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That's Relevant! Different Forms of Practical Relevance in Management Science Alexander Nicolai and David Seidl Organization Studies 2010 31: 1257 DOI: 10.1177/0170840610374401 The online version of this article can be found at: http://oss.sagepub.com/content/31/9-10/1257

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article title

That’s Relevant! Different Forms of Practical Relevance in Management Science Alexander Nicolai and David Seidl

Abstract Alexander Nicolai University of Oldenburg, Germany David Seidl University of Zurich, Switzerland

Recently there has been an intense debate amongst scholars on how to increase the practical relevance of research. Although the notion of ‘relevance’ is frequently mentioned in the literature, it is hardly ever defined and may have different, even contradictory, meanings in different contexts. This article presents a taxonomy of different forms of relevance, based on a textual analysis of the ‘relevance literature’ and of a set of 450 articles in three leading academic management journals that are renowned for their practical relevance. The main categories of this taxonomy are then discussed against the background of different aspects of the social dynamics of science in order to ascertain the forms of relevance that can justifiably be expected from management science. Keywords: relevance, science, rigour, instrumental knowledge, conceptual knowledge

Introduction

Organization Studies 31(09&10): 1257–1285 ISSN 0170–8406 Copyright © The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub. co.uk/journals permissions.nav

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In recent years there has been a growing concern that the knowledge produced in management science is hardly taken notice of in management practice. This has given rise to urgent calls for making management research more ‘relevant’, and an intensive debate on how to achieve this aim has arisen (Hodgkinson et al. 2001; Huff 2000; Mohrman et al. 2001; Rynes et al. 2007; Rynes et al. 2001; Van de Ven 2000, 2007; Wren et al. 1994). After the 1950s, American business schools began to emphasize the importance of academic rigour over applicability. However, now the pendulum is swinging back towards ‘more practical relevance’ (March, cited in Huff 2000). Yet, the term ‘relevance’ is very broad and unspecific and can refer to very different things. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989: 561) defines the adjective ‘relevant’ as ‘bearing upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand’. In this sense one can speak of X as being ‘relevant’ to Y whenever X makes a difference to Y (cf. Bateson 1972: 315). However, the question is: what type of difference are we talking about? Although many researchers talk about ‘relevance’ they hardly ever specify what they actually mean by that. As Augier and March (2007: 138) put it: ‘The definition of relevance is ambiguous, its measurement imprecise, and its meaning complex’. Sometimes a more specific meaning is implicitly defined; in most cases, however, the various authors speak very generally and abstractly about relevance as if there were a general consensus on how the term is understood, which is not

DOI: 10.1177/0170840610374401 Downloaded from oss.sagepub.com at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on April 4, 2011

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the case. Practical relevance may take very different forms, as we will show in this article, such as uncovering contingencies, or providing recipes for action or new linguistic concepts. The vagueness of terms used in the scientific discourse (e.g. ‘corporate culture’) is nothing extraordinary and, far from stifling the discussion, has often even contributed to its momentum. Yet, in the case of ‘relevance’, this vagueness seems particularly problematic, since the different meanings imply different and, as we argue, conflicting relationships between science and practice. The various contributions to the debate on ‘relevance’ cannot be meaningfully related to each other without a prior clarification of the underlying notions of relevance. This is particularly critical when it comes to questions about research policy: different notions of relevance lead to different recommendations for research policies, as we will show. After all, there is no doubt that management science as an applied science has to display ‘practical relevance’. Against this background, the present article aims at making two contributions to the current debate on the practical relevance of organization and management science. First, it develops a taxonomy of different forms of relevance, based on a systematic analysis of a sample of 450 articles from three leading academic journals, as well as of the literature (in English) on the practical relevance of management science, which, at the time of writing, comprised 133 articles, chapters and books. The aim of the exercise is to identify the forms of practical relevance that are explicitly or implicitly referred to in the academic management literature.1 In contrast to the majority of contributions to the debate on relevance, this article draws on insights from the philosophy and sociology of science in order to discuss the more fundamental obstacles to relevance that are rooted in the social process of scientific knowledge production. Thus, the article’s second contribution is that it assesses the extent to which the different forms of relevance fit the social dynamic of science, and consequently examines what forms of relevance can be expected from management science. The rest of this paper is divided in five sections. First, we present the theoretical background to our study, outlining how the relationship between management science and practice is conceptualized. In the second section, we explain the research methodology we used in order to develop a taxonomy of forms of practical relevance, and in the section following we present the resulting taxonomy, illustrating each form of relevance separately. In the fourth section, we discuss the different forms of relevance against the background of different aspects of the social dynamics science, in order to establish what forms of relevance management science can be expected to yield. We conclude with reflections on the article’s contributions.

Theoretical Background Sociology of Science

The problem of practical relevance is connected with the question of how science relates to other aspects of society. In order to address this question, first of all it is necessary to clarify how science is defined, how it is differentiated from other


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elements of society (particularly from management practice) and what distinguishes scientific knowledge from other kinds of knowledge. The theoretical background for dealing with these questions is provided by the sociology of science — particularly the more recent studies that have been influenced by Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory (Weingart 2003; Luhmann 1994; Stichweh 1994). Although the sociology of science refers to various approaches to the philosophy of science, it differs from it to the extent that it is more empirically oriented, conceives science as a particular form of social action, and analyses specifically the interrelation between science and society (Weingart 2003: 12). As a result, it has the potential to add a particularly fruitful perspective to the current debate on relevance. While in management science this debate focuses on the properties of individual research contributions (e.g. focus on the practitioners’ problems, readability of research for practitioners, emphasis on managerial implications etc.), in the context of the sociology of science it focuses on the supra-individual dynamics of an entire academic discipline and its long-term ‘evolutionary drift’. In addition to that, the sociology of science allows for a better conceptualization of science as such and its particular momentum. Science as a Communication System

Some theorists conceptualize science (implicitly or explicitly) in terms of a scientific community (Kuhn 1962), i.e. a particular group of people. The typical member of this group is the university professor. A somewhat related view defines science on the basis of institutions, such as universities, or research groups or departments (e.g. Krohn and Küppers 1989, 1990). Some authors who have engaged in the recent debate on relevance in the context of management and bemoan ‘the irrelevance, intransigence’ of ‘business professors’ (Oviatt and Miller 1989: 304), or state that ‘business schools lost their way’, have this conceptualization of science in mind (Bennis and O’Toole 1983). However, from the person-based or institution-based perspective, some central aspects of the relevance debate are obscured. In particular, it remains unclear why there should be a problem of relevance at all: many professors of business studies offer consulting services to companies; business schools offer executive education programmes that focus explicitly on practitioners; companies cooperate with business professors at various different levels; students with a particular interest in management practice earn degrees in business schools and afterwards join industry. In terms of enrolment figures and graduate salaries, the development of business schools over the last 20 years can be considered a success story ( Pfeffer and Fong 2004; Röbken 2004). Paradoxically, during this same period, the number of critical voices complaining about the practical irrelevance of management science has dramatically increased, as our review of the relevance debate indicates. If one looks closely at those criticisms it becomes clear that the majority do not take issue with persons or institutions but with scientific publications, in particular the scientific article. Here, the term ‘science’ refers to the network of communications that is constituted by publications connected through cross-citations (Stichweh 1994). Business professors might act as business consultants, teach executive courses,


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write popular management books, or supervise practice-oriented dissertations. However, this does not prove that there are meaningful links between such activities and the network of scientific publications (March and Sutton 1997; Nicolai 2004; Röbken 2004). The question of a meaningful connection between the results of scientific research and management practice is at the centre of the debate on relevance. In this article, we follow the lead of those theorists of the sociology of science who treat science as a particular communication system (e.g. Luhmann 1989; Price 1963; Stehr 1992). Self-reference of Science

If we abstract from persons or institutions, an important question is how scientific communication can be differentiated from other forms of communication. For example, not everything that a business professor communicates or a business schools publishes belongs to scientific discourse. There have to be certain criteria that determine what can be considered scientific knowledge claims to which one can refer in further scientific communications. These criteria are not exogenously given, but developed by and within science (Stehr 1992). Hence, defining what is considered part of science and what is not is an interpretative scientific task in itself. This is often described as the self-referential modus operandi of science (Bailey 1997; Kieser and Leiner 2009; Luhmann 1994; Weingart 2003: 86). Mechanisms that are intrinsic elements of scientific communication, such as peer reviews, stylistic requirements for journal articles, or mechanisms of attributing reputation, stabilize this self-referential mode of operation. From a historical perspective, this form of self-organization, which leads to the dissociation from societal structures (e.g. class, religion, law, etc.), is a precondition for the emergence of modern science (Stichweh 1994: 92). Self-reference does not imply that science circles tautologically around itself (Luhmann 1994: 622; Weingart 2003: 86). It always incorporates external references, but only in accordance with its historically developed, self-referential logic. It is also important to note that this self-referential mode of operation does not contradict the idea of ‘applied science’. Management science perceives itself as a prime example of an applied science, so ‘practical relevance’ is regarded as one of its distinguishing features. In view of that, it is not surprising that almost all statements of editorial policy in leading academic journals call for practical relevance. For example, the Academy of Management Journal writes in its mission statement that it aims to publish empirical research that also ‘contributes to management practice’, while the Journal of Business Venturing ‘seek[s] papers that [address] issues useful to scholars, educators, and practitioners’ and the Journal of Marketing is ‘designed to bridge the gap between theory and practice’, according to the journals’ respective websites. The Context-dependence of Knowledge and the Input–Output Model of Science

Even though self-reference does not contradict the notion of an ‘applied’ science, it is doubtful whether science could function on an input–output basis, being fed



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with managerial problems and producing solutions (Nicolai 2004). Indeed, many sociological studies on the use of scientific knowledge contradict this idea (e.g. Mulkay et al. 1987). Yet, within the recent relevance debate, it is often implicitly assumed that science follows an input–output model, as is evident in the claims of management scholars that the focus should shift to the problems of practitioners in order to increase the practical relevance of research (Teece 1990: 42). These claims, however, do not take into account that the definition of a problem is the construct of a particular social context. Bowman (1990: 26) cites Schön’s remark on the definition of problems: ‘But with the emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, the means which may be chosen. In real world practice, problems do not present themselves to the practitioners as given.’

What is defined as a problem depends on the respective ‘frame of reference’. For example, from consulting research, we know that earlier experience and the solutions at hand influence the definition of the client’s problem (Bloomfield and Danieli 1995). Similarly, scientific observers might ask themselves whether the problems presented are the ‘real’ problems. They might possibly acknowledge that the definition of the problem is itself part of the problem. In this way, negotiating the definition of the problem would become a communicative process that depends on the specific frame of reference — in the case of science, this is the scientific network of publications. While some publications in management science have chosen as their point of departure concrete problems that practitioners face, we typically find that in these publications new problems und sub-problems emerge, as a consequence of which the initial problem is lost from sight (Kieser and Nicolai 2002). ‘In short after producing a considerable number of studies, researchers are forced to concede that the phenomenon ... is more complex and ambiguous than the question that originally gave rise to this stream of research’ (Lampel and Shapira 1995: 128).

Consequently, as the problem gradually unfolds, the scientific modus operandi takes hold again (Stichweh 1994). While self-reference does not rule out practical relevance, already the issue of problem framing raises the question whether striving for rigour shifts the scientific communication away from practically relevant implications. We will discuss this question further in the fourth section. The notion of self-reference challenges the input–output model of science also on the ’solution side‘. There is a tendency in management science to equate the diffusion of certain solutions with scientific validity (O’Neill et al. 1998). This assumption is often based on the idea of a ‘market’ of concepts competing with each other, where the best concepts will find the widest diffusion (Marcus et al. 1995). Accordingly, diffusion is treated as an indicator of validity. The untenability of this line of reasoning (cf. O’Neill et al. 1998) becomes obvious when we examine it in the context of the discussion about management fashions (Abrahamson 1996; Kieser 1997). Fashionable concepts that, according to scientific criteria, would be expected to lead to uncertain or even harmful effects are often extremely popular in management practice. The reasons for the success of such concepts are often in stark conflict with scientific criteria. Benders and


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Van Bijsterveld (2000), for example, have identified the inconsistency, ambiguity and non-falsifiability of management concepts as aspects that particularly contribute to their diffusion. Consequently, science cannot import the success criteria from management practice directly but has to use its own criteria instead — i.e. scientific, theory-based criteria. Hence, the practice-oriented researcher is — more or less inadvertently — thrown back onto the self-referential course of operation that is typical for scientific discourse. Moreover, theories usually compete with alternative theories or paradigms. Thus, even if the scientific reasoning delivers solutions, the practitioner is confronted with a plurality of theories (Scherer and Dowling 1995). Whether theory pluralism affects the utilization of scientific knowledge positively or negatively depends on the form of relevance. We will discuss this question in more detail in the fourth section. Self-reference, the context-dependence of scientific knowledge and the observation that different, incommensurate theories do not converge, correspond to the idea that science constructs realities (Astley 1985; Luhmann 1994). The same is true for the social systems of practice; for example, organizations construct their reality on the basis of particular ‘frames of reference’ (Luhmann 2000). For the social sciences, which take organizations or other social systems as their object of inquiry, this means that the relevance problem is even more complex than is the case with the natural sciences. Giddens (1987) argued that in the social sciences the feature of double hermeneutics characterizes the link between theory and practice. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences have a two-way relationship to systems of practice. People can use the knowledge of social sciences to make choices and alter their practice, which in turn changes what scientific constructions of practice are ‘true’ or not (e.g. the assumption that managers behave rationally or not). Since the notion of double hermeneutics has different consequences for different forms of relevance, we will discuss this issue later, in the fourth section. Management Practice

In order to discuss different forms of practical relevance of management research, it is also necessary to clarify the concept of management practice. Management practice is characterized by a different logic from that of management science. As has been pointed out by Luhmann (2000, 2005a) and others (e.g. March 1991), managerial behaviour revolves around decision making, where decision making is defined as any behaviour that is a reaction to expectations (Luhmann 1984). Of course, this does not mean decision making is all there is to managerial behaviour. It includes not only activities that are involved in the preparation of decisions, such as communication and negotiations, but also activities that are not directly geared towards decisions. Some authors (e.g. Chia and Holt 2006) even argue that managers rarely make decisions as such; on the contrary, decisions are only made in exceptional circumstances. However, a particular feature of formal organizations is that every activity of their members can be referred to by other members as a decision — the ‘why did you act in this way and not in another way?’ principle. Because of that, members of an organization typically behave in a way that allows them to present their activities as decisions if they are later questioned about them (Luhmann 2005a). Downloaded from oss.sagepub.com at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on April 4, 2011


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Against the background of such an understanding of managerial practice, the ‘practical relevance’ of management science has to be conceptualized as the impact of management science on managerial decision making. This conceptualization is very common in the literature on relevance (e.g. Cohen 2007; Kieser and Wellstein 2008; Luhmann 1993; Starkey and Madan 2001). Starkey and Madan (2001: 6) pertinently cite Davenport and Prusak (1998): ‘if knowledge doesn’t improve decision making, then what’s the point?’ As Luhmann put it: ‘The question is whether the decision situation is modified through the incorporation of a scientific result, which may (but doesn’t have to) affect the alternative ultimately selected’ (Luhmann 1993: 330; our translation). In the same way as scientific communication refers to other scientific communication, a decision refers to other decisions within the organization. The ‘incorporation’ of scientific results into the process of decision making raises the question of how far scientific knowledge can be separated from its original context. If we frame the relevance issue in this way, it becomes clear that the context of understanding is a crucial aspect of any form of practical relevance (see fourth section below). Figure 1 summarizes the central aspects of the relevance issue from a social system’s perspective. Generally, any kind of knowledge would be considered ‘relevant’ to management practice to the extent that it makes some kind of difference to decision making — whatever that difference might be. Hence, the term ‘relevance’ as such does not imply a particular kind of difference; the difference that particular scientific knowledge might make to management practice might even be the same that certain religious beliefs or cultural norms might make. If — following Luhmann and other scholars — we take decision making as our main point of reference, we can distinguish on a very general level different forms of practical relevance according to the three different phases of decision making: the definition of the decision situation, the selection of one of the alternatives and the enforcement or legitimation of the selected alternative. First, knowledge affects how we perceive, or rather construct, a decision situation. To the extent that scientific knowledge modifies our understanding of decision situations, it possesses what one could call ‘conceptual relevance’. Second, knowledge influences what courses of action we select within particular decision situations. In that respect, one can speak of ‘instrumental relevance’. In a similar

Figure 1. Analytical Framework

Organizations as communication systems

Management science as a communication system

1. Rigour, certified by self-referentially developed standards

2. Theory pluralism

3. Double hermeutics

4. Context of understanding


Decision making

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way, Rich (1977) distinguishes between ‘knowledge for understanding’ (cognitive utilization) and ‘knowledge for action’ (instrumental utilization). While the former is a more direct form of influence, the latter is a more indirect one (Beyer and Trice 1982). Finally, knowledge might be used to legitimate or enforce a chosen course of action with relation both to oneself and to others. To the extent that this is the case, one can speak of ‘legitimative relevance’. A similar differentiation, though not systematically developed from the concept of decision, can be found in Knorr (1977) and Pelz (1978). This general framework of different aspects of decision making will complement our empirical analysis of the different forms of practical relevance.

Methodology Data Collection

To identify the different forms of practical relevance that are explicitly or implicitly referred to in management science, we drew on two complementary sets of data: the first consists of articles, books and book chapters that explicitly discuss the practical relevance of management science — the so-called ‘relevance literature’. In order to compile this set of data, i.e. the relevance literature, we searched the databases of the Social Science Citation Index and of Business Source Premier for texts that contained at least one of the search terms we identified as pertinent to our topic (‘practical relevance’, ‘managerial relevance’, ‘utilization’, ‘rigour and relevance’, ‘theory and practice’). In addition, we systematically followed up all references for this subset of relevance literature. We thus compiled a fairly comprehensive collection of 133 articles, chapters in books, and books that explicitly deal with this topic. In order to compile the second set of data, we chose three leading management journals that explicitly cater to practitioners. The three journals are Management Science, Journal of Marketing and Strategic Management Journal. All three are consistently ranked amongst the most prestigious academic journals and all three refer to practical relevance as a criterion for accepting papers for publication. For instance, Management Science writes in its online editorial statement that ‘in addition to managerial relevance, articles must meet high standards of originality and rigor’ and recommends that authors write a ‘compelling Managerial Relevance Statement’ (according to the online submission guidelines; original emphasis). The Journal of Marketing explains on its website that it is ‘designed to bridge the gap between theory and practice’, while the Strategic Management Journal says in its online description that it is ‘designed to appeal to both practicing managers and academics’ and ‘provides a communication forum for advancing strategic management theory and practice’. From each journal, we selected the last 150 articles (450 articles in total) that had been published up to September 2008. In the cases of the Strategic Management Journal and of the Journal of Marketing, the selection comprises articles published roughly over three years, while in the case of Management Science it covers 15 months (see Table 1).


Nicolai & Seidl: Different Forms of Practical Relevance in Management Science Table 1. Data Sample

Journal

Issues analysed

Management Science Journal of Marketing Strategic Management Journal

Vol. 53, Issue 12 [last nine articles] to Vol. 54, Issue 9 Vol. 69 (October 2005) to Vol. 72 (September 2008) Vol. 27 Issue 3 [last two articles] to Vol. 29, Issue 9

1265 n articles 150 150 150

We should note that all three journals are based in the northern USA and mainly publish articles that reflect a more or less ‘positivistic’ paradigm. This entails the risk of a certain bias. Being aware of that risk, we had initially planned to include European journals that represented a more constructivist perspective. However, among the leading academic European journals of management, none emphasizes practical relevance in a straightforward manner — in fact, it might be no coincidence that the more reflective journals with regards to the philosophy of science tend to abstain from claims of direct practical relevance. Since academic prestige was an important criterion for selecting those journals (given our communication-based conceptualization of science), we decided to take the risk of a possible bias. We assumed that, even if we missed some forms of relevance as a result, our first set of data — the relevance literature — would capture most of it, as this literature cuts across different paradigmatic positions. Data Analysis

The analysis of our data proceeded in three steps. First, we selected in both sets of data the passages in which practical relevance was directly addressed. While in the relevance literature (i.e. the first set of data) these passages were often widely dispersed, the 450 articles of the second set often included sections specifically on the implications of the respective study (which were frequently several) for managerial practice. In most cases, these sections came at the end of the article. Second, we conducted a content analysis of the selected passages of both data sets (Babbie 2003; Krippendorf 2004; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Weber 1990). The coding of the passages involved several iterative steps. Initially, one of this article’s authors and one assistant analysed 50 passages independently of each other. We did not introduce the assistant to our theoretical argument so that he would not be influenced by it. Thus, we let the data speak for itself, as it were. The analysis of the selected passages often required referring to the text from which they had been excerpted, for the purposes of clarification. The whole exercise resulted in two sets of preliminary categories of practical relevance. These sets were then compared by both authors and the assistant, and the differences were discussed. Following that, a set of initially nine categories that all three parties agreed on was extracted from the first two sets. Using these nine categories, a further hundred passages were analysed independently by each of the initial two coders. Again, the results were compared and discussed, which led to the addition of two further categories. At the same time, it became clear that there was an overlap between some of the initial nine categories. The overlapping categories were


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thus subsumed under a more general category. This yielded a set of eight categories that the two coders used independently of each other to analyse the remaining passages. The discussion of the results of this analysis confirmed that the categories we identified were orthogonal, mutually exclusive and of practical relevance (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In the third step, we juxtaposed our empirically derived taxonomy of eight forms of practical relevance with the theoretically derived form that is described in the first section with relation to instrumental, conceptual and legitimative relevance. Our empirical findings seemed to fit together fairly well with our theoretical classification, confirming our argument. The combination of the two classification schemes resulted in a taxonomy that comprises three main categories and eight subcategories of practical relevance in the management literature (see Figure 1 and a detailed description in the next section). In this way, we generated an empirically and theoretically derived taxonomy of forms of practical relevance in the management literature. While we cannot claim to have captured all forms of relevance in the academic management discourse, not least because of a certain bias in the selection of the journals we analysed (see above), we would nevertheless argue that the particular combination of data sets has enabled us to capture most of those forms.

Results: A Taxonomy of Forms of Practical Relevance Figure 2 presents our empirically derived taxonomy of different forms of practical relevance, which consists of three forms of instrumental relevance, three forms of conceptual relevance and two forms of legitimative relevance. Instrumental Relevance Schemes

Schemes provide systematics for ordering decision situations. More precisely, they allow different aspects of a decision situation to be sorted into different Figure 2. Forms of Practical Relevance in the Management Science Literature

Instrumental relevance

Schemes Technological rules/recipes Forecasts

Conceptual relevance

Linguistic constructs

Uncovering contingencies (common knowledge, superstition, institutionalized practice) Uncovering causal relationships (e.g. unknown side-effects)

Legitimative relevance

Credentializing (persons or knowledge)

Rhetoric devices



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categories. They are often presented graphically, e.g. as flow charts, matrixes or checklists. We encountered this form of relevance, for example, in Marcus et al. (1995), who refer to the well known classification of strategic types by Miles and Snow (1978) as an example of practically ‘relevant’ scientific knowledge. Note, however, that such schemes are often combined with other forms of relevance; for example, they might be based on new linguistic constructs, i.e. new concepts or metaphors which have to be treated as separate scientific contributions (see section on linguistic constructs below). Schemes help define different courses of action in a decision situation but they do not determine a particular course. In our analysis of the implication sections of the 450 research articles we selected, about 9% of the relevance forms identified represented schemes. Technological Rules or Recipes

Technological rules or recipes not only define the decision situation,2 as schemes do, but they also guide the process of choosing between different courses of action. Technological rules in their pure form are algorithmic rules (‘if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then perform action X’) or heuristics (‘if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then perform something like action X’), as Van Aken (2001: 3) explains. An example of this form of relevance is a passage at the end of a research paper by Ramani and Kumar (2008: 41): ‘Firms must adopt customer-based performance metrics and institute employee rewards and incentives based on these metrics, instead of using aggregate-level measures, such as sales and market share growth, to evaluate marketing performance.’

There are frequent references to this form of relevance in the relevance debate — both explicit and implicit ones — for example, when authors cite engineering as a model for management science (e.g. Van Aken 2005). Also, in our analysis of the implication sections of our sample, we found that almost 40% of the relevance forms we identified were formulated as technological rules. Forecasts

A further form of knowledge with instrumental relevance is the forecast.3 Forecasts are trends or predictions about the future development, e.g. of particular markets or of share prices. Dubin (1976: 32), for instance, refers to this type of relevance when he writes: ‘From the standpoint of sheer utility, a theoretical model is best judged by the accuracy of the predictions generated by it.’ This form of relevance appears infrequently in the relevance literature, and is completely absent from the implication sections we analysed. Conceptual Relevance Linguistic Constructs

Another form of practical relevance that can be found frequently in the literature are linguistic constructs, i.e. new concepts or metaphors. Linguistic constructs have the potential to change the way we think and communicate about our world and, by extension, about our decision situations (Astley and Zammuto 1992: 450). For instance, Starkey and Madan (2001: 13) refer to Gareth Morgan’s research on the metaphors of organization as a practical form of relevance, and Augier Downloaded from oss.sagepub.com at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on April 4, 2011

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and March (2007: 143) cite the ‘winner’s curse’, which originated in game theory, as a concept that ‘turned out to have some very practical uses’. Often new linguistic concepts are also used for creating schemes. In this case, one needs to distinguish between the concepts as such and the schemes generated from them. While this form of relevance appears frequently in the relevance literature, in our sample of research articles we found only a single instance where it was mentioned as such. At the end of their paper on package design, Orth and Malkewitz (2008: 76) point out that they offer the practitioner ‘shared vocabulary, associations, and conventions that are so eloquently called for in previous research’. Uncovering Contingencies

Similarly to linguistic constructs, this form of relevance influences the way in which decision situations are perceived — without determining any particular course of action. This form of relevance was encountered relatively often in the relevance literature but very seldom in the articles (in the latter, it represents about 3% of all relevance forms identified). The description refers to the uncovering of new or alternative routes of action. For example, Liu (2007: 32) argues that the findings of his study on loyalty programmes in marketing challenge commonly held assumptions about reactive strategies. He writes: ‘These findings suggest a need for managers to expand their mentality toward loyalty programs beyond mere reactive tactics.’ Uncovering Causal Relationships

A further form of conceptual relevance is the uncovering of causal relationships and unknown side-effects. In contrast to the uncovering of contingencies that we discussed earlier, this form of relevance leads practitioners to become aware of hitherto unnoticed causal relationships. For the decision maker, such academic studies are of relevance in that they can provide a better understanding of the decision situation. Yet, as Bartunek (2007: 1326) points out, recommendations to pay attention to particular causal relationships ‘do not help managers to know what to do in response to [them]’, they just change their understanding of the decision situation. The passage at the end of the article on business longevity by Desai et al. (2008: 105), for example, illustrates this form of relevance: ‘Overall, our results help managers in the service sector understand how the longevity of their firms can affect consumers’ perceptions of [the] risks involved in dealing with them. In addition, the results of Experiment 2 show that the relative impact of longevity as an extrinsic cue diminishes when consumers are more involved.’

Generally, this form of relevance was often encountered in the relevance literature and represents the most frequent form of relevance in the articles analysed (about 49% of all relevance forms identified). Legitimative Relevance Credentializing

Scientific knowledge can also be used as a form of credentializing. Whitley (1995) describes how business schools that select and train students can serve as a talent filter. Degrees from business schools certify that talent. Scientific research



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influences the curricula of business schools and in a complex way controls the process of certification. In this way, scientific knowledge provides management practice with a non-arbitrary measuring tool for assessing competence. Additionally, scientific knowledge can also serve as a means of credentializing specific knowledge domains. Whitley illustrates this with the example of accounting: ‘The introduction of statistical and mathematical techniques into accounting and finance training programmes … buttressed the scientific appearance of accounting skills, even if they are rarely utilized in practice. Thus, the desire of accounting academics to become “scientific” and academically respectable in the USA matched the growing need for “scientific” foundations and legitimacy for accounting practitioners and accounting skills.’ (Whitley 1995: 63)

While credentializing as a form of practical relevance has been described quite elaborately in the relevance literature — particularly by Whitley — it was not encountered in the research articles we analysed. This is not surprising, as this is a somewhat latent form of relevance. Rhetoric Devices

A second form of legitimative relevance is the use of scientifically generated knowledge as a rhetoric device. Like credentializing, this is a latent form of relevance, so it is not surprising that we did not come across it in our sample. However, we did encounter it in the relevance literature. Astley and Zammuto (1992), for example, speak of the relevance of symbolic labels. This form of relevance might sound very similar to that of linguistic constructs. Yet, the function of scientific knowledge in each case is very different. While scientific knowledge as a linguistic construct serves to enhance the practitioner’s understanding of his or her problem situation, as a rhetoric device it serves to legitimate a choice that is already made to third parties. Couching one’s arguments in scientific language often increases the perceived legitimacy of the argument. As Astley and Zammuto note: ‘Managers often point to theoretical models or research findings to justify courses of action’ (Astley and Zammuto 1992: 452). They point out that the rhetoric use of scientific knowledge does not necessarily constitute ‘improper’ use. As an illustration, they cite Conger (1991), who argued that rhetorical techniques serve an important leadership function: ‘Rhetorical techniques of metaphors, of stories, of repetition and rhythm, and of frames all help to convey ideas in the most powerful ways. They ensure that strategic goals are well understood, that they are convincing, and that they spark excitement. If you as a leader can make an appealing dream seem like tomorrow’s reality, your subordinates will freely choose to follow.’ (Conger 1991: 44)

Discussion: Different Forms of Relevance and the Social Dynamic of Science Our analysis of the implication sections of three leading research journals shows that management scholars strive for relevance (at least rhetorically) without, however, tackling the question of why there is a perceived ‘relevance gap’. In the ‘relevance literature’ we examined, most authors attributed the lack of practical


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relevance in management science to the use of jargon (e.g. Gulati 2007); setting the wrong research questions (e.g. Buckley et al. 1998); unclear implications (e.g. Davenport and Markus 1999); wrong incentives (e.g. Cohen 2007); or an underdeveloped transfer infrastructure (e.g. Tushman et al. 2007). In some cases, authors also blamed it on the ignorance of practitioners (e.g. Porter and McKibbin 1988: 179) or an information overload (e.g. Starkey and Madan 2001). On the basis of these explanations, the lack of relevance appears as a ‘technical’ problem (Whitley 1985) that can be solved, for example, through appeals and the editorial policies of academic journals. However, this view misses two important aspects of the problem. First, it is unclear why the ‘relevance problem’ is so persistent and even appears to get worse — although in recent years the pressure to produce ‘relevant’ research has increased (e.g. Zell 2001). There seems to be a long-standing and broad consensus among researchers on how the relevance problem should be solved (Wensley 2002: 392). Many of the suggestions made in the context of the current relevance debate only repeat old demands. For example, as far back as the 1970s, Hilgert (1972) presented a ‘proposal for bridging the gap’ in order to overcome the problem of the ‘increasing theory orientation of most business school faculties with a corresponding neglect of practical or applied approaches’ (1972: 2). Hilgert’s proposal is very similar to some very recent suggestions in the relevance debate. Indeed, the self-concept of management science as an ‘applied science’ has never been substantially questioned (Whitley 1984a). Second, the relevance problem is by no means specific to the various sub-disciplines of management science; on the contrary, it is typical of the applied social sciences in general. The solutions suggested in other areas of social research are strikingly similar to those in management science (Stehr 1992). In view of these points, one can argue that there are more fundamental reasons for the persistence of the relevance problem than those cited above. Hence, in the following, we will focus our discussion on those aspects of the relevance debate that are directly related to the mode of operation that characterizes science, and on those problems that cannot be resolved by appeals to the scientific community. We concentrate on four aspects that are connected to the social dynamics of every social science and not subject to the intentions of the individual researcher. From this perspective, it also becomes clear that the relevance concept itself may constitute a barrier to relevance. Forms of Relevance and Scientific Rigour

Under the label ‘rigour versus relevance’ the relevance debate has explicitly addressed the question of the extent to which the pursuit of truth, which is characteristic of science, can be reconciled with the pursuit of results oriented to practical application. If we conceptualize science — as suggested in the first part of this article — as a communication system, ‘rigour’ refers to the norms and rules within that system that define which communications can be used as a point of reference for further scientific communications (Luhmann 1989; Seidl 2007). Thereby the criterion of truth is decomposed into sub-criteria such as conceptual adequacy, methodological rigour or accumulated empirical evidence



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(e.g. Shrivastava 1987: 78). Undoubtedly there are some very different, often conflicting assumptions in management science about the appropriateness of methods or theories on which research programmes are to be grounded. These conflicts are persistent and have not been solved by the philosophy of science (see also the problem of theory pluralism below). But, in any case, the communication about the rigour of research is grounded in the communication system of science. There is a broad consensus that scientific rigour and relevance should be combined (e.g. Hodgkinson et al. 2001). Moreover, most management scientists also postulate that rigour and relevance can be combined if the ‘technical’ problems summarized above are solved (e.g. Cohen 2007). Only a minority have identified a tension or even a trade-off between rigour and relevance (e.g. Lampel and Shapira 1995; Kieser and Leiner 2009; Mayer 1993; Nicolai 2004; Shrivastava 1987). However, most authors address this issue on the basis of a very vague notion of relevance. Our taxonomy allows us a more nuanced discussion. In the case of schemes, the relation between rigour and relevance is relatively neutral. While the development of schemes does not contradict scientific reasoning as such, it is not the direct objective of a scientific research project. Schemes help to structure scientific reasoning but they do not put forward truth claims. They can be useful or not, but not true or false. As such, schemes might be more accurately described as a by-product of scientific research. It has to be noted, though, that schemes seldom appear in academic journals as a purely analytical instrument. In many instances, they are empirically grounded and, as such, combined with other forms of practical relevance, e.g. the uncovering of causal relationship. In this case, a scheme can also be at the centre of academic knowledge production. The case is different where technological rules are concerned. Usually, these can be neither directly derived from theories nor directly substantiated by theories, which tend to be too general for those purposes (Bunge 1967; Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2006; Nienhüser 1989). At most, theories fulfil a heuristic function in the development of technological rules (Kirsch et al. 2007). The same goes for predictions. Apart from that, one may generally question whether management science is able to produce technological rules at all without having to give up their claim to rigour. Whitley (1988), for example, argues that management is not a task that can be standardized. Consequently, standardized solutions like technological rules are ‘doomed to failure’ (Whitley 1988: 64). Developing technological rules for management thus implies that one has to ignore differences, e.g. between companies from different industries, countries, life cycles, etc. If this is true, then there is indeed a trade-off between instrumental relevance and scientific rigour, at least if one understands management science as a social science that deals with complex problems (Mintzberg 2004). There might be areas (e.g. operations research and accounting) where problems tend to be more technical or quasi-technical and where technological rules can be derived from scientific research. Yet, even in those areas, it is usually difficult to isolate problems and examine them independently of their social context. In view of this, it is not surprising that the instrumental relevance of research in such areas is decreasing (e.g. Choudhury 1986). Indeed, in the course of its


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academization, management science generally tends to become less instrumental. Particularly in top-tier academic journals, one can hardly find technological rules that could be compared to the recipes (much like those of cookery books) offered by certain management best-sellers, or to the formula ‘if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, then perform something like action X’ referred to by Van Aken (2001: 3). Though our analysis of the selected articles showed that many recommendations to management were formulated as technological rules, these were typically relativized by statements like ‘managers should consider ...’. Occasionally, we also came across tautological formulations — for example, ‘Managers should try to acquire customers that have the greatest potential, as long as the costs of acquiring such customers do not outweigh the benefits’ (Ryals 2005: 260). It seems that even management authors who aim at technological relevance are aware that it is not permissible — and may even be dangerous — to suggest specific technological rules independently of a particular temporal, social and local context (Zinkhan and Hirschheim 1992). In contrast to instrumental relevance, the different forms of conceptual relevance do not seem to imply such a trade-off. Relevance that results from a deeper understanding of practical situations appears not to contradict the notion of science as a particular form of truth-oriented communication. This can be seen, for example, in a study by Davis (1971), who analysed a number of social theories that received a lot of attention within the sciences, i.e. which became ‘famous’. He concludes that the theories that catch on are those that are considered particularly ‘interesting’. He writes about these theories: ‘All interesting theories, at least all interesting social theories, then, constitute an attack on the taken-for-granted world of their audience. This audience will consider any particular proposition to be “worth saying” only if it denies the truth of some part of their routinely held assumption-ground.’ (Davis 1971: 311)

In a similar vein, Daft and Lewin (1990: 7) argue: ‘The worth of the research outcome is measured by surprise.’ Gergen too (1992: 218) evaluates ‘theory in terms of its challenge to the taken-for-granted and its simultaneous capacity to open new departures for action’. In other words, the criteria that determine the acceptance rates of scientific knowledge are identical to those that determine its conceptual relevance. Hence, on the conceptual level, academic rigour and practical relevance are not only compatible but amplify each other. ‘The “taken-forgranted world” includes not only this theoretical dimension but also a practical dimension as well. A theory will be considered truly interesting only if it has repercussions on both levels’ (Davis 1971: 311). The relation between scientific rigour and the various forms of legitimative relevance is somewhat different. At first glance, scientific rigour and legitimative relevance appear to be highly compatible: the more rigorous, i.e. the more scientific, a particular knowledge claim is considered to be, the greater its potential as a form of credential, and consequently the better it can be referred to rhetorically in order to legitimate something towards third parties (Kieser 2002). Yet, as will be discussed in the following section, in the context of theory pluralism the relation between rigour and legitimation becomes more ambivalent.



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Forms of Relevance and Theoretical Pluralism

Management science is a ‘fragmented adhocracy’ (Whitley 1984b) characterized by a pluralism of incommensurable theories or paradigms. Often scientific statements contradict each other without necessarily being wrong. Scientific reasoning within the social sciences does not resolve this situation since there are no overarching criteria on the basis of which one could choose between the various ‘incommensurate’ positions (Albert 1985; Scherer 1998; Scherer and Dowling 1995). The philosophy of science does not offer a solution either, as it is also characterized by theoretical pluralism, which, if applied to the problem described above, would result in an infinite regress at best. Furthermore, in management science different incommensurate positions do not converge in the course of scientific evolution. Instead, the differences become even greater (Scherer 1998; Scherer and Steinmann 1999). Theoretical pluralism poses a problem to instrumental relevance. If different theories are associated with different instrumental claims, they might neutralize each other. Instrumental relevance is based on the reduction of complexity, i.e. on the exclusion of alternative decisions. This is most obvious in the case of instruments that suggest a single ‘best way’, yet theoretical pluralism re-establishes complexity with regard to the decision maker. Thus, with increasing pluralism, instrumental relevance is reduced. Since science itself does not offer any methods for choosing between instruments, this problem cannot be solved by scientific means. Theoretical pluralism also affects conceptual relevance. Different conceptual statements or concepts can also contradict each other. Yet, since conceptual relevance is not restricted to the ‘output’ of research but to the process of scientific reasoning, different scientific statements stand in a kind of dialectical relation to each other. Theoretical pluralism, in this sense, can lead to an increasing conceptual relevance, as Astley and Zammuto (1992: 455) demonstrate: ‘Problem-solving skills can be increased by developing what Bartunek et al. (1983) refer to as “complicated understanding” — the ability to see and understand organizational events from several, rather than single, perspectives. Complicated understandings are important because many of the problems managers face — such as motivating employees, formulating strategies, etc. — are complex or “wicked” problems (Rittel and Weber 1973), which can be framed in many different ways, have many different answers, and are rarely definitely resolved.

At first glance, theoretical pluralism seems to increase the legitimative relevance of management science. The pluralism of management theories means that it is possible to legitimate almost any form of management practice (Beck and Bonß 1989; Nicolai 2004). The fragmentation of management science makes it possible to pick out individual elements of scientific communication and use them opportunistically in practical communication. In the long run, however, theoretical pluralism undermines legitimative relevance. To the extent that scientific justifications in management practice appear arbitrary, legitimation disappears. This is one reason why some researchers have observed that scientific authority is increasingly eroded (e.g. Luhmann 1994: 629). In that respect, theoretical pluralism reduces the legitimative relevance of management science in the long run.


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Forms of Relevance and Double Hermeneutics

Giddens (1987) argued that in the social sciences the feature of double hermeneutics characterizes the link between theory and practice. If a social science claims to be practically relevant it has to assume that it changes the social world that it observes — and with that the assumptions on which it bases its own constructions about that world. An obvious consequence of double hermeneutics is that relevance claims may become self-fulfilling or self-defeating (Merton 1957). For example, predicting that the share price of a particular company will rise will motivate shareholders to buy shares, which will lead to a rise in the share price (self-fulfilling prophecy). Or, predicting that a company will go bankrupt due to a lack of particular competences will lead to the company’s trying to acquire those competences and thus avoid the fulfilment of that prediction (self-defeating prophecy). In management science there are surprisingly few studies on how research is used in practice (see, however, Beyer and Trice 1982; Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2006; Mohrman et al. 2001). Consequently, we know very little about the effects of relevance claims in management practice. Yet, in the few examples of instrumental relevance, self-fulfilling prophecies play a central role (Ferraro et al. 2005; Ghoshal 2005). In terms of practical relevance the Black–Scholes formula (Black and Scholes 1973) is one of the most successful theories in finance. At the same time, it is a prime example of the self-fulfilling nature of research results. According to Ferraro et al. (2005:12) there is perhaps ‘no clearer demonstration of this effect’ than the case of this formula which helps to predict option prices on the basis of observable parameters and of the unobservable price volatility of the underlying asset. Initially, the formula was imprecise, with deviations of 30–40%. At the end of the 1970s the formula’s precision increased noticeably and deviations from the predicted Black–Scholes price were only 2%. MacKenzie and Millo (2003) ascribed this to the fact that people acted as if the theory were true. Traders started to use the Black–Scholes equation to determine their bids, and financial software used the formula to provide theoretical prices for all the options being traded, which in turn increased the accuracy of the formula’s predictions. In other words, the widespread use of the formula created the conditions that made its prediction come true. The same argument can be made for forecasts in general. In an analysis of 3,142 forecasts about US manufacturing industries carried out during the 1970s, Barnett et al. (2006) found evidence that the accuracy of predictions depended to a large extent on self-fulfilling prophecies. The exemplary case of this trend is ‘Moore’s Law’ of 1965, which predicted that the number of components that could be crammed onto a silicon chip would double annually. This ‘law’ has proved surprisingly accurate in the last four decades. However, it did not originate in the sciences but was the result of ad hoc speculation. Its unusual accuracy, as Barnett et al. (2006) convincingly showed, was not so much due to the quality of the prediction as a result of the industry members’ believing in the prediction — treating it as a ‘law’ — and making their investments in accordance with it. These examples show once more that instrumental relevance and scientific rigour can contradict each other — or may at any rate be only loosely related. Indeed, Merton (1948: 195) defined ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ as a prediction that ‘is, in the beginning, a false definition of a situation evoking behavior which Downloaded from oss.sagepub.com at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on April 4, 2011


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makes the originally false conception true’. It is not necessarily the case that an instrumental theory starts with a false definition of the situation. The theory could also anticipate its own application and define the situation in accordance with that. This would imply that the theory reappeared as part of the object of study. Thus, the theory would try to represent itself as part of itself. On the basis of such a ‘re-entry’ (Luhmann 1994), science and management practice would have to be conceptualized as reciprocally related. Such a concept of the science–practice relation, however, does not go well with the idea of a linear transfer of knowledge, which the model of instrumentally relevant research implies (Luhmann 1993). Claims of conceptual relevance, in contrast, are not susceptible to self-fulfilling prophecies, as expectations are only developed after the application — not ex ante. Legitimative relevance, again, can be based on self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, if business schools, students, employers, etc. believe that a research degree constitutes a relevant management qualification, this degree becomes a relevant qualification that influences career opportunities. The study by McCabe and Trevino (1996) provides a good example of such reflexive processes. They showed that business school students ‘have come to college to get a credential … How they get that credential is often less important than simply getting it’ (McCabe and Trevino 1996: 29, cited in Pfeffer 2005). Similarly, rhetoric devices may be relevant because other managers believe in their relevance. The point is to master the common code in order to be able to join in the conversation. Managers who believe that the code is important use it and thus make it important to other managers. In this respect, the acquisition of academic knowledge might be compared to learning the words of a foreign language. The phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecies makes it clear that relevant knowledge is not necessarily beneficial (Ferraro 2005 et al.). Ghoshal and Moran (1996), for example, argue that in the case of transaction-cost economics, selffulfilling beliefs had detrimental effects. Apart from that, it demonstrates that the often-cited examples of instrumental relevance constitute no ‘proof’ that there is a linear transfer of rigorous scientific knowledge to management practice (Nicolai 2004). Self-fulfilling beliefs spread more or less independently of their empirical validity (Ferraro et al. 2005). Yet, this does not mean that they are arbitrary. With regard to their diffusion, the question of whether particular knowledge is compatible with existing norms and expectations in society is much more important than scientific criteria as such (Gergen 1973). In view of this, it is possible that management practice has a greater influence on science than vice versa (Barley et al. 1988). In contrast to claims of conceptual relevance, the quest for instrumental relevance might thus lead to the enforcement of taken-for-granted assumptions. Thus, according to Ferraro et al. (2005: 21), ‘When theories produce self-fulfilling beliefs, societies, organizations, and leaders can become trapped in unproductive or harmful cycles of behavior that are almost impossible to change.’ Forms of Relevance and the Context of Understanding

Given the societal differentiation between management science and management practice (Astley and Zammuto 1992; Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2006; Luhmann 1989; Nicolai 2004; Seidl 2007; Shapin 1995; Weingart 2003), an Downloaded from oss.sagepub.com at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen on April 4, 2011

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important question is whether the particular knowledge generated in management science requires practitioners to understand the scientific context for that knowledge to prove relevant to them. Again, there are significant differences between the various forms of relevance. The three types of instrumental knowledge discussed here typically require no understanding of the larger context within which that knowledge was developed. This is what the concept of ‘instrument’ implies: in order to use an instrument, all one needs to know is under what conditions it is to be used and what effect it has. One might have to specify given variables on the basis of context-specific information, or calibrate the instrument, but one need not understand how and why the instrument works. This is true for schemes and forecasts but also for technological rules. For Luhmann, the possibility of context-free transfer is the defining characteristic of a technique: ‘The application of scientific knowledge becomes highly technical whenever it can be practised without an understanding of the theoretical context of origin.’ (Luhmann 1993: 329; our emphasis; our translation)

In the case of conceptual forms of knowledge, the situation is very different. They usually require an — at least rudimentary — understanding of the theoretical context in which that knowledge is embedded (Luhmann 2005b). Without that understanding, the meaning of those forms of knowledge cannot be grasped. In contrast to instrumental knowledge, where it is enough to understand how to use it, the main characteristic of conceptual forms of knowledge is that they broaden our understanding. Typically, the user of conceptual knowledge will have to become actively engaged in it in order to integrate it into his or her concrete experience. All this puts some strain on the practitioner who tries to use conceptual forms of knowledge, as it requires him or her to engage in scientific forms of thinking and communication. Thus, conceptual knowledge can only diffuse into practice if the practitioners are able and willing to become acquainted (at least to some extent) with the theoretical background. In this context, Luhmann (1993: 332) argues that in order for such knowledge to diffuse into practice on a larger scale, the scientification of practice is necessary — which is already taking place (Whitley 1995). This is not to say that the process of diffusion follows a linear path. On the contrary, as several writers have argued, ‘diffusion’ needs to be conceptualized as a process of ‘dissociation’ (Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2006), ‘translation’ (Latour 1987) or ‘productive misunderstanding’ (Seidl 2007). Hence, a fruitful way to gain a better understanding of the science–practice relation would be to study the concrete processes of reinterpretation, translation and negotiation involved in scientific knowledge. Finally, for legitimative forms of relevance, an understanding of the wider theoretical context is usually not necessary. In some cases this could even be counterproductive. An example is the opportunistic use of rhetoric devices to communicate certain information, which the receivers of the communication would see through, if they understood too much of the theoretical background. In Table 2 we summarize our discussion of the different forms of relevance.


Nicolai & Seidl: Different Forms of Practical Relevance in Management Science Table 2. Summary of Discussion

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Instrumental relevance

Conceptual relevance

Legitimative relevance

Relation between rigour and relevance

Mostly strong trade-off between rigour and instrumental relevance

No trade-off, but compatibility between rigour and conceptual relevance

Compatibility with theoretical pluralism

Pluralism tends to undermine instrumental relevance

Compatibility between pluralism and conceptual relevance

Necessity for understanding of scientific context

Not necessary

Necessary (at least to a rudimentary degree)

Initially, compatibility between rigour and legitimative relevance; later, trade-off Initially, compatibility between pluralism and legitimative relevance; later, trade-off Not necessary, could even be counterproductive

Compatibility with double hermeneutics of the social sciences

Incompatible: self-fulfilling without rigour or self-defeating or inconsistent

Compatible

Compatible: susceptible to becoming selffulfilling

Conclusion The aim of the present article was to clarify the different meanings of ‘relevance’ that figure in the management–science discourse, and to discuss the extent to which different relevance claims are justified. We approached these research questions from the more recently developed perspective of sociology of science, as set out in the works of Luhmann and others. A particular advantage of this approach is that it provides us with a better understanding of the differentiation between science and other fields of society, in particular, management practice. Consequently, it puts the problem of any form of ‘transfer’ between these areas at the centre of attention, rather than obscuring it, as other approaches tend to do. We began by developing a taxonomy of forms of practical relevance based on a textual analysis of the relevance literature and of 450 research articles published in three top-tier academic journals. Then, we went on to discuss the different forms of relevance against the background of central aspects of the social dynamics of sciences. This led us to the conclusion that management scholars strive too much for immediate, instrumental relevance and tend to overlook the importance of conceptual relevance. Thus, rather than offering recommendations to practitioners on how to act, i.e. what course of action to choose, management science should aim at enriching the practitioner’s understanding of the decision situation. It is important to stress that such a shift from instrumental to conceptual relevance forms does not constitute a devaluation of science but an upvaluation. After all, the appreciation of the decision situation (i.e. sensemaking) rather than the ultimate selection of a particular course of action distinguishes intelligent from non-intelligent decision making (March 1999). The suggested focus on conceptual forms of relevance implies a reorientation in the relevance debate, which so far has been dominated (implicitly or explicitly)


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by a model of instrumental relevance (e.g. Van Aken 2005; Van de Ven 2000). The persistence of instrumental relevance claims is surprising, given the fundamental problems we outlined above. Possible reasons for this might be that the relevance debate has traditionally used engineering as a role model for successful science (e.g. Thompson 1956), or that tools, rather than concepts, are more attractive to management scientists because they support their status and identity as applied social scientists (Weick 2007). Apart from that, one has to take into account that conceptual forms of relevance present merely an ‘indirect and subtle’ utilization of social science research, in contrast to instrumental forms, with their ‘direct and obvious uses and consequences’ (Beyer and Trice 1982: 615). The higher degree of visibility of (the allegedly) instrumental utilization may contribute to the fact that instrumental relevance receives considerably more attention than other forms — one need only think of the labelled tools of management consultancies. We hope that this article makes it harder to ignore the conceptual use of scientific knowledge in the future. Yet, as our discussion has shown, conceptual forms of relevance are also demanding, as they presuppose a mutual learning process for scientists and practitioners, a process of co-production of new knowledge (Luhmann 1994: 645; Seidl 2007). Thus, to the extent that the relevance debate is reoriented towards conceptual forms, one also has to discuss ways that make this process possible. One obvious source of such learning is management education, where the ‘unresolvable dialectics between claims of experiential knowledge and the claims of academic knowledge’ (Augier and March 2007: 144) might lead to the development of novel knowledge. The focus on direct utilization, local knowledge and the model of instrumentality tends to limit the possibilities of such a dialectical process taking place. To some extent, this focus might even be dangerous, as Mintzberg (2004: 400) pointed out: ‘The notion of being handed “relevance” on some sort of silver platter, with no obligation to think, probe, work, has been the cause of enormous amounts of managerial malpractice’. A shift of focus from instrumental to conceptual forms of relevance would indeed lead to a change in management education. The ‘pseudo-professionalism’ that Hayes and Abernathy (1980) criticized would be replaced by a form of education with an entirely different orientation: breaking rather than following rules, rich observations rather than simplifications, an entrepreneurial rather than a managerial attitude. On the whole, such a shift would also counteract the occasionally observed decoupling of management science and management education (Röbken 2004), as the promise of instrumentality and of the ‘quick fix’ leads to tensions within the academic core of the business school. Our article also has certain implications for the development of the relevance debate itself. The various diagnoses of, and recommendations for, the relevance problem still parallel the expectations of the external stakeholders. The assumption that demanding the provision of instrumental knowledge forcefully enough will solve the relevance problem is in accordance with the conventional expectations of external stakeholders (Shove and Rip 2000). Yet, the more we realize that ‘relevance’ is a problem with many facets, and as such, closely related to the social dynamics of science, the more it becomes apparent that the solutions are not as obvious as many contributions to the relevance debate seem to imply. In



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other words, reappraising this problem from the perspective discussed here will help make ‘relevance’ a research topic in itself, rather than just an issue for presidential addresses or editorials. As a consequence, the topic of ‘relevance’ is likely to be caught up in self-referential dynamics, which would lead to a separation of the scientific from the practical treatment of the topic. After all, a scientific discussion of relevance would not make much sense if it merely reproduced the expectations of the practitioners. Practitioners are likely to associate the term ‘applied management-science’ with other images than those that might be implied in the scientific discourse itself. A limitation of this article is that we have only analysed how relevance is conceptualized in the context of management science. The practitioners’ conceptualizations of relevance have not been directly addressed. We hope that this will be the topic of a further empirical study examining the application of scientific knowledge in practice. Given the great interest in ‘relevance’, it is surprising that such studies are scarce. This lack might be explained by the fact that instrumental relevance is often assumed to lead directly to practical relevance. After all, the latter type seems to provide a convincing answer to practitioners’ ‘So what?’ questions. All the same, in this article we have tried to show that the quest for instrumental knowledge does not necessarily lead directly to relevance. We now call for empirical studies that examine how knowledge contained in the network of scientific publications ‘diffuses’ (if this is the right term, after all) into practice, and how it influences decision making. Our empirically derived taxonomy of relevance forms and our theoretical discussion provide, on the one hand, a framework for such studies and, on the other, some propositions that challenge the conventional wisdom concerning relevance questions. Notes

We thank Alfred Kieser and Guido Möllering as well as the participants of the Third Organization Studies Summer Workshop for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers and the Guest Editors, Paula Jarzabkowski, Susan Mohrman and Andreas Scherer, for their enormous help with developing this published version of the article. We would also like to acknowledge the helpful support by Amir Rahbaran in analysing the empirical material for this study. 1

2 3

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The title of our paper follows in the line of earlier papers, which studied the types of research that would make readers exclaim ‘That’s interesting!’ (Davis 1971), or ‘That’s moving!’ (Weick 1999). Our study examines the kind of scientific knowledge that would prompt readers to think ‘That’s relevant!’. We chose the term ‘technological rules’ rather than ‘technologies’ as the latter is often used in a much broader sense (see Scharff and Dusek 2003), which includes elements that we identify as separate forms of relevance, distinct from what we described as ‘technological rules or recipes’. We can distinguish forecasts, as predictions of concrete events, from more general if-then statements, which represent general laws.

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Alexander Nicolai

Alexander Nicolai is Full Professor of Entrepreneurship at the University of Oldenburg. He was Juniorprofessor for Strategic Management and Digital Economics at the Bauhaus University in Weimar (December 2002–September 2005), Assistant Professor at the Deutsche Bank Institute for Family Business at the Witten/Herdecke University (September 1999–December 2002), Visiting Scholar at the MIT Sloan School of Management in Boston (October 2001–March 2002) and consultant at the Management Zentrum Witten (January 2001–December 2002). His current research interests include strategic processes and the capital market, entrepreneurship, the spread of management ideas and the practical relevance of academic research. Address: University of Oldenburg, Ammerländer Heerstraße 138, 26129 Oldenburg, Germany. Email: [email protected]

David Seidl

David Seidl is Full Professor of Organization and Management at the University of Zurich and Research Associate at the Centre for Business Studies at Cambridge University. He is a senior editor of Organization Studies and sits on the editorial boards of Journal of Management Studies, Organization and Scandinavian Journal of Management. He is an executive board member of the European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) and co-organizer of the EGOS standing working group ‘Strategizing: Activity and Practice’. He has widely published on organization, strategy and the philosophy of science in journals including Journal of Management Studies, Organization, Organization Studies and Human Relations. He is a co-editor of the new Cambridge Handbook of Strategy-asPractice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Address: University of Zurich, Universitätsstrasse 84, CH-8006, Zurich, Switzerland. Email: [email protected]
