Notes on the Theory and Metatheory of Intrinsic ... - Science Direct

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 15, 130-145 (1975)

Notes on the Theory and Metatheory of Intrinsic Motivation EDWARD

L . DEC~

University of Rochester This paper is a reply to a number o f criticisms made by Scott about the work of myself and others on the topic of intrinsic motivation. First I pointed out that Scott's metatheoretic starting point is different from mine and therefore forms the basis for disagreement at the theoretical, methodological, and prescriptive stages of our work. In response to the criticism that my work does not shed light on the obscure meaning of intrinsic motivation, I briefly outlined the elements of a general theoretical framework for conceptualizing and studying intrinsic motivation in relation to other motivational processes. Within this general framework I looked more specifically at the way in which extrinsic rewards can affect a person's intrinsic motivation. 1 then considered some specific methodological critiques and finally turned briefly to some implications and applications of this work.

T h e central point in Scott's (1975) critique of my work seems to be an assertion that functional analysis is the most fruitful and meaningful approach to the study of b e h a v i o r - a n assertion that has often been made by Skinner (e.g., 1975) and others. In making that assertion, Scott was actually making a metatheoretical statement. He was subscribing to the assumption that human beings are mechanisms whose behavior is determined by reinforcement histories and contingencies in the present environment. Internal states such as motives, feelings, and attitudes are seen as epiphenomenal to the c a u s e s of behavior and are typically considered to be postbehavioral self-attributions (e.g., Bern, 1967). The important point to note is that all of this is an assumption that Scott has made; it is a philosophical rather than psychological statement. I don't subscribe to that assumption. My metatheoretical starting point is the assumption that internal states do cause behavior. Motives, emotions, and cognitions play a central part in energizing and directing behavior. Later in this paper I will outline in more detail the way in which this works, but now I simply want to point out that the most significant locus of disagreement between Scott and me is in our basic assumptions about human beings. These assumptions are not provable in a I thank Allan J. Schwartz and H. Kenneth Cohen for comments on the first draft o f this paper. Address reprint requests to Edward L. Deci, Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, N Y 14627. 130 Copyright © 1976 by AcademicPress, Inc. All rights of reproductionin any form reserved.

NOTES ON I N T R I N S I C M O T I V A T I O N

131

scientific sense; they are the philosophy on which we build psychology. Starting with different philosophies will lead to psychologies that look quite different. I shall not attempt to argue the merits of a mechanistic, functional approach (Scott's) versus an organismic, cognitive-affective approach (mine); that has been done many times before. My aim here simply is to highlight the distinction. Scott also stated that my work (Deci, 1971, 1972a, 1972b) and the work of de Charms (1968) did not help shed light on the "obscure meaning of intrinsic motivation." Whether or not that is true is a question of judgment; however, my intention in those studies was, not to clarify the meaning of intrinsic motivation in a theoretical sense, but rather to explore the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. That in itself shed some light on the meaning of intrinsic motivation and, combined with other work, has helped us move toward a reasonably comprehensive understanding of intrinsic motivation. I now shall discuss the nature of intrinsic motivation and the way it motivates behavior. Given the space limitation, this will be very sketchy; however, these notions are explicated in considerable detail in my recent book (Deci, 1975).

THE NATURE OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATION The most commonly used definition of intrinsic motivation in the experimental literature states that behavior is intrinsically motivated when there are no apparent external rewards. Although this definition has served quite effectively as an operational definition for experimental investigations, it does not provide a meaningful account of the processes that underlie these behaviors. A more meaningful definition must deal with psychological and physiological processes. Based on the work of White (1959) and de Charms (1968), I have suggested (Deci, 1975) that intrinsically motivated behaviors are ones that are involved with the human need for being competent and self-determining. This motivation is innate and motivates such things as play, exploration, and the development of cognitive structures (e.g., Piaget, 1952; Connolly & Bruner, 1974). Further, intrinsically motivated behaviors fall into two general classes. The first class is behavior that people engage in to seek out optimally challenging situations. These challenges can be thought of as involving an incongruity, or discrepancy, between a stimulus input and some standard of comparison. The second class is behavior that aims to conquer the challenge or reduce the incongruity. In other words, people are involved in an ongoing process of seeking and conquering challenges. They attempt to conquer challenges (or reduce incongruities) when they encounter them, and when there are no challenges available for them to

132

E D W A R D L. D E C I

conquer, they seek or create some. If a challenge is too difficult or too far above the optimal level, people will ignore it until they are able to deal with it. Hunt (1965) suggested that people need an optimal amount of incongruity and that this need is the psychological basis of intrinsic motivation. Although I believe that Hunt was definitely on the right track, I think that the statement is slightly misleading. People do seek optimal incongruity, but they don't seek it to maintain an optimal level. The seeking of optimal incongruity (or optimal challenge) is one of two parts of the ongoing process of seeking and conquering challenges. The postulate of a need to maintain optimal incongruity emphasizes the seeking aspect to the exclusion of the conquering aspect. The conquering aspect involves the reduction of the incongruities and is akin to what Festinger (1957) has called "cognitive dissonance reduction" and Kagan (1972) has called "uncertainty reduction." Whereas Hunt emphasized the seeking, the latter two theorists emphasized the conquering. In actuality both are going on as part of the continual interaction between human organisms and their environment. Elkind (1971) has discussed this cyclical process in relation to cognitive growth. Intrinsic motivation can be distinguished further from extrinsic motivation by noting that intrinsic motives are based in the physiology of the central nervous system and have no appreciable effect on nonnervous system tissues. Berlyne (1971), drawing on the earlier work of Olds and Olds (1965), has discussed the physiological basis of intrinsic motivation. He distinguished two mechanisms: one that underlies the class of intrinsically motivated behaviors, which I have labeled seeking behaviors, and another that underlies the class of intrinsically motivated behaviors, which I have labeled conquering behaviors. I shall not elaborate on the physiological basis of intrinsic motivation in this discussion; I mention it only to indicate further that a considerable amount is known about the processes involved with intrinsically motivated behaviors. As I stated previously, the psychological basis of intrinsic motivation is in people's need to feel competent and self-determining. This, of course, is an acceptable psychological account of intrinsic motivation only if one accepts the metatheoretical assumptions that I mentioned. It assumes that internal states cause behavior and that humans are information processors who make decisions and behave in accord with those decisions. I shall outline now an information-theoretic framework for the study of motivational processes. It assumes that people choose what to do in order to achieve their desired end-states. That is not to say that people have free will nor even that all the decision-making is conscious; it is only to say that behavior is understandable and predictable and that a decision-making framework that views people as working to attain


133

goals having psychological value to them seems to be a very productive way of studying behavior. Within this framework motives are seen as cognitive representations of future states. Such a view of motivation stems from the early work of Tolmon (1932) and Lewin (1938) and bears similarity to more recent work of Atkinson (1964), Vroom (1964), Kagan (1972), and others.

A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO 'MOTIVATION The current framework (Deci, 1975) emphasizes that affective states are motivational in nature just as basic drives are. Since the basis of intrinsic motivation is one's need to feel competent and self-determining, we see that the desired end-state for intrinsically motivated behavior is an affective state, namely feeling competent and self-determining. Let us look now at the general framework. A sequence of motivated behavior begins with stimulus inputs to the central nervous system. They may come from the environment (e.g., an interesting puzzle or a hot fudge sundae), from memory (e.g., a past event or an image), or from internal stimulation (e,g., gastric motility or pleasurable sensations). The stimulus inputs set up in people "awareness of potential satisfaction." These awarenesses are what we call motives; they are cognitive representations of future states. People may become aware of the potential satisfaction from feeling competent and self-determining, or of the potential satisfaction from leaving a threatening situation, or etc. This awareness of potential satisfaction provides the energy for selecting goals and behaving in ways that people believe will lead them to the satisfaction that they have become aware of. The awareness of potential satisfaction-the motives in this s y s t e m - c a n account for what in other systems have been called drives, affective motivation, and intrinsic motivation. A motive is an awareness that develops out of stimulus inputs from the environment and the organism. Inputs from the organism are elements of information that come from the organism's physiology and memory. For example, what is called the hunger drive is an awareness that develops out of informational inputs from one's physiology (e.g., blood sugar level) and memory (e.g., knowledge of a regular dinner hour). These sources of informational inputs are relatively stable factors in the organism-just as one's intrinsic motivation (the need of the central nervous system for encountering and reducing incongruity) is relatively stable. I shall refer to these internal sources of stimulus inputs as one's motive structure. A motive, on the other hand, is a transitory awareness; it is an internal representation of a future state. To summarize, motives are "awarenesses of potential satisfaction" that develop out of the

134

EDWARD

L. D E C I

interaction of stimulus inputs from the environment and from one's motive structure. Intrinsic motivation energizes and directs people's interaction with their environment. People are in a continual process of seeking and conquering challenges, and they do this out of the awareness of the potential satisfaction from feeling competent and self-determining. This interaction is on-going unless interrupted by other motivational processes. Interruptions occur when other awarenesses become more salient. For example, d r i v e s - w h i c h are awarenesses of certain potential satisfact i o n s - a r e based in a significant way in nonnervous system tissues and tend to have a recurring, cyclical operation. When this awareness becomes sufficiently salient, it will break into the ongoing, intrinsically motivated interaction with the environment and energize behavior aimed at achieving the satisfaction that the organism became aware oL There is still another category of awareness of potential satisfaction: Simon (1967) has called it "real time needs." These awarenesses can break into behavioral sequences motivated either b y intrinsic-affective motivation or by drives. Simon also called them emotions and compared them to an interrupt mechanism in an information-processing system. T h ey are highly salient awarenesses resulting from some unpredicted event in the ever changing environment. A hurled stone coming toward one would be an example. Typically these real time needs will organize and motivate behavior that is adaptive for the organism in the situation. To summarize, people are motivated by what I've called awareness of potential satisfaction, and out of that awareness they make choices about what behaviors to engage in based on their expectations of the end-states to which the behaviors will lead. The awareness encompasses what in other places have been called intrinsic motives, affective motives, drives, and real time needs. I should reemphasize that these awarenesses need not be conscious in the usual sense but work in a lawful and predictable way. A schematic representation of the theoretical framework appears in Fig. 1. In this very brief discussion of the system there are two more aspects that must be mentioned. First, there is a continual matching of outcomes to standards that is occurring at two levels, one within the other. The more global one is that when people become aware of potential satisfaction and choose to seek that satisfaction, their awareness of potential satisfaction becomes a standard against w hi ch their satisfaction is compared. This comparison works in a way that Miller, Gallanter, and Pribram (1960) have called the T O T E unit: Test, Operate, Test, Exit. People "test" their level of satisfaction against the awareness that is the s t a n d a r d - i f there is a discrepancy, they "operate" or behave to reduce the discrepancy; if there is a match, they "exit" or terminate that motivated sequence.

, , ,>

>

Feedback Channel 2

I'Goal Directed [ Behavior > | --operation of [Goal ..... i Selection I ' ' " '| TOTE feedback loop against |~ goal

1

!ii!:iil

I~ satisfaction

FIo. 1. A schematic representation of a cognitive system of intrinsically and extrinsically motivated behavior (after Deci, 1975).

Stimulus Inputs --environment --memory --internal s t a t e s

Awareness of Potential Satisfaction --intrinsic need for feeling competent and self-determining --drives --real time needs (emotions)

Feedback Channel 1

tm ta

>

O

Cn O Z

Z O

136

E D W A R D L. D E C I

Within this larger feedback loop (TOTE unit) is a second feedback loop. Based on awareness of potential satisfaction, people set goals that they believe will lead to that satisfaction. As they behave to achieve that goal, they will be involved in a matching process between the goal and their current state of goal attainment. This will follow the operation of the T O T E model. To achieve a goal is not necessarily the same as achieving the satisfaction of which they were aware. Goals are set based on expectations of the rewards and satisfaction that will accrue from goal attainment. If the goals do what is expected, people will experience the expected satisfaction. If not, there will still be a discrepancy between the standard and their level of satisfaction, so they will set another goal to try to achieve the desired satisfaction. In other words, people set goals and, utilizing a feedback loop, they behave to meet the goals. In a larger sense, the goals are set because of awarenesses of potential satisfaction, and the person's aim is to achieve that satisfaction. When the goals are reached, people, again utilizing the feedback loop, either terminate if they've achieved the satisfaction or set new goals if the former ones did not lead to the desired satisfaction. The final point about the system that needs to be made here is that there are a variety of feedback channels involved. I will mention just two in this discussion, since those two relate to Scott's critique of my work. The first feedback channel begins in the linkage between behavior and extrinsic rewards and feeds back to the motives (i.e., awareness of potential satisfaction) and motive structure. People's motives are affected (in a way that is elaborated in the next section) when behaviors become linked to extrinsic rewards. The second feedback channel of interest begins with a person's satisfaction and feeds back to the motives and motive structure. These two feedback processes will now be elaborated.

COGNITIVE EVALUATION THEORY According to cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1975), there are two processes by which rewards affect intrinsic motivation. The first process is a change in perceived locus of causality. When behavior is intrinsically motivated, the perceived locus of causality is said to be internal. This simply means that people perceive the cause of a certain behavior to be their own intrinsic needs. When they perceive the cause of a behavior to be intrinsic, they will engage in the activity for intrinsic rewards. However, when they receive extrinsic rewards, their perceived locus of causality becomes external and they do the behaviors only if they believe that the extrinsic rewards will be forthcoming. Within the general information-theoretic system, the change in perceived locus of causality process operates as follows: people develop behavior-reward


137

instrumentalities (linkages between specific behaviors and corresponding extrinsic rewards); that information is fed back to one's motives and motive structure through the first feedback channel that I mentioned previously. The second process through which intrinsic motivation may be affected is what I've called "a change in feelings of competence and selfdetermination." Rewards that convey to people that they are competent and self-determining increase their intrinsic motivation; rewards that convey to people that they are not competent and self-determining decrease their intrinsic motivation. This information is fed back to their motives and motive structure through the second feedback channel shown in Fig. i. Cognitive evaluation theory further asserts that all extrinsic rewards have two aspects: a controlling aspect and an informational aspect. The controlling aspect of rewards is what causes the behavior-reward instrumentalities. In other words, it is the aspect that initiates the change in perceived locus of causality p r o c e s s - t h e r e b y decreasing one's intrinsic motivation. The informational aspect of extrinsic rewards provides people with information about their effectiveness at the rewarded activity-thereby initiating the change in feelings of competence and self-determination process. The information is fed back through the second channel to people's motives and motive structure, and it either increases or decreases their intrinsic motivation, depending on whether the information conveys competence or noncompetence. In summation, I have sketched out briefly a conceptual framework for understanding motivated behavior. ! have done it in this abbreviated form since it is elaborated elsewhere (Deci, 1975). My aim was to point out that a great deal of work is beginning to converge now toward a comprehensive understanding of intrinsic motivation. But this understanding derives out of the metatheory that assumes that internal states cause behavior, that people decide what to do and behave accordingly, that intrinsic motivation is innate to the human organism, and so on. If one is unwilling to accept these assumptions, as apparently Scott is unwilling to do, one will probably continue to assert that our work on intrinsic motivation is misleading or inconclusive. I have talked about a theoretical framework for the study of intrinsic motivation in response to Scott's criticism that our work has not helped to shed light on the obscure measuring of intrinsic motivation. I shall consider now the more specific criticisms made by Scott. In so doing I shall try to respond to his methodological concerns and review relevant data. The most important finding of the studies that Scott criticized is that certain extrinsic rewards, especially if they are contingent upon effective

138

EDWARD L. DECI

performance and expected by the people receiving them, will decrease the intrinsic motivation of these people. Scott stated that there were enough methodological problems with the studies to vitiate the findings. Shortly, I will look at those supposed methodological problems, but first I want to point out that the most important support for the assertion that certain rewards decrease intrinsic motivation comes, not just from the two studies that Scott discussed, but rather from the fact that the original finding has been replicated many times with a variety of paradigms and a variety of rewards (e.g., money, good player awards, food, and avoidance of punishment). In addition to the studies of mine and my colleagues (Deci, 1971, 1972a; Deci & Cascio, Note 1), numerous other investigators have reported decreases in intrinsic motivation or interest following the administration of extrinsic rewards (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; Greene & Lepper, 1974; Lepper & Greene, 1975; Ross, in press; Kruglanski, Alon & Lewis, 1972; Greene, 1974; Calder & Staw, 1975; Eden, in press). In all of these studies, people's expressed interest in an activity or the likelihood of their engaging in the activity during a free-choice period was lower after they did the activity for some extrinsic reward than when they did the activity for no reward. MOTIVATION A N D BEHAVIOR Before going on to related studies, it is necessary to make the point that Scott continually confuses behavior with intrinsic motivation. This is to be expected since Scott's behavioristic position, with its metatheoretic assumptions, fails to recognize the importance of internal states as casual elements in understanding behavior. So long as he continues to ignore the importance of understanding the motivational determinants of behavior, he will continue to confuse behavior and motivation. In the same vein, Scott confuses behavior motivated by intrinsic motivation with behavior motivated by extrinsic motivation. First he talked of certain classes of reinforcers decreasing the probability of certain classes of behaviors. My studies have not attempted to deal with the effects of extrinsic rewards (or reinforcers, if one prefers) upon the likelihood of behaviors per se. They have dealt with the effects of extrinsic rewards on the internal state called intrinsic motivation. It is true, of course, that this internal state, in turn, will motivate behavior, but one must keep the internal state distinct from the behavior that it motivates. Further, one must distinguish a behavior when it is intrinsically motivated from the same behavior when it is extrinsically motivated. Let us imagine a behavior-say, playing a flute. Suppose that behavior is intrinsically motivating for a person who does it often simply because she enjoys it. If someone offers to pay her for playing the flute and she agrees to play for the money, we cannot say that she is doing it because

N O T E S ON I N T R I N S I C M O T I V A T I O N

139

she is intrinsically motivated. In the presence of extrinsic rewards one cannot be sure to what extent the person is intrinsically motivated; therefore, to say that extrinsically rewarded behavior is a reflection of intrinsic motivation is misleading. Throughout the critique, Scott referred to the behavior of puzzle-solving as if it were synonomous with intrinsic motivation to solve the puzzles. They are not synonomous. Intrinsic motivation for puzzle-solving is an internal state that may motivate that behavior; however, the occurrence of the behavior when a person is receiving extrinsic rewards for doing it does not necessarily imply that the person is intrinsically motivated. In discussing the three-session paradigm study (Deci, 1971), Scott mentioned that while subjects were being paid they "showed increases in behavior presumed to reflect intrinsic motivation." The point is that the behavior at that point was being extrinsically motivated. Subjects were being paid one dollar per puzzle solved, so when they were left alone before attempting two puzzles from which they could earn two dollars, they worked on the puzzles. Of course they would do that; practice increases their chances to earn the desired two dollars. This behavior, therefore, cannot be assumed to reflect their intrinsic motivation. Only when they behave at a time when the behavior is not instrumental to getting extrinsic rewards can we assume that the behavior reflects their intrinsic motivation. To summarize, my studies that Scott criticized have shown that certain extrinsic rewards decrease people's intrinsic motivation. In his criticism Scott confused this internal state with behaviors. Only when they are understood as separate will we be making headway toward understanding these complex processes. Although the studies that Scott criticized used measures of intrinsic motivation as the dependent variable, it is interesting to note that other studies have shown different detrimental effects of extrinsic rewards. In discussing these other studies, I am not asserting that extrinsic rewards do not motivate behavior. There are countless studies spanning this century that indicate that extrinsic rewards (or reinforcers) motivate behavior. If people want rewards, and if certain behaviors are instrumental for getting those rewards, they will generally do those behaviors. The point, however, is that rewarding people extrinsically will, at the same time that it is motivating behavior, have certain unintended consequences. For one thing, it is likely to decrease their intrinsic motivation for doing those behaviors. Further, a recent study (Benware & Deci, 1975) has shown that paying subjects to espouse a communication that they believe in will lead them to believe in it less. Still other studies have shown that extrinsic rewards actually cause decrements in performance on activities such as recall and effective tutoring (Kruglanski, Freedman, & Zeevi, 1971; McGraw & McCullers, in press; Garbarino, in press).

140

EDWARD

L. D E C I

All of this opens up a host of fascinating questions. As I said, we know that extrinsic rewards can motivate behavior. Further, rewards will improve performance on some activities in some situations. However, we now are beginning to see that there are also situations in which the use of extrinsic rewards will decrease intrinsic motivation, change attitudes, and impair performance. Thus, even if we are concerned with performance, it now becomes important to sort out when extrinsic rewards enhance performance and when they are detrimental to it.

CONDITIONING TREATMENTS There are two other criticisms to be addressed before I turn finally to a short discussion of prescriptions. Scott asserted several times that during the experimental period of my experiments (Deci, 1971, 1972a), when half the subjects were being paid one dollar per puzzle solved and half were not paid, there were different conditioning treatments taking place. I understand Scott's assertion to mean that one group would have solved more or fewer of the puzzles than the other group or would have spent more or less time working on the puzzles during the payment period. Shortly I will present the appropriate data to show that neither was the case, but first I wish to point out that the logic of Scott's assertion is detrimental to his own point of view. I agree that successfully completing puzzles will tend to increase people's intrinsic motivation, since it makes them feel more competent and self-determining; failing will tend to decrease their intrinsic motivation, since it leaves them feeling less competent and self-determining (see Deci, 1975, for evidence of this). However, the results of my experiments showed that paid subjects had less intrinsic motivation than unpaid subjects. Using a functional analysis, the paid subjects should have performed better and, therefore, should have displayed more rather than less intrinsic motivation. Hence, Scott's implied alternative interpretation fails in that either paid subjects would have to do less well than unpaid subjects (a notion that is itself inconsistent with a functional analysis prediction) or else successful completion of puzzles during the "conditioning" phase would have to decrease rather than increase intrinsic motivation (which is counter to the data). In spite of the apparent inconsistency in Scott's logic, I do believe that the data about performance during the conditioning phase of the experiments are important, so I now shall consider those data. Elsewhere my colleagues and I (Deci, Cascio, & Krusell, 1975) presented data that showed there were no differences between the paid subjects and u ~ a i d subjects on the amount of time that they spent working on the puzzles during the experimental manipulation (what Scott called the "conditioning" phase of the experiment). This was true for the study employing

NOTES ON INTRINSIC MOTIVATION

141

TABLE 1 AVERAGE NUMBER OF CORRECT SOLUTIONS FOR PAID VERSUS UNPAID SUBJECTS DURING THE MANIPULATION PHASE OF TWO EXPERIMENTS Reference

Paid

Unpaid

P-U

Significance

Deci, 1971

3.33

2.67

.66

n.s.

Deci, 1972a

2.42

2.75

-.33

n.s.

the three-session paradigm (Deci, 1971) as well as the study employing the one-session paradigm (Deci, 1972a). The criticism that conditioning procedures- in the sense of number of correct solutions-may account for the differences in the dependent measures may be assessed in two ways. First, the average number of correct solutions during the manipulation phase will be compared for paid versus unpaid subjects. The data are shown in Table 1 and indicate that there were no differences between the paid and unpaid subjects. A second way to assess whether the average number of completed puzzles during the manipulation phase influenced the free-choice measure of intrinsic motivation is to correlate the average number of correct solutions in each cell with the average free-choice measure of intrinsic motivation for that cell. I shall do this for only the one-session paradigm study (Deci, 1972a), since there were 12 cells in that study but only two ceils in the three-session paradigm study (Deci, 1971). A positive correlation would suggest that the more correct solutions the subjects achieved, the more intrinsically motivated they would be. A negative correlation would mean that the fewer solutions the people got, the more likely they were to be intrinsically motivated. If there were a significant correlation, it would be troubling to my interpretation of the results, since it would represent a confound. The correlation between number of correct solutions for a cell and intrinsic motivation for that cell w a s . 14, which does not approach statistical significance. Thus, there is no indication that the results were due to what Scott referred to as differential conditioning. This does not mean that on an individual level there is no relationship between number of correct solutions and intrinsic motivation; it simply means that it was not systematically distributed in the cells in a way that would confound the data. Scott discussed at some length two studies by Harlow and his associates that investigated problem-solving behavior of monkeys. The results of these two as well as several other studies from the series (see Harlow, 1953, for a review) indicated that the introduction of an extrinsic reward disrupted performance. I shall not assert that these

142

EDWARD L. DECI

studies are direct evidence about the intrinsic motivation of humans. I did mention the studies in an early paper (Deci, 1971) as an indication that rewards may not work in as straightforward a way as reinforcement theory would have suggested. However, my orientation is an organismic approach to the study of human behavior, emphasizing human motivation, human affect, and human decision-making. I believe that the causes of behavior of human beings are different from the causes of behavior of subhuman species; therefore, I shall not deal with the Harlow data. Since there is a large amount of data beginning to accumulate on the effects of extrinsic rewards on the intrinsic motivation of humans, I believe that it will be more fruitful to concentrate on those data.

APPLICATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS Finally, I shall address the question of the implications and applications of the research on intrinsic motivation in reply to Scott's statement that I and my colleagues have a disturbing propensity to make prescriptive statements. Recently (Deci, 1975), I have discussed in some detail the application of this research to two kinds of applied settings: educational institutions and commercial organizations. In both kinds of settings there have been approaches that prescribe the use of extrinsic rewards and controls and others that prescribe the use of intrinsic motivational systems. In education they have often been referred to as traditional schools (extrinsic orientation) versus free-schools (intrinsic orientation). In management they have been referred to as scientific management (extrinsic orientation) versus participative management (intrinsic orientation). Realizing that this is a gross oversimplification and without going into this material, I want to make just two points. The prescription (supposedly couched in rather meaningless vernacular) that Scott quoted about structuring situations to elicit intrinsic motivation is from one of my papers (Deci, 1972b). Since intrinsic motivation is based on people's need to feel competent and self-determining, this need seems to relate closely to two fairly recent developments in organizational psychology. Participative management emphasizes employee participation in decisionmaking-this relates to one's needing to feel self-determining. Job enlargement, or job enrichment, programs emphasize the importance of designing jobs that are interesting and challenging as a means of motivating employees-this relates to needing to feel competent. In other words, my supposed meaningless prescription was an endorsement of the recent movement toward participative management and job enlargement. Both movements have substantial support from research studies, and both are being used more and more in American industry. My second point is that those of us who espouse an intrinsic-cogni-


143

tive-affective point of view are not alone in our offering of prescription. Functional analysis, to which Scott subscribes, has done its share. Reinforcement theorists regularly call for programmed learning, token economies, behavior technology, and so on. It is interesting to note that to a large extent these prescriptions come from metatheoretic assumptions rather than data. A recent and interesting paper by Levine and Fasnacht (1974) has discussed the use of token economies in education, concluding that they don't seem to work the way reinforcement theorists would have us believe. It seems to be the case that while token programs are in operation, they control behavior quite effectively. However, during times when these token programs are not operative, behaviors are as bad as or worse than they were before the introduction of the programs. This conclusion makes sense in light of the data that my colleagues and I have presented. In closing, I think that the question of using experimental results to make prescriptions is a difficult and tricky problem. Therefore, any prescriptions should be viewed as exploratory in n a t u r e - o f f e r e d to be tried and evaluated. When they work in a way that is predicted from theory and data, the theory becomes strengthened. When they do not, we need to investigate why not. At this stage of our work on the use of rewards, prescriptions should be considered e x p l o r a t o r y - w h e t h e r they be prescriptions from reinforcement theorists such as Scott or organismic theorists such as I.

REFERENCES Atkinson, J. W. An introduction to motivation. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964. Bem, D. J. Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 1967, 74, 183-200. Benware, C., & Deci, E. L. Attitude change as a function of the inducement for espousing a pro-attitudinal communication. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 271-278. Berlyne, D. E. Aesthetics and psychobiology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971. Calder, B. J., & Straw, B. M. The self-perception of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 35, 599-605. Connolly, K. J., & Bruner, J. S. (Eds.) The growth of competence. New York: Academic Press, 1974. De Charms, R. Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1968. Deci, E. L. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 18, 105-115. Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic reinforcement, and inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 22, 113-120 (a). Deci, E, L. The effects of contingent and non-contigent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation. Organ&ational Behavior and Human Performance, 1972, 8, 2!7-229 (b). Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum Publishing Corp., 1975. Deci, E. L., Cascio, W. F., & Krusell, J. Cognitive evaluation theory and some comments

144

EDWARD

L. D E C I

on the Calder, Staw critique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 81-85. Eden, D. Intrinsic and extrinsic rewards both have motivating and demotivating effects. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, in press. Elkind, D. Cognitive growth cycles in mental development. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 197l, 19, 1-31. Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957. Garbarino, J. The impact of anticipated rewards upon cross-aged tutoring. Journal of Personality and Social PsychologY, in press. Greene, D. Immediate and subsequent effects of differential reward systems on intrinsic motivation in public school classrooms. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1974. Greene, D., & Lepper, M. R. Effects of extrinsic rewards on children's subsequent intrinsic interest. Child Development, 1974, 45, 1141-1145. Harlow, H. F. Motivation as a factor in the acquisition of new responses. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1953, 1, 24-49. Hunt, J. M. Intrinsic motivation and its role in psychological development. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1965, 13, 189-282. Kagan, J. Motives and development. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, t972, 22, 51-66. Kruglanski, A. W., Alon, S., & Lewis, T. Retrospective mis-attribution and task enjoyment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 8, 493-501. Kruglanski, A. W., Freedman, I., & Zeevi, G. The effects of extrinsic incentive on some qualitative aspects of task performance. Journal of Personality, 1971, 39, 606-617. Lepper, M. R., & Greene, D. Turning play into work: Effects of adult surveillance and extrinsic rewards on children's intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 479-486. Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., Nisbett, R. E. Undermining children's intrinsic interest with extrinsic rewards: A test of the "overjustification" hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 28, 129-137. Levine, F. M., & Fasnacht, G. Token rewards may lead to token learning. American Psychologist, 1974, 29, 816-820. Lewin, K. The conceptual representation and measurement of psychological forces. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1938. McGraw, K., & McCullers, J. C. The distracting effect of material reward: An alternative explanation of the superior performance of reward groups in probability learning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, in press. Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960. Olds, J., & Olds, M. Drives, rewards, and the brain. In T. Newcomb (Ed.), New directions in psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965. Piaget, J. The origin of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press, 1952. Ross, M. Salience of reward and intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, in press. Scott, W. E. The effects of extrinsic rewards on "intrinsic motivation": A critique. Organizational Behavior and Human Pelformance, 1975, 14, 117-129. Simon, H. A. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. Psychological Review, 1967, 74, 29-39. Skinner, B. F. The steep and thorny way to a science of behavior. American Psychologist, 1975, 30, 42-49.


145

Tolman, E. C. Purposive behavior in animals and men. New York: Century, 1932. Vroom, V. H. Work and motivation. New York: Wiley, 1964. White, R. W. Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. Psychological Review, 1959, 66, 297-333.

REFERENCE NOTES t. Deci, E. L., & Cascio, W. F. Changes in intrinsic motivation as a function o f negative feedback and threats. Paper presented at the Eastern Psychological Association Convention, Boston, 1972. RECEIVED: February 1'975