the biopsychological perspective on motivation. ... tors is the neural center more lastingiy inhibited. However ...... goals (e.g., the goal of making a phone call from.
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11 otivation PETER M. GOLLWITZER, JUAI{ D. DELIUS, AND GABRIELE OETTINGEN
I 1.1 ll.2
Tue BropsycHot-ocrcAl PBRspecrrve Tse SocropsycHot-ocrcel PenspECTrvE
Motivation is the study of the processesthat causeanimalsandhumansto exhibit varying sets of behaviorat different times.Someexamplesof such behavior sets are eating, fighting, socializing, achieving, and studying. Traditionally, one distinguishesbetweenbiopsychologicaland sociopsychological approaches to the processes that causethese behaviors (Reeve, 1997). The processesaddressedby the first tradition are principally physiological and those by the second tradition mainly cognitive. The biopsychological perspective has been particularly successful in the analysisof so-caliedbiological motives common to animals and humans.such as hunger,aggression, or sex.The sociopsychological perspective has been effective in the analysis of so-called cognitive motives largely restrictedto humans,such as power or achievement needs. To the extent that modern psychologyhascometo acceptthat all psychological processesare due ultimately to physiological activity, the division is now somewhatarbitrary. Nevertheless,explanationsof biological motives, even when concerning humans, are mainly offered in terms of largely factual physiological mechanisms(neuronal activation, hormone secretions, etc.), whereas cognitive motives are mainly explainedin terms of psychologicalconstructs (intending, planning, executing, etc.). These conshucts, modern neuroimaging techniques notwithstanding,can not yet be easily
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relatedwith physiological events.This validates the dual approachoffered in this chapter.Still, in some caseswe have offered an integration of biopsychological and sociopsychological approaches,and other examplesof suchintegration are given in Chapter4. We look forward to further integration of these two approachesin the years to come.
11.1 Tse Bropsycnor-ocrcAt-PpRsppcrrvp All organisms,including humans,are the product of biological evolution, a pecuiiar gamethat certain organic molecules with not perfectly self-replicatingpropertiesstartedup about four billion years ago. This observationis basic to the biopsychologicalperspectiveon motivation. Organisms are biological machines which are dedicatedto the survival and reproduction of their genes,the presentday descendants of these molecules(Dawkins,1989).All behavioris the final product of a phylogenetic (evolutionary), ontogenetic(developmental),and physiogenetic (physiological)cascadeof causesand effects. The biopsychological study of motivation is principally concernedwith the last stagesof this chain of eventsbut at times it must also attendto their evolution and development.Geneticsand
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learning for exampleplay a role in deterrnining why somepeople over-eatand othersundet-eat, why some are aggressiveand otherstimid, and so on. The modem biopsychologicalperspective, which originated with ClaudeBernard and Charles Darwin during the nineteenthcentury, assumesthat most behaviors of humans and of other advancedanimalsare the consequences a varied and interactingnumberof causalfactors and processes,which can not be easily subsumedunder one global theory or even a limited number of different theories.This is best conveyed by describing some of the mechanisms underlying the most salient biological motivation systems.
Thirst The life functions of all organismsare basedon physico-chemicalreactionsthat take place in an aqueousmedium and work best when there is a certain salt/water mixture. The circulation of some animals furthermoredependson a certain volume of blood. More than 90Voof the human body consistsof water, about a third of it in a chemically bound form. Water lossesare continuously incurred throughrespiration,perspiration, urination, and defecation.Drinking water or very watery solutions is by far the main mechanismby which water deficitsare compensated.Water saving through excretion of more concentratedurine, avoidanceof dry foods, suppressionof sweating (o the possibledetriment of thermoregulation!), and other mechanisms can help temporarily but will not prevent death if water is not drunk within a coupleof days(De Caro, 1986).Water swallowedwets the mouth. This stimulates chemo- and mechanoreceptors in the mouth by diluting the concentrated(salty tasting) and lesser (parched sensation) saliva secretedduring water deprivation and relieves the drinking drive for some time. The sensory receptorssend neural signalsthat reach an area of the hypothalamusresponsiblefor integrating the neural messagesabout the lack or presence of water in the mouth and elsewhere.Its activity correlates well with the subjective feeling of thi-rst. However, filling the mouth with water and spitting it out again does not inhibit thirst for long. Only when water filling the stomachis sensedby mechanoreceptorsand chemoreceptors is the neural centermore lastingiy inhibited. However, if the passageof the water to the intestine is blocked (in animals) thirst recurs after a while. A longer lasting quenching of thirst occurs only when the water is allowed to oassinto the intestinaltract and from there into
the blood. Here it replenishesthe loss in blood volume which goes along with water deficits and increasesthe venousblood pressuresensed by baroreceptorsnear the heart. Loss of blood pressureis known to be an important elicitor of thirst becauseof the verbal report and drinking behaviorby humansafter massivebleeding.An increasein venouspressruedecreasesthe hypothalamic thirst drive, but still not definitively' A more lasting inhibition of thirst occurs when water-diluted blood reachesthe anterior hypothalamusand water finds its way by diffusion into osmoreceptiveneurons, swells them and causesthem to fire neural signalsthat massively inhibit the neighboringhypothalamicthirst center. They are called osmoreceptorsbecause they respondto the salt/waterconcentrationdifferencesbetweentheir outsideand inside giving rise to osmotic pressure.In fact the sameoptimal salt/waterconcentrationis vital for all body cells. The osmoreceptorsact as samplersof that variable.We know that thesecells are crucially important for the regulation of thirst because water-satiatedanimals will begin to drink copiously again if a minute quantity of concentrated saline solution is experimentally injected into the anteriorhypothalamus.They overdrink drastically and as soon as the injection effect wanes they begin to urinate profusely. Generally, an excessof water intake can be compensatedby an increased diuretic activity of the kidneys. This activity is regulatedby many of the same factorsthat control drinking, but of coursein an opposingmanner.When their supply with blood decreases,the kidneys secretea substanceinto the blood that activates the hormone angiotensin. Among other things this active form of angiotensin is capable of inducing drinking through special brainstem chemoreceptorsthat activatethe hypothalamicthirst center.The hypothalamicosmoreceptorson the other hand do not only inducethirst but alsolead to the secretionof the hormone vasopressinby the pituitary gland (hypophysis).Vasopressinreachesthe kidneys via the blood circulation and actsto reducetheir water excretion. The hypothalamic thirst drive activatesthe essentialand largely innate swallowing of water, but of course only if water is directly available. Most often the quenchingof thirst requireslearnedresponsessuchas walking to a well and drawing water from it. Some drinking may also be motivated less by the osmoticneedsof the body than by the fact that a solution containssubstancessuch as caffeine or alcohol for which there is no real bodily need but which are capable of directly stimulating neural mechanismsresponsiblefor a sensation of well-beingor pleasure(seebelow).
Motivation
Hunger The life functions of all animals require the fats, proteins,vitamins, intakeof carbohydrates, salts, and trace elementsto replenishthe loss of solid matter which occurs through excretion and respiration after metabolic turnover (Leeg, 1994).Deprivationof food inducesthe motivating stateof hunger,which is strongerthe longer the deprivation lasts. When we eat a meal, chemoreceptorsand mechanoreceptorsin the mouth, pharynx, and stomachsignal to an area of the hypothalamus which functions as a satiation center. This area in turn temporarily inhibits a neighboringhypothalamic area functioning as a hungercenter.It appearsthat inhibition is basedon the synaptictransmitterserotonin and that hungeractivationinvolves the synaptic transmitter noradrenaline. Fenfluoramine, a pharmacological blocker of noradrenaline, is used to control excessiveeatingby very obese individuals. When the food mass enters the inducethe secretionof intestine,chemoreceptors the hormone cholecystokinin,which enters the blood streamand amongother things, stimulates the satiefyareaof the hypothalamus.When food reachesthe upper intestine, digestion has progressivelybroken down carbohydratesinto glucose, fats into fatty acids and glycerin, proteins into amino acids,and trace elementshave been freed from organicmolecules.Vitamins are not modified and salts are dissolved. All of these substancesenter the bloodstreamand are transportedto all the cells of the body wherethey are further metabolizedin the service of the lifesupportingfunctions. We have alreadymentionedthe needfor salts in connectionwith the maintenanceof a precise water/saltbalancein the body cells. The regulation of salt appetite is mediated by the same osmoreceptorswhich are also important for thirst regulation; but more immediately it is simply the pleasanttastethat salt confersto food which normally ensuresthat we take up enough salt. A fall in salt concentrationsignaledby the hypothalamicosmoreceptors might even causea relative upgrading of the hedonic value of the tasteof salt. Any excessin salt intake that might occur through this rough and ready mechanism causesthe kidney to excrete more salt than it normally does, at the cost of extra water loss. This increasedsalt excretionis elicited by aldosterone, a hormone secreted by the adrenal glands. Exaggeratedingestion of salt provokes increasedthirst. The drinking that normally follows restoresthe osmotic state of the body's ce11sbut also indirectly enablesthe disposal of salt through increasedurine production.
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Glucose(blood-sugar)is the main metabolic fuel for the cells and is thus requiredin appreciable quantities,not least so by the nervous system. Nevertheless,its concentrationin the blood should not exceed a certain measure because too much glucose has a poisonous effect, as in diabetes.To prevent this, glucoreceptorsin the hypothalamusactivatethe satiety centerinhibiting any further eating.Also, under the influenceof the hormoneinsulin, the lack of which causesdiabetes,the liver regulatesblood glucose levels by converting it into the starch glycogen,which it stores.This glycogenis converted back into glucose,under the influence of the hormone glucagon,when the glucose level falls again. Both insulin and glucagon are secreted by the pancreas gland under hypothalamic neural control. Fatty acids can also supply metaboiic energy except in neurons that are fully glucosedependent.The latter, however,can benefit from the fact that the liver can convert glycerin into glucose.Glycerin and fatty acids,recombinedto fat, can however also be stored in special adipose cells located under the skin and elsewhere in the body. While storingfat, thesecells secrete leptin, a hormone which has a satiating effect when it reachesthe brain (Kalat, 1997). Some peoplemay in fact be obesebecausetheir brain is genetically under-sensitiveto leptin or because their leptin is chemically aberrant(Rosenzweig, Leiman, & Breedlove, 1999). However, there certainly are other causesof obesity, such as individual differences in the basal metabolic turnover controlled by the hormone thyroxin. The mechanismthat causesfat celis to release fatty acids and glycerin, which serve as energy sources during extended physical exercise or long-term fasting, is not yet clear. Although we have left out many of details, it should be obvious that the intake of carbohydratesand fats is normally regulatedhomeostatically,ensuring the maintenance of a fairly constant body weight. Increasedlevels of metabolitesof these substancesare sensedand these signals cause a satiation of hunger. However, these postresorptive satiation signals arise too late to be relevant for the loss of appetite that normally limits the size of a meal. The latter arisesfrom the much faster feedbackoriginating from the food passagethrough mouth and stomach. There do not seem to be any sensorscomparableto the glucoseor leptin receptorswhich could ensurethe separateregulationof ingestion of proteins, vitamins, and trace minerals. Less definite regulatory mechanismsseem to ensure that we eat enoughof them. One such mechanism is our preference for varied rather than monotonousfood. The pleasurabieconnotation of eating is much reducedif we persistentiyeat
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the sametastingfood. This habituationcausesus to seek some variety in foods. There are some hypothesesabouthow this may be implemented neurally. Chancesale that the varied diet that comesabout in this mannerensuresa balanced intake. There ale also learning processesthat help to ensurea balanceddiet. Vitamin deficits are known to induce a feelins of sickness. Ingestion of food which contaiis the missing vitamin quite rapidly brings relief. Animals, and probably also humans,can associatethis relief with the taste and odor of the food which they ate shortly before, and will then seekit out later. Conversely, animals and humans also learn to associatesickness with the taste and odor of food which they ate earlier.This aversionto the taste or odor of the particular food is virfually beyondconsciouscontrol.This device,of course, ensuresthe avoidanceofpoisonousfoods. It is possible that as in the case of salt appetite,deficits and excessesof particular substances or elements may affect states of the brain in ways that subjectivelyfeel like cravings for or aversionsto foods containing these substances.These statesmay be equivalentto the special hungers that we at times are able to identify in ourselves: a definite appetite for sweets,for meat, for vegetables,or some other kind of food. Childhood experiencealso influence taste preferencesand might result in diet customssuch as the eating of hot Indian curries or of American Junk-food'. Cultural fashions can also lead to a consciousregulation of food intake with the aim of maintaining sportive fitness or social attractiveness.Anorexia, a lifethreateningunder-eatingwhich arises often in adolescentgirls, is exacerbatedby a learned beauty-of-slimnessfad. Culture often connects the simple act of eating and drinking with complex ceremonies(formal dinners, tribal feasts) that serve social needsmore than the need for nutrition. Or again, the hunger motive may underlie complex cognitive operationssuch as organized hunting or cofilmercial agriculture. But even at this sociocognitive level genetics can affect eating habits. Certain humanpopulations are genetically unable to digest lactose (milk-sugar) as adults and therefore some of thesegroupsbleed rather than milk their cattle. Sleep and Wakefulness The necessity of keeping oneself fed and hydratedobviously requiresphysical and mental activity. The satisfactionof most other motives usually also involves activity. Even when all needs seem satisfied there is stitl an intrinsic motive for intermittent activity. It servesto keep the neuro-musculo-skeletal movementapparatus
in a fit condition. There is also an intrinsic exploration or curiosity drive that makes us suryey the envilonment,inspect novel items, and generally acquire knowledge that may be useful later (Schneider& Schmalt, 1994). All this requires a state of wakefulnessassociated with a heightenedresponsiveness to extemal stimuli and a general readinessfor behavioral action. But activity is also connected with increasedchemical turnover and physical stress due to the drain on metabolic resourcesand wear on body structures.Thesemust be replenished and repairedin periods of rest. In humans as well as in animals,the cycles of activity and rest are organizedon the basisof a daily rhythm (Pinel, 1997).Diurnally active animals,humans included, tend to sleep at night and be awake during the day. In nocturnally active animals this pattern is reversed.Even when humansor animals are experimentallykept in a constantly lit, even-temperatured,sound-insulated,clockless, artificial environmentthey persist with an activity/rest cycle that is close to 24 hours in duration, the so-called circadian rhythm. It is driven by a neuro-humoraloscillator (biological clock) with the nucleus suprachiasmaticusand the pineal gland (epiphysis) as interacting elements.The basicrhythm, however,is modulated by homeostaticprocesses.Temporary deprivation of sleepor activity is partly compensated by a relative iengthening of subsequentsleep or activity phases. Wakefulness is largely determined by the activity of a densenetwork of neuronsalongthe axis of the brainstem.It receivescollateral signals from all sensorystimuli and is capableof activatingmost cortical circuits. This is reflected by high frequency,small amplitude oscillations (EEG). As a perseenin electroencephalograms son becomes drowsy and falls asleep, EEG recordings are dominated by low frequency, large amplitude oscillations. This slow wave sleep is periodicaily intemrpted by episodesof EEG activity very similar to that seen during waking, although the person remains asleep. Rapid eye movements (REM sleep) can be observed through the sleeping person's closed eyelids. If a personwakes up during this phase she/fie mostly reports having been dreaming. Deprivation of REM sleepfor a night increases the number and length of REM sleep phases during the next night. This indicates that the organism needs REM sleep. The function of this dream sleep is not totally clear but animal studieshave suggestedthat its preventioninterfereswith the consolidationof memories.It may serve to reorganizecognitive information that accumulatesduring wakefulness.Both types of sleep and their alternation are controlled by nuclei of the midbrain and thalamus.where the
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synaptic transmitter serotoninmay be involved togetherwith the epiphysialhormonemelatonin in inducing the basic sleepingstate.The addition of the transmitter acetylcholine induces REM episodeswhereas wakefulnessstate may be maintained by the synaptic transmitter noradrenaline. Noradrenaline and serotonin have already been impiicated in the regulation of hunger and satiety, and acetylcholineis among other things the tralsmitter that acts at the neuro-muscularendplates.Thus the sametransmitters are acting in the regulation of different behaviorsin different parts of the nervous system. Certain affective disorders are associated with sleep-irregularities and precisely timed dosesof melatonincan bring relief. In any case, disturbanceof the various mechanismsof sleep results in symptoms such as insomnia, sleepwalking, or narcolepsy. Aggression and Fear Survival and reproduction are dependentupon individual organisms securing environmental resources.When resourcesare freely available, as for examplewater in a humid country, there is no need to fight for them. However, food acquisitionby predatoryspeciesentailshunting, and the prey may resist.Both predatorsand prey may engagein aggressiveattack and defensive fleeing during such encounters.This agonistic behavior is often similar to that seen in inffaspecific interactions,as individuals of the same speciesoften have to competefor resourcessuch as food or shelter. Intra-specific antagonism may also occur during competition for social resources,such as mating partners or allies. Such agonism often developsover prospective resourcessuch as winter-barrenland in expectancy of its summerfertility, or over social status in expectancyof prime accessto all kinds of resources.Moreover, agonisticbehaviormay be supportedby social groupingssuch as families, tribes, or nations. These conflicts take on the character of wars as the size of the groups involved increasesand as weapons potentiate the group's power to injure and kill. Xenophobia, sectarianism,obedience,and fanaticism are some cognitive/cultural factors that can exacerbateaggression. Fighting is connectedwith risk of injury and thus aggressionis often balancedby fear. This frequently results in threat behavior. The individual developmentof agonistic motivation is driven by geneticallydeterminedbehavioraldispositionswhich are modulatedby experience.It is easy to breed genetically increasedaggressiveness;fighting flsh, cocks, and dogs being examples. Children probabiy become more
aggressiveif they discover that aggressronis more often followed by reward than by punishment. Agonistic behavior is mainly controlled by non-homeostaticmechanisms,triggeredby situationalfactorssuchaspain,offence,jealousy, or frustration (Renfrew, 1997). Nevertheless, deprivation from channeled,socially accepted aggressiveoutlets such as competitive sportsor verbal disputesmight lead to increasedaggressive drive in at least someindividuals.Frustrated children are more likely to behaveaggressively to a bystanderif they have previously experiencedan aggressivescenethan if they have not. Sensoryinformation about situationsprovoking anger or fear is apparently transmitted by a special thalamo-amygdalarpathway. Stimulation through electrodesimplanted into a neural circuit that extendsfrom the amygdalathrough to the nucleusstriaeterminalis,the medialhypothaiamus,and the medial midbrain elicits agonistic behavior in animals.In humans,responses such as slapping a medical attendant,accompanied by an angry facial expression, were observedwhen stimulationof the amygdalawas necessaryas a pre-surgical exploration. Male animalsandhumansgenerallyare more prone to show aggressionthan females.In animalsthis is mediatedby the hormone testosterone(Rosenzweig, Leiman, & Breedlove, 1999). Castrated male animals display less aggressionthan normal males and in both humans and animals testosteroneinjections heighten readiness for aggression.In female animals the pregnancy hormoneprogesteroneappearsto increasereadinessfor defensiveaggressionwhen offspring are threatened.
Sexand Parenthood The central property of genes is replication. Sexualreproduction,a common complicationof genereplication,is advantageous but also costly. Advantageous,becauseit enablesthe mixing of parental genes and thus guaranteesoffspring diversity. This increasesthe chance that some offspring will succeedin a perrnanentlychanging environment. Costly, because in many speciesit requiresthe synchronizedcoupling of ovurn and sperm within the body of the female who then also bearsthe costs of pregnancyand in marnmals, lactation. Sex is energetically cheap for males but they must compete for females.Femalesmust be choosy about males, who are co-responsiblefor the geneticquality of their offspring. Females assessthe quality of malesand their willingnessto continueinvesting in the cornmonprogenyafter mating. The dominanceof monogamyin human culturesis likely derived from the poor prospectssingle mothers
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have of raising healthy progeny under rough conditions.In many species,a maintainedpair bondis essentialfor successful parenting.Males' reproductiveefforts could be wastedif they do not contribute to the welfare of their offspring. Love probably strengthensthis pair-bonding. Among humans,culturalcustomsproducemuch variation in courtship and partnership habits. The role that off-reproductivemating plays in pair maintenanceis probably why sex is connectedwith intensepleasure.The dissociationof sexual activity from reproduction by contraceptivetechnologyhasreducedsex to a largely hedonicmotive. The existence of women and men is determined by the sex chromosomes.An XX fertilized ovum is predeterminedto develop into a female,an XY fertilized ovum to developinto a male. However, this only determineswhether the embryos develop female or male reproductive organs. Occasionally occurring XO (only one X chromosome)individuals develop neither testes nor ovaries. The differences in female and male behavior, or rather in the details of brain structues that control these differences,come about through a more complicated mechanism.A few weeks before birth the testes of male (human) embryos secrete testosteronewhich biasesbrain developmentin a male direction. Femaleembryoshave no such burst of testosterone, nor indeedof estrogen,as the ovaries exhibit no perinatal activity. This allows the relevant brain structuresto go on developing undisturbed (Kalat, 1997). Quite early in life these brain differences have the consequencethat girls tend to learn to speak earlier than boys and boys are more prone to show rough-and-tumble(fighting) play than are girls. At puberty (testessecretingagain testosterone,ovaries secretingfor the first time estrogen), the brain differencesdeterminethat most girl,s begin to develop an interest in boys and most boys are attractedto girls. Why some do not and becomehomosexualrather than heterosexualis not yet aitogetherclear. For a proportion of male homosexualsit seemslikely that brain differentiation is partly blocked by a mutant genelocatedon their X chromosome. Readinessfor the sex act, or libido, is in part influencedby the presenceof circulating testosteronein males and, to a lesserextent. circulating estrogenand progesteronein females.Erotic stimuli and stimulationbring aboutmating readinessin both sexes.In males,more than females, this arousalis helped by the novelty of erogenous stimuli. This so-calledCoolidge effect is an easiiy demonstrablephenomenonin male animals. They appearto tire if the samefemale is repeatedlypresentedbut show renewed sexual
efforts if a new receptivefemale is presented. Sexual arousal results in penile and clitoral erectionsand lubricatory gland secretions.This entailsthe expansionof vein irrigated cavernous tissueand glandularcontractionsunder the control of nervoussignalsfrom the brain. Mechanostimulation of penile and vaginal tissue results in ejaculationof spermin the male and contractions of the vaginal walls in the female. Both eventsare associatedwith a sensationof pleasure (orgasm),due to neural signalstransmitted to the brainstemreward areas.The contractions associatedwith female orgasmmay be coupled with a particularly effective transportof sperm to the uterus.The releaseof matureova by the ovary occurs at four-weekly intervais and menstruation is connectedwith the post-ovulatory sloughing off of tissue lining the uterus. This tissue developswithin the cycle in preparation for the possible implantation of a fertilized ovum andis rejectedif suchimplantationdoesnot take place. A complicated interaction between hypophysial and ovarial hormone secretions regulatesthe ovulatory/menstrualcycle. In contrast to many animals,the cycle has little influence on the day-to-day sexual receptivity of the human female. Even the widespreadintercoursebar connectedwith menstrualbleedingis probably culturally sanctionedand not physiologically determined (Abramson & Pinkerton,
1.99s). When implantation occurs and gestation begins, female libido is at first not inhibited despitea much changedhormonalsituation.This suggeststhat sexual receptivity in the human female,additionally to fertilization also supports pair-bonding. As birth approaches,the hypophysial hormone prolactin readies mafitmary gland tissue for milk production. Emotional attachmentto the baby seemsto be facilitatedby mechanicalstimulationof the uteruswall during child birth. When the baby nurses, an innate responseactivatedby low blood glucose,this stimulatesthrough a quite direct neuralpathway the secretionof oxytocin, anotherhypophysial hormonethat causesthe releaseof milk. Parentalcare is the most basic form of genetically driven altruism (Rosenblatt, 1996). Although genes are essentially selfish in their operations,the evolutionary game allows that carriers of identical genes (e.g., offspring, kin) can benefit from genetically instructedaltruistic behavior. The gene sets of children are of coursecombinationsof half-setsof maternaland paternalgenecopies.They can rely on being the preferred recipients of altruistic parental attention. Parentsare preparedto bestow advantages on their childrenat costto themselvesbut mothers more so than fathers.Mothers cannearly always
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be certain of their maternity whereas fathers may have been cuckoldedand could be caring for a child that is not their own. Social Motivation Many animal speciesare highly social.Much of this is basedon familial clans,involving a kind of extendedparenting. This genetically driven kind of altruism provides gradedbenefitsfor all blood-relations.Reiatives have a proportion of genes in common, high if the relationship is close, low if the relationship is distant. Aunts and uncles are typically prepared to act parentally to nephewsand nieces.However, social dispositionscan also developamongnon-related persons.If I do somethinggood for someone,it is not unreasonableto expect I might have a favor retumedlater. This altruism is foundedon a reciprocal strategy promoted by friendships and/or cultural groups that make reciprocity their rule or tradition (Zahn-Waxler,Cummings, & Iannoty,1991).Division of labor,wheresome people arehunters,othersare farmers,othersare cooks, and so on, is more efficient than each individual in a group trying to do everything.A division of labor however,increasesdependence on the mutual exchangeof servicesand goods. Animals living in social groups are often capable of extensive social learning. Transgenerational traditions or protocultures (song protoculturesin birds, food-washingculturesin monkeys,for example)and evenproper cultures can develop as a result provided that the repertoire of traditions is sufficiently rich. The elements of culture are transmittedto individuals and come to reside as long-term memory traces in their brains and contribute to determining their behavior. Long-tenn memory traces are constellationsof synaptic connectionsbetween neurons modified by learning, social in this particularcase.Theseelementsof culture,sometimes calledmemes(Dawkins,1989),are packagesof information that multiply through social iearning and have some superficial similarities to genes.Genesare also packagesof information but they reproduceby biochemical means. Memes are engagedin cultural evolution, which has similarities to biological evolution (Delius, 1991). Through memetically (rather than genetically) drivendispositions,they canbring about a meme-basedaltruism (for example, among membersof trans-racialreligions such as Muslims and Catholics) and promote meme-based aggression(for examplestrife betweenreligious groups such as Catholics and Lutherans).This altruism and agonism is of a predominantly cognitive nature. Indeed, it is argued that the selectionpressurefor the evolution of primate
intelligencearosemainly from the necessityto efficiently cope with the complexities of the socialenvironment.Shiftingalliances,coalitions, squabbles,and struggleswith or againstgroup members are usually necessaryto obtain the best possiblelife quality for oneselfand one's family. Learned Motives Biological motives are conventionally (and not totally incorrectly) considered as essentially innate and their development as genetically driven.However,aswe havealreadyseen,among many animals motivated behavior is rarely based on only genetically determinedmechanisms. Learning processesusually refine or even create part of the mechanisms that control behavior. The capacity to learn is a genetically instructedmechanismevolvedto take advantage of the possibility of improving the behavioral apparatusof an individual on the basisof experience. Genetically instructed because the synaptic connectivity modifications that underlie learning and memory formation are biochemical processesthat requiregeneactivity. Biologically motivated behavior is often prone to modifications by learning because the satisfaction of motives is usually associatedwith the activation of a positive hedonic state that is widely broadcastfrom the midbrain to throughout the forebrain by a ramified reward circuit using dopamineas a transmitter.Endorphines,natural morphine-like neuromodulators,also intervene. We know about this circuit because animals and humans with electrodesimplanted in the relevant brain areas will learn to repetitively perform some arbitrary responsesuch as lever pressing to get brief weak electric pulses deliveredto theseareas.Conversely,the thwarting of motivational goals is associatedwith the broadcast of a hedonically negative signal through a punishment system. Both these reinforcementsignalsare strongagentsin bringing about synapticmodifications. Apart from primary rewardsand punishments such as the satisfactionof thirst, the achievement of sexualorgasm,or converselythe pain of being bitten, initially neutral stimuli can acquire secondaryreward or punishmentproperties.For example,animals exposedto a particular sound before receiving painful electric foot-shocks learn to flee from that stimulus to avoid being shocked,and persistin doing so for a long time. althoughthe shock may have been disconnected in the meanwhile. They show all the signs of fear when they hear the soundeven though it is innocuousby itself. They have acquireda conditioned or learnedemotionalfear responsethat
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is sufficient to motivate an escaperesponse. Some human phobias(of knives or of heights, for example)are thoughtto be acquiredthrough such associativelearning (Mook, 1996). Conversely, monkeys who have been taught that plastic chips thrown into vending machineswill yield desirabletit-bits suchas peanutsor grapes, once well trained, will work for hours on end, pressinga lever for the occasionalreward of chips. This learnedmotive also causesthem to hoard chips in particular places and to steal chips from each other, things that humanstend to do with money. These learnedmotives may representincipient cognitive motives, and help to remind us that in the last analysiscognitive motives are biological, in the sensethat they are based on information processingin the brain. Whether for example the monkeys are consciously aware of the stand-forquality of their chips or not is debatable.On the other hand, consciousreasoningis no longer considereda necessaryattribute of cognitive operations in humans.We are often only very dimly or not at all arvareof many of the cognitiveprocessesthat determineour behavior. Summary The biopsychological approach to motivation assumesthat organismsincluding humans are primarily biological machinessynthesizedunder the control of inherited genesand operatingfor the purposeof thesegenes' survival and reproduction. Behavior must be understoodas fulfllling aspectsof that overall function and as the product of the physiologicalmachineryof individual organisms that, although grown under geneticcontrol, is subjectto adaptivemodifications through learning. Through learning, the machinery is open to the influence of memes, cultural determinantsof behaviorthat may act to support the organism's survival and reproduction or that may indeedpromote only their own persistenceand multiplication. The mechanisms of the motivation processesunderlying different sets of behavior are varied and intricate, as befits the varied and complicatedfunctions they fulfil. lI.2
TuB SocropsycHoI-ocrcAIPeRspscrrve
Three sets of phenomena have traditionally been of concern in the field of human motivation for personality and social psychologists: (a) the selection of a certain course of action, (b) the energizing of the implied behaviors, and (c) the regulation of these behaviors. In other
words, motivation refers to what type of goals people choose, and how they go about implementing them: when and how goal-directed behaviorgetsstarted,is energized,sustained, and stopped.Taking this broad and comprehensive perspective,any field in socialpsychology(e.g., helping others,aggression,inter-grouprelations) may potentially be analyzedfrom a motivational viewpoint, and this extends not only to how people behave in social situations,but also to their social thoughtsand feelings. The lay conceptof motivation points solely to energizing. People are referred to as unmotivated when they fail to exert effort and do not live up to their potential. This narrow definition of motivation, however, reflects an important insight. Issuesof what people can do, that is, their cognitive capabilities and limitations, are just the starting point of a motivational analysis which commonly attemptsto discoverthe determinants and processesthat underiie a person's willingaess to use his or her potential. The history of motivational theory can be summarizedin terms of how the basic nafure of human functioning and development is conceived.Early theoriesportrayedthe human as a machine-like, reactive organism compelled to act by internal and/orexternalforcesbeyondour control (e.g.,instincts,needs,drives,incentives, andso forth). According to Weiner (1992),prototypical theoriesarethe psychoanalytictheoriesof Freud, Hull's learning theory, or Lewin's fieldtheoretical approach.These theoriesimply that if one could just push the right buttons,motivation would result. There is no room for consciousreflection and attemptsat self-regulation. Instead,motivationalforcestransmittheir energy outsideof awareness,establishinga stateof balanceor equilibrium (referredto as a.rousalreduction, self-preservation,or needsatisfaction). More modern theoriesconstruethe human as God-like (Weiner, 1992). Accordingly, people are seenas all-just and all-knowing final judges of their actions.Expectancy-valuetheories(e.g., Atkinson, 1957) and attribution theories (e.g., Weiner, 1992) are based on this metaphor. Expectancy-valuetheories assumethat people choosegoals rationally basedon comprehensive knowledge about the expected value and the probability of goal attainment. Attribution theoriespropose that the motivational determinantsof a person'sbehaviorare the causalexplanationsof prior action outcomes.The human is seenas an amateurscientist who systematically exploresthe causesof his or her past behaviors. The types of causesdiscoveredare expectedto affect the person's readinessto engagein these or related behaviorsby influencing affects and expectations.However, even thoughpeoplemay be quite knowledgeable, they are imperfect
Motivation
and evaluators(i.e., they only decision-makers possessa boundedrationality). Present-daytheories of motivation go one step further. Human beings are construed as flexible strategists.The focus is on the different tasksa personhasto perform when transforming wishes into actions (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen,1991). Accordingly, humans are conceivedof as highly flexible organismswho readily adjust to task demands. When choosing goals, people apparently try to live up to the ideal of being all-knowing and ali-just by processing all of the available information and weighing it impartialiy. However, when the implementationof an already chosen goal is at issue, people are determinedto achieve the desired ends. As a consequence,we become partial, favoring the implementation of the chosengoal. The desirability and feasibility of the chosen goal are seen in the most positive light, and the focus of attentionis on the chosen goal. Although this determinationto achievethe chosengoal invokesa machinemetaphor,recent research confradicts this image of the goaldriven human. GoaI achievement is rather a highly strategicundertaking that demandsthe flexible use of self-regulationskills. In the following sections,selectedissuesare presentedwhich characterizepresent-daysocialpsychologicalresearchon motivation. We will addressresearchon (a) motives and needs,(b) expectations,attributions, and control beliefs, and (c) goal settingand goal striving. Motives and Needs Research on motives highlights the relation between motivation and affect (McClelland, 1985). Any motivated behavior is pulled by the anticipatedaffect associatedwith so-called natural incentives.Such incentivesare attached to situations and actions that are important for the survival of the human species(e.g., affiliation, influence, intellectual mastery). Accordingly, it is proposed that there are a limited number of natural incentives, each of which showsan inborn relation to a specific cluster of emotions.The individual's preferencesfor certain types of incentivesare defined as the individual'smotivedispositions. Socializationis said to teachwhich situations are associatedwith what kind of natural incentives and their respectiveaffective experiences. In addition, people are assumedto acquire the skills which allow them to successfullyapproach desired incentives. McClelland distinguishes three basic groupsof motives: the achievement motive, the power motive, and the affiliative motives(i.e., sex, affiliation, and intimacy).As
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food is the rewardor incentivefor hunger,so is improving one's perfonnanceon a given task the incentive for the achievementmotive. The incentiveof the power motive is having impact. control, or influence over another person, a group, or the world at large. How this impact or influenceis establisheddependson the individual's socialization.There are the crudeways of attacking others physically, but also the more sophisticatedroutes of persuadingor teaching others. Finally, the incentivesfor the affiliative motives extend to sexual pleasures (sexual motive), being together with people (need for affiliation), and experiencing harmony, concern, and commitment(intimacy motive). All of these motives may entail a fear or avoidance component.Trying to meet a standardof excellence may not be motivated solely by hope for success, but alsoby fear offailure, and spending one's sparetime affiliating with others may not be determinedsolely by the anticipatedpositive but also by a high fear feelings of togetherness, of rejection. In principle, all humansare seenas possessing the various motives described. There are vast differences,however, in motive strength. by exploring both the array This can be assessed of situations a person interprets in terms of a given motive (e.g., a person high in need for power interpretsall kinds of situationsaspowerrelated) and the intensity of the anticipated affect associatedwith having acquired respective incentives.Commonly this is done with the Thematic ApperceptionTest (TAT) which contains pictures of scenesloosely related to the motive measured.In the AchievementTAT, for instance,one picture showsan employeeknocking at his boss's door. Participantswho take the test are instructedto give free reign to fantasy, talking about what happensin the picture, how the depicted scenario came about, what the depicted personsthink, and what will happen next. This procedure(often referred to as the operprocedure)is based on the idea ant assessment that the presentedpictures will trigger motiverelatedthoughtswhich will then be expressedin procedures free fantasy.Respondentassessment (i.e., the standardself-reportquestionnaires)are less appropriate,becausethey also reflect the values people hold with respect to a certain motive. Most peopleknow that achievement,for instance, is highly valued in our society, and many havelearnedto value it highly themselves. But when it comes to actually behaving in an achievement-orientedmanner in a given situation, a person who highly values achievement may neverthelessspontaneouslypick up the affiliative cues present in this sifuation, and opt towards enjoying togethernessrather than
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achieving - becauseher achievementneed is lower than her need for affiliation. A person's spontaneousfantasyproductionas stimulatedby TAT pictures should reflect such preferences, and therefore should provide a more valid assessmentof a person's motive dispositions than do self-reportquestionnaires. More recentresearchhas attemptedto link the activation of different motives to different hormonal responses.An activatedpower motive leadsto an increasein noradrenalineand adrenaline, whereasan activated achievementmotive is associatedwith an increaseof the hormone (McClelland, 1995). The arginine-vasopressin affiliation motive has been linked to the neurotransmitter dopamine.It is assumedthat each motive is linked to specifichormonalresponses that in turn facilitate motive-specificbehaviors. People's motives have also been observedto affect the functioning of the immune system. For example, power-motivatedpeople become ill more frequently and more severely when their attempts to acquire social influence are repeatedlyfrustratedor when they becometargets of influence attemptsby others. Being high on a certain motive implies a recurrent concern for acquiring the respective incentives.Peoplehigh on the affiliation motive perform affiliative acts frequently and energetically, readily perceiveaffiliative cues in the environment,and quickly detect affiliative networks.Also, predictionsof the professionalsuccessof managersare strikingly accurate,particularly if one considersthe motive dispositionsin achievement (high), power (high), and affiliation (low) in concert. However, attempts to predict behaviors from motives commonly fail when engagementin thesebehaviorsis basedon consciousreflection.When it comesto choosing, betweencoursesof action,tasksof differing difficulty, or persistingon a given task or leaving the field, people deliberateon the feasibility and desirability of the alternative courses of action. As it turns out, people do not determine the feasibility and desirabilityof an action solely on the basis of their motive dispositions,but also by ttrinking abouttheir skills, the intricacies of the situation, and the expectedvalue of the respectivecou-rseof action. Expectations, Attributions, Control Beliefs
and
One of the first attempts to integrate these aspectsof motivation was made by Atkinson (1957) in his risk-taking model. He proposed that the subjectiveprobability of successand the task's incentive value conjointly affect task choice, both variables being influenced by the
perceived difficulty of the task. Whereaseasy tasks lead to a high subjective probability of success(direct function),they also possesslow incentive value (inversefunction) becausethe anticipatedaffectassociated with success(pride) is lowestfor easytasks.The reverseis assumed for difficult tasks.Atkinson suggestedthat multiplying probability of successand incentivevalue will give a good estimate of whether a person will chooseto work on a task, especiaiiywhen the obtainedscore is weighted by the approach and avoidancecomponentsof his or her achievement motive (hope for success and fear of failure, respectively).The prediction is that primarily success-motivated individualswill choose tasks of medium difficulty, whereas failuremotivated people prefer easy or very difficult tasks. Researchsupportsthe model for predictions on task choice, but the model fails to account for the quantity and quality of task performanceonce people have startedto work on the chosentasks. Elaborationsof the model(Heckhausen, 1991) added further expectation-relatedconceptsand differentiate various aspects of the incentive value of task performance..Theincentive value of task performanceis not simply determined by anticipatedpride and shame.Positive selfevaluations,praise from significantothers (e.g., teachers,parents), the instrumentality of task performanceto super-ordinatelong-term goals, and extrinsic side-effects(e.g.,when an achievement task has affiliative benefits)must also be considered.In addition, Heckhausenpoints out that even if there are many potential positive incentives,one will only be motivated to strive for them if one expects that (1) the behaviors one is capable of performing will lead to successfultask performance,and (2) successfultask performance will lead to the incentives (i.e., possesses high instrumentality). There is a further type of incentivethat needs to be taken into consideration.Certainbehaviors may possessan incentive value in and of themselves. This is most apparent when people fiercely engagein activities(e.g.,hang-gliding) that serveno ostensiblepurpose.The associated flow-experienceand completeabsorptionmakes people seek such activities for no other reason but performing the activity. This is difficult to interpretin terms of expectancy-value theorizing which claims that people engagein action to achievecertain ends that are a consequenceof having actedsuccessfully. Atkinson's model has also been elaborated by attribution theorists (Weiner, 1992) who attemptedto understandchangesin expectations and incentive value in terms of the attributions madefor past performances.Successand failure may be interpretedas causedby internal (e.g.,
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ability, effort) or external factors (e.g., task difflculty, luck). Ability and task difficulty are more stable causalfactors than effort and luck. Weiner shows that the stability of successor failure attributionsaffects people's expectations of successful task performance (stabie attdbutionslead to high or iow expectations,respectively), whereasthe internality of performance outcome attributions relates to affect (internal attributions produce more pride or shäme, respectively). Weiner also discovered that the approach componentof the achievementmotive (hopefor success)is associatedwith attributing failure to luck or lack of effort and successto ability, whereasthe avoidancecomponentis linked to attributing failure to lack of ability and success to luck. Researchon aggressionalso points to the importanceof attributionsfor people'sreadiness to retaliate.'Our anger and readinessto retaliate in responseto the aggressionof others are less related to the damagethat was done to us, but ratherto our interpretationof the aggressive act as intentional.Similarly, attributionsalso affect whether we help people in need. Interpreting the plight of victims as causedby their own irresponsiblebehaviorsleads to less helping as comparedwith causal interpretationsof their plight in terms of uncontrollable,external factors. People develop personalstyles of explaining positive and negativeevents(Seligman,1990). An optimistic attributionalstyle is the tendency to make more stable and global attributionsfor positive than for negative events, leading to expectationsthat positive events will be more persistentand pervasivethan negativeevents.If, in addition, positive events are attributed to internal causesmore than are negative events, strengthenedself-esteemresults. An optimistic attributional style predicts success at school, work, and sports,as well as physical and mental health(e.g.,lack of depression). Recognition of the motivationai importance of expectationsand attributionswas the starting point of the cognitive revolution in the psychology of motivation. The revolution has progressed and has inffoduced further cognitive conceptssuch as control beliefs and goals. The most prominent theoretical explication of control beliefs is Bandura's (1997) self-efficacy theory. Self-efficacious individuals hold the firm belief that they possessthe potentiai to executethe kinds of behaviorsthat a given task demands.Peopleacquirethis belief by reflecting on their own relevantpast behaviors,observing the behaviorsof similar others,being evaluated by significantothers(e.g.,teachers),and observing their own physiologicalreactionswhen challengedby a given task.High self-efficacybeliefs
are associatedwith choosing aspiring goals, exerting strong efforts to attain thesegoals, and persistingin the faceof obstacles andhindrances. Goal Setting Determinantsof Goal Setting Researchon the determinantsof goal setting distinguishesbetween assignedgoals and selfset goals.Whetherpeopleadoptgoals assigned by others depends on variables that facilitate persuasion(e.g., the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the person who assigns the goal and whether the recipient managesto integrate the assignedgoal with the goals he or she already holds). The adoptionof self-setgoals depends on the perceived desirability and feasibility of anticipatedgoal attainment,judged in comparison to potential alternative goals. Moreover, peoplediffer in their preferencefor settinggoals with certain structuralfeaturesor contents.For example,peoplewho generallythink about their actions in concrete versus abstract terms also prefer to set themselvesconcreteversusabstract goals, respectively.People who construe their self as an ideal (which they intrinsically desire to attain) set goalswith a positive outcomefocus (i.e., goals focusing on establishingand keeping positive outcomes),whereaspeople who construe their self as an ought which they feel compelled to reach set goals with a negative outcomefocus (i.e., goalsthat focus on avoiding and getting rid of negativeoutcomes). For goal settingin the achievementdomain it matters what kind of implicit theories people hold on the nature of ability. If people believe that ability is fixed andcannoteasily be changed, they chooseperformancegoals(i.e., goalsgeared at trying to find out through past performance how capableone is). If, however,peoplebelieve that ability can be improved by learning, they chooselearninggoals(i.e., goals gearedat trying to learn more abouton how one can successfully carry out the task at hand). People's needs, wishes, and higher order goals also influence the type of goals that are set. Once specifichigher order goals are formed (e.g., to becomea physician),the latter determine the contents of lower order goals (i.e., goals describingwhat has to be done to achieve thehigherordergoal).Moreover,a person'sconcept of what he or she could possibly become (i.e., the possibleself provides the individual with thematicconceptionsof what future selves he may strive for. Finally, the contentsof goals tend to reflect people's needs. For example, strong autonomy,competence,and social integration needslead to fewer materialistic goals and promote self-realizationgoals.
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For applied psychologists who attempt to strongly commit people to beneficialbehavioral Goal settingis basedon reflectiveand reflexive goals (e.g.,health goals, academicgoals,interprocesses.With respectto reflectiveprocesses, personalgoals), these findings imply that alon-e various ways of goal setting can be differwith promotingpeople'sconfidencein their own entiated(Oettingen,L99l). First, rhe heightened capabilities,making them mentaliy contrasttheir senseof efficacy that is basedon having sucpositive fantasiesabout the future with negative cessfuily attained a prior goal stimulates the aspects of the impeding reality is critical. setting of ever more challenginggoals. Second, Merely encouragingpeople to 'think positive' people show a greater readinessto set themabout their future does not lead to strong goal selvesgoals when they have exhaustivelydelibcommitments, even if expectationsof success erated the desirability and feasibility of their are high. Moreover, the contrastingprocedure wishes(i.e.,potentialgoals).Third, whenpeople helps people to refrain from setting themselves are lured into planning the implementationof a goals in domainswhere expectationsof success potential goal, they tend to commit themselves are low, as contrastingleads to recognizingthe to it. probability of success.Peoplewho are caughtup Finally, recent research demonstratesthat in perseveringfantasies about a desired future feasibility of goal attainment is not always or in perseveringruminations about a negative reflectedin people's goal setting,in the sense reality ignore the feasibility of potential goals that only goals with high probability of success and thus are at risk to commit themselvesto are chosen (Oettingen,2000). When people goals that cannotbe attained. positively fantasizeabout a desiredfuture outGoals may also become reflexively activated come, they set themselvesgoals independentof outsideof awareness(Bargh & Chartrand,1999). perceived feasibility. In other words, people Strong mental links develop betweenthe cogniwho indulge in positive fantasiesabout desired tive representationsof situations and the goals future outcomes commit themselvesto goals that peoplechronically pursuewithin them.As a irrationally; they are too committedwhen probconsequenceof this repeated and consistent abilities of successare low, and not committed pairing in the past, such goalsbecomeautomatienough when probabilities of successare high. cally activatedwhen the personentersthe releSuch irrational goal commitmentsare also obvant situation. The automatically activatedgoal servedwith people who are caught up in rumithen guides behavior, without the individual nations about aspectsof the presentreality that choosing or intending the respective goalstand in the way of reachingone's fantasies. directedline of action.Therehasbeena reflective When people are mentally contrasting their choice of the goal in the past,but this conscious positive fantasies with the impeding negative choice is now bypassed. If, for example, a reality, however, their goal setting strictly person has repeatedly and consistently chosen reflects perceivedfeasibility. Strong goal comsocial gatherings(e.g.,parties)to discusswork mitments emergewhen the perceivedfeasibility problems, the contextual cues associatedwith is high, and no goal commitmentat all is found parties will sooner or later trigger behaviors when the perceivedfeasibility is low. servingthis goal outside of awareness. Accordinglj, when the perceived feasibility of goal attainmentis high, the mental conffastGoal Striving ing of positive fantasiesabout the future with negative aspectsof the impeding reality is an Goal Content Effects effective route to creating sffong goal commitments.For instance,when an overweightperson Successfulgoal striving is determinedby how who is confident of her ability to lose weight goalsare framed and what contentsthey specify. contrasts his or her positive fantasies about The following structural features of goals are successfulweight loss with his or her thoughts important.Challenginggoalsthat are spelledout about the present negative reality (e.g., bad in specificterms lead to a higher attainmentrate eating habits, the hardships of exercising), a than modest specific goals or challenging but stronggoal commitmentcanbe expected.Strong vague ('do your best!') goals. Proximal goais goal commitments will not occur, however, that relateto what the individual doesin the near when people (evenhighly confidentpeople) fail presentor will do in the future are superior to to conüast their positive fantasies about the distai goals that point far into the future. App*desired future with the negative reality and ently, proximal goais allow for more performinstead mentally indulge in their desired future ance feedback and make it easier to monitor or are caught up in ruminations on negative progresstowards the goai. Goals with a positive aspectsof the presentreality (thus losing sight outcomefocus produce a promotion orientation of their desiredfuture). geared at achievement,which facilitates goal Processesof Goal Setting
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pursuit,whereasgoalswith a negativeoutcome focus producea preventionorientationgearedat acquiringsecurity,which hampersgoal pursuit. Learning goals lead to better performancesthan performancegoals, as the former allow for a more effective coping with failure than the latter by making people view set-backsas cues to Accordingly, focuson new behavioralstrategies. becomes oriented towards mastering behavior the causes of the set-backs,which ultimately furthers goal attainment.Performancegoals are lessdetrimental,however,when they are framed as approachgoals (e.9., I want to get good grades)as comparedwith avoidancegoals (e.g., I do not want to get bad grades). Moreover, the thematic content of goals matters. Goals covering issues of autonomy, competence,and social integration are said to further intrinsic goal pursuit and thus lead to better performancein the senseof greater creativity, higher cognitive flexibility. greaterdepth of information processing,and more effective coping with failure. The side effects of such goal pursuit are positive well-being and higher life satisfaction. People who set themselves goals such as making money,becomingfamous, and acquiring high stafus,experiencea reduced level of well-being as comparedwith goal contents such as cultivating one's relationshipsto friends or becoming active in community services. This is particularly true for individuals who feel a strong self-efficacy, implying that peoplewho successfullyimplementmaterialistic goais are particuiarly at risk for low well-being. Holding a high proportion of achievementand power goals is also linked to reduced wellbeing, whereas a high proportion of intimacy goals enhancesit. The effects of goals on subjective well-being are also influenced by how well people's goal contentsmatch the motives of achievement,affiliation, power, and intimacy. People with strong achievement and power motives and goals of the same theme as well as people with strong affiliation and intimacy motives and goals of the same theme report higher emotional well-being than people whose motives and goals are mismatched. Planning Experiencetells us that it is often a long way from goal settingto goal attainment.Having set a goal is just a first step,commonly followed by a host of implemental problems that need to be successfullysolved. These problems are manifold and pertain to initiating goal-directed actions and bringing them to a successfulending. To solve theseproblems effectively a personmay plan how shewantsto attain the chosen goal.
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Researchon implemental mind-sets (Gollwitzer, 1990) has shown that planning the implementationof a set goal createsa cognitive orientation that facilitates getting started with goal-directedactions. People with an impiemental mind-setbecomeclosed minded in the sense that they are no longer distracted by irrelevant information. They are, however, very effective in processing information related to the implementation of set goals. Moreover, desirability-relatedinformation is processedpartially, favoring pros over cons, and anaiysis of feasibility-related information favors illusory optimism. This optimism extendsto the illusion of control over behavioraloutcomes,a person's self-conceptof possessingimportant skiils and aptitudes,and to their perceivedvulnerability to both conffollableand uncontrollablerisks. These featuresof the implementalmind-setfavor goal attainmentas they allow the individual to effectively cope with problems of goal striving such as being distracted by irrelevancies, doubting the attractivenessof the pursuedgoal, or being pessimisticabout its feasibility. Set goalscommit peopleto attainingthe specified future (outcomeor behavior),but they do not commit people to when, where, and how they want to attain it. Such additional commitments can be added,however,by planningone's goal pursuit via forming so-called implementation intentions that take the form of if I encounter situationx, I intend to perform the goal-directed behaviory' (Gollwitzer,1999). Difficult to reach goals (e.g., healthy eating) benefit greatly from being furnishedwith implementationintentions. As implementation intentions spell out links between situational cues and goal-directed behavior, by forming such intentions people passon the control of goal-directedbehavior to environmentalcues.This facilitatesthe initiation of goal-directedactions. First, the mental representationsof the specified situational cues become highly activated, making these cues more accessible.Situational cues specified in implementationintentions are thus more easily detected,remembered,andmore readily attended to than comparablenon-intendedsituations.Second, action initiation becomesautomated.Goaldirected behaviors specified in implementation intentions are initiated immediately and effortlessly in the presenceof the critical situations. Even patientswith frontai lobe injuries (who are known to be plaguedby deficient consciousand effortful conffol of behavior)benefitfrom implementation intentions. But it is not only the problem of action initiation that is amelioratedby implementationintentions.Resistanceto temptation,fighting bad habits, and escapingthe
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unwantedinfluencesof competing goals activatedoutsideof the person'sawareness can also be facilitated. Next to forming implementation intentions there are other effective forms of planning. The task of planning can be approachedin a more reflective way as is entailed in mental simulations that explore possible routes to achieving one'sgoal(so-calledprocesssimulations;Taylor, Pham,Rivkin, & Armor, 1998).If suchprocess simulations are applied repeatedly,they further goal attainment,such as achieving good grades in academicexams.Apparently,repeatedmental simulations of how to achieve the soal also result in firm plans. Action Control Strategies Goal attainmentis often hamperedby competing goals.The issueof competinggoal pursuitshas been paid particular attention in theorizing on action control (Kuhl & Beckmann,1994).Successful goal attainment implies that a cuffent guiding goal has to be shieldedfrom competing goals(e.g.,the goal of makinga phonecall from the competing goal of tidying up one's messy desk). A number of different, but compatible control strategiesaredifferentiated,suchasattentionai control, emotional control, motivational control, and environmental control. Through environmentalcontrol, for example,the individual prevents the derailing of an ongoing goal pursuit by removing competing temptationsor enticementsfrom the situation in which goal pursuit is to occur. Whether and how effectively these strategies are useddependson the cunent control mode of the individual. An action-orientedperson concentrateson the planning and initiation of goaldirected action, respondsflexibly to contextual demands,and usescontrol strategieseffectively. Things are quite different with a state-oriented person as he or she cannot disengage from incompletegoalsand is thus caughtup in uncontrollable perseverationof thoughts related to aversiveexperiencesor in dysfunctionalthoughts about future successes.Action- and stateorientation may be induced by situational variables(e.g.,a surprisingevent,persistentfailure), but are also foundedin a personaldisposition. Recent research on state orientation as a personality attribute has discovered a further volitional handicapcalled self-infiltration. Stateorientedindividualsreadily misperceiveassigned goals as self-generated,and the degreeof such false self-ascriptions is closely associatedwith reduced enactmentof self-chosenas compared with assignedgoais.Thesefindingshave stimulated a new theoreticai perspective on action
orientationversusstateorientation,basedon the assumptionthat the volitional control of action is a result of the cooperationof various subsystems(i.e.,intentionmemory,extensionmemory, intuitivebehaviorcontrol,and objectrecognition). Action orientationversusstateorientation are parametersthat modulate the cooperation betweenthesesystemsthus leading to different kinds of action control with different outcomes. Successfullyresolving goal conflicts is not only an issue of shielding an ongoing goal pursuit from competinggoal pursuits (Cantor & Fleeson, 1994). There is also the possibility of creativeintegtations,wherenew goalsareformed which serveboth of the conflictinggoals (e.g., affiliation and achievementgoals can be reconciled by taking on very important or responsible communal roles). Moreover, in an attempt to meet higher order goals (e.g., graduatingfrom high school)peoplecan strategicallylink behavioral goals that on the surfaceappearin conflict (e.g., when being with people and studying are reconciled by studying in groups). Finally, people may always resort to disengagingfrom one of the conflictinggoals (e.g., by using the mental contrastingproceduredescribedabove). Mobilization of Effort A different line of researchis concernedwith how people avoid failures through increased effort (Wright, 1996). A person's readinessto exert effort turns out to be directly determined by the perceiveddifficulty of the task at hand. As the perceiveddifficulty increasesso doesthe person's effort expenditure,unless the task is recognizedas unsolvable.But there is a second limit to the linear increaseof effort expenditure in responseto heightenedtask difficulty: a person's potentialmotivation. Potential motivation is determinedby needrelated variables (i.e., strength of the related needor higher order goal, the incentive value of the task, and the instrumentalityof task completion for need satisfactionor attainment of the higher order goal). If the level of potential motivation is low, people do not find it worthwhile to extend more effort when an easy task becomes more difficult. This is because the upper limit of effort expenditure(suggestedby the potentialmotivation) is low and thusreached quickly. If potential motivation is high, however, an increase in difficulty is matched by investing more effort, and this responsiveness holds up to high levels of difficulty. This is becausethe upper limit of effort expenditure (suggestedby the potential motivation) is high and thus reachedonly after much effort.
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comesto 'Be-goals'that specifya desiredidentity (such as being a good parent, an excellent When failure occurs people do not give up on scientist,or a very reiigious person)there are their goal pursuitsbut experiencea discrepancy many different, alternative ways to indicate to that needsto be ciosed.In Bandura's(1997) oneselfandothersthat one possesses the aspired theory,goalshaveno motivationalconsequences identity. If one has failed to attain an indicator per se. They oniy specify the conditionsthat or has discovered that an indicator is out of allow for a positive or negativeself-evaluation. reach(e.g.,importantdiscoveriesfor a scientist), If the set goal is attainedthroughone's actions, one can compensateby striving for alternative a positive self-evaluationprevails;whereasstayindicators (e.g., supervisingstudents).People ing below one's goals leadsto a negativeselfwho havesetthemselvesself-defininggoalsand evaluation.The individual thus is seenas pushed still feel committed to attain them readily by the negativeself-evaluationassociatedwith respondto experiencesof falling short with such the discrepancy,and pulled by the anticipated compensatoryefforts. positive self-evaluationthat is intrinsically linked to closing the gap betweenthe statusquo and Summary the goal (i.e., the performancestandard).This implies that goais stimulate effortful action perspectives Social-psychological on motivation toward goal attainmentonly when peoplerecogfirst focused on identifying the determinants of nrze a discrepancybetweenthe statusquo and motivation. This search has moved from motives, the set goal. Bandurathereforeproposesgiving needs,and incentivesto more cognitive determifrequentfeedbackas a powerful meansof stimunants,such as expectations,attributions,control lating goal pursuit.However,peopleareexpected beliefs, and goals. With the recent focus on to engagein efforts to reduce the experienced goals, the issue of self-regulation of behavior discrepancyonly when they feel self-efficacious, has becomeprevalent.The human is conceived Carverand Scheier(1998)proposea different as a flexible strategist.This concept leads to a discrepancy reduction theory of goal pursuit. focus on the analysisof reflective and reflexive Based on cyberneticcontrol theory, the central psychologicalprocessesthat guide the successconceptualunit of their analysisis the negative ful attainmentof desiredoutcomes. feedbackloop. Carver and Scheierhighlight the hierarchical organization of goal pursuit and thus assumea cascadingloop structure. GoalAcrNowr-BDGEMENTS directed behavior is usually regulated at the middle level ('Do-goals') with action at higher J. D. D. thanks Dr. M. Siemann (Konstanz) levels ('Be-goals') suspended until the individfor much help during the preparation of the ual becomesself-aware.When discrepancieson the 'Be-level' or the 'Do-level' are discovered, manuscript. lower level goalsor behaviorsgealedat discrepancy reduction are triggered. People are assumedto consult their outcome Resounce RBpeBBNcps expectations when discrepancy reduction is hampered;in case of high expectationspeople Bandura, A. (1997). Self-fficacy: The exercise of keep trying, whereaslow expectationslead to control. New York: Freeman, giving up. A positive affective responseas a Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the selfconsequenceof goal attainmentis not assumed, regulation of behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambndge nor is the detectionof a discrepancyassumedto University Press. be associatedwith negative affect. Rather, the Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.). (1996). The speedof progressin discrepancyreduction is psychology of action: Linking cognition and motiseenas the sourceof positive or negative feelvation to action. New York: Guilford Press. ings in a person'sgoal pursuit.The intensityof Heckhausen, H. (1989). Motivation und Handeln. these feelings is again regulated in a negative Berlin: Springer-Verlag. feedbackloop. If the speedmeetsa setreference Heckhausen, H. (1991). Motivation and action. criterion, positive feelings result, whereasnegaBerlin: Springer-Verlag. tive feelings are experiencedwith any speedthat Kalat, J.W. (1997). Biological psychology (6th ed.). staysbelow this criterion. Pacific Grove: Brooks Cole. Researchon self-defininggoals demonstrates, McClelland, D. (1985). Human motivation. Glenview, however,that peopledo not necessarilyhave to IL: Scott, Foresman & Co. move downwards (i.e., to lower level goals) Mook, D. G. (1996). Motivation: The organization of when trying to closegoal discrepancies. When it action (Znd ed.). New York: Norton. DiscrepancyRedttction
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Communications concerning this chapter should be addressed /o.' Professor Peter M. Gollwitzer, Universität Konstanz, Fachgruppe Psychologie, Postfach 55 60, D-j8434 Konstanz, Germany
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