New Directions in Reactance Research

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Rex A. Wright, Stephanie D. Agtarap, and Christopher Mlynski. 267. Call for Papers .... 2012; see also, Kukla, 1972; Meyer, 1987). A key assump- tion is that ...
New Directions in Reactance Research Editors Sandra Sittenthaler Eva Jonas Eva Traut-Mattausch Jeff Greenberg

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Zeitschrift für Psychologie

Founded by Hermann Ebbinghaus and Arthur König in 1890 Volume 223 / Number 4 / 2015 ISSN-L 2151-2604 • ISSN-Print 2190-8370 • ISSN-Online 2151-2604 Editor-in-Chief Bernd Leplow Associate Editors Edgar Erdfelder · Herta Flor · Dieter Frey Friedrich W. Hesse · Heinz Holling · Christiane Spiel

Contents Editorial

Review Article

Original Articles

Research Spotlight

Call for Papers

Volume Information

Ó 2015 Hogrefe Publishing

New Directions in Reactance Research Sandra Sittenthaler, Eva Jonas, Eva Traut-Mattausch, and Jeff Greenberg

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Understanding Psychological Reactance: New Developments and Findings Christina Steindl, Eva Jonas, Sandra Sittenthaler, Eva Traut-Mattausch, and Jeff Greenberg

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Extending the Theory of Reactance to Guilt Appeals: ‘‘You Ain’t Guiltin’ Me Into Nothin’’’ Elena Bessarabova, Monique M. Turner, Edward L. Fink, and Nathan Beary Blustein

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Fear and Psychological Reactance: Between- Versus Within-Individuals Perspectives Lijiang Shen and Valerie B. Coles

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Reactance to (or Acceptance of) Stereotypes: Implicit and Explicit Responses to Group Identity Threat Soledad de Lemus, Marcin Bukowski, Russell Spears, and Maı¨ka Telga

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Intervention-Elicited Reactance and Its Implications: Let Me Eat What I Want Nadine Ungar, Monika Sieverding, Fabian Schweizer, and Tatjana Stadnitski

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Salzburger State Reactance Scale (SSR Scale): Validation of a Scale Measuring State Reactance Sandra Sittenthaler, Eva Traut-Mattausch, Christina Steindl, and Eva Jonas

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Conversion of Reactance Motives Into Effortful Goal Pursuit: Implications of Brehm’s Theory of Motivation Intensity Rex A. Wright, Stephanie D. Agtarap, and Christopher Mlynski

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‘‘Implicit Theories – The Role and Impact of Malleable Mindsets’’: A Topical Issue of the Zeitschrift fu¨r Psychologie Guest Editors: Marko Lu¨ftenegger and Jason Chen

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Reviewers 2015

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Zeitschrift fu¨r Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4)

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Research Spotlight

Conversion of Reactance Motives Into Effortful Goal Pursuit Implications of Brehm’s Theory of Motivation Intensity Rex A. Wright, Stephanie D. Agtarap, and Christopher Mlynski Department of Psychology, University of North Texas, USA Abstract. As originally formulated, Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance posited two manifestations of reactance, (1) an increased desire to exercise the threaten freedom, and (2) an increased tendency to exercise that freedom. The theory included no statement about what determines the intensity of reactant striving, although many have assumed that striving intensity should be proportional to the magnitude of reactance, that is, the strength of the reactance motive. Conceptual links between Brehm’s reactance theory and his later theory of motivation intensity have rarely been made. However, the motivation intensity theory in fact has important implications for how reactance motives should convert into effortful goal pursuit. This article identifies central motivation intensity theory implications and discusses in summary a body of evidence that bears them out, albeit indirectly. The broad indication is that reactance should increase the willingness to deploy effort in the interest of restoring or confirming freedoms, with the conversion of willingness into action depending on what can, will, and must be done to achieve these ends. Keywords: effort, reactance, goal pursuit, motivational intensity

Jack Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance (J. Brehm, 1966, 1972; Wicklund, 1974) is a classic formulation in psychology. Its core tenets have held up well over time and been applied widely, especially in consumer behavior and clinical contexts (S. Brehm, 1976; S. Brehm & J. Brehm, 1981; Miron & J. Brehm, 2006). In broad terms, the theory proposes that eliminations of and threats to perceived behavioral freedoms inspire motivation to restore and confirm the freedoms, respectively, with the inspired motivation (reactance) being manifested in an increased desire to exercise the threatened freedoms and an increased tendency to do so. Consider cigarette smokers on a university campus whose access to cigarettes has been restricted by a Presidential edict imposing a smoke free campus. Because of reactance, the smokers should want more to smoke on campus than they did before the edict. The smokers also should be more inclined to smoke on campus, although individual smoking decisions should be based on an analysis that weighs the benefit of smoking (i.e., acting on the reactant desire) against its cost. In theory, the campus smokers should smoke if the perceived benefit of doing so outweighs the perceived cost. They should not smoke if the reverse is true. Reactance theory is detailed and nuanced, including, for example, statements about factors that should determine the magnitude of reactance and conditions under which behavioral freedoms should be restored and surrendered (Worchel & J. Brehm, 1971; Wortman & J. Brehm, 1975). However, this is not to say that it addresses all questions that might be  2015 Hogrefe Publishing

asked about responses to perceived restrictions in freedom. One question the theory does not address concerns the intensity of reactant striving, that is, the effort people expend in attempting to restore and confirm freedoms. Specifically, it is the question of how reactance motives convert into effortful goal pursuit (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012; Wright, 2014). Investigators commonly assume that reactant striving will be proportional to the magnitude of reactance. Thus, for example, they assume that people experiencing strong reactance in regard to the freedom to smoke on a campus should work harder to restore or confirm that freedom than people experiencing weak reactance in this regard. Such an assumption is reasonable, given elements of the reactance analysis and traditional effort beliefs (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Graham & Weiner, 1996; Heckhausen, 1977, 1991), but it is not a formal facet of the theory. Although Brehm’s reactance theory does not provide guidance for predicting the intensity of reactant striving, a later theory of Brehm’s does – specifically, his theory of motivation intensity (J. Brehm & Self, 1989; J. Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, 1983; Wright & J. Brehm, 1989). Motivation intensity theory (MIT) is concerned with determinants of momentary effort, with the latter defined as effort deployed at a point in time. Conceptual links between MIT and reactance theory have rarely been made; however, MIT has important implications for how reactance motives should operate, including ones pertaining to their conversion into effortful goal pursuit. In this brief Zeitschrift für Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4):267–276 DOI: 10.1027/2151-2604/a000228

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article, we will identify central MIT implications for reactant striving and review in summary a body of evidence that bears them out, albeit indirectly. We will begin with a specification of core reactance theory tenets and an overview of MIT. We then will delineate the implications and consider the relevant evidence, concluding with a recap and parting thoughts.

Reactance Theory Tenets Reactance theory tenets are straightforward and can be characterized as follows. 1. People view themselves as possessing behavioral freedoms that are finite in number and both person- and situation specific. 2. When people believe a behavioral freedom has been eliminated or threatened with elimination, they have activated a motive oriented toward restoring or securing the freedom (reactance). 3. The strength of the motive activated (i.e., the magnitude of reactance) should be determined by a set of considerations, including (a) initial confidence in the freedom, (b) the subjective importance of the freedom, and (c) the degree of threat. The more sure people were that they possessed the freedom, the more important the freedom was to them, and the greater the perceived threat to the freedom up to the point of elimination, the stronger should be the reactance motive. 4. There are two central manifestations of reactance, (a) an increased desire to exercise the eliminated or threatened freedom, and (b) an increased tendency to do so. The first manifestation has been identified as subjective, the second behavioral (S. Brehm & J. Brehm, 1981).

Motivation Intensity Theory According to MIT, effort should not vary with the strength of a motive, as has been commonly assumed (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976). Instead, it should vary with the difficulty of required (i.e., instrumental) behavior to satisfy the motive. As difficulty increases, so should effort until effort requirements are no longer justified by motive strength or success is perceived to be impossible, rendering effort futile (Wright, 2008). At these last difficulty points, effort should be withheld and remain low as difficulty continues to rise. MIT follows closely a financial investment metaphor wherein effort is conceived as a finite currency invested following a principle of conservation (Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012; Wright & Agtarap, 2014 – see also Kruglanski et al., 2012). Performers can try only so hard and should deploy effort only (1) as it is needed, and (2) where it yields a return greater than its value. Difficulty corresponds to the price of items available for purchase. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4):267–276

Investment should comport with price except when price exceeds what can or will be done. In MIT discussions, motive strength commonly is identified in terms of success importance and the construct of potential motivation. Stronger motives are more important to satisfy and associated with greater effort potential.

Simple Illustration By way of simple illustration, consider teens employed at a chain restaurant and provided the chance to earn a bonus free lunch by performing an extra marketing task over the course of a morning. In theory, the teens’ effort should be determined not by the strength of their motive to secure the lunch, but rather by the difficulty of the task that must be performed. If the task is easy (e.g., sitting in a central square with a sign that advertises the restaurant), their effort should be low. If the task is more difficult (e.g., walking casually around the square wearing the sign), their effort should be greater. If the task is even more difficult (e.g., circling the square 20 times wearing the sign), they could see it as excessively difficult – given the strength of their driving motive – or even impossible. If either of these last difficulty points is reached, the teens’ effort should be low.

Motive Strength: Determinants and Influence Where Difficulty is not Known MIT assumes at least three determinants of motive strength: (1) need, (2) incentive value, and (3) outcome expectancy. Conceptions of need and incentive value are traditional, with the former referring to a personal state of the performer and the latter referring to characteristics of an outcome that can be attained or avoided. Returning to the teens in the illustration immediately above, they could be expected to have a stronger motive to secure the lunch if they had not eaten the night before than if they had (need higher vs. lower). They also could be expected to have a stronger motive to secure the lunch if it consisted of favorite food items than if it consisted of disliked items (incentive value higher vs. lower). Outcome expectancy refers to the perceived chance a motive such as that to secure a lunch will be satisfied if required behavior (e.g., sign sitting or carrying) is successfully executed (Bandura, 1982; Vroom, 1964). The greater the combined value of these determining variables (need, incentive value, outcome expectancy), the greater is presumed to be motive strength and the upper bound of what performers would be willing to do. MIT also assumes that performers can be impelled to act without knowing what will be required to satisfy their driving motive. Imagine here, for example, the teens above being told they can earn lunch if they market vigorously enough to impress a volatile manager whose standards for allocating bonuses of this sort fluctuate from generous to extreme. In such circumstances, effort is expected to correspond directly with motive strength, presumably to the point that performers can try no harder. Thus, the teens  2015 Hogrefe Publishing

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would be expected to work harder the more profound their hunger and the more favorable their anticipated character of the available meal until their maximum effort was reached. If action is only imminent, correspondent engagement should be anticipatory (Wright & Gregorich, 1989).

Capacity Extensions MIT extensions have concerned the role performance capacity (ability or efficacy) plays in determining effort (Ford & J. Brehm, 1987; Wright, 1998; Wright & Stewart, 2012; see also, Kukla, 1972; Meyer, 1987). A key assumption is that subjective difficulty rises as relevant capacity falls. Following the financial investment metaphor, lowcapacity performers are viewed as possessing a less valuable effort currency that requires them to ‘‘pay’’ (deploy) more to make ‘‘purchases’’ (meet task demands). This allows separate effort plots for low- and high-capacity performers, with the plots revealing complex interactional relations among capacity, motive strength, objective difficulty and effort. As seen in Figure 1, limits on capacity should have different effects on effort depending on the strength of driving motives and the objective difficulty of satisfying them. Three obvious implications pertaining to low- and highcapacity groups are: (1) Low-capacity performers should exert more effort so long as they view success as possible and worthwhile; (2) low-capacity performers should withhold effort at a lower objective difficulty level, creating a window of difficulty levels within which effort responses are weaker for them; and (3) effort should be weak irrespective of capacity where success calls for more than lowcapacity performers can or will do. A fourth, nuanced, implication is that so long as success is possible, success importance should determine the objective difficulty level at which low- and high-capacity people withhold effort – thus, moderating the relation between capacity and effort holding objective difficulty constant. This can be illustrated visually by raising and lowering the thick motive strength bar in Figure 1, observing changes in effort drop points along the objective difficulty continuum. There has been discussion of capacity influence where objective difficulty is not known (Gendolla & Wright, 2005; Silvia, Nusbaum, Eddington, Beaty, & Kwapil, 2014), but no consensus on its character. Therefore, we will put this matter aside in considering reactance implications.

Guidance for Predicting Reactant Striving So what might MIT tell us about the intensity of reactant striving? In theory, the traditional determinants of reactance (e.g., initial confidence in freedom, importance of the freedom) should not determine this directly, but rather should determine it indirectly by helping to set the strength of the reactance motive. What should determine reactant striving directly is the difficulty of what must be done to satisfy the motive (restore or confirm the threatened freedom).  2015 Hogrefe Publishing

Figure 1. Effort as a function of difficulty for low- and high-capacity performers, with effort limits determined by motive strength (rather than success impossibility).

Where difficulty is low, effort should be low irrespective of motive strength. As difficulty rises, so should effort until difficulty calls for more effort than can or will be deployed. If difficulty is not known, then reactant striving should correspond to the strength of the reactance motive to the point that people attain their effort peak.

Illustration To illustrate the reactance application, let us return to our earlier example involving reactant cigarette smokers on a university campus. Responding to the traditional reactance determinants, the smokers should have a stronger motive to smoke on campus after the Presidential edict than they did before. But the effort they exert in the interest of satisfying the motive (confirming or restoring the freedom to smoke) should depend on what can, will, and must be done to satisfy it. Let us imagine that the university board of regents conducts a one-time review of the edict and the smokers have the chance to achieve a reversal by persuading a plurality of members to vote for reversal (Smith, Baldwin, & Christensen, 1990). If the smokers learn that the regents are already powerfully predisposed toward reversal, they could be expected to view success as easy and exert limited effort in the process of preparing and presenting their case. If the smokers learn that the regents are neutral in regard to reversal, they could view success as harder and exert more effort. If the smokers learn that the regents are powerfully predisposed against reversal, they could view success as even harder and (1) exert even more effort, or (2) withhold effort, perceiving success as either excessively difficult (given the strength of their motive) or impossible. Finally, if the smokers have no knowledge of the regents’ predisposition toward the case, difficulty would be unknown and their effort should correspond to the strength of their reactance motive up to the point that their upper effort limit is reached. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4):267–276

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Figure 2. Minimal determinants of the strength of reactance motives.

A point of note about the illustration above is that it involves direct restoration of the threatened freedom. Readers well versed in reactance theory might observe that alternative, indirect, restoration paths are possible (e.g., Andreoli, Worchel, & Folger, 1974) and ask how restoration along them has relevance to the present analysis. As best we can tell, implications where indirect restoration options are available should be the same as those present where direct restoration options are. Insofar as an available alternative path requires effort, it should produce effort up to the point that success is seen as excessively difficult or impossible. Consider, for example, a campus smoker who wishes to restore smoking freedom not by persuading university regents to rescind an edict, but rather by hiking to a hidden place on campus to smoke. Effort expended in this regard should depend on the difficulty of accessing the hidden place.

Reactant Need and Additional Determinants of Motive Strength We claim above that traditional reactance determinants should only help to set the strength of the reactance motive because from a MIT perspective those variables should affect only the need to restore or confirm the relevant freedom. That is, they should affect the state of the person in whom reactance has been activated. Additional determinants of motive strength should be the character of the outcome that can be secured through action (incentive value) and the belief that successful action will in fact secure the outcome (outcome expectancy). Presumably, some outcomes meet reactance needs more effectively than others. Consider complete as compared to partial freedom to smoke on a campus. Also presumably, one can be more or less confident that successful execution of a required activity (e.g., making a persuasive argument) will result in reactance motive satisfaction. Fundamentally, determinants of motive strength for reactance motives should be the same as those for non-reactance motives (Figure 2).

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Capacity Influence – With Illustration As for performance capacity, where difficulty is known it should exert a multifaceted influence on reactant striving dependent on the strength of the reactance motive and the difficulty of satisfying the motive (restoring or confirming the freedom). Where both low- and high-capacity people view success as possible and worthwhile, striving intensity should be (1) correspondent to difficulty for both groups, and (2) greater for the low-capacity group. Where highcapacity people view success as possible and worthwhile, but low-capacity people do not, striving intensity should be (1) low for the low-capacity group, and (2) correspondent to difficulty for the high-capacity group. Where motive strength and difficulty are such that neither lownor high-capacity people view success as possible and worthwhile, striving should be low for both groups. Capacity influence can be illustrated in context of the campus smoker example as well. Reflect on two smokers going before the board of regents to argue for a reversal of the no smoking edict, with one smoker being a more capable speaker than the other. If the board is predisposed toward reversal, and the objective difficulty of persuasion is low, the less capable smoker should strive harder, compensating for his or her ability deficit. As objective difficulty rises, a point should be reached at which the less capable smoker withholds effort and the more capable smoker strives harder. As difficulty rises further, a point should be reached at which even the more capable smoker withholds effort, rendering nil the capacity/reactant-striving relation. So long as success is possible for both performers, the relation between performance capacity and reactant striving at any given difficulty level should depend on the strength of the reactance motive.

Evidence To our knowledge, no published studies have examined MIT striving implications as they pertain to reactance motives. On the other hand, many such studies have

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examined the implications as they pertain to alternative – non-reactance – motives (J. Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla et al., 2012; Wright, 1996; Wright & Kirby, 2001). Insofar as findings have been favorable, the suggestion is that the reactance motive application should have merit. Nonreactance studies have involved different protocols; however, most have addressed four effort issues: (1) difficulty influence, (2) interactional effects of motive strength and difficulty, (3) interactional effects of performance capacity, motive strength and difficulty, and (4) effects where difficulty is unknown. Most also have made effort inferences on the basis of cardiovascular (CV) responses, following Obrist’s (e.g., 1981) proposition that beta-adrenergic influence on the heart is proportional to engagement in a performance circumstance. In theory, more intensive striving should yield greater beta-adrenergic activation, resulting in stronger CV elevations above baseline – especially for certain CV outcomes, including heart contraction force (typically measured as pre-ejection period, or PEP) and systolic blood pressure (SBP), which tends to be affected by this force. Passages below summarize and offer samples of relevant findings.

Difficulty Simple difficulty studies have borne out the implied nonmonotonic relation between difficulty and effort, with the latter first rising and then falling precipitously with difficulty increases. A favorite case in point is an elegant CV response experiment by Richter, Friedrich, and Gendolla (2008). Investigators presented trials of a character recognition task whose difficulty varied across four levels, ranging from low to impossibly high. As expected, heart contraction (PEP) and SBP responses assessed during performance rose steadily across the first three difficulty conditions and then fell to a low level.

Motive Strength · Difficulty Studies have confirmed that effort will be (1) proportional to the difficulty of a possible task when motive strength justifies effort requirements, and (2) low when it does not. A case in point here is an experiment by Silvia, McCord, and Gendolla (2010) that examined interaction implications in an objective self-awareness theory context (Duval & Silvia, 2001; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Duval, 2001; Wicklund, 1975), using a mirror to manipulate focus. Investigators presented a more or less difficult scanning task under conditions where participants should have been more or less self-aware. Assuming that success importance would be greater when awareness was high (and standards of good performance were especially salient), they predicted and found that SBP responses during work rose with difficulty among High Awareness participants, but were consistently low for Low Awareness participants.  2015 Hogrefe Publishing

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Capacity, Motive Strength, and Difficulty Relevant studies have borne out the implication that capacity influence should vary depending on the strength of the operating motive and the difficulty of satisfying the motive. Representative of ones addressing the proposed interactional influence of capacity and difficulty is an experiment that operationalized ability in terms of fatigue (performance resource depletion), assuming lower ability among more fatigued (depleted) participants (Wright, Martin, & Bland, 2003). Participants first performed an easy (fatigue low) or difficult (fatigue high) counting task and then were presented mental arithmetic problems with the chance to earn a prize if they attained a low or high performance (percentile) standard. Analysis of CV responses during work revealed a Fatigue (capacity) · Standard (difficulty) interaction for SBP, with means in the expected crossover pattern. Specifically, responses were stronger for more fatigued participants where difficulty was low, but stronger for less fatigued participants where difficulty was high. In this case, results were similar for diastolic blood pressure (DBP) and mean arterial pressure (MAP – average pressure across a heart cycle). The role of motive strength is illustrated in another experiment that involved fatigue (Stewart, Wright, Hui, & Simmons, 2009). It first required participants to perform an easy or difficult scanning task and then presented them mental arithmetic problems with instructions that they would earn a high or low chance of winning a prize if they did as well as 50% of those who had performed previously. Investigators assumed that extra effort requirements associated with fatigue would be justified when outcome expectancy was high, but not when it was low. Accordingly, they anticipated fatigue augmentation of effort and associated CV responses only under high expectancy conditions. Analysis of work responses confirmed this for SBP and revealed similar response patterns for DBP and MAP.

Where Difficulty is not Known Once again, implied effects have been documented. A favored study in this instance is an experiment by Richter and Gendolla (2009) that examined CV responses during a period in which participants performed a visual matching task. The task required participants to match displayed patterns to a target pattern, with success earning 1, 15, or 30 Swiss Francs. Instructions left details ambiguous and indicated that a computer would assign at the end of the session the performance standard that would constitute success. As expected, contractility (PEP) responses rose directly with incentive value. SBP responses were in a similar pattern, but did not differ between the 15 and 30 Swiss Francs conditions. Importantly, incentive effects such as those above have been demonstrated with a variety of performance challenges and shown not to be present when the difficulty of motive satisfaction is known. Consider in this regard two additional experiments that involved memorization. In the Zeitschrift für Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4):267–276

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first (Richter & Gendolla, 2006, Experiment 1), investigators presented in sequence a set of four nonsense quadrams, that is, character strings made up of four letters that convey no meaning (e.g., AEGD). Preliminary instructions informed participants that they could earn an attractive or unattractive poster (incentive value high vs. low) if they memorized their quadrams successfully. For some (difficulty known), the instructions provided details about the number of quadrams that would be presented, the time interval between quadram presentations, and the total time that would be available to memorize the set of four. For others (difficulty unknown), no such information was provided. Analysis of CV responses assessed during the work period indicated the expected interaction for SBP responsiveness. Responses were stronger under high incentive value conditions when difficulty was not known, but modest irrespective of incentive value when it was known. The second experiment (Richter & Gendolla, 2006, Experiment 2) used a similar protocol and manipulated incentive value by offering 10 Swiss Francs or nothing for a good performance. Once again, SBP responses assessed during work corresponded to incentive value only when difficulty was unknown (for other relevant findings, see, e.g., Brinkmann & Franzen, 2013; Brinkmann, Schüpbach, Ancel Joye, & Gendolla, 2009; Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2014; Wright, Killebrew, & Pimpalapure, 2002; Wright, Tunstall, Williams, Goodwin, & HarmonJones, 1995).

Recap and Parting Thoughts To recap, Brehm’s MIT has implications for how reactance motives should convert into effortful goal pursuit. Traditional determinants of reactance should not determine reactant striving directly, but rather should determine the striving indirectly by helping to set the strength of reactance motives. What should determine reactant striving directly is the difficulty of what must be done to satisfy the motives, with effort first rising with difficulty and then falling precipitously. If difficulty is not known, reactant striving should correspond to the strength of the reactance motive to the point that people attain their effort peak. Theoretical extensions imply that, where the difficulty of restoring or confirming a freedom is known, performance capacity should exert a multifaceted influence on reactant striving dependent on the strength of the reactance motive and the difficulty of satisfying it. To our knowledge, no published studies have examined MIT striving implications as they pertain to reactance motives, although many have examined and supported the implications as they pertain to alternative motives.

Significance Preceding MIT implications are significant because they allow sharper anticipation of a key aspect of behavior that should follow from activation of reactance motives, that Zeitschrift für Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4):267–276

pertaining to intensity. As noted earlier, investigators commonly assume that reactant striving should comport with the magnitude of reactance, that is, the strength of reactance motives. MIT presents a more nuanced picture, one suggesting that this can – but should not necessarily – hold true. The implications also are significant because they shed light on the influence reactance motives should have on outcomes that can follow from striving, including performance outcomes and the CV responses discussed here. The CV responses are especially interesting to consider for two reasons. First, they could offer a covert means of detecting reactance. Second, they have been linked to adverse health outcomes such as coronary heart disease when experienced in an exaggerated form (Contrada, 2011; Smith & Ruiz, 2002). To elaborate on the point pertaining to covert assessment, it is easy to imagine two broad types of studies. One would expose groups to manipulations designed to induce lower or higher levels of reactance and then make beta-adrenergic CV assessments during a period in which the groups would have the chance to restore the relevant freedom by meeting a more or less difficult performance challenge. In theory, the groups should display equivalent responses up to a certain level of difficulty and then divergent responses – with responses dropping to a low level for the less reactant group, but continuing to rise for the more reactant group. Increasing difficulty further, one should find that responses eventually drop for the more reactant group as well. Ability factors could easily be incorporated into paradigms along these lines. The second type of study would involve similar procedures, but include performance conditions under which difficulty was not known. In theory, the more reactant participants should evince stronger betaadrenergic responses until their maximum effort was achieved. Elaborating on the second point, pertaining to health, elevated blood pressure responses are believed to promote damage to inner (endothelial) walls of key arteries – most notably the coronary arteries, which supply blood to the heart itself. Damage is believed to promote inflammation and fatty deposits that develop into plaques. Plaque accumulation has the effect of narrowing and potentially occluding arterial openings (lumen), resulting in dysfunction and sometimes death. Research scientists generally assume that exaggerated CV responses are most likely to be toxic if they are experienced chronically, across time and circumstances. This suggests that people who experience frequent and intensive bouts of reactance could sometimes be vulnerable to health risk. Regarding the beta-adrenergic CV responses we have discussed, it is of note that they have been tied with increasing singularity to effort in recent decades and appear unlikely to reflect emotional and motivational states per se (Kelsey, 2012; Kreibig, 2010; Wright & Gendolla, 2012). Thus, for example, we would not expect them to reflect states such as frustration and anger except insofar as those states were associated with ongoing or anticipatory engagement (effort). We also would not expect them to reflect the mere presence or strength of motives, but rather the conversion of motives into action. To be sure, respected alternative  2015 Hogrefe Publishing

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views exist (e.g., Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). But these views are meeting with increased skepticism and suggestions that relevant influences might best be detected through study of alternative outcomes, including ones outside the CV system such as facial electromyographical (EMG) responses (Wright & Kirby, 2003).

Dangling Issue A dangling issue concerns a question that emerges easily from reflection on the present discussion – how the difficulty of behavior required to restore or confirm a freedom might impact the magnitude of reactance, that is, the strength of the reactance motive. One might assume that difficulty should increase reactance. This assumption would follow reasonably from the ideas that (1) reactance should vary with the degree of threat to a freedom, and (2) threat is greater when difficulty is greater. But it would be problematical theoretically. Specifically, the assumption would entangle difficulty with the upper bound on what people will be willing to do to satisfy a reactance motive. Any increment in difficulty would be associated with a corresponding increment in motive strength and willingness to exert effort. Among other things, this would present the possibility of a theoretical infinite loop wherein willingness rose endlessly with difficulty (Wright & J. Brehm, 1989). We have thoughts on how this conundrum might be resolved, but none coalesced enough to print. At present it seems best to identify the problem and welcome input from parties positioned to help generate a solution. Readers might note that the conundrum is not well resolved via the suggestion that effort will simply be withheld once a point of impossible freedom restoration is reached (see Wortman & J. Brehm, 1975, below). This would imply that reactant performers should never withhold effort because the costs of success outweigh the benefits of success, which seems plainly not to be the case.

Other Analyses and Applications It bears mention that the MIT implications we have discussed resemble in some respects ones associated with certain earlier analyses. Of greatest relevance to most readers will be Seligman’s (e.g., 1975) learned helplessness model and Wortman and J. Brehm’s (1975) integration of that model with reactance theory. Seligman’s model indicated that performers who fail repeatedly sometimes give up on success, displaying diminished motivation and a form of depression identified in terms of the model’s namesake. The Wortman and J. Brehm integration included two central observations. First, when there is an original expectation of success, failure should yield reactance and an increased desire to succeed. Second, when persistence does not alter the failure outcome, performers should accept defeat, give up the freedom to succeed, and display responses indicative of helplessness.  2015 Hogrefe Publishing

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The helplessness model shares with MIT the implication that reactant performers should withhold effort when they believe they cannot restore or confirm a freedom. The integration shares with MIT both this implication and the implication that reactant performers should sometimes persist in the face of failure. Importantly though, neither analysis conveys the same rich understanding of reactant striving that the MIT application does. For one, the analyses did not consider in the same detail factors that should determine motive strength. The analyses also did not consider (1) the general role of difficulty in determining effort deployment, (2) the role performance capacity plays in determining that outcome, or (3) effort responses in circumstances where difficulty is not known. Limitations in these regards should not be surprising as the analyses never focused on striving as a central concern. Rather, they came to the construct secondarily via discussions of the helpless state, reactance, and relinquished freedom. It also bears mention that our presentation here does not represent the first application of MIT principles to reactance. Previous applications were made by Wright (1992) and Miron and J. Brehm (2006). However, both focused on reactant desire, rather than reactant striving. Consequently, they connect only peripherally to the current discussion. Links to desire were made through a MIT assumption that felt need to attain or avoid outcomes varies with energy mobilized for instrumental behavior (J. Brehm et al., 1983; Wright & J. Brehm, 1984; see also J. Brehm, 1999). This suggests that desire to restore or confirm a freedom might have the same rich set of determinants as reactant striving, possibly with motive strength being represented outside the affective system in the form of cognitive assessments of which people might not always be consciously aware (Berridge, 2004; Wright & J. Brehm, 1989).

The Intensity Dimension of Behavior We close with quick thoughts on the importance of reflecting carefully on the intensity dimension of behavior when considering the operation of motives (see also, Wright, 2014). Countless theories in psychology have focused on factors that establish motives and determine their strength (i.e., importance), but few have considered how motives of different strength convert into effortful goal pursuit. To the extent that theories have considered behavioral intensity at all, they typically have done so in terms of the intuitive assumption that intensity should rise with motive strength. Pervasive neglect of the motive conversion process has been unfortunate, limiting our ability to account for existing observations and anticipate new ones. As appropriately revered as it is, reactance theory stands as an apt case in point. The theory tells us what should establish and determine the strength of motives to restore or confirm freedoms. It also tells us something about behavior in asserting that reactance should increase the tendency to exercise freedoms that have been eliminated or threatened. But it does not tell us how reactance motives Zeitschrift für Psychologie 2015; Vol. 223(4):267–276

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convert into striving. Its behavioral manifestation statement is best understood as pertaining to the directional aspect of motivated behavior, not the intensity aspect (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2010; Weiner, 1992). To explain and predict outcomes that can be expected to correspond in any measure with reactant striving, the theory needs to do more – to be elaborated. The directional character of reactance theory’s traditional behavioral implication is illustrated by an early experiment designed to evaluate the implication (Sensenig & J. Brehm, 1968). Participants were presented a note that implied low or high threat to select one of two options. Where threat was low, most selected the suggested option; by contrast, where threat was high most selected the opposing option, presumably because the force of reactance outweighed the force of persuasion. Thus, the central finding was that participants moved one way under low threat conditions and another way under high threat conditions. Notably, the intensity of reactant striving in this study almost certainly was low because participants could confirm the threatened freedom through a simple choice with limited adverse consequences. Presumably, striving intensity could have been different had confirmation been more difficult, for example, requiring active persuasion of the person who prepared the note. In theory, it would have been proportional to the difficulty of the confirmation challenge up to the point that success appeared excessively difficult or impossible. We must be careful not to be too generous in assigning import to the striving implications we have discussed. However, with proper empirical support they could justify an expansion of the traditional statement regarding the behavioral manifestation of reactance. Specifically, they could justify the added claim that reactance should increase the willingness to deploy effort in the interest of restoring or confirming freedoms, with the conversion of willingness into action depending on what can, will, and must be done to achieve these ends.

Acknowledgments Contributions of second two authors were equivalent. Names are listed alphabetically.

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Rex Wright Motivation Science Laboratory Department of Psychology University of North Texas Denton, TX 76203-5017 USA Tel. +1 (205) 936-4743 Fax +1 (940) 565-4682 E-mail [email protected]

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