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PSDOccasionalPaperNo.10

September1995

Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia

Jomo K. Sundaram, Khoo Boo Teik, and Chang Yii Tan

Public Disclosure Authorized

Public Disclosure Authorized

/5135

I

| I WorldBank The

PrivateSector DevelopmentDepartment

Private Sector Development Department Occasional Paper No. 10

Vision, Policy and Governancein Malaysia Jomo K. Sundaram, Khoo Boo Teik, and Chang Yii Tan September 1995

The authors gratefully acknowledgethe assistanceof Khoo Khay Jin, Henry Loh, and T, Rajayiayan Jn the preparationof this paper. This paper has been cleared for inclusionin the occasionalpaper series by R. Shyam Khemani,Manager,Competition& Strategy. The views expressedare those of the author(s)and sould not be attributedto the WorldBank. This paper forms part of a forthcomingvolume,Leila Fxischtakand zak Atiyas(eds.), "Governance,LeadershipandCommunication:BuildingConstituenciesfor EconomicReform."

The World Bank Private Sector Development Department

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Contents 1.

Introduction ....................................

.I .

The "Fifth Tiger?'?

.

2.

Governance Capacity and Vision

3.

Ethnicity and Class

4.

Political Economy under the Alliance, 1957-69

5.

Economic Adjustment and State Intervention: NEP, 1970-81.13

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1 3

.5 .9

NEP: Problems and Tensions .18 6.

Mahathir's Policies, Reforms, and Vision: 1981-83.21

7.

The Political Economy of Adjustment, 1985-66

.23

The Collapse of Commodity Prices.24 The Rise in Public Debt .25 Decline in Private Investment .27 Holding NEP in Abeyance.27 Responses to Adjustment ..

28

8.

Consolidation afterthe Crises: Vision2020......

9.

Conclusions

Bibliography

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31 35

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iii

.37

Al

1 Introduction The "Fifth Tiger?" 1.1 For much of the thirty-eight years since it gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957, Malaysia was regarded as a moderately successful, middle-income, commodity-producing, and net oil-exporting developing country. But the last eight years of uninterrupted high, export-oriented, and manufacturing-led economic growth, beginning in 1987 and averaging over 8 percent annually, has transformed Malaysia into a second-tier, newly industrializing country. Now ranked nineteenth among the world's industrialized nations, Malaysia has arguably become East Asia's "fifth tiger," after the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China), Hong Kong, and Singapore. 1.2 There are several remarkable features in this economic transformation. First, it seems to have started in the late 1980s, in the wake of Malaysia's severe economic recession of 1985-86 and some of its most intractable political crises. Second, the transformation is associated with the privatization, including economic liberalization, launched by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, previously regarded as a staunch ideologue of state economic intervention. Third, it appears to have been scripted to follow Mahathir's post-1990 National Development Policy, more popularly known as "Vision 2020," which captures Mahathir's hope of propelling Malaysia into the ranks of the developed countries by the year 2020. Fourth, the economic transformation features a regime "rolling back the frontiers of the state," in a Malaysian variation of the "strong state, free economy" model that was most emphatically advocated by Margaret Thatcher for the United Kingdom in the 1980s. In short, Malaysia's progress since the late 1980s appears to have been a composite of farsighted vision, firm economic adjustment, and high governance capacity.

I

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Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia

2 GovernanceCapacityand Vision 2.1 How might this Malaysian experience of economic recovery and transformation illuminate the junctures between the sociopolitical vision of a leader, the governance capacity of a state or regime, and the outcome of economic adjustment under stressful circumstances? It is the objective of this paper to provide some answers to this fundamental question. 2.2 We might first delineate how the concept of governance capacity is used in this paper, albeit without engaging in a theoretical exegesis of the concept. In principle, governance capacity denotes the ability of a state or regime to govern based on a claim to legitimate authority, which is acknowledged and accepted by the governed. Governance capacity may or may not be enhanced by the coercive (even repressive) capacity that all states and regimes retain, and the former should be differentiated from the latter. In practical terms, governance capacity refers to the ability of a state or regime to set, shape, offer, gain acceptance for, and implement its agendas-the social, economic, and political agendas, subject to variations or changes depending on circumstances that cannot be determined in advance. 2.3 It is assumed that social groups, vested interests, and political forces will exhibit a variety of responses to these agendas, including support, indifference, criticism, and rejection. Some of these forces may well contest the state or regime agendas with their own alternatives. Thus, a regime may be said to have a high governance capacity if it can consistently gain a sufficiently broad acceptance of its agendas in competition with the alternatives. In multiethnic societies with class divisions cutting across the ethnic groups (such as Malaysia), a regime's governance capacity probably hinges on its ability to promote its agendas as national rather than merely sectarian, or to frame its public discourses as universalizing instead of particularistic. This applies even if the agendas and discourses address limited ends or narrow interests (as, indeed, they frequently do). 2.4 A leader's "vision" may mean quite different things to different social classes and ethnic communities, reflecting competing, if not antagonistic, claims. Thus, acceptance of a leader's vision may be grudging or forthcoming depending on whether it can be shared rather than imposed. This may be critical when a regime undertakes a stringent program of economic adjustment, and can only promise the populace, or certain segments of it, future gain in exchange for immediate pain. 2.5 But governance capacity is not merely a function of persuasion and discourse. It is grounded in the performance of a state or regime, or its success or failure in carrying out policies, programs, and projects it is committed to implement. If an overarching policy with 3

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clearly established objectives and targets exists (such as Malaysia's New Economic Policy), a regime's governance capacity will be enhanced by their attainment; conversely, it will be impaired by inadequate performance (whatever its root causes may be). Similarly, vision endures and captivates to the degree that experience suggests that it works. 2.6 On the basis of the above understanding of governance capacity and vision, this paper provides a comparative study of two Malaysian experiences with economic adjustment. The first involves the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was promulgated in 1970, with planned implementation to extend until 1990. The second is based on Mahathir's policy initiatives and management of the economy, especially after 1986. Although Mahathir's premiership began in 1981, and several of his major policies were attempted between 1981 and 1985, this paper focuses on Mahathir's policy responses to the Malaysian recession of 1985-86, later consolidated after 1990, particularly in the form of Vision 2020. To set the stage for such a comparative study, the paper provides an overview of Malaysian society and political history and discusses the failure of the first postcolonial regime to solve critical problems of political economy in Malaysia's "race and class" society. 2.7 This paper seeks to demonstrate that while vision and governance capacity facilitate successful economic adjustment, their roles are neither fixed a priori nor unchanging in relation to economic constraints and political realities. It cautions against any mechanistic assumption that vision supplies a blueprint for adjustment, while governance ensures its implementation. It is hoped that the paper will illustrate that the Malaysian experience with NEP and Mahathir's Vision 2020 raise the general propositions that vision can be an outcome of economic failure as well as a precondition for successful adjustment, and high governance capacity facilitates, but is also constrained by, adjustment performance.

3 Ethnicityand Class 3.1 To help us understand and analyze these issues, it is useful to begin with a quick overview of Malaysian society and politics. Geographically, the country is made up of two major entities. There is Peninsular Malaysia-that is, the Malay Peninsula-which is contiguous with the land mass of Thailand to the north, and linked by a causeway to the island-state of Singapore to the south. The other region of Malaysia consists of Sabah and Sarawak on the northwestern flank of Borneo Island, the rest of Borneo being the small state of Brunei, and Indonesian Kalimantan. This region was once referred to as East Malaysia, but the name has been dropped from official use. The federation of Malaysia includes a total of thirteen states, with eleven states in 3.2 Peninsular Malaysia, which made up the Federation of Malaya until 1963. The Federation of Malaya merged with Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore in 1963 to form Malaysia. Singapore, however, separated from Malaysia in 1965 as a result of irreconcilable differences between the federal government of Malaysia and the state government of Singapore. 3.3 The population of Malaysia (excluding Singapore) was approximately 8.9 million in 1963, and has since grown to almost 20 million today. The population is composed of many different ethnic communities. Official classification divides the population between the Bumiputera, or indigenous, people of Malaysia and the non-Bumiputera, or nonindigenous people. By this classification, the Bumiputera consists largely of the Malays and the aboriginal groups in Peninsular Malaysia and the various "natives" of Sabah and Sarawak. The Sabah and Sarawak Bumiputera include numerous groups, such as the Kadazan, Murut, and Bajau of Sabah and the [ban, Melanau, Bidaiyu, Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit, Berawan, and Penan of Sarawak. The non-Bumiputera category chiefly refers to the Chinese and Indians, whose presence in Malaysia became significant with the waves of immigration from China and India, which were tolerated or encouraged by the British colonial administration, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 3.4 In recent years there has been an official tendency to differentiate the population along religious lines, the most important dividing line being that between Muslims and nonMuslims. Without exception, the Malays, including those of Sabah and Sarawak, are Muslims. There are sizable numbers of indigenous non-Malay Muslims in Sabah and Sarawak, as well as Indians and Muslims in Peninsular Malaysia, and a small number of Muslim converts of other ethnic backgrounds. Other Malaysians are classified or regard themselves as non-Muslims. 5

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According to the Constitution, Islam is the official religion of the country, but there is freedom of worship. These major ethnic and religious differentiations do not exhaust the cultural 3.5 complexity and diversity of Malaysian society. They do, however, crudely reflect the reality of Malaysia's pluralistic society, a characterization of Malaysian society that has been compelling for many observers because Malaysian social and political life appears to be overwhelmingly organized around this plural society and its trends of fluctuating interethnic competition, compromise, and conflict. Political parties are mainly ethnically based, all kinds of issues are readily "communalized," and political coalitions represent attempts at interethnic compromise. National economic, educational, and cultural policies, to take prominent examples, either explicitly or subtly discriminate on the basis of ethnic and religious differentiation. 3.6 Nevertheless, Malaysian social and political life is not-and historically, never was-exclusively determined by the realities of its plural society, as many analysts, viewing Malaysian society from this ethnic perspective, tend to insist. They overlook other features of postcolonial Malaysian society, which has deep class cleavages, for example, that are no less significant than the ethnic distinctions. 3.7 From the immediate post-World War II years until the late 1960s, the most important (Peninsular) Malaysian class and occupational divisions coincided with the main ethnic divisions. The Malay aristocracy was relatively small but influential, with members groomed by British colonialism to help run the state apparatus. The "commanding heights" of the Malaysian economy, which were unmistakably dominated by foreign nationals during colonial times, remained under foreign control after Malaysia's experience of political decolonization without economic nationalization. But this foreign presence was arguably less visible than that of the ubiquitous local Chinese capitalists. Some of the latter had comprador origins in colonial times, and most continued to be primarily engaged in commercial and financial pursuits, rather than industry. The working class was mainly composed of an urban, Chinese component, based in services and industry, and an Indian component, primarily engaged in public works and services. Among agriculturists there was a sizable group of Chinese squatterfarmers, but the Malay peasantry was by far the single largest component. Again, this summary of the structure of newly independent Malaysia does not reflect all the complexities of its class divisions. It merely seeks to show that postcolonial Malaysian society had an ethnic division of labor that reflected the classic, colonially bred pattern that was found in several other former British colonies. 3.8 Hence, before the 1970s, the class conflicts and ethnic tensions that arose from Malaysia's pluralistic society and ethnic division of labor combined to produce the major political crises of the Malayan and Malaysian states. Between 1948 and 1960, the state fought an insurrection led by the Communist Party of Malaya, composed mainly of Chinese communists, left-wing Malay nationalists, former wartime partisans, radical sections of the Chinese and Indian working class, and Chinese squatter-farmers. The insurrection was virtually defeated by a counterinsurgency program, officially called the "Emergency."

Ethnicityand Class

7

3.9 In the process of winning this victory, the state extended its writ in several ways. Its military was bolstered by the creation of a Malay "ethnic soldiery" (Enloe 1980). The Special Branch of its police was strengthened by the recruitment of anti-Communist Chinese officers (Zakaria 1978). The colonial state's bureaucracy was reestablished and gradually Malayanized. Perhaps the colonial state's coercive capacity was best illustrated by its forcible resettlement of about half a million (mostly Chinese) squatter-farmers in "new villages" (Loh 1988), the prototype for Vietnam's "strategic hamlets." 3.10 With the Emergency, the colonial state gained time to come to terms with a conservative Malay nationalist movement led by Malay aristocrats. It gained space for a multiethnic elite, led by Malay aristocrats and Chinese capitalists, to experiment with coalition politics in preparation for a new polity based on the electoral franchise and party politics. By 1957, the Alliance, a tripartite coalition of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), had been formed to govern a newly independent Malaya. The Alliance governed Malaya, and then Malaysia, for the next twelve years.

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4 Political Economyunderthe Alliance, 1957-69 4.1 During its tenure, the Alliance continued the colonial repression and police harassment of its class opponents, this time the parliamentary left, which included the Socialist Front, made up of a Chinese-majority Labour Party and the Malay-majority Partai Rakyat Malaya (PRM, or Malayan People's Party). But the Alliance did have wide electoral support. It won the 1959 and 1964 general elections, each time retaining a two-thirds majority in Parliament. (It also won the 1969 election but came to grief in the process, as will be discussed below.) 4.2 Its success rested on at least two major points relevant to this discussion. First, as the "party of independence," it had inherited the mantle of Malayan nationalism, which the radical anticolonialists forfeited in defeat. The mantle conferred a mandate to govern. Second, the Alliance's so-called formula of balancing Malay special rights with non-Malay citizenship and improving the Malays' economic position, while protecting the non-Malays' economic position, appeared to embody the kind of interethnic compromise and cooperation that a newly independent, multiethnic Malaya required. To that end, the Alliance consistently occupied the middle ground, offering and conducting itself as a coalition that had won support from all ethnic groups, unlike the extremist or chauvinistic opposition parties that were rather more captive to single, ethnic constituencies. In that sense, not only had the Alliance inherited a sophisticated military-police-bureaucratic apparatus left behind by the British, but it had also built up its own considerable governance capacity. 4.3 The Alliance's governance capacity grew increasingly tenuous as the 1960s wore on. The anticolonial and class struggle of the Emergency was followed by the ethnic recriminations that dominated Malaysian politics in the 1960s. Disenchantment with the Alliance grew with increasing unemployment, worsening income inequalities, and the regime's inability to stem increasing ethnic polarization. The poor and marginalized Malay peasantry expressed its dissatisfaction through the religious-nationalist idiom of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, or Pan Malaysian Islamic Party) (Kessler 1978). The Malay intelligentsia, middle class, and bureaucrats-led by some of the ruling UMNO's own politicians-were impatient with the Alliance's laissez faire, which left them commercially and financially well behind their Chinese counterparts, and Chinese capital in particular. Middle-class and working-class non-Malays considered themselves disadvantaged by the constitutional provision of certain "special rights" for the Malays. Those special rights entrenched the position of the Malay rulers, the Malay language as the national language, a preferential quota for Malay recruitment into the civil service, and, most important, enhanced state economic assistance for Malays, all in support of 9

in Malaysia 10 Vision,PolicyandGovernance their special position within the country. Between a Malay anxiety to protect their special positionfrom non-Malayencroachmentand a non-Malayinsistenceon a "MalaysianMalaysia," a chasm of interethnic recriminationwas created. The politics of the 1960s were increasingly characterizedby interethnic accusationsand chauvinisticbrinkmanship,most of all during the campaignfor the May 1969generalelection. The Alliance regime was committedto a policy of laissez faire, a pillar of the 4.4 independence compromise struck among British colonialists, the Malay aristocracy, and the Chinese capitalists. This meant a mild strategyin developmentalterms, perhaps matchingPrime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's reputed moderationin politics. The state urged plantationoriented agricultural diversification geared toward exports in commodity production and industrializationthroughlow-levelimportsubstitution.Neitherthreatenedforeigncapitalor local businesses. Rural developmentwas plannedto providebasic infrastructureto rural residents and to raise their productivity and income without land reform; in this way, politicallyinfluential landedinterestswere not offended. Under the circumstances,the Alliance's formulaof leaving businessvery much to 4.5 itself was disastrousin at least two major ways. First, it failed to meet the mass expectationsof improvementsin living conditions,expansionin economic opportunities,and greater scope for social mobility that were raised by decolonizationin Malaysia, as they had been elsewhere. Those expectationswere keenly felt among very broad sections of the Malaysian population when manufacturingemploymentand land developmentcould not keep pace with the growthof the labor force in the 1960s. Second, while staying out of business seemedconsistent with the "Alliance formula" and Tunku's vision of leaving "politics to the Malays" and "economicsto the Chinese," the policy sowed the seeds of its own destruction,proving to be unsustainablein the long run (Jesudason1989,pp. 47-75). A nascentMalay businessclass, a vocal Malay middle class, and a marginalized Malay peasantry could not accept "economics for the Chinese" (Mahathir 1970, p. 15), while a resentful non-Malaymiddle class and a repressed non-Malay workingclass rejected"politicsfor the Malays." When the May 1969 elections were contested in this conjunctionof ethnic and 4.6 class disaffection, the Alliance's middle ground partially collapsed, as the Islamic PAS, the "Malaysian Malaysia" Democratic Action Party (DAP),' and the social democratic Gerakan RakyatMalaysia(Gerakan,or MalaysianPeople's Movement)made substantialelectoral gains.2 UMNO lost eight of its fifty-nine parliamentaryseats, while the MCA lost fourteen out of twenty-seven. The losses were insufficientto topple the Alliance, but enough to damage the "consociationalism"of its ethnic elites. Perhaps the overall result did not justify the desperate anger of UMNO's Malay supportersor the reckless exuberance of the non-Malayopposition parties' followers,but on May 13, only two days afterthe elections, KualaLumpurwas engulfed by interethnic violence. The May 13 incident, Malaysia's crisis of decolonization,ended the 1 DAP, widely perceivedas a Chineseparty, advocateda "MalaysianMalaysia"platform that opposedethnic privileges. Since the 1970s. DAP has won mostof the urbannon-Malayparliamentaryseats,makingit the most importantoppositionparty. 2 The most complete account of the May 1969 election and the ensuing violence, from a point of view sympatheticto the Alliance, was given by Von Vorys 1975.

PoliticalEconomyunder the Alliance, 1957-69 11 Tunku regime. Using emergency powers, Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak convened a National Operations Council (NOC) and became its director. While the new regime had token representation from the Chinese (MCA) and Indian (MIC) partners of the Alliance, in reality, Razak; select UMNO leaders; and the chiefs of the Malay-dominated army, police, and bureaucracy ruled Malaysia, while the newly elected Parliament remained suspended.

12 Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia

5 EconomicAdjustmentand State Intervention: NEP, 1970-81 5.1 We need not rehash the many administrative details regarding NOC's bout of authoritarian but effective rule, which lasted until March 1971. But it is essential to note that NOC showed that the state's governance capacity was equal to the crisis (Von Vorys 1975). NOC was immediately able to confine the violence to Kuala Lumpur and to end the uprising within a matter of weeks. Within months it had reestablished a semblance of normalcy in Kuala Lumpur and in the rest of the country. Within one and a half years it had restored parliamentary rule, albeit by strengthening the Sedition Act, which reduced the scope of parliamentary immunity for debates on sensitive issues-constitutional provisions pertaining to the Malay rulers, Malay language, Malay special rights, and non-Malay citizenship. 5.2 More pertinently, within a year, the state was able to promulgate NEP. NEP's premises were that poverty, Malay resentment of interethnic income and wealth inequalities, and the ethnic division of labor lay at the heart of the mass dissatisfaction with the Tunku regime that exploded in May 1969. To overcome those problems, NEP had two objectives: "poverty eradication irrespective of race" and "restructuring to abolish the identification of race with economic functions." For poverty eradication, NEP's "Outline Perspective Plan 1970-90" proposed a decline in the poverty rate from 49 percent in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 to 16 percent in 1990. Restructuring was intended to raise the Bumiputera share of corporate equity from 2.5 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990. And in seeking to "eliminate the identification of race with economic function," NEP proposed a massive affirmative action program that would favor Bumiputera and limit non-Bumiputera access to tertiary education and civil service employment. 5.3 Malaysia's economic planning has traditionally been carried out in five-year increments. Accordingly, NEP's implementation began with the first post-1969 plan, the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75. But the full elaboration of NEP also involved subsequent plan documents, up to the Fourth Malaysia Plan. In the process, NEP encompassed several major developments. 5.4 First, although restructuring had officially been promoted as an exercise to redress interethnic imbalances-principally by redistributing corporate wealth ownership as well as employment-it became, in practice, a huge social engineering project that altered the class structure of Malaysian society. It accomplished this primarily by sponsoring the rise of a Malay 13

14 Vision,Policyand Governancein Malaysia capitalist class, which has come to be known in recent years as the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC). NEP-sponsored Malay capitalists have variously been called statist capitalists, because of their bureaucratic associations and reliance on state power and patronage (Jomo 1988); distributional coalitions, for their involvement in powerful rent-seeking ensembles (Mehmet 1986); and ersatz capitalists, because of their orientation toward short-term accumulation rather than long-term industrial development (Yoshihara 1988). Second, the state radically reversed the Alliance's policy of leaving economics to 5.5 private capital. Laissez faire was replaced by growing state intervention in the economy. Allocations for public sector expenditure vastly increased during the NEP years. Compared with the RM 4.6 billion allocated under the pre-NEP First Malaysia Plan (1966-70), the allocation for the first NEP five-year plan (the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75), was RM 10.3 billion (Jomo 1990, p. 106, Table 5.1). In the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) the allocation rose to RM 31.1 billion, while in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85) the figure was RM 48.9 billion (Jomo 1990, p. 106, Table 5.1). Indeed, total public expenditure as a proportion of GNP rose from 28.7 percent in 1970 to 61.2 percent in 1982 (Mehmet 1986, p. 133, Table 6.1). 5.6 The state also entered businesses in a large way, seeking to expand public sector ownership of corporate equity and to build up state-owned business enterprises. The state's enlarged role in business spawned a proliferation of public enterprises. The number of public or state-owned enterprises grew from 22 in 1960, to 109 in 1970, to 656 in 1980, and to 1,014 in 1985. The early NEP period was the heyday of state agencies, banks, and funds that sought and held equity in trust for the Bumiputera.3 Some of the best known of these were Bank Bumiputera Berhad, PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional, or National Corporation), PNB (Permodalan Nasional Berhad, or the National Equity Corporation), ASN (Amanah Saham Nasional), UDA (Urban Development Authority), MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat, or the indigenous People's Council of Trust), and the SEDCs (state economic development corporations). Such a proliferation of public agencies required an expansion of public sector employment, which grew, excluding military and police personnel, from 139,476 employees in 1970 to 521,818 in 1983 (Mehmet 1986, p. 9, Table 1.3) 5.7 Third, the state became a determined regulator of business, mostly local Chinese enterprises, although foreign companies operating in Malaysia were also affected. The state strengthened its regulatory powers through the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 and the establishment of the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) to ensure compliance with NEP's restructuring requirements. In practice, this meant a quota of at least 30 percent for Bumiputera equity participation and employment in companies covered by the ICA (Jesudason 1989, pp. 12847). ICA, originally applicable to any manufacturing firm with RM 100,000 or more in shareholder capital and employing at least twenty-five workers, was unpopular with non-Malay (including foreign) businesses. It was especially irksome to local Chinese business, which considered itself to be the ICA's main target. The ICA gave the minister of trade and industry tremendous discretionary powers over licensing, ownership structure, ethnic employment, product distribution quotas, local content, and the pricing of products (Jesudason 1989). 3For

a critical analysis of what Malay trusteeship involved, see Mehmet 1986 (pp. 6-11, 132-54).

EconomicAdjustmentand StateIntervention: NEP, 1970-81 15 5.8 Given the interethnic violence that prompted its response, the state was very careful in its ideological presentation of NEP. Razak, Tun Dr Ismail, Ghazali Shafie, and their colleagues, who crafted NEP, offered a vision of achieving interethnic economic parity in order to attain genuine national unity, which had eluded the Alliance.4 5.9 They justified NEP as a policy to correct the Malays' historical "backwardness" in relation to the non-Malays. Restructuring, then, was unavoidable, and socially desirable and just, but they reassured the non-Malays that it would be carried out in an expanding economy so that there would be no sense of deprivation among the non-Malays. NEP's restructuring actually targeted increases for both the Malay and non-Malay shares of corporate wealth-at the expense of the foreign share. 5.10 Was this a shared national vision rather than an imposed ethnic perspective? It would be unsatisfactory to give a categorical or static answer to this question. Inadequate as it may sound, the answer is: probably a little of both. Insofar as a comprehensive response to a national tragedy tends to contain a shared or universalizing potential, most sections of the Malaysian nation (with differences, most certainly) could accept the rationale for NEP for national reconstruction. Therein lay NEP's bonding, or shared, qualities. Whatever one's notions of social justice or interethnic relations, there was no mistaking that 13 May 1969 had brought Malaysian society to a watershed. Tunku, nominally still prime minister in 1969-70, had been sidelined while NOC ruled. The Alliance regime and what it stood for were things of the past, a reality capped by Tunku's retirement in September 1970. Something akin to NEP in its capacity to redelineate the politico-economic parameters of Malaysian society would have had to have been invented even if NEP had not been promulgated in 1970. NEP, when it came, had the advantage of being a visionary and comprehensive response to national trauma: it supplied a diagnosis, imposed a treatment, and specified a period of recovery. 5.11 But NEP's discrimination also had to be imposed by law and admninistrativefiat, because its ideological justification remained flawed. At a general level, the Malays applauded restructuring as affirmative action, while the non-Malays tended to resent it as ethnic discrimination. At the level of party and coalition politics, only the UMNO politicians and Malay bureaucrats were really persuaded by NEP's "national unity" rationale. Most would concede that NEP contributed to ethnic polarization in later years, but UMNO's non-Malay political partners, who claimed to support NEP in principle, were also apt to complain about its overzealous implementation, leaving others to wonder about their commitment to NEP. In the sphere of commerce, Malay businesses and regulators tended to think of corporate restructuring as interethnic sharing, while non-Malay businesses were more likely to regard it as unwarranted control. 5.12 In other words, there were discernible divergences in the way NEP's vision was perceived. NEP's architects stressed its national unity objectives, its (Malay) beneficiaries In pursuitof national unity, NOC also proffered a national ideology, the Rukunegara,but it never quite caught the public imagination. It was the bread-and-butterNEP-and mostly restructuring-that has generatedthe fervorof both NEP supporters and detractors. 4

16 Vision,Policyand Governancein Malaysia supported its remedial features, while those (non-Malays) adversely affected protested its discrimination. These divergences in perception were partly occasioned by the impact of the politico-economic adjustment that NEP entailed, which has been succinctly summarized by Khoo Khay Jin (1990, p. 50): Whatever the sources of inspiration for NEP, it spelled a new phase in Malaysia's development, overturning the relationship between state and economy and recasting the balance of power within the "pact of domination." NEP spelt the end of an alliance between the Malaysian state and private capital in which the state was content to support the efforts of private accumulation, both local and foreign, restricting itself to limited programs aimed at ameliorating rural discontent and the frustrations of a rising Malay intelligentsia. Instead the roles were to be reversed with the state playing the leading role and laying down the agenda with private capital in tow. The choice of this particular alternative expressed primarily the demands of the Malay business and intelligentsia network, many of the latter being in bureaucratic positions, who wanted the state to be interventionist in favor of 'Malay' interests. To the degree that state power depended upon its ability to command votes in the countryside, where poverty levels were atrocious, the policy also expressed incorporating intentions towards such strata, primarily the peasantry. In power terms, it spelled a shift of power to technocrats and bureaucrats. In implementation, it was geared towards the utilization of state resources to sponsor a Malay capitalist class. In realization, it assumed in large part the form of public corporations acquiring assets for and on behalf of Malays and run by political appointees and bureaucrats. Under the circumstances, several factors were crucial to NEP's acceptance and 5.13 viability. Politically, the "NEP state" had to maintain a high level of governance capacity. Economically, NEP years had to show demonstrable success. Administratively, the bureaucrats and technocrats to whom power had shifted had to be able to deliver on NEP promises. In hindsight, the Razak and Hussein Onn administrations succeeded on all three counts. Consequently, they were able to ensure that NEP's radical adjustment was executed in the "power," "implementation," and "realization" terms mentioned in the passage quoted above. NEPs acceptance came almost by default. Politically, there was no room for 5.14 oppositionist objections to NEP's promulgation, because NEP was formulated when NOC ruled, and P.rliament, or politics, was suspended. But Razak envisioned a political corollary to NEP's socioeconomic restructuring that would enhance his regime's governance capacity. After the May 1969 election unveiled wide pockets of anti-Alliance disaffection, Razak moved to co-opt the major parties, which had capitalized on that disaffection. In Peninsular Malaysia, these were the PAS, which ruled Kelantan, and Gerakan, which held the state government of Penang. Razak had the foresight and diplomatic skills to restructure the old Alliance's interethnic, elitist, consociational framework into a much broader, power-sharing, Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front). A number of smaller parties traded their opposition for a small voice in the Razak administration. Consequently, BN embodied a wide spectrum of political parties. DAP was left isolated as the only significant opposition party. At the same time, BN's power-sharing

EconomicAdjustmentand StateIntervention: NEP, 1970-81

17

was predicated on an UMNO dominance far exceeding the party's preeminence in the old UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance. UMNO's position (indeed, its hegemony) in BN became the sine qua non of a much more Malay state, one that was more consistent with NEP's Malay orientation. BN succeeded the Alliance and has ruled Malaysia to this day. 5.15 Public debates over NEP were sometimes acrimonious. Nevertheless, two general aspects of those debates underscore how well received NEP actually was. On the one hand, criticism, including non-Malay criticism of NEP, as suggested earlier, was almost entirely confined to disagreement over the details of its implementation. It very rarely questioned NEP's premises and objectives. If anything, criticisms of that kind typically began with an endorsement of NEP in principle. On the other hand, there emerged what one might call a quota fixation, which dominated the public psychology and political imagination of the time. Both sides of the Malay-non-Malay divide appeared to fasten their sights on increasing or protecting their quotas in education, employment, and business, submitting, consciously or otherwise, to NEP's restructuring discourse. As a result, alternative views of remaking or reforming the Malaysian political economy that refused to accept NEP's parameters appeared to be unrealistic and nonpragmatic, and failed to move beyond the fringes of public debate and consciousness. Unsavory though it was, the quota fixation showed how successfully the NEP state's governance capacity had dictated the parameters of public debate over its sociopolitical agenda. 5.16 Economically, the 1970s coincided with Malaysia's discovery of offshore petroleum and an international commodities boom, both of which bolstered state revenues. In 1970 Malaysia became a net oil exporter for the first time. Petroleum exports grew from RM 203 million in 1970, to RM 861 million in 1975, and to RM 6,709 million in 1980. Malaysia's petroleum exports peaked at RM 9,683 million in 1985 before the collapse of oil prices in 1986 brought the export value down to the 1980 level (Jomo 1990, p. 54, Table 3.10). The value of Malaysia's nonpetroleum commodity exports rose from RM 4.96 billion in 1970, to RM 8.37 billion in 1975, and RM 21.46 billion in 1980 (Jomo 1990, p. 54, Table 3.10). 5.17 On the strength of these sharply increased petroleum and commodity receipts, the state was able to finance its intervention in the economy without imposing undue stress on the national budget or the country's balance of payments. State-led demand and public enterprise investments during the first NEP decade helped to maintain the economy's growth rate at a consistently high level. The average real annual GDP growth rate for 1970-80 was 7.6 percent. The average annual growth rate for the Second Malaysia Plan period of 1971-75 was 7.3 percent, while that for the Third Malaysia Plan period of 1976-80 was 8.6 percent. Employment expanded steadily, rising from 4.0 million in 1970 to 4.8 million in 1980. The unemployment rate declined from 7.8 percent in 1970 to 5.7 percent in 1980. Per capita income rose from RM 1,100 in 1970 to RM 3,700 in 1980. 5.18 The high growth rates seemed to vindicate the NEP architects' scenario of an expanding economy in which all communities could share. Sheltering under the BCIC umbrella, Malays already in business or aspiring to business were nurtured on easy credit, reserved government contracts, reserved corporate shares, access to restricted business licenses, and other forms of preferential treatment. It was not just the Malays who benefited from the economic

18 Vision,Policyand Governancein Malaysia opportunities NEP opened up for them. Many well-connected Malays and non-Malays formed "Ali Baba" joint ventures, whereby the Malay partner ("Ali") secured the necessary contracts, licenses, and the like controlled by the state, while the Chinese partner ("Baba") supplied the finance, expertise, and, all too often (so it was charged), the real work itself. Whether more genuine interethnic cooperation in business-avoiding the "sleeping (Malay) partner" syndrome-could have been fostered by NEP during that first decade is debatable. But under heady conditions of high growth, unlimited opportunities, and quick profits, it did seem as if restructuring, or interethnic redistribution, could be carried out without causing too much of a sense of deprivation among the non-Malays. 5.19 At the same time, the state apparatus vigorously pursued its administrative implementation of NEP. Staunch advocates of restructuring in the late 1970s, such as Mahathir (then deputy prime minister) and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (then finance minister), did not balk at the implications of a single-minded remaking of Malaysian, and especially Malay, society. Mahathir, for example, viewed with equanimity the massive rural-to-urban migration of young Malays, whether into the civil service, educational institutions, or factories. Razaleigh readily employed state resources to buy into, buy out, or start companies that were pivotal to securing Bumiputera control of the "commanding heights" of the economy. The state also strove to lure foreign (manufacturing) investment into newly created free trade zones (FTZs). The state's foreign investment incentive package of cheap industrial land; good physical infrastructure; nonunionized, low-wage labor; pioneer status; and export tax and other incentives helped to launch a successful wave of export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Whatever the costs or other benefits of this FTZ-based EOI program might be, it was important to the state because it opened up mass factory employment opportunities for young Malays (especially young Malay women) in a modem and expanding sector of the economy that-unlike the traditional, local, Chinesedominated sector-was amenable to fulfilling the employment quotas required by ICA. This was one very visible aspect of NEP's intention to "abolish the identification of race with economic function." At the same time, but at a higher and more rewarding level, at least for its participants, the state enlarged its corps of Malay graduates and professionals. It accomplished this by the establishment of new state universities and all-Malay residential schools and colleges at home, and generous financial support to send tens of thousands of young students and midcareer officers to overseas universities. This was the heyday of the bureaucrats and technocrats. With single-minded vision, technical planning, and virtually unlimited expenditure on physical and social infrastructure, they seemed to have proven themselves equal to the tasks of poverty eradication, restructuring, and abolishing the identification of race with economic function.

NEP: Problemsand Tensions 5.20 To say that NEP gained a wide measure of acceptance is not to overlook several problems and tensions that arose from its implementation. A number of difficulties emerged in the first half of NEP's two-decade span, but intensified during the second half, as well as when worsening economic conditions exposed the inefficiency of the bureaucracy and the limitations of state intervention and undermined the governance capacity of the Mahathir regime.

EconomicAdjustmentand State Intervention:NEP, 1970-81 19 worsening economic conditions exposed the inefficiency of the bureaucracy and the limitations of state intervention and undermined the governance capacity of the Mahathir regime. First, it was well known that the public enterprises (PEs) were, on the whole, 5.21 economically inefficient. Their poor management, rapid expansion (for example, into new business areas), and lack of accountability led to heavy losses. In 1984, for instance, only 269 out of more than 900 PEs submitted their annual returns to the Ministry of Public Enterprises, recording a collective accumulated loss of RM 137.3 million (Supian 1988). Ideologically, the PEs were too willing to consider themselves as social enterprises and to rationalize their losses as the price to be paid for Bumiputera advancement and learning. Second, there was something of a parting of ways between what is commonly 5.22 identified as a Malay public sector and the non-Malay (mainly Chinese) private sector. This was partly a result of the state's strong interventionism, and partly because of the post-1969 rupture in relations between the state and (Chinese) private capital. The public sector generally regarded the private sector as rapacious, while the private sector considered the public sector to be inefficient and incompetent. Most non-Malay businesses resented the heavy hand of state regulation. Local Chinese capital tended to adopt a short-term investment outlook, preferring to concentrate their investments in nontradable sectors, especially property and construction (Jesudason 1989). Some foreign investors were probably discouraged from investing because of restructuring and other measures of the ICA (Marican 1987). Third, the relatively easy access of Malay business to credit and contracts, their 5.23 high failure rate in spite of the advantages, and the frequency of Ali-Baba arrangements caused concern that Malay businesses were becoming too accustomed to handouts, bailouts, and subsidies. The majority of Malay professionals, trained at state expense, looked to the state for employment. There were suggestions-some of the most pointed coming from Mahathir-that excessive state protection and preferential treatment had fostered a dole mentality that rendered too many Malays dependent and noncompetitive, thus defeating the NEP goal of creating a BCIC that could hold its own with the non-Malays.5 Fourth, there was a tension between NEP's poverty eradication and restructuring 5.24 objectives. In ethnic terms, few state-supported programs of "poverty eradication irrespective of race" were designed to serve the non-Malay poor, whether in the rural or urban areas; the official assumption was that poverty was predominantly a rural Malay condition.6 There was also a steady shift in emphasis from poverty eradication to restructuring, which benefited the new politically and bureaucratically well-connected Malay businesses disproportionately (Jomo and Ishak 1986).

MahathirMohamad,"Speechat the Pemudaand WanitaUMNOGeneralAssembly,"KualaLumpur,25 June 1981(reprinted in HarunDerauhand ShafieNor 1982).

5

For a BN component party's views on the plight of the mainly Chinese "new villages," which were poor but bypassed by official rural development efforts, see Partai Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia 1986. 6

20 Vision,Policy and Governancein Malaysia 5.25 Fifth, there was a persistent tension between growth and distribution. Some critics maintained that NEP's restructuring retarded the country's growth, although it is virtually impossible to prove whether the high-growth 1970s would have seen even higher growth without NEP's interethnic distribution. But even UMNO and Malay business circles-generally those most devoted to restructuring-began to show a polarity of opinion between pro-growth and prodistribution advocates when the national economy began to falter in the early and mid-1980s.7

7 For a candid and insightful analysis of this growth versus distributionsplit among Malay political and business circles, see

Marican1987.

6 Mahathir'sPolicies,Reforms,and Vision: 1981-83 6.1 The Mahathir era began when Mahathir succeeded Hussein Onn as prime minister in July 1981, about midway in NEP's two-decade Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) period of 1970-90. The problems of NEP, outlined above, were well-known to Mahathir. He also would have known that a potentially divisive and bitter interethnic accounting on the attainments or shortcomings of NEP could take place as the end of NEP drew nearer. Mahathir stood in an unusual position in relation to NEP. When it was formulated in 1970, he was in a kind of political wilderness. He had lost his parliamentary seat in the 1969 election, and had been expelled by UMNO in late 1969 for openly blaming Tunku for the May 13 violence. Yet the general public impression, gained from following his controversial career as a Malay nationalist and reading his book, The Malay Dilemma, was that Mahathir was NEP's ideological soul. He had advocated state-managed social engineering to restructure Malaysian society to promote economic advancement of the Malays. In government, since his 1974 appointment to the Razak cabinet he had consistently defended NEP, although he had his own reservations about the ICA and Malay economic performance. 6.2 Early in his term in the prime minister's office, Mahathir appeared to have a socioeconomic agenda that differed in focus and priorities from NEP's core concerns. Apart from reassuring everyone that NEP would be continued and fairly implemented, he proposed a starkly novel agenda for the nation. In short, he wanted a nationalist-corporatist venture to transform Malaysia into a newly industrializing country. He wanted his cabinet to provide leadership by example, the people to "Look East" to emulate an Eastern work ethic, the bureaucracy to become "clean, efficient and trustworthy," the public and private sectors to cooperate in a "Malaysia Incorporated," and the economy to move ahead on the basis of privatization.8 He committed the state to heavy industrialization through joint-ventures with Japanese and Korean manufacturers of automobiles, motorcycle engines, steel, and cement. 6.3 Mahathir's early economic policies and bureaucratic reforms came so quickly that, initially at least, what he was aiming for was not altogether clear to a lot of Malaysians. It was generally acknowledged that he had a modernizing vision and a nationalist mission. The bureaucratic reforms were just beginning, and his anticorruption campaign seemed less than wholehearted. But to a public long weary of bureaucratic ills, his reformism was welcome. To a s "Leadershipby example,""Look East," "Eastem work ethic," "Clean,efficient,and trustworthy,""MalaysiaIncorporated," and "Privatization"were all catchwordsand slogansassociatedwiththe earlyMahathirpolicies,examinedat lengthin KhooBoo Teik 1995.

21

22 Vision,Policyand Governancein Malaysia public used to political detention without trial, his release of many political prisoners seemed quite liberal, although a battery of repressive legislation remained. Even his rather undiplomatic "buy British last" campaign and his spuming of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Melbourne in 1983 evinced some national pride in being able to stand up to the West. In sum, Mahathir, and his deputy, Musa Hitam-both former rebels against Tunku in 1969-managed to weave a populist, dynamic, reformist, and liberal aura over their "2-M (Mahathir-Musa) administration." Vision, aura, persuasion, and leadership: these were critical, if intangible, factors in the enhancement of the early Mahathir regime's governance capacity, as demonstrated by the incorporation of Anwar Ibrahim, president of ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia), into UMNO, and BN's strong victory in the 1982 general election.9 In those early years Mahathir conducted himself as if he had all the answers to the 6.4 problems spawned by NEP. His bureaucratic reforms seemed to speak to the issues of bureaucratic ineptitude and lack of fiscal discipline and accountability. Privatization, still in its infancy, appeared as an answer to the perennial losses of NFPEs and offered a way to distribute state assets to able and successful Bumiputera entrepreneurs. "Malaysia Incorporated" proposed to mend the rift between the public and private sectors now that there was a nationalist mission to accomplish. The work ethic, at once Eastern and Islamic, stressed the need for hard work and self-reliance and was offered as the corrective to Malay dependence. Exhortations do not ordinarily mean much in politics, but Mahathir's exhortations were backed up by his bureaucratic reforms, industrialization drive, and Islamization projects (including the establishment of an Islamic bank and an Islamic university). These actions did much to prepare Malaysian society for change and adjustment under his leadership. By and large, Mahathir brought home the themes of change, adjustment, and innovation to many Malaysians in small, but personal, ways: for example, setting Peninsular Malaysia's time back by a half-hour to synchronize with Sabah's and Sarawak's and installing a punch-card system in all government departments. He had imposed a new agenda and a national purpose that was different from the old concerns of NEP, and moved toward the attainment of "NICdom." It is critical to appreciate and remember this because, ironically, the Mahathir regime's governance capacity was soon to be tested fully.

he tried to reduceduringthe 9 Without this, Mahathirmightnot havelockedhornswith the Malayrulerswhoseprerogatives constitutionalcrisis of 1983. Thecrisis ended in a stalemate,but Mahathirtook advantage of more favorablecircumstancesto gain a major victoryover theMalay rulersin 1992-93.

7 The PoliticalEconomyof Adjustment,1985-86 The Malaysian economy began to slide into recession at about the time Mahathir 7.1 Perhaps Mahathir and Finance Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah came to power. underestimated the impact of the recessionary global economy on the national economy, or perhaps they took no chances with the 1982 general election. In any case, they responded to the recession by countercyclical spending through increased public sector consumption, investment, and employment. The economy had a mild recovery in 1983, but by 1985 it had fallen into a much worse recession, which lasted until 1986 (Table 1). There were at least three major components to the 1985 recession-a global collapse in commodity prices; a sharp rise in public, especially foreign, debt; and a substantial decline in private investment. Table1: Macroeconomic Indicators,1973-93 ringget) (million Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Fixed ca.ptItaformation Public Private 1,203 1,644 2,110 2,505 3,078 3,419 4,135 5,338 7,206 11,378 12,521 12,046 10.854 8,639 7,271 7,946 11,097 13,283 14,749 16,653 18,632 22,340

2,908 4,154 3,492 3,701 4.387 5,058 6,701 9,559 12,044 11,367 12,692 13,345 12,270 10,226 11,009 13,976 18,966 24,207 31,432 34,044 36,836 40,224

Consumption /GNP 74.53 78.73 69.90 71.47 73.08 67.02 71.33 76.11 74.88 72.44 69.20 72.54 72.63 66.81 67.45 69.23 69.60 72.30 67.98 64.68 63.28

Investment /GNP 26.52 25.93 22.96 24.03 24.53 25.15 30.19 34.72 38.11 38.48 34.23 32.13 28.18 24.46 25.56 31.09 33.85 37.38 36.14 34.88 35.13

Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years.

23

Exports/ GNP 50.51 47.08 53.84 52.20 53.70 60.27 61.65 54.44 53.35 54.62 58.20 59.11 60.20 68.03 71.62 77.73 80.12 85.37 82.15 83.74 85.32

Imports/ GNP 50.27 46.61 42.98 44.39 47.71 50.31 57.73 60.87 62.49 60.72 56.15 53.59 53.68 52.98 60.64 71.15 78.04 91.55 80.33 78.65 80.19

Real GNP growth 7.67 2.22 11.42 7.47 6.59 7.76 8.55 7.23 10.16 3.86 6.69 -1.26 2.70 5.41 9.45 9.13 11.29 7.46 7.55 8.70 8.57

Inflation 10.5 17.4 4.5 2.6 4.8 4.9 3.6 6.6 9.7 5.7 3.7 3.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 2.5 2.8 3.1 4.4 4.7 3.5 3.4

24 Vision,Policy and Governancein Malaysia The Collapse of Commodity Prices Practically all of Malaysia's major commodities showed huge declines in earnings 7.2 by the mid-1980s (Table 2). With crude petroleum prices having fallen from US$36.5 a barrel in 1980 to US$14.7 a barrel in 1986, an even higher volume of petroleum exports earned less in 1986 than earnings in 1980. Palm oil earnings fell from RM 4.5 billion in 1984 to RM 3.0 billion in 1986. The tin industry in Malaysia had virtually collapsed by late 1985, when the International Tin Council Buffer stock manager ran out of money to maintain tin prices. The value of Malaysia's tin exports in 1986 barely exceeded 25 percent of the 1980 figure. Table 2: Unit Prices of MajorCommodities, 1970-92 Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Rubber (sen/kg) 128.1 105.0 95.1 153.0 183.9 138.8 192.4 204.4 223.1 271.5 302.7 250.0 192.7 234.4 230.8 191.8 209.9 241.6 326.3 265.6 229.1 237.6 227.8

Tin (RM/tonne) 10,938.7 10,394.4 10,311.9 11,000.6 17,671.3 15,473.9 18,724.5 25,610.0 28,800.8 32,111.2 36,048.7 32,182.2 30,543.1 30,070.5 29,351.5 28,711.4 16,086.2 16,907.4 18,625.4 23,463.3 17,118.4 16,126.3 15,962.0

Sawlogs (RM/m3) 72.3 73.2 64.9 97.5 107.9 79.1 120.9 113.4 99.6 108.2 172.7 155.5 175.3 149.9 165.7 141.2 150.8 186.5 195.0 206.4 198.5 212.2 214.8

Palm oil (RM/tonne) 657.5 663.5 520.3 584.7 1,204.1 1,136.9 914.6 1,292.6 1,235.3 1,300.4 1,152.7 1,131.1 973.4 1,015.6 1,524.6 1,226.2 696.6 802.8 1,089.6 944.9 776.6 906.8 974.1

Petroleum (RM/tonne) 43.1 49.2 52.4 70.4 214.0 226.9 244.6 258.8 245.5 350.1 597.6 682.4 642.6 553.4 529.6 520.8 287.4 349.5 307.4 370.2 481.2 451.2 405.0

Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, September 1993.

During this period, the government authorized increased timber extraction, given 7.3 that sawlogs were the only primary commodity to sustain its prices. In addition, contractual exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Japan, which had begun in 1983, grew in volume despite lower prices. These two exceptions to the general decline in commodity export earnings eased an otherwise (for Malaysia) unprecedentedly severe recession. The overall effect of the commodities collapse on export earnings and state 7.4 revenues was tremendous. Optimistic after a threefold increase in export earnings between 1975 and 1980, Malaysia's economic planners had forecast total export earnings of RM 63.1 billion in 1985; the actual figure turned out to be only RM 37.6 billion!

The PoliticalEconomyof Adjustment,1985-86 25

The Rise in PublicDebt 7.5 Malaysia's public debt rose sharply during the first half of the 1980s. It had begun to rise in the 1970s as a result of deficit spending associated with NEP's implementation (Table 3). As real interest rates increased in the early 1980s (beginning from 1979 with the Volcker-induced deflationary liquidity contraction), Malaysia borrowed heavily from abroad. The Mahathir administration probably thought that it could spend its way out of the international recession. Much of its countercyclical spending came in the form of Isi Penuh (a massive civil service recruitment exercise), an expansion of NFPE activities (particularly those related to the heavy industrialization drive), and the commencement of some large-scale projects in infrastructure and heavy industry. One other factor was responsible for the rapidly escalating foreign component of the public debt-the sizable appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar following the G-7 Plaza Accord of 1985. 7.6 Total public debt, which stood at RM 34.16 billion in 1981, rose to RM 46.18 billion in 1982, RM 57.83 billion in 1983, RM 66.73 billion in 1984, RM 72.43 billion in 1985, and RM 87.06 billion in 1986, before it fell to RM 82.43 billion in 1987 (see Tables 4 and 5). The federal government foreign-debt-servicing ratio alone rose from 4 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 1984, and to 39 percent in 1985 (although this last figure included some major loan prepayments).10 Table3: FederalGovernmentSurplus/Deficit,1975-93 (millionrlnggit) Year 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Revenue 5,117 8,841 10,926 13,926 15,806 16,690 18,608 20,805 21,114 19,518 18,143 21,967 25,273 29,521 34,053 39,250 41,231

Operating expenditure 4,900 8,041 10,040 13,617 15,686 16,671 18,374 19,806 20,066 20,498 20,185 21,812 22,982 25,026 28,296 32,075 32,315

Development expenditure 2,113 3,699 4,151 7,331 11,135 11,189 9,416 8,074 6,756 7,521 4,741 5,231 7,696 10,689 9,565 9,688 9,921

Total expenditure 7,013 11,740 14,191 20,948 26,821 27,860 27,790 27,880 26,822 28,019 24,926 27,043 30,678 35.715 37,861 41,763 42,236

Overall deficit -1,896 -2,899 -3,265 -7,022 -11,015 -11,170 -9,182 -7,075 -5,708 -8,501 -6,783 -5,076 -5,405 -6,194 -3,808 -2,513 -1,005

Overall deficit/GNP (%) 8.8 8.4 7.6 14.2 19.9 18.7 14.0 9.5 7.9 12.7 9.1 5.9 5.6 5.6 3.1 1.8 0.6

Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years.

1I For an extended analysis of Malaysia's fiscal and debt problems of the 1980s, see Jomo 1990 (pp. 166-200).

26 Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia Table4: Total PublicSectorDebt, 1975-93 (millionringgit) Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Domestic debt, percent of total debt 75 71 73 72 72 72 67 63 60 58 57 54 66 71 73 74 74 78 80

Domestic debt 8,927 10,573 12,709 14,074 16,744 19,206 22,929 29,305 34,612 38,773 41,510 46,960 54,796 63,097 65,763 69,988 73,654 76,083 78,402

External debt 3,013 4,312 4,740 5,439 6,636 7,264 11,231 16,873 23,215 27,592 30,918 40,102 27,629 25,922 24,182 24,726 25,418 20,922 19,834

Extemal debt, percent of total debt 25 29 27 28 28 28 33 37 40 42 43 46 34 29 27 26 26 22 20

Total debt 11,940 14,885 17,449 19,513 23,380 26,470 34,160 46,178 57,827 66,725 72,428 87,062 82,425 89,019 89,945 94,714 99,072 97,005 98,236

Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various years.

Table5: OutstandingExternalDebt, 1981-93 (millionringgit)

Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Federal govemment debt 8,278 13,158 17,728 20.848 23.070 28,310 27,629 25,922 24,182 24,726 25,418 20,922 19,362

Governmentguaranteed debt 3,071 3,715 5,487 7,105 12 ,02 7 a 14,585 a 16,771 a 16 , 183 a 1 3 ,2 76 a 11,819 11,657a 11,401 a 16 ,5 16 a

Public sector debt 11,349 16,873 23,215 27,953 35,097 42,895 44,400 42,105 37,458 36,545 37,075 32,323 35,878

Private sector debt 4,019 7,410 8,600 9,665 7,210 7,474 6,289 4,868 4,680 4,943 6,713 10,464 14,875

Total debt 15,368 24,283 31,815 37,618 42,307 50,369 50,689 46,973 42,138 41,488 43,788 42,787 50,753

Federal debt, percentage of GNP 15 23 28 28 32 43 41 30 25 22 21 15 12

Public debt, percentage of GNP 21 29 36 38 49 66 64 49 39 33 30 23 23

Total debt, percentage of GNP 28 42 49 51 59 75 68 55 44 37 35 31 32

Note: These figures include drawings from the IMF facility in federal government debt and are thus higher than the Ministry of Finance figures. *: NFPEs only from 1985. Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report, various years.

The PoliticalEconomyof Adjustment,1985-86 27 Decline in Private Investment 7.7 Total private investment declined from RM 13.3 billion in 1984 to RM 10.1 billion in 1986 (Table 1). Foreign corporate investment alone fell from a high of RM 3,262 million in 1982 to RM 2,926 million in 1983, RM 2,138 million in 1984, RM 1,725 million in 1985, and RM 1,262 million in 1986. Private investment as a proportion of GNP fell from about 19.0 percent in the 1979-84 period to 14.0 percent in 1987. The decline in foreign and domestic investments continued until after 1987, when tightening labor costs, loss of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) privileges, and rising production costs brought East Asian newly industrialized country (NIC) investment into Malaysia. Holding NEP in Abeyance 7.8 After fifteen years of continued high growth, the economy contracted by 1.0 percent in 1985 and managed to register a meagre 1.2 percent growth in 1986. Per capita GNP, having peaked at RM 4,800 in 1984, fell to RM 4,600 in 1985, and to RM 4,100 in 1986, before rising to RM 4,500 in 1987. This time around (1985-87) there was no countercyclical spending to cushion the recessionary effects. If anything, Mahathir and his new Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin (who had been appointed to replace Razaleigh in 1984), imposed heavy restraint on most public spending. The federal government's development expenditure was severely reduced-the 1987 development expenditure of RM 6,673 million was just over half the 1983 figure of RM 11,670 million (Table 4). Increases in operating expenditure were stringently held down, mostly by means of a job and wage freeze. Besides HICOM (Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia), which was engaged in Mahathir's heavy industrialization projects, the PEs were subjected to tighter budget constraints, greater monitoring, privatization, and even closure. 7.9 The Mahathir-Daim regime of fiscal austerity and contraction in state expenditure contained bitter medicine for several groups. Unemployment shot up from a low of 5.0 percent in 1982 to 8.6 percent in 1987, and the total number of unemployed doubled between 1982 and 1986. For the first time since the expansion of the universities under NEP, graduate unemployment, of Malay graduates in particular, became a serious problem. Bankruptcy became frequent among businesses dependent on state support and contracts, with the hardest hit the smaller Malay companies. These were mostly contractors whose main source of business had long been government contracts and jobs. Not only was there a reduction of allowances for senior bureaucrats, but these bureaucrats, along with those running the PEs, were publicly criticized and ridiculed for low productivity and inefficiency, and some were told to resign if they could not improve their performance. 7.10 Amid such economically difficult conditions, and facing widespread criticism over financial scandals and political crises, Mahathir led the BN to another victory in the August 1986 general election. A detailed analysis of that victory, and of UMNO's landslide triumph against PAS (eighty-one out of eighty-two contests), is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it

28 Vision,Policyand Governancein Malaysia to say that rising interethnic tensions, the prospects of a big DAP gain (which materialized), PAS's poor electoral campaigning, and Mahathir's political skills kept UMNO's Malay constituency loyal to the party. Mahathir apparently considered this electoral triumph as a popular vindication of his policies. Before the election in 1986, he had initiated several measures to stimulate growth. 7.11 Guidelines for foreign equity ownership in manufacturing were liberalized in July 1985. The ICA was amnendedin December 1985 to make it easier for manufacturers to start new projects, expand their capacity, or diversify their products. In May 1986 the Promotion of Investments Act provided additional tax incentives for manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism. The state also launched a New Investment Fund to allocate funds at preferential interest rates for new projects in these three sectors. With his August 1986 electoral victory, Mahathir was ready to unveil the most drastic of his counter-recessionary measures-the suspension of NEP's restructuring objective, or what he called keeping "NEP in abeyance." At the end of September 1986, he announced a set of new, more liberal conditions 7.12 for foreign equity and expatriate staffing in an effort to attract new foreign investment. A company that exported at least 50 percent of its output or hired at least 350 Malaysian workers would be permitted to hold whatever level of foreign equity it requested. The only major stipulation was a requirement that employment in new foreign ventures should approximate the ethnic composition of Malaysia, and Mahathir promised foreign investors who committed investments between I October 1986 and 31 December 1990 that they would not be required to restructure their equity at any time. Mahathir knew that placing NEP in abeyance could be politically risky. He 7.13 justified it on entirely pragmatic grounds: without new investments, there would be no employment; without growth, there could be no distribution. The liberalization of foreign equity ownership in September 1986 was followed by another amendment to the ICA so that only firms having more than seventy-five workers or RM 2.5 million in paid-up capital had to comply with the ICA requirements." This was a major concession in NEP implementation to benefit local Chinese capital. Thus, the fiscal adjustments induced by the recession eventually led to deregulation, economic liberalization, and a virtual end to state intervention.

Responsesto Adjustment How was the overall adjustment-deregulation package received? There appear to 7.14 have been no clean class or monolithic ethnic cleavages in the response. Labor was generally too weakly organized and too divided to mount a coherent opposition to Mahathir's initiatives. Workers in a sector such as tin mining, which had been virtually shut down, or employees in the FTZs, which were effectively prohibited from unionizing, were not in a position to respond to the finance minister's call for a voluntary three-year wage freeze (without a concomitant price 1 Until the December1985amendment,ICA requirementscoveredfirms employing more than twenty-five workersor having

RM 250,000in paid-upcapital. The December1985amendmentraisedthe minimumnumberof workersto fifty and the paid-up capital to RM I million.

The PoliticalEconomyof Adjustment,1985-86 29 freeze) in October 1986. One segment of labor that still had some bargaining power was CUEPACS, the Congress of Unions of Employees in the Public and Civil Services. For some time since Mahathir had become prime minister, CUEPACS had demanded a pay revision for government employees. After rounds of inconclusive negotiations, with the state intransigent and CUEPACS mildly threatening industrial action, the government decided not to run the risk of offending one of the state's traditional electoral bases before an impending general election. In 1985 a 6 percent wage increase was granted to about 800,000 category C and D employeesthat is, those on the lowest two scales of the civil service. 7.15 The urban non-Malay middle class had mixed reactions. It had been extremely discontented with the Mahathir administration's handling of several financial scandals-the major ones involving Bumiputera Malaysia Finance (BMF), Pan Electric Industries (PanEI), Maminco, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), and Makuwasa. It had expressed its disaffection during the August 1986 election, sweeping DAP into most of the large, urban, nonMalay constituencies. But as a class, it was relatively well-insulated against the (relatively shortlived) recession. It was not unfavorably disposed toward deregulation, suspension of NEP restructuring, privatization, and economic liberalization because it had long resented bureaucratic power, ineptitude, and shortcomings. For the urban non-Malay middle class, privatization, deregulation, and reduced state intervention implied fewer restrictions and greater opportunities. Holding NEP in abeyance had symbolic significance as well, given the non-Malay middle-class grievances against NEP's ethnic discrimination. 7.16 Local capital, especially Chinese, generally welcomed the deregulation. The "NEP in abeyance" policy immediately satisfied their long-standing opposition, to the ICA in particular. Mahathir and Daim's firmness in reducing state expenditure and debt, holding down wage levels, and reducing state intervention went down well with both local Chinese and foreign capital. Significantly, most of the larger and more successful Malay capitalists were not necessarily opposed to deregulation, especially those who gained from privatization. For those who had been groomed and protected by the state, but had succeeded and become economically more resilient, growth had a higher priority than distribution. They saw NEP's protection of the Malays as less critical than the need to counter the negative impact of excessive intervention and regulation in economic performance. 7.17 This left essentially two social groups, who arguably lost the most from the Mahathir-Daim adjustment policies. One group comprised mainly small to medium-size Malay businesses badly affected by the contraction in state expenditure and the shortening of their lifeline of state contracts, finance, and assistance. This group of businesses saw the narrowing of state patronage as cronyism, and blamed Daim. The other group mainly consisted of middleranking bureaucrats and PE managers, whose base in government and the PEs had been eroded. This group was more staunchly in favor of redistribution, and continued to press for a continuation or even an extension of NEP restructuring. One observer noted that relaxations on foreign investment, equity conditions, and the ICA, as well as the "strong undertaking to promote economic growth came as a major shock" to these groups of Malays (Marican 1987, p. 10).

30 Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia

8 Consolidationafter the Crises: Vision 2020 During the period from 1987 to 1990, a good part of disenchantment with 8.1 Mahathir's adjustment policies was mediated through UMNO itself, and expressed in the form of Razaleigh's initially strong, but ultimately unsuccessful, challenge to Mahathir's leadership of the party and, by extension, of the nation. In the wake of this challenge and other opposition to the major policies of the Mahathir regime there were three major political crises: the mass arrest of opposition politicians, nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives, and other dissidents in October 1987; the High Court declaration that UMNO was an illegal party in February 1988; and the sacking of the lord president of the Supreme Court in mid-1989. But Mahathir weathered all those political storms, and by the time he led BN into general elections for the third time, in October 1990, his position had been well consolidated. In November 1990 BN once more gained a comfortable electoral victory. By then, however, the "politics of economic adjustment" had ended. The year of 8.2 1987 still saw modest economic growth of 5.2 percent, but from 1988 to 1990 there was an average annual growth rate of over 9 percent. Part of the turnaround arose from improved commodity prices and increased commodity export earnings, which climbed to RM 28.97 billion from RM 23.93 billion in 1985. By 1990, the value of manufacturing exports had risen to RM 48.05 billion from RM 12.47 billion in 1985, an average annual increase of 31 percent (Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1993). Manufacturing employment grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent between 1986 and 1990. The previous trend of declining private investment was reversed. In manufacturing alone, the proposed capital investment of all industrial projects approved for 1990 was RM 28.17 billion, compared with RM 5.69 billion in 1985. Foreign investments in approved industrial projects amounted to RM 17.63 billion in 1990, compared with RM 959 million in 1985. The principal sources of these post-1986 investment inflows were Taiwan (China),'2 Japan, and Singapore, economies that were prompted to relocate some of their manufacturing activities because of rising production costs, tightening labor markets, and stricter environmental restrictions at home. Such considerations would have combined with a post-1986 investment regime of liberal equity requirements, easier start-up conditions, substantial ringgit depreciation, and lower labor costs to make Malaysia an attractive site for industrial relocation.

12 Total investment from Taiwan (China) in Malaysia during the Fifth Malaysia Plan period of 1986-90 reached RM 9.58 billion. For 1990 alone, Taiwanese investment was RM 6.34 billion, compared with RM 32 million in 1985. See Malaysia 1991b ( p. 133, table 4.6).

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32 Vision, Policyand Governancein Malaysia 8.3 From the point of view of understanding vision acceptance and governance capacity in relation to structural adjustment and economic reform, the fact and scale of Malaysia's dramatic economic turnaround are far more important than whether one can disaggregate the differential effects of home-based factors as opposed to Mahathir's policies on the decisions of foreign investors. Mahathir could well claim that he and Daim contained the recession by their austerity drive, boosted foreign investment by suspension of NEP, and stimulated economic growth by their reliance on the private sector. Certainly he would have considered the expansion of the manufacturing sector to be a sign that his vision of NICdom was not far from being realized. 8.4 The empirical evidence of a strong post-1987 economic performance would have been enough to vindicate Mahathir's policies, not just in his own eyes, but in public perception as well. Mahathir had previously justified his adjustment policies on the entirely pragmatic grounds of reversing recession and stimulating growth. The rationale for holding NEP in abeyance was different from the National Development Policy (NDP) promulgated after 1990. But some of the administration's convictions and assumptions, particularly those associated with deregulation, economic liberalization, and privatization, were retained as major components of an ideologically more coherent and more assertive Mahathirist vision, now known as Vision 2020. 8.5 NEP was promulgated with a two-decade span for achieving its poverty eradication and restructuring targets. Notwithstanding some problems engendered by NEP, or the suspension of NEP itself in 1986, both NEP objectives and targets had been substantially attained by 1990. Despite some controversy over official data, the incidence of poverty had declined from 49 percent in 1970 to about 17 percent, according to official statistics. Despite a similar controversy over the extent of Bumiputera equity, there had also been an increase of the Bumiputera share of corporate equity, from 2.5 percent in 1970 to at least (and probably considerably more than) 20 percent in 1990. Bumiputera companies, including some state agencies and funds, now controlled the "commanding heights" of the Malaysian economy. Bumiputera professionals, who made up less than 5 percent of major professional categories in 1970, constituted over 29 percent in 1990. The working class in the modern manufacturing sector probably best reflected the ethnic composition of the labor force. Whatever one's position on NEP might have been, it had been a success by the standards it set for itself. 8.6 It was with that kind of an assurance that on 28 February 1991, Mahathir presented a working paper-"Malaysia: The Way Forward"-to the Malaysian Business Council, a newly formed, sixty-two-member body comprising the state elite and captains of commerce and industry. Mahathir's inaugural speech unveiled his socioeconomic agenda for the nation, which was later elaborated as the NDP associated with the post-NEP Second Perspective Plan, 19912000, released just before the Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991-95. But Mahathir's post-1990 agenda has been more popularly known as Vision 2020. 8.7 Vision 2020 seeks to propel Malaysia into the ranks of the developed countries by the year 2020. This ambitious objective is to be attained through a combination of intensified industrialization, increased productivity, enhanced managerial ability, improved technological proficiency, heightened competitiveness, and corporatist cooperation between the state and the

Consolidationafter the Crises: Vision2020

33

private sector. Strategically, Vision 2020 relies on export-led growth, direct foreign investment, privatization, deregulation, and promotion of small-scale industries. Politically, it also talks of national unity, but veers away from the narrower ethnic concerns of NEP. For Vision 2020 to be attained, the Malaysian economy must fulfill a targeted average annual growth rate of 7 percent between 1990 and 2020. This was a realistic target, Mahathir declared, given that the Malaysian economy had grown by an average annual rate of 6.9 percent in the preceding twenty years. Soon after 1990, NEP's catchwords were no longer heard. High growth and 8.8 expanded economic opportunities have relegated the 1980s' ethnic disputes to obscurity.'3 The NFPEs have lost their influence; the social enterprises that once aggressively carried out restructuring have been superseded by the private enterprises now aggressively pursuing profits. The state has put itself "out of business" and has turned to private capital with touching faith. Now Vision 2020's catchwords are dominant: free enterprise, market forces, productivity, Vision 2020 already seems to have gained a competitiveness, excellence, and so forth. generalized acceptance within Malaysian society. It was never absolutely clear that NEP would come to an end in 1990 and be superseded by an overarching successor policy. Perhaps the "grandiose" and "universalizing" Vision 2020 fulfilled, and thereby profited from, long-felt social desire for, and expectations of, a new foundation for a post-1990 Malaysian society. When Mahathir's reforms, policies, and pet projects first appeared, they were sometimes greeted with skepticism. When deregulation was initiated, it met opposition. It has been entirely different with Vision 2020. Almost no one greets it with derision, and one finds no trace of an alternative or competing agenda being offered for public debate. In that sense, Vision 2020 benefited from one unimpeachable factor: the 1985-86 recession was relatively short, and the recovery was dramatic. In the end, probably nothing breeds acceptance better than success.

13 Except for Sabah,where the rise of a Kadazanculturalnationalistmovementdefied Mahathir's attemptsto defeat it until just after the February1994 Sabahstate election.

34 Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia

9 Conclusions 9.1 Of our two Malaysian experiences of structural adjustment-that is, NEP and Vision 2020 (or the reversal of NEP)-the 'visionary" aspect of NEP appears, at first glance, to have been the stronger. Then, in 1970, there arose a dire political need for a vision of a reconstructed, post-1969 Malaysia. Then vision preceded and laid the foundation for economic adjustment, principally in the form of state intervention in pursuit of interethnic redistribution. There is no need to repeat our discussion of the role governance capacity played in getting NEP accepted, although not without reservations and differences. It is possible to argue that it was partly the failure of governance in handling state 9.2 intervention and public sector expansion during NEP's first fifteen years that precipitated the economic and political crises and generated the need for the structural adjustment policies of 1986. Public enterprises are not preordained to fail, as their record in Malaysia's neighbor, Singapore, shows. But too many of Malaysia's PEs, established in the name of NEP and interethnic restructuring, were badly managed or provided a license for inefficiency, political patronage, or corruption, with little regard for accountability, profitability, and budgetary discipline. Malaysia's bureaucracy has neither been a model of efficiency and competence, nor an appalling example of hopeless ineptitude. It could be more accurately characterized as having vacillated among different levels of competence and ability-between rising effectively to NEPs targets and falling into the PEs' insolvency. Seen in terms of administrative capability, the governance capacity of the Malaysian state has, at most, been inconsistent-buoyed by favorable economic conditions, but threatened in the face of recession. 9.3 In contrast, perhaps, executive capacity to initiate policies and program-visionbuilding-has been rather more apparent, whether in the aftermath of the violence of 13 May 1969, or when faced with the recession and crises of the mid-1980s. In the latter instance, particularly in relation to post-1990 policy, it would seem that Vision 2020 attempts to consolidate the relatively successful policy adjustments around 1986, when Mahathir took the bold step of suspending NEP. If one views it from that viewpoint, then Vision 2020 seems less like a new initiative than an afterthought, a fate accompli, which consolidated rather than prescribed the success of Mahathir's economic adjustment.

35

36 Vision, Policy and Governance in Malaysia

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38 Vision,Policyand Governancein Malaysia Kamal, Salih and Zainal Azman Yusof. 1989. "Overview of the New Economic Policy and Framework for the Post-1990 Economic Policy." Maalaysian Management Review 24 (2): 13-61. Kershaw, Roger. 1989. "Within the Family. The Limits of Doctrinal Differentiation in the Malaysian Ruling Party Election of 1987." Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 23: 125-93. Kessler, Clive. 1978. Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Khoo, Boo Teik. 1995. Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Khoo, Kay Jin. 1992. "The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernization." In Joel S. Kahn and Loh Kok Wah, eds., Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia. Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia and Allen & Unwin. Khor, Kok Peng. 1983. The Malaysian Economy: Structure and Dependence. Kuala Lumpur: Maricans. Loh, Kok Wah. 1980. "Beyond the Tin Mines: The Political Economy of Chinese Squatter Farmers in the Kinta New Villages, Malaysia". Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Mahathir, Mohammad. 1981. 'Speech at the Pemuda and Wanita UMNO General Assembly." Kuala Lumpur, 25 June 1981. Reprinted in Harun Derauh and Shafie Nor (1982), Mahathir: Cita-cita tan Pencapaian. Kuala Lumpur: Berita. -.

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Bibliography 39 Von Vorys, K. 1975. Democracy Without Consensus. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. World Bank. 1983. Malaysia: Structural Change and Stabilization. Washington, D.C. Yoshihara, Kunio. 1988. The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Zakaria, Haji Ahmad. 1978. "The Bayonet and the Truncheon: Army/Police Relations in Malaysia." Journal of Asian Affairs 3 (2):103-26.

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