No. 23-2004 ICCSR Research Paper Series - ISSN 1479-5116
No. 24-2004 ICCSR Research Paper Series - ISSN 1479-5124
Morality in consumption: towards a multidisciplinary perspective Robert J. Caruana
Research Paper Series International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility ISSN 1479-5116 Editor: Dirk Matten International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility Nottingham University Business School Nottingham University Jubilee Campus Wollaton Road Nottingham NG8 1BB United Kingdom Phone +44 (0)115 95 15261 Fax +44 (0)115 84 66667 Email
[email protected] http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ICCSR
Morality in consumption: towards a multidisciplinary perspective Robert J. Caruana Abstract Keywords: Morality, ethics, consumption. The multidisciplinary perspective forwarded in this paper demonstrates that the notion of morality is inherently contestable and needs careful consideration before it can contribute to developing an understanding of consumption. At present, studies into ‘fair-trade’ and other forms of ostensibly moral practices such as ‘ethical consumption’ are largely informed by a psychological perspective which views morality as a process of individual, rational decision-making. Grounded in this approach, existing research into environmental concern (Minton and Rose, 1997), social responsibility (Strong, 1997) and consumer boycotting (Smith, 1990) has contributed significantly to the characterisation of moral decision-making in the market. Yet in practice the inability of this approach to successfully reconcile consumer’s ‘rational’ moral concerns with their market behaviour clearly suggests the need to examine more closely the notion of morality on which such research is founded. Indeed, the notion of morality itself is often an assumed force and is rarely confronted within these interpretations. This may be problematic. For if we look at the diversity of opinion regarding the notion of morality both across and within disciplines such as philosophy, economics, sociology and psychology there appears to be no evidence of a general answer to the question “What is morality?” Within psychology, for instance, morality is presumed to develop in line with cognitive maturation towards the final realisation of an ‘ethical self’. Alternatively, for the moral agent of philosophy, there is a universal basis for deciding the ‘good’ which serves as a means for establishing an ethical existence. Then, for the ‘rational, self-interested man’ of economics, who in contrast cannot know the consequences of his own individual actions, the market system assumes the role of moral agent. Certainly, there appear to be some quite alternative answers to the question “What is morality?” between disciplines. Yet, there is even evidence of considerably diverse answers within some disciplines. Indeed, for sociologists the notion of morality has been depicted as an objective, regulatory structure at the centre of social action, as a dialectic process of rule-construction and even as the more subjective impulse of a ‘pre-social man’. Given this inherent diversity, both between and within disciplines, it is argued in this paper that interpretations of what are essentially moral consumption phenomenon will become more insightful having first considered the contestability of that reoccurring question - “What is morality?” This paper has two parallel agendas reflected in the structure of table 1. The first is to characterize the ‘field’ of available answers to the question “What is morality?” offered by sociology, psychology and economics as well as ‘enlightenment’ and ‘post-enlightenment’ philosophy. Here, particular attention will be paid to the components that help construct a coherent version of morality within each discipline such as the nature, locus, purpose and ontological status of morality. Discussing these components will help to elucidate important conceptual boundaries that exist between perspectives, whilst simultaneously highlighting some significant inter-
disciplinary relationships. Secondly, whilst characterizing the range of available moral perspectives and in so doing challenging the existence of a single, uncontested conception of morality, this paper will consider the implications of such contestability for developing an understanding of consumption. Ultimately, the multidisciplinary perspective forwarded in this paper will allow academics, marketing practitioners and public policy-makers to re-examine the way in which morality in consumption is both conceived and communicated. The Author: Robert Caruana did his undergraduate degree in 'Business Administration' at Cardiff Business School 1997-2000 and started his PhD at Nottingham in October 2002 with ESRC funding. His current research focuses on the influence of morality in the context of consumption and is linked to the growing literature on ethical consumption. Address for correspondence: Robert Caruana, International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, Nottingham University Business School, Nottingham University, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, Nottingham NG8 1BB, United Kingdom, Email:
[email protected] .
Introduction Fundamental to the organisation of human life itself, consumption is a phenomenon with a significant moral dimension.
Indeed, a relationship
between morality and consumption has surfaced in a number of different practical and theoretical genres. Economists and government politicians, for instance, have long theorised and to some extent propagated consumption as a key factor in securing a nation’s economic and social welfare. In an equally ‘systemic’ abstraction, both the human and physical strains of geography continue to be concerned with the pressures on human and ecological systems of rising levels of economic and consumption power.
Here,
problematic notions of ‘over-consumption’ have served to question the moral legitimacy of the prevailing capitalist model. On a more micro-level, acts of ‘gift-giving’ during major consumption events such as Christmas, birthdays and weddings can be seen to represent manifestations of reciprocity and even altruism. Less positively, consumption has been associated with the violation of both consumer’s and more recently producer’s rights.
In the former,
perceived moral infringements have given rise to consumer protection organisations like BBC’s Watchdog and the Consumer Association, whereas the latter has seen the construction of an entirely new international ‘fair trade’ market. Consumption has even provided a potent point of leverage for the political interests of civil society.
The early twentieth century prohibition
movement in the US and more recent incidents of boycotting and other nonconsumption forms of resistance and protest are all significant examples here. Evidently, morality in consumption is a phenomenon of substantial theoretical and practical interest on both a micro and macro level. However, despite its
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apparent breadth and complexity the development of a correspondingly intricate understanding of this subject has so far been restricted.
Current studies into ‘ethical’ and sustainable consumption as well as consumer boycotting are fundamentally underpinned by a conception of morality.
That is, they develop understandings of consumption which
implicitly rely upon notions of right and wrong, good and evil.
Most
significantly, the underlying notion of morality, on which such knowledge implicitly rests, has taken on different and often contrasting meanings across the various core and functional disciplines. This is not a problem in itself. What is more problematic is the propensity for current understandings about morality in consumption to become entrenched within one particular discipline, preventing consideration of significant insights from other fields.
The key
issue here is that disciplines, as they must of course discipline, inherently shape and therefore constrain the way in which moral consumption phenomenon can be conceived.
For example, the notion of ‘ethical
consumption’, where it is subsumed into a micromarketing discourse, primarily considers the cognitive dimension of individual agents as constituting the ‘boundaries of knowledge’ surrounding morality in consumption.
Such a
framework necessarily denies, for instance, consideration of the importance of economic systems and socio-political structures in which the practice of ‘ethical consumption’ has developed. Consequently, it is argued in this paper that the generation of theory from single disciplinary perspectives in this way is problematic for the generation of a broader, more integrated picture of this complex and intriguing subject.
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As a necessary theoretical contribution, the multidisciplinary perspective forwarded in this paper demonstrates that the notion of morality is inherently contestable and needs careful consideration before it can contribute to developing an understanding of consumption. For example, present studies into ‘fair-trade’ and other forms of ostensibly moral practices such as ‘ethical consumption’ are largely informed by a psychological perspective which views morality as a process of individual, rational decision-making. Grounded in this approach, existing research into environmental concern (Minton et al, 1997), ‘fair trade’ (Strong, 1997) and consumer boycotting (Smith, 1990) has contributed significantly to the characterisation of moral decision-making in the market.
Yet in practice the inability of this approach to successfully
reconcile consumer’s ‘rational’ moral concerns with their market behaviour clearly suggests the need to examine more closely the notion of morality on which such research is founded. Indeed, the notion of morality itself is often an assumed force and is rarely confronted within these interpretations. This may be problematic. For if we look at the diversity of opinion regarding the notion of morality both across and within disciplines such as philosophy, economics, sociology and psychology there appears to be no evidence of a general consensus regarding a notion of morality.
Within psychology, for instance, morality is presumed to develop in line with cognitive maturation towards the final realisation of an ‘ethical self’. Alternatively, for the moral agent of philosophy, there is a universal basis for deciding the ‘good’ which serves as a means for establishing an ethical existence. Then, for the ‘rational, self-interested man’ of economics, who in
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contrast cannot know the consequences of his own individual actions, the market system assumes the role of moral agent. Certainly, there appear to be some quite alternative answers to the question “What is morality?” between disciplines.
Yet, there is even evidence of considerably diverse answers
within some disciplines. Indeed, for sociologists the notion of morality has been depicted as an objective, regulatory structure at the centre of social action, as a dialectic process of rule-construction and even as the more subjective impulse of a ‘pre-social man’. Given this inherent diversity, both between and within disciplines, this paper undertakes to formally examine the key question “What is morality?”, and importantly, considers the implication of its contestability for an understanding of consumption.
First, though, it is
important to consider why it has been necessary to know what morality is in the first place and further, why its contestability matters for the development of an understanding of consumption.
The question “What is morality?” represents an attempt to make sense of how seemingly abstract notions of right and wrong, good and evil fit into established theoretical and epistemological conventions.
Essentially, the
question helps to construct a coherent version of morality that accords with a discipline’s perspective or ‘world-view’. In turn, this furnishes the notion of morality with a discernable composition - nature, locus, purpose and ontological status – that is facilitative for the subsequent generation of knowledge. However, there is a problem. It is in the very structure of the question “What is morality?” to provide an absolute answer - “It is this!” Significantly, whilst it is useful for the task of developing discipline-specific
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understandings this key question has not provided the universal answer it promises. Indeed, in the presence of multiple sets of competing answers noted above, the question “What is morality?” must be considered inherently contestable. This is an extremely significant consideration for developing new understandings of moral consumption phenomenon. For, in the absence of one unifying and uncontested notion of morality, it can be argued that those interpretations of morality in consumption which are entrenched in one discipline cannot convincingly claim to have a monopoly on the truth. Instead, they can be seen as constituting only a segment of a wider, multi-disciplinary arrangement of knowledge.
In sum, given the contestable status of the
question “What is morality?” it then becomes appropriate, even necessary, for new understandings of moral consumption phenomenon to consider the influence, not of one, but of multiple fields of knowledge.
Why a multidisciplinary perspective? As the title of Yannis et al’s (1995) provocative book The Unmaneagble Consumer suggests, there is no one singular paradigm that can claim to have the dynamics of consumption entirely ‘pinned down’. There are, instead, only a variety of extremely useful lenses through which this complex and intriguing phenomenon can be known. This section highlights the potential for and relative advantages of a multidisciplinary perspective and considers the implications of this approach for developing an understanding of morality in consumption.
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Despite sharing a common ‘theme’, notions such as ‘gift-giving’, ‘ethical consumption’, ‘consumer rights’ and other ostensibly moral consumption phenomenon have remained largely unidisciplinary. By this it is meant that the entire scope of academic outputs, from teaching and consultancy to the generation of new theoretical frameworks is bound, as if by centripetal forces, to the conventional assumptions of an identifiable discipline. Currently, most studies of consumption in a moral key are unidisciplinary in nature. One of the main advantages of locating studies within a discernable discipline is that, in the presence of a single, explicit epistemological and theoretical structure, making sense of potentially complex phenomenon is a relatively unambiguous and therefore unproblematic task. That is, what can constitute ‘truth’ and how such truths can come to be known is widely recognized and accepted. Moreover, unidisciplinarity can be advantageous, not only in terms of sensemaking and knowledge construction but also in terms of communication. Undoubtedly, where there is general agreement regarding the constitution of knowledge and ‘truth’, unidisciplinarity facilitates the dissemination of concepts and theories through common language. There are then some clear benefits of unidisciplinary approaches. Yet, whilst not wishing to diminish the potential contribution offered by ‘distinct’ disciplinary areas, there are some compelling arguments for moving towards a multidisciplinary perspective.
Perhaps the most appropriate way in which to build an argument for multidisciplinarity is by questioning the need for an argument in the first place. Indeed, in addressing the ‘possibility’ of multidisciplinarity in management research Brown (1997) remarks:
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“Multi-disciplinary research into management is, as it were, the only game in town….management research and multi-disciplinarity are inseparable, by reason of the fact that management is, in its very essence, multi-disciplinary, rather than mono-disciplinary, in nature.” (pg. 23)
The same inference can be readily made for consumption.
‘Ethical
consumption’, for example, whilst subsumed into a micromarketing discourse, is at the same time, a product of a range of functional as well as traditional academic discourses from consumer behaviour, social-psychology, green and societal marketing, economics and of course moral philosophy. By definition, then,
whist
it
remains
mostly
subverted,
a
substantial
degree
of
multidisciplinarity is inherent. A strong epistemological argument for multidisciplinarity can also be made. Indeed, whilst it has been noted as beneficial, being locked-in to one dominant way of knowing phenomenon can simultaneously constrain the generation of theory. The problem is that, given the hegemony of a single ‘world view’, other potentially profitable ways of knowing are necessarily obscured.
For example, as Crane (1999) has argued, the prevalence of
positivist research within business ethics, to the exclusion of other important epistemological traditions such as interpretivism, has limited the types of questions researchers can ask and so too the types of answers that might ensue.
This charge can also be levelled against studies that forward
discipline-specific understandings of consumption and morality.
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The popularity of positivist, survey-based methodology in the emergent ‘ethical consumption’ literature has lead to a heavy theoretical bias towards the cognitive dimension of individual agents.
Whilst this approach is not
insignificant, the overemphasis on individual agency has allowed little consideration of the external structures through which such consumer action is given legitimacy. Thus, in the absence of a multidisciplinary approach, a more vivid picture of the complex nature of phenomenon under investigation is too easily forgone, leaving only partial accounts. This is a point echoed in Watson’s (1997) argument for the adoption of a pluralist approach to theorising. Reflecting on the limitations of the ‘dualistic mentality’ present in structure/agency debates, Watson argues that a combined focus upon the subjective ‘thoughts, feelings, values and assumptions’ of individual agents and on the more objective ‘social, political and economic structures’ external to them can lead to a ‘fuller picture’. Ultimately, understandings of morality in consumption, where they foster only one method of knowledge generation, will necessarily obscure from the researcher’s ‘gaze’ other important and complementary insights.
Accordingly, it is the task of the next section to
consider the multiple ways in which morality in consumption can be known. This paper has two parallel agendas reflected in the structure of table 1. The first is to characterize the ‘field’ of available answers to the question “What is morality?” offered up by sociology, psychology and economics as well as ‘enlightenment’ and ‘post-enlightenment’ philosophy.
Whilst the more
functional disciplines can cast some light on the alternative notions of morality, it is in these core areas that the question has most formally been addressed and from which those functional disciplines are wholly informed. In
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examining these five disciplinary ‘homes’ to the question “What is morality?” particular attention will be paid to the components that help construct a coherent version of morality within each discipline such as the nature, locus, purpose and ontological status of morality. Discussing these components will help to elucidate important conceptual boundaries that exist between perspectives, whilst simultaneously highlighting some significant interdisciplinary relationships.
Secondly, whilst characterizing the range of
available moral perspectives and in so doing challenging the existence of a single, uncontested conception of morality, this paper will consider the implications of such contestability for developing an understanding of consumption. Ultimately, the multidisciplinary perspective forwarded in this paper will allow academics, marketing practitioners and public policy-makers to re-examine the way in which morality in consumption is both conceived and communicated.
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What is Morality?
Sociology
Nature -Norms, values, and beliefs embedded in social process and structures which define right and wrong -Social rules of right and wrong are constructed by individual agents
Economics
Outcome of systematic processes
Locus of morality
This largely depends on the degree to which morality is assumed to derive from social constructs as opposed to individual agency
Systems
Developmental and Hierarchical: Psychology
[Moving from nonmoral, to stimulusresponse then to ethical]
Individuals
Presumption
Nature of Man
Metaphysical rules
Existential moral disposition
Moral discourse surrounding products embedded in social norms e.g. ‘family’:
-Right and wrong is framed at an individual level
-‘Pre-social Man’
-Ordering individual conduct
Man is legitimately a selfinterested individual who cannot know the social consequences of his actions [which the market assumes]
‘Rational, selfinterested Man’
Sanctioning of individualism for collective interest
‘Conscious Man’
Realising final article of an individual ‘ethical self’
‘Ethical Man’
Means of evaluating and creating an ethical existence
Starting from a non-moral position morality develops in line with cognitive maturation
Metaphysics
There is a universal basis for deciding the ‘good’
Contextually situated moral agent
Developing a moral character; ‘dispositions’
Table 1. A multidisciplinary perspective on morality.
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-Guiding social interactions
-‘Social Man’
Philosophy ‘postenlightenment’ View
Implications for consumption
-Social structures frame right and wrong for individuals
Philosophy ‘enlightenment’ view
Purpose
‘Ambivalent Man’
Developing consistent moral conduct and character in the face of moral flux.
‘My husband likes to chose those kinds of goods so I let him decide’
Ontological status of morality
Proponents
-Objective
-Durkheim,
-Subjective
-Bauman
Objective
Smith, Friedman
Objective
Piaget, Kohlberg
Objective
Locke, Kant, Mill
Individual purchases are linked to macro-social outcomes: ‘I buy local produce in support of regional farming industry’ Increasing levels of information leads to truly ‘Good’ purchases: ‘Because I know x, y, and z about company ‘a’ I will only buy petrol from company ‘b’’
Strict adherence to specified moral rules: ‘Can I wish it that every man would also wish this purchase to be truly good?’ Ethical practice in the face of moral fragmentation:
-Subjective
Satre, McIntyre,
‘Even though I can’t be sure this purchase is morally right I must decide’
-Relative
Lyotard
Enlightenment philosophy. Ethical Man The ancient discipline of philosophy represents the first significant attempt to ask the question “What is morality?”
Before this, a notion of morality was generally
prescribed by the particular religious institution to which a community was subject. In most instances, adherence to divine laws governed the patterning of practices such as consumption and any formal notion of morality remained largely undeveloped. Then, sometime after the ‘birth’ of philosophy a period of ‘enlightenment’ thinking was ushered in that, in contrast to religious interpretations of the time, conceived Humans and not Deities as the original force of morality. In this dramatic turn away from traditional doctrines of external divine rule, philosophy sought instead to formally consider the moral agency of a corporeal, rational Man (Locke, 1959, Mill, 1992). Here, the question “What is morality?” commonly provoked answers that sought to ground man’s actions in his innate rational powers. Starting from this metaphysical disposition the purpose of morality, then, was to provide all individuals with the means for evaluating and creating an ethical existence here on earth. Importantly, this could be achieved, it was argued, by man’s obligation to a set of metaphysical rules that were grounded in pure reason:
“Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, i.e., as a ground of obligation, must imply absolute necessity; he must admit that the command, ‘Thou shalt not lie,’ does not apply to men only, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it. The same is true for all other moral laws properly so called. He must concede that the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason.” Kant (1969, pg. 5)
In this, Kant reflects the central project of enlightenment philosophy: to establish a universal basis from which all individuals can judge the rules to which they are obligated in any given context. Importantly, this would imply that morality is not a phenomenon that can be interpreted differently from person to person or place to place; it is clearly given an objective ontological status.
Consequently, this
‘metaphysical morality’ has a firm, determinable hold on the actions of ‘Ethical Man’. This perspective has some important implications for developing and understanding of consumption.
The notion of consumer rights mentioned in the introduction explicitly draws upon enlightened philosophical thinking about morality. It suggests that each consumer should have access to ‘equal entitlements’ to which other moral agents have the duty to respect and protect.
A reading of Kant, for example, suggests that the
establishment and maintenance of such rights is achieved entirely through an individual’s access to innate rational powers. In the case of consumer rights, then, it would be rational deliberation alone that set out what constitutes a right and therefore that which every consumer would wish to become a universally binding law. The moral question for ‘Ethical man’, then, would be; ‘Can I wish that every man would also wish the universal administration and preservation of my right to expect ‘x’ from the market?’
This seems an extremely pertinent question for contemporary
consumer society given the massive power imbalances that exist between global organisations and their inherently atomised consumer constituents.
Indeed, the
recent, high profile collapse of the pension industry in the UK has left thousands of British citizens in doubt as to the level of quality of life they are to expect in the future. Given the vital role consumption played here in administering people's right to
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participate in society, an enlightenment philosophical perspective on morality can provide a useful, if not crucial contribution. However, it is far from being the only useful source in developing understandings of morality in consumption. In fact, there are other important insights to be gleaned from another branch of inquiry within philosophy.
Post-enlightenment philosophy. Ambivalent man ‘Post-enlightenment’
inquiry,
broadly
speaking,
represented
a
substantial
epistemological shift in the way philosophers conceived the world, and importantly, man’s actions within it. As a consequence, the meaning of the question “What is morality?” also changed and so too the types of possible answers it could generate. In a very real sense, the post-enlightenment view of morality obtains much of its character from its oppositional stance towards the conventions of the previous ‘enlightened’ epoch.
In stark contrast to the teachings of Kant, for instance,
philosophers such as Satre, MacIntyre and Lyotard developed far less objective understandings. Indeed, in the absence of a governing metastructure the purpose of morality under the post-enlightenment view becomes a matter developing a set of moral dispositions that reflect the more subjective ‘social and cultural particularities’ of existence. In this sense, ‘Ethical Man’ is replaced by the notion of an ‘Ambivalent Man’ who strives to cultivate a sense of what is right in the face of social-cultural flux but whom cannot know for certain the absolute moral ‘truth’ of her actions (MacIntyre, 1985, Bauman, 1993, 1995). In this way, Lyotard (1994) views morality as being more like a problem, rather than an answer, on which to reflect:
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“Whereas the problem that faces us, even if it is put in terms of Idea and reflective judgement, is that it is no longer a matter, for us, of reflecting upon what is just or unjust against a horizon of a social totality, but, on the contrary, against the horizon of a multiplicity or of a diversity.” (pg. 87)
It is important here to consider what implications this subjective notion of morality has for developing an understanding of consumption.
Facing a life-world of moral fragmentation and uncertainty, post-enlightenment philosophy's ‘Ambivalent man’ would be likely to ask something like the following question: ‘Even though I cannot be sure for certain that this purchase is just, fair and right, I must still make a decision here.’ This is indeed a relevant question when we consider the moral complexity of certain consumption events. For example, whilst an individual might be concerned that her consumption of private transport may culminate in environmental pollution, increased levels of traffic and lower revenue for an already under-funded public transport network, she may, on balance, decide that moral responsibilities to her work and family take precedence. Importantly, here, our hypothetical consumer has had to make a morally problematic decision in a complex and uncertain situation.
As evidenced, both here and under the ‘enlightenment’ epoch, philosophical inquiry can contribute significantly towards developing understandings of consumption in a moral key.
However, despite being the disciplinary ‘home’ of moral inquiry, the
question “What is morality?” has been broached in a number of different ways by
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other fields outside of philosophy.
Therefore, in order to assess their potential
contribution these will now be considered.
Psychology. Conscious Man Largely
responsible
for
current
micromarketing
understandings
of
ethical
consumption practice, psychology has also asked itself the question “What is morality?” Although there are several different branches of inquiry within psychology such as social learning theory, psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology there are some central, common themes with which to characterise a general perspective. Unlike philosophy, a search for the fundamental basis of morality is precluded from a psychological approach and an individual’s rational status is treated as an assumption rather than a central, formal question. Upon this assumption, Man, or rather ‘Conscious Man’ is considered to develop a set of moral dispositions through a process of cognitive development. This key presumption holds that, starting from a non-moral position (as a child) morality develops in line with cognitive maturation. Largely influenced by the early works of Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg is responsible for much of the direction and constitution of this developmental thesis (Hersh, 1979).
In fact, he undertook to ‘unpack’ this process of cognitive moral
development into no less than six discernable stages, with each stage representing a significant advancement in an individual’s ability to rationalise the ‘proper course of action’. Significantly, this widely shared developmental thesis depicts the common purpose of moral development as the eventual realisation of an individual ‘ethical self.’ This ‘ethical’, or more aptly, ‘Conscious Man’ can now rationalise the correct, moral course of action in any given situation. Therefore, not unlike the ‘Ethical Man’ of enlightenment philosophy, a psychological perspective also lends morality an
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objective ontological status.
Having considered here the notion of morality, as
shaped by prevailing psychological convention, it is necessary to consider what implications this view has for developing an understanding of consumption. The psychological perspective outlined above suggests that morality in consumption is the product of an individual’s cognitive capacity to make rational choices. Accordingly, we might expect our ‘Conscious Man’ to address the moral problems he faces in his consumption activities by rationalising them along the following lines: ‘Because I know ‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z’ about the ethical practices of company ‘a’ I now only buy my petrol from company ‘b’ and company ‘c’. Crucially, rather than being bound to a particular code or rule, in this situation, moral action is seen to follow a logical sequence in which critical information is cognitively processed. This thesis has found much expression within micro-marketing studies into ‘ethical consumption’ which, like psychology, predominantly conceptualise morality as a process of individual, rational decision-making (Shaw, 2002, Strong 1997). As a consequence the micro-marketing thesis commonly argues that increased levels of information about the ‘ethicality’ of commodities will allow consumers to make ‘better’ moral judgements in the marketplace:
“Translating fair trade principles into consumer behaviour involves devising a social and consumer system which ensures the objectives of fair trade are understood and believed on a global scale, with consumers understanding their role in the attainment of an ecologically sound consumer society” Strong (1997, pg 36)
The psychological perspective outlined in this section can and has contributed significantly to the development of knowledge surrounding ostensibly moral
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phenomenon in consumption. Again however, whilst this moral perspective clearly adds a significant additional layer of theory on which to develop an understanding of consumption, it is not the only area from which to strengthen such knowledge. Economics. Rational, self-interested man Economics has principally been interested in explaining how macro-phenomenon such as consumption, production, government and the environment fit into a systems framework. It is not surprising, then, that an economic perspective views the nature of morality as the outcome of systematic processes. Here, the basic presumption is that it is in Man’s nature to be a rational, self-interested individual. That is, because he cannot possibly know (in order to judge) the consequences of his individual actions, it is considered natural and thus legitimate for him to pursue only his own interests.
On its own, however, this does not constitute a moral perspective.
Crucially, it is argued that ‘hidden’ market processes would serve to effectively redistribute ‘the good’ to a social collective. The foundation of this systems approach to morality was laid out by Adam Smith and is famously encapsulated in the words:
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest.” Smith (1970, pg.119)
A key principle, echoed much in later economic thought (Friedman et al, 1980), this statement can be seen to define the purpose of morality as the sanctioning of individualism for collective interests. That is, on the premise that ‘goodness’ will ensue, not from the benevolence of the individual alone but as a residual ‘goodness’ of the sum of parts, one is encouraged, if not impelled, to endorse a moral role for the
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market system. Essentially here, a notion of morality is abstracted from the locus of individual agents and is ‘systemised’ at a macro-level. This, significantly, serves to provide morality with an objective ontological status in that it leaves no room for interpretation at the level of the individual subject. Again, it is important to consider here the implications an economic perspective has for developing an understanding of morality in consumption.
Given the role of the market as a legitimate distributor of morality, the implication is that individual consumer purchases will culminate in beneficial macro-social outcomes. Consequently, presented with a situation of some moral complexity, our ‘Rational, self-interested man’ would be expected to rationalise his actions in the following way: ‘I tend to buy my groceries from the local farmer’s market in support of the regional farming industry.’ Significantly, although a direct role for the market is overtly implicated here, even forms of indirect market morality can be drawn under this perspective.
Smith (1990), for example, has conceptualised consumer
boycotting behaviour as a macro-systems feature of ‘morality in the market’. In this case, the following question must also be considered appropriate: ‘I will continue to boycott firm ‘x’ because they source much of their agricultural produce from disparate international suppliers rather than from national or local areas.’ So, either directly or indirectly, the market is upheld as the ultimate channel of morality. From this, it is evident that an economic perspective has much to contribute towards the development of an understanding of morality in consumption. Yet, as we have seen, it is not the only authority in this area. In fact, the discipline of sociology must first be considered for its contribution until this treatise can be considered properly exhausted.
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Sociology. [Pre-] Social Man? Like philosophy, psychology and economics the discipline of sociology has also undertaken to ask the question “What is morality?”
However, characterising the
overall meaning of this question is a more problematic task than it is for the other disciplines. Indeed, the locus, purpose and nature of morality within sociology all largely depend upon the degree to which morality is assumed to derive from social constructs or from individual agency. This is an important distinction. As discussed earlier, the former, ‘structuralist’ perspective essentially regards the norms, values, and beliefs embedded in social processes and structures to define what is right and wrong for a society. Emile Durkheim was one of the first sociologists to presume that morality had structural force in this way:
“Durkheim understood that a society's morality was closely related to, indeed, was an expression of what was collectively perceived to be sacred.” Stivers (1996, pg. 2)
Importantly, the structuralist perspective reflected here in Durkheim gives rise to a ‘Social Man’ whose actions are largely predetermined by an objective structural force. In this, the purpose of morality can be seen to guide, or rather, ‘fix’ all social interactions for an identifiable collective. However, a structuralist perspective, whilst representative of early sociological thought, does not represent the only answer to the question “What is morality?” offered by sociology.
Indeed, this has evolved
somewhat.
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There are some sociologists who view the nature of morality as a set of rules about right and wrong that are constructed by individual agents. The central proposition here is that morality, rather than being a ‘guiding arm’ of social structure, is regarded as a 'pre-social' impulse to take responsibility for social ‘Others’ (Levinas, 1987). This gives rise to a ‘Pre-social Man’ who, instinctively urged to be ‘For the Other’, is left to manage the moral problems that he encounters without reference to a determinable, regulatory structure. This more complex, subjective view of morality has much resonance with recent sociological commentary on postmodernity. Indeed, according to Bauman (1993,1995), in this time of social disengagement from traditional sources of moral guidance, such as the church and the community, unconditional responsibility ‘For the Other’ leaves individual decision-making at best a highly uncertain task:
“We know now that we will face forever moral dilemmas without unambiguously good (that is, universally agreed upon, uncontested) solutions, and that we will be never sure where such solutions are to be found; not even whether it would be good to find them.” Bauman (1993, pg. 31)
Therefore, the seemingly near-relativist account of morality present here in Bauman, suggests that whilst the purpose of morality can be seen as helping to ‘guide’ individual conduct, it is not a function that necessarily leads to a satisfactory, final solution.
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Together, the two contrasting perspectives presented here offer important insights into a sociological view of morality.
Necessarily, their contribution to an
understanding of morality in consumption must now be considered.
By way of extension, ‘Social Man’ is driven in his consumption activities by an obligation to the structurally embedded moral rules that define what is ‘good’ and ‘proper’ for his community. For example, the codification of social categories such as ‘family’ would predetermine the ‘right’ course of action for mothers/fathers, wives/husbands, sons/daughters etc. In this case, the following question, or more aptly, statement is implicated:
‘Apart from items of food and drink, it is the husband’s role to choose what we purchase for our households’.
Essentially here, social roles and their associated moral rules for consumption would be inflexible throughout the community. However, quite the reverse is true for ‘Presocial Man’. The following sentence encapsulates the contrasting thesis:
‘I find it incredibly difficult at times to know whose needs come first whilst shopping for my family and whether or not I should be the only person responsible for this activity.’
This is certainly an important statement when we consider the fragmentation of traditional social roles articulated in contemporary, postmodern commentary. Certainly, at a time where markets are communicating with increasingly well defined
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sub-factions of society, the structuralist moral theses that proclaim a relatively fixed ‘Social Man’ are necessarily contested, or at least, reconstructed.
Despite the contradistinctive meaning of the question “What is morality?” it is evident that a sociological perspective has much to contribute towards the development of an understanding of morality in consumption. In fact, both in theoretical and practical terms, all of the disciplines outlined here appear to have much to contribute to the growth of knowledge in this area. Yet, as we have seen, the meaning of the question “What is morality?” and the subsequent answers it can generate are generally limited to a specific discipline, denying the possibility of a fuller, multifaceted understanding of morality in consumption. Significantly, it is the task of the rest of this paper to address this important issue.
Discussion. Let us start out by questioning the ‘possibility’ of a multidisciplinary understanding of morality in consumption.
Rather ironically, this task can be best achieved by
challenging the possibility of an existing unidisciplinarity in this literary field. Although table 1. appears to represent five divergent perspectives on morality with adjacent implications for consumption there are in fact some important interrelationships present. First, the enlightenment philosophical view of morality produced an ‘Ethical Man’ who, through rational reflexivity, was able to know the objective moral truth of his consumption decisions.
Notably, the notion of an objective, rational actor
presented here is not confined to this discipline.
Indeed, psychology, whilst not
formally engaged in a philosophical discussion, relies implicitly on the notion of a rational agent who, with the correct training, can also come to know the proper way
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to act in all situations. In turn, the ‘Rational, self-interested man’ of economics, whilst embedded in macro-systems theory, does also assume to some degree an objective, rational morality.
Furthermore, the structuralist ‘Social Man’ of sociology, whose
actions are governed by a law-like structure at the centre of society, also embodies this notion to a great extent. However, an objective rational morality is not the only shared conception that exists between disciplines.
Indeed, a post-enlightenment
philosophical view of morality has much in common with a post-structuralist sociological account.
For instance, both disciplines conceived of an existentially
subjective individual who, in the absence of governing social or metaphysical structures, attempts to act morally in the face of socio-cultural flux and uncertainty (Bauman, 1993, Levinas, 1987).
Yet, there are, of course, some important
theoretical clashes here too. For instance, the economic notion of a ‘self-interested’ individual agent is diametrically opposed to the ‘ethical self’ of psychology whilst, with their focus on individual agency, both are simultaneously at odds with the structurally guided ‘Social Man’.
Similarly, the morally unsure ‘Ambivalent Man’ of post-
enlightenment philosophy stands in stark contrast to the morally certain ‘Conscious Man’ of enlightenment philosophy. Overall though, whilst recognising the existence of some significant theoretical clashes between the disciplines, there is a corresponding measure of ontological ‘boundary hopping’ or multidisciplinarity.
Significantly, given the existence of certain similarities across ostensibly distinct disciplines, there is, then, a platform on which a multidisciplinary understanding of morality in consumption can develop. In fact, there are strong epistemological and theoretical arguments for pursuing this more pluralist approach.
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In accordance with the structure of table 1, attempting to generate understandings of consumption that accord solely with a single discipline’s perspective on morality will logically constitute part of the available knowledge. What the table demonstrates most poignantly is that, despite shared ontological assumptions, the question “What is morality?” has a different meaning from discipline to discipline and that depending upon what meaning is attributed to this question, different types of answers will ensue as different types of research questions will be asked. As a result, the first point to note is that the question “What is morality?” , because it is epistemologically bound to provoke the answer “It is this!” (social norms, systemic processes etc), can be considered inherently contestable. There are clearly multiple regimes of truth here.
Indeed, the table itself characterises the various, seemingly concrete,
understandings about the nature, locus, purpose and force of morality that reflect the theoretical and philosophical conventions of each identifiable discipline. Significantly, following a positivist tradition, these are taken to be true and so when economists answer the question “What is morality?” the epistemological boundaries dictate that it is only ever the outcome of systematic processes. However, where disciplines offer up such ‘truths’ about morality in consumption, in the presence of adjacent sets of competing ‘truths’, they can only ever, by definition, be considered ‘truth claims’. This is, in itself, a very strong argument for pursuing multidisciplinary understandings of morality in consumption.
For, by challenging the authority of single, absolute
claims to truth, one is impelled to consider instead how the various competing arguments offered across a range of different perspectives can contribute to a broader, more integrated understanding of morality in consumption.
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The epistemological argument for multidisciplinarity offered here is supported by Gilligan (1993) who has criticised the dominant objective rational agent thesis within psychology:
“When one begins with the study of women and derives developmental constructs from their lives, the outline of a moral conception different from that described by Freud, Piaget or Kohlberg begins to emerge and informs a different description of development.” (pg. 19) Given the dominant positivist tradition within psychologically informed ethical decision making literature (Crane, 1999), there is indeed support here to question the appropriateness of constraining new understandings to the narrow individual, rational decision making thesis.
This observation leads straight into considering the theoretical argument for a multidisciplinary approach to morality in consumption. As the principle currency with which academic institutions can continue to claim a legitimate role in society, the argument for richer, integrated, multidimensional theory is a highly significant one. Yet, as evident in marketing and management’s overemphasis on cognitive decisionmaking processes, present theoretical insight into moral consumption phenomenon can be considered weak currency at best. For, as table 1. demonstrates, whilst entrenched within a single ‘knowledge stream’, attempts to build theory concerning ostensibly moral consumption phenomenon must necessarily constitute only a part of the available picture. For example, due to its epistemological approach, an economic perspective on morality in consumption can only generate certain types of macrosystems theory (Smith, 1990). Whilst this may be sufficient for the dissemination of
25
knowledge through certain economic papers, textbooks and student modules, economists preclude from their understanding of morality in consumption, for instance, the important role that social structures and consumer cognition might play in explaining complex market systems.
Likewise, in focussing only upon the
cognitive aspects of ethical decision-making, studies into ethical consumer behaviour necessarily ignore the impact of significant external factors. Indeed, consideration of a number of contextual factors may go a long way to account for how certain consumption practices have come to be morally legitimate and others not (Kilbourne et al, 1997). This can also be applied to the philosophically grounded notion of consumer rights. By considering in conjunction the import of social, political and economic frameworks as well as consumer cognition a fuller picture, of what, how and why certain consumer rights, as they stand alongside broader social, civil and political rights, may be developed.
Therefore, whilst acknowledging the various
political, institutional and symbolic barriers (Knights et al, 1997) that might prevent academics from considering the contributions of other disciplines, the potential for multidisciplinarity to add extra theoretical dimensions to current fields of knowledge is a tantalising prospect.
The theoretical implications of dogmatic unidisciplinary
approaches are, however, less promising. Where the ardent sociologist, economist or psychologist continues to answer the question “What is morality?” in line with the conventions of his or her familiar discipline, they impose certain constraints on the way in which subsequent knowledge can be generated and importantly, used.
Conclusion. The multidisciplinary perspective forwarded in this paper has demonstrated that the notion of morality is itself inherently contestable and needs careful consideration
26
before it can contribute to developing an understanding of consumption.
It was
argued that interpretations of what are essentially moral consumption phenomenon will become more insightful having first considered this contestability.
This was
achieved by a concise exposition of five distinct disciplinary fields that have each attempted to ask and answer the question - “What is morality?”
Having discussed
the implications that each individual version of this question has for an understanding of morality in consumption the possibility for and benefits of a multidisciplinary approach were then put forward. Here, it was argued that due to the mainly positivist epistemological traditions in each field, the question “What is morality?” acted to constrain the types of possible answers that might be generated. This was deemed to be a significant problem for the principle academic role of creating insightful and facilitative knowledge.
Finally, it was argued that by simultaneously considering
contributions from a number of perspectives, rather than a singularly contestable one, a broader, more integrated understanding of complex moral consumption phenomenon may be achieved.
Whilst it is likely that the prospect of enhancing knowledge of morality in consumption through multidisciplinary approaches will be ignored by some, it should be taken extremely seriously.
For, not only does this paper indicate the benefits to the
academic community in terms of advancing the scope and depth of theory, but it also considers other audiences to which we are responsible. Students, whether they are undergraduates or MBAs, currently live, and will eventually go on to work, in complex, changing environments where over-simplified cause-effect ‘nuggets’ fail to account for the intricate problems they encounter.
In this way, unidsciplinary
understandings of moral consumption phenomenon do not reflect the fragmented,
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multi-role lifeworlds in which certain audiences exist. Indeed, whilst confining the communication of knowledge to this or that particular perspective, it is no wonder that, as academics, we are sometimes accused by our publics of not existing in the ‘Real World.’ Yet it is not just our students to whom we owe, for want of a better word, more ‘realistic’ knowledge offerings. Managers and public policy makers, for example, are often awkwardly positioned between the multi-functional structures internal to their organisations and at the same time a spectrum of stakeholder demands on the outside. Making decisions or even sometimes just making sense is a far more complex and involved process than a unidisciplinary approach can allow for.
Ultimately, where a multidisciplinary perspective of morality in consumption
appears most ‘capable’, is in its potential to facilitate broader and more integrated understandings of the inherently complex worlds in which we and our various audiences actually exist.
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Research Paper Series International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility ISSN 1479-5116 Editor: Dirk Matten The ICCSR Research Papers Series is intended as a first-hand outlet for research output of ICCSR. These include papers presented at symposiums and seminars, first drafts of papers intended for submission in journals and other reports on ongoing or completed research projects. The objective of the ICCSR Research Papers Series is twofold: First, there is a time goal: Given the quality of ICCSR publication, the targeted journals normally require large time spans between submission and publication. Consequently, the ICCSR Research Papers Series serves as a preliminary airing to working papers of ICCSR staff and affiliates which are intended for subsequent publication. By this, research output can be made available for a selected public which will not only establish ICCSR’s lead in advancing and developing innovative research in CSR but will also open the opportunity to expose ideas to debate and peer scrutiny prior to submission and/or subsequent publication. Second, the ICCSR Research Papers Series offers the opportunity of publishing more extensive works of research than the usual space constraints of journals would normally allow. In particular, these papers will include research reports, data analysis, literature reviews, work by postgraduate students etc. which could serve as a primary data resource for further publications. Publication in the ICCSR Research Paper Series does not preclude publication in refereed journals. The ICCSR Research Papers Series consequently is interested in assuring high quality and broad visibility in the field. The quality aspect will be assured by establishing a process of peer review, which will normally include the Editor of the ICCSR Research Papers Series and one further academic in the field. In order to achieve a reasonable visibility the ICCSR Research Papers Series has full ISSN recognition and is listed in major library catalogues worldwide. All papers can also be downloaded at the ICCSR website.
Published Papers No. 01-2003
Wendy Chapple & Richard Harris Accounting for solid waste generation in measures of regional productivity growth
No. 02-2003
Christine Coupland Corporate identities on the web: An exercise in the construction and deployment of ‘morality’
No. 03-2003
David L. Owen Recent developments in European social and environmental reporting and auditing practice – A critical evaluation and tentative prognosis
No. 04-2003
Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane Corporate Citizenship: Towards an extended theoretical conceptualization
No. 05-2003
Karen Williams, Mike Geppert & Dirk Matten Challenges for the German model of employee relations in the era of globalization
No. 06-2003
Iain A. Davies & Andrew Crane Ethical Decision Making in Fair Trade Companies
No. 07-2003
Robert J. Caruana Morality in consumption: Towards a sociological perspective
No. 08-2003
Edd de Coverly, Lisa O’Malley & Maurice Patterson Hidden mountain: The social avoidance of waste
No. 09-2003
Eleanor Chambers, Wendy Chapple, Jeremy Moon & Michael Sullivan CSR in Asia: A seven country study of CSR website reporting
No. 10-2003
Anita Fernandez Young & Robert Young Corporate Social Responsibility: the effects of the Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines on a representative self-interested corporation
No. 11-2003
Simon Ashby, Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann Industry self-regulation: A game-theoretic typology of strategic voluntary compliance
No. 12-2003
David A. Waldman, Donald Siegel & Mansour Javidan Transformational leadership and CSR: A meso level approach
No. 13-2003
Jeremy Moon, Andrew Crane & Dirk Matten Can corporations be citizens? Corporate citizenship as a metaphor for business participation in society (2nd Edition)
No. 14-2003
Anita Fernandez Young, Jeremy Moon & Robert Young The UK Corporate Social Responsibility consultancy industry: a phenomenological approach
No. 15-2003
Andrew Crane In the company of spies: The ethics of industrial espionage
No. 16-2004
Jan Jonker, Jacqueline Cramer and Angela van der Heijden Developing Meaning in Action: (Re)Constructing the Process of Embedding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Companies
No. 17-2004
Wendy Chapple, Catherine J. Morrison Paul & Richard Harris Manufacturing and Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Cost Implications of Voluntary Waste Minimisation
No. 18-2004
Brendan O’Dwyer Stakeholder Democracy: Challenges and Contributions from Accountancy
No. 19-2004
James A. Fitchett Buyers be Wary: Marketing Stakeholder Values and the Consumer
No. 20-2004
Jeremy Moon Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility: The UK in Comparative Perspective
No. 21-2004
Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten Questioning the Domain of the Business Ethics Curriculum: Where the Law ends or Where it Starts?
No. 22-2004
Jem Bendell Flags of inconvenience? The global compact and the future of United Nations
No. 23-2004
David Owen and Brendan O’Dwyer Assurance Statement Quality in Environmental, Social and Sustainability Reporting: a Critical Evaluation of Leading Edge Practice
No. 24-2004
Robert Caruana Morality in consumption: towards a multidisciplinary perspective
