they belong to a military veterans association. However, this membership is not defined in terms of possessing a membership card, but has more to do with identifying with the organisation. During the interview process, many respondents stated that even though they are not card-carrying members, they still regard themselves as members. The reason for this is that very few can afford to pay the membership fee. Both APLA and MK soldiers believe that military veterans associations have a role to play in addressing the socio-economic needs of ex-combatants. In Gauteng, the common Interview with respondent no. 61 MKGP, 18 December 2001. Interview with respondent no. 57MKGP, 11 December 2001. 181 Telephonic interview with a staff at MKMVA national office, 13 November 2002. 179 180

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view among ex-combatants is that veterans associations should establish incomegenerating projects to assist unemployed ex-combatants. Others argue that veterans associations should lobby both the public and the private sector to provide funds that could be used to support struggling ex-combatants (see section 10 for an analysis of the relevant veterans associations). 9.3) Church Organisations Close to 60% of respondents reported that they are members of religious organisations, with approximately 80% indicating that they are actively involved in the activities of these religious bodies. Examples include: secretaries of a church youth groups, preachers, and members of church financial committees. Some of the female respondents reported that they are members of a church women’s league. A number of the respondents, who are not members of any church group, have very strong views against the church. Among former APLA soldiers, the common argument is that Christianity was a critical mechanism used by European colonisers to dispossess Africans of land. Other respondents were merely sceptical about religion. 9.4) Ex-Combatant Interaction The comradeship between ex-combatants was forged in the context of a hostile social and political climate, thus most combatants were able to transcend ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries to join arms in the struggle. Table 9.1: Frequency of Meetings between Ex-Combatants Frequency of Meetings Daily Occasionally Weekly Monthly Never Not Answered

Number of Respondents Percentage 219 86 58 19 6 22

53.4 20.9 14.1 4.6 1.4 5.3

More than half of the respondents (53.4%) indicated that they meet with other excombatants on a daily basis. This “meeting” usually entails the sharing of a cigarette or some food between combatants, but there are also weekly and monthly gatherings in which ex-combatants discuss developments regarding political, social and economic issues. Information is shared about possible jobs, and debates are held on strategies to alleviate poverty. In Gauteng, in areas outside of the cities, former MK soldiers with good contacts in MKMVA often make house calls informing their comrades about news from MKMVA Head Office in Johannesburg. Critically, these regular contacts are an indication that informal support structures exist among ex-combatants. In fact, 68% of respondents reported that, if possible, they try and help “comrades in need”. In addition, many indicated that they are more comfortable with requesting help from “comrades” than from their own families: It is a matter of sharing beer and cigarettes because at least I am earning an income.182 182

Interview with respondent no. 146MKNW, 4 June 2002.

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The field research indicated that former MK soldiers have substantially stronger informal networks than former APLA combatants. Approximately 30% indicated that they do not help their former “comrades”. The reasons that were given were: geographical location; economic hardship; and a sense that other ex-combatants were lazy and not willing take responsibility for their lives: I regard them as my comrades but lazy comrades. How can we help each other when they fail to help themselves? The comrades themselves must take some initiative and stop waiting to be spoon-fed183 Due to the culture of entitlement among ex-MK soldiers I tend to isolate myself from the comrades. Generally I help those who try to pick themselves up. Currently one of my comrades owes me R50 000.00184

9.5) Incidents of Protest Over the past three years individuals who have claimed to be MK/APLA ex-combatants have been involved in a series of planned and implemented protest and/or civil disobedience actions. These actions have largely been motivated by the needs of the individuals concerned to highlight their grievances. This is a clear indication that many ex-combatants have become marginalised politically, as these forms of action are typically used by people who perceive themselves to be powerless. Examples are provided below. 9.5.1) Threat to Blockade the Golden Highway On 16 June 2000, former MK soldiers planned to blockade the Golden Highway next to Orange Farm (south of Johannesburg) to demand jobs. However, the blockade never took place for two reasons. First, some former MK soldiers within the group felt that others would use the opportunity to commit crime: Our idea was positive because, it was not against the government, it was simply to say: ‘government remember us, we are still hungry’. Others came with negative ideas and said things like ‘what is happening in Zimbabwe is good why can’t we do it’. If we do what war veterans are doing in Zimbabwe, we will end up pushing ourselves into a situation that we do not like. We realised that some people would use the opportunity [the highway blockade] to rob people of their money185.

Second, the Head Office of the ANC was informed of the planned action, but requested the “comrades to be patient and their issues would be addressed.” Even though this information was not verified ex-combatants abandoned their plan: This [the blockade] was stopped by people who claim to have consulted the head quarters but the name of the person who was contacted and convinced us to stop this is

Interview with respondent no. 90APLAGP, 21 February 2002. Interview with respondent no. 106MKLP, 1 February 2002. 185 Interview with a former MK combatant, 15 August, 2000. 183 184

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still unknown to us. We started to suspect the people that we send to Shell House lied to us.186

9.5.2) Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA) March In November 2000, the City Press on Sunday reported that a group of about 100 former APLA and MK combatants “threatened to block tourists, target government buildings and cars and evict government employees in the Western Cape’s black townships” if the government did not respond to their demands for employment. The ex-soldiers were apparently marching under the name of Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA) and threatened to join the Western Cape vigilante groups, Qibla and PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) 187. 9.5.3) Soldiers Forum Protests On 17 August 2002, some ex-combatants from the Soldiers Forum, who were part of a Social Movement Forum protest action against the World Summit on Sustainable Development (held in Johannesburg), were tear-gassed and arrested by the South Africa Police Services at Johannesburg Station. 9.5.4) The Planned Hostage-taking In December 2000, a group of ex-MK soldiers from Orange Farm planned to take a white Gauteng farmer hostage, in order to alert President Thabo Mbeki to the plight of ex-combatants. However, this never materialised.188

Interview with a former MK combatant, 15 August, 2000. ‘Give us jobs or…’, City Press Sunday November 26, 2000. 188 Personal conversation between Lephophotho Mashike and an former MK soldier, December 2000. 186 187

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Section 10: Ex-Soldiers’ Organisations and Veterans Affairs Bodies This section considers the various military veterans organisations and bodies that have a direct bearing on the MK and APLA ex-combatants. In addition, a brief analysis is provided of those semi-formal organisations that are managed by ex-combatants, and are dedicated to meeting the needs of ex-combatants in South Africa. 10.1) Overview of Military Veterans Associations In South Africa there are two types of formal military veterans’ associations, namely those that represent veterans who previously served with non-statutory armed forces and those who represent veterans that served in statutory armed forces. In terms of the former, the relevant organisations are as follows: Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association and Azanian People’s Liberation Army Veterans Association. The latter type is made up of the following organisations: SA Legion; Memorable Order of Tin Hats (MOTH); Gunners’ Association; Sappers’ Association; SA Air Force Association; Naval Officers’ Association of Southern Africa; SA Cape Corps Regimental Association; St Dunstan’s Association for South African War-Blinded Veterans; SA Jewish Ex-Service League; SA Infantry Association; SA Medical Service Veterans’ Association; Curamus Association; The South African Scottish Regiments Association; The Naval Association of South Africa; South African Armour Association; Polish Combatants’ in Southern Africa; Special Forces League; and the SA Veterane Voortsettingskomittee. 10.2) Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association The Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA) was established in December 1996. According to the Constitution of MKMVA, MK veterans are all those individuals who joined MK before the suspension of the armed struggle, and never deserted the ranks of MK. Membership is open to returned MK exiles and internal combatants. Former members of MK who are in the SANDF are entitled to be members of MKMVA with the proviso that they are not allowed to hold office in MKMVA189. 10.2.1) Structures and Membership MKMVA is comprised of a National Office and nine provincial offices. The organisation is managed by a National Executive Committee, which has five members: Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General and the Treasurer. The National Office is staffed by six people: an administrator, executive secretary, secretary, two welfare officers and the National Chaplain who doubles as a driver due to shortage of funds. Each of the provincial offices is managed by a Provincial Executive Committee, which is made up of five members. Each provincial office is staffed by an administrator and a secretary. The National Office provides funds to pay for the staff salaries and office expenses.190

189 190

Interview with comrade Bob Mabaso (then) General Secretary of MKMVA, 09 July 1999. Telephonic interview with an MKMVA key informant, 13 November 2002.

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The exact number of MKMVA members is currently unknown, even to the NEC of MKMVA. In its submissions on the Demobilisation Amendment Bill (2001) and Termination Of Integration Intake Bill hearings (2001) before the Defence Portfolio Committee on 1 October 2001, MKMVA stated that “MKMVA has a constituency of 45 000 people spread all over the Republic of South Africa” (emphasis added)191. However, when a member of the research team contacted a key MKMVA informant, this person suggested that 45 000 is an over-estimation, and that a more realistic membership figure is 30 000 (although there is no basis for this estimate).192 However, to make matters more confusing, in the publication, Profile of Umkhonto We Sizwe, current membership of MKMVA is estimated to be 60 000. An MKMVA source indicated that the veterans association plans to embark on a process whereby all membership information will be captured on an electronic database. However, before this can take place, those who will undertake the data collection and capture require training, and a system has to be designed in order to determine the authenticity of membership. 10.2.2) Activities The activities of MKMVA include: • • • • •

To assist veterans of Umkhonto we Sizwe who are unable to fend for themselves due to old age and disability. To create and develop income generating community-based projects which will involve veterans. To assist in terms of vocational training, education and re-integration of veterans into civil society. To provide assistance to dependants of veterans who died during the struggle for a non-racial South Africa. To promote and defend the rights and dignity of all MK veterans, as well as, promote the history and heritage of Umkhonto we Sizwe.193

In order to assist MK ex-combatants with economic reintegration, MKMVA established the Veterans Heritage Investments (VHI) (Pty) Ltd. MKMVA is a 100 % shareholder of VHI, which seeks to pursue opportunities in the local and export market in the following sectors: • • • • •

Aviation; automotive and other electronic components; Metal and leather goods for aircraft and cars; Wood and metal furniture; Workplace overalls and other garments; and Agricultural products and flowers.194

As an initial investment, the ANC donated a farm in Doornkuil (south-west of Johannesburg), near Orange Farm. MKMVA planned to build an industrial and agribusiness park and a training centre on this property, which would benefit former liberation movement combatants and retrenched members of the SANDF. It was envisaged that Veteran’s Centres in each of the nine provinces would be created. In 1998, Minutes of the Defence Portfolio Committee, 2 October 2001. Telephonic interview with an MKMVA key informant, 13 November 2002. 193 Profile of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association: 2-3. 194 MKMVA Business Plan for National Industrial Participation: 1. 191 192

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British Aerospace (BAe)’s Airborne Trust donated R4.5 million to this a pilot project at Doornkuil farm. It was anticipated that this pilot project would include low-cost housing, a clinic, orphanage, old age home and light industrial park.195 According to BAe: Veterans will become self-sufficient, deriving income through job creation, training and the marketing and sale of products. The long-term benefits will be the provision of housing and support for veterans from disadvantaged groups.196

However, speculation in the media suggested that this contribution was linked to BAe’s bid for major SA defence contract. BAe’s representatives denied this. 10.2.3) Shortcomings MKMVA appears to be suffering from serious organisational problems, which include ineffective planning, co-ordination and implementation of projects at both the national and provincial levels. There also seems to be a lack of sufficient transparency in the manner in which the organisation functions, as well as the accountability of Committee members and other staff to the general membership. In addition, there appears to be very poor communication between the national office and the provincial offices. Despite numerous promises, there has been little action on the part of MKMVA to initiate income-generating projects or provide sustainable support for its members. Three examples of these shortcomings are outlined below: First, at a demobilisation and reintegration roundtable discussion held in Johannesburg in August 2000, the General Secretary of MKMVA, Mr. Lebone Mosia claimed that projects at Doornkuil farm were about to begin and invited the APLA Veterans Association to join MKMVA in this business initiative. By March 2002, these projects had still not been implemented. Allegations were made that the funds from the Airborne Trust had been embezzled. These reports were denied by both the MKMVA treasurergeneral, Dumisane Khoza and the Airborne Trust spokesperson, Linden Birns. According to Khoza: Only R84 894 had been used on services such as surveying of the land in Doornkuil, south of Johannesburg, its master planning, project management and legal fees. The bulk of the funds are lying in the bank.197

In February SABC 3’s current affairs programme, Special Assignment broadcast a twopart documentary on returned ANC exiles entitled Family Ties. The second part of the documentary focused on the integration of returned exiles into society and had a section on Doornkuil, in which the National Chairperson of MKMVA, Deacon Mathe promised that the farm would be operational by April 2002. However, by November 2002, following a visit by a member of the research team, there was no evidence that these projects were being implemented, other than some limited farming activities.

MKMVA. 1998. Memorandum of Understanding. (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1998/pr0325.html). 196 British Aerospace. News Release, 25 March 1998. 197 Sowetan, March 8, 2001. 195

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The farm currently employs four workers who are supposed to produce milk and vegetables for sale in order to raise funds for MKMVA, however, the farm workers are managed, paid and accountable to the ANC, not MKMVA.198 According to an MKMVA source: It seems these guys sell the milk and vegetables and pocket the money for themselves.199

Critically, some of the chairpersons of provincial offices had never heard of the Doornkuil farm project. Second, former MK soldiers who were interviewed at the offices complained about the high rate of unemployment and some of them privately complained about the failure of MKMVA to assist them. Third, in 2001 the MKMVA office in Polokwane became partner in owning a mango farm in the Nkowankowa (Mopani region), Limpopo Province. However, this project proved to be highly problematic as many of the mango trees suffered fire damage following an arson attack.200 It appears as though the MKMVA national office was not informed about this project. 10.2.4) Limited Resources Many of the shortcomings of MKMVA are the result of a shortage of adequate human and financial resources. Members of the NEC of MKMVA are unable to attend to their duties on a full time basis due to a lack of funds and other commitments, and MKMVA offices are serious understaffed. MKMVA generally operates within the ANC, which allocates office space to MKMVA and is responsible for MKMVA’s telephone and certain office expenses. In some provinces, such as Limpopo and Mpumalanga, MKMVA provincial structures have been allocated an office within the ANC’s provincial offices. In other provinces such as North West, MKMVA operates from a desk only, and the Provincial Secretary of the ANC doubles as a Provincial Secretary of MKMVA (at the time of this study). 10.3) Azanian People’s Liberation Army Veterans Association The Azanian People’s Liberation Army Veterans Association (APLAVA) was established in 1997 with the aim of addressing the socio-economic needs, as well as problems encountered by APLA veterans, such gaining access to government pensions. The mission of APLAVA is as follows: To serve PAC veterans of the liberation struggle and their families and to be their principal advocate in ensuring that they receive the care, support and recognition they earned in the service of their country.

The National Office is managed by six National Executive Committee members: the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, General Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Treasurer and Telephonic Interview with MKMVA key informant, 13 November 2002 . Telephonic interview with an MKMVA key informant, 13 November 2002. 200 Interview with Mr. Richard Takalo, the provincial chairperson of MKMVA in the Limpopo Province, 24 January 2002. 198 199

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National Co-ordinator. No formal provincial structures exist, but some APLA veterans have established informal offices from their own homes with their own resources. 10.3.1) Activities There appears to be few or even no dedicated APLAMVA activities currently taking place. Information about APLA veterans projects was not forthcoming despite a series of requests for this information from the APLAMVA National Office. It appears as though APLAVA is participating in some collaborative initiatives with MK veterans, but details of these projects were not readily available. 10.3.2) Challenges APLAVA’s operating budget is virtually non-existent, and the NEC has been unsuccessful in raising funds for the organisation (even from membership fees). This is best illustrated by the fact that APLA veterans who work in the Special Pension office to process applications from former APLA applicants do so on a voluntary basis, while their MK counterparts are paid by the ANC. APLAVA was unable to provide details on its membership, as no database currently exists. Given the history of operating under very strict conditions of secrecy, former APLA soldiers are hesitant to provide information about their organisation. For six months an attempt was made to obtain the APLAVA’s Constitution but to no avail. According to staff members in the APLAVA’s head office in Johannesburg, the organisation’s Constitution is a very sensitive document and the National Chairperson, who was unavailable for an interview, is the only person with the authority to issue the document. Even the former National Chairperson, Mr. Lennox Mlonzi refused to be interviewed, because he claimed that it may result in disciplinary action being taken against him. 10.4) Statutory Military Veterans Associations All formal statutory military veterans affairs organisations are members of the Council of Military Veterans’ Organisations (CMVO). The CMVO is a voluntary association that was established in August 1976. The CMVO seeks to promote mutual co-operation between its members with the primary objective of “speaking with one voice” on veterans affairs. The CMVO is recognised by the government and its chairperson is ex-officio, the adviser to the Minister of Defence on military veterans affairs. The CMVO is also a member of the World Veterans Federation. Neither APLAVA nor MKMVA are affiliated to CMVO. There are two reasons for this. First, APLA and MK veterans feel that as former members of liberation forces they have a unique history and special needs which cannot be addressed in the broader context of military veterans’ affairs. Second, there is a lack of reconciliation between South African the statutory and non-statutory veterans structures. However, there have been some attempts to establish co-operation between different veterans’ associations, predominantly via the Advisory Board on Military Veterans Affairs (ABMVA), which was established by means of the Military Veterans’ Veterans’ Affairs Act (no. 17 of 1999).

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10.5) The Advisory Board on Military Veterans Affairs In 1999, the government passed the Military Veterans Affairs Act in order to recognise the sacrifices that all military veterans have made in service of their country and their role in the liberation of South Africa from oppression and racial domination. This Act stipulates that the State President is Patron-in-Chief of all military veterans entities and also provides for the establishment of an Advisory Board on Military Veterans’ Affairs, with the aim of unifying military veterans associations in South Africa. The Advisory Board on Military Veterans Affairs is representative of all military veterans as it is made up of nominees from recognised military veterans organisations of both former liberation and statutory forces. The Board is made up of five members and four co-opted members who serve on the board for a period of five years. 10.4.1) Activities The activities of the Board are implemented by the Office of Military Veterans Affairs in the Department of Defence. This office is currently engaged in three activities that directly relate to the affairs of MK and APLA veterans, which are as follows:201 First, an attempt is being made to establish unity among military veterans’ organisations. In this regard, the Board is facilitating discussions on the formation of the South African Military Veterans’ Federation (SAMVF), a federal umbrella body to which all veterans organisations will eventually be affiliated. To facilitate this process a Steering Committee has been appointed. A draft Constitution is currently under consideration by various parties. Preparations are also underway to host the 24th General Assembly of the World Veterans Federation (WVF) in December 2003 in Sandton, Johannesburg. Second, a modest number of skills development programmes have been envisaged, with one pilot project for 40 veterans having been implemented in September 2002. The Diplomacy, Intelligence, Defence and Trade Education and Training Authority (DIDTETA) under the auspices of the Department of Labour, together with the Service Corps is planning to launch a skills development programme over the next five years. A total of R39 million has been budgeted for this project. Third, the Board is dealing with a number of military pension-related issues, including assisting MK and APLA veterans apply for a Special Pension. 10.4.2) Challenges The Board only has access to limited funds for operations and activities. Disunity between the various veterans associations is delaying the effective implementation of SAMVF.

Information derived from a written reply by Rear Adm. (JG) Lukas Bakkes, Director Reserves and Veterans Policy, DOD to Parliamentary question on veterans affairs, 1 September 2002. 201

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10.5) Non-Governmental Veterans Related Bodies 10.5.1) Khumbula202 Khumbula was formed on the 16 December 1998 in Cape Town, by former APLA and MK combatants, as well as other activists who contributed to the liberation struggle. Although its leadership and the majority of members are in the Western Cape, Khumbula is a national body committed to the well being of former combatants throughout the country. Khumbula has five main objectives: • • • • •

To erect monuments for those combatants who died in foreign countries during the course of the liberation struggle against apartheid; To develop healing programmes for former combatants that emphasise development; To write the history of South African liberation movements; To exhume the bodies of liberation fighters who died in foreign countries for reburial in South Africa; and To engage in the development of youth and women.

Examples of three types of activities are as follows. First, the organisation is planning to erect a monument to “the fallen heroes of the liberation struggle” in Paarl (Western Cape), however they have encountered resistance from the local municipality. Second, Khumbula initially had a partnership with the Institute for the Healing of Memories for this institute to provide a range of healing initiatives for former combatants. However, this partnership proved to be unsustainable. They also have HIV and literacy support groups. Third, at the time of undertaking the research for this project, Khumbula had exhumed three bodies of former MK combatants who were all killed during the 19 December 1985 SADF raid in Lesotho. There are two major challenges facing Khumbula in terms of achieving its objectives. First, there is the lack of available funds, and second, Khumbula is managed by volunteers and has no offices or dedicated staff to raise funds and manage its projects. 10.5.3) Western Cape Action Tours (WECAT)203 Western Cape Action Tours (WECAT) is comprised of eight members and was formed by former ex-combatants in Cape Town under the leadership of Mark Yazir Henry. These ex-combatants appear to have been motivated to establish WECAT in order to make a living as their names did not appear on the CPR, and they had were unable to secure demobilisation gratuities, despite numerous attempts. According to Henry: We did not want to sit down and continue pointing figures at the ANC or government. Doing that is very hurting to us, it destroys your self-esteem.

Information on Khumbula was obtained through an interview with Jama Matakata (a former MK combatant, now Chairperson of Khumbula) and Afrika Kehlapho (a former MK combatant, now National Organiser Khumbula), on 29 November 2001 in Cape Town. 203 Unless otherwise stated information in this section is based on an interview conducted with Mark Yazir Henry, Project Co-ordinator, WECAT, 25 July 2001. 202

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According to Henry, the aim of WECAT is to unite ex-combatants in their quest to find meaning after the war of liberation. The main activity of WECAT is the provision of tours of Cape Town’s townships, with an emphasis on places of historical importance as far as the struggle of liberation is concerned (which is the main source of income). WECAT also runs ‘The Direct Action Centre for Peace and Memory’. This is a selfhealing programme for ex-combatants, where these individuals and their families are given an opportunity to “record the unwritten histories of anti-apartheid fighters and black communities in the Western Cape”.204 This allows ex-combatants to express themselves through music, poetry and art.205 WECAT faces three challenges. First, the South Africa Revenue Services expects WECAT to pay company tax from its meagre earnings. Second, according to Henry, the Western Cape Tourism Authority is hostile to WECAT as its members refuse to take approved tourism courses and wear regulation badges. Third, during the interview process, certain ex-combatants criticised the township tours, accusing WECAT of “exploiting historical resources to make themselves rich without giving anything back to the community.”206 However, it is unclear if these comments were motivated by legitimate concerns or jealousy. 10.5.4) Soldiers Forum207 The Soldiers Forum (SF), which is affiliated to the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), was established to represent former black members of the SADF and later included former APLA and MK soldiers who, in the words of its chairperson, Mr. Mphati Matabane, “are fighting for reintegration into the SANDF”. According Matabane: the organisation is intended to be inclusive of former members of APLA and MK who feel that they do not have a voice to register their grievances.

However, according to Matabane, former APLA and MK members who joined the SF have been intimidated by their respective political organisations, which told them to express their grievances about integration through MK or APLA political structures. Matabane states that his organisation is prepared to forge links with other community organisations which are fighting for the socio-economic advancement of impoverished people.

MK vets doing it for themselves” in Mail and Guardian April 26 – May 3, 2001 Fragments of the Scattered Heart – The Music, Poetry and Art Project, a collection of unpublished poems by members of WECAT. 206 Interview with a former female MK combatant, Cape Town, 25 July 2001. 207 Telephonic interview with Mr. Mphati Matabane, chairperson of the Soldiers Forum, 30 October 2002. 204 205

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Section 11: Analysing the Needs and Expectations of ExCombatants In the immediate period following the 1994 general elections, there was widespread euphoria and a mood of optimism among the majority of South Africans. Amongst many black South Africans there were high expectations that their standards of living would be dramatically improved under an ANC government. This was particularly prevalent among former MK and APLA soldiers, who were under the impression they would be rewarded for their contributions to the liberation struggle. However, as this study has shown, these expectations have not been realised for many ex-combatants. The large majority of ex-combatants are unemployed, have limited marketable skills and live in poverty. This section provides a detailed analysis of the needs and expectations of ex-MK and APLA combatants. It also explores the manner in which these needs and expectations could be addressed, and by whom (as suggested by ex-combatants). 11.1) Overview of Needs and Expectations For many ex-combatants, the aim of the liberation struggle was not only for democracy, but also for economic and social freedom, equality and respect for human dignity for all South Africans. For the majority of respondents, following the end of apartheid, they expected to be able to achieve sustainable financial security, so that they could enjoy a relatively good standard of living. Ex-combatants expected to achieve this through a combination of mechanisms, such as: skills training, access to education, secure employment, resources to establish businesses, pensions, government subsidised housing and access to land: I have improved my life to achieve what I want. But my desire was to see Africans’ lives been improved. We fought for a better life. I wanted to see that. But people are still poor and politicians think about themselves whilst the masses are suffering.208 We were expecting our lives to improve. Mandela promised us that we would get houses, water, education [and] medical health care.209

There is general consensus among the majority of ex-combatants that their political needs and expectations for a free democratic South Africa have been realised: At a political level, we have attained our freedom and something has definitely changed. But there is still a lot to be done to eradicate poverty. We need visible improvements, proper houses, and eradication of corruption. We need to see people living a better life.210 We have achieved democracy. We now need genuine economic emancipation.211

Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.17 WC, 19 December 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.20 NC, 22 February 2002. 210 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.36 FS, 04 January 2002. 211 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.23 NC, 22 February 2002. 208 209

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11.2) Employment As this study has demonstrated, many (close to 70%) ex-combatants are unemployed and live in poverty. Most ex-MK and APLA combatants expected that they would become employed, or be provided with adequate support to secure employment or a profession, in either the public or private sector following the 1994 elections. In addition, some individuals wanted to remain in the military. Relevant comments by respondents are as follows: After war everyone expected to start and reap the fruits of freedom…I expected to move forward [and] and engage myself in business ventures [to] create jobs and make contribution in the economic liberation of our people.212 You see, when we came back [from exile], I wanted to learn civilian courses in order to rebuild our country. We were promised that we would find jobs to rebuild our country. We are still waiting.213 I was not expecting to be demobilised. I want to go back to the army and get my rank back. That is all that I need.214

A few ex-combatants said they were expecting to receive reasonable demobilisation packages in order to have some form of financial security, while others were counting on being integrated into the SAPS and other government departments: When I demobilised, I expected to get lot of money, especially money that we were promised before the demobilisation process.215 I only wanted a better job in the SASS [South African Secret Service]. We were promised we would be integrated there…216

11.3) Housing Many ex-combatants were expecting that they would be provided with adequate shelter following political liberation, but in reality (as this report reveals) only 39% of respondents have their own houses, which are mostly shacks: [I was expecting] to own a house and to receive the money that befits the number of years I served in MK.217 I was expecting that we would all have decent jobs, education and better houses not the UNO houses that the government has built.218

11.4) Education Interviews with ex-combatants revealed that they are acutely aware of the disadvantages the lack of education presents, especially with respect to employment opportunities. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.140 MP, 24 April 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.39 FS, 11 January 2002. 214 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.37 FS, 09 January 2002. 215 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.127 MP, 23 April 2002. 216 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.10 WC, 16 November 2001. 217 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No. 156 NW, 04 June 2002. 218 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.01 GP, 16 October 2001. 212 213

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Many expected to be have opportunities to educate themselves or improve their skills base following the conclusion of the armed struggle: I was expecting to further my studies and after that getting a job that was going to suit my qualifications” (Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.129 MP, 23 April 2002). I was expecting the government to help us with money and education” (Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.46 KZN, 27 February 2002).

61% of ex-combatants indicated that they still want to receive appropriate education and training. 11.5) Access to Land Access to productive land in South African was one of the cornerstones of the liberation struggle, as black people had been forcibly removed from various areas under apartheid, and were prevented from owning land by law. However, despite South Africa’s transition to democracy, less than one percent of respondents have access to agricultural land. A number of respondents felt that because they had participated in the armed struggle, they should consequently be granted access to land, and certain respondents argue that there should be a redistribution of land: We fought for this land and we all need to benefit from the land. Whites are still in control of the land and benefit immensely from it. We also deserve something too. It is our land.219 I don’t have a place. I stay in a shack. This takes my dignity away. I fought for freedom and the land. These are basic needs and they should see to it that they are there.220 I want to do farming and I need land to do that. We build Mazimbu in Tanzania out of nothing. Why can’t we do the same in our own country.221

11.6) Preferential Treatment 87% of interviewed ex-combatants strongly feel that the government must establish special job creation programmes targeted particularly at them. This, they say would serve as a form of compensation for their sacrifice they made during the liberation struggle, as well as acknowledge their contribution to secure democracy in South Africa. The relevant comments are as follows: Ex-combatants never had a chance for education and jobs. It is true that other people are suffering as well, but ex-combatants should receive a special treatment because of time spent in service of the country.222

11.7) Limited Needs and Expectations A small proportion of those interviewed said that they are satisfied with the conditions under which they were living, and subsequently had no needs and expectations: Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.13 FS, 31 December 2002. Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.05 WC, 20 October 2002. 221 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.28 KZN, 26 February 2002. 222 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.144 LP, 31 January 2002. 219 220

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I did not have any expectations, I knew the going would be tough.223 I was not expecting anything. I knew I had to fend for myself. I had a degree.224

11.8) Perceptions of the Government’s Service Delivery More than 60% of respondents felt that the government is not doing enough to address their problems. This is particularly in the light of the impoverished conditions under which most respondents are currently living. However, 35% felt that the government was doing a relatively effective job given the major constraints it was facing. 11.9) Addressing Needs and Expectations of Ex-Combatants Suggestions were offered by ex-combatants as to how their needs and expectations can be addressed. A summary of various suggestions is provided below. • • • • • • • •

Government assistance with respect to job creation and the provision of employment opportunities, such as labour intensive projects. The suggestions are provided in Table 11.1 below. Financial and material support from government for training and small business development. Provision of education and skills training. Transformation of the economic system. Provision of job opportunities in SANDF, SAPS, Correctional Services and other government departments. Prioritise ex-combatants with respect to land redistribution. Provision of adequate housing. More effective and efficient service delivery.

Table 11.1: Suggested Special Employment Programmes by Ex-combatants Special Programmes for Excombatants Construction Programmes

Nature of Projects • • •

Security Programmes

• • •

223 224

Provide construction services to government and the community Provide housing maintenance services to government and the community Provide infrastructure construction services to government and private companies Provide security services to government and civilian buildings Provide security services to government personnel and civilians Provide security services to private companies

Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.137 MP, 23 April 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.01 FS, 06 November 2001).

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Cleansing Programmes

• • •

Farming Programmes

• •

Provide cleaning services in government departments and in the community Provide cleansing service to private companies Provide environmental maintenance service to government and private companies Engage in crop farming activities Engage in animal farming activities

International experience has shown that a potential connection can exist between unemployed demobilised soldiers and crime. Faced with unemployment, homelessness, unmarketable skills and poverty, ex-combatants could easily resort to misusing their military skills to engage in crime, banditry and political violence. This link is taken seriously by ex-MK and APLA combatants. Many indicated that by creating special employment programmes for them, the government would not only be addressing their needs and expectation, but would also be addressing a potential security problem they may pose. In this way employment will be created for us. This can also reduce the possibility of guerrillas been involved in crime. You cannot teach a young person to use a gun and then fail to provide him with a job. Remember I have military skills that I can use.225 Because the rate of crime is high already and trained ex-combatants create big problems for the country. Job creation projects will prevent soldiers from getting involved in crime.226 We need jobs at this point in time to avoid using our military skills for criminal purposes. Some of us are still armed. Others can obtain guns easily.227

Although ex-combatants stress the need for the government to address the land question, they are cautious as to how land redistribution should be approached. Conscious of the difficulties associated with farming, many said that land should be given to those who want it and could put it into good use. It should not be a free-for-all. Added to this, people should be supported and assisted if they are interested in farming as this is not an easy task. 11.10) Addressing Social Needs and Expectations: Who should be Responsible? A critical factor regarding the needs and expectations of ex-combatants is that who should be responsible for addressing them? Given their economic and social conditions, the majority of our interviewees feel that the government is in a good position to address most, if not all of their needs and expectations. Only the government should be responsible because we sacrificed our lives to put it into power.228 The government should address our needs because those people in government are there because of the blood of South African children.229

Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.11 FS, 30 December 2001. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.10 EC, 29 January 2002. 227 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.04 KZN, 25 February 2002. 228 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.146 NW, 04 June 2002. 229 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.84 GP, 04 January 2002. 225 226

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Others feel that non-governmental organisations, churches, political parties, veterans associations, the business community, the international community and the community at large can play a meaningful role in assisting them in addressing their needs and expectations. NGOs because they work with the people on the ground.230 Black economic empowerment Commission, Non-governmental organisations. If all groups and resources are put together to deal with the problem, solutions will be found.231 The leadership of liberation movements. They are interested in themselves and have forgotten about us. You only see them during the elections. That’s the only time they know that we exist.232 The government and MKMVA because they understand our problems better.233

On the other hand, other ex-combatants said that they too have a responsibility. They stress that they should not burden the government with their needs. Instead, they should make the task of the government easier by also helping the government in addressing their needs and expectations. Of course we should not expect the government to do everything for us. We should also take responsibility of our lives. Organise societies or projects to create jobs for ourselves. We should think for ourselves.234 Only ourselves can help ourselves. Those of us who were working used to contribute R20 every month for those who were not working and had difficulties.235

Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.18 NC, 22 February 2002. Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.18 EC, 30 January 2002. 232 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No.01 WC, 07 October 2001. 233 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.115 GP, 16 January 2001. 234 Interview with ex-APLA combatant, No. 17 WC, 19 December 2001. 235 Interview with ex-MK combatant, No.41 FS, 12 February 2002. 230 231

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Section 12: An Assessment of the Reintegration of ExCombatants into Civilian Life This section provides an assessment of the extent to which MK and APLA excombatants have been integrated into society from an economic, social and political perspective. 12.1) Economic Integration In the section on definitions and key terms, economic integration is defined as that process through which retired or demobilised soldiers secure a livelihood for themselves and their dependants through production or gainful employment. Research conducted for this report reveals that approximately 80% of ex-combatants that were interviewed are younger than 50, with 60% being 40 years of age or younger. Hence, most of the respondents are still economically active. However, 66% of respondents are unemployed, which is more than double the official unemployment rate of 29% for South Africa. Of these unemployed ex-combatants, close to two-thirds have been looking for employment for four years or more. Many survive by depending on family members to provide them with money, food and shelter, or engage in ad hoc informal sector activities such as hawking. 40% of respondents indicated that they believed that they are discriminated against in the job market. Just over 12% are employed in the formal sector or run their own businesses, while less than 10% depend on a Special Pension as a livelihood. Consequently, it appears as though the economic integration of the majority of respondents has been unsuccessful. Taking this into account, for several years there has been speculation in the media that numerous ex-combatants have been involved in criminal activities. This speculation has been influenced by the involvement of ex-combatants in high profile crimes. Two examples are as follows. First, Colin Chauke, a former MK combatant and member of a syndicate that engaged in cash-in-transit robberies, who eluded police for years and escaped from custody, received substantial media attention. Second, as a result of a dispute over transport routes and transport prices between the Golden Arrow bus company and the taxi associations in the Western Cape (2000), an ex-MK combatant was hired by taxi owners to shoot at Golden Arrow busses, and was paid between R50 and R350 for each attack. The arrest and trial of this ex-combatant received considerable exposure in the print and television media. There has also been speculation in the media that former APLA members have been involved in violent attacks on white farmers. However, no substantial evidence has been presented to verify this speculation. Despite this high unemployment rate, less than 1% of respondents indicated that they were involved in criminal activities. This is not an accurate reflection as it unlikely that individuals would share that information with researchers. In addition, asking questions about criminal activities can be potentially hazardous for the researcher in question.236 A

For example, following the arrest of an ex-combatant for armed robbery, who had previously been interviewed by a member of the research team, one of this ex-combatants colleagues telephoned the 236

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few ex-combatants indicated that they were aware of some ex-combatants who made a living out of crime. For example, in Limpopo Province, one former MK soldier stated that he knew of at least six ex-MK soldiers involved in criminal activities, including cashin-transit heists. Another former MK soldier from Mahwelereng, near Mokopane suggested that he knew of at least one former MK combatant who was engaged in armed robbery on a regular basis. However, it is highly unlikely that a substantial number of excombatants are engaged in criminal activities. 12.2) Social Reintegration As indicated in the section on definitions and key terms, social integration is the process through which former soldiers and their dependants consider themselves to be part of, and are accepted by the communities in which they live and society at large. Close to 70% indicated that their families were supportive of them, while 10% stated that they had negative relationships with their families, some of which had been completely rejected by their families. However, more than a third (38.7%) reported that they suffer from psychological problems, which contribute to stress and conflict in the family. A handful of ex-combatants have also lost their hearing, sight and limbs in the course of the liberation struggle. 75% of respondents suggested that the way the community had treated them prior to them joining the armed struggle compared to how they are currently viewed has not changed. Close to 10% said that they are mocked and victimised by members of their communities. Hence on the surface level, it appears as though many ex-combatants have been relatively successful in reintegrating into their communities. However, most ex-combatants live in impoverished communities where unemployment is relatively high, and tend to interact predominantly with other former combatants on a regular basis. This raises some questions about the depth of their social reintegration. 12.3) Political Reintegration To reiterate, political integration is the process through which retired or demobilised soldiers participate in the political life of their communities. Most ex-combatants (80%) appear to be engaged in politically oriented activities in their communities, with many playing an active role. Hence, it would appear at a superficial level, that the ex-combatants have been relatively successful in terms of integrating into civilian life. However, a more critical analysis of the interview data indicates that the political reintegration of ex-combatants may not be that comprehensive. There are two relevant factors. First, most respondents were primarily involved in ANC/PAC and/or veterans organisations. It appears as though the manner in which they interact with these entities is similar to how they interacted during the liberation struggle. Some are suspicious of outsiders who want to undertake investigations into the affairs of ex-combatants. For example, during the research process, some MK ex-combatants were not prepared to be researcher who facilitated the interview and was verbally abusive and accused the researcher of being a police informer.

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interviewed without consulting with ANC/MK structures first. In addition, many MK members were obsessed with secrecy, and at times were reluctant to give away information because they were concerned that this information may be used to discredit the ANC leadership. There was also a fear that ANC intelligence agents may be able to identify the source of the information and thus the individual would be marginalised within ANC structures.237 Many respondents are dissatisfied with the ANC leadership’s lack of interest in their plight, but they appear to be emasculated as they have been unable to lobby the ANC to provide them with poverty relief and employment. Some have even had to resort to public protests to air their grievances. Some MK ex-combatants (who still regard themselves as soldiers), however, remain loyal to the ANC and state they are prepared to take up arms to defend South Africa’s democracy and the ANC should it come under attack from “counter-revolutionary forces”. Second, for many ex-combatants, it is apparent that their military career appears to have created a culture of dependency. It is particularly relevant for those ex-combatants who were in exile as most of their needs were catered for, and the course that their lives took was largely dependent on commanding officers and/or political leaders. There are two indications of this dynamic. First, a number of respondents lack self-motivation to actively seek employment and improve their standard of living. They tend to wait for others to assist them rather than taking the initiative themselves. Second, many excombatants feel strongly that the government must provide them with employment, housing and financial support. Hence, in conclusion, it appears that, despite some positive developments, excombatants have predominantly been unsuccessful in reintegrating into civilian life. This reinforces the primary research that has been undertaken by Cock (1993), Liebenberg and Roefs (2001) and Gear (2002) (see the Introduction).

In certain provinces there was a rumour circulating that Office of the President of the ANC has commissioned researchers to interview ex-MK soldiers to investigate their loyalty to the ANC, and as a result certain ex-combatants refused to be interviewed. 237

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Section 13: Recommendations Attempts to successfully reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life lies in addressing both their short- and long-term needs by designing and implementing insightful and comprehensive reintegration programmes that focus on assisting ex-combatants to become productive members of society. However, for any reintegration programme to be successful, there needs to be strong political will on the part of government; extensive consultation with ex-combatants and effected communities; and the provision of the necessary funds and technical expertise. This section provides a series of recommendations that if implemented, could improve the lives of many ex-MK and APLA combatants who are faced with social, economic and health problems. Reintegration is seen as an element of development, and hence reintegration programmes should be incorporated into already existing national development strategies in order to facilitate sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. However, in the short run, carefully planned special reintegration programmes targeted at ex-combatants need to be developed. The main reason for this is that many of the problems encountered by ex-combatants are unique and acute. Following many years in exile, and to a limited extent in South Africa, many ex-combatants became dependent on their liberation movements for survival, not only in terms of protection, but also with respect to food, shelter and clothing. This led to a culture of dependency among some ex-combatants, which still exists among many ex-combatants today. The dilemma to design or not to design targeted reintegration programmes for excombatants in the face of widespread poverty is not unique to South Africa. Similar decisions had to be made in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Angola and Chad. Often the decision to target ex-combatants depends on the following: (1) whether they are a special group; (2) whether they return to productive non-military life and not pose a security threat to the country; and (3) whether such targeted programmes help them successfully reintegrate into civilian life. The World Bank discovered that in Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe, ex-combatants lacked basic education, marketable skills and in some instances social skills essential for successful economic and social reintegration.238 As the study shows, ex-combatants in South Africa are also faced with the same difficulties.

13.1) Recommendations for Economic Reintegration The central focus of economic reintegration programmes should be to improve the security of ex-combatants. An enabling environment for them to generate a livelihood should be created and supported. Human development programmes, such as career counselling, vocational training, credit provision, employment creation, and access to land should be designed and implemented for this purpose (Nübler, 1997). These measures should form part of the bigger picture to develop the economy of the country through investments, trade resumption, and promotion of economic stability.

238

World Bank, 1995: xi.

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13.1.1)Vocational Training • The Service Corps (SC) should be managed by a civilian body. This would allow for more efficient, effective and accountable provision of vocational training to excombatants. Alternatively, the Department of Labour (DoL) should be charged with the responsibility of providing vocational training to ex-combatants given their expertise in this regard. • The DoL, in conjunction with the DoD, veterans associations, trade unions, NGOs and CBOs should develop a Veterans Education and Training Scheme (VETS) under the framework of the Skills Development Act of 1998, in order to provide vocational training to ex-MK and APLA combatants. Given that many excombatants are unemployed, training should be provided free of charge. They should also be provided with a monthly subsistence. Funds from the National Skills Fund (NSF) and the Job Creation Trust (JCT) should be utilised for this purpose. NGOs, CBOs and the private sector should be approached to provide assistance in this regard. • Training under the VETS should be attuned to the local context and be based on a thorough labour market analysis. This will avoid a mismatch between skills required and vocational training output, as it is currently the case with the SC.239 • Under the VETS, an internship programme should be developed to provide excombatants with practical work experience. The internship programme should be designed in such a way that it serves as a means of securing employment for excombatants following the completion of their training. The DoL should approach various sectors in the economy for them to place ex-combatants into internship programmes and possibly employing them thereafter.240 • Following completion of their vocational training and internship, ex-combatants should be provided with qualifications that are accredited by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). This would increase their chances of finding employment or creating their own employment opportunities. • For VETS to be successful there needs to effective collaboration between the DoD, DoL, NGOs, CBOs, trade unions and veterans associations. • Another source of potential empowerment is the Youth Foundation Training Programme (YFTP) established by the SANDF in March 2001. The YFTP, which is managed by Denel, is aimed at imparting disadvantaged youth with academic and leadership skills. They are taught skills and personal development and adaptation to the working world.241

According to DoL, between 1994 and 1999, the number of apprenticeship contracts dropped from 22 015 to 18 868. Within the same period, there was a skills shortage of between 350 000 and 500 000 people in managerial and technical sector, and 25 000 people in the information technology sector (SA Institute of Race Relations, 2001:287-364). 240 The Otto Benecke Foundation initiated a similar programme in Namibia with the aim of balancing the need for reliance on market forces with proactive programmes (World Bank, 1993:XIV-XV). In Mozambique, two to three ex-combatants were placed in small companies for on-the-job training. This skills provision method proved successful in providing ex-combatants with practical work experience (Kimberly-Mahling, 1996:18). 241 Sowetan, 05 March 2002. 239

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13.1.2) Career Counselling Some ex-combatants are not sure as to the career path they want to follow. Others’ have career expectations that are well beyond their own capabilities. This is often the result of low levels of education and a lack of information. It is therefore critical that ex-MK and APLA combatants are provided with appropriate career counselling. The following is recommended: • •

Career counselling should not only be a means of providing directions, but also unearthing the hidden talents of ex-combatants. It should include self-assessment workshops. Career counselling should also be a prerequisite to any form of vocational skills training for ex-combatants under the VETS or any education provision scheme that is offered.242

The Skills Development Act of 1998 makes provision for the Employment Service Directorate (ESD) under the supervision of the DoL, which acts as an intermediary between job seekers and employers. Besides assisting job seekers, the ESD provides career counselling and screening.243 Therefore, the ESD is in a good position to provide career counselling to ex-combatants. It is imperative that the DoD, the DoL, veterans associations, trade unions, NGOs and CBOs make ex-combatants aware of the service offered by the EDS. 13.1.3) Employment Placement • •

The DoD and ex-combatants should use the services of the ESD to assist them with securing employment. The ESD should maintain a database containing profiles of ex-combatants to market them to different potential employers.244 The Employment Equity Act (1998) prohibits any form of discrimination, including discrimination on political grounds. Should an ex-combatant feel discriminated on any grounds, they should report such incident to the DoD, DoL, trade unions, NGOs, CBOs or veterans associations, which in turn should pursue the matter and ensure that appropriate action is taken.

13.1.4) Labour-Intensive Employment Often countries emerging from conflict adopt labour-intensive public works programmes to create employment and reconstruct the country. These programmes form the basis of reintegration. Furthermore, they incorporate aspects of social and economic development.245 In 1994, South Africa adopted the RDP with similar intentions. Key programmes of the RDP are as follows: (1) meeting the basic needs of the people; (2) Career counselling, which was one of the responsibilities of the Information and Referral Service (IRS) in Mozambique proved helpful for many ex-combatants. In its two years of operation, about one-third of the over 90 000 ex-combatants received assistance from the IRS in the form of referrals, information and career counselling (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 1998). 243 Government Communication and Information System, 2000: 263-265. 244 When there was antipathy to employ ex-combatants in the private sector in Namibia, the Employment Contracts Manager (ECM), a small placement unit was established under the Development Brigade Corporation to facilitate employment of ex-combatants after receiving vocational training. The ECM worked in close collaboration with the Ministry of Labour and the private sector, and proved successful in helping some ex-combatants find employment (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer,1996:160-161). 245 International Labour Organisation, 1995:25-26. 242

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development of human resources; (3) building the economy; (4) democratising the state and society; (5) and implementing reconstruction and development.246 In keeping with RDP policy programmes, jobs were created through construction of houses and infrastructure. Some ex-MK and APLA combatants were employed in these programmes and found them rewarding. Bearing this mind, the following is recommended: • • • •

Following completion of their vocational training, ex-combatants could be placed in various labour-intensive public works programmes and RDP projects through the ESD in the DoL, as part of an employment placement strategy; Through the VETS, they could also serve their internship in these labour-intensive programmes, which should be a stepping stone to future employment. Some ex-combatants could be employed on either a part-time or full-time basis to administer maintenance services for labour-intensive public works programmes or RDP projects.247 The government could also introduce a policy that obliges companies that are awarded government contracts to employ a certain number of ex-combatants. In addition, it can introduce incentive schemes for the private sector to employ excombatants through subsidies and tax-reductions.

13.1.5) Public Sector Employment The public sector is a major employer in South Africa. Here, the government has direct influence in terms of employment. Therefore, policies that favour the employment of excombatants could be introduced. This is especially the case with SAPS, Intelligence Services and Metro Police Services and Correctional Services. In addition, there is a shortage of manpower in the SAPS and Correctional Services. In 1999, there was one policeman for every 408 people in South Africa and the number of police officials dropped by 5% - from 109 104 to 104 200 - between January 1999 and January 2000. Although the number of personnel in Correctional Services increased by 6% between 1998 and 1999, the number of prisoners increased by 11%.248 Such a project is not unprecedented, in March 2002, the Minister of Defence announced that 7 700 SANDF members would be transferred to the SAPS to help fight crime and free up resources from the armed forces. 13.1.6) Self-Employment The government has adopted a vigorous National Strategy for Small Business (NSSB) with the aim of encouraging and supporting self-employment initiatives among South Africans. To this effect, institutions such as Ntsika Enterprise, Khula Enterprise and

African National Congress, 1994:7-12. The ILO developed and implemented labour-intensive programmes in Mozambique where many excombatants were employed to construct roads and infrastructure. A reconstruction programme was also developed in which ex-combatants were offered employment in helping rebuild roads, sewers, health centres, de-mine roadways, and construct channels and wells (International Labour Organisation, 1995:26). 248 SA Institute of Race Relations, 2001:108-127. 246 247

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National Empowerment Fund (NEF) have been established to encourage and support small business initiatives.249 Despite the availability of these institutions, many ex-combatants find it hard to access them. They complain that when they approach some of these institutions they are often asked for collateral. Given their socio-economic conditions, many fail to secure collateral. Hence the following recommendations are made: • • •

•

Ntsika Enterprise and DoL should be utilised to provide entrepreneurial skills to those ex-combatants involved in small business initiatives and those who want to start their own businesses; An Empowerment Micro Lending Scheme (EMLS) should be developed under the NEF to provide small amounts of credit to those ex-MK and APLA combatants who are interested in starting their own businesses. Loan provisions should be accompanied by a process of mentorship to jumpstart businesses and ensure that they become successful. Ex-combatants should submit business proposals and loans should be granted based on the viability of such proposals.250 As another form of facilitating self-employment initiatives, ex-combatants should be provided with equipment and tools to start their own businesses. This is particularly the case for professions such as motor mechanics, carpentry, bricklaying, tailoring and welding.

13.1.7) Employment in Rural Areas Most people in the rural areas rely on subsistence farming, pensions and remittances from their family members who work in urban areas. Those ex-combatants in rural areas indicated a strong need for employment opportunities to be created in their areas. Apart from providing access to land and helping them with farming, other non-agricultural related employment opportunities should be created. • •

•

They should be assisted and encouraged to start handicraft, artistic and artisan projects. Another source of income in rural areas could be the creation of co-operatives. Excombatants can be encouraged to establish co-operatives, which should serve as a means of improving their socio-economic conditions and cultivating the spirit of initiative through employment creation opportunities. Ex-combatants should be encouraged to become involved in the tourism industry as tour guides and running bed and breakfast businesses. This should be done under the rubric of the NSSB. The EMLS and Ntsika Enterprise could assist ex-combatants with expertise and funds.

Government Communication and Information System, 2000: 256-259. Various credit schemes were established to grant and facilitate access to loans to ex-combatants in Eritrea. Those who applied for loans were offered technical support and advises to ensure that their businesses become successful (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000:107). 249 250

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13.1.8) Agriculture and Access to Land South African agricultural policies have generally been directed towards helping largescale landowners. However, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) is making efforts to empower small-scale farmers.251 Many ex-combatants expressed a strong desire to own land. They see the land as part of their heritage. However, the most prominent need for land is for farming in order to establish a sense of livelihood. To help drive this process, the DoD in partnership with the DoLA should create a Land Need Distribution (LAND) programme with the following objectives: • • •

To assign farming land to those ex-combatants interested in farming.252 To assist and train relevant ex-combatants in farming skills. To provide government land for farming purposes where possible.

Prior to assigning land for farming, the DoLA and DoA should encourage excombatants to form partnerships under the LAND programme. Following this, they should submit farming proposals to the DoA stating clearly what they want to do and how they anticipate implementing their proposals. This they should do with the help and close guidance of the DoA. If satisfied with the proposal and commitment, ex-combatants should be provided with the opportunity to enrol in an intensive-farming course. Such a course should be divided into two components, for those ex-MK and APLA combatants interested in crop farming and those interested in livestock farming. Subjects to be taught could include the following: • • • • • •

Ploughing and harvesting; Equipment care and maintenance; Farm management; Animal husbandry; Pest control; and Products marketing.

After completing the course, ex-combatants should be issued with certificates registered with SAQA. In the final stage of the LAND programme ex-combatants should be assigned land with the help of the DoLA. Ex-combatants should then be assisted with equipment, seeds and credit.253 A possible source of credit is the Land Bank, which has introduced the Step Up Scheme to encourage small scale-farming.

Government Communication and Information System, 2000:127. Agricultural settlements were established in Eritrea where ex-combatants and returnees were allocated settlement lands to secure their livelihoods and raise agricultural production (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000:108). 253 Ex-combatants in rural areas in Ethiopia were provided with basic agricultural tools and implements, seeds and fertilizers as a means of assisting them to start a livelihood (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996:56). 251 252

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Perhaps the most important area is the marketing of agricultural products. The National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC) could assist ex-combatants in marketing their agricultural products and integrating them into the mainstream agricultural systems.254

13.2) Social Reintegration Programmes Social reintegration programmes aimed at ex-combatants should be about building a socially just environment for them. Such programmes should address the housing, education and family needs of ex-combatants. Their families and communities should be sensitised to their needs, conditions and experiences. Ex-combatants should also be able to identify with other members of the community and actively participate in community activities. 13.2.1) Housing Provision One of the expectations of ex-combatants when reintegrated into civilian life was that they would be provided with housing. Few respondents in this study own property. The DoH has instituted several subsidy schemes to address the housing backlog in South Africa. Unfortunately, to qualify for subsidy, one should be working to cover the other costs not covered by the DoH. Naturally, this puts many ex-combatants at a disadvantage, as many are unemployed. Yet, there are those housing schemes that focus on people who are unemployed and poor. These include the People’s Housing Process (PHP) and the Special Presidential Projects for Urban Renewal (SPPUR). Whilst PHP is aimed at assisting people with material and skills to build their own houses, the latter is about promoting RDP through housing provision, upgrading of hostels and social infrastructure.255 Ex-combatants should take advantage of the support offered under PHP and SPPUR housing schemes. Government should not be solely responsible to provide for excombatants’ needs. Ex-combatants should also take the initiative to construct their own houses. Consequently, it is recommended that: • •

Ex-combatants should form Masisizane - lets help each other – groups. Here, they can take turns to build houses for each other with the support from PHP and SPPUR housing schemes. To build community relations and facilitate their own social reintegration, Masisizane groups should also include other members of the community who want to be involved in such schemes.

Both MKMVA and APLAVA could oversee that this happens and encourage the formation of Masisizane groups. Apart from the DoH, ex-combatants should enlist the support and capabilities of NGOs and CBOs to assist them in erecting houses. At another level, the DoD, in consultation with veterans associations and the DoH, could develop a housing blueprint which targets ex-combatants, which should seek to:

254 255

Government Communication and Information System. 2000:136-140. Government Communication and Information System. 2000:470-471.

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• •

Prioritise and fast track ex-combatants for housing allocation and construction under the RDP based on strict criteria that takes into account their socio-economic condition. Provide a stipulated number of ex-combatants each year with RDP houses.

13.2.2) Education Provisions As this report has shown, more than half the respondents did not have a matric certificate, and another 25% only have a matric certificate. Provision of education to ex-combatants and their families in Uganda formed part of the social reintegration process under the Uganda Veterans Assistance Programme (UVAP). Those who wanted to continue with their formal education and vocational training were provided with funding.256 MKMVA has a bursary scheme for its members and their dependants. Nonetheless, many ex-MK combatants say they have not benefited from this scheme. Common problems cited in this respect are the lack of funds and allegations of favouritism and misappropriation of funds. Therefore, to provide education opportunities to ex-combatants and their family members, a Veterans Bursary Scheme (VBS) should be established by the DoD in partnership with the Department of Education (DoE) and veterans associations. This could be achieved by implementing the following: •

• • •

The VBS should be administered by an independent body established under the auspices of the DoE. Efforts should be made to ensure that all ex-combatants and their family members have equal access to the VBS. Information should be widely disseminated. Criteria for selecting applicants for the VBS should be based on academic potential and socio-economic needs. To assess these, applicants should be taken through a vigorous vetting system. Administrators of the VBS, NGOs, CBOs and veterans associations should approach tertiary institutions to accommodate those ex-combatants who do not meet entry requirements to see if special arrangement could be made be to accommodate them. In turn, tertiary institutions could devise an Orientation Programme for Education Need (OPEN) which targets ex-combatants. The main purpose of OPEN could be to ascertain the academic potential of ex-combatants and placement in various fields of interests to them.257

Some ex-combatants are keen to receive basic literacy education. In 1999, the DoE launched an education campaign, Tirisano – working together. One of the priorities of

Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996:230-262. For example, the University of the Western Cape (UWC) has initiated a similar OPEN programme. Realising the limited education opportunities that many ex-combatants had, UWC agreed to provide a number of ex-combatants with a tertiary education. A programme was designed to assess their academic potential, following a request by Khumbula, however, the project is constrained by a lack of funding. ML Sultan Technikon also offers somewhat a similar programme to members of the community with limited education. The programme is also open to ex-combatants. Courses that are offered include: financial management, bookkeeping, rural development management, office administration, animal husbandry and business skills. In most instances, these courses lasts for a period of six months with a possible extension of a year to three years leading to the awarding of a national diploma. 256 257

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Tirisano is to eliminate illiteracy among adults and youth.258 To this effect, the Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) programme has been introduced. Ex-combatants could use ABET to improve their education level. Added to this, they could approach their local high schools for either evening or day classes. This they can do themselves or with the help of their respective veterans associations, NGOs or CBOs. 13.2.3) Provision for Dependants One of the shortcomings in the South African reintegration process was a lack of provision for ex-combatants’ dependants. As many ex-combatants are unemployed, they struggle to support their dependants. Such assistance be provided in the following ways: • • • • •

Bursary scheme Medical care Credit to start small businesses Skills training Repatriation assistance.

In countries such as Uganda and Zimbabwe, dependants of ex-combatants were provided with food, school fees and credit for small-scale farming initiatives (World Bank, 1993:XI). 13.2.4) Family Members and the Community In order for integration to be successful, ex-combatants require a supportive family and community environment. Educational campaigns can be used to sensitise families to the needs and problems of ex-combatants. Veterans associations with the support of the Office for Military Veterans’ Affairs (OMVA) in the DoD should initiate a Community Sensitisation Programme (CSP). The chief aim of the CSP could be public education, which can be achieved in three ways: • •

•

Through media campaigns. Community and national radio stations could be approached to host programmes on the lives and experiences of ex-combatants. Newspapers and public television stations could be utilised for this purpose.259 Through public education campaigns. MKMVA, APLAVA and individual or groups of ex-combatants could host public forums where they invite youth organisations, the community and church leaders to discuss the issue of ex-combatants. Public holidays such as Freedom Day, Youth Day, Reconciliation Day, National Women’s Day and Human Rights Day could be used for this purpose; and Through the writing of history of the liberation struggle. This history could be recognised by the DoE and be included in school history books. Documentaries and oral history should be used to sensitise communities about the contribution of excombatants to the liberation struggle. Monuments should also be erected in their honour.

Government Communication and Information System. 2000: 429. Following reintegration in Uganda, the Ugandan Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) engaged in a massive education campaigns to sensitise the community about the needs of ex-combatants. The UVAB campaign included the hosting of seminars and a radio programme about the lives and needs of excombatants (Kazoora, 1997:9). 258 259

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13.2.5) Women Ex-combatants There was significant focus during and after demobilisation on male ex-combatants. The needs of women ex-combatants were generally ignored. The role of women excombatants in the liberation struggle should be highlighted and acknowledged. In South Africa, structures have been created to promote and support gender equality. These include: Office of the Status of Women (OSW), and Commission on Gender Equality (CGE). The CGE is responsible for transforming society by exposing all kinds of gender discrimination through public forums. This presents a number of opportunities to women ex-combatants to educate society about their roles in the armed struggle and the lessons society can learn from these experiences.

13.3) Healthcare Reintegration Programmes A significant number of respondents suffer from psychological trauma, as well as physical disabilities, as a result of being in the armed struggle. A series of recommendations are provided below to met the healthcare needs of these excombatants. 13.3.1) Medical Care Medical care provision is an essential element in ensuring successful reintegration. For this purpose, the DoD should initiate a Military Veterans Medical Programme (MVMP) with these objectives: • • •

To provide free and accessible healthcare to impoverished ex-MK and APLA combatants in all nine provinces of South Africa.260 To identify and classify the health conditions and needs of ex-combatants and recommend specialised treatment; To source and provide information to ex-combatants about NGOs, CBOs as well as government departments that could be able to assist them with their health problems.

Under MVMP, the DoD should initiative a military veterans medical aid scheme. The scheme should enable ex-combatants to have access to medical care in military and public healthcare institutions. Criteria for those to be considered for medical aid should be strict and be based on the following: • Severe physical and psychological health conditions. • Social and economic needs and circumstances. The MVMP should consist of two approaches with respect to addressing the healthcare needs of ex-combatants.

In Uganda, disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants were provided with medical treatment which included transport costs, daily subsistence expenses and medical expenses (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996:255). 260

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• •

The first should focus on addressing their physical disabilities. Attention should focus on the provision of artificial limbs, guide dogs, hearing devices, eye glasses and wheelchairs. Medication should also be provided if necessary. The second segment should deal with psychological issues, where counselling, trauma debriefing and psychotherapy is provided.

The MVMP should draw expertise from medical professionals, government departments such as health and social welfare, NGOs and CBOs. 13.3.2) The SANDF Military Health Service The South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) is well placed to ensure that some of the objectives of the MVMP are achieved. The SAMHS has a number of wellequipped military hospitals and quality medical expertise. The SAMHS offers medical, psychological and social services to members of the DoD as well as their dependants. In preparation for the rationalisation process, the DoD established a number of structures to facilitate this process more effectively. There is a Transitional Support Centre (TSC), which consists of psychologists, social workers, nurses and chaplains to provide psycho-social services to DoD members to be rationalised. There are also regionally located Base Advice Centres (BACs), which assist DoD members with securing employment, as well as counselling, stress management and social adjustment.261 Where possible, ex-combatants should also be allowed to make use of the services of SAMHS, especially the TSC and BACs. 13.3.3) Department of Health It is unlikely that the MVMP could function without the support of the Department of Health (DoH). The DoH has a variety of expertise and access to resources. More so, the DoH has developed a comprehensive health care plan grounded in the RDP, with the main objective of providing healthcare to all South Africans in rural and urban areas.262 Hence, there is a need for a strong partnership between the DoD and DoH to be developed. The DoD should seek support and co-operate with the DoH in providing healthcare to ex-combatants as part of the MVMP. This will provide a platform for a more informed and inclusive response to their health problems and needs. The DoH has made a commitment to provide healthcare as a fundamental right to South Africans. A strong emphasis is placed on the provision of primary healthcare in clinics, community healthcare centres and municipalities. Relevant services to ex-combatants rendered by the DoH to communities include: • • • • • 261 262

Counselling services; Health education; Provision of basic drugs; Screening for common diseases; Community nursing and home care; DOD Bulletin, 24 March 2000. Government Communication and Information System, 2000:411-412.

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• • • •

Family planning; Oral health care; Basic optometry; and Mental healthcare.

Ex-combatants who need healthcare can benefit from these services. Where the primary healthcare centres cannot provide help, patients can be referred to other healthcare facilities. 13.3.4) Non-Governmental Organisations NGOs have already provided valuable support to ex-combatants with psychological difficulties. These organisations include: the Institute for the Healing of Memories (IHOM), Khulumani Support Group, the Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the KwaZulu-Natal Programme for Survivors of Violence. Their approach to psychological healing varies, but generally includes: • • • • • • •

Counselling Trauma debriefing Stress management Rehabilitation Psychotherapy Psychoanalysis Psycho-education.

In consultation with these NGOs, the appropriate services and support methods could be included in the MVMP. 13.3.5) HIV/AIDS and Reintegration Of late, the issue of incorporating HIV/AIDS policies into reintegration programmes has received significant attention. The reason for this is that soldiers are prone to this disease, as they are highly mobile and belong to a sexually active group. Donors such as the World Bank, Swiss International Development Agency (SIDA), United States Agency of International Development (USAID) and Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID) are introducing HIV/AIDS programmes linked to demobilisation. Assistance, which include counselling, screening, prevention and education to former fighters and soldiers.263 In South Africa, it is estimated that nearly 4 million people are infected with HIV/AIDS. These figures continue to rise daily with an estimated 1 500 infections taking place daily.264 As one way of combating the disease and encouraging prevention, ex-combatants could join their communities to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. The following could be done: 263 264

Forman and Carballo, 2001:74-85. Government Communication and Information System, 2000:455.

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• • • •

Training workshops could be conducted for ex-combatants to give them with skills to educate their communities about the disease.265 They could be trained as HIV/AIDS counsellors. Those ex-combatants infected with HIV/AIDS could be encouraged to talk about the disease and engage in awareness campaigns. They could also be encouraged to form support groups.

13.3.6) Healthcare and Employment Healthcare provision alone is not enough for successful reintegration. It should be accompanied by efforts to provide employment and skills to disabled ex-combatants so that they become self-sufficient. For this reason, the MVMP should be directly linked to efforts to create employment opportunities through training and job placement. Priority should be given to those with physical or mental disabilities. The White Paper on Integrated National Disability Strategy, recommends a number of ways in which the discrimination of people with disabilities can be reduced, and create equity in employment and training, which are as follows: • • • • •

Determining the potential pool of disabled workers. Introducing financial and tax incentives to organisations that meets targeted levels of employment to people with disabilities. Equitable provision of employment benefits. Introducing measures to protect people with disabilities. Introducing incentives to encourage the accommodation of workstations to facilitate the employment of people with disabilities.266

Under the supervision of the Department of Social Development (DoSD) and DoL, the government has established sheltered and protective workshop facilities where people with disabilities are employed with the aim of preparing them for employment in the open labour market. The President has also initiated the Thabo Mbeki Development Trust (TMDT) for Disabled People.267 There are also a host of organisations that provide support to people with disabilities such as: the Deaf Federation of South Africa (DEAFSA), South African National Council for the Blind (SANCB), National Council for the Physically Disabled (NCPD), Disabled People South Africa (DPSA) and the South African Federation for Mental Health (SAFMH) (Office of the Deputy President, 02 May 2002). At community levels, churches, women’s organisations and youth organisations also provide support to people with disabilities. The DoD, OMVA, veterans associations and individual ex-combatants should seek assistance, and form partnerships with, some of these organisations. For those ex-MK and APLA combatants with disabilities and who want to open their own self-help Given the seriousness of HIV/AIDS in Uganda, ex-combatants and other members of society were offered basic education on the disease, counselling and support (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996:239-242. 266 Office of the Deputy President, 02 May 2002. 267 Government Communication and Information System. 2000:455. 265

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projects, they should be encouraged and be directed to relevant organisations and government departments for assistance as part of the MVMP. Funding should be requested from the TMDT and other sources.268

13.4) Government Policies Targeted at Ex-combatants Government has two mechanisms that specifically target ex-MK and APLA combatants, namely Special Pensions and the Office for Military Veterans Affairs. However, these two mechanisms could be more effectively implemented. 13.4.1) Special Pensions The Special Pension Act No. 69 of 1996 provides for Special Pensions for MK and APLA military veterans, but in terms of Subsection A of Section 1 of the Act, only individuals who were “at least 35 years of age on the commencement date” are entitled to a Special Pension. Consequently, this Act discriminates against certain categories of MK/APLA veterans. In fact, many of the respondents were highly dissatisfied with the manner in which the Act was drafted; the criteria used for determining who qualifies and how much money they get; as well as the administration of the Special Pension. The recommendation in this regard is as follows: •

The Parliamentary Committee on Defence should convene a public hearing on the Act to determine if the Act should be amended.

13.4.2) Office for Military Veterans Affairs (OMVA) In some provinces, representatives of veterans associations are not aware of the existence of OMVA. Those who know about it say they do not know why it exists and how it could assist them. Others complain that the OMVA is not responsive to their needs and therefore not useful. To deal with some of these difficulties, efforts must be made by the OMVA to publicise itself and its activities to the ex-combatants. This can be achieved in the following manner: • • • •

OMVA could establish offices in all provinces. The OMVA could also undertake media campaigns to publicise itself. It should encourage and promote social and cultural exchange programmes with other veterans associations elsewhere. It could promote unity among different veterans associations by celebrating historical events relevant to ex-combatants.

Disabled ex-combatants in Ethiopia were provided with medical, financial, training and employment support. They were classified into three categories: less severely disabled; moderately impaired and severely disabled. The former were provided with medical and paramedical rehabilitation, as well as other reintegration programmes benefits. Moderately impaired ex-combatants were covered under the pension scheme following medical treatment and vocational training. Those who received vocational training were provided with material support to start their own employment initiatives. Severely impaired ex-combatants were given institutional care, vocational training and financial assistance to embark on sustainable income generating activities (Ayalew and Dercon, 2000:141). 268

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13.5) Policy Co-ordination and Implementation: Institutional Framework Currently, the DoD is well-placed to co-ordinate and implement the recommendations in this report. It is in possession of the personnel and resources. Most significantly, it was responsible for demobilisation and reintegration, and thus aware of the weaknesses and strengths of these processes. Its major task should be to drive the process and ensure effective implementation of the recommendations. The Defence Secretariat’s (DS) Policy and Planning Unit could be utilised to plan and monitor the progress of reintegration. As part of its Constitutional mandate, the DS is responsible for advising the Minister of Defence on policy matters and compliance thereof.269 This should be done in close collaboration with other relevant government departments, NGOs, CBOs, veterans associations and ex-combatants themselves. To increase capacity and ensure successful reintegration, the DoD should create small but effective units dedicated to ensuring the success of reintegration programmes, which are described in detail below. 13.5.1) Information Unit Communication between the DoD and ex-combatants about reintegration programmes and the needs and expectations of ex-combatants appear to be ineffective. A common complaint from ex-combatants is that they were often not informed by DoD about official decisions that would have a major impact on their lives. Often, they had to rely on friends or the media for information. Veterans associations also complained that information concerning their members is often not forthcoming from the DoD. To open communication channels, provide useful information to ex-combatants and develop more positive relationships with relevant stakeholders, the DoD should establish an Information Unit (IU) to perform the following tasks: • • • •

To ensure effective communication between the DoD, veterans associations and excombatants. To disseminate relevant information about programmes or activities. To act as referral point for ex-combatants on issues of employment, vocational training, healthcare etc. To work in partnership with other government departments, NGOs, CBOs, veterans associations and ex-combatants in order o enhance the success of reintegration programmes.270

13.5.2) Funding Unit Reintegration is a costly process. Experience suggests that most developing countries cannot finance the process via the national budget. Often these countries are poor, lack Department of Defence, 1998:52-53. In Mozambique, the establishment of the IRS proved helpful in maintaining communication between ex-combatants, the government and organisations involved in the demobilisation and reintegration in that country. Ex-combatants were assisted with information regarding possible employment, vocational training opportunities and material resources to come with their own employment initiatives (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 1998). 269 270

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the resources and capacity to effectively co-ordinate and implement reintegration programmes. In the case of South Africa, with pressing development priorities, funds for reintegration programmes are not readily available. However, as the Donor Survey Report indicates, there are some international donor organisations that have the capacity to support reintegration programmes. Consequently, it is recommended that the a Funding Unit (FU) be established in the Defence Secretariat with the following objectives: • • • • •

To seek funding for reintegration programmes. To co-ordinate funding for reintegration programmes. To prioritise funding for reintegration programmes. To disburse funding to various reintegration programmes. To provide accurate and timely financial and narrative reports to funders.

13.5.3) Monitoring Unit The DoD should establish a Monitoring Unit (MU) to monitor the performance of reintegration programmes. Regular assessment should be undertaken to ensure that these programmes address the stipulated aims and objectives. Assessment should be provided from both stakeholders and ex-combatants. To ascertain impact assessment and outcomes, the following indicators could be used:271 • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Projects created Timeframes Projects performance Ex-combatants employed Self-employed ex-combatants Education level Ex-combatants with shelter Funding provided Community participation Societal receptiveness Access to healthcare Family relations Self-image

In turn, the MU could establish Provincial Monitoring Units (MPUs) throughout the country to work with various stakeholders. The work of the MPUs would be to collate information on the performance of various projects, which could be fed into the national MU. Where appropriate, MPUs should be staffed with ex-combatants as they are familiar with local conditions and the needs of ex-combatants. This should also be seen as way of empowering ex-combatants.

271

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 1998.

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13.6) Programmes Co-ordination and Implementation: The Role of Other Actors Other actors should be involved in the co-ordination and implementation of reintegration programmes. Their role is significant in ensuring a speedy and successful process. Therefore, planning, co-ordination and implementation of reintegration programmes should be as inclusive as possible. The fundamental aim should be to create an environment of reintegration success. 13.6.1) The Role of NGOs and CBOs NGOs and CBOs have been in the forefront of facilitating reintegration programmes. Among many of these organisations are: IHOM, Student Service Centre (SSC), U Managing Conflict (UMAC), Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), Quaker Peace Centre, KwaZuluNatal Programme for Survivors of Violence, World University Service (WUS), Khulumani Support Centre, Khumbula, Shaft 17, CCR and Institute for Security Studies (ISS). It is crucial that the DoD takes full advantage of these support programmes and, where possible and appropriate, incorporate them into their overall reintegration strategy. NGOs and CBOs could even develop relationships with ex-combatant groups and veterans associations. NGOs/CBOs could even manage certain projects on behalf of the ex-combatant groups or veterans associations. 13.6.2) The Role of the Community Community acceptance of ex-combatants is an essential prerequisite for successful reintegration. Strengthening relations between the two facilitate reintegration. Overall, a mutual respect and strong co-existence among the two seems to exist. Certain members of the community acknowledge the role ex-combatants have played in the liberation struggle. On the other hand, ex-combatants identify with the sufferings of their community under the apartheid regime. However, some ex-combatants encounter hostility from their communities. This calls for the active community involvement in reintegration programmes. Different community forums such as youth organisations, women’s movements and churches could be mobilised for this purpose. Their contribution to reintegration efforts could include the following: • • • •

To establish community support forums which include ex-MK and APLA combatants in sports, recreational and others activities. To organise debates and invite ex-combatants to talk about their military experiences. To embark on community awareness campaigns to raise awareness about the plight of ex-combatants. To liase with NGOs and CBOs to provide support to ex-combatants.272

In Namibia, community members such as pastors, teachers, youths and business people collected money to assist ex-combatants who did not have families. They were also assisted with locating their family members, accommodation and transport (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996:192). 272

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13.6.3) The Role of Veterans Associations MKMVA and APLAVA are the two principal veterans associations representing the interests of ex-combatants. They seek to highlight the plight and champion the cause of ex-combatants as clearly reflected in their various constitutions. As a supplement to their objectives, both MKMVA and APLAVA should ensure the following: • • • • • • • •

That they highlight the plight of their members and strive to attain appropriate strategies to address their needs, and defend their interests. That they develop accurate membership databases; as well as implement effective communication strategies between their national offices and branch offices. That they form partnerships with various relevant stakeholders to source assistance for their members. That they actively participate in societal forums and embark on education campaigns to inform society about their history. That they develop projects to create employment opportunities for their members. That they commemorate historical events in their calendar of events. That they collaborate and encourage exchange programmes with other veterans associations in the region and internationally. Tender for government contracts as another form of creating employment opportunities for their members.

13.6.4) The Role of Political Parties Most ex-MK and APLA combatants viewed remain deeply loyal to their respective political parties, ANC and PAC. The majority of them play an active role in the activities of their parties. Their roles in the party include running election campaigns, recruiting new members, and organising meetings and conferences. Their dedication and service to both the ANC and PAC is voluntary. Given their loyalty and dedication (and at times sacrifices) to their political parties, the ANC and PAC should provide some form of material and symbolic support for excombatants. Recommendations are as follows: • • •

Public acknowledgement and campaigns about the role played by ex-combatants in the achievement of democracy in South Africa. Employment creation opportunities. Education provision for ex-combatants and their dependants.

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