view of norms as part of the mental structure representing moral values. Key words: ... We propose that schemas consist of features at two levels of abstraction in which information at a ..... away with it in the study of moral development. ... C. Modgil (Eds.), Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and controversy (pp. 485-546).
Morality and Norm Violation Niklas Fransson and Anders Biel Department of Psychology Göteborg University Fransson, N., & Biel, A. Morality and norm violation. Göteborg Psychological Reports, 1997, 27, No. 3 Undergraduate students were asked to judge each of 24 real-life events associated with eight different moral values. In a proposed model moral values were seen as mentally represented by schemas and a norm. The main purpose was to test the hypothesis that events that have been categorised as activating the same moral value violate the same norms. The results supported the hypothesis and it was concluded that the results are compatible with a view of norms as part of the mental structure representing moral values. Key words: Norms, mental representation, moral.
Most psychological research on moral has viewed values as an important factor guiding judgment and/or action (Feather, 1994; Haan, 1982; Haan, Aerts, & Cooper, 1985; Kohlberg, 1971; 1986). This is in line with two of the most widely recognised frameworks for studying values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990). Both conceive of values as enduring beliefs concerning modes of conduct and end states that are socially and personally desirable. Values are also viewed as a criterion that individuals use to evaluate people and events and to justify and select actions rather than as qualities inherent in objects. The frameworks by Rokeach and Schwartz have offered clarity and gone a long way toward identifying general values, and a psychological structure of human values (in particular Schwartz & Bilsky). Nevertheless, since their aim was to derive values that transcend specific objects or situations, the conceptual content proposed for these general values are not action specific (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Our aim is to provide a more detailed account of the conceptual content of potential moral values. In doing so we follow the approach put forth by Medin (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Medin proposed a theory-based approach to concepts in contrast to similarity-based approaches. Briefly, this approach holds that people’s theories about the world connect features of a concept, that is, make the features understandable and coherent. Medin also proposed that a concept is an idea (i.e., a mental structure), including all that is typically associated with it, and that a category is a grouping to which some assertion or set of assertions might apply. ______________________________________
The authors wish to thank Ulf Dahlstrand and Tommy Gärling for valuable comments.
No. 3:27, 2
In relation to these theoretical proposals a model was suggested (Biel, Fransson, & Dahlstrand, in press) where moral values are seen as concepts and information about these concepts is structured in schemas and norms. In line with Medin, it is assumed that a schema contains features of a concept. We also posit that such features are represented at more than one level of abstraction. Assume that all features were represented at a very concrete level. If this was the case, the number of schemas would be extremely large and the effectiveness of a schematic representation lost. On the other hand, if all features were represented at a very abstract level, schemas would be nondiscriminating between different moral values. We propose that schemas consist of features at two levels of abstraction in which information at a higher level is called elements and at a lower, more specific level attributes. Most schemas are assumed to differ between values with respect to which combination of elements they contain and each particular combination of attributes in a schema is assumed to be a unique representation. Elements are assumed to correspond to components of events that are important for activating a particular moral value. Expressed differently, it is a particular combination of elements that is important in order to activate a specific moral value. This hypothesis was tested in a previous study (Biel et al., in press) where real-life events were sampled. In that study, the subjects’ task was to recall events or situations they had interpreted as unrighteous. In a second phase, 125 such events were used. The events were divided into nine sets, each containing 13-14 unique events and two in common. Respondents were asked to describe what they thought the original story teller had reacted to with one or few words related to moral. Each event was described by approximately 60 respondents. A factor analysis was performed on the product-moment correlations between events across words. An eight factor solution accounted for 82% of the variance. In this way the categorisation of events was based on frequency profiles of different value-laden words used by respondents to describe the content of each event. As an example the most frequent words for one group of events were injustice, unfair, lack of understanding, and exploitation. For another group lack of respect, humiliating, distrust, and offensive were the most frequently applied words to describe the content of the events. The most frequently used words for each group are represented in Table 1 below. It was assumed that events in the same category had activated the same moral value. In a second experiment, events from different categories were shown to differ with regard to which components of the events that were important for an activation of the moral value. For events from one category components of the events corresponding to the elements ”act”, ”agent” and ”the wronged individual” were important for activating that moral value. Such an event could be that parents have beaten their own child. For events activating another moral value, information about the elements ”act” and the ”agent’s intention” were the most important. As an example, people in the Baltic States have been reported to sell false visa in order to gain money. The elements are rather abstract. It is thus rather unlikely that an event is evaluated directly against a particular combination of elements in a schema. If a particular combination of elements was all that was mentally represented, say ”agent” together with ”act” and ”the wronged individual”, this representation would
No. 3:27, 3 not enable a discrimination between various events since almost all events, moral as well as immoral, include information about these elements. This calls for an additional and more specific mental representation, that is, attributes. As an example, the element ”agent” may be linked to the attribute ”someone close to oneself” or to the attribute ”somebody with power”. Since the element ”agent” is likely to be part of the representation of several moral values, attributes will provide information that is more distinct with regard to a particular value. At the same time, there may be several schemas representing one moral value. They will all have the same combination of elements but differ with regard to attributes. Thus one schema will contain the attribute ”someone close to oneself” while another may include the attribute ”colleagues”. The purpose of the present study was to test that not only combinations of elements but also norms is a distinct part of moral values. A norm combines and connects features in the schema into a prescriptive statement of conduct. For example, if a schema contains the following elements and connected attributes; ”agent” - friend, ”agent’s intention” - to gain something, and ”act” - telling a lie, the associated norm could prescribe that one should be true and sincere with persons close to oneself. In relation to Murphy’s and Medin’s (1985) account, a norm functions as a theory or an underlying principle. The norm concept has been used in various ways in psychology such as personal, moral, and social. Regardless of connotation, norms are usually understood as implicit or explicit rules that, if in effect, regulate thought and behaviour. The different connotations narrow down the meaning of the concept, although they are not mutually exclusive. These somewhat blurred distinctions are probably part of the answer to the controversy among social psychologists over the concept’s usability. In a quest to clarify the role of social norms, Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren (1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993) distinguished between two types: descriptive norms that specify common behaviour in a situation, and injunctive norms that specify what behaviour is approved and disapproved within the culture. They further argued that any or both types can be salient or focused simultaneously and hence activated. Once activated, a norm is assumed to direct behaviour. The injunctive norm is similar to what Fiske (1992) termed a moral standard, defined as a norm that individuals insist that they and others must follow. Our view of moral norms coincides with the definition of moral standard proposed by Fiske. In accordance with the distinction between personal and social norm proposed by Kerr (1995) and Schwartz (1977), we view moral norms as personal norms. Schwartz and Kerr proposed that a norm is a social norm when reactions to consequences of norm adherence/violation are administered by those other than the actor, and a personal norm when adherence or violation results in a positive or negative selfevaluation by the acting individual. A personal norm guiding behavior in a situation can have two different origins apart from being constructed in the situation by reference to previously internalised values according to Schwartz (1977); a social norm that has been internalised, or a prexisting stable general norm related to internalised values. Our view of moral norms coincides with the latter two types. Feather’s (1994) conception of values as relatively stable across an individual’s life span, and that they function as a prescriptive standard of conduct support our view of moral norms as stable cognitive structures representing moral values held by the individual.
No. 3:27, 4 A norm is assumed to be quite abstract and general in order to encompass the information contained in various schemas representing a single moral value. The assumption that norms are abstract and general is also made by Sabini and Silver (1992). It is suggested that when there is a match between components and specific attributes of an event and attributes in a schema, this match signals that the associated norm has been violated. Following the previous example such a schema would match the perception of an event where three friends lie to a fourth goodlooking friend about to where to go and meet potential girlfriends on a friday evening. This match signals that the norm one should be true and sincere with persons close to oneself has been violated and leds to an activation of the moral value. Thus, we assume that events activating a specific moral value violate a particular norm. In order to test this assumption, three events from each of the eight categories (Biel et al., in press), that is, 24 in total, were selected as stimuli. Two of these three had unambiguously been categorised to one moral value, that is, loaded significantly (>. 65) only on one factor while the third event was also categorised to another value, that is, loaded significantly, but slightly lower than the unambigously categorised to one moral value, on two factors. The eight norms that subjects had to judge by its applicability to each event were formulated by the authors (see Table 1). The content of each norm statement was based on common characteristics of all events categorised to each moral value in the study by Biel et al. (in press). In this way, the norms used were expressed in an abstract and general form as proposed by previous research (Sabini & Silver, 1992). The hypothesis that different norms had been violated by events from different groups was tested in three ways. In all three, data were analysed by means of multiple t-tests for the eight à priori planned contrasts. For the first test, that events were expected to violate a particular norm, the mean score of norm violation for each pair of events on their expected norm was contrasted with the mean score of norm violation for the same pair across the other seven norms. In the second test, that each norm was violated by the expected events rather than by the other events, the mean score of norm violation for each pair of events on the expected norm was contrasted with the mean across the other seven pairs of events on that same norm. Finally, in order to test if events that had high factor loadings on two factors also were judged to violate the two norms representing these moral values rather than the other six norms, the mean judged norm violation for the two expected norms was contrasted with the mean across the other six norms.
No. 3:27, 5 Table 1 The Eight Norms Followed by Two of the Most Frequently Used Words to Describe each Category of Events in the Former Study Norm
Frequent words
1. Resources and burden should be fairly distributed.
Injustice, Unfair
2. One should take responsibility for one’s duties.
Irresponsible, Reckless
3. One should be true and sincere with persons close to oneself.
Deceitful, Dishonest
4. The value of (human) life should be sacred.
Inhuman, Cruelty
5. People in exposed positions should be met with understanding
Lack of sympathy, Lack of empathy.
6. People should be treated with respect and trust.
Lack of respect, Humiliating
7. One should not abuse power.
Abuse of power, Ruthless
8. One should not betray one’s values or principles out of sheer greed.
Exploitation, Dishonest
Method Subjects Respondents were 70 university students, 40 women and 30 men, attending summer courses. Their mean age was 27.5 years, varying between 18 and 57 years of age. Participation was voluntary and the answers anonymous. Subjects were paid 50 SEK (appr. $7) for their participation.
Procedure Subjects received a questionnaire containing descriptions of all 24 different events. To control for order effects, events were presented in randomised orders in the questionnaire. The eight norms were listed below each event. After reading through an event description, subjects were asked to judge to what extent it violated each norm on an eight-point scale. The scale ranged from ”not at all” to ”to a very
No. 3:27, 6 high degree”. Thus, subjects made eight judgements for each event adding up to 192 ratings per subject.
Results To test if the unambiguously categorised events had the expected relation to the norms, mean scores for each pair of events across subjects were calculated for each norm (see Table 2). Higher values indicate a clearer example of norm violation. Table 2 Mean Ratings of Norms for Pair of Events Associated with each Moral Value Events from category
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Norm 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
3.39 1.35 1.01 2.34 1.21 1.15 3.01 1.49
1.31 5.19 3.57 4.73 2.24 1.47 2.61 1.86
.86 1.59 6.17 2.02 1.45 .97 1.04 1.88
.71 1.78 .72 6.03 1.44 1.59 3.34 1.01
1.87 1.79 1.88 4.89 4.79 4.61 3.14 3.44
2.13 4.17 5.49 5.91 3.81 6.19 4.39 3.71
2.06 3.04 1.91 5.14 1.39 3.21 5.56 3.80
1.14 3.61 3.82 2.42 1.21 1.66 3.60 3.46
The first hypothesis to be tested was that the two events associated with each moral value were judged to violate the expected norm to a higher degree than the other seven norms. A t-test was performed for each pair of events to test the planned contrasts. The results are depicted in Table 3. All eight contrasts proved highly significant in the hypothesised direction (p < .001) . But as can be seen, the magnitude of the differences between the rating of the hypothesised norm and the other norms vary over pairs of events. The highest contrast was for events from category 6 and the lowest for category 8. The assumption about homogeneity of variance associated with the statistics were not fulfilled for all eight contrasts, but since the sample sizes were equal and the magnitude of t values were high we judged the risk of making type I error to be small (Kirk, 1995). The second hypothesis to be tested was that respondents perceived each norm to be more clearly violated by the predicted pair of events than by the other pairs of events. That is, the contrasts included the columns of Table 2. The same statistics as above were used. As in the previous tests all eight contrasts proved highly significant
No. 3:27, 7 in
the
hypothesized
direction
(see
Table
4).
Taken
together
with
the
Table 3 Resulting Contrasts for each Pair of Events over Norms Events from category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ***p < .001
Expected norm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Contrast
1.82 2.53 3.31 1.97 2.73 3.83 2.38 .94
SE
t
.23 .19 .18 .20 .17 .19 .23 .25
7.85*** 13.05*** 18.35*** 9.88*** 16.20*** 20.41*** 10.49*** 3.80***
former analysis, the results support the hypothesis that events categorised as activating the same moral value violate the same norm. Again, the results pointed toward the connection between pair of events from category 8 and norm 8 being the weakest. Table 4 Resulting Contrasts for each Norm over Pairs of Events Norm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ***p < .001
Expected pair of events from category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Contrast
SE
1.58 2.47 4.46 4.22 1.59 1.84 2.46 .91
.23 .20 .24 .19 .19 .19 .19 .26
t 6.80*** 12.36*** 18.56*** 22.16*** 8.56*** 9.76*** 12.67*** 3.52***
The third event from each category that was used in the questionnaire had also been associated with a second moral value. That is, these events loaded significantly on two factors in the former study (Biel et al., in press) and hence were related to two categories. We hypothesised that these events to a higher degree would be judged to
No. 3:27, 8 violate the two norms related to both their moral values than the other six norms. The same statistics as before were used but contrasts were calculated between ratings of these two norms and the other six. Again all contrasts were significant in the hypothesised direction (see Table 5) lending support to the assumption that events categorised to two different moral values involve violation of two different norms. Table 5 Resulting Contrast for Events Associated with Two Moral Values Event connected t to category 1, 8 2, 5 3, 8 4, 2 5, 7 6, 5 7, 2 8, 3 ***p < .001
Expected norms
1, 8 2, 5 3, 8 4, 2 5, 7 6, 5 7, 2 8, 3
Contrast
1.15 .90 2.59 1.95 1.80 3.21 1.29 2.21
.18 .14 .20 .15 .14 .18 .17 .19
SE
6.38*** 6.47*** 13.09*** 12.92*** 12.96*** 17.88*** 7.53*** 11.53***
Discussion According to the proposed model, a norm and schemas represent the conceptual content of moral values. The content of each moral value is represented by one general norm and one or more schemas containing information on two levels of abstraction; elements and attributes. Each norm is assumed to capture the essence of associated schemas and relate that information into a statement that prescribes approved conduct. The present study examined if events categorised as activating the same moral value violated the same norm. The results suggested that this was the case. Although each planned contrast regarding pairs of events that had been unambiguously connected to one category was statistically significant, an examination of mean ratings over norms (see Table 1) can be informative. Across rows, events from categories 1 to 7 were judged to violate the predicted norm to a higher degree than any of the other seven norms. This was not the case for events from group 8 where norms 6 and 7 were rated marginally higher than norm 8. Examination of columns reveal two departures from the expected pattern. Firstly, norm 5 was rated somewhat higher in connection with events from category 4 than with events from category 5. Secondly, norm 8 was rated higher in connection with events from categories 2, 3, and 7 than with events from category 8. One plausible explanation to these departures is that the formulations of norm 5, and especially of
No. 3:27, 9 norm 8, do not capture the essential content of the moral value that it is supposed to represent. Another possible explanation can be attributed to our assumption about the high level of abstraction and generality of norms. Take for instance norm 8 that reads, ”One should not betray one’s values or principles out of sheer greed”, or norm 2 ”One should take responsibility for one’s duties” and norm 7 ”One should not abuse power”. It is assumed that moral norms are general so that they can be applied to a wide variety of situations or events. If so, it would imply that some immoral events may be perceived as violating more than one norm and thus activate more than one moral value. The results of the previous study (Biel at al., in press) where some events were categorized to two groups indicated that some events activated two moral values. If nuanced immoral events are compared with generally formulated norms they will probably be interpreted as violating more than one norm to some extent. As indicated by the results, there was a considerable agreement in judgements about norm applicability to different unrighteous events. We take this result as a support for the usability of the norm concept in a moral context. However, in this study both social and personal norms may have been used by respondents to accomplish the task facing them. That is, in order to judge norm applicability to reallife unrighteous events, the norm does not have to be internalised. Therefore, the obtained results could not with certainty confirm the assumption in our model that norms and schemas mentally represent moral values. Since the model proposes that affective reactions in the moral sphere signify that a person subscribes to a moral value, a possible avenue to study personal norms is to focus on affective reactions to unrighteous events. If negatively valenced emotions are elicited by a norm violation, this indicates that the norm is personal.
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