Jun 14, 2017 - Vira, who have guided and steered the direction of this MPhil project. ... Elder brother ... the other, navigate the politics of intervention in rural Alwar. ...... TBS can enact paternal powers over the communities and organize them under ...... Saurabh Gupta (2016) details, the PAWDI model soon failed because ...
Politics of ‘community-based natural resource management’ in rural Alwar: A critical analysis of Tarun Bharat Sangh’s work on water conservation.
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Modern South Asian Studies.
By, Gaurav Daga, Darwin College, 14 June 2017
i
Declaration: This MPhil dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is an outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. No part of the dissertation is written or submitted concurrently for any other degree, diploma or qualification at the University of Cambridge or elsewhere, except for the fulfilment of the degree in Master of Philosophy in Modern South Asian Studies as stated on the title page. This dissertation does not exceed the word limit of 20,000 as specified in the MPhil course handbook and the approximate word count of this dissertation is 19,997 words (excluding translations, figure captions and addendum). Interviews conducted for this dissertation are available in a CD with the Centre of South Asian Studies, and except stated photographs used are from my fieldwork.
ii
Table of Content: Page No. List of figures and table
v
Acknowledgements
vi
Acronyms
vii
Glossary
viii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1
Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 Literature Review
2 3
2.1
What is CBNRM?
4
2.2
The emergence of CBNRM
5
2.3
South Asia’s unique context
6
2.4
Why CBNRM?
9
2.5
NGO led CBNRM
11
2.6
Studying an NGO led CBNRM
11
2.7
Tarun Bharat Sangh
12
2.8
Research Question
13
Chapter 3 Methodology
14
3.1
Design and approach
14
3.2
Data Collection (Primary and Secondary)
14
3.3
Positionality
17
3.4
Limits of research methodology
19
Chapter 4 Micro and Macro politics of TBS
20
4.1
Alwar and its brief history on water conservation
20
4.2
Arrival of Tarun Bharat Sangh in rural Alwar
21
4.3
Institutional step up of TBS in Bheekampura
23
4.4
Organisation, ideology and process of TBS
25
4.5
The strategy of TBS’s CBNRM
32
4.6
Summary
40
Chapter 5 Politics of intervention in rural Alwar
1
41
5.1
Sehgal Foundation
42
5.2
Govt. of Rajasthan
43 iii
5.3
TBS’s critique of Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan 45
5.4
Summary
Chapter 6 Perceptions of TBS’s Intervention:
50
6.1
The idea of ‘community’
50
6.2
Participation and Equity
51
6.3
Traditional knowledge
54
6.4
Environmental impact of TBS’s johad
57
6.5
Summary
57
Chapter 7 Conclusion 7.1
48
58
Limits and areas for further research
62
Bibliography
63
Appendix 1 – Other tables
71
Appendix 2 – Other photographs from the field
75
iv
List of Figures and Table: Figures:
Page No.
Figure 1
Participant observer becoming a real participant
18
Figure 2
The guru-student story
23
Figure 3
Location of TBS Ashram
23
Figure 4
Proverb 1
29
Figure 5
Proverb 2
29
Figure 6
Chaman Singh’s list for a site selection
31
Figure 7
Policy advocacy of Rajendra Singh
36
Figure 8
Proverb 3
47
Figure 9
Proverb 4
47
Figure 10
Proverb 5
48
Figure 11
A depiction of gram sabha process at Tarun ashram
52
Figure 12
Water, Women and River
54
Figure 13
Drip Irrigation System at a farm in Jaitpura
55
Comparison between TBS, Govt. of Rajasthan and SF
49
Table: Table 4
v
Acknowledgements: Any academic work will be incomplete without a due acknowledgement of the role of network and space in which one operates. Therefore, I would like to first thank my supervisor Bhaskar Vira, who have guided and steered the direction of this MPhil project. Bruno Latour, for his classes at SciencesPo and the concept ‘Parliament of Things’ from which the idea to work on Tarun Bharat Sangh evolved. David Washbrook and Edward Anderson for their enduring support throughout the MPhil program. Barbara Roe, Rachel Rowe and Kevin Greenbank for their help with the administrative and technical support. Darwin College for the Finley Bursary, and all other professors, colleagues, family, and friends for their active support throughout the MPhil program. A substantial part of the thesis stems from the informal conversation and interviews I conducted with dozens of people over Skype, telephone, email and in person. Therefore, I want to thank each one of them for their time, help and support. This dissertation is dedicated to my lifeworld, Puja.
vi
Acronyms CBNRM Community-based natural resource management
CNRM
Community natural resource management
CII
Confederation of Indian Industries
GS
Gram Sabha
ICCO
Inter-church Organisation for Development Cooperation
JFM
Joint Forest Management
JJJ
Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan
MJSA
Mukhya Mantri Jal Swavlamban Abhiyan
NGOs
Non-governmental organisations
NRM
Natural resource management
PRI
Panchayati Raj Institutions
SC
Scheduled Caste
SDC
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SF
S M Sehgal Foundation
SIDA
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SONIA
SOciety for New Initiatives and Activities / Associazione Sonia
ST
Scheduled Tribe
TBS
Tarun Bharat Sangh
vii
Glossary: Hindi
English
anicut
‘A cement concrete structure plugging a drain or a waste weir of a bund or embankment’ (Gupta, 2016; Kumar and Kandpal, 2003: 18)
bade bhaiya
Elder brother
bandh
‘Community or private structure impounding water generally with a straight embankment’ (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003: 18)
bhoomi poojan
Ground-breaking ceremony
bighas
A traditional unit for the measurement of a land
hookah
‘A tobacco pipe with a long tube which draws the smoke through water contained in a bowl’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2017)
johad
A concave-shaped earthen dam built to store rainwater run-off (Gupta, 2016; Kumar and Kandpal, 2003: 18)
khalsa villages
Villages paying revenue to the state
mai-baap
Father and mother
padayatras
A march for protest or pilgrimage on foot
pani baba
Water man
samaj / samaaj
Community or society
samaj seva
Public service
sarvodaya
The economic and social development of a community as a whole
shramdan
Voluntary labour
shivirs
Workshops
swadeshi
Self-sufficiency
viii
Chapter 1: Introduction: The objective of this dissertation is twofold. At one level, it tries to trace the evolution, strategy and politics of a non-governmental organisation, namely Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) vis-à-vis state and non-state actors, at another level, it tries to analyse the delivery model used by TBS to solidify its legitimacy. Central to this twofold objective is a discussion on the political economy of water in rural Alwar. Home to a population of 3,674,179, the district of Alwar is in the state of Rajasthan (Census, 2011). Geographically characterized by Imperial Gazetteer (1908: 254) as ‘rocky and precipitous’, the district is surrounded by Aravalli hills in the north and east part of the region, and dry plains in the south and west of the region. The semi-arid climatic condition of the region combined with sequences of ‘limestone, quartzite, phyllites’ as its geomorphic condition makes it prone to drought occurrences (Glendenning, 2009: 45). Therefore, to meet its demands, the region has been historically dependent upon rainfall and the public infrastructure created by the state and communities. After the establishment of the nation-state, many who believed in the state led development called for it to organise natural resource management (NRM). Others, who rested faith in communities, called for them to lead the mantle (Kulkarni et al., 2015). However, the advent of an atomistic paradigm of groundwater extraction in India radically changed the demand-supply economics of natural resources. That is, at one hand, while the usage of groundwater resources has ‘enabled millions of India’s farmers to improve agricultural production over reasonably short periods of time’, on the other hand, it had also ‘given rise to serious issues around socio-ecological sustainability including public health, environment and increased levels of vulnerability to resource abuse and contamination’ (Kulkarni et al., 2015: 189). To tame this conundrum, many argued for the state ‘to develop robust mechanisms of groundwater governance along with participatory forms of groundwater management’ (Kulkarni et al., 2015: 190). In the light decentralization discourse, this was framed as a call for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). While the state rested faith in science led development, civil society actors were quick to embrace CBNRM (Gadgil and Guha, 1995). Following its implementation, TBS claimed that its unique CBNRM model for watershed has minimized droughts occurrences and elevated
1
communities from abject poverty in rural Alwar. The creation of critical water zones with equitable social and ecological benefits led global admiration for TBS (SIWI, 2017). Today, other actors in the region, namely, the Govt. of Rajasthan and Sehgal Foundation (an NGO) have started replicating its approach and methods. In this context, it becomes interesting to see how does TBS, at one hand, and other actors, on the other, navigate the politics of intervention in rural Alwar. One way to explore this question would be to broadly focus on the macro economy of water in rural Alwar, but such a discussion will negate the micro methods of each actor and the choices/strategies it makes along the way. Combining both the scales rather, micro and macro, will shed light on the method, organisational structure and politics they engage to attest their legitimacy. Taking TBS as its case study, this dissertation will first go on to develop a history of TBS along with its organisational structure and method of working. Second, it will try to show the choices and strategies TBS makes in its micro-macro politics of intervention. Third, the dissertation will examine the politics of CBNRM intervention in rural Alwar vis-à-vis TBS, Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan. And finally, it will try to interrogate the effects of TBS’s intervention and how have different stakeholders engaged and perceived these interventions. In unpacking these questions, the dissertation will analyse the legitimacy, accountability and transparency challenges of the organisation and what they mean for TBS and other actors. 1.1: Outline of the Dissertation: The dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter 2 will briefly discuss the state-civil society relationship vis-à-vis the emergence of CBNRM in India’s historic developments. It will then raise the research questions for the dissertation. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology employed in the dissertation, along with issues of positionality and its limits. Chapter 4 will present the findings of the first research question, followed by Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on the second and third question respectively. And finally, Chapter 7 will give a summary of the key issues discussed in this dissertation, followed by bibliography and appendixes.
2
Chapter 2: Literature Review: Civil society actors have contributed immensely in the development process and public service delivery of essential goods. According to a report, there are about twenty-two lakh registered NGOs operating in India (Rajagopal, 2015). Some enthusiastically term their rise as an ‘associational revolution’, while others modestly recognize their importance (Salamon, 1995). Analysing their contribution in governance mechanisms, Kapur et al. (2017) have argued that civil society organisations have ‘provided a buffer against the state’s weaknesses and also helped to improve accountability’ (Kapur et al., 2017: 8). They argue that using various methods, civil society actors have held the state accountable. However, when it comes to their own transparency and accountability procedures, civil society organisations have not been uniformly transparent (Kapur et al., 2017: 8). There is little information available publicly on the operations, procedures and performance many organisations have engaged in (Kapur et al., 2017). The Hindu argues that out of twenty-two lakh registered NGOs, only 10% have submitted their balance sheets to the government (Rajagopal, 2015). In this regard, the recent crackdown on civil society organisations by the Modi-led government is premised upon the principle that NGOs need to be held accountable for the funds, agendas and politics it participates in (Mohan, 2017). While such crackdown affects organisations that engage in legitimate work, the ‘capricious and oversensitive’ nature of the state hampers the growth of civil society led social movements (Kapur et al., 2017: 9). Kudva (2005) and Sahoo (2013) have shown that the terrain of civil society-state relationship has been historically dependent upon the state-society relationship. Starting from the colonial period to the present-day politics, they argue that NGOs navigate their role based on national and international politics (Sahoo, 2013: 62) (Kudva, 2005). In other words, the multi-faceted nature of the state and civil society organisations imposes challenges on the life, evolution and legitimacy of genuine NGOs. Edwards and Hulme (1996) in their seminal edit have argued that to avoid such legitimacy traps, strong accountability, performance monitoring and strategic planning can help NGOs take advantage of the opportunities offered while ensuring ‘warning signals are identified, listened to, and addressed’ (Edward and Hulme, 1996: 4). While it can be tricky to track the functioning accountability method NGOs adopt, such as echoing to the agenda of the state, or the donor agency, but the
3
organisational prescription by Edwards and Hulme (1996) is that accountability and legitimacy measures are important criteria to claim representation and opportunities. Within the discourse of natural resource management, community-based natural resource management has been rigorously adopted for accountability and service delivery methods (Kulkarni et al., 2015). From the United Nations to local NGOs, many actors have adopted CBNRM as the method to claim legitimacy and provide services for rural development. 2.1: What is CBNRM? Also known as participatory resource management (PRM), collaborative resource management (CRM), community forest management (CFM), community natural resource management (CNRM) and by various other terms, CBNRM, as a method is used and applied for various accountability measures – reciprocal, upward-downward and so on (Edward and Hulme, 1996). Be it for a watershed, forestry or land management, various actors, including governments increasingly use and prefer CBNRM to contextualise their performance. But what remains confusing and bit contested is the precise definition of CBNRM. Tang and Zhao (2011) argue that ‘CBNRM essentially emphasises collaborative, deliberate, programmatic, decentralised, democratic, inter-disciplinary, and adaptive, dynamic decision processes’ (Tang and Zhao, 2011: 406). While these terminologies might capture the specificities of CBNRM, it can have different meanings for different actors. For instance, Norman Uphoff (1998), argues that CBNRM is different from ‘community natural resource management’ i.e. CNRM. For him, ‘CNRM’ refers to communities that are ‘autonomous’ and independent in their ‘protection and use of natural resources’ (Uphoff, 1998: 2). Compared to Tang and Zhao’s (2011) description, Uphoff’s definition also includes utilization of traditional ‘knowledge, norms and institutions’ (Uphoff, 1998: 2). In other words, Uphoff argues with the inclusion of the word ‘community-based’, it means, in CBNRM (not CNRM) there is an involvement of a third party (government, donors, or an NGO) which works with the community for its natural resource management. Jesse Ribot (2002) on the other hand, argues that CBNRM means ‘efficiency’, ‘equity and justice for local people’ (Ribot, 2002: 1). But qualifying the statement, Ribot (2002) argues that CBNRM cannot be achieved without establishing local institutions and transparency conditions. Arguing for ‘democratic decentralization’, Ribot believes without ‘representative
4
and accountable local institutions’ CBNRM cannot be scaled up or institutionalized (Ribot, 2002: 1). Thus, to implement CBNRM as a solution, local democracy is essential (Ribot, 2002). Taking the Indian case, Baumann and Farrington (2003) point out that powers for CBNRM need to be devolved to ‘Panchayati Raj Institutions’ (PRI), which are better placed in allocating rights, resolving conflicts, establishing accountability and creating impact. In sum, what these different definitions and specificities suggest that broadly CBNRM emphasizes the involvement of a community, if not participation, as an essential condition for legitimacy and method for NRM (Menon et al., 2007). In involving ‘community’, the idea is that one simultaneously addresses issues of social justice, environmental sustainability and responsibility in their approach. While this highlights the discursive terrain of the discourse, it also shows the ‘faith’ that is being put by different actors on ‘CBNRM’ as a method for NRM. This mainstreaming is not only done by actors who work on environment or NRM, but also by governments, missionaries, cooperatives, international agencies and civil society organisations who have innovated and believed in CBNRM as a tool for their legitimacy and accountability measures. Therefore, the shift in the wider discourse of development, particularly in South Asia, is the result of various experiments and initiatives that emerged from ‘below’ and ‘above’ in the early 1970s. 2.2: The emergence of CBNRM: After India’s independence, Nehru’s tryst with destiny was embraced with an enthusiasm for science and state-led development (Roy, 2007). Nehru believed that state-led investments in dams, heavy industries, and scientific research can bring progress and providence to the poverty-ridden newly independent country (Roy, 2007). Even though Gandhi differed from Nehru’s path for modernization, Nehru rarely considered his ideas of note-worthy (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006). The state led path of modernization was thus based on science, industrialization and consumption of fossil fuels (Gadgil and Guha, 1995). At this point, civil society actors were largely ‘silent partners’ in the state-led social transformation (Sahoo, 2013). In the first few decades, one saw state led extraction of natural resources to produce energy, steel, cement, and the new industrial base for the country (Gadgil and Guha, 1995). It was believed that this discourse of progress will alleviate poverty in India. However, policies that were undertaken for reducing poverty were ‘piecemeal’ (Ray and Katzenstein, 2005: 7).
5
Rather, the ‘complex of processes favouring a narrow elite’ created a ‘large numbers of ecological refugees in the hinterlands’ (Gadgil and Guha, 1995: 32). The process of empowering certain section of the society came at a massive cost to the mass, environment and the earth systems. This process of state-led development did not see high levels of growth either. From 1951 to 1991, the average growth rate was around 4% (McCartney, 2009: 32-33). In other words, the Nehruvian dream neither lifted a significant number of people from poverty nor created a substantial socio-physical infrastructure (Kohli, 1987) (Gadgil and Guha, 1995). Later, the policy results of ‘Green Revolution’ were also limited – with it came increased groundwater extraction, degradation of soil, and use of pesticides (Kohli, 1987). This was supplemented with a short-sightedness of policies adopted. The agricultural subsidies that were implemented benefited only a tiny rural elite (Kohli, 1987: 206). By the late 1970s, the disillusionment with the development state paved the way for civil society actors to occupy the centre stage of public service delivery (Sahoo, 2013; Gadgil and Guha, 1995). At this point actors who believed in a community led institutional design, began to emerge at large. In varying degrees, each one of them, including technocrats, innovated upon different legitimacy, accountability and service delivery methods. 2.3: South Asia’s unique context: First, those who believed in a Gandhian approach: In 1948, six weeks after Gandhi’s assassination, individuals like ‘Jayaprakash Narayan, Vinobha Bhave’, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru’ and many others came together to deliberate upon his principles (Cherian, 2014: 11). Out of this meeting emerged, the Sarva Seva Sangh (SSS) with a mandate to ‘carry forward the Mahatma’s plan to build a casteless society based on truth and nonviolence’ (Cherian, 2014: 11). This was in line with Gandhi’s idea that after Independence, political parties must dismantle themselves and serve the country in form of a voluntary public organisation. The few, who were inspired by his principles become the forerunners in the formation of civil society groups in India. Gandhi Peace Foundation, Ekta Parishad and movements such as Sampoorna Kranti (Total Revolution) led by Jayaprakash Narayan (or J.P.), emerged out of the 1948 principles (Cherian, 2014: 1). Critiquing state processes, these actors demanded public accountability from the state. And as with their own responsibility, they believed in accountability to the communities (not to the state).
6
Second, those who believed in a traditional approach: Growing out of the Gandhian approach, this model emphasized upon the role of traditional knowledge in its approach. Using Uphoff’s (1998) definition of CNRM, these were communities who believed in utilizing local knowledge to implement NRM policies. They argued that ‘state’ (be it via – Panchayati Raj, partnership model or any other way), needs to be kept at a distance. Involvement of ‘state’ meant a dilution of control, knowledge and ownership of natural resources. The Mendha-Lekha village of Gadchiroli in Maharashtra were regarded as the representative of successfully managed traditional CNRM (Pathak and Erica, 2008). However, blurring Uphoff’s (1998) definition, NGOs and other actors started employing the discourse of ‘traditionalism’ in their functioning strategy. As Sinha et al. (1997) puts it, these actors valorised concepts like ‘traditional’ society and ‘indigenous’ knowledge to legitimize their discourse (Sinha et al., 1997: 67). As Chapter 4 will show, Tarun Bharat Sangh is one such organisation which blurs the distinction between Gandhian/traditional and CBNRM/CNRM model as sharply defined by Uphoff and others. Third, those who believed in cooperatives: The independence of India had a profound effect on the role of cooperatives in tackling the rural indebtedness and agricultural development. Leaders like Gandhi, Nehru and Patel supported the idea of cooperatives and saw it as an essential pillar in strengthening the fragile (economic) democracy of India (Saigal, 2012). While it was intended to be a bottom-up CBNRM approach, the co-option by state, transformed it into a top-down approach. The success of AMUL, a dairy cooperative, become the example for the state (Saigal, 2012). As a part of the planned economy, cooperatives were often prescribed as the service delivery solution for rural challenges. However, with state-led cooperative development, came control and interference. That is, by regulating the accounts of cooperatives in terms of funding and direction, the state started controlling ‘all aspects of cooperative functioning’ (Saigal, 2012: 188). By 1985, the control and bureaucratisation of the cooperative continued further by creating a ‘top-down’ system of cooperative CBNRM model rather that its intent (bottom-up). Soon, the failure of this approach led the state to look for other alternatives. This search was addressed with the emergence of decentralized institutional approach.
7
And finally, those who believed in decentralization: 1. Calling for community ownership, civil society movements like Chipko, and Narmada Bachao Andolan, argued for a decentralized decision-making system. These movements were premised upon the idea that devolution of power would give a ‘voice’ to the local communities and create functional accountability within the system. While some argue, these movements were defensive in nature, their demands, however, were policy prescriptive. Based on Ribot’s (2002) classification, these movements believed in democratic decentralization and implementation of CBNRM. 2. The second set of actors who believed in the voice and ownership of communities were technocrats. They sought to create a space for communities in their collective action for NRM. The famous Sukhomajri and Dhamala experiment in Haryana led by a technocrat was hailed as the model for watershed CBNRM (Ray, 2008: 24). With the support of the local government, the results of this initiative led to increased socio-economic standards of the village. Similarly, following the efforts of a ‘forest officer in Arabari, West Bengal’, communities participated in the forest management of their region, which later led to the emergence of Joint Forest Management (JFM) (Menon et al., 2007: 5; Ray, 2008: 24). Therefore, out of the 1990s ‘decentralization’ wave, the state (after failures in the cooperative method), brought two major administrative and political changes in the governance of NRM. First, was the devolution of state powers on NRM to ‘Panchayati Raj Institutions’ (PRI). In 1993, a constitutional amendment was passed with an aim to ‘strengthen local government, collectively called Panchayati Raj Institutions, at District, Block and Village levels’ (Baumann and Farrington, 2003: 1). More than any proven success, this was based on the emerging discourse that participatory institutions can resolve multiple accountability challenges and provide a buffer against the legitimacy crisis of the state (Mathur, 2013). Second, was the partnership model: That is, following the passage of ‘Panchayati Raj Institutions’, Joint Forest Management (JFM), Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), and Watershed Management (WM) began to emerge in India. ‘While the underlying idea of both these developments was to empower and involve the community at the lower level in decision making…, the institutional structures envisaged for them’ served ‘different purposes’ (Bose, 2006: 2). With PRI, the idea was the ‘elected representatives of the village populations as mandated by the Constitution’ can steer, amend, resolve or enact local policy
8
solutions (Bose, 2006: 2). On the other hand, with JFM or WM, these models were specifically designed by the state departments to actively involve local communities in their efforts for NRM – without Panchayati Raj politics (Bose, 2006). While both models had their own accountability goals, the main objective was that in one way or another, local communities must be engaged in NRM and legitimacy must be gained for the ‘state’ (Bose, 2006). 2.4: Why CBRNM? As evident from the above discussion, civil society actors and the state innovated upon different types of CBNRM to legitimize their interventions. This was not the first-time state or the civil society actors were discovering ‘communities’. But the new thing in their emergence was the larger change in the policy context and the legitimacy interest of varied actors to follow their own model. For state: 1. The first stream of support emerged from the policy practitioners who were critical of the way policies were formulated and implemented. The Hanumantha Rao Committee Report (1994) and the Mohan Dharia Committee Report (1995) argued that the involvement of communities, and their knowledge were important in achieving the objectives of rural development. Development professionals like Robert Chambers (1983) also argued that one of the reasons rural development does not work is because people who define and implement policies (the ‘outsiders’) are not the ones who experience rural life (the ‘insiders’). ‘Outsiders’ as he puts it ‘underperceive rural poverty’ (Chambers, 1983). Therefore, ‘the failure of development projects’ is the result of a ‘technocratic approach to development’ (Chambers, 1983). Thus, these practitioners highlighted the need to change the ‘method’ and design for policy implementation. 2. The second stream of support emerged from the actors who were interested in addressing the legitimacy and accountability challenges of the state. To overcome the crisis of representation and performance, they argued for a strong state with participatory methods (Kudva, 2005). By creating ‘downward’ accountability to beneficiaries, communities and supporters, the state would effectively gain its legitimacy. And by controlling the operational procedures of civil society actors, the state could also minimize its dissent and
9
discipline NGOs (Kapur et al., 2017). In sum, the adoption of CBNRM approach meant the emergence of a stronger state with renowned purpose and intent (Kudva, 2005). For civil society actors: 1. The first stream of support emerged from a variety of discourse. The post-colonial discourse of environmentalism argued that the linear path of modernity came at the cost of the ecological destruction, and only benefited the tiny urban-rural elites (Gadgil and Guha,1995). Supporting this discourse, the traditionalist, argued that involvement of local communities and their knowledge will not only instil a positive attitude in NRM but also help manage resource better because as a ‘small’ ‘homogeneous’ ‘spatial unit’, communities share common norms and concern (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001: 8). Demonstrating such hypothesis, works of Elinor Ostrom ‘showed that when natural resources are jointly used by their users, in time, rules are established for how these are to be cared for and used in a way that is both economically and ecologically sustainable’ (Nobelprize.org, 2017). In sum, these discourses argued that with proper norms and institutions, CBNRM can be achieved. 2. The second stream of support emerged from the state-civil society relationship on the accountability and legitimacy challenges. Civil society organisations, often have multiple accountability challenges – addressing – ‘upwards’ to the trustee, donors and governments, and ‘downwards’ to the beneficiaries, staff, partners, and supporters (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Adopting CBNRM was argued would not only help establish upward and downward accountability challenges, but also provide NGOs, an authority against the multi-faceted nature of the state, which seeks to control, discipline and regulate the functioning of an organisation. Hence, politically, ‘a strong community-based NGO’ can then negotiate with the state on its own terms, irrespective of the state-society relationship (Kudva, 2005: 236). Supporting this discourse, many NGOs like Ekta Parishad started adopting the Gandhian approach with such strategic accountability in its practice (Carr-Harris, 2015). Such legitimacy-innovation gave civil society organisations the openness to change its strategy as per context and situation.
10
2.5: NGO led CBNRM: While the appropriation of CBNRM gave NGOs the legitimacy and voice to claim its political presence, they employed a different functioning strategy based upon their agenda and politics of intervention. As Lewis and Kanji (2009) classifies, NGOs working on CBNRM pivoted themselves around one or more of the three main parameters of its function – ‘implementers’, ‘catalysts’ or ‘partners’ (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 12). Depending upon their political economy goals, NGOs manoeuvred to their ‘upward’ (to the trustee, donors and governments) and ‘downward’ (to the beneficiaries, staff, partners, and supporters) challenges (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 1. As implementers or partners, these NGOs aligned with the governments, the donor agency or a private player to implement CBNRM policies. Such strategy benefited both the NGO, community and the third party (state, donor or private player). The third party could delegate resources to such NGOs to deliver results, while it would claim the impact as its ‘performance’. This helped minimize risks and maximize results for both the parties. As Chapter 5 will show, Sehgal Foundation is one such NGO which works with both public and private players while developing its own brand image. 2. And second, as catalysts, these NGOs were driven by a leader who tried to bring a change in their chosen discourse. ‘This [change] may be directed towards individuals or groups in local communities, or among other actors in development such as government, business or donors’ (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 12). To implement such change, catalyst NGOs manoeuvred their strategy based on state-society relationship. As Chapter 4 will show, Tarun Bharat Sangh is one such NGO which positions itself as a catalyst. 2.6: Studying an NGO led CBNRM: Given this discursive framework and the wider network in which NGOs operate, it becomes interesting to take a case study and analyses its politics vis-à-vis its organisation, method, politics and the CBNRM model it promotes. Why? Because during the euphoria of the 1990s, NGOs were perceived as the ‘gap-fillers’ of development but today, there are a wider set of perceptions about their role (from anti-nationals to key partners). Therefore, to navigate against the heavy hand of the state, NGOs can ‘shift its emphasis from one to the other [strategy] over time’ (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 15). Further, to develop a niche market for itself, they try to develop their primary image in the larger development space as ‘implementers’, ‘catalysts’ or
11
‘partners’ (Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Therefore, focusing on an NGO will not only shed light on its evolution, choices, strategy and legitimacy challenges but also help us avoid generalization on the CBNRM model. Thus, taking cognizant of the wide literature available on the politics of NGO and CBNRM, this dissertation has decided to focus upon, an NGO, namely Tarun Bharat Sangh based in rural Alwar, Rajasthan as its case study. 2.7: Tarun Bharat Sangh: Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS), an NGO was formed in 1975. Inspired by the Gandhian ideals of rural development, TBS decided to work on water conservation using traditional-Gandhian approach to CBNRM. Located in the semi-arid region of Thanagazi tehsil of Alwar district, TBS aims to make communities self-reliant (Tarun Bharat Sangh, 2017). Celebrating the spirit of ‘community’, TBS ‘considers itself as a grassroots movement rather than a conventional NGO’ (Gupta, 2016: 113). Starting initially as johad constructors in Gopalpura, TBS has radically expanded its scale over the years. It claims to have an experience of working in 15 districts of Rajasthan, covering 1000 villages and constructing 10000 rain-water harvesting structures (Sisodia, 2009: 7). In 2001, Rajendra Singh, the chairman of TBS was named the ‘Ramon Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership’ and similarly, in 2015, the winner of ‘Stockholm Water Prize’ (SIWI, 2017). Today, it has an international office in the UK and Rajendra Singh is frequently invited by global civil society actors to discuss, influence and shape policies on water, climate and environment. Given this global admiration for its ‘success’ and the staggering amount of work done by TBS, its working model has been an example for other actors to replicate. Actors, like Government of Rajasthan, and Sehgal Foundation, operating in rural Alwar have replicated TBS’s model while retaining their functioning strategies.
12
2.8: Research Question: Therefore, focusing on TBS, this dissertation will ask the following questions in its attempt to understand, 1. What makes TBS’s model a unique approach to CBNRM? How has it evolved, and what are the choices it has made in its political economy? 2. Given the increasing success of its model, how have other actors in the region adopted its model and what has been the politics of intervention between them? 3. And finally, what are the effects of TBS’s intervention and how do different stakeholders engage and perceive these interventions? The aim of these questions is to understand both the evolution of an NGO vis-à-vis the broader political economy and the delivery mechanism it chooses to adopt. As William F. Fisher (1997) puts it, CBNRM practitioners ubiquitously use ‘participation, empowerment, local, and community’ to legitimize their role (Fisher, 1997: 442). Similarly, they operate across complex networks of constellations whereby they undertake different sets of activities and partnerships over time. Therefore, unpacking TBS’s strategy and choices will help unpack the processes and politics of conservation in rural Alwar.
13
Chapter 3: Research Methodology: At one level, while the focus of this dissertation is to unpack the evolution, strategy, choices and politics of TBS, at another level, it is also to focus on the interpretation and representation of the CBNRM model. In trying to peel its multiple layers, the dissertation seeks to understand the centrality of TBS’s power relationship and the conditions that inform its political ecology. The theoretical framework for this dissertation is inspired by the concept of political ecology, which is generally understood as an ‘attempt to understand the political sources, conditions and ramifications of environmental change’ (Bryant, 1992: 13). One of the key arguments of political ecology is ‘that access to environmental resources is always socially mediated or constrained, usually involving multiple processes acting at different scales’ (Batterbury, 2015: 28). This means looking at issues from multiple spatial and temporal framework. 3.1: Design and approach: As its research design, this dissertation employs political ecology as its framework to understand the legitimacy and accountability challenges of an NGO and its political economy. 1. In ontological terms, the framework of political ecology means interrogating ‘what’ questions of reality that constitute the socio-economic condition of the emerging order. 2. In epistemological terms, this means asking questions of how and why. How are stories of legitimacy constructed? How does TBS frame the political economy of its ‘success’? and so on. Such questions will not only help to understand the discursive nature of its practice but also unpack issues of representation and challenges. 3. In methodological terms, this means understanding the historical context and reasons for TBS’s emergence, the narrative of its beneficiaries, motives of the TBS, counter-narratives of the other actors and reasons for its ‘success’. By using qualitative research and other sources of primary and secondary data collection, the dissertation seeks to analyse its research questions. 3.2: Data Collection The data for this dissertation was collected using qualitative research and other sources of primary and secondary methods. This includes being aware of researcher’s subjectivity and other biases that stem from the theoretical framework. The following section will explain the various methods that were used for data collection, followed by a section on positionality and limits of this research.
14
1. Primary data: a. Qualitative research: Qualitative research can mean varied things and approaches. But for the dissertation, the approach employed is of ethnography, which includes, participant observation, analysing artefacts, and conducting interviews. One of the reasons qualitative method was used is because observational research is well suited for understanding the socio-historical context, processes, mundane details and micro-macro politics of TBS. This does not mean that the limits of qualitative research, or observer-observed difference do not apply but for the context of this research, qualitative research was seen as a useful tool. b. Purposeful sampling: In order to unpack the discursive landscape of the research objectives, purposeful sampling was employed. In carrying out the sampling, actors were selected based on the discourse created by TBS and the stakeholders it is accountable to. That is actors from ‘upward accountability’ – donors, state, civil society actors and ‘downward’ to the beneficiaries, staffs and representatives of TBS were interviewed. Following the discourse, actors operating in rural Alwar, that is, representative of Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan were also interviewed. In sum, around seventeen interviews were conducted. Table 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 gives a detailed description of the sample along with its rationale. c. Interviews: Interviews play an important in understanding the link between the narrative and the social construction of CBNRM. With a belief in participants as ‘experts’ or ‘holders’ of social knowledge, participant’s access to experiences and reason were regarded as ‘understanding’ the phenomena. The interviews were conducted in semi-structured format keeping the objectives of the research in mind. Regarding the process of carrying out interviews, it is often perceived that to gather data, one must leave the desk and go to the ‘field’. But this assumes the consistency of research sites and actors involved. Given globalisation and scattered representation of actors, actors who work on water conservation, such as funding agencies, civil society actors, or government officials, do not necessarily live in rural Alwar. Therefore, online interviews or ethnography conducted
15
over the Internet were also considered as a part of the ‘fieldwork’. Hence, interviews were conducted online via Skype, telephone, WhatsApp and emails. As Sara Delamont (2004) writes ‘‘The field’ is metaphorical: it is not a real field, but a setting or a population’ (Delamont, 2004: 207). It is true that online ethnography, in this case-study, do not give direct access to events, but the methodology does help close the gap between access and representation. Table 1 in Appendix 1 highlights the actors that were selected for an online interview (See page no. 71). d. Site selection: Based on the primary field visits conducted in July 2016 and March 2017, four out of five different villages and sites of watersheds were selected to conduct the ‘field’ study. Several parameters were adopted in village selection, few of them were, 1. Villages with the active support of the donors. 2. Villages with different phases of TBS involvement or those considered as ‘model’. 3. And finally, villages with varied social, cultural, economic and geographical characteristics. Table 2 in Appendix 1 shows the actors that were interviewed on ‘the field’ (See page no. 72). e. Participant Observation: Beyond interviews, the methodology also engaged in participant observation during visits to schools, government departments, watershed sites, local grocery shops, and with Bhilwara farmers, who were on a field visit to TBS. During my two-week stay at the TBS ashram, I also engaged in a partial immersion of participant observation, whereby I ate, worked, discussed and relaxed with the employees of TBS and other visitors to understand their everyday life. This was complemented with the visual analysis of – how they do what they do, and how are artefacts represented, mobilized and used. f. Government report and gazettes: And finally, to verify the claims made by TBS and give a brief history of Alwar on water management, government reports and gazettes were used.
16
2. Secondary data: The existing secondary literature on CBNRM, TBS and state-civil society relationship was helpful in three ways. First, it helped frame many of the questions for the semi-structured interviews. Second, to support or critique the emerging narrative, the available literature on CBNRM and TBS was useful. And third, at situations when it was difficult to access desired participants or what Fielding (2004) called as ‘elusive population’, secondary data benefited the primary research. In this sense, secondary data helped overcome many of the shortcomings of the primary research and provided validity/invalidity to the narrative which was being employed in the dissertation. To substantiate arguments, all the seven chapters of this dissertation have an extensive secondary literature. 3.3 Positionality: Despite many precautions, the data collection process faced multiple dilemmas, frustration and positionality issues when conducting the fieldwork. First, as Craig Jeffrey (2010) echoes, most of the research time, due to purposeful sampling, was spent in preparing questions, waiting to talk, waiting to get replies, or waiting to meet. ‘Waiting’, in its philosophical sense, became an important part of the research process. Second, during my fieldwork in rural Alwar, access to information was controlled by the organisation. One of the employees of TBS was my key informant. This was problematic as the research objective of my dissertation was not only to understand TBS’s style of working or method but to also hear the voices of the villagers. So often when I travelled to villages, questions of – whom to interview, when to interview, and where to interview was not only an issue between me and the participants, but also between me and the informant. My dependence on the informant restricted my access to the ‘multivocality’ which I wanted to embrace (Duncan and Barnes, 1992). This was not because of my dependence on transportation, or unfamiliarity of the area but also due to the lack of trust with the villagers. Further, during the interview/observation process, access to information was restricted because of the informant’s presence. I believe, because of the presence of the NGO worker, actors often said what the NGO would like to hear, not what I would like to understand. If an alternative respective was presented, the informant would often interfere to state what he (or the NGO) believed was the ‘truth’. In other words, the research faced issues of ownership, representation, power and trust.
17
Third, at several instances, the research process faced an identity crisis. Initially, the NGO workers viewed me as a ‘media’ reporter, as someone who would go back and publicize their work. For instance, they wanted me to visit places which they felt was not widely covered in the ‘media’ or in ‘academic’ research, compared to what I wanted to observe and write. Later, at times when I desired to be a ‘participant observer’, I was deemed as a ‘real participant’. Figure 1 shows that during a workshop conducted on ‘World Water Day’ in Gopalpura, my role of a participant observer was transformed into a speaker of the workshop (which was not the case).
Figure 1: Participant observer becoming a real participant – news article in Alwar Dainik Bhaskar on 23 March 2017.
And finally, an ethical dilemma occurred while conducting an online interview. Minni Jain (2016), one of the online participants asked me to share my dissertation draft before the interview. This can be framed as a question of negotiation or access, but as David Mosse (2015) writes, sharing dissertation is a tricky affair. It can close or open access to research venues (Mosse, 2015). And in my case, I decided to share my initial draft in a hope for an interview. As it turned out, the thesis became ‘a medium of positioning, relating, and articulating divisions or alliances, not only vis-à-vis’ myself but also with other actors (Mosse, 2015: 131).
18
The sharing of thesis opened the space in which it helped me interview another participant. Thus, it gave me the needed access and trust which otherwise was difficult to achieve ‘online’. 3.4: Limits of the research methodology: The limits of the research methodology and data collected are listed as follows, First, given it is an MPhil dissertation and the time allocated was limited, this acted as a limitation in the selection of a larger and extensive sample size. Furthermore, the time for the field visits and interaction with the beneficiaries was limited only to two weeks. This placed a limitation on areas that could be studied. Second, given the research process of collecting data was dependent upon the organisation, this can be seen as a limitation which otherwise can be tackled if trust is established with villagers. Third, the prevailing social customs did not allow sufficient interaction with the women folk, except one interview, and as such the study of TBS’s effects and the perception of its intervention can be skewed towards the male opinions. Fourth, the lack of documentation on the chronological changes, or documentation on crop yield, soil erosion, water table, or rate of aquifer recharge, prevented a ‘scientific’ analysis of the impact of the watersheds. Hence, the dissertation had to rely on the few available scientific research. And finally, the personal subjectivities and biases, in terms of attribution, selective memory, exaggeration of certain events might limit the validity of my empiricism.
19
Chapter 4: Micro and Macro politics of TBS This chapter will take the first research question of the dissertation and explain how TBS evolved, and what were the choices it has made in its political economy of water conservation. The chapter is divided as follows – first, it will present a brief history and the evolution of TBS in rural Alwar. Second, it will explain the ideology, organisation, and the working model of TBS. Third, it will move on to analyse the micro-macro strategy of TBS vis-à-vis the state, media, donor agencies and civil society actors. The chapter will show that the initial growth of TBS has been very much dependent upon the personal history of Rajendra Singh and the organisational choices he made during those encounters. Second, the strategic collaboration of various local, national and international stakeholders has helped TBS develop its legitimacy while leading to some accountability and transparency challenges. And finally, the internal reorganization of TBS has ensured that the image of Rajendra Singh is increasingly personified in the national and international sphere without experiencing any institutional crisis in rural Alwar. 4.1 Alwar and its brief history on water conservation: As aforementioned in Chapter 1, the district of Alwar has historically been short on water supply. To meet its demands, the Imperial Gazetteer (1908) highlights that in 1844 a dam was constructed upon Ruparel river to feed the growing needs of urban Alwar. But for rural areas, water was extracted largely using ‘the charas or leathern bucket’ (Imperial Gazetteer, 1908: 262). However, the advent of electric motors and diesel pumps radically changed the demandsupply economics of rural Alwar and today, bore and tube wells remain one of the most important sources of water supply (Shah, 2009). As with water security, the Imperial Gazetteer (1908) highlights that there were ‘about 175 irrigation dams and 15,000 wells in the khalsa villages’ and that in 1890, a regular Public Works Department was established to oversee the irrigation works but exists no reference to johads, or anicuts which Tarun Bharat Sangh, as we shall see, claims to have revived (Imperial Gazetteer, 1908: 262). Similarly, after the formation of the Rajasthan state, the District Gazetteer of Alwar (1968) details about the use of ‘tanks’ in storing, submerging and diverting water but there exists no
20
reference to the idea that ‘irrigation dams’ are ‘important in preventing soil and water run-off, improving sub-soil storage of water and recharging groundwater’ (Gupta, 2016: 116) (District Gazetteer, 1968: 212). Furthermore, to the claims made by TBS that ‘johads were traditionally used and preferred by the people’, there exists no documentation either (Gupta, 2016). Fortunately, the District Gazetteer of Alwar (1968) does detail on the construction of different types of well used by the people of Rajasthan. It argues that a variety of structures such as kothi, nalcha, santhara, papra, kachcha, dher, and dhinkli were used and constructed (District Gazetteer, 1968: 214). Therefore, in the mid-1980s when Rajendra Singh arrived in rural Alwar, it is factually incorrect to argue that it was only TBS which ‘discovered’ or ‘revived’ the ‘lost’ methods of water conservation. 4.2: Arrival of Tarun Bharat Sangh in rural Alwar: In 1975, Tarun Bharat Sangh was formed as an NGO in Jaipur by the urban elites, students and intellectuals of the Rajasthan University. Inspired by the ideals of Gandhi and Jay Prakash Narayan, the initial objective of TBS was to a) persuade urban youths to do sarvodaya for the common good and b) work on issues such as education and healthcare. Rajendra Singh, who had joined the Rajasthan civil services as a bureaucrat, encountered TBS during his stay in Jaipur. Like TBS, Rajendra Singh was also influenced by the J. P. movement and Gandhian ideology of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘self-rule’ (Gupta, 2016). When TBS expanded its scale of activities to rural Rajasthan, Rajendra Singh’s field visits made him conscious of the urbanrural disparity. Driven by altruistic reasons, Rajendra Singh quit his job in 1984 and decided to lead the mantle of TBS. On the eve of Gandhi Jayanti, 2 October 1985, Rajendra Singh along with his four friends arrived in Bheekampura (in Thanagazi Tehsil of Alwar) to ‘spreading literacy in the villages’ (Singh, 2008: 239). At Bheekampura, Rajendra Singh faced two sets of an identity crisis. First, perceived as fleeing terrorists from Punjab, villagers were anxious about their arrival at Bheekampura (Pushkarna, 1998). Second, influenced heavily by the J.P. movement, Rajendra Singh had his conceptions of the local needs. In an interview to Madhu Kishwar (2003), Rajendra Singh says, his ideas of class struggle were challenged when he saw warm social relations between different caste and class members. Epitomizing this relationship, Rajendra Singh concluded that ‘villages don’t need class struggle, but strengthening of their
21
mutual bonds which traditionally knit various caste groups into mutually interdependent and cohesive village communities’ (Kishwar, 2003). Guided by Mangu Meena (a big landowner), Rajendra Singh started following ‘whatever this samaaj (community) direct[ed] them to do’ (Kishwar, 2003). As Rajendra Singh explains, Mangu Meena, once ‘told me, “we do not want your literacy, we want Water”’ (Singh, 239). Mangu Meena drew Rajendra Singh’s attention to the ‘breakdown of traditional water harvesting system in the region’ (Pangare, 2008: 258). As the functionaries of TBS narrate, the villagers informed Rajendra Singh about different types of traditional earthen structures, such as, johads, anicuts, bandhs which had stored water and ensured water supply all around the year. In 1986, Rajendra Singh and his friends began working on the desilting of the dried-up ponds on Mangu Meena’s land (Singh, 2017). Driven by voluntary labour, Rajendra Singh explains ‘no one from the village gave them any help. But slowly, seeing their unconditional commitment and hard work, people began to lend them support. This desilting exercise meant not only that with the first monsoon the pond itself filled up, but a dried up well in the neighbourhood also got recharged’ (Kishwar, 2003). The results of this conservation, as TBS claims were overwhelming. Rajendra Singh’s effort rekindled a hope of stability among the communities of Gopalpura. Having built his trust with the villagers, his guru, Mangu Meena advised him to now ‘simply help’ them ‘in figuring out ways by which the’ livelihood of the villages can be improved (Kishwar, 2003). This above-described story of a ‘guru-student relationship’ has become a source of legitimacy for TBS to narrate to every individual. This essentialization of a personal story, later becoming an organisational history, is reflected in the following comprehension enunciated by Suresh (a functionary of TBS). He says, ‘We do what the samaj wants us to do and nothing else’ (Raikwar, 2017). But what this story hides in its description is the fact that Mangu Meena approached Rajendra Singh only after his disillusionment with the state. Mangu Meena drew Rajendra Singh attention to the ‘traditional water harvesting system in the region’ not because the state
22
department of irrigation or agriculture did not work on those methods but because he was unable to get their attention for his land desilting. Coincidentally, when Rajendra Singh arrived for his samaj seva, Mangu Meena strategically convinced him to work on water conservation. This self-interest of Mangu Meena, however, created a win-win situation. While Mangu Meena got his land desilted, Rajendra Singh got familiarized with the region and created a bond with a ‘community’, which today gives them the legitimacy. As figure 2 shows, the bond of Meena and TBS is museumized as primordial.
Figure 2: The guru-student story – Chaman Singh narrating to the Bhilwara farmers at Tarun Ashram.
4.3: Institutional step up of TBS in Bheekampura:
Figure 3: Location of TBS Ashram. Courtesy: Google Maps.
23
With the community-NGO legitimacy created, Rajendra Singh decided to set up Tarun Bharat Sangh’s ashram in Beekampura. Unemployed youths from nearby villages, such as from Gopalpura and Bheekampura starting supporting Rajendra Singh’s endeavour with an aim to get employment at TBS (Gupta, 2016). Chaman Singh seen in figure 2 is one of the early members of TBS who joined in 1986. On the one hand, members like Chaman were leading the formation of TBS, on the other hand, Rajendra Singh using his personal contacts was mobilizing funds for the organisation. Driven by ‘community service’ agenda, charity NGOs like Church's Auxiliary for Social Action (CASA) supported TBS with an initial grant of 40 tonnes of wheat (Kishwar, 2003). This food grant became the basis for TBS’s early ‘food for work’ program whereby landless villagers undertook johad construction operations for in return for the food. TBS’s aim to structure watersheds helped build confidence and trust among villagers in two ways. First, families who had land contacted TBS to construct various kinds of conservation structures (johads, anicuts, bandhs etc.). Second, landless or seasonal labourers who were in need for a job got employment. While TBS frames their ‘success’ as an outcome of communityled natural resource management (CBNRM), it is rather ‘a part’ of the ‘community’ which derives substantial benefits from the conservation work than others (Chapter 6 explains in detail). Soon with the liberalization of Indian economy and retreat of the development state, TBS expanded its scale of construction operation as it started to receive international funding. Partly driven by the donor agenda and partly by Rajendra’s personal belief and experience, TBS adopted CBNRM as its accountability and delivery model. Today, TBS claims to have worked in more than 1000 villages of Rajasthan constructing around 15000 watershed structures because of CBNRM (Sisodia, 2009: 7). To strengthen its footing, TBS went beyond constructing johads or anicuts in many of the nearby villages. In Gopalpura and Bheekampura, it undertook series of development initiatives on health and school construction, and in Sariska and other nearby areas, it undertook massive tree plantation drive. All these activities have helped TBS establish a community bond and a
24
mai-baap1 relationship. This relationship today gives a) TBS the social legitimacy to survive in Bheekampura, b) creates a kinship relationship among villagers, as many women affectionately call Rajendra Singh as ‘bade bhaiya’ and c) most importantly, helps TBS minimize dissent against its politics of working (explained in Chapter 6). Acting as ‘model’ villages, they help TBS create a ‘voice’ in its politics against the state. 4.4: Organisation, ideology and process of TBS: In TBS’s organisational structure, ‘trust’ and Gandhian principles of ‘self-reliance’ plays an important role (Tarun Bharat Sangh, 2017). The leadership and vision of the NGO reside exclusively with Rajendra Singh. His authority and command on the NGO is almost absolute. More than ‘TBS’ it is the brand image of Rajendra Singh (also known as Pani Baba) which attracts the media attention, civil society support and donors to fund their projects. Officially, there are seven members in the governing body of the organisation, but it is he and from 2010, his son, Maulik Sisodia, are the decision makers of TBS (Tarun Bharat Sangh, 2017). One can label it as a representation of ‘Indian business’ model, were families lead the institution. But the inclusion of Maulik Sisodia in the organisation reflects the long term thinking of TBS which is rarely considered in personality driven civil society movements. a. Gandhian ideology in its approach With Rajendra Singh and Maulik Sisodia framing the agenda and politics of TBS, it is excepted that the rest of the functionaries will ‘simply follow’ and ‘implement’ their ideas. Rajendra Singh’s personal belief in Gandhian ideology, for instance, is so ingrained in the policy and spatial axis of TBS that one finds his pictures, images, quotes and principles of his politics embedded in their working. As described in Chapter 2, this is common among environmental movements. From Vinoba Bhave’s Bhoodan movement to Sunderlal Bahuguna’s Chipko movement, many of them successfully embraced Gandhian ideology in their approach (Gadgil and Guha,1995).
1
The word mai-baap is used to denote the patronage and power of TBS’s politics. As mai and baap, TBS can enact paternal powers over the communities and organize them under the metaphor of ‘family’. As a ‘family’, TBS can then frame the terms of consent and processes of legitimation for its politics. This is not to say that communities lose their agency in this partnership but to show how TBS and communities strategically use each other.
25
As with TBS, the Gandhian ideology is appropriated in the following ways, First, in terms of its working principle, the construction work carried out by TBS is done using the principle of shramdaan, meaning voluntary contribution (either physical or financial). The symbolism of Gandhi’s shramdaan was premised upon the idea that all kinds of labour are socially equal and that ‘dignity’ of work needs to be restored (Palshikar, 2014). Based on his own experience of johad construction in 1986, Rajendra Singh advocates that with community involvement and their physical labour, one creates an ownership of natural resources among the villagers. This ownership principle is then founded upon the idea that from implementation to maintenance of the watershed, communities will self-manage the resources, thereby reducing the NGO dependency and creating a kind of CNRM in CBNRM (Uphoff, 1998) Second, in terms of creating public awareness, TBS believes in carrying out padayatras (public marches) (Pangare, 2008). Deriving from Gandhi, Rajendra Singh believes that padayatras mobilizes communities, creates a social movement and helps rediscover traditional knowledge. The purpose of carrying out padayatras is two-fold. First, to establish contact and understand the socio-economic problems of the village. And second, to identify leaders, who can represent and undertake collective action. These days although padayatras are rarely undertaken, villagers, on the other hand, are expected to approach the NGO. Premised upon a ‘demand driven approach’, TBS enters in a village only when there is an established authority and leadership for watershed construction. The emerging ‘leader’ from the village is then elected as the head of the ‘Gram Sabha’ (GS) whereby in consultation with other groups, ‘he’ conducts the activities democratically. At a structural level, TBS argues that its institution of gram sabha is different from Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI). Citing PRI as a forum of patronage and power politics, gram sabha, it argues is an apolitical and open forum where ‘communities can make decisions and debate the questions that involve them directly, according to their priorities, their logic and their needs’ (Torri, 2010: 240). As Chapter 6 will show, gram sabha is as political as PRI but the point here is that the framing of gram sabha as an ‘apolitical’ institution is important for TBS to claim fairness and performance.
26
Third, in terms of its headquarters, TBS is housed in an ashram. As Rudolph and Rudolph (2006) describe Gandhi viewed ashram in many layers – At one level, it would be a space where notions of purity and pollution would be dissolved, and simple and egalitarian ideals of commonalities can be adopted, yet at another level, it would also become a site where ‘training for resisters and workshops for fashioning strategies’ can be developed, and a bond of togetherness can be formed (Suhrud, 2011: 78). For TBS, ‘Tarun Ashram’ is the centre for all its activities. Most of the functionaries of TBS work, live and eat in the ashram. As they come from different class, caste, region and religion, the ashram becomes a shared space where they could converge upon the identity of water conservation. To override Brahmanical notions of hierarchy, common dining and self-cleaning is promoted. Furthermore, in line with Gandhian principles, non-vegetarian food, alcohol and tobacco products are prohibited inside the premises. And to promote ‘self-rule’ functionaries are expected to ‘just’ implement their responsibilities. The idea is that the combination of these principles creates a shared identity among TBS functionaries and a realization that ‘selfreliance’ (of NRM) can be achieved as an alternative to ‘dependency’. Tarun Jal Vidyapeeth (also based in the ashram), ‘provides a platform for farmer-to-farmer interactions’ (Gupta, 2016: 126). This interaction is mediated by the NGO but the idea is that farmers can learn from each other, and that capacity of the ‘water leaders’ such as of local institutions, NGOs, academicians, and activists can be strengthened. During my stay at Tarun Ashram, about 25 farmers from Bhilwara district of Rajasthan visited TBS to learn about their CBNRM. Foundation for Ecological Security (FES), the NGO which brought them to TBS wanted farmers to contribute 15% of the total watershed construction cost via shramdaan. And for TBS, sharmdaan being an important principle, it facilitated a two-day workshop on community ownership for the farmers. Interestingly, in its narrative, Chaman Singh described the benefits of adopting sharmdaan as a service for the future generations (Singh, 2017). For both the NGOs, concepts like shramdaan become an important site of increasing their financial sustainability. While FES succeeded in decreasing its spending by bringing farmers to TBS. TBS, on the other hand, could increase its economic sustainability, by charging FES a small fee as a part of their Tarun Jal Vidyapeeth training. Even my stay at TBS was billed under the letterhead of ‘Tarun Jal Vidyapeeth’. Bhupinder, an accountant at TBS claims that
27
about 5000 visitors come to the ashram to understand the works of their organisation (Singh, 2017) Furthermore, as Gandhi envisioned, Tarun Ashram is a site of ‘training resistance’ and ‘fashioning strategies’ for its agenda (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2006: 35). During my stay at Tarun Ashram, the functionaries of TBS were aggressively inviting eminent civil society actors for a three-day event on ‘Social and Environment Justice’ program whereby strategies and plans could be developed ‘against the [natural resource] exploiters’ in India (Invitation letter, 2017). Fourth, in terms of clothing, Rajendra Singh and most the early TBS functionaries wear khadi. As Emma Tarlo (1996) writes, Gandhi viewed ‘khadi spirit’ as a representation of faith, patience, and sacrifice (Tarlo, 1996: 89). For Gandhi, clothing was a ‘question of morality and belief’ (Tarlo, 1996: 89). Similarly, for TBS, khadi is a question of representation and knowledge. By wearing khadi, TBS tries to argue that to reduce abject poverty, it is only through ‘swadeshi’ or traditional knowledge that one can achieve emancipation. Fifth, in terms of its community mobilization, the discourse of sacredness is very visible in TBS’s approach. As Akeel Bilgrami (2011) once argued, Gandhi believed that the denial of God in the European conception of science, ‘desacralized nature and made it prey without impunity to the most ruthlessly systematic extractive political economies – of mining, deforestation, plantation agriculture’ and so on (Bilgrami, 2011: 109). In line with Gandhi’s principle, TBS believes that reclaiming green landscapes means reclaiming sacredness and a ‘lost way of life’ (Poonamallee, 2010: 18). Sacredness to TBS means subscribing to a moral and cultural framework of Indian ethics. As Suresh once put it to me – ‘Pani ka kaam, punya ka kaam hai’ (water conservation is a deed of divine virtue). And to deny ‘punya ka kaam’ would mean to ‘desacralized nature’ (Bilgrami, 2011). This aesthetic symbolism of sacredness is also visible in the everyday workings of TBS. In the front porch of the Tarun Ashram, one finds visual images with slogans such as ‘Ped mein hai Bhagavaan, iska karo samman (meaning ‘Gods reside in trees, and therefore, trees must be respected’)’ and ‘Ped pitha hai, dharti mata pani pran hai. Eska raksa karna humara karam aur dharm hai’ (Tree is our father, the earth is our mother and water our soul. It is our duty to guard and protect them) (see figure 4 and 5) (Gupta, 2016: 127).
28
Figure 4: Proverb 1 – Gods reside in trees, and therefore, trees should be respected.
Figure 5: Proverb 2 – Tree is our father, the earth is our mother and water is our soul. Their protection is our duty and religion.
29
Similarly, in the various shivirs, padayatras, and bhoomi poojans of TBS, the functionaries often enunciate the discourse of sacredness in their approach. In a yuva jagrute shivir (youth awareness workshop) at a Gopalpura school, Suresh described conservation as follows, ‘Suresh: Have we ever seen ‘Bhagavaan? [God] Kids: No. Suresh: We go to the temple to pray, Isn’t it? Kids: Yes. Suresh: Similarly, we have ‘Bhagawan’ in, Bha – Bhumi [land] Ga – Gagan [atmosphere] Va – Vaayu [air] and Na – Nadi [river] Bhumi, Gagan, Vaayu and Nadi are our Bhagavaan. We need to conserve, protect and worship them. … Suresh: Let’s take an oath to conserve, protect and worship our Bhagavaan’ (Raikwar, 2017b). b. The process of watershed construction: Once the leaders are identified, TBS then works to select the site, type, design and budget of the structure. The gram sabha is called upon to deliberate upon the following questions, First, the formation of the gram sabha committee: The idea of forming a gram sabha is to make the village a self-dependent entity in managing its natural resources. As per TBS norms, 1. GS will prepare a ‘WUMP (Water Usage Master Plan)’, whereby it audits ‘the usage… [and] requirement of water in each household’ (Rai, 2017). 2. It will form a construction, forest, grazing, women’s and a water committee to oversee their respective issues and concerns. 3. And finally, in terms of representation, it is expected that one adult or female member of the household will become a member of the GS and represent their concerns.
30
Second, site selection: The process of site selection ‘starts fairly early in the intervention’ phase of TBS (Pangare, 2008). It can ‘potentially’ be selected during the padayatras or individually suggested to the GS. Every potential site should be decided upon a few criteria – 1. Cost – A site where minimum amount of resources can be spent. 2. Flow – A site where the flow of the water (if constructed over a river) is not fast nor slow. That is, a balanced flow where water can percolate into the ground and store water on the surface. 3. Land – A site where the land does not get swamped and stop the flow of water. 4. Design – Based on cost, type and size, an appropriate design of the structure is selected – pukka (concrete) or kutcha (earthwork). And finally, 5. Benefits – A site where a) forest, if possible, can grow, and b) water can be easily extracted from the ground. Like World Bank’s ‘best practice’ list, Chaman Singh (2017) listed out his set of issues in figure 6 to Bhilwara farmers before selecting the site,
Figure 6: Chaman Singh’s list for a site selection.
Third, contribution: After site, beneficiaries and structure of the watershed are identified, beneficiaries are called to decide upon their shramdaan (financial or labour). The percentage and amount of the contribution depend upon the estimated budget, and type of structure (Pangare, 2008: 271). TBS maintains that the contribution is around 30-40% of the total budget
31
but during field research, villagers observed that it can vary based on individual’s influence and their relationship to the organisation – reflecting patronage and politics (mai-baap for the few). And finally, the withdrawal and follow-up: ‘Once the construction of the structure is completed, TBS starts working on other sites in the same or other villages where contribution has been mobilized’ (Pangare, 2008: 274). However, at what point TBS decides to move out a village is not clear. In some villages, it has constructed more than thirty structures, in other villages, one or two. Instead of a coherent exit strategy, scholars have argued that there are varied reasons why TBS leaves or stays in a village (Pangare, 2008) (Gupta, 2016). Ranging from a conflict in GS to lack of willingness of TBS to work, it remains ambiguous. 4.5 Working strategy of TBS: From the above discussion, it may seem that instead of grand strategy, TBS advocates for operating at a local level using its unique method of working. But this micro-discourse, as we shall see in the following section is used by TBS to legitimacy for its macro-politics at national and international level. The macro-politics of TBS: a. With State: In its interaction with the state, the tools and strategy used by TBS are a derivative of Vinoba Bhave, Prem Bhai and P.V. Rajagopal’s social movements. The strategy employed is two-fold: struggle-to-dialogue and dialogue-to-struggle (Carr-Harris, 2015). Both these strategies are inter-linked and in voicing its agenda TBS often starts from a struggle-to-dialogue framework, that is, rural Alwar – as its site for micro-political struggle and New Delhi – as its site for macro-political dialogue (Carr-Harris, 2015: 2). Struggle to dialogue framework: In rural Alwar, TBS frame the discourse of watershed development as a ‘rights movement’ in which communities and villages are ‘struggling’ to get their entitlements (Carr-Harris, 2015: 2). Shaping their struggle TBS acts as a catalyst NGO (refer Chapter 2), which tries to express villagers dissent or concerns in a democratic framework. While framing this ‘struggle’, TBS also channels its own politics with the state. As Chapter 5 will show, due to personal and political interests, TBS and the local state department, refuses to interact with each other.
32
When it reaches the top-level, that is at the central or state level (i.e. except Rajasthan), TBS initiates a process of ‘dialogue’ in its strategy (Carr-Harris, 2015: 2). While pursuing its dialogue process, TBS is conscious of its ‘struggle’ identity. For instance, in 2000, when Bhaonta-Kolyala village of rural Alwar was awarded the ‘Down to Earth Joseph C. John Award’ for the successful implementation of CBNRM, the then President of India, K. R. Narayanan, invited representative of the village and TBS to come and receive the award. But TBS insisted that the President should come himself to the village and give the award. On other similar occasions, TBS have argued that dignitaries must visit rural Alwar and celebrate community effort. Contrary to the depoliticization argument by Chhotray (2011) and Chandhoke (2003), such visits become a site of repoliticization between the state, community and TBS. In subscribing to the ‘struggle’ identity, TBS constructs a brand image for itself and Rajendra Singh. More than an NGO, it acquires a ‘grassroots’ image. This image is important for TBS to hold on. For instance, when Welthungerlife, one of the funders of TBS’s national campaign asked Rajendra Singh to make a Bollywood movie on water, he replied – ‘‘oh Waterman is now involved in the film industry.’ So, this is for me the problem of identification with the people’ (Fritz, 2014: 78). In constructing this identity, TBS distances itself with actors who otherwise might be in collusion with the state. As a result, the ‘struggle’ and ‘dialogue’ politics of TBS, is a self-reinforcing strategy in which pressure is geared around the state and other powerful actors. What is uncommon in TBS’s choice of approach is the choice of ‘struggle-to-dialogue’ strategy than ‘dialogue-to-struggle’. NGO often engage in dialogue first and then struggle, but given TBS’s delivery model, such ‘struggle-to-dialogue’ strategy can only be possible if an organisation has invested a long duration of time in building up its ‘voice’ at a grassroots level (Carr-Harris, 2015: 2). Dialogue to struggle framework: When Rajendra Singh is ‘dialoguing’ at the top-level, he creates a political space for himself (Carr-Harris, 2015: 2). As an ‘expert’ on CBNRM, Rajendra Singh is often invited to lead key position in suitable government institutions to frame the policy agenda on water and river rejuvenation. After accepting such positions, Rajendra Singh resigns from such post, creating a ‘struggle’ space at the upper level. For instance, one of the early success of TBS national campaign – ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’, was to influence the Prime Minister of India to establish
33
the National Ganga River Basin Authority (NGRBA). After the institutional setup, Rajendra Singh was named as one of the key members of the ‘policy-making Apex Council’ of NGRBA (Jebaraj, 2012). However, after three years, in 2012, Rajendra Singh resigned from NGRBA calling it as a ‘toothless’ entity generating no significant impact on the ground (Jebaraj, 2012). This distinctive ‘dialogue to struggle’ strategy at the upper level, reinforces TBS’s national legitimacy and validity for the larger audience. In sum, both these ‘dialogue-to-struggle’ and ‘struggle-to-dialogue’ strategy, gives TBS the space and power in which its political agenda compels the state to respond (Carr-Harris, 2015). For better or worse, the combination of such strategy offers ‘TBS’ the transformative power to influence change. b. With Media: Unlike the NGO-state politics, TBS has enjoyed the limelight of media attention since the early 1990s. From New York Times to regional newspaper of India, media has followed the narrative of TBS. Its work is often framed as a struggle of the community against the Machiavellian state. The Guardian lists Rajendra Singh as one of the ‘50 people who could save the planet’ (Vidal et al., 2008). A single Google (2017) search of ‘Tarun Bharat Sangh’ will show results of news articles and profiles of Rajendra Singh with captions such as – ‘Traditional water body restoration in western Rajasthan by Tarun Bharat Sangh’, ‘The Green Oasis around Tarun Bharat Sangh, Alwar’, ‘The Promotion of Community Self Reliance: Tarun Bharat Sangh in Action’, ‘The water man of Rajasthan’ and so on. Categorization of TBS’s work using terms such as ‘traditional knowledge’, ‘drought-proofing’, ‘community development’ and ‘water man’ has made their work as a ‘success story’. It is difficult to identify a single critical story of TBS’s work in the news media. As one of the reporters of Alwar Dainik Bhaskar put it to me – ‘Amid everyday life and chaos, from stories of road accidents to corruption, Tarun Bharat Sangh’s work, especially on water in Rajasthan gives us a positive hope’ (Interviewee A, 2017). The interviewee explained that amongst the negative news, positive news is also needed. By framing TBS’s work as ‘positive news’ and work of community-led development, media creates an excitement about its success. Furthermore, the coverage of Rajendra Singh’s calling upon the state and central government creates a personal voice for him in the national and international policy debate (Jebaraj, 2012). In his critique to ‘expert’ led development process, Rajendra Singh has now become the ‘expert’ of CBNRM.
34
c. With Donors: ‘As suggested earlier, many international donors and lending agencies have played a key role in developing and implementing CBNRM related policies. They have not only supported CBNRM initiatives but driven them as well’ (Menon et al., 2012: 11). Starting from the 1990s, DFID, World Bank, SIDA, ICCO and many other such agencies pushed for the approach. The impetus can be seen in SIDA’s discourse, which funded TBS for two decades. In the 1990s, SIDA argued that for aid efficacy and projects to be ‘sustainable in the long-term, it is essential that the ownership of the projects is in their [community] hands’ (Sida, 2017). Apart from the Swedish Government’s mutual interest to work on the environment, the 2003 evaluation report released by Sida, states that two key factors mattered in their partnership. First, ‘the scale at which it [TBS] has replicated Johads’ and second, the usage of CBNRM ‘as an entry point activity’ (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003: 12). From 1995 to 2013, Sida poured around ₹22 crore rupees in TBS’s project (Open Aid Data, 2017). At times, Sida funded almost 77% of the TBS’s annual budget, revealing the dependency of such NGOs on the international money (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003). While the 2003 evaluation report was immensely critical of TBS’s work and strategy, the 2013 report, however, ended up praising their work. This was the year when the aid cooperation between India and Sweden was ending, therefore ‘as [a] part of its responsible exit strategy’ Sida released this report (Sinha et al., 2013). In its final evaluation, Sida argued ‘that concerted efforts of TBS and the community over two and a half decades has significantly improved living conditions of local community in addition to taking a big step to restore ecological balance and revive traditional knowledge systems and practices in the regeneration and management of natural resources’ (Sinha et al., 2013: 10). Interestingly, while the documentation is called as an ‘evaluation report’, it hardly achieves the objective. Instead of a critical analysis of the aims, objectives, implementation and performance of TBS (like the 2003 report), this report ends up celebrating its work. This is evident in the introduction of this document where it says that the report is written for ‘TBS to harness opportunities to continue its work and in the process, generate additional funding to ensure organisational sustainability’ (Sinha et al., 2013: 12; my emphasis).
35
The point here is that instead of an ‘evaluation report’, the Sida documentation becomes a ‘policy advocacy’ report for TBS. Since its publication, TBS has used the report to give a ‘voice’ to its interventions and credibility. An approving evaluation of its work by a Swedish government agency does add value to TBS’s legitimacy and competence. Using this report, TBS can argue that with successes in policy implementation, it can now enact roles of agenda setter and policy formulator. The below figure 7 is an example of Rajendra Singh using the Sida report as a tool to show Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Devendra Fadnavis, the kind of effective implementation it has been able to achieve.
Figure 7: Policy advocacy of Rajendra Singh – Presenting Chief Minister of Maharashtra, the 2013 Sida evaluation book on the impact of TBS’s work. Courtesy: TBS Facebook page (The book is in orange-yellow colour).
During my interview with civil society supporters of TBS, many cited this documentation in their narrative (Singh, 2017; Joshi, 2017). Even during my first meeting with the functionaries of TBS, I was directed to ‘refer’ and ‘use’ the Sida 2013 report for my dissertation writing. This ‘faith’ that is being put by donor agencies and organisations working on CBNRM creates a discourse of conformity that ‘CBNRM’ is the ‘only’ way for achieving policy goals on water conservation.
36
Apart from the international donors, the second set of national donors who believe in TBS’s agenda is industrialist and ex-Maharajas. In TBS’s formal narrative, it argues that ‘corporates’ and ‘governments’ are the exploiters of natural resources. As a fight against the neo-liberal agenda, it has launched legal actions against mining and brewery firms creating a utilitarian discourse for the rural mass, but informally, TBS does not refrain from accepting funds from these actors (UB Group, 2007: 172). In fact, Rajendra Singh, in collaboration with the Maharaja of Jodhpur runs ‘Jal Bhagirathi Foundation’ (JBF), a parallel NGO dedicated to water conservation in Marwar region of Rajasthan. As a blog piece of ‘India Development Coalition of America’ (IDCA) explains, Rajendra Singh had often thought of partnering with Maharaja of Jodhpur for his water projects in Alwar but was unable to establish a contact with him. However, in 2001, when Rajendra Singh was awarded the ‘Ramon Magsaysay Award… the Maharaja read all about him’ (IDCA, 2017). The meeting between the two was facilitated and they soon become partners. In its invention of the past, TBS believes that historically, maharajas and villagers had a harmonious relationship (Suutari and Marten, 2005). However, with the advent of colonization and state-led industrialization, this relationship was distrusted (Suutari and Marten, 2005). TBS reinforces a similar narrative with the business class/caste groups. It believes that ‘baniyas or the business-caste people… used to give certain amount of their wealth as charity for socially useful or communal purposes’ (Gupta, 2016: 139). This practice, it says declined because of their self-interest. However, now, if it receives any funds from business houses, TBS does not refuse to accept it. Its willingness to listen and dilute its stand on ‘class conflict… is one of the reasons that Rajendra Singh is invited to seminars and conferences on ‘private partnership’ in the water sector, organised by industry associations like the CII’ (Gupta, 2016: 139). So, publicly, while TBS maintains its opposition to the neo-liberal agenda, but privately, as Sehgal Foundation also argues, TBS does not hesitate to accept funds from controversial business giants like the Reliance Industries (Saiphy, 2017). From the viewpoint of transparency and accountability, such politics can be a challenge to TBS given little information is available publicly on the funds it receives and agendas it participates in. d. And with Civil society actors: 1. National: In terms of alliances, TBS often exchanges ideas with varied individuals, activists, think tanks, NGOs and research centres. On the one hand, it is in constant touch with the Gandhian and
37
other NRM NGOs in the country, on another hand, it also interacts with organisations across the ideological spectrum. At the left end of the spectrum, arguing with the Gandhi Peace Foundation, Centre for Science and Environment, Medha Patkar, Vandana Shiva, Chandi Prasad Bhatt and P. V. Rajagopal, it cites their movement as an example of community’s fight over natural resources and against the neo-liberal agenda. While at the same time, arguing with the ‘right’, such as the RSS, Anna Hazare, and Sunderlal Bahuguna, TBS cites their ‘success’ due to the usage of the traditional knowledge and sacredness (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003: 68; Sharma, 2012) (See Table 3 in Appendix 1). With varied support, in the late 2000, TBS launched a national campaign on water conservation and river rejuvenation. Under the banner of ‘Jal Biradari’ and ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’, it argued for the state to adopt CBNRM as the method for resource management. (Singh, 2017; Joshi, 2017). However, what is interesting in its campaign is the strategic use of civil society actors. To promote Rajendra Singh’s image, TBS never really brings other actors when interacting with the state or donor agencies. It strategically utilizes their support in forums or protest rallies and channels this ‘struggle’ to build Rajendra Singh’s image for ‘dialogue’. This strategy goes in line with the ones described in the ‘state’ section. 2. International: Over the past few years, TBS has established an international presence in the global discourse of water and climate change. In 2012, TBS opened its first office in the UK with an objective to understand, influence and learn from the global policy debates. As Minni Jain (2016) TBS’s UK representative explains, the rationale was multi fold – ‘There is a significant effort that is being put in to make the programme internationally recognizable. There is a challenge in the sense that most of the groundwork is done at the grassroots level. My colleagues are aware of the ground realities and outreach programmes aimed at uplifting rural level groundwater management, and since many years, they have worked primarily at this level. Owing to this, there are some difficulties in synchronizing the grassroots level work with the norms, laws, and efforts at the global level. This is primarily because the global level scenario is completely different from the grassroots level and familiarizing oneself with the global standards will take a little time. While we worked in getting Rajendra ji for the award [i.e. 2015 Stockholm Water Prize Award], the whole point of the exercise was to get him acquainted with the international notion of community based
38
development and projects on rejuvenating the landscapes. It is like a sliding door. It has to work both ways. This was also an opportunity to familiarize the global community with the grassroots level work being done in India in order to intensify co-operation. It is also very difficult to secure awards for such people at the global level. In fact, during the first year, his nomination wasn’t even considered. But in the second year, after monitoring the effort put in by him, his nomination was accepted. Also, to be noted is that SIDA has just finished its project in India and they were highly impressed with what was being done. It was, therefore, a combination of favourable circumstance and hard work which finally got him the award and thus his work is being steadily recognized in the world’ (Jain, 2016; my emphasis). From the above description, it seems clear that TBS has not only achieved a presence in the international civil society space but also established a recognized ‘voice’ in the discourse of NRM by securing the 2015 Stockholm Water Prize Award. The $150,000 sum which came with the prize helped TBS intensify its national campaign on water conservation and further its interest in India. This is in line with Sida’s objective of helping ‘TBS to harness opportunities’ (Sinha et al., 2013: 12). Today, other international NGOs collaborate with TBS because of its national and international success. Tamera, a European NGO working on CBNRM in Portugal believes that working with Rajendra Singh – ‘is of great help as we are also struggling with European legislations. If we bring international experts recognized by the Stockholm International Water Institute, it makes our job easier as it gives a credible reference to our work’ (Müller, 2017). At various other forums, such as COP22, Rajendra Singh has called for global problems, local solutions. ‘The solution is traditional’, he says (Mathiesen, 2015). Later this year (2017), Rajendra Singh plans to visit the ‘office of the United Nations high commissioner for human rights in Geneva to push for the recognition of the right to river water and access to nature’ (Mathiesen, 2015) (refer Chapter 2). In sum, ‘by building new links among actors in civil societies, states and international organizations’, TBS multiply its ‘opportunities for dialogue’, ‘exchange’ and influences (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 89). As Keck and Sikkink (1999) writes, ‘What is novel in these networks is the ability of non-traditional international actors [like TBS] to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressurize, and gain
39
leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments’, both nationally and internationally (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 90). 4.6: Summary In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the approach and model of TBS is a product of local and global forces. While at the micro level, it has developed its own politics and strategy of working, this process was an outcome of the choices TBS made. The organisational structure and working model of TBS evolved partly from Rajendra Singh’s personal encounter and belief, and partly from the ideology of the funding agencies. Over the years, it has recruited individuals from nearby villages and has maintained a strong kinship tie with them. This relationship with the local communities has given TBS the accountability and legitimacy to influence policy debates on the national and international level. Further, the strategic amalgamation of media, donor and civil society actors has perpetuated the ‘struggling’ micropolitical narrative of TBS. By the late 2000s, when Maulik Sisodia joined the organisation, TBS restructured its line of order. Today, Maulik micro-manages the business and management side of the TBS whereas Rajendra Singh travels worldwide to lead civil society campaigns on water. This division of labour has led the image of TBS been increasingly personified by the image of Rajendra Singh (alias Pani Baba or Waterman of India). On the other hand, it has also ensured that TBS retains its strong connection with the communities in rural Alwar while keeping its core principles constant – that is, continuing to maintain the Gandhian-traditional rhetoric of CBRNM, oppose collaboration with local governmental agencies, and dismiss the works of other NGOs. Table 3 in Appendix 1 will show the space TBS has created for its politics (Page no. 73). Unlike any other civil society movements, this dialectic nature of TBS politics (both micro and macro, and father and son) gives it the legitimacy and ability to expand its discourse in the national and international sphere without experiencing any institutional crisis in rural Alwar. But from the viewpoint of public accountability and transparency, TBS faces a serious challenge. There is little information available publicly on its donors, funds or activities it undertakes every year. Such worries are intensified as Chapter 5 will show when other actors in the region begin to contest its everyday legitimacy.
40
Chapter 5: Politics of intervention in rural Alwar: For better or worse reasons, the CBNRM discourse embraced by TBS has had greater developmental effects in rural Alwar. Actors working on water conservation, such as Sehgal Foundation and the Government of Rajasthan have swiftly embraced the discourse. At one level, it can be seen as a positive outcome of ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’, given the national campaign is premised upon such prescription, but at another level, such embracement harms TBS’s local interests. Taking the second research question of the dissertation this chapter will develop a discursive politics of CBNRM in rural Alwar. The chapter will show that the while all actors have conformed to CBNRM, the politics of intervention has become a politics of distinctiveness. Sehgal Foundation and the Government of Rajasthan, on one hand, embraces the discourse because it is ‘the’ discourse that offers the opportunity, and legitimacy to ‘influence the configuration of the political field’ (Rossi, 2004: 23). However, in appropriating the discourse these actors have retained their bargaining power over the meaning, effects and interpretation of such framework (Rossi, 2004). That is, by strategic embracing it, Sehgal Foundation and the Government of Rajasthan have retained their distinctiveness while furthering their respective agendas. On the other hand, for TBS, the embracement of CBNRM is a challenge to its micro-politics. Since the other two actors are located in rural Alwar, the success of its national campaign is only a ‘success’ if such development takes place outside Alwar. But in Alwar, the competition within the actors diminishes TBS’s legitimacy and its interest. Therefore, opposing the method and functioning strategy of Sehgal Foundation and the Government of Rajasthan is vital for TBS’s interests. The chapter will detail the political economy of water conservation in rural Alwar by describing the intervention politics of Sehgal Foundation and Government of Rajasthan, followed by its effects and critique by TBS.
41
5.1: Sehgal Foundation Founded in 1999, S M Sehgal Foundation (Sehgal Foundation or SF) is a public, charitable trust run by an India-born American philanthropist, Suri Sehgal. Also based on family run ‘Indian business model’, Sehgal Foundation is steered by husband and wife. With a mission to solve India’s pressing rural challenges, Sehgal Foundation adopts ‘traditional wisdom’ in its ‘community-led development initiatives’ (Sehgal Foundation, 2017). Since the mid 2000, SF started working on watershed activities in rural Alwar (Saiphy, 2017). Today, it operates in villages close to TBS, and has adopted similar working principles. Working principles: Like TBS, SF first, forms ‘Village Development Committees (VDC)’ (or gram sabha in TBS’s vocabulary), and identifies watershed sites using ‘a need-based approach’ (Saiphy, 2017). After site, size and design selection with community involvement, it moves on to construct the watershed using the principle of ‘shramdaan’. Unlike TBS which has an ambiguous exit strategy, SF ‘remains in an area for a minimum period of ten years’ (Saiphy, 2017). This is to understand the impact of its performance. Aim and objectives: In terms of their aim and objectives, the distinctiveness of SF (from TBS) is twofold. Critiquing Rajendra Singh and TBS’s personified style of working, Salahuddin Saiphy, a representative of SF, argues that their ‘primary objective is not to establish’ themselves as ‘the messiahs of environmental conservation’ but to foster ‘an integrated approach encompassing not just on water conservation or water replenishment, but also issues like increasing agricultural productivity, giving farmers their fair share of crop prices, clean polluted land and water resources, enhancing domestic water storage capacity, women’s health, etc.’ (Saiphy, 2017). Strategy: In terms of its working strategies, SF maintains a healthy relationship with corporate organisation, state and other NGOs. While it collaborates with ‘Coca-Cola and Budweiser’, TBS argues that such engagement is not water conservation, but for water extraction. SF, on the other hand, argues that such engagement does not mean a dilution of their core principles but a convergence for social impact. While many like Aneel Karnani (2011) have criticized corporate engagements, Brugmann and Prahalad (2007) argue such partnerships create ‘new links between business innovation and social development’ (Brugmann and Prahalad, 2007).
42
On its relationship with the state, SF argues that ‘nothing happens when things are done independently’ (Saiphy, 2017). It believes that active support and partnership of governments is crucial and imperative if one wishes to expand its scale of operations (Saiphy, 2017). My field visits also observed that almost every development officer of Alwar vouched for SF’s competence. ‘K L Meena, superintendent engineer at Alwar’s Zila Parishad (District Council)’ believes that ‘organizations like Sehgal Foundation are the essential gap fillers. They assist and support the government in this tedious task of reaching out to rural communities in the country’ (Chaturvedi, 2016). In other words, the discourse created by TBS has only helped SF’s working and functioning strategy. Rather than emanating TBS’s style of working, SF’s approach is pragmatic and context specific. 5.2: Government of Rajasthan From the civil society narrative, it may seem that the state and central government of India have done little in the field of water conservation via community participation, however, this description is not accurate. Since the 1970s, the Government of India (GoI) and state government of Rajasthan have undertaken various policy initiatives on in situ water conservation. Following the emergence of NGO led CBNRM initiatives, the state welcomed such approach and even declared its intention to embrace ‘community participation’ (Hanumantha Rao Committee, 1994). By early 1994, the policy effects of Hanumantha Rao Committee guidelines were unprecedented. The central government ‘introduced many institutional provisions that reflected wider discourses around decentralization and participatory development’ (Chhotray, 2011: 65). And likewise, the state government of Rajasthan introduced a ‘People’s Action for Watershed Development Initiatives’ (PAWDI). PAWDI was a collaborative project between Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Govt. of Rajasthan, Tarun Bharat Sangh and Sahyog Sansthan (another NGO). As Saurabh Gupta (2016) details, the PAWDI model soon failed because of conflicting agenda and interests among the varied actors. While TBS wanted to promote community control on natural resources, the state wanted to retain its legitimacy. With internal and external tensions, PAWDI, became a blame game (Gupta, 2016: 80). This can be seen as one of the reason why TBS and the state government departments dislike each other. But the concrete effect of this policy experimentation was both TBS, and Govt. of Rajasthan, realized the need to collaborate with actors with similar agenda and interests.
43
The twin challenges of state’s eroding legitimacy and TBS’s growing success, led the state government to embrace CBNRM as its policy method. Known as Mukhyamantri Jal Swavlamban Abhiyan (MJSA), the ‘vision [of MJSA is] to ensure effective implementation of water harvesting and water conservation related activities in the rural areas’ (Mukhyamantri Jal Swavlamban Abhiyan, 2017). Operationalized in 2016, Sumaer Singh, a bureaucrat in the ‘Watershed Development and Soil Conservation Department’, says that MJSA has ‘facilitated the implementation of 2,093 watershed development works’ and in its ongoing phase 2, it intends to complete another 3000+ watershed (Singh, 2017). Working principles: Like TBS and SF, the working principles of MJSA is also similar. Falling under Baumann and Farrington’s (2003) description, it calls on the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) to deliberate upon the possible site, design and size of the watershed. The district administrative is informed about the selected sites, whereby they ‘formulate a Detailed Project Report (DPR), which is then passed on to the Village Panchayat’ for approval (Singh, 2017). While formulating DPR, MJSA includes the ‘traditional wisdom’ of the communities vis-à-vis its ‘scientific planning’ (Singh, 2017). Once DPR is approved by the PRI, Sumaer says, ‘the Natural Resource Management team works for the SC/ST, and small and marginal farmers, from which we take a 5% share and 10% contribution respectively [as shramdaan] and deposit it in a watershed development fund. This fund is totally for the farmers and can be used by them in the case of undertaking repairs to equipment or compensate themselves in a case of a crop failure’ (Singh, 2017). As with exit strategy, MJSA hands ‘over the project to the Gram Panchayat at the end of five years’ (Singh, 2017). Aim and objectives: In terms of MJSA objectives, Sumaer Singh says, it aims to achieve a holistic approach to water conservation encompassing access to clean drinking water, development of forest, land and water as an index of watershed policy (Singh, 2017). Strategy: In terms of its strategy, MJSA collaborates with various private, public and nongovernmental organisations. On the website, MJSA says it accepts ‘financial resources from multiple sources’ – ‘corporate houses to ‘religious trusts’ (Mukhyamantri Jal Swavlamban Abhiyan, 2017). During the first phase of MJSA, 2% of the total cost (around ₹2.5 crore rupees) came from CSR and public donations. NGOs like Sehgal Foundation have collaborated with the state department to supervise and implement MJSA policies. This partnership in line with
44
the statement of ‘K L Meena’ that ‘organizations like Sehgal Foundation are the essential gap fillers’ (Chaturvedi, 2016). Similarly, they see no contradiction in partnerships with brewery firms. While TBS rejects such partnerships, MJSA accepts their CSR funds with open arms. SABMiller, a brewery firm has even adopted villages in rural Alwar under MJSA scheme (Singh, 2017). When asked about TBS, Sumaer Singh, argues that their ‘work is a big hype’ (Singh, 2017). He argues that to show President of India, TBS called tankers to fill water in one of their johads (Singh, 2017). And one of the reasons, ‘they [TBS] don’t cooperate with us [state], is because [TBS] do not want to disclose that they are receiving funds from the outside, which is mandatory [to disclose]. Secondly, [Sumaer says] I haven’t seen Rajendra Singh in Alwar for many years. Where is he?’ (Singh, 2017; my emphasis). In other words, Sumaer is not only questioning the accountability procedures of TBS but also its legitimacy – as Rajendra Singh is rarely seen in Alwar. Therefore, from Govt. of Rajasthan’s perspective, retaining its distinctiveness over CBNRM and discarding TBS’s performance is important for its legitimacy. 5.3: TBS’s critique of Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan: While Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan have strategically embraced CBNRM, this development has become a source of worry for TBS. As Chapter 4 showed the micro-politics of TBS is premised upon a successful collaboration between local, national and international actors. But at multiple levels, the rise of Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan, harms TBS’s legitimacy and its distinctiveness. First, the thirty-year-old mai-baap relationship between TBS and communities can be harmed if other actors in the region increasingly frame them as a part of their legitimation. Second, with the exit of SIDA’s support, the growth of other actors might diminish its financial and donor backing. Third, the successful alignment of SF and Govt. of Rajasthan, may not only diminish the political and strategic legitimacy of TBS, but also reveal some of its shortcomings in accountability and transparency procedures. Citing the recent crackdown on ‘Ford Foundation’ and ‘Amnesty’, Vijay, a representation of Welthungerlife, which funds TBS’s ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’ argues that ‘formally we cannot say that we are supporting them [TBS] because we are under a lot of pressure’ (Rai, 2017). In other words, to retain its legitimacy, the state, although not Govt. of Rajasthan, the central government ‘can’ clampdown on TBS for transparency reasons. And finally, the growth of SF has led long-time functionaries of TBS to move out. Saiphy and Suresh alluded me that
45
Kanhaiya Lal Gujjar, who joined TBS in the early 1990s left to join SF (Saiphy, 2017; Raikwar, 2017). Such internal fractures might hamper TBS micro style of working and undermine its human resource capacity to implement projects. The growing effects of SF and Govt. of Rajasthan on TBS leaves it nothing but to criticize and reject their performance while stressing its distinctiveness. Table 4 summarizes the distinctiveness of TBS vis-à-vis the other two actors in terms of their objectives, funding, approach, relationship, strategy and popular perceptions. In an interview to me, Suresh (from TBS), framed SF as an NGO working for the neo-liberal agenda and the performance of government policies as ineffective, riddled with bureaucratic inefficiencies and red-tapism (Raikwar, 2017a). He invited me to study their performance and credibility. As figure 8, 9 and 10 shows, wall writing in nearby villages is one way to attest TBS’s territory and presence. Therefore, in rural Alwar, the rise of Sehgal Foundation and Government of Rajasthan is nothing but a challenge to TBS’s position. In the near future, it will be interesting to see what strategies TBS and the other two actors will adopt to tackle each other.
46
Figure 8: Proverb 3 – Use water judiciously, every drop has a purpose, You will enjoy it and happiness will be the result. Tarun Bharat Sangh / Wells for India.
Figure 9: Proverb 4 – Water drops have defined human history, Earth is its witness so as the atmosphere. Tarun Bharat Sangh / Wells for India.
47
Figure 10: Proverb 5 – Without water conservation, the farm gets dry. If greenery is unseen, One see sand and sands. Tarun Bharat Sangh / Wells for India.
5.4: Summary: This chapter has shown that the CBNRM discourse propagated by TBS has had greater development effects in rural Alwar. From the perspective of ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’, it may be seen as a positive outcome, but in rural Alwar, it has become a source of worry for TBS. The implementation of such discourse by other actors hampers the strategic local, national and international network of TBS and intensifies its legitimacy, transparency and accountability challenges. In this context, TBS is left nothing but to criticize the performance of Sehgal Foundation and the Government of Rajasthan and stress its distinctiveness. On the other hand, both Sehgal Foundation and the Government of Rajasthan have strategically utilized the discourse for their benefits. By simultaneously appropriating it and retaining it distinctiveness, both the actors have increased their opportunities and legitimized its role in rural Alwar.
48
Table 4: Comparison between TBS, Govt. of Rajasthan and SF: Organisation
Objective
Approach
Relationship
Method of
with one other
working
Strategy
Funding
Popular
Challenges
perception
Tarun
Water
Gandhian -
Confrontational Participatory,
Complex –
Donor
Credible,
Everyday
Bharat
conservation
Traditional
to both the
Refer Chapter
agencies,
success
legitimacy,
CBNRM
actors (Govt. of and community
4.5
public and
model
accountability
Sangh
Rajasthan and
decentralized ownership
SF)
private
and
players,
transparency
awards etc. MJSA -
Holistic
Decentralized
Confrontational Same as TBS -
Evolved to
Multiple
Govt. of
approach to
and
with TBS,
Discourse
collaboration
sources –
Rajasthan
water
traditional
Collaborative
conformity.
with similar
private,
management
CBNRM
with SF.
interest and
public,
agenda (See
religious,
Chapter 5.2)
donations etc.
Sehgal
Holistic
Scientific and
Confrontational Same as TBS -
Collaboration
Donor
Foundation
approach to
traditional
with TBS,
Discourse
with similar
agencies,
water
CBNRM
Collaborative
conformity.
interest and
public and
with Govt. of
agenda (See
private
Rajasthan
Chapter 5.1)
players.
management
Contested
-Not analysed-
Credible
-Not analysed-
49
Chapter 6: Perceptions of TBS’s Intervention: Taking the final research question for this dissertation, this chapter will highlight the social and environmental effects of TBS’s intervention and how have different stakeholders have engaged and perceived them. It will argue that contrary to the generic claims and critiques of CBNRM, the perception of TBS’s impact is heterogeneous for two reasons – one, because of the approach and two, due to the heterogeneity of stakeholder perception. 6.1: The idea of ‘community’: Many scholars have argued that central in the promotion of CBNRM, NGOs often project ‘communities’ as a static, primordial and harmonious (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001). While categories of class, caste, and gender are used for project funding, they are rarely interrogated to understand the internal differences. Second, critics have argued that the imagined ‘community’ of shared norms and values often ignores the hierarchy of priorities and issues within NRM (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). As a result, NGOs present ‘community’ as a simplified assumption of what is varied and contested in practice. With TBS, the above critique of ‘community’ applies. As we saw in Chapter 4, it was Mangu Meena, a landlord of Gopalpura, who shaped the ‘community’ of TBS’s CBNRM. The Meenas of Gopalpura comes the lineage of Zamindar Meenas of Rajasthan. According to Kumar Suresh Singh (1998), the Zamindar Meenas have enjoyed a high social position among other Meena groups. They claim a Kshatriya status equivalent to that of the Rajput and has followed their socio-cultural habits (Singh, 1998). In Gopalpura too, these characteristics are visible and out of 500 bighas of cultivable land, 400+ belongs to the Meenas, and Mangu Baba’s family owns the largest amount of land in the village, 40 bighas. As Menon et al. (2009) show, the social relationship between Meenas, Balais and Banjaras of Gopalpura have been often hostile. The Meenas, have historically opposed the allotment of public land to Balais in Gopalpura. When Balai tenants become landowners due to land reform in Rajasthan, the Meenas did not take it well (Menon et al., 2009). Further, when Banjaras arrived in Gopalpura, both Meenas and Balais termed them as ‘murders’ and outcast (Menon et al., 2009: 125). From my own observations, even TBS does not care to engage with the rehabilitated Banjaras.
50
Asides the sanskritization of Meenas, the hostile, hierarchical and antagonistic social relationship of communities has led to the spatial segregation of Gopalpura. Meenas, today predominantly live in Gopalpura, Balais in Amlika ki Dhani and Banjaras outside the villages. When I asked Puran Meena, a family member of Mangu Meena, about the social relationship within the village, he portrayed a warm and cordial picture (Meena, 2017). Suresh, (from TBS) also framed Gopalpura as a village of harmonious social relationship. As an institution, TBS went further by arguing that their CBNRM model has transformed the social relationship. But in reality, the conflict-ridden spatial segregation of Gopalpura helps TBS frame it as a ‘model village’ because it is only the Meenas and relatives of Mangu Meena who reside in Gopalpura. While Balais, who are technically part of Gopalpura have been segregated and forced to call their villages as Amlika ki Dhani. Similarly, asides the caste-based community heterogeneity, inter-gender differences are also rarely counted in TBS’s community construction. The prevailing ‘patriarchal and feudal norms heavily control women’s lives in the village’ (Menon et al., 2016: 124-125). During my fieldwork, I was unable to access the voices and concerns of women on NRM. Asides many other reasons, women are not allowed to express their concern to an ‘outsider’ (me). They are also not allowed to sit, interact and perform cultural practices on par with men. This is reflective from my visit to Murti Devi Gujjar’s house in Raipura. Before I started interviewing her, Murti sat on the floor allowing me to sit on the cot. In her interview, Murti voiced that she not only undertakes household activities but also works on the farm (Gujjar, 2017). In other words, the simplified notion of ‘community’, based on men from a dominant social group in TBS’s case, obscures the varied and contested notion of – who forms the community and what their interests are. The heterogeneity of ‘community’ is further hidden by TBS’s framing and the inherent social and spatial segregation of the village. 6.2: Participation and Equity: Many scholars have argued that the inherent rationality of participation fails to recognize the potential link between inclusion and subordination in the process. As Cooke and Kothari (2001) in their influential book write, ‘how the different, changing and multiple identities of individual’s impact upon their choices whether and how to participate’ are rarely recognized (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 9). They point that although community participation is often
51
prescribed to ‘reveal the realities of this everyday life, paradoxically its public nature means that the more participatory it is, the more the power structure of the local community will be masked’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 12). Thus, ‘participation’ in CBNRM means an engagement with complex sets of issues ranging from power relations, structural challenges, and codified oppressions.
Figure 11: A depiction of gram sabha process at Tarun ashram.
In TBS’s case, the issue of participation is much trickier. As aforementioned earlier, TBS promotes ‘gram sabha’ as its local institution to deliberate, discuss and decide upon the watershed and other issues related to NRM. Despite its ‘apolitical’ aspect, the participation of women and individuals from other castes are limited (Torri, 2010: 237). The unequal social and economic constraints of the village prevent individuals from putting forward their concerns and voices in the gram sabha (Torri, 2010). Voicing against the influential members and communities’ decision can be seen as an attempt to jeopardize their access to resources. Therefore, staying silent or abstaining from the meeting, is not only out of unequal power relationship but also a right that they wish to engage with. As Amartya Sen (1995) writes the ‘connection between well-being and capability… [is] itself depend on the capability to function’ (Sen, 1995: 41). ‘Choosing’ as he argues, ‘may itself be a valuable part of living’ (Sen, 1995: 41). Therefore, ‘choosing’ to stay silent or ‘choosing’ to abstain from the meetings,
52
helps less influential communities or individuals to have the right to engage in rare situations of conflict (Cochran and Ray, 2009: 440). At one level, it can be said that the establishment of gram sabha and insistence on ‘equal participation’ can be seen as a façade or a matter of formality (or informality) for the influential (Torri, 2010). As Menon et al. (2016) write, the façade is much visible when ‘community space and decisions are often influenced by social norms’ (Menon et al., 2016: 144). That is, on certain occasions, men gathering to smoke hookah, discuss issues related to NRM restricting the access of other community members and women to participate. In line with Kothari’s (2001) characterization, the framing of these events as ‘public’ by TBS, masks the effects of dominance or possible diverging interests. However, Kothari (2001) misses out on the point that the functioning of ‘gram sabha’ might be unequal, in terms of participation or cost allocation, but this inequality may not be ‘inequitable in light of all the economic, and symbolic dimensions’ (Cochran and Ray, 2009: 436). As a study by Cochran and Ray (2009) show, in two of the villages where TBS has worked, individuals and communities express their normative right to participate where ‘equality through participation’ can be achieved, yet, they accept the principle of equal contribution for community watershed construction. That is, by agreeing to contribute equally, these communities ‘get’ the right to access the resources, which otherwise divorces them from economic or every day gains. Also, aware of the fact that the outcome of resource allocation might be unequal, not only due to the geography but also due socio-economic conditions, they still stress on their equal contribution. Independent of the ‘output’ benefits, Cochran and Ray (2009) argues that the ‘benefits’ that can be derived from equal ‘input’ is much greater. While TBS argues that everyone who contributes ‘equally’, benefits ‘equally’, this is not true as Cochran and Ray (2009) shows. Furthermore, the perceived ‘apolitical’ nature of the institution masks the politics of participation. Many have argued that the institution of gram sabha becomes dormant after johad construction, as dominant social groups meet informally, and others after their access to johads rarely attend (Everard, 2015: 128). Thus, the hypothesis of Elinor Ostrom and others, that over time institutions automatically mature is also not true for this context (Nobelprize.org, 2017).
53
For TBS, more than the internal politics of participation, equity or benefits, it is the broader outcome literature on CBNRM which is relevant. That is, by framing the outcome of CBNRM projects as ‘enormous positive impact on very marginalized groups’ (this can even mean Meenas as they are constitutionally ST in Rajasthan), ‘decrease in forced migration’ or ‘liberation [of women] from back-breaking chores of fetching water, collecting fuel & fodder’, both TBS and donors attest their projects as ‘success’ (Sisodia, 2009: 13). Using such loaded phrases, donors and NGOs strategically simplify the internal differences of their ‘success’ and showcase project accountability (Li, 2002). 6.3: Traditional knowledge: The third critique of CBNRM comes from the ubiquitous usage of the term ‘traditional knowledge’. As David Mosse (2001) argues, the assumption that local knowledge of the ‘communities’ will help development actors redefine their policy approach is a simplified deduction. Rather, far from the local ‘knowledges’ of the communities leading the CBNRM solution, it is the appropriation and interpretation of the donor and the NGO which constitutes as ‘traditional knowledge’. With TBS’s case, Mosse’s critique of ‘traditional knowledge’ is valid. In fact, the assertion by Rajendra Singh that traditionalism brings back the glory of ‘Neer, Nari and Nadi’ (Water, Women and River) is also flawed (Salam, 2011).
Figure 12: Water, Women and River
54
First, the construction of ‘traditional knowledge’: As it often happens with project proposals, donors fund the project that satisfies certain criteria of its agenda, like – identifiable improvements on livelihood, implementation of CBNRM as project method or usage of ‘traditional knowledge’. In principle, this means – local knowledge needs to be identified every time the project is undertaken, and communities in question are devolved to implement the project. In practice, however, NGOs shape and lead the process of the engagement. With TBS, rather than communities shaping the needs, it is them which shapes the issue or the ‘needs’ of the community (Mosse, 2001). For example, during my fieldwork visit to Raipura, Gopalpura and Jaitpura, TBS had been fiercely advocating for communities to adopt a sprinkler and drip irrigation system in their farms. Everywhere I went along, TBS argued for communities to visit the farm in Jaitpura where it had successful installed such system (See figure 13). During the ‘World Water Day’ workshop in school, Suresh framed the ‘drip irrigation system a doctor’s injection’ – which goes on to the crop and saves water (Raikwar, 2017b). Suresh appealed students to visit Jaitpura along with their parents to see the benefits for themselves. This construction of villagers ‘need’ as ‘vital’ is shaped by the fact that after the project implementation, TBS can showcase its ‘success’ to donors, visitors, and create functional accountability.
Figure 13: Drip Irrigation System at a farm in Jaitpura.
55
During my visits, farmers, teachers, and women requested TBS to consider the issue of water contamination and increasing levels of fluoride, but it has chosen to negate it (Gujjar, 2017; Meena, 2017; Sharma et al., 2017). Similarly, during my stay, Panthers from nearby Sariska Forest Reserve had killed four to five individuals and villagers requested TBS to do something, but it chose to stay silent. While this was a developing issue, the point here is that TBS and donors construct the ‘needs’ and ‘knowledge’ of the communities rather than vice-versa. This is not to say that communities do not benefit from the ‘needs’, but this construction highlights the appropriation of traditional knowledge. Further, as Chapter 4 showed, the ‘traditional knowledge’ which TBS espouses reflects the needs and knowledge of the Meenas – johads. In return for its knowledge appropriation, TBS get things done for the Meenas and other influential groups in the village, as these communities shaped the accountability and legitimacy of TBS. Second, heterogeneity of local knowledge: As many scholars have argued, knowledge ‘is highly differentiated in terms of who produces it and in terms of different ways of knowing’ it (Mosse, 2001: 19). In NRM, Bina Agarwal (2010) has shown that interests can diverge based on caste and gender lines (Agarwal, 2010: 43). Regarding gender, the distinctiveness of men and women’s interest stems from the ‘gender division of labour on the one hand, and the gender division of economic resource on the other’ (Agarwal, 2010: 32). In the early 1990s, when TBS imposed a ban on cutting green woods from the forest, it did result in an emergence of environmental consciousness among villagers, but it came at a cost to the women (Menon et al., 2016: 143). Due to the gendered division of labour, women from Raipura, Gopalpura and nearby villages had to go elsewhere to collect their woods. Sariska Reserve Forest, a nearby forest area, was indiscriminately exploited by the women folk (Menon et al., 2016). Murti Devi Gujjar, from Raipura (whose village lies in the Sariska reserve), told me that she often travelled (and still does) to the interior of the reserve to collect water and woods (Gujjar, 2017). This is true for the women’s from Gopalpura also (Menon et al., 2016: 144). All these narrative show us that an acknowledgement to the complexity of diverging interests across caste, class and gender lines are largely absent in TBS’s knowledge framing. It can be said that the knowledge system produced, appropriated and celebrated by TBS is an outcome of events and knowledge that reflects ‘local relations of power, authority, and gender’ (Mosse, 2001: 19).
56
6.4: Environmental impact of TBS’s johads: Like other critiques, scholars have argued that variations in rainfall pattern, geology, topography and hydrological conditions matter in understanding the environmental impact of johads. Therefore, the various complexities associated with the scientific measurement of watersheds make it ‘very difficult to quantify the hydrological impacts’ of watersheds as ‘positives’ or ‘negatives’ (Glendenning et al., 2012: 10). Like the equity issue, TBS masks the nuances of its scientific impacts and frames it as ‘increased agriculture production’ or ‘controlled erosion and silting’ (Sisodia, 2009: 13). This is perpetuated by the fact that except for one or two scientific field studies, there is an enormous lack of data on the geological conditions of rural Alwar (soil profile, aquifer, rainfall pattern, topological profile etc.). Glendenning (2009) who did her PhD on the hydrological impacts of TBS’s site, argues the watershed structures constructed by TBS does have an impact on groundwater supply, but only to a point. ‘The data showed that johads were capturing 7% recharge’ (Subramanian, 2015: 106). However, the overall efficiency of johads began to decrease even if a large number of watershed sites were constructed in a given area. In simple terms, there is only so much water johads can recharge despite its existence. Similarly, contrary to TBS’s claim of ‘drought proofing’, the watersheds do ‘not provide longer term supply if drought occurs because the local pumping practices for irrigation reduces the buffer between seasons and recharge from RWH [rain water harvesting] would decrease’ (Glendenning, 2012: 727). She further argues that the claim of perennial river rejuvenation by TBS is, in reality, a ‘semiarid ephemeral’ (Subramanian, 2015: 107). Another scientific study by Davies et al. (2016) argues that an investigation of TBS’s watersheds ‘produced equivocal results’ (Davies et al., 2016: 24). In sum, except these two studies, the lack of data sets for rural Alwar, help TBS frame CBRNM as the magical bullet for social and ecological transformation, which in reality is contested. 6.5: Summary: This chapter has shown that contrary to the broader claims and critiques of CBNRM, the results of TBS’s CBNRM has been heterogeneous. The explanation for this heterogeneity stems from the multiple and interlinked issues of ‘community’, ‘participation’, ‘equity’, ‘traditional knowledge’ and ‘impact’.
57
First, with the idea of community, the perceived homogeneity of Gopalpura helps TBS create legitimacy and frame it as a ‘model’ village, which otherwise is an outcome of internal village differences. Second, the politics of participation shows that while the apolitical ‘gram sabha’ runs on being accountable to the few, but the idea of establishing such institution, temporarily it may be, gives other communities the access to resources. This inequality is linked to the third issue of social equity that groups are aware of differentiated outcomes, and pragmatically accept it despite the situation. Fourth, TBS can rightly argue that the knowledge which it advocates is an outcome of community-led processes, but as Murti’s (2017) example shows, it has trade-offs and does not change as issue and context demands. Furthermore, it is the interpretation of the donor and the NGO which counts as a ‘traditional knowledge’. And finally, the lack of scientific data on rural Alwar helps TBS frame its impact in a generic positive term, which in light of the few studies is also contested. Thus, the functioning accountability of TBS projects is limited only to donors, trustees, staffs and dominant social groups.
58
Chapter 7: Conclusion: To draw out key takeaways from the analysis presented in the presiding chapters, it is useful to recall the context in which the research questions for this dissertation was asked. Chapter 1 and 2 showed that from being ‘silent partners’ in the initial decade of social transformation, civil society actors emerged to develop their own model and politics of service delivery (Sahoo, 2013). Among various approaches, two major types of models evolved to work on natural resource management – first, the Gandhian model and second, the traditional. In adopting these models, NGOs argued for CBNRM. The argument for embracing CBNRM was twofold. First, the link between community and NGO would address the multiple accountability challenges of the organisation and second, it would attest legitimacy to their practices. The state, on the other hand, coming out of the decentralization discourse realized the need to embrace CBNRM (Mathur, 2013). For it, CBNRM could effectively give back its authority and resolve its legitimacy and representational challenges. Furthermore, using regulatory and legal measures, it can overpower the authority and legitimacy of civil society actors (Kapur et al., 2017). Cognisant of this authority of the state, NGOs working on CBNRM manoeuvred their functioning strategy depending on state-civil society relationship (Kudva, 2005) (Sahoo, 2013). As we saw in Chapter 5 showed Sehgal Foundation partnered with the state, acting as essential ‘gap fillers’, whereas Tarun Bharat Sangh, confronted it to attest its grassroots image. In this context of multi-faceted nature and objectives of the NGOs and the state, the dissertation chose to focus on an NGO-led CBNRM, that is Tarun Bharat Sangh and analyse its role in the political economy of water conservation in rural Alwar. The dissertation first sought to unpack the method, procedure, and organisational structure that shaped the micro-narrative of TBS, followed by its macro-politics of working. Second, it analysed the discourse effects of TBS’s method on other actors such as Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan in rural Alwar and tried to unpack the politics of intervention among them. And finally, the dissertation sought to analyse the effects of TBS’s intervention and how have different stakeholders engaged and perceived these interventions. The central theme across these questions was to analyse the legitimacy, accountability and transparency challenges of the organisation and what they meant for TBS and other actors. Adopting the framework of political ecology and qualitative methods, Chapter 4, took the first question of the dissertation and went on to show the evolution of TBS in rural Alwar. It showed that two key factors mattered in TBS’s CBNRM embracement. First, Rajendra Singh’s
59
personal belief in the Gandhian approach of shramdaan and second, his experience of incorporating traditional knowledge in Gopalpura when building johads for the Meenas. This Gandhian-traditional discourse or framed differently, the communitarian discourse was also pushed by donor agencies to legitimize its aid efficacy. With the Meenas and donors at its side, TBS set up its ashram in Bheekampura. To strengthen its footing, it went beyond the objectives of water conservation for the local communities and established a strategic collaboration with local, national and international forces (TBS, Meenas, civil society and donor agencies). This collaboration gave TBS the legitimacy to carry out its micro-macro politics. In rural Alwar, it framed its intervention as a ‘rights movement’ and channelled this ‘struggle’ to high politics of policy processes (Carr-Harris, 2015). In adopting this strategy, TBS framed its accountability demands for the communities and occupied a crucial position in the national debates on water and river rejuvenation. This strategy was amplified further when a combination of factors strengthened its grassroots identity. First, a reorganisation of its institutional structure - whereby father (Rajendra Singh) led the national/international campaign, and son (Maulik Sisodia) managed the everyday affairs of rural Alwar. And second, the media and donor agencies framing of TBS’s story as a ‘grassroots success’, followed by civil society’s support for its ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’. Although challenges were seen in TBS’s accountability and transparency procedure, the institutional and strategic collaboration of actors led TBS to receive international fame and recognition. Today, because of its say in national and international space and successes in rural Alwar, TBS can enact all the stages of policy processes depending upon context and geography –agenda setter to policy evaluator. This shift from a service implementer to a policy all-rounder reflects the strength of its campaign and politics. Intentionally or unintentionally, the effective success of its campaign has led other actors in rural Alwar re-evaluate their method of working. Taking the second question of the dissertation, Chapter 5 showed that Sehgal Foundation and Govt. of Rajasthan have started to foster a ‘discourse conformity’ to TBS’s CBNRM discourse while retaining their bargaining power over its meaning and interpretation. That is, by strategically aligning to the discourse, these actors retain their distinctiveness and legitimized their interventions. At one level, it can see as a positive outcome of TBS’s ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’, but at another level, it can harm its interests given these actors are in rural Alwar. The growing competition among actors has led to cracks in TBS’s strategic network of collaboration and has intensified its everyday
60
legitimacy, transparency and accountability challenges. Thus, the micro constraints compel TBS to criticize the performance of the other actors and reject their strategies and distinctiveness. In sum, the promotion of CBNRM discourse by TBS has created a discursive competition in rural Alwar, creating challenges for its everyday legitimacy. And finally, taking the third research question of this dissertation, Chapter 6 showed that the effects and perceptions of TBS’s work are differentiated across class, caste, gender and geography. It is often the dominant social group in a given village, like the Meenas in Gopalpura which form the voice, community and leadership of its ‘gram sabha’ institution. Aware of such reality, other groups accept such situation by contributing equally in the watershed process, because equal contribution in an unequal social setting, might provide symbolic and economic access to the resources, which otherwise may not be possible (Cochran and Ray, 2008). TBS, on the other hand, negates such heterogeneity because the perceived homogeneity of it helps frame the interventions as successes. Further, it is the interpretation of the NGO and donor agency which counts as ‘performance’ and ‘knowledge’. Hence, acceptance of social hierarchies coupled with its interest legitimizes TBS’s discourse. On the other hand, it also shows the limits of its functioning accountability. In conclusion, the dissertation has shown that a careful selection of choices and strategies has made TBS an indispensable actor in the political economy of water. It strategic collaboration of local, national and international actors has given it the legitimacy to carry out its watershed politics and interventions. But as Chapter 5 showed the unintended consequences of the CBNRM model adoption by other actors in rural Alwar has led to legitimacy, accountability and transparency challenges for TBS. It will be interesting to see how will it retain its interest while ensuring that ‘warning signals are identified, listened to and addressed’ as Edwards and Hulme warned (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 4)
61
7.1 Limits and areas for further research: Before closing it might be pragmatic to re-emphasize the limits of this dissertation. Given time, access, and sample size constraints, the dissertation could not expand to a broader scope or incorporate other methods in its study. In its reliance on TBS for information, access and data, the validity of the arguments might be limited further. Chapter 6, for instance, had to rely upon unpacking the perceptions of TBS’s interventions compared to doing a pre-and-post-analysis of its performance. In this regard, a possible area for further research could be on a comparative study of TBS, Govt. of Rajasthan and SF’s performance. Such a study could offer valuable insights upon the strengths and weakness of each approaches and the legitimacy challenges it offers to each other. Thus, it is important to read this dissertation considering the limitations and gaps.
62
Bibliography: Primary Sources: a) Government reports and gazettes: 1. District Gazetteer of Alwar (1968) Government Central Press, Rajasthan. 2. Hanumantha Rao Committee (1994) ‘Report of the Technical Committee on Drought Prone Areas Programme and Desert Development Programme’, Department of Land Resources, Government of India, New Delhi. 3. Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908) Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta. 4. Mohan Dharia Committee (1995) ‘High Level Committee on Wastelands Development’, Department of Land Resources, Government of India, New Delhi. b) Interviews: 1. Altarelli, V. (2016) Email conversation with Gaurav Daga on 9 and 12 December, Cambridge. 2. Gujjar, M. D. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 23 March, Raipura. 3. Heijne, Å. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 3 March over Skype, Cambridge. 4. Jain, M. (2016) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 12 December over Skype, Cambridge. 5. Joshi, S. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 13 February over WhatsApp, Cambridge. 6. Interviewee A (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 22 March, Goalpura High School, Gopalpura. 7. Meena, P. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 20 March, Gopalpura. 8. Müller, B. W. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 10 March over Skype, Cambridge. 9. Prakash, O. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 13 February over Skype, Cambridge. 10. Rai, V. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 3 March over Skype, Cambridge. 11. Raikwar, S. (2017a) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 20 March, Jaitpura. 12. Raikwar, S. (2017b) World Water Day: Youth Awareness Workshop on 22 March, Gopalpura High School, Gopalpura. 13. Sharma, O. P., Sharma, R. L. and Sharma, K. K. (2017) Conversation with the teachers of Gopalpura High School on 21 March on issues of water and human-animal conflict, Gopalpura High School, Gopalpura. 14. Sippy, S. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 24 March over telephone, Bheekampura. 15. Singh, B. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 22 March, TBS Ashram, Bheekampura. 16. Singh, C. (2017) Participant observation of speech given to Bhilwara farmers on 25 March, TBS Ashram, Bheekampura.
63
17. Singh, S. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 13 February over WhatsApp, Cambridge. 18. Singh, S. (2017) Interview with Gaurav Daga on 27 March, Alwar city. c) Websites: 1. Census (2011) ‘Alwar District: Census 2011 data’ – Accessed on 2 June 2017. Link - http://www.census2011.co.in/census/district/429-alwar.html 2. India Development Coalition of America-IDCA: Water (2010) ‘World Water Day 2010Clean Water for a healthy World’ – Accessed on 20 May 2017. Link - http://idca-water.blogspot.co.uk/2010/ 3. Open Aid Data (2017) ‘Water Supply & Sanitation: India’ – Accessed on 7 June 2017. Link - http://www.openaiddata.org/purpose/645/140/10/ 4. Nobelprize.org (2017) ‘Elinor Ostrom – Facts’, Nobel Media AB – Accessed on 22 May 2017. Link - http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-facts.html 5. Mukhyamantri Jal Swavlamban Abhiyan (2017) ‘Mission’ – Accessed on 26 May 2017. Link - http://mjsa.water.rajasthan.gov.in/mjsa/mission.html 6. Sehgal Foundation (2017) ‘About Sehgal Foundation’ – Accessed on 29 May 2017. Link - http://www.smsfoundation.org/about-us/ 7. Sida (2017) ‘About Swedish development cooperation’ – Accessed on 29 May 2017. Link - http://www.sida.se/English/how-we-work/about-swedish-developmentcooperation/ 8. SIWI (2017) ‘Stockholm Water Prize Laureates discuss human right to water at the Vatican’ – Accessed on 29 May 2017. Link - http://www.siwi.org/latest/stockholm-waterprize-laureates-discuss-human-right-water-vatican/ 9. Tarun Bharat Sangh (2017) ‘Our Mission’ – Accessed on 15 February 2017. Link - http://tarunbharatsangh.in/our-mission/ 10. UB Group (2007) ‘UB Engineering limited – Draft letter of offer’ – Accessed on 5 June 2017. Link - http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1291873245443.pdf 11. Invitation letter (2017) ‘INVITE: 1-3 April 2017; Social and Environment Justice Leadership Camp in Bheekampura’ – Accessed on 9 June 2017. Link - https://panipost.in/2017/03/social-environmental-leadership-program-at-tbs-alwar/
64
Secondary Sources: a) Unpublished dissertations: 1. Glendenning, J. C. (2009) ‘Evaluating the impacts of Rainwater Harvesting (RWH) in a case study catchment: The Arvari River, Rajasthan, India’, The University of Sydney, Sydney. 2. Saigal, S. (2012) ‘Life and afterlife of a development project: origin, evolution, and outcomes of the Tree Growers' Cooperatives Project, India’, University of Cambridge, Cambridge. b) Published works 1. Agrawal, A. and Gibson, C. C. (eds.) (2001) ‘Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-based Conservation’, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick. 2. Agarwal, B. (2010) ‘Gender and Green Governance’, Oxford University Press, New York. 3. Baumann, P. and Farrington, J. (2003) ‘Decentralising natural resource management: lessons from local government reform in India’, Natural Resource Perspectives, Number 86, Overseas Development Institute, UK. 4. Batterbury, S. (2015) ‘Doing political ecology inside and outside the academy’, in Bryant, R. L. (eds.) ‘The International Handbook of Political Ecology’, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK. 5. Bilgrami, A. (2011) ‘Gandhi’s religion and its relation to his politics’ in Brown, J. and Anthony P. (eds.) ‘The Cambridge companion to Gandhi’, Cambridge University Press, USA. 6. Bose, S. (2006) ‘Role of User Groups and Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in strengthening Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in India’, 11th Biennial Conference, IASCP, Ubud, Bali Indonesia. 7. Brugmann, J. and Prahalad, C. K. (2007) ‘Co-creating Business’s New Social Compact’, Harvard Business Review, USA. 8. Bryant, R. L. (1992), ‘Political ecology: an emerging research agenda in Third-World studies’, Political Geography, Volume 11, Elsevier B.V., pp. 12–36. 9. Carr-Harris, J. (2005) ‘Struggle-dialogue: tools for land movements in India’, Ekta Parishad, New Delhi, India 10. Chaturvedi, S. (2016) ‘Reinstating the traditional rainwater harvesting systems in water deficient district of Alwar’, Sehgal Foundation, India.
65
11. Chandhoke, N. (2003) ‘The Conceits of Civil Society’, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 12. Chambers, R. (1983) ‘Rural development: putting the last first’, Prentice Hall, Harlow. 13. Cherian, M. (2014) ‘A Million Missions: The Non-Profit Sector in India’, AuthorsUpFront, New Delhi. 14. Chhotray, V. (2012) ‘The Anti-Politics Machine in India: State, Decentralization and Participatory Watershed Development’, Anthem Press, London. 15. Cochran, J. and Ray, I. (2009) ‘Equity Reexamined: A Study of Community-Based Rainwater Harvesting in Rajasthan, India’, World Development Volume 37, No. 2, Elsevier B.V., pp. 435–444. 16. Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001) ‘The case for participation as tyranny: Participation: The New Tyranny?’ in ‘Participation: The New Tyranny?’, Zed Books, London. 17. Davies, T. et al. (2016) ‘Community-based groundwater and ecosystem restoration in semiarid north Rajasthan (3): Evidence from remote sensing’, Ecosystem Services 21, Elsevier B.V., pp. 20–30. 18. Delamont, S. (2004) ‘Ethnography and Participant Observation’ in Seale et al. (eds.) ‘Qualitative Research Practice’, SAGE, London. 19. Duncan, J. S. and Barnes, T. J. (1992) ‘Introduction’ in Duncan, J. S. and Barnes, T. J. (eds.) ‘Writing worlds: discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of landscape’, Routledge, New York. 20. Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (2011) ‘Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World’, Kumarian Press, USA. 21. Everard, M. (2015) ‘Community-based groundwater and ecosystem restoration in semiarid north Rajasthan (1): Socio-economic progress and lessons for groundwater-dependent areas’, Ecosystem Services 16, Elsevier B.V., pp. 125–135. 22. Fielding, N. (2004) ‘Getting the most from archived qualitative data: Epistemological, practical and professional obstacles’, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, Volume 7(1), Taylor & Francis, pp. 97–104. 23. Fisher, W. F. (1997) ‘DOING GOOD? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices’, Annual Review of Anthropology, Volume 26, pp. 439-464. 24. Fritz, M. (2014) ‘The Waterman of India’, W.A.S.H. - Water Art Sanitation Hygiene, Welthungerlife. 25. Gadgil, M. and Guha, R. (1995) ‘Ecology and Equity: The use and abuse of nature in contemporary India’, Routledge, USA.
66
26. Gupta, S. (2016) ‘Politics of Water Conservation: Delivering Development in Rural Rajasthan, India’, Springer International Publishing, Switzerland. 27. Glendenning, C. J. et al. (2012) ‘Balancing watershed and local scale impacts of rain water harvesting in India—A review’, Agricultural Water Management 107, Elsevier B.V., pp. 1–13. 28. Jebaraj, P. (2012) ‘Rajendra Singh, two others quit Ganga basin authority’, The Hindu, New Delhi. 29. Jeffrey, C. (2010) ‘Timepass: Youth, Class, and the Politics of Waiting in India’, Stanford University Press, USA. 30. Kapur, D. et al. (eds.) (2017) ‘Rethinking Public Institutions in India’, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 31. Karnani, A. (2011) ‘Fighting Poverty Together: Rethinking Strategies for Business, Governments, and Civil Society to Reduce Poverty’, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 32. Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1999) ‘Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics’, International Social Science Journal, Volume 51, Issue 159, pp. 89–101. 33. Kishwar, M. (2003) ‘Villages in Rajasthan Overcome Sarkari Dependence: Profile of Rajendra Singh and his Work’, Issue 123, Manushi, New Delhi. 34. Kohli, A. (1989) ‘The State and Poverty in India’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 35. Kudva, N. (2005) ‘Strong States, Strong NGOs’ in Ray, R. and Katzenstein, M. F. (eds.) ‘Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power and Politics’, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 36. Kumar, P. and Kandpal, B. M. (2003) ‘Project on Reviving and Constructing Small Water Harvesting Systems in Rajasthan’, Sida Evaluation 03/40, Department for Asia, SIDA, Stockholm. 37. Kulkarni, H. et al. (2015) ‘Shaping the contours of groundwater governance in India’, Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies, Issue 4, Elsevier, pp. 172-192. 38. Lewis, D. and Kanji, N. (2009) ‘Non-Governmental Organizations and Development’, Routledge, New York. 39. Li, T. M. (2002) ‘Engaging Simplifications: Community-Based Resource Management, Market Processes and State Agendas in Upland Southeast Asia’, World Development, Volume 30, No. 2, pp. 265-283. 40. Mathur, K. (2013) ‘Panchayati Raj’, Oxford India Short Introductions, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
67
41. Mathiesen, K. (2015) ‘Rajendra Singh: Clean flowing rivers must be a human right’, The Guardian, London. 42. McCartney, M. (2009) ‘India - The Political Economy of Growth, Stagnation and the State, 1951-2007’, Routledge, USA and Canada. 43. Menon, A. et al. (2007) ‘Community-based Natural Resource Management: Issues and Cases in South Asia’, SAGE Publications, India. 44. Mohan, R. (2017) ‘Narendra Modi’s Crackdown on Civil Society in India’, New York Times, New York. 45. Mosse, D. (2015) ‘Misunderstood, misrepresented, contested? Anthropological knowledge production in question’, Focaal, Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology, 72, Stichting Focaal and Berghahn Books, pp. 128–137. 46. Mosse, D. (2001) ‘‘People’s Knowledge’, Participation and Patronage: Operations and Representations in Rural Development’’, in Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (eds.) ‘Participation: The New Tyranny?’, Zed Books, UK. 47. Rajagopal, K. (2015) ‘Only 10% of 22 lakh NGOs file returns: CBI’, The Hindu, Chennai. 48. Ray, S. (2008) ‘Management of Natural Resources – Institutions for Sustainable Livelihood: The case of Rajasthan’, Academic Foundation, New Delhi. 49. Ray, R. and Katzenstein, M. F. (2005) ‘Introduction’ in Ray, R. and Katzenstein, M. F. (eds.) ‘Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power and Politics’, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 50. Ribot, J. C. (2002) ‘Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular Participation’, World Resources Institute, USA. 51. Rossi, B. (2004) ‘Revisiting Foucauldian Approaches: Power Dynamics in Development Projects’, The Journal of Development Studies, Volume 40:6, pp. 1-29. 52. Roy, S. (2007) ‘Beyond Belief: India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism’, Duke University Press, Durham and London. 53. Rudolph, L. I. and Rudolph, S. H. (2006) ‘Postmodern Gandhi and Other Essays: Gandhi in the World and at Home’, University of Chicago. 54. Palshikar, S. (2014) ‘Cleansing Gandhi of radicalism’, The Indian Express, India. 55. Pangare, G. (2008) ‘Johad Versus Watershed: Case Study of Tarun Bharat Sangh's Approach’ in Jairath, J. and Ballabh, V. (eds.) ‘Droughts and Integrated Water Resource Management in South Asia: Issues, Alternatives and Futures’, SAGE Publications Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi. 56. Pathak, N. (2006) ‘Community conserved areas in South Asia’, Kalpavriksh, India.
68
57. Pathak, N. and Taraporewala, E. (2008) ‘Towards self-rule and forest conservation in Mendha-Lekha Village, Gadchiroli’, ICCA Consortium, India. 58. Poonamallee, L. (2010) ‘Transforming Realities—Making the Improbable Possible: Reclamation of Sacredness as a Source of Generative Capacities’, Journal of Management Inquiry XX(X), pp. 1–21. 59. Pushkarna, V. (1998) ‘Kiss of life for mother earth’, The Week.in, India. 60. Sahoo, S. (2013) ‘Civil society and Democratization in India: Institutions, ideologies and interests’, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, USA and Canada. 61. Salam, Z. U. (2011) ‘Trickle of hope’, The Hindu, Chennai. 62. Salamon, L. M. (1995) ‘The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector’, Foreign Affairs, USA. 63. Sen, A. (1992) ‘Inequality Reexamined’, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 64. Sharma, M. (2012) ‘Green and Saffron: Hindu Nationalism and Indian Environmental Politics’, pages 318, Permanent Black, Ranikhet. 65. Shah, T. (2009) ‘Taming the Anarchy: Groundwater Governance in South Asia’, RFF Press, Washington DC. 66. Sinha, J. et al. (2013) ‘Flow – River Rejuvenation in India: Impact of Tarun Bharat Sangh’s work’, Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2013:28, Citat. 67. Singh, R. (2008) ‘The indigenous knowledge systems of water management in India’, in Mirza, M. M. Q., Ahsan U. A. and Qazi K. A. (eds.) ‘Interlinking of rivers in India: issues and concerns’, Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK 68. Singh, S. K. (1998) ‘India's communities, H-M’, Anthropological Survey of India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 69. Sinha, S. et al. (1997) ‘The ‘new traditionalist’ discourse of Indian environmentalism’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, Volume 24:3, pp. 65-99. 70. Sisodia, M. (2009) ‘25 years of EVOLUTION’, Tarun Bharat Sangh, Kumar and Company, Jaipur 71. Subramanian, M. (2015) ‘A River Runs Again: India's Natural World in Crisis, from the Barren Cliffs of Rajasthan to the Farmlands of Karnataka’, PublicAffairs, USA. 72. Suhrud, T. (2011) ‘Gandhi’s key writings: In search of unity’ in Brown, J. and Parel, A. (eds.) ‘The Cambridge companion to Gandhi’, Cambridge University Press, USA. 73. Suutari, A. and Marten, G. (2005) ‘Water Warriors: Rainwater Harvesting to Replenish Underground Water (Rajasthan, India)’, The EcoTipping Point Project.
69
74. Tang, Z. and Zhao, N. (2011) ‘Assessing the principles of community-based natural resources management in local environmental conservation plans’, Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 405–434. 75. Tarlo, E. (1996) ‘Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India’, C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, London. 76. Torri, M. C. (2010) ‘Decentralising Governance of Natural Resources in India: Lessons from the Case Study of Thanagazi Block, Alwar, Rajasthan, India’, 6/2 Law, Environment and Development Journal, pp. 230-245. 77. Uphoff, N. (1998) ‘Community-based Natural Resource Management: connecting micro and macro processes, and people with their environments’, International CBNRM Workshop, Plenary Presentation, Washington D.C. 78. Vidal, J. et al. (2008) ‘50 people who could save the planet’, The Guardian, UK.
70
Appendix 1: Tables Chapter 3: Research Methodology: Table 1: Organisations and rationale for conducting an interview with them (Refer page no. 16). Table 1: Interviews conducted online S.No. The organisation
Rationale
1
The Flow Partnership
International representative of TBS in the UK
2
Tamera Healing Biotope 1
An CBNRM NGO based in Portugal where Rajendra Singh is often invited to lead global conversation on water.
3
Wells for India
One of the main funders of TBS.
4
Swedish International
One of the main funders of TBS from 1993 to
Development Cooperation
2013.
Agency (SIDA) 5
Welthungerhilfe
One of the funders of TBS’s national campaign - ‘Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan’ on water conservation and river rejuvenation
6
Parmarth Samaj Sevi Sansthan
National Campaign Coordinator of Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan
7
8 9
Maharashtra Coordinator of Jal
Leading the campaign on water conservation
Jan Jodo Abhiyan
and river rejuvenation in Maharashtra
Former representative of
A brewing company which also works on
SABMiller
water conservation in rural Alwar
Representative of Sehgal
Opponent NGO to TBS, which works on
Foundation
watershed CBNRM in rural Alwar.
71
Table 2: Interviews conducted on ‘the field’: (Refer page no. 16). Table 2: Interviews conducted on the site S.No. Village name and location
Actor
Rationale:
interviewed 1.
Jaitpura
4kms from TBS
Farmers,
1. To understand why farmers were using
ashram
TBS’s
drip water irrigation, a process which is
employees
promoted by TBS after beneficiaries have constructed the earthen dams. 2. To oversee the construction of anicut by TBS in Jaitpur
2.
Gopalpura
The ‘model’ village Farmers, of TBS
1. To understand why Gopalpura is often
teachers,
termed as the ‘model’ or ‘star’ village
and youths
by TBS. 2. To understand the spatial mapping of the village in terms of caste, class and economic status.
3.
Bheekampura 2kms from TBS ashram
Farmers and 1. To understand farmers’ perspective on TBS ashram
TBS, government and other actors. 2. To study the everyday life of TBS employees.
4.
Raipura
6kms from TBS
Women
1. To understand how TBS work in an area
ashram; on the
where ‘access’ to the village is difficult
foothills of Sariska
and what do women think of their work.
Tiger Reserve 6.
Alwar city
70kms from TBS
Government 1. To understand the works done by
ashram
officials
government of Rajasthan on water conservation, their opinion of TBS and their recent initiative on watershed CBNRM
72
Chapter 4: Micro-macro politics of TBS: Table 3: Actors and networks who support/work with TBS and others who don’t (Refer page no. 40). Table 3: Actors and networks who support/work with TBS and others who don’t Those who Categories 1.
Those who work with/listen to TBS
Central
‘Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Water
government
Resources, Ministry of Rural Development,
reject TBS
CAPART, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Department of Science and Technology, Planning Commission, Ministry Of Youth Affairs And Sport’ (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003) 2.
State
Govt. of Maharashtra, Govt. of Kerala, Govt. of
Many
government
Uttar Pradesh
departments of Govt. of Rajasthan
3.
Business
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
institutions 4.
Private firms
Various business firms, ex-maharajas
Brewery and mining firms.
5.
Donors
Wells for India, SONIA, SIDA, Oxfam India, The Prince Charles Trust, SDC, Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation, Ford Foundation, ICCO, Global Tiger Patrol, Irish Aid, UNDP, Welthungerhilfe, Stockholm International Water Institute
6.
International
The Flow Partnership, UK; Tamera, Portugal;
NGOs/groups
Walking Water, USA; Viva con Agua, Germany; People and Water, Slovakia; The Bridge, Denmark
73
7.
Media
The Guardian, Maharashtra Times, Loksatta, The Hindu, ‘India Today, Week, Dainik Bhaskar, Indian Express, Hindustan Times’ and various regional newspapers (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003)
8.
Civil society
Centre for Science and Environment, Narmada
groups
Bachao Andolan, Gandhi Peace Foundation, Navdanya, Parmarth Samaj Sevi Sansthan, Participatory Research in Asia, Rashtriya Jal Biradari, Jal Jan Jodo Abhiyan, Ekta Parishad, Kalpavriksh, ‘Voluntary Action Network of India, World Wide Fund for Nature, Indian Social Institute, Indian Institute of Public Administration, ActionAid India, Centre for Environment Education’ (Kumar and Kandpal, 2003)
9.
Research
Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur;
institutes
Stockholm International Water Institute, Stockholm
10. Prominent
Sunita Narain, Anil Agarwal, Vandana Shiva,
individual
Medha Patkar, late Anupam Mishra, M. S.
supporters
Swaminathan, Minni Jain, Michal Kravcik, Prince Charles, Anna Hazare, Sanjay Singh, G. D. Agrawal, Ashish Kothari, Bittu Sahgal, RSS,
11. Social Media
Amitabh Bachchan
Supports
74
Appendix 2 – Other photographs from the field
Figure 14: Tarun Bharat Sangh’s resolution at the entrance of the ashram
Tarun Bharat Sangh * Our Resolution * Where the water runs, teach it to walk Where water walks, teach it to crawl Where water crawls, teach it to stop Where water stops, teach it to soak the bowels of Earth Save it from the evil eye of the sun So, when there be drought or famine Regulate water to regulate life
Figure 15: The ashram of TBS
75
Figure 16: Chaman Singh (in blue t-shirt) leading the discussion on shramdaan with Bhilwara farmers
Figure 17: Tractors constructing anicut in Jaitpura
76
Figure 18: Prince Charles, Rajendra Singh and Minni Jain at Highgrove in 2014. Courtesy: The Flow Partnership.
Figure 19: Rajendra Singh with members of Tamera in California. Courtesy: Terra Nova Movement Facebook page.
77
