Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Does the Promise Hold? Frank Biermann, Man-san Chan, Ayşem Mert and Philipp Pattberg
CSR PAPER 28.2007
DECEMBER 2007 CSRM – Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management Frank Biermann, Man-san Chan, Ayşem Mert and Philipp Pattberg, Department of Environmental Policy Analysis, Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series Index: http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/CSRPapers/default.htm
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail:
[email protected]
The special issue on Corporate Social Responsibility Papers: The potential to contribute to the implementation and integration of EU strategies (CORE) collects a selection of papers presented at the Marie Curie Conference CORE organised by FEEM. The CORE conferences Series addresses the question of the goals achievement of the EU strategies. The main EU strategies (Lisbon, Sustainability, Integration) can be successful if their implementation involves adequately and effectively the business sector, non-profit partnerships and networks, local communities and civil society. In this setting CSR holds the potential to stimulate corporate contributions to the implementation and integration of the mentioned EU strategies and can be tested as a policy tool. This batch of papers has been presented at the second Core Conference: The potential of CSR to support the implementation of the EU Sustainability Strategy. CORE is financed by the European Commission, Sixth Framework Programme and it is coordinated by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM). Further information is available at www.core-project.net
Conferences: • The potential of CSR to support the implementation of the EU Lisbon Strategy Milan, June 22-23, 2006 • The potential of CSR to support the implementation of the EU Sustainability Strategy Milan, June 14-15 , 2007 • The potential of CSR to drive integration in an enlarged Europe Nottingham, June19-20, 2008 • The potential of CSR to support the integration of core EU strategies Darmstadt, 15-16, 2009 Partners of the CORE network: • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italy • Oeko Institut, Freiburg , Berlin, Darmstadt, Germany • University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Does the Promise Hold? Summary Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have increasingly been accompanied and partially also substituted by other, more flexible instruments to reach the goal of sustainable development. Multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development have even been promoted as an official (type 2) outcome at the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD), suggesting that traditional MEAs (type 1 outcomes) are necessary but insufficient means to achieve sustainable development. Although public-private partnerships in national contexts have been rather common since early 1980s, they are novel governance arrangements in transnational politics. On the other hand, effectiveness of partnerships for sustainable development (for the implementation of MEAs) has rarely been the topic of investigation and most research has been conducted as single case studies, hindering more general understandings of the phenomenon. This paper discusses these multi-stakeholder initiatives and public-private partnerships for sustainable development in the context of global environmental governance, inquiring to what extent they fill the governance deficits. Governance deficits that will be researched in this paper are three-fold: The participation deficit, the implementation deficit, and the regulation deficit. On the one hand partnerships have been introduced with Agenda 21, as early as 1992, as a means to ensure the participation of vulnerable groups (such as women, workers, farmers, etc.) and major stakeholders (businesses, NGOs, etc.) to the decision making process of sustainable development. The extent to which these groups have actually been incorporated to decision-making mechanisms, the distribution of power among different partners, and the extent to which corporations are willing to take part in partnerships would frame the query on the participation deficit. On the other hand, in 2002, the Bali Guidelines and WSSD defined them as implementation mechanisms of inter-governmentally agreed outcomes. To what extent partnerships are able to effectively implement sustainability goals would be the frame of the query on the implementation deficit. Finally, current literature on WSSD partnerships overlooks their interaction with existing regulatory governance institutions (international environmental regimes), and possible repercussions these institutions might have on governance. The issue areas in which partnerships are more numerous, and more effective will be discussed in relation to self-regulation in the international/transnational contexts, to explore if the regulation deficit is addressed. The answers to these questions are explored using statistical analyses of the data from Global Sustainability Partnerships Database (GSPD v.1), as well as other databases on WSSD partnerships. Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships, Governance Gaps, Sustainable Development This paper will be published in Glasbergen, P., Biermann, F., Mol A., eds. (forthcoming), Partnerships for Sustainable Development. Reflections on theory and Practice. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Address for correspondence: Aysem Mert Institute for Environmental Studies Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam De Boelelaan 1087 Amsterdam 1081 HV The Netherlands Phone: +31 (20) 5982623 E-mail.
[email protected]
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