National Sentiments in Eastern and Western Europe

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2003

National Sentiments in Eastern and Western Europe* Mikael Hjerm In a world of presumed nation-states nation has been, and still is, an intrinsic part of political legitimization. The claim of nationality has played an important role in such legitimization for the last two centuries. More than this, it has also constituted a fundamental collective entity for an individual’s understanding of who they are in relation to those who are perceived as not sharing the nationality. This is nothing new, but in an era of globalization we are witnessing the rebirth of nationalism and nationality (Castells, 1997), where the power struggle over the political agenda will increasingly be about the struggle for the right to identity and the risks of exclusion from the national community. Even if this is the case it stands clear that everyday nationalism and nationalist struggles take different forms in different parts of the world. It has often been claimed that there are two types of nationalism prevalent in different parts of Europe, one in the so-called West and one in the so-called East. Kohn (1945) claimed that the rise of nationalism in the West was a political occurrence based on the democratic creation of the modern nation-state whereas the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe was of a more backward type drawing its power from the struggle for cultural hegemony. The legacy of Kohn is taken up by Smith (1986; 1991) in his classical division of civic and ethnic national identities and nationalism, claiming that the former is a Western product and the latter mainly an Eastern one (see also Ignatieff, 1993). More recently, White (2000) claims that national identities in Eastern Europe have been strongly influenced by romanticism. The emphasis on ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe not only is related to historical nation formation, but also has been claimed to be of great importance in the postcommunist era (Lovell, 1999). It is widely realized that national identities and nationalism differ within the West as well as within the East, but it is still assumed that there are fundamental differences between Western and Eastern European nation formation and that these have influenced the types of national identity and nationalism prevalent in the different geographical areas. For example, Sugar (1969) claims that there are differences between the Eastern European states; nonetheless, there are also commonalties that make them differ from Western European states. There are two main objections against the classical division of civic West and ethnic East. First that the so-called civic states of the West in fact were built upon ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/03/040413-17 © 2003 Association for the Study of Nationalities DOI: 10.1080/0090599032000152933

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ethnicity and have only recently become foremostly civic (Kaufmann, 1999; 2000; Kuzio, 2002; Yack, 1996). This is undoubtly the case; the question is when the transition from ethnic to civic took place and to what extent ethnicity remains to this day an intrinsic part of the civic West (Hjerm, 1998a). Second, Kuzio (2001) claims that the East has transited from ethnic to liberal civic states via democratization, the building of new institutions and so on; thus questioning the supposed division between East and West. The question is not whether the West is civic and the East is ethnic but to what extent ethnicity is present within the institutions as well as part of the nationality. If the classical division is correct in that Eastern and Western national identities and nationalism can be attributed to the division of civic and ethnic then it seems plausible to assume that the Eastern version should be more related to negative images of other people perceived as not belonging to the nation than is the case in the West. This, given that the common claim of a separation between civic and ethnic is something inherently positive (Gellner, 1983; Castles and Miller, 1993; Habermas, 1995; Birnbaum, 1996; Hjerm, 1998a; 1998b; Nodia, 1994; Parekh, 1994). If the critique against such division is correct differences would still be expected between various countries, since the assumed degrees of civic and ethnic present within them are related to the amount of time that the civic state has existed. The question is whether this is the case. This article sets out to examine the common assumptions of an Eastern and a Western kind of nationality. Focusing on two types of national identification, namely, national pride and nationalism, in ten different countries, is a means to do this. Five Eastern European countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Poland—will be contrasted with five Western European countries, namely, Britain, Austria, The Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. The questions are, firstly, whether there are differences in how people identify with their respective country which can be derived from the East–West dimension and, secondly, whether there are differences in the consequences of such identification. Data and Method The data used in this article come from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 1995. The International Social Survey Programme is a program for international comparative attitude studies. One topic is examined each year in the same way in all the participant countries, which at present number 31 (25 in the module used here). The 1995 study “Aspects of National Identity” deals with areas like national identity, nationalism, national pride, globalism and xenophobia. The ISSP studies are mainly intended for use in international comparative studies, which means that there are certain limitations that can be troublesome when analyzing the material (Svallfors, 1996). First, attitudes are context dependent, which means that certain questions are difficult to phrase, since they will be interpreted differently in different

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NATIONAL SENTIMENTS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE

countries. This means that there is a risk that the questions asked are trivial in order that they have universal applicability. Second, the framing of the questions is of importance, since the entirety will have an impact on the answers given by the respondents. The second problem is of course always salient in attitude studies, but becomes even more so in a comparative context when the framing can be interpreted differently in different countries. Both of these problems affect the kind of questions that it is possible to ask and when this is coupled with the large number of member countries, it becomes even more difficult to avoid asking trivial questions. Still, the material is quite comprehensive. Even if some questions are trivial and do not have a very high applicability to conditions in the examined countries, others do. It is also possible to aggregate questions into compounded indexes in order to strengthen different measures, which in combination with the truly comparative part of the survey renders some very interesting data material. The samples were drawn from whole populations and include people between the ages of 18 and 76. 1 This means that people who are not citizens, or so-called “denizens” (cf. Hammar, 1990), and people with an immigrant background are also included. The inclusion of those who may be perceived as “others” may initially seem to be a problem, especially when analyzing xenophobia. 2 Even if it seems reasonable to exclude people who have not had a reasonable chance to obtain any form of national sentiment in the country they live in at the moment, where should one draw the line? Are all non-citizens or all people with some form of immigrant background to be excluded, or perhaps people who have lived in the country for less than, say, ten years? Regardless of the point of demarcation, there will be problems that are not easily dealt with. Moreover, even though it is possible to separate noncitizens and those who were not born in the country from the rest of the population, it makes little difference.3 The choice was made to keep the full samples in order to maintain the representativeness of the populations. National Pride National identity could be seen as an awareness of affiliation with the nation which gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others or infuses them with a sense of purpose that makes them feel at home (Keane, 1994; cf. Rex, 1996). National identity can vary between individuals of the same nation, but this does not change the fact that they still belong to the same nation (Gellner, 1983; MacCormick, 1996). This is well visioned in Anthony Smith’s (1991) division of the concept into civic and ethnic. The former includes a well-defined territory, a community of laws and institutions, a single political will, equal rights for members of the nation and a minimum of common values, traditions or sentiment that binds people together. The ethnic model is characterized by common descent or perceived common descent where the people are one “folk.” This means that “others” are going to be different people depending on the criteria one’s national identity is based on or the type of

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national identity one has. Not only do people identify differently with the nation-state; they also take pride in different things connected with the nation-state. Some people are proud when the national soccer team performs well and others are proud of the country’s social security system. Even if there are as many ways to feel pride in one’s country as there are individuals, there are, as with national identity, similarities on a more general level that can be examined. These similarities may somewhat correspond to the civic and ethnic dimensions of national identity. National pride should be seen as individual sentiments of pride toward the nationstate.4 It can be based in a diversity of factors, but it is possible to identify two overarching notions that contain the diversity of factors. These notions are political and cultural national pride. This division comes close to Smith’s (1991) division of national identity into civic and ethnic, but it does not cover all aspects of his division and therefore the choice has been to use different and somewhat narrower notions. Political national pride is connected with what could be considered to be the civic side of a society or the political institutions, the economy and social security system. Cultural national pride is connected with what could be considered to be a people’s history, cultural practices and achievements connected to the people. National pride differs from national identity in that the former is more open to changes than the latter, which exhibits at least some degree of stability over time. Moreover, national identity is both a macro and a micro phenomenon simultaneously. That is, it can be the attributes of a nation as well as individuals’ self-definition of belonging to a larger community. This is not the case with national pride, which is foremost individuals’ relationship with their nation and that is the focus here. Nonetheless, it is possible to examine national pride on an aggregate level. However, it must be realized that if it is true that national pride is more open to current political and structural changes in a given nation, then it is possible that national pride varies over time more than is the case with national identity. This becomes especially acute in the Eastern European countries that have recently been and still are witnessing fundamental structural changes, changes that have the potential to influence individuals’ sentiments toward their nation. It is not possibile to measure this over time, owing to limitations in the empirical material used, but it needs to be kept in mind that there are limitations when it comes to the interpretation of the results. Still, given the general supposition that Western Europe differs from Eastern Europe when it comes to the formation of nationality and the sentiments connected with it combined with the structural changes in Eastern Europe lately, it is possible to assume that there are differences in national pride to be found. These differences would in some way correspond with the view of an ethnic Eastern Europe and a civic Western Europe. Let us have a look at this. Ten variables dealing with pride in different factors connected with one’s country have been used in order to operationalize and assess national pride. These are:

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How proud are you of [country] in each of the following? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The way democracy works. Its political influence in the world. [Country’s] economic achievements. Its social security system. Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. Its scientific and technological achievements. Its achievements in sports. Its achievements in the arts and literature. [Country’s] armed forces. Its history.

A first glance suggests that the included variables in fact measure different dimensions of national pride. Pride in the way democracy works, political influence, economic achievements, the social security system and equal treatment of different groups of people seem to be connected with the state or the polity of the country, that is, to the political dimension of national pride. Pride in sports, science, literary achievements and history on the other hand come closer to a more cultural understanding, whereas other sources of pride are more ambiguous. The armed forces are, of course, controlled by the state (at least in the examined countries). However, even though it is somewhat ambiguous, it is also true that the armed forces are more often perceived as a defender of the people living in a certain country and not of the state. It seems to be justifiable to see the last five variables as the same dimension, the cultural dimension. A factor analysis has been executed in order to examine whether national pride can indeed be understood as comprising distinctly different dimensions. 5 The results show that the different statements indeed can be understood as making up two different dimensions, wherein the first five statements make up the first factor and the last five statements a second factor. There are differences between the examined countries, but the overall pattern is reasonably manifest. That is, the first five variables load high on one factor that has to do with the state and its activities, in other words, the political dimension. The other dimension is made up of the last five variables in the list. There is no perfect match between the political and the cultural dimensions and the concepts of civic and ethnic. The former dimensions could instead be seen as included in the two latter concepts without covering the whole of them. In order to be able to analyze the two dimensions as well as their outcome the first five variables have been combined into an index of the political dimension. Correspondingly, the last five variables have been combined into a cultural index. The higher the index value the stronger the national pride based in the different dimensions. Let us now take a look at our initial assumption that the Eastern European countries are more

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inclined to base their national pride in the cultural dimension than are people from the Western countries. Table 1 shows that, contrary to what was expected, there is little support for the assumption that people in the Eastern European countries are more inclined to base their national pride in the cultural dimension. However, the degree of national pride in the political dimension is lower in the Eastern European countries, even though Sweden is an exception among the Western European countries. It is striking that in all countries, except for The Netherlands, the degree of pride based in the political dimension is actually lower than in the cultural dimension, indicating that a clear-cut difference between Eastern and Western Europe is not to be found. The differences between the countries are not positioned in a way that was expected. Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that these results are colored by the contemporary state of affairs, such as the whole political system and ongoing political debates. Moreover, it is perfectly possible to display a strong sense of political national pride even though the object of one’s pride is colored by dominant cultural and ethnic practices. This means that national pride based in the political dimension may in fact have different connotations in the different countries. No state nor its institutions are ever free from cultural influences from the national majority, and the amount of influence is likely to differ among the examined countries. If the Eastern European countries’ institutions are more influenced by the national majority’s cultural practices than is the case in the Western European countries, this implies that it is possible that the displayed results actually obscure a difference that cannot be pinpointed with this analysis. However, if this is the case it is expected to emerge when examining the connotations of the two dimensions of national pride in the different countries.

TABLE 1 Average index values of the two dimensions of national pride

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Political

Cultural

Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia

5.6 5.7 4.3 5.3 5.8

11.2 8.9 9.6 8.4 9.9

Austria Britain Norway Sweden The Netherlands

9.5 7.6 9.0 5.7 9.1

10.2 10.8 9.5 8.9 8.8


National Pride and Xenophobia The question is whether the two dimensions do in fact have different connotations in the examined countries. Examining xenophobia in relation to national pride will give a hint about this. Xenophobia is a notion that is often used yet seldom defined. Therefore, it will be defined as a negative attitude toward or fear of individuals or groups of individuals who are in some sense different (real or imagined) from oneself or the group(s) one belongs to. In this case only attitudes toward immigrants will be considered. Four statements about immigrants have been used in order to operationalize xenophobia. The question and statements were phrased as follows: There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [country]. (By “immigrants” we mean people who come to settle in [country].) How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 1. 2. 3. 4.

Immigrants increase crime rates. Immigrants are generally good for [country’s] economy. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country]. Immigrants make [country] more open to new ideas and cultures.

In order to better assess the complexity of xenophobia and to increase reliability, the statements have been combined into an index that can vary between 0 and 16 (16 being the most xenophobic).6 To assess whether the statements measure the same dimension a factor analysis was conducted. The analysis produces only one factor in the examined countries, indicating that the statements measure the same dimension. Table 2 shows that Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary score significantly higher than the other countries do. This may be in accordance with the view that the conception of nationality in the Eastern European countries has been grounded more on ethnicity, which leads to a situation where the awareness of the “other” as a stranger is more overt in these countries. However, it can also be attributed to the fact that the Eastern European countries are witnessing deep social and economical changes that are producing a greater degree of insecurity among the people of those countries. This means that the differences in the degree of xenophobia between the Eastern and Western European countries can be related more to recent structural changes than to more profound understandings of how “us/we” is conceptualized. It has often been claimed that the separation of the civic and ethnic in society is something positive in that it increases the probabilities that a fair society will prevail. It facilitates a society where different groups can coexist on equal terms and with equal life chances regardless of ethnic affiliation. People in the Eastern European countries displayed lower degrees of pride in the political dimension and the overall degree of xenophobia was higher than in the Western European countries. Thus, the supposition of positive civic sentiments and negative ethnic sentiments ought to

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TABLE 2 Average xenophobia index value Xenophobia Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia

11.2 10.4 11.3 8.8 9.7


8.2 8.0 8.7 7.6 7.7

make sense in the examined countries. However, it was hinted above that there could be a difference in the actual meaning of the political dimension between the Eastern and Western European countries. Thus, it is possible that the consequences of taking pride in the political dimension differ between Eastern and Western Europe in that it is negative in the former case and positive in the latter. Table 3 shows that there is indeed a difference between the examined countries. The cultural dimension of national pride does not correlate positively with xenophobia in the Eastern European countries (with the exception of Bulgaria). On the other hand, in the Western European countries the cultural dimension either does correlate positively with xenophobia, or not at all, as in Sweden. The political dimension correlates negatively with xenophobia or not all in all the examined countries. This means the more pride one takes in the political dimension over one’s country the less the xenophobia, or alternatively it has no consequence at all. Only two of the Eastern European countries compared with four of the Western countries display a negative correlation between the political dimension of national pride and xenophobia. This could indicate that the ethnic influence in the civic sphere is greater in the former countries than the latter. However, if such influence were significantly different in Eastern Europe there ought to be a positive correlation between the political dimension and xenophobia, but this is not the case. Thus, the assumption that a difference in the degree of cultural or ethnic influence over the civic sphere between Eastern and Western Europe is responsible does not seem correct, at least not as expressed in people’s sentiments. People from the Eastern European countries displayed on average higher levels of xenophobia and in these countries xenophobia is not positively related to the cultural dimension (with the exception of Bulgaria). This, combined with the lower levels of national pride in the political dimension in Eastern Europe, suggests that the idea of difference on account of national sentiments between Eastern and Western Europe is

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somewhat supported, but perhaps not in the way that was expected. The question is whether similar results are prevalent when it comes to nationalism. Nationalism “Nationalism” has been used to cover partly different phenomena. The modernist approaches of Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1990) try to explain the emergence and the role of nationalism for the creation of modern societies. Others, like Billig (1995) (see also Calhoun [1997] on nationalism as a discourse), refer to the ideological habits and discourse that contribute to reproducing societies through everyday practices. Treanor (1997) approaches nationalism from yet another perspective, and argues that it is a functional world order that minimizes the divergence within states and the number of states in the world.7 The choice here has been to focus on the political or ideological side (cf. Smith 1991; 1995) of nationalism and its relationship with nationalist sentiment. The latter refers to nationalist attitudes that people, from a specific nation, have toward their nation or national affiliation. Even if there are different ways to understand the political side of nationalism, one thing is clear: nationalism has its roots in historical experiences (e.g. Calhoun, 1995; 1997; Smith, 1995). Embarking in these historical experiences it has been claimed that nationalism can have negative as well as positive sides depending on the circumstances in which it is formed and sustained. There are, however, three strong objections to the existence of a positive and a negative side of nationalism. First, even if nationalism in one sense is necessary for the nation-state project, this does not mean that negative images of others do not follow in its footsteps by transforming a nation into The Nation. This is a side of TABLE 3 Correlation between two dimensions of national pride and xenophobia

Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia Austria Britain Norway Sweden The Netherlands

Political

Cultural

–0.22 –0.18

0.11 –0.12 –0.13

–0.10 –0.12 –0.23 –0.12

0.17 0.09 0.12 0.14

Note: Empty cells mean that the correlation is not significant at the 5% level.

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nationalism that liberal thinkers have tended to underestimate or ignore (Giddens, 1987; Hjerm, 2004). The second objection is that nationalism can only be positive if a separation between civic and ethnic were a fact. Regardless of how enticing this thought is, it is afflicted with a practical flaw; such a situation does not exist anywhere in the world today (cf. Gellner, 1983). The third objection, closely related to the second one, is that nationalism often tends to be conflated with both national pride and national identity, which may have both negative and positive effects, depending on where the pride and identity have their roots. Another important distinction that needs to be made when dealing with nationalism is between nationalism as an ideology and individual sentiments or attitudes. Nationalist sentiments are individual attitudes founded on a belief in national belonging and the superiority of the nation one belongs to. That these attitudes are based on national superiority does not rule out the possibility that they can be based on nationalism as a civic as well as an ethnic project. Nationalist sentiments, understood as an attitude of national superiority, come close to patriotism or national pride, but do nonetheless differ from the latter (Billig, 1995; Smith, 1994). Billig (1995), for example, rightly argues against the quite common distinction between nationalism and patriotism/national pride, giving the former negative connotations and the latter positive connotations. National pride comprises individual sentiments toward the nation, whereas nationalist sentiment operates on different levels and should be seen as associated with both belonging to a nation as well as views of national superiority. Two things separate the two concepts. First, national pride need not be based on an ideology. It is doubtful whether nationalism as a sentiment could be considered a clear-cut ideology. However, the imagined ethnic foundations and national self-determination that it rests upon are comprised in the nationalist understanding of the nation. This is not the case with national pride, since it is not colored by ideology to the same extent. Second, the negative connotations of nationalism as a sentiment (cf. Nairn, 1988; Keane, 1994; Hjerm, 1998c). Sentiments that spring from its base in the ideology of unity among certain members of a society and, by the same token, exclusion of “others” not defined as belonging to the nation. Therefore, nationalism as a sentiment should be seen as a form of national sentiment and belonging based in both civic and ethnic aspects, combined with a belief in the superiority of one’s own nation. However, there is a possibility that the nationalist sentiment is based on different forms of nationalism in different countries. For example, if the nationalist sentiment is grounded in nationalism as a civic project it is possible that the sentiment is less related to negative images of “others” living within the state than if it is based in ethnic nationalism. Five statements have been used in order to operationalize the nationalist sentiment as a form of national pride and national belonging based in both civic and ethnic aspects, combined with a belief in the superiority of one’s own nation.8 The question and statements are as follows.

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How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like those of [country]. Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [nationality]. The possible responses vary from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly” on a fivegrade scale. The statements seem to correspond well with the nationalist sentiment that was to be measured. Moreover, the statements have been reliability tested with Crombach’s alpha scores. The results vary between 0.63 for Hungary and 0.78 for Britain, indicating that the statements could be said to measure the same dimension i.e. nationalist sentiment.9 It is of course difficult to operationalize the nationalist sentiment. Regardless of how it is done, we will, by definition, not cover the whole multidimensional spectrum of the nationalist sentiment. However, seen as a signifier of the latter, it can help us to better understand the nationalistic belief system. Table 4 shows that there is no obvious division between Eastern and Western Europe in the levels of nationalist sentiment. Bulgaria scores on one end of the spectrum and The Netherlands on the other with the rest of the countries in between. The results do not support the claim that Eastern Europe is more nationalistic than Western Europe, but the values of the different countries seem to make sense. Kürti (1997) claims that nationalism and ethnocentrism are more common in Bulgaria than in the other Eastern European countries examined here. The other Eastern European countries are, owing to globalization and the European project, closing in on Western Europe on many accounts. Hence the “lower” scores make some sense in the rest of the Eastern European countries. The Austrian scores may explain why Haider’s Freedom managed to rally such support after the time when the data were collected (1995). Another interesting thing to note is that Bulgaria and Austria score high on the cultural dimension of national pride whereas Sweden, The Netherlands and the Czech Republic score low on both the nationalist sentiment as well as on the cultural dimension of national pride, indicating that the understanding of the nationalist sentiment as including civic as well as ethnic virtues seem to have some merits. Nationalism and Xenophobia It was claimed above that the nationalist sentiment is a civic and ethnically based sentiment and sense of national belonging, combined with a belief in the superiority of one’s nation-state. In order to believe that one’s own nation or nation-state is

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TABLE 4 Average index value of the nationalist sentiment Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia

14.4 11.6 13.0 13.2 12.4


13.7 12.2 12.3 11.5 10.1

superior it must be compared with something else, i.e. other nations or people from such. Thus, there is reason to assume that nationalist sentiments go hand in hand with xenophobia. At the same time there can clearly be differences in the magnitude of this relation. Table 5 shows clearly that the stronger nationalist sentiment people have, the higher their risk of being xenophobic, in all the examined countries. This is no surprise. However, it is very interesting to note that there is a clear difference in the magnitude of the correlations between the Eastern and the Western European countries. The correlations are substantial in the latter countries and obviously lower in the former ones. Nationalist sentiment may be negative in itself, but it is clear that the consequences are somewhat less severe in the Eastern European context. In other words there is a difference that cuts between Western and Eastern Europe. This difference may possibly owe to the prevalence of different “others” constructed in relation to the nationalistic belief system in Eastern and Western Europe. The “other” is constructed in the sense of old nationalism in Western Europe and of new nationalism in Eastern Europe (cf. Rex, 1996). Or, in other words, nationalism in Eastern Europe is grounded in the notion of the “other” being other people in other countries, and other countries itself, whereas in Western Europe on the “other” being people from other countries living within the country’s territory. East Is West and West Is East? The depicted results indicate more similarities then differences, but the question is why this is the case. There are some possible explanations. First, there is the possibility that the assumed difference between Eastern and Western Europe is in some sense overestimated and that revisionist scholars have nailed it. Regardless of the amount of time that has passed between the creation of civic states in the West as well as in the East, countries in the latter have managed to more rapidly institu-

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TABLE 5 Correlation between nationalist sentiment index and xenophobia Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia

0.12 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.25


0.37 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.39

tionalize civic values into both the state and into people’s conception of what and whom constitute the nation. This also implies that the classical ascription of the liberal civic West and illiberal ethnic East is substantialy flawed not only in terms of institutional make-up but also in terms of sustainment of the nation. Second, nationalism is a prerequisite for liberal democracy (Elias, 1996; Nodia, 1994), but as soon as the latter is institutionalized nationalism turns from its civic virtues toward chauvinism and the construction of the ethnic “other.” It is possible that the national sentiments were measured during a time period when the civic virtues of national sentiment where at their peak in Eastern Europe. Matic (1999) argues along this line regarding recent changes and claims that nationalism had a positive role in bringing down communism and opening the field for democracy in Eastern Europe. At the same time she realizes that nationalism is a doubled-edged sword in that it has the propensity to threaten democracy in the long run. This also means that the less negative national sentiments in Eastern Europe have been changing since 1995. This possibility cannot be refuted, but it seems unlikely that the relationships depicted here could have turned around in the short time that has passed since 1995 given the presumed stability in such attitudes. Third, but closely related to the second point, is the possibility that the difference in the magnitude of the correlations between the nationalist sentiment and xenophobia can be explained by a real difference in the type of nationalism prevalent. Nationalism and the construction of the other are taking place in relation to other countries and people living within them whereas such construction is related to people from other countries living within one’s own country’s territory in the Western countries. This suggests that differences between Western and Eastern Europe may owe to national sentiments after all. If this is true then there is little reason to sit back and feel satisfied about the less negative nationalism and more positive cultural dimension of national pride in Eastern Europe. It is important to

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bear in mind the fact that the Western nation-states examined here were all founded on ideas of nationalism in relation to other countries. In the era of migration and globalization the goal changed to preserving nationality at the expense of the immigrants living within the territory. This means that it is possible that the same changes will take place in Eastern Europe. Even if this is a possibility it does not give any support to the classical division, but only hints that things may change in the future. Fourth, there is the possibility of a diverging macro level of nationality and people’s sentiments. It is possible that the formation of nation and the sustaining of nationality are different in the Western and the Eastern European contexts, but this is not evident in people’s sentiments in a clear-cut way. This makes some sense if one bear’s in mind that the mythologized Eastern national identity has in many ways been a product of the ruling elite, one that may not have trickled down to the masses in a way that has been presumed. This does not imply that the celebration of ethnic homogeneity and the sustaining of the nation on an ethnic basis are things to strive for, since this is bound to have effect sooner or later. It must at least be kept in mind that the élite’s conception of the nation does not necessarily correspond to people’s understanding of it. Still, given the significant impact of the people during the creation of democratic states in Eastern Europe, it seems unlikely that this possibility could have any significant bearing after the fall of communism. Fifth, if the two parts of Europe are really so different as has been claimed then it is possible that the same indicators cannot be used to pinpoint the measured attitudes. Take xenophobia as an example, which was shown to be more prevalent in the Eastern European countries. This can possibly can be taken as an indicator of the more widespread antagonism toward non-nationals in Eastern Europe and at the same time may indicate that the way different national sentiments were measured may not be appropriate to Eastern Europe. The higher levels of xenophobia indicate that such a possibility has some merit. However, it is likewise possible that the higher levels of xenophobia exhibited in Eastern Europe are a result, not of real differences in conceptualizing national sentiments, but of difference in the economic situation. Situations in which poverty and economic marginalization are more widespread tend to increase feelings of vulnerability and lack of control, which may lead to intolerance toward those who are perceived as “others.” The latter seems to be a more reasonable possibility, especially given that the indicators used have been found to be valid indicators by the researchers responsible for the ISSP program in the Eastern European countries as well as in the Western ones. Conclusion There are differences in national sentiments as well as their consequences between the examined Eastern and Western European countries. However, the differences were not in accordance with the initial expectations. The degree of national pride

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based in the political dimension was lower in the Eastern European countries, which perhaps was to be expected given the revisionist argument (e.g. Kuzio, 2002). At the same time the degree of national pride based in the cultural dimension was similar in the two parts of Europe. More important is the fact that it was only in Bulgaria, of the Eastern European countries, that a strong sense of national pride based in the cultural dimension was related to xenophobia, whereas it was only in Sweden of the Western European countries that this was not the case. It was also shown that strong nationalist sentiments went hand in hand with high levels of xenophobia, but that the magnitude of the correlations were lower in the Eastern European countries. There are many possible explanations of the depicted results. Still, it is clear that the classical division between an Eastern ethnic understanding of nationality and a Western one based on civic virtues needs to be reconsidered. This is especially true regarding the indirect assumption of more negative national sentiments in Eastern Europe, which simply is not the case. Some of the results indicate that Eastern European national sentiments are somewhat more ethnically based, but at the same time such sentiments do not produce xenophobia in Eastern Europe whereas this is the case in Western Europe. Kürti (1997) may be correct in claiming that the ascription of Eastern Europe as backward celebrators of a mythologized past and ethnic homogeneity is a product of colonial Western thinking. There are strong reasons to question the Western depiction of Eastern Europeans as tribalistic nationalists and acknowledge that there seems to be empirical support for the revisionist standpoint. There is a difference between Eastern and Western national formations but perhaps not the difference that many Western scholars have been claiming and still continue to claim. NOTES 1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Ages 14–76 in Austria. The data were collected through mail surveys and face-to-face interviews, depending on the country. Responses vary from 52% in Britain to 75% in Slovenia, the typical rate for the included countries being 66%. Initial sample sizes also vary between the countries, but were around 2,000 for most of them. All samples can be considered to be representative of the populations in the examined countries with respect to key variables such as sex, age, education and so on. For more information see . Comparing different ethnic groups with the citizens would be a very interesting embarkation point for further investigations, but the ISSP-95 data do not allow for such comparisons owing to the low numbers of non-citizens or foreign-born people in the data. There are some minor deviations in some of the percentages. Even though national pride comes close to patriotism the choice has been to use national pride, since it is not, to the same extent, colored by different connotations. Results available from the author. Statements 1 and 3 have been reversed in order that they go in the same direction. Even if Treanor sets out to approach nationalism differently from common practice, the minimization of difference within each state must by necessity include the particularization that Treanor rejects.

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M. HJERM

8. 9.

A sixth statement was included in the questionnaire. However, it was excluded because it did not measure the same dimension as the other five when tested with Crombach’s alpha. The statements also produce a one-factor solution in all the examined countries except for Hungary. However, the eigenvalue for the second factor comes very close to 1 and the statements correlate positively in Hungary, indicating that the statements do in fact measure the same dimension. NOTES

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