Public Disclosure Authorized
Counry Ecnom'am DQaarnent TheWorldBank may 1990
Public Disclosure Authorized
Public Disclosure Authorized
Public Disclosure Authorized
Civil Service Reform and the World Bank Barbara Nunberg and JohnNellis
Somearguethatthecomplexityand uncerainty of civilsavice refonn place the fieldoutside.he Bank's comparativeadvantage. But a retreat from civil servicemanagementreform is tantamountto denying the crucial importance of government capacityto implementeconomicand socialproadminisu'ative grams. A more realistic approachis to ty to learn, through tir and error,how to makesuchprogramswork better. Po dni_n a _ d PREWagi P,pL to*&vwmhUw duvu_ u- EaiAni Affasaan The Pa.b'. R. ,a pmumsn_ papmcam o uG U aN urn _do ewd 8 o f _, thu A = WGI,. ThmrEN._ Msrnin. ad A .iin. aW n aN.M b Ua MMM dirn Of0r a ? M = W |dB _ un W _m amL d u lmNd4 OuW b_m _ to d Wm T%p dm _m_*>>
pub" S_at mOaement wedPrIvateSeegaOevei*meni
This paper - a product of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Division. Country EconomicsDepartment-- is partof a larger effort in PRE to assess the Bank's accomplishments. problems,and pmspects in the field of public sector management An earlier version of the paper was presented at a December 1989conference on "lstitutional Developmentand the World Bank." Copies are available fre from the World Bank, 1818 H Sret NW, WashingtonDC 20433. P¶easecontact Rose Malcolm. rmomN9-055, extensionJ7495 (50 pages with tables). After rviewing civil service refomnwork in the Bank. Nunberg and Nellis reach certain conclusions: The impact of Bank pgrams to contain the cost and size of civil services thrugh emergency reform of pay and employmentpolicies has so far been negligible. Reform efforts have not been ambitious enough; meaningful change wiU require more foreful reform. Middle-range measurs such as voluntary departure schemes and eardyrtirment prgrams are useful but ar not a substitute for biting the bullet. Whedtr mot aggressive rforn is feasible is parly a technical but mainly a political issuc But in the few countries where reform has been carried out the political costs were lower than most govemmnents(pettaps even the donors) expected. This may have been partly because of the surprising capacity of labor markets to absorb surplus governmentworkers and panly because of the skillful handling of reforn. Functional reviews and competency testing prmvidesymbolic assurancethat the reform prcess will be fair. Retraining.redeployment. credit, and public works programs for rdundat employees ar symbolicallyand politically effective but have limited practical impact and are administraively diffiCUlt The Bank should no longer encourage or support mechanisms such as topping up executive-level salaries for key govermmentposts unless such incentive schemes are part of an acticn strategy for long-term structural reform.
twice he present amount of staff supervision and specialized expertse. Such technical assistance ans require mor time to prepar and implement than do infrm projecs. Tey often get shor, shrift strcu because of their dependence on the scheduling and requirementsof structual adjustnent lending. On the other hand, without SALs, many civil service reforms in TALs have no teeth Most Bank activities have concentrated on shor-term cost-containmentmeasues. More emphUsismust be given to longer-tern management issues if sustainedimprovement in govemment administrativecapacity is to take place. More atention must be placed on devising a cohernt overarching strategy and detailed tactics for civil service reform. Some argue thauthe complex and uncertain nature of civil service reforn places the field outside the Bank's comparaEiveadvantage. They argue that the Bank should confine itsclf to helping define economicollyrtional policies, such as the appmpriate.affordable size of the wage bill. But the Bank cannot identify the need to remove X thousand surplus personnel and assume that thejob of removing them will be carried out by the governmentor a bilateral donor. The ctallenge for the Bank is to design projects that have measurableshort-run costcontainmentgoals but realize them in the context of a strategy to solve the fundamental managementproblems in the long run.
Technical assistance loans (TALs) for civil service management should probably provides andExtcmraa ThePRE WortkingPapa Senes dissaninmaesLherlndingso( work underway in the Bank'sPolicy.Resex&ch.
eLndinp . out quickly. even if premntaions e le thanfuliy X Affas Comptel. An obcuve of he x n ts sswet andconclusions n thm papmdo not nenarily r-pucsntozTicial8aitkpoitcy. potishL fLT findings.niuprtaui Producd u the PRE DiOninasbn Ceaw
Civil Service Reformand the World Bank by Barbara Nunberg and John Nellis
Table of Contents
Part A. Pay and Employment Reform: -Thort.TermIssues
The Problem: Analytic Approaches
Recent Bank Operational Experience in Civil Service Reform
Cost Containment: Operational Approaches to Pay ane dVmployment Reform - A Progress Report
Impact of Cost Containment Refornm
Part B: The Long View: Civil Service Management
Components of Rationalist Reform Efforts
Implementation Issues and Lessons in Development Management
Part C: Conclusions
* With the contribution of Louis de Merode (AF1PS) and research assistance by Meera
0UDNEAND S WOtN
The emphasisplacedby the World Bank in recentyears on the major overhaul of devloping country economies has accentuated the importance of adequate public sector admistrative capacity,espe:ially within the central core4.&government, that is, the civil service. Incr:esingly, the abilityof civil servicesto carry out the critical -- mach less the routine-- functionsof governmenthas been found severely deficient. Purthermore, the size and cost of many civil services have been de4med excessive and have thus become key targetsof adjustment. In a real sense, this growing concern vith containingthe size and improvingthe performance of the civil servicesignifiesnothing lessthan the redimensioning' of the state, reflecting a fundamental shift in the direction of the BDank's own policies. The new visdom is to 'ma=nagelose -- but better. This paper surveys recent Dank experiencein civil service reform, and begins to assese the progressmade. To the extent that conclusionsabout 'right" and 'wrogg strttegiescan be reasonably drawn, soo guidance is offered, with the caveat that it. is too early to offer definitive policy prescriptionsin this area. Most operationaland evn policy work on these issues is still at an incipliatstage,of a duration of a few years or less. The papor focuses on two separatebut related aspects of civil service refom work in the Bank. One deals with the shcrter-term, emergency steps to refora public pay and employment policies. These reforms usually focus on measurec to contain tho cost and size of the civil service, mostly in the context of structuraladjustmentlending. The other set of reforms are those dealing vith longer-range civil servicestrengthening efforts,some of which may support variouc of the nearer-teorcost containmentmeasures,but most of which are directed toward ongoing, sustained maagement improvements. Many of these reforms have been included in technical assistance projects -- either those that standalone as 'development management' operations or those that constitute direct institutional support for specificactions taken in SALs. Many of the issues discussed in the paporhave been the subjectof earlier World Bank reviews. 1 Material from these analyses is synthesized and updated where data permit. In particular, some of the papor'sconceptsand much of its findings stem from researchcurrently being conducted by the Africa Technical Department (Public Sector Management Division) for a study, *Public Sector Pay
Sm. Geoffrey Lamb, Institutioral fofarn: Som Lesons from Structural Adjustment Lnding,' 1984; and. Berbera unberg, 'Publc Sctor Pay and EmpIoymnt Rdefors,eWorld Bnk Disusslon PoPw' No. 68. 1989; add eRvlw of Public Sector Managementissues In SUructural Adjustment LondIng, World Bank PREWorking Par, fortrio.ling 1990.
and Imploymnt Reform in Africa,
forthcomling in 1990.
The organizationof the paper is as follows:Part A focuseson the shortterm pay and eployment reformissues. SectionI reviewssome currentanalytic approachesto the goveraenntpay and employmentproblem. Section II discusses the BDnk'-experiencewith thesereformsthroughits lendingoperations and tries to assess*heir.ovetall impactto date. Part B of the paper examinesthe longerterm civil servicemanagementissues,analyzingthe maln types of development managementinitiativesundertakenthroughrecent Bank operations. Conclusions are then drawn about this experience. The final sectionof the paper attempts to drew the findingsof part A and 3 together and offers recovmendationsfor futurework.
PartAs Pay and EmploymentReform:Short-TermIssues 1. The Problem: AnalyticApproaches Recent analyticvork on public pay and employmentissues has provided a generalunderstanding of the broad outline of tho problem. Governments in many developing countries are unable to manage and finance thfir civil services. Evidence suggests'... declining moral. and work effort on the part of government workers, problems in staffing large number* of skilledpositions,a paucity of compleontary inputs ln producing government services,and increasing imbalance botween the demand for government serrices,and the provision of public goods..2 Civil services in many developing countries are too large, too expensive and insufficiently productive; and civil servants,especially thoso in managerial positions,are poorly motivated. They are too large in the broad sense that in many states the public sector is over-extended:i.e., it possessestoo many agenciesand organizations, chargedwith too broad a span of responsibilities; and in the narrower sense that too many of these agencies employ numbers of people excessiveto requirements(in the sense of people and skills needed to fulfill off.ciallyassignedeconomicand administrativetasks). They are too expensivein the sense that public sector wage bills constitutetoo high a percentageof total governmentrevenues,and account for too high a percentage of CDP. The agents within civil servicestend to be poorly motivacedin that remsnerationscales for upper and middlemanagersare low, often extremelylow, in comparisonto thoseof roughly equivalant posts in the privateand frequently the parastatalsector;and wages are oftenseverelycompressed--the highestpaid earninglow multiplesof the wages of the lowestpaid. Many civil servantsare insuffic±entlwproductive in tho sense that they do not fulfill the tasks assignedto them (they are ineffective),or they carry out their assignments partially,with great delays,at high cost (theyare inefficient). 208vid Undaucr et al., Governeent Wage Pollcy In Africa: SomeFindings and Polcy lssues, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 3, No. I (January. 1988), p. 1. Particularly acute for Afrlca, such problems are also Increasingly present In countries as gwgraohicallY dispersed as Srl Lanka. Bolivla. Morocco, and Argentina, to name but a few.
3 nalysis within the Bank on these issues has tended to focus on four problems3 Excessive oublicsectorwage bills. Excessiveness is a subjectivequality, one for which no clear measurementmethodologyexists, and no standardized approachis appliedthroughoutthe Bank. The extremecases are easy to identify; i.e.,where public sectorwage bills become so large that they begin to 'crowd out' other high priorityilems. In general, the wage bill is measured against one of the follovingsthe overallgovernmentbudget;overallgovernmentrevenues; GDP; or total recurrentexpenditures. The lattermeasure is perhaps the most comon, and the degree to which non-personnelrecurreutexpenditures(such as those for supplies and maintenance) diminish in relation to personnel expenditures is taken as a key signal that the wage bill is inappropriately high.
SurDlusnumbersof civilservants.Althoughobviousl?relatedto the size. of the wage bill, statementsabout the "appropriate, nwALer of civil servants are often derived ad hoc from the proportionof public servantsto the overall population, to the moder sector labor force, or from somewhat casual observations of 'too many people sittingarounddoing nothing. Sometimesthe rate of expansionof public employmnt is taken as a warning signal of surplus numbers in government. Clearly, the definitionof what c=nstitutes too many' in the public sector must considerthe relativeroleof the statein the economy, the level of a country,* e,velopmant, andthe relativeimportanceof the state as a primary sourceof 9'.itictl patronageand socialwelfare. To identifya personnelsurplus,most -orldBank reformoperationsrelyupon the indicatorof insufficient operatingbudgets for suppliesand maintenance. Erosionof Public ServiceSalaries. In many countriesthe level of re.l public sector salaries-- and particularly civil servicesalaries--h .s eroded substantially over time, The result is remunerationthat is too low either to sustainlower echelonworkers above the povertylevel or to attractand retain neededskilledpersonnel. Real remunerations are significantly affectedby the rate of inflationand the regularityand natureof salaryadjustments.Declines if real wages have often been cushionedby elaborateallcwancesor non-wage benefitstructuresthat in some countrieshave become an increasingly important pairtof the overall compensationpackage. A pervasiveirony afflicts many ccuntriessi.e., the overall salarybill is too high while wages are too low. This dilemma is the product of years of trade-offs,given fiscal constraints, in favor of hiring growingnumbers of employeesat diminishingsalaries. Wage erosion is particularlya problemwhere there exists an alternativemarket for public servants, eitherthrougha better paying parastatalsector, a domestic private sector with higher salariesand benefitsor an international market to whicn highly skilledpublic servantsmay migrate. Waie Compression.In many cases,compression of the ratioof top to bottom salarieshas increasingly been identified as a seriousconstrainton governmentsI ability to attract and retain qualifiedpersonnelat the middle and higher 3 Th/s
section draws heavily on Nunberg. t989.
.4 loevls. Wage compressionis partially a function of expansive employment policiesas discussedabove,but in some countriesit may also derive from regime preferencesfor agilitariansalarrstructures. This,in turn, may hinge on the ideological characterof the regimeor the degreeto vhich its politicalsupport is drawn from the lower socioeconomic strata. Many of the generalprinciplessuggestedaboveare derived from the only availabledata base; i.e., recent pirical analysisof wago and employment 4 The generalanaly-!practices in a group of Africancountries. and sectorwork carried'out in the Bank (andolsewhere)as well as observatior.gatheredthrough operationalexperienceconfirm these findings for a broader range of cases. These findings represent a significant advance in our understanding of this pheonamnon. Indeed, the low wage/high employment scenario in depressed aacroeconoeLcs turns on its head previously accepted wisdom of the government as high wage-giver. ComparrAtive data that would permit procise measurement ur quantification of these phenomena remainto be collected, however. In short, the issue is difficnIlt to analyze. The reasons for this are several. Certainly, a standardized view of the proper functional span and size of the state remains elusive, despite the sweeping re-omrgence of liberal notions of minimalist government. For example, even in societies in broad ideologicalagreoemntas to the appropriaterole of the state, there is no usarguablecriterionthat deterainesthe appropriatenumber of ministries, or sub-divisionsof ministries,a governmentshould posess; and relative prices (wage scales) in differinglabor marketsmight provide sound economic reasons for a wide variation in employmentlevels in organizationihaving roughly quivalent objectives.furthermore, the rangeof solutionsto this quotion may varyby country,region,or levelof industrialization. On the otherhand, there is no clear, linearpath to developmentin this regards large stateswith high numbers of civil servantsper capita are prevalentin both the developedand underdeveloped world. Vexing measurement questions are unresolved. The methodology for determiningappropriate wage levels for privateand public sectorscontinuesto be debated. Ways to measure productivityfor centralgovernmentagencieshave been the subjectof a vast but inconclusiveliterature,Questionsremainabout the potentialconsequences of publicsectorretranchment programs. The relative capacityof differenttypes of labor markets (rural-urban, forml-informal)to absorbredundantlaborfromthe public sectoris poorlyunderstood.And analytic techniquesfor determiningthe direct and indiroct,upstream and dawnstream costs and benefits of various reduction in force scenariosare still very primitive. Political economy features of public pay and employmnt practices have only begun to be analyzed. The real as opposed to the perceivedpoliticalrisks of governmentretrenchmentprogramsare neitherknown aor at present calculable. Which are the key bureaucratic and societalcoalitionsthat figurein employment and pay reform?How much reform is politicallyfeasiblefor a given regime to undertakeunder what conditions?
There is, in sum, a lack of agreementon guidinganalyticprinciples,a lack of fim measurementcriteria, and a great regional variation in the intensity of tue syndrow. Noretholess,a growingbody of empiricalevidence on this topic -- accumulated mainlythroughBank lendingexperience-- provides sufficieht information for at least a preliminary examination. The sectionthat followshighlightsthe more strikingfeaturesof this experienceand then draws general lessonsabovt the imple entationof these typos of reforms. 2.
Recent Bank Operationaltxoeriencein Civil Serice Reform
Since 1981, civil service reform has featured prominentlyin 61 Bank lending operations. Of these, 38 were StructuralAdjustmentLoans or Credits (CUL or SACs), and2Z were TechnicalAssistanceLoans or Credits.(Table1 lists lankoperationswith civilservice reformcomponents). 5 Fouroperationshave been in the hKINA region (Europe,Hiddle East and North Africa);5 in Asia; 11 in Latiu Amrica and the Caribbesanand 4* in Africa. Thus, two out of three of recent Bank-supported civil servicereform programshave been in Africa. The magnitudeaad intensityof the issue is clearlygreatest in that region; and efforts discussedbelow are mainly, though not exclusivoly,taking place in Africa. (Table2 shows the regionaldistributionof lank operationswith civil service reform components by lending instrument.) Activity is quite new in this field; prior to 1981, the Bank was only tangentia,lly involvedwith civil service or administrative reform -- except for the occ&sional report, such as on Thailandand Indonesis, and some lnvolvement by educational specialists on civll service traininginstLtutes-- and what was -done ws *inaily on the project, not the policy, level. It has been the Bank's entry into policy-based lending, with its amphassL on demand management and improvlng the performance of adjustinS governments, that has led to the lncreased involvementwith civil servLce issues. The most importantset of reasonsfor the inclusionof civil serviceresorm in zecent adjustmentoperationscenter, troundthe issue of budgetaryburden, the recognitionof the heavy, fiscal b-,'en posed by large wage blls. For extreme exampl*, in the early 1980s, followingrapid increasesin the numbers employed, many African countri,ssaw theirwage bLils rise to accountfor more than half of total governmentrevenues. Such increases were tolerable (though neverwise) as longaS totalrevenuesincreased.But with the prolongedeconomic crisis and its attendantstagnationof growth ln governmentrevenues,the difficult-to-roduce wage bill begins, ts discussedin the precedingsection. to Ocrowdout'othercriticalcurrentexpenditurest maintenanceand depreciation, the provisionof essentialsuppliesand equipment. This led to the lncreasingly coaon situationof teacherswithout books, doctors lackingmedicine,postal workers having no stamps to sell, etc. The recognitton that this was taking place led some governmeats to initiate their owe rationallzation measures. It led the Bank increaslngly to lnclude .ivll service reform in adjustment -S,vern/other tyDes of policy-based lending operations, such as Reconstruction Inport Credits and Econosic Recovery Credits (R/Ca and EfACs),were counted among the SAJs. They are Iteoized In Table 1.
operations. Thus, the primary reason for the Bank's more recent, intense and direct approach to civil service :,form has been the need to help borrower governmentsmanage demand, to cont'ln and reduce a major cost area. The second set of reasons centers around the perception of low nt administrations, attested to effectivenessand efficiencylevelsin goverrun (and supposedlystateir.criticalcasesby the degradationof the state-provided and even in the less criticalcases 1b i4.gh maintained)physicalinfrastructureI transuction costs, pervasive delays, and the prevalence of corruptlon. and efficiencylevelsis seen as the essentialand nprovementof effectiveness ultimate goal of administrativereform. From the outset it was thought,and experiencehas confirmed, that raising those levels is a complicated, problematic and longer term effort. The relation of cost contsinment measures eo efficiency/effectiveness promotion is thus analogous to the relation of stabilization to the restorationof growthin adjustingeconomies:i.e., issues of demad managemnt take precedenceand arc easier to effect than restarting of growth. For civil service reform one could easily argue that is should be the othervwy round;that assessingvhat the organizationsof the ut¶teneed to do, what resources,physicaland human, they need to do it, and how to go about doing it, should precede the question of cost containmentand reductions. Nonetheless,becausoof the magnitudeand intensityof fiucalproblems,the cost containmentsteps havo been soon as the first priority. 3.
Cost-Contaien.ntvOperationalAporoachesto Pay and Employmnt Reform -- A ProgressReport
-This sectioneszmL'ies the most recentBank experiencein pay and employment reform, analyzing the short-term,emergencymeasures taken (mostly through adjustmentoperationsand companiontechnicalassistanceprojects)to contain the size and cost of civil services.The focus is on the period since 1987 when Bank-supported pay and employmentreformwva last reviewed. The purpose here is to providea progressreporton approachesto the problem,concentratingon theirimplementation.New initiatives that have been devisedin the intervening following section evaluates,on the basis of period are also analyzed. The availabledata, the overallimpactof thesemeasuresby examininggeneraltrends in wage bill containment, employment increases, and rationalizationof remunerationstructures. Bank operationsdealingwith governmentpay and employmentissues have supporteda rangeof reformapproaches. Many of thesehave been implementedon a trial and error basis, and we are only beginningto leazn about which are working and which are not. (Thekey measurestaken by countriesto reformpay and employmentpolicies are summarizedin Table 3). With regard to costcontainment,various of these actions have been ranked on a continuum of political difficulty ranging from the easiest-- undertaken first -- to the most difficult. The main steps taken have been the fillowing: ----
the eliminationof 'ghost'or non-existentnames and workers; the eliminationof officiallysanctionedposts which are not currentlyfilled; workers; the retrenchmentof temporaryor easonal
the enforcementof retirementago (or retirementefter z years of service)stipulations: the freosing of recruitment; the elimination of ;uaranteedentryto the civil service from the educat'onal or training system; the voluntary,or inducedby incentives,retirementof surplus workers;and finally the dismissalof servingcivil servants.
A number of techniqueswere utilizedto supportthe stepsoutlinedabove, including: ---
FunctionalReviews -- PayrollComputerization -- CompetencyTesting -a Public Informtion Campaigns -RedeploymntTrainingand Credit Programs '- Salary Supplemnts ExecutivePrograms SkillsMobilization--Senior -The implementation of thesemeasuresare dis:ussedbelow.
CivilService Censuses, Keasures
Computerization and Clean-Up and GhostReduction
The reductionof civil service cadres throughthe elimination of ghosts 6 the first and leaist politicallysensitive approach to employmentreform -appears to have been an effective techniquo in emergency cost-containment programs,althoughcomprehensivedata on reductionsaccomplishedthrough this method are not yet available. (Table 4 presents various measures taken by selectedcountriesto reduceemployment.)For Ghana and Uganda.at least,ghost elimination represented a usefulinstrumentof employmentreform.7 Ghost removal was also claiMedto have been a significantfeatureof reformsin variousother countries. After a staff audit in 1987 in Guinea, for example,approximately 1091 ghost names were strickenfrom the civil service'payroll. In Cameroon, approzimately 5000fict.tiousnams were eliminated. In general,ghostreduction --
Gftsts are name on tth payroll, receiving a wage, who cannot be shown to ex/st physically. They are worAers who hove died, retired or otherwiso left the civil service but were never recordod as such. rhey are fictitious persons whose pay Is claimd by othes. rTheyare variants on a name with one prson receivlng two or more salaries. 7 Data
on ghost removals In Ghans are very tentativo and remain to be verifled. Government claims that 11,O0 ghosts were eslminated through headcount and census exercises have not yet been validated. In Uganda. approxlately 30,000 ghosts have been Identifled, but there Is no evldence that those nameshave been removed from the payroll as yet.
incurslow politicalcostsbecausethe only opposingconstituencyare the system abusersthemselves.for whom a public admissionof fraudwould be nocessaryto stakea claim to continuing payment.Indeed,in none of the above casesdid ghost removalgeneratea public outcry. The first step in ghost removal is,
service censuA to
determine the numborand type of governmentemployees.In many countries,such a poll will be the first time in many years (or perhapsthe first time ever) an attempthas been made to got an accuratepictureof public employment. The need enrolledon the civil service to establishwho is, and who is not, legitimately rostersand payroll is paramu.rAt. Civil soervice censusesand payroll sanitizationhavo been featuresof a Few reforming governmentshave ignoredthe issue,though soa have proceededwithout a cleanup exercise. Laos, for eample, is reportedto hav shed an estimated10 to 30 percent of governmentworkers using a payroll listing as the sole form of and personnelrecords. For most countries,though, a prior data collection clean-upactivityis -scessary. They serve so-ral useful purposes,including information providing the often large ranks of temporary staff; quantifying leading to the enforcementof the statutoryretirementage, and, most important, refoms as shown in Table 3. numberof pay and cemployment
of .. census is related to its level of comprehensiveness The usefulness more exercisemay be little The most elemetal census-takiug and sophistication. of ths. number and the structure than a 'head count' which simply establishes (i.e. the number of employes* at various professional governmenteployment lovelsor in differentregionallocations).Censuses of the head count variety are usuallydesiSnedand carried out by governmeztsthemselves. (At earlypoints Bolivia and Uganda and others in the reform process, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, assistance.) The results technical own without performedhoad counts oantheir of these counts have often beon disappointing.Findingshave been incomplete civil service and inaccurate,mainly because they have been based on existing While not present employees. of physically rolls rather than verification to undertake,head counts of this sort can stillbe a waste of scarce expensive resources,since theymust usuallybe followedby more rigorouscensusescarried out by outsideconsultants.On the otherhand, even flawedhead countscan serve useful purposes. Tn Ghana, the initial civil service survey revealed the of employmentwhich clearly indicatedoverstaffingat lower overall structure reform for policy point a starting providing grades of tho bureaucracy, discussions. validation Sven censuses that are more sophisticated in their Successive censusescarried methodologies may have only lIJ'ited applications. s in Ghana (there were three all told) used the consultL .. out by international payroll mehanism to count civil servants,but they did not actuallyverify the physical existenceof employees -- the rationale being that just getting fraudulentnames off the payroll nwasgood enough. Neither did they establish durablelinksbetwoenthe computerizedpayrollsystemin the Ministryof Finance, and the the personnelrecords in the Office of the' Head of the Civil Service, annualbudget. The censusesdid, however,provideimportant,one-shot,baseline data to begin the employmentreductionprogram,thus fulfillingan essential
9 function. &t least tWOpgoblemscan be seenwith the Ghanaianapproach. One is that, vithout the institutionalcapacity to utilize the data in a computerized monitoring system, the quality of census data is subject to rapid erosion. ResultsbecomAoutdated quicklyas new recruits enter the civil service(openly or clsndestinely)and as others leave. Personaldata which might provide an overall profile of the administration also change, so that informationabout stpects such as the age structureand promotionpattevus is no longervalid. Moreover,it is importantto be able to capitalizeon the resultsof the census quickly because the patience of civil servantsto endure successivesurveys wears thin, as has been the case in Ghanaafter three such ezercisusin a period of a fev years. However, "doing it right* also imposes administrativeand financialburdens. In Madagascar,the censuswas more rigorous;enumerators were hired and civil servantshad to be presentat the place of census. The penalty for ton-cooperation was severetsuspensionof paycheck. Thus,participation was high. The cost of this elaborateexercisewas a non-trivialfive percentof the wage bill. however. Furthermore,the organizational requiremonts for execution of the census -- i.e. organizingreviewcommittees,enumerators, census centers at both centraland districtlevels-- wege also considerable. In general, recent experiencevith ;ensus design and implementation suggeStsthat such mechanismsare importantfirst steps to gettingtoe reform processuavi,g; that their design shouldbe kept simple,but strategicin the sense that they should be conceivedas part of the establishment of an ongoing system of controls, and thab. their successful conceptualization and implementation generallyrequiresexternaltecbnicalassistance. FreezingCivil ServiceRecruitment Freezing or limiting civil service recruitment is an oiten applied mechanism for reducing government employment. It is only marginally more politically difficult than ghost elimination. (The difficulty is due to the potentialdisruptions that might be causwdby aspiring civil service candidates.) Hiring freezes have been widely used, with varying results, in a number of countries,includingCosta Rica, Ghana, the Central African Republic,Congo. Gambia,Gabou and Mauritania,among others. A varietyof mechanismswere used to administer these policies. Senegal,for example,instituted c hiring freeze in 1983, and created a high-level inter-ministerial commission to supervise the process. The commission, the secretariat of which met weekly. revievwd all departuresfrom the civil service,with a view to determining(a) if it were necessaryto fill the particular vicancy,(b) if so, with whom, and (c) if not whether the staff of the organization could be i.deu-dby one or whether the or3anization had some pressingpersonnelneed in anotherarea that justifieda position. Between1000 and 1500 reductionswere reportedto have been effected in the first two years of the commission'soperation.This experience,and a similarbut stronger scheme in the CentralAfricanRepublic.are summarized in the 'Box' on cost containmentin Annex 2. Variations on this theme include allowing hiring only if it does not result in a noet creation of civil service posts (Kenya has tried this); or limiting hiri'g to essentialprofessionalstaff (in force in Malawi,Mali and Nigeria).
Automatichiringhas been discontinuedin someAfricancountrieswhich had traditionally guaranteedgovernmentjobs to schoolgraduates.(Examplesare CAR, Congo, Gu4 *a, Mali, Somalia,Sudan, and Senegal.) This reform measure turns out to be somewhatcomplicated to implement,as the case of Senegaldemonstrates. When the hiring freezewas institutedin Senegal, there were more than forty governmentschools and trainingcenters. Prior to the freeze, entry to these centers equalledentry to the civil service. The freeze forced the Senegalese to curail severelythe entry to and activities,of these centers;the result to date has been the continued existence of most of these institutions,but with ever-declining numbers of students or trainees. Still, the Senegalese government, as moot others faced with this problem, maintained its employment coitment to those already in the training pipeline, meaning that it may be some years before an effect from this particular lement of restructuring can be perceived. 8 !A general, the record of hiring freezes appears to have been mixed. Where they have signified a haLt to automatic civil service recruitment from universities or public administration training institutions, they apply a significant brake on civil service expansion. But recruitment freezes may constrain government from achieving the necessary skill mix through renovation of its cadres with young entrants. Moreover, for some civil services, hiring freezes may be no -ore efficient in eliminating redundant civil servants than natural attrition. Indeed, in som countries (such as Madagascar), the height of civil service ezpansion took place in the early 1960s, when many new recruits vere hired, causing a persistent bubble in the civil service rolls. Hiring then leveled off. It could be argued that in these instances it makes sense to let naturalattritionthroughnormal retirement, which will occur over the next few years, take care of this surplus. Suspensionof AutomaticIncreasesand Advancements One cost containment measurewhichhas come intoincreasinguse in the most recentoperationsis the suspensionof automaticincreasesand stepadvancements. This is of particularrelevancein the francophoneAfrican countrieswhere advancesin grade and pay tendedto be based solelyon years of service. Thus, freezing recruitmentor evenmodest reductionsin the totalnumber of the civil servantssoomtimeshas had but a limitedeffect. Senegal,for example, froze recruitmentas earlyas 1983,and even succeededover two yearsin reducingtotal numbers. Still, it found that automaticstep and grade increaseskept the wage bill on the increase;the fiscalresult of what the Senegaleseregardedas an heroic and politicallydangerouseffort was reductionin the annual average STho Sengal Case rases another ISsue: the Adfalll refoarA In the parapublic In reduced tVansfers to and, It Ishoped, eventual reductlon In the numbers of public enterprises. But many of the staff now employed In Senegalese PEs re 'tenured civil servants who chose or were assigned to servlco In a PE. If they are dismissed from thO PE they ha'oe the legal right to a post In the civil servico proper. Legal rights can be ended, of course. but only at the expense of time, effort and the expenditure of some of the government's political base.
sector Is resulting
11 growth rate of the wage bill from fourteento nine percent. The suspensionof automaticadvancesis an elementof recont reformsin five countrieswith Bank programs,includingDominica and Mauritania. In addition,Burundi and Cots d'lvoi:etemporarilysuspendedautomaticpay increasesto dampendrift factors. Both BurkinaFaso and Cote d'Ivoirealso restructured their pay systemsso that promotions are now offered on a more selectivebasis rather than granted automatically. Strict enforcementof retirementfor over-agecivil *.rvants has boen a foatureof a numberof reformprograms (includingCameroon,Gabon, Costa Rica, and Benin, Senogal, Ghana, and Guinea). In Guinea, for ezamplo, the Bank supportedthe enforcementof a retirementprogram in which all civil servants over 55, or all those who had completedthirty years of service,were to be placedin automaticand effectiveretirement.The resultwas a reductionof over 7000 cadres. While presentingan option for employmentreductionthat causes few politicalripples,the impact of such programshas been minimal. This is partly due to the unreliabilityof most informationabout age -- even when gathoredby modern survey techniquesthroughcivil servicecensuses -- and to the overallage profile of most civil servicesin most LDCs. This is especially the caso in Africa,where the averageage of civil servantsis bolow 40. Thus, the removalof over-agedemployeesusuallytargetsa semll group. Early Retiremnt Proarams Increasingly, countriosfindthatimplementing the more "easy optionsdoes not result in sufficientcost cutting. They thus begin to exploreways to actuallycut back on the numbers of serving employees. Even at this stage, governmentsare loathe to take the most difficult political route; that of involuntarydismissal. A number of strategieshave been tried with varying degreosof success. Usually,theseoptionsare offeredas one among severalin a mized approachto staff reductions. Early retirement is an option that has been proposed in several countries, including Senegal. This program targets civil servants within a few years of normal retirementage, either paying them a lump sum separationpackagewith pension benefits to begin with normal retirementage, or by starting their pensionsat the early departuredate. Althoughsystematicanalysishas not yet been performedon these types of programs,their benefits (in terms of numbers reduced and wage bill decreases)would seem to be minimal and their costs significant. First, the net presentvalue of the savings stream is likely to be low sincethe savingsonly representthreeto four years of staff reductions instead of those that would occur if younger workers were to be removed. Furthermore,early retirementprogramstarget the most experiencedemployees- both at managerialand supportlevels. This poses a particularlyacute cost for thosecivil servicesin which oncehigh standardsof professional performance and training have broken down. Early retirementmeans that the collective experienceof the olderemployees,who mightbe the solekeepersof the efficient flam of an earlierera, is lost to the newer generation. VoluntaryDeparturePrograms Voluntarydepartureschemeshave been a featureof severalcivil service
12 reform programs,including those in Guinea, the CAR, Mali, Kenya and Somalia; one has boen proposedfor Senegal. In general, voluntarydeparture schemesare viewed as politicallypalatable because they are not coercive. Voluntary departureprogramsare problematic, however,in that they often attractthe best and brightestcivil servants;that ls, thosewhom governmentwould most wish to retain. Carriedout on a largescale,voluntarydepartureschemesare expensive. In Guinea, voluntarydeparturewith an associatedpremiumwas to be financedwith an earmarkedfund of GP 6.5 billion. The benefitsinvolveda three-optionplan from which departeesmight choose tos (a) drav a salarywith accompanyingrice rations for 60 months; (b) take 40 percent in cash and the remainderin regular salary payments; or (c) take a share of the severance allowance as a down payment on a new private sector business venture. In its proposedvoluntarydeparture scheme,Senegal would offer 60 months of salaries to voluntarily departing civil 3ervants. The government has requested financial support for this scheme from the lank. Many countrilswould prefer to carry out staff reductions exclusively through voluntarydeparture programs,particularlyif they can find external financingfor a portion of the costs. Nonetheless,it seems clear that the monetary incentives would have to be significant(andprobablyunaffordable)to encouragesufficientreductionsin numbers. On a smaller scale, some civil servants might have a low reservation cost that would permit them to take advantage of voluntary departure incentives that were not exorbitantlyexpensive for government. In this way, voluntary departure, when combined vith retrenchment, could be a viable strategy to achieve significantemployment reduction. Howevr, on its own it is probably not terribly effective. Retrenchment Retrenchment-- the direct and explicit dismissalof redundant civil servants-- is the most difficultand politicallycontentious measure used to reduceemployment. Governmentshave stronglyresistedthese remedies,and have adopted them as last resortoptions. This reluctanceis relatedto the mature of the state in many developingcountries. An importantpurposeof governments is construedas the distributionof politicalpatronage and social welfare throughthe provisionof publicposts to loyal followersand otherwisedeserving at this basic definitionof clients. Overt employmentreductionthus strikes the role of government. Moreover, the fear of most political regimes that retrenchment will incitsdestabilizing social upheaval and politicalopposition serves to stiffenresistance to overt employmentreductionmasures. The task of opponentsto staff cuts is made that much easier by fears that the labor absorptivecapacityof the privatesector is weak. It ls thus not surprisingthat involvedBank staff note difficultiesand in adjustmentoperations delays in complyingwith staffreductionconditionality in the Central African Republic,Guinea Blissau, Guinea, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe,Senegal,Costa Rica and Dominica,to name but a few recent oases. Supervision reports record acceptance of fwer dismissals and lengthier timeframesthan originallynegotiated;these reportsnote as well in several second adjustmentoperationsthe repetition, in somewhat stronger terms, of employmentreductionconditionsseen in the first operation (SAL 1- enforce retirement age regulations;' SAL 2-'strictly enforce retirement age
Despitethe considerableresistanceof governmentsto undertake what they perceiveto be politically risky measures, retrenchment is nonethelesstaking place in severalcountriesthroughBank operations. Ghana,Guinea,Gambia,and CAR (countriesfor which some documentedreductionfiguresare available)are cases in pointa as of 1989, approzimately27,791 civil servants have been retrenchedln Ghana, in addition to those removed from the rolls by other mchanisms. In Guinea,an estimated4245 have beenretrenched. In the Gambia, fol'owinga census and staff audit, approximatelyS350 governmentemployees (including2600 temporaryemployees)were dismissed.And in the CentralAfrican Republic,300 civilservantshave been firedso far,with more reductions planned for coming years.9 (See Table 4). The data on these retrenchment exercisesare stillquite preliminary,and 0 in-depthanalysisof this experienceis only nov beingperformed)1 It is thus possible to offer only tentativeobservationson impleentation. One notable feature of these programswas the use of a variety of techniquesto deflect politicalopposition,minimize the social cost of retrenchment, and provide technical support to redundancy programs. In Guinea and CAR (and planned for Senegal), for example, public information campaigns were designed, with the help of consultants, to inform governmnet employees through radio broadcastsand newspaperarticles, of governmAnt intentions vith regard to administrative and financialaspects of the staff reduction programs Bank staff reported positive effects for these efforts. Teetin_ Cometency examswere used in at leastone country. In Guinea, competency tests for sitting civil servants provided technical criteria to determinewhich personnel would be graded as surplus. Those who passed the test were to be retained, and those who failed would be entitled to a severance package related to the length of service. (Theywould not, however,be able to opt for the more 9 In
faCt,many of the Mechanismsdescribed In this sectIon have been utilized In combnatlon with one nother, maklngIt difficult to Isolate the relative utility or Impact of any singl one. In Ghana. for example, voluntary departure was not stixulated through additonal Incenttves: the 'voluntary ewaratlon package was the same as for redundant workers, thus providing little notivatlon for workers to leave of their own volitlon. At the saw time, workers theoretically had the optlon of early retirement, but would receive no extra payomnts over and above their regular ponslon rights. If they choe voluntary retirooent, however, they would roceive the lumpsumseparatlon payment In addition to thior pnsion. Thus, there were virtuaiiy no earry rorirews in unana, our som older voluntary departee. Clearly, It was not the nature of the Individual scheme, but Its relation to. the other parts of the staff reduction program that dot-rmined the
analysis of pay and eomloyment reform In three Bank cperatlons (Guine, Ghana and Gambia)ls the subject of the Africa Technical Doepartme,t,Publlc Sector Managent DivisIon study In progress, 'Pubilc Sector Pay and EmploymentReform In Afrlca,' forthcoming, 1990.
lucritive package offered those in voluntary departure). Recruitment in subsequentyearswouldbe determinedaccording to the new qualifications testing, and the promotionof employees retainedwould follow a logical procedure coupled vith training. Although the exams were first geared to university level standards in France for professional level positions, the requirementswere later
relaxed to fit local capabilities. The objectivityand credibilityof the program was validated by the presence of external consultants, and this apparentlyenhancedacceptanceof the practice. Despite this acceptanceof the principleof testing,the exercisehas proved to be cumbersometo administer, causing conflict and delays in the overall civil service reform program in Guinea.
Competencytestingwas coupladin Guineawith the creationof a special nersonnelbank vhere those employeeswho passed sxawv,,but were considered otherwiso redundant, were placed in a specialcatelory. These people remain on the payroll for siz months. If they do not find jobs, they are removed and dismissed. They also have the option of leaving of their own volition with a severance package somewhat less generous than that offered to voluntary departes. There are approximately 14,487 employees in this category as of this writing. (This figure may include some 3400 public enterprise employees, howevr.) The administrationof this personnelbank has proved exceedingly complicated,and there is not yet clear indicationthat any of those placed in the pool have actuallyleft government. There is concernthat this categoryof employeeswill continue to impose an onerous burden on the wage bill without contributing to civil service productivity.Horeover,the presencein government of an (officially)idle class of disgruntledemployeesmay serve to demoralize other governmentpersonnel. SeverancePackages Severancepayments-- financedby governments themselves--haveaccompanied retrenchmentprogramsin most countries. A comparisonof severanceprovisions is shown in Table 5. While the absolutevalue of these separationpackagesis impossibleto compare,the formulaethemse'vesappearto be relativelygenerous. These formulaeare mostly embellishments upon the basic legal obligationsof governmentto disaissed workers worked out throughnegotiationsamong various interestedparties. The administration and the size of the severance packages appear to be among the most importantdeterminants of the level of acceptance of the overall employmentreductionprogram by affectedemployees. In Ghana, delaysin the calculationand distribution of separationentitlementin the first year of the reform program stirred some disruptiveoppositionamong affected civil servants,for example. Bank staff reportedthat protestswere smoothed over in the second year when severancepaymentsbegan to be awarded on time. FunctionalReviews In some countries, functional reviews have provided an important technical rationale for employment cuts. (Table 3 shows a sampleof countriesthat have carriedout functionalreviews). These reviewsare discussedin greater depth in Part B of this paper. Their purpose is essentiallyto audit the functions
of componentagencies of governmentand the number and type of staff presently carryingthem out in an attemptto determinethe optimal staffingarrangements for basicgovernmenttasks. Functionalreviews are difficultto administer(they are usually carried out through technicalassistance),and they are timeconsuming. Indeed,as is discussedin detailbelow, in the two caseswhere they figuredmobt prominentlyin the reform progr4m (Ghana and Gambia)many cvfthe employmentcuts actually took place before the functionalreviews had been started. Nonetheless,it has been reported that the carrying out of these review.evenwell into the implementation of a retrenchment programprovidesan assurancethat there is at least an intentionto pursue staff reductionsin a rational,technical,-andjust manner. This assurancehas served to dispel politicaland socialdiscontent over the retrenchmentprogramsas a whole. Redeplonmgnt, Retrainingand Credit Proarams Bank operationshave begun to address the issue of redeoloyment of redundantlabor in their reformprograms. Severalcountrieshave put together programewhich offer trainingfor jobs in the informalsector,credit schemes at favorableinterest rates for small businessor agriculture,and/or public works programs. (Ghana,Gambia, Guinea, and Bolivia offered such programs.) On a technicalbasis, these programs have been less than fully successful;in some instancesthetir justification may be questioned. First, retrainingfor informalsectoractivities-- which is where many redundantworkers tend to go, may be largelyirrelevant;indeed,the number of poople benefiting from training for carpentry or dressmaking is probably quite small. In Ghana, for example, where this type of programwas offered through the Prograe of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment(PAMSCAD), the demandfor such trainingwas low. In most countries,the existenttraining institutionsare not equipped to handle this kind of informaltraining,or if the demandwere higher, to accomodate the number of traineesthat potentially could result from massive lay-offsin the public sector. The administrative costs are high and the potentialbenefitsunclear. Again in Ghana, an attempt vas also made to provide trainingthroughan apprenticeship program. This was difficultto organize,however,and only reacheda limitedgroup. Like the other redeploymentschemes, this program was undersubscribed. Credit for small businessand agriculturalactivities,another aspect of the program,was also in low demand. In the Gambia,the Instituteof BusinessAdvisoryServices(IBAS) administered a similarprogramwhich receivedapproximately 700 applications (out of more than 2000workerslaid off by the government) and providedcreditand/or trainingservicesto only about 300 individuals. In Bolivia, a public works programwas organizedthrough the Emergency Social Fund to provide transitionalemploymentfor dismissedtin mine workers from COMIBOL,the statemining company Reportsindicatethat most miners did not take advantageof theseprograms,however. Instead,they sometimesused the cash payment provided by a generousseparationpackage to relocateand start enterprisesin the informalsector,or to find construction work elsewhere. In Guinea, the Governmentset up a special office, BARAF, (Bureau d'Aide a la Reconversion des Agents de la Fonction Publique)to assist departingcivil servantsin applyingfor credit to finance privatebusinesses. Some Bank staff fear this credit program may have permanentlydamaged the country'scredit
system; indeed, there are now on the books large numbers of loans to departed civil servants that have almost no hope of being recovered. The Gambia small business credit scheme for redundantcivil servantsdid not fare well in this
respect either. Its loan recovery rate was 30 porcent (as compared to 65 percent, for example, for an SEC-financedcredit scheme with more stringent eligibility requirements).
This experiencesuggests that the technical rationale for these programs is weak. It would appearthat many civil servants being retrenched nsither need nor expect to be retrained or redeployed. Most go into the informal sector for which therso ^eLw adapted credit schees. It would be ad-inistratively easier, and would probably havi a more beneficial economic impact,to simply award cash severancepayments to departing staff. Another point institutional
is that redeployment
ad-inister. In the Gambia, the program
the ground one and a half years after retrenchment had begun. In Ghana, tho lag tim was two and a half years. In Guinea, the program began on the anticipated date, but proved to be very difficult to manage. Typically, there are a number of institutions whose activities must bo coordinated and the preparation requireants are considerable. Moreover, because existing training and credit institutionsare inadequate, new aechanisms often are required, imposing substantial additional costs. Finally, for some countries, the need for special mechanisms to rechannel labor into private marketsmay be less than anticipated. That is, there is some preliminaryevidence to suggest that labor absorptionhas been easier than expocted -- or than governments typicallycontend. In Africa. for example,urban workers appear to have moved easily into agriculturalactivities. In Bolivia, the ability of the informal sector to absorb redundantpublic sectoremployees appears to havo been considerable.Thus,the technical rationale for retraining and credit is furthereroded. These programs do perhaps have an importantsymbolicvalue to the extent that dismissed workers place value on access to this kind of assistance, whether they avail themselvesof it or not. Such programs thus serve an important political function in defusing potential discontent among retrenched employees. In general, though, it may make more sense to concentrateon severancepackages or generous golden handshakes in desigzingemploymentreductionsprograms,as this is where most eployee interestand demand are focused. RemunerationIssues Many of the cost-containmntmeasures taken have focused on reducing asploymnt; but many steps have also been directedat containingthe wage bill in the aggregate, and at removing distortionsin the overall remuneration structure. These measures are discussedbelow. Wase Restraint
are common measures.
17 called for in Uruguay,Senegal,Gambia,Sao Tome and Principe.Cameroon,Gabon and Tunisia. (Priorto the Bank'sincreased involvementin wage bill restraint, wage froozesfeatured more prominentlyas conditionsof D(F agreements.) Ways of institutinga wage freeze or at least restrainingwages are numerous; i.*. by holdingwages to existinglevelsin currentterms;, by holdingthem in constant ternr;by allowingincreasesequal to a portionof, but less than the entirety of the rateof inflation;by settinga currencyunit ceiling,or by agreeingthat the wage bill cannot surpass a particularratio (for example, percentapsof governmentexpenditure). Rationalization of Remuneration IAcreasingly, pay and employmentreformprogramshave also been addressing specificpay conditionsfor civil servants in an attemptto removedeaotivating distortions in government remuneration structures. A number of reform programs have aimed at improving pay conditions, rationalizing the overall system of romuneration, and building an institutional capacity in government to formulate *ad implement sound salary policies on an ongoing basis. Uaticnalization of the remueration structure has been an important reform objective. This has mainly consisted of attempts to reduce the proportion of rommnerations from non.wage benefits. In many countriec, these constitute an
as real wages have been
steadilyerodedby inflationand expandingemployment. Most work on this issue has boen in the formof studiescallingattentionto the problemand recomending solutions.Such studiesare being carriedout in Senegal,Cameroon,Hauritania, Senegal,among others. In severalcountries,concretesteps have been taken to reduce allownsces. Bolivia, Laos, Guinea, Senegal, and Cameroonhave reduced non-wage allowances(housingin Cameroon),in-kindbenefits (rice rations in Guinea and
special porformance prenia in Bolivia.)
However, available data
suggestthat, in genoral,virtually
no progresshas been made on this front. As Table 6 indicates.non-wagebenefitsas a percentageof total compensation have increasedon the averageby nearly 8 percent for those countriesthat experienceda change. It is claimedthat the Cameroonhas also significantly reducedthe number and extentof allowances,but data do not show any improvementbetween1986 and 1988. Boliviahas officiallytakenactionsto reducebenefits,but data on the resultsof those measures have not yet been collected. One reason for the slow movementon this issue is the difficultyin gettingsystematicinformationand disentanglingthe enormously intricate webs of benefit structures. For many coungries -- in particular,those in francophone Africa -- it may well be that refom will only resultfroma simple declaration nullifying the entirety of the present convolutedbenefit system,and replacingit with a rational,salarybasedrewardsystem. Unfortunately, it is politically difficultto dispensewith non-wage machanisaswithoutredressingthe inadequacies of the salary structure which stimulated the emergence of non-wage distortionsin the first place. Bolivia's recent attempts to legislatea rational salary system have been circumvented, for example,by spontaneous non-wagebonusfeaturesto reward some employeesoutsideof the strictwage system. Equalizins
18 Ineouitiesin pal amont various parts of governnenthave also been the targetfor rationalization.In Mauritania,salarydiscrepancies among different centralgovernmentministriesfor comparablework, and the effectsof inequities resultingfrom irregularitiesin employmentstatus, were both the subject of studiesfinancedby the Bank'sDevelopmentManagementProject. Closing the gay in pay and benefitsamong differentparts of the public sector was the goal of some reform programs. In Jamaica, and many other countries,parastatalbodieswere able to attractqualifiedcandidatesaway from the civil service with substantiallyhigher salaries. SAL III instituted conditionalitythat higher level managementposts in the civil service be remuneratedat 85 percentof equivalentgrades in statutorybodies through a three-phasepay hike. Althoughtwo raisesfor managersdid occur,the opposition to differential wage increases from unionizedcivil servants at lower skill levels preventedthe third increase from being enacted. As a result of this delay and the continuingwage erosionthroughinflation,qualifiedprofessionals 11 and managerscontinueto be in short supply in centralgovernment. Simpliftingthe Salary
In some countries, simplification of the salarygrid has resulted from pay and gradingstudy recoamundations.Studieshave been carried out in Bankfinanced programs in the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, DoLinica, and Jamaica, for egample. In Dominica,the reuneration system, consistingof over 100 pay scales, was convertedto a structureof 14 for middle and lower management; almost all jobs are now includedin this new pay scale system. In Guinea, consultants undertooka job evaluation exercise and reduced19 grades to 12. Wage Compressionand Decompression For many countries,the erosionof averagewages was the big problem to be addressedby pay reform. But, particularly in Africa, a principal objective of pay reform is the decompressionof the wage structure. This is essential, given the difficultiesin recruitmentand retentionof higher level staffwhose salaries have sunk to very low multiplesof the lowest rankedworkers. (Table 7 shows some compressionratios for selectedcountries.) Decompressionof the salary structurewas a definite aim in Ghana, for example,where in 1984, before the SAC I program began, the compressionratiowas approximately2.5 to 1. It rapidlymoved to 5.7:1 in that year and by 1989, it had decompressedto 7.8 to 1. The Government'sstatedobjectiveof achievinga 13 to 1 ratio by 1991 may or may uot be ,eached,but it is clearlymoving in the right direction. In the CAR, five years of reform produced no perceptiblechange in the compression it Mothodologies for determining the appropriate pay levels In the civIl service are only now being developed. In Jamaica, a comparative pay survey was carrfled out through the Administrative Reform Project, the Institutlonal counterpart for pay reform In SA. 1il. But the survey took so long to be cc -:leted that the AMP was terminateo before the results becm known. Slmilar surveys .-re carrled out In Ghana, the Gambla, and Tlhailand to determine the approprlate pay levels for clvil servants.
19 ratio. And in Laos, salaries decompressedfrom 3 to 1 to 6 to I under a prograa supported(in its later stages)by the Flnd and the Bank. For othor countries,progressis much less clear.During the reformperiod in the Gambia, for example,salariesappear to have become more compressed in the firstyears of adjustment,moving from 6.5 to 1 to 5.7 to 1.. -(Thismight havo been due, in part, to the introduction of the 'new, shorter twelve grade structure,however.) In guineaBissauand Senegal,as voll, it would also appear that salariescompressedfurtherduring the reform period, from 5.2 to 1 to 4 to 1 in the former:to 7.8 to 1 to 6.8 to 1 in the latter. It must be underlined that all theso figuresshouldbe takenwith a large grain of salt; they tend to be 'guess-timates', based on sketchy data. Salary SuDDlements Vhere reformof the salary structure has not been mminent,a number of countries have resorted to interim programs aimed at attracting qualified professionals intogovernment.Salary suoolements are the most commonmechanism used to compensatefor low civil servicepay at upper echelons. Although no systmatic docuentation exists, salaryoupplements appearto be widelyutilized. Exaples includeMozambique,Bolivia,Uganda, Guinea Bissau,Camroon and Niger, among others. In councrieswhore intrntational donor assistance provides an alternativo employment market for skilled professionals, salary supplements may be provided by eoternally financed projects in several different ways. Civil servants may accept supplements to top off their civil servicepay by as much as 400 percent (as in Mozsambique or Bolivia),without taking leave from the government rolls. Indeed, in Moxambique(and elsewhere)Bank and other donor projects have hired individuals working in ministries to staff specialproject units at higher salaries while still retaining their government Jobs. The obvious conflict of interest potential here is enormous. Moreover, the demonstration effect for those governmentemployeeslackingaccess to toppingup benefitscan be devastating.. Some c ril servants may take leave or actually separate from the civil service. Whi., this is a *cleaner' arrangementin principle, the cost may well be the loss of the skilledindividualfrom governmentserviceover the short and long run. In countriessuchas Mozambiquewherehuman capitalis so scarce,this brain drain could paralyzegovernmentfunctions. Moreover,on a large scale, such supplementation is affordableonlywith sustainedexternalfinancing. The siphoningoff and rewardingof the best and the brightestundercutsgovernment motivationto improveconditionsfor the majorityof individuals.On the other hand, salary supplements are viewedby many BanK Staffas unavoidable. They are seen as the only way of obtaining good staff to run projects and programs which, presumably, will enhance the functioning of the civil service, and restart the process of economic growth. The argument is that the loss of time and money that would occurwith inferiorstaff is worth both the higher remuneration, and the demoralization of the unaffectedmajority.
In some countries,salary supplements consistof those paymentsprovided to hisher levelcivil servantsover and above their civil servicegrade salazy. These payments -re offeredlargelybecauseit is feared that,without toppedup
20 financed salaries,the most capablepersonnelwillbe luned into internationally projectsor, better-payingparastatal, or (where this is an option) into the privatesector. There is littledoubt that salarysLpplementshave a corrosive and distorting effect on civil servicemoral& and management. Host important, reform in the longer of meaningfulstructural they undermine the possibilities aspect of this problem is that in many instances the term. The insidious the Bank's are tho donors, includingthe Baik. This is so despite offenders overt policy of not financinggovernment salaries. Zn a few instances,innovationshavo been proposed to deal vith this donorscontributed$ U.S. 6 million to form problm. In Bolivia,intornational a foundation to finance 500 key high level government positions -- all performanceevaluated-- outside of the budget and outside of the Da' targets for the wage bill. While thiswas not seen as a long-termsolutionto the salary problem, it was viewed as a means to bring som order to tho chaotic pay suppleeont situation. In Ghana, tho Bink assistedan innovativeSkills for key governmentpositions Scheme to finance local consultancies Mobilization essentialto the economicrecoveryprogram. Fees for these coniultancies were to be at local privatesectorrates -- well over civil servicelevels-- and the by servinggovernment employees. The idea was positions were not to be filled to attract skilled professionalsfrom the private sector, and porhaps even debatoover the repatriateskilledGhanaianslivingoverseas.After considerable tems of these contracts,the schem was made operational,but appearsto have have been individuals forty-one At time of writing, had little impact. roster, on a consultants for the scheme and registered identified as eligiblo but only threegovernmentslotshave actually been filled through thismechanism.
Attempts to There are various aspects to the salary supplemont problem. were salaries and parastatals sovernment approach parity betveen central if not alvays fully carried out, in Jamica, Ivory Coast and contemplated, Bolivia. Such attemptssometimesresult in a no-win situation. First, the equalizationof state enterprisesalaries with those of central government agenciesis often not achievable;all that can be accomplishedis to narrow the gap betweenthe two in order to stem the flowof qualifiedstaff fromone to the other and to mitigatesomewhatthe resentmnt of civil servantsat receiving Second, even in cases where parity has been relativelylower salaries. to performanceof stateenterprisesthemselvescannot legislated, the incentives help but be negativelyaffected. To the degreethat parastatalsbehavemore like -enterprises or competitive central government agencies than private vith regard to salary and personnel policies -- parastatal particularly performanceis likelyto suffer. Institutional ArrangementIssues in programsto reducethe sizeand containthe The Bank's interlocutor(s) cost of the civil servicehave generallybeen the Hinistry of Financeand the 4inistry of the Civil Service. The tendencyof the Bank to centralizeits socus on these core agencieshas occasionallyoversimplifiedthe complicatedmap of
institutions involved in variousphases of cost-containment.In the Ghana case, the failureto perceiveand bring on board the entiretyof agenciesinvolvedin 1 2 In other the process resulted in design mistakes and delaysin impl¶mentation. instances, the failure to understand thatinstitutional arrangoments in countries are more decentralizod and less controllablethan donors would like (or are accustomedto) has led projectdesignersto underestimate the potentialfor noncompliancewith reformobjectives. Again in Ghana, the exclusion of the Ghana Education Service from redeployment .discussions contributed to a misperception of the chances for post-freezerecruitmentof teachers. Internal Bank nroceduresare also factors affectingthe outcome of the reforms ezperiencesdiscussedabove. Onne lemnt increasinglyrecognizedas crucial to the preparationof pay and employmentprogramsis diagnosticsector work in anticipation of and in conjunction with SAL design. Much of the uneven progress noted at various points in this paper in the Ghana reformprogrimmight well have been mitigated by adequate diagnosticwork that mapped out the strength.and weaknessesof the institutions that would need to be involvedin the program. An 'institutional assessment' of this type might have resultedin a strategywhich establishedthe objectives, and the ways to reachx them,of each step of the reformprogram.
of Cost Containment
The above discussionhas focusedmainl" on aspectsof implementation of government pay and employmnt reforms through Bank operations. Although a fair amount can be determined about how these programs are working from this implementational perspective, a sense of the real contribution of these reform programscan only be achieved by looking more closely at their outcomes and trying to assess the degree to which they have accomplishedtheir stated objectives. (Noteagain that the usualwarningsobtainabout the limitedextent and low qualityof the data.) Wase Bill Imoact The primary objectiveof most reformswag to reduce the aggregatewage bill. To what extenthas this occurredin recentyears? Is there any way to linkchanges(positive or negative)in the wage bill to Bank-sponsored government pay and employmentreforms? (Table 8 shows wage bill trends for selected countries).For the fifteen countrieswith available data in which either the Bank -- through a SAL or a TAL -- or an DMP program sponsoredreform,ten (twothirds)had wage bill increasesfor the last two years. Moreover,this group includedthose countriesin which the reformprogramhad progressedfurthest, such as Ghana, Jamaica, Guinea, and the Gambia. In only four countriesdid the wage bill decline in absoluteterms. In nine countries, wages and salaries rose 1 2A
noted by J. rait oavis In -Revlew and Evaluation of Ghana's Clvil Servlce Refor. Programm," Consultant's Report, ATPS, World Bank, October, 1989.
salariesrose as a percentageof total expondituros. Moreover,the percentage of total expenditureson goods and servicesor materialsand supplies, the indicatorof the availability of necessaryinputsfor governmentstaff,declined for seven out of the group and rose only for four. (For Togo, the percentage of currentexpendituresspent on goods and servicesdeclinedfor .he last year of availabledata). For the other four countries,data were not available. To repeat, these data are not very robust and it would not bo vise to overgeneralizefrom them. Indeed,theremia be any number of good reasons why the wage bill rose in these countriesthat are completelyumrelatedto civil service refou programs. It is not possible to explain reliably the idiosyncraticreasonsfor each vage bill increase. Even for cases where it is possibleto probo data more deeply, the reasonsfor increasesin the wage bill 13 can be very ambiguous. Moreover,even at the aggregatelevol, the time lag between reform and impactmay bo longer than can bo captured in the available figures. It is possiblethat these resultswill only be visible 1-nfuturedata
sets. It shouldalsobe noted thatpersonnelexponditure trendsoftendo not show up in the aggregatewage bill figures. They can be hidden in the budget in myriad other (often non.itemized)categories. Thus, som of these wage bill figuresmay actuallyunderstatethe total amount of personal emolumentsfor a given year. Taking all these caveats into account,however, the data suggest that the impactof these reform programs on aggregate wage bill reductionis negligible. The increase in overall wages and salaries expendituresmay be due to
generalpay hikes awarded to civil servantsto alleviatethe erosion that had been affectinggovernmentsalariesin many countries-- again, especiallyin Africa. As has been pointed out earlier in this paper, this general wage erosion affecteddifferentclasses of civil servantsdifferently,and higher levelprofessionalssalarieshad fallento dangerouslylow levelsin many cases. Thus, the possible 'good newsv in a higher aggregatewage bill might be the decompressionof the salary structurefrom top to bottom. Data on wage compressionare poor. Table 7 shows changes in only six cases. Of these,half the wage structuresshoweddecompression and half showed compression. Lookinga bit more closelyat individualreformprogramsit seems clear that Ghana has made progress in decompressingits salary structure,and Bank staff confirm improvedmorale among upper echelonpersonnel. In the CAR, it would appear that not much decompression has occurred. And the compression situationsin Guinea ane tho Gambia are less encouragingstill. Deepite reform programs,vages have actuallybecome more compressed. In the Gambia, this is especiallydisturbingsince a hotly debatedsalaryincreaseof approximately25 13 In 8u/lvla, for example, where ore detailed analytic work has recently been eoapleted on pubilc sector wage and employmenttrends, the Increase might be explalned by a rise In employment (perhaps with declining average wages) or an Increas'. In average real salarles. The data for that country are so ambiguousthat It Is ilpossible to argue eIther case with confidene. See Barbara Munberg, 80oliv/C:A Review of Public Pay and EmJioyment Issues' 1990.
percentwas awardedin 1988. Another possible explanation of wage bill incresses m3ght be the rationalization of the romunerationstructure. As noted, non-wagebenefits and allowanceshave traditionallyconstitu.edan importantcomponent of the package. These benefits have oftcen been unevenl overall compensation distributedand have rarelyboen linkedto performance-based criteria-- or eve need. In most countries informationabout these benefit structures i unavailableto policy makers. And, of course,the more important the non-wag benefitcontributionto the overallcompensation package,the more i: is likel to distort the generaldistributionof remuneration,thus making culculation of compressionratios among various .evelsof the civil serviceat.best onl indicative of real remuneration relationships. EuDlo7ment Reductions In the absence of clear improvements on the fiscal side, the overal objectiveof employment reductionretainsimportance. Has this been achieved Table 9 shows the limiteddata availableon employment under these programs? trends for selected countrieswhich have undergonesome form of employment refosm. For the fifteencountriesfor which data are available,eightwere able to reduce goverumentemploymentduring this period. Among these, out (Ghana) experiencidslippagethrough new recruitment in the Education Service. Two reductions in recent others - Jamaica and Cameroon-- experiencedsignificant Years,but then reversedthe trend slightlyduring the last year. For the other constant during the reform countriec, the rate ofIrowth remainedrelative4y period. In general,these reductionswere of smallmagnitude. The limitedimpact on the wage bill for those few cases where results have been even modestly encouragingmay be a functionof the very low levels of employmentcuts that. countriesare besig asked and are willingto make. Indeed,it may well be that reductions. more serious impact can only be achieved through more drastic It is also important to note that the savingachievedthroughgovernment to pay for the subsequent salary increases cuts were generally not sufficient avarded to correct previous civil servicewage erosion. Indeed, preliminary evidencefrom Ghana and the Gambia suggestthat aggregatepay increasesvastly outstrip the savings accrued by the retrenchment exercise. rTe discrepancy betweenthe relativelysmall fiscal savings of retrenchment and the generouspay hikes is partially explained by the extremewage erosion that had taken place in many countries in recent years. It is not likely that significantredress of this erosioncould be achieved through anything less than massive employee lay-offs,the likes of which have not been contemplatedor carried out in any of the presentcases. Finally,most employmentreductionhas takenplaceat the lowerpay levelsof the civilservice. Thishas tendedto mitigatethe financial impactof the redundancies.
TEMLCNGVIEW: CIVIL SERVICEHANAGEMENT
Short-term efforts te correct glaring and burdensome distortions in governmentpay and employmentpractices have clearly dominated the Bank's operationalagenda in civil service reform. However,with the advancementor completion of emergencysurgary, many governments -- vith Bank support -- have begun to focuson longer term issuesin civil service strengthening.The along view' transcends cost-containmentto concentrateon detailed, slower-paced and efficiencyof government reforms aimed at improvinglevelsof effectiveness administrative systems. The grand objectiveof these 'rationalist'reformsis to create or strengthena capacityfor petsonnelpolicyformulationand for dayto-daymanagementof the civil service. Underlyingthe longer-termapproachis that shorter-term measuresmust bo supportedby institutionalized the recognition systems that can sustainongoingreform. To the extent that developmentmanagement iaterventionsare linked to from the oublic administration policy-based reforms, they may be distinguished assistanceactivitiesof other donorsworking in this field (particularlythe UnitedStatesAgencyfor International Development[USAID] and the UnitedNations Departmeatof Technology,Co-operation and Devolopment(UN-DTCj]).These latter have tended to engago ln eztensive,diffuse,trainingand improvement programs, with little policy focus and few links to often linked to particularprojects, precise,measurablo,institutional outcomes. In essence,
the Bank's long view, more rationalist'
reform programs aim
at: informationand civiLsorvices--personnel and management systems, more tightlylinkedto payrolls, including clear and appropriatecareer development schemes; audits, to determine vhat personnel is on hand; * staff • improved training systems; of the legal usually meaning simplification, * revision, frameworkgoverningthe civil service;and partly by the right people into the administration, * getting them, partly by strongerincentivesto attractand retain changingobjectivesand proceduresin an effort to make the and rewarding. work situationmore challenging * AAatalling-in-
of Civil service management reform has been dealt with in a series technicalassistanceprojects of relatively recent origin. The main activit es of these developmentmanagementoperationsare outlinedbolow. The discussion then raisesa set of importantimplementational issues,and concludesby drawing the first discernablelessonsfrom these operations'results. 23 TALshave supportedcivil servicemanagement Since 1981 approximately reformprograms. Most, thoughnot all, were in Sub-SaharanAfrica. Host of the operationshave been specifically linkedto institutional reformscontained 14somwof trese rALs were only partalaly devoted to developaent sanaegent Issues and thus cannot be strictly classifled as developnt can.gent projects.
25 in ALe (The remining have oecn supposedlyfreestanding projects,but even a fair number of these ha7e had an indirectrelationto SAL reform programs.) There is no formsl model for reform that can be applied uniformly across countries,but there are identifiablesets of activitieswhich most of these projectshave in c,imon. These measures are presentedbelow accordingto the phased order in wh.ch they usuallyoccur in the reformprocess.
Comoonentsof RationalistRefor-uUfiorts Data Collection
In the least developedcountrieswith weak reporting and records systems, the firstneed is to determinethe facts; i.e. to determinethe number,personal characteristics, skills,yearsof service,pay, etc., of the civil service. In some cases, there has been a coincidenceof this data collectionexerciseand a civil servicecensus (Mauritania,for instance). In others, such exercises may complementor supplant previous censuses which were methodologically flawed or did not go far enough in collecting pIrtinent information. This was the case for Whana and the Gambia, or example,. ' Vhilo tim-consuming and expensive, these data gathering and analysis exercises provide the data base for the establisheat of effective records managoomt practices. This means improving registry procedures and building systems for the ongoing collection, aggregation and analysis of personnel data. Even in the short run, a manpower data base for the civil service is essential to devising and implementingretrenchment strategies. They provide informationthat assists in the determination of priorityareas or ministries to undergo functional reviews (discussedbelow), for example, or they help establish the scope for staff savings in various employmentcategories. Introductionof ComputerizedPayrollFunctions Civil servicemanagementimprovementprogramsfinancedby the Bank often have includedsupportfor the rationalization and computerization of the payroll mechanism, usually located in the Treasury in the Ministry of Finance.
Senegal, Mauritania, Uganda are a few examples). In some cases this computerization has proceededon its own; in others, the payroll systemhas been linkedto the improvedpersonnelmanagement data base discussedabove. Explicit linksto the budgethave alsobeen forged. In severalcountries,implementation 1IOGhana, for exampie. the original 1986 civil servicoecensus and the manpower survey carried out by the Neadcount CommitteeIn 1987 to Identify ghost workers were successful In Indicating In broad terms the overall numbers and distributlon of civil servants, but were technically flawed In other ways that linited their usefulness as a imangment tool. For example, the data were collected and stored manually, making agregate analysis difficult and time-consuming;the population" was not clearly defined so that It was not possible to tell exactly what the percentage coverage or response was; certain key pleces of summarypersonnel informatlon were not collected; and, the surveys were 'one-off exercises with no provision for maintaining or updating Informatlon.
26 of this integrated system has not been carried out, but the management TALs have provided support for studies to produce recommendations and the technical rationale for the implantation of such a network. The integration of the personnel data and the payroll and hudgetary information is somewhat cumbersome administratively and institutionallyas it involves the coordination of various organs: ministries of finance and civil service, statistical institutes, computation centers and technical line ministries are usually all involved. But comprehensive and sustained control over personnel management functions cannot occur vithout a linked system. Furthermore, the greater the degree of decentralizationof personn_Lmanagement, the more crucial an integrated network becomes. Most governments (and several donors) have been easily seduced by the appeal of computerized payroll systems, but there has been greater resistance to the notion of an integrated payroll-personnelmanagement information system. Functional Reviews Functional reviews have been a common feature of Bank-sponsored civil service management reform efforts. Such reviews are in essence organizational audits on a sample or selected priority list of central government agencies. Their overall aim is to determine the appropriate match between types and numbers of staff, and tasks or functions of government. In adjusting countries, these review have sometimes been hurriedly devised and rapidly implemented. Thus, they have not always met the most rigorous standards of productivitv measurement. Nonetheless, functional reviews do represent a rough, often best available, effort to determine the appropriate number of perionnel and the type of skills necessar" to carry out the organizational objectives of various component parts of government. To some degree, the term, 'functional reviev' is a catchall for a range of related or similar activities, includingt 0JobInspections -- A job inspection program reviews the structure and staffing of agencies in government to determine: what work needs to be done to fulfill the organization's objectives; whether the organizational structure is appropriate for its activities;whether the staffing numbers, grades, and levels of responsibility are appropriate to the needs of the work; and, whether some degree of consistency is maintained across agencies. Orxanization and method studies constitute another instrument used in functional revievs. These are evaluations of the efficiency of a particular service provided in a similar way by several or many agencies, and where significant numbers of staff are employed. The aim is to identify main areas of weakness in performance, to find and remove bottlenecks, and, in sum, to simplify procedures. This process can yield significant staff savings as well as promote greater efficiency. *
A third technique used in functional reviews is budgetary analysis. This is an examination of financial data in an effort to pinpoint sreas where manpower are being inefficientlyemployed. This, it is assumed, automatically identifies potential targets for budgetary savings. One approach is to undertake analysis by exceptions for example, to pinpoint agencies where the proportion of personal emoluments to total expenditure is particularly high, or where trends in *
personnelemolumentshave deviatedsignificantly from observedtrends in other programexpenditure. Functionalreviews often use ratio analysis,a means of identifying potentialproblemareas requiringmore detailedpolicy reviews. Ratio analysis is tailoredto the precise functions and objectivesof the organization or sector concerned. Typical examplesincludemedical officer/bedratios, teacher/nonteachingstaffratios,agricultural eztensionofficer/population ratios,and cost of tax revenuescollected/taxcollector.These ratiosare then reviwed against governmenttargets to assist in highlightingregional disparitiesand, in particular,flaggingareas of apparentstaffshortagesor surplusesrelativeto the average. Ratio analysis is indicativeratherthan conclusive;it indicates needs for more specificpolicy reviews,and ultimatelyto more detailed plans for recruitment,trainingand staff developmnt. In the imediate, it helps identifyfunctionswhich are obsolete,overlappingor otherwiseredundant. *
The findingsof functionalreviewslead to the next phase in the sequence of administrative rationalization; the matchinaof existingpersonnelto ideal needs. In principle,this shouldresultin the identification and retentionof those individualswith appropriateand needed skills. It should also lead to the reassignment (and porhaps retraining) of staff superfluous to the requiremntsof the agencyunderreview,but who possess capacities and potential requiredelsewherein the system. Finally,it should identifythe individuals who are not needed,and shouldbe dismissedor porsuadedto leave voluntarily. Functionalreviewshave been utilizedin severalcountries(Ghana, Guinea, Benin,Gambia)to providea technicalbasis for decisions concerning employment cuts. Although thQ heavily rationalistprocess describedabove suggestsonly an ideal type, functional reviews of the sort described have enhanced the credibilityof redundancyprograms,in Ghana and the Gambia, for example. In both countries,as part of the adjustmentprocess, functionalreviews were conducted over a period of a few months. They vere mainly designed and administeredby internationalconsultants. In Ghana, the consultants,in conjunction with BritishOverseasDevelopment Assistance(ODA)-sponsoredoverseas training,succeededin transferringpersonnel reviewtechniquesto local staff in the ManagementServicosDivision of the Office of the Read of the Civil Service (OHCS). The result was that a corps of competentjob inspectorswas built from scratch. This successfultransferof technologyturnedout to be an importantand positivefeatureof the program. It not only boostedprofessional pride in the OHCS, but also extended a sense of Ghanaian ownership to the redeployment program. On th. other hand, job inspectors were not the highest priority among the manpower requirements of the Ghanaian civil service. Presumably, the demand for these
diminish considerably --
initial, cost-cutting phases of the redeployment program have been completed. In the Gambia, by contrast, virtually no on-site training of local staff was accomplished by the implementing consultants in the execution of functional reviews. The consultants attributed this admitted deficiency to a number of factors, including intense pressure to produce the reviews very quickly.
2S a that in both the Ghanaian and Gambian cases, It is worth noting in the first those effected number of employment cuts (and certainly substantial of the months of tho reform programs) were made izn advance' of the findings functionalreviews. However, these reviews did, reportedly,help in the of the second round of cuts. The reason is justificationand implementation as followst the second-roundtargetedreductionsfell on areasof less obvious 'fat, and tho data and recomendations of the functionalreviews provided decision-makers vith 'technical'and 'objectivoeinformationwith which to In Senegal, a processakin contest the variousgroupsopposedto the staff cuts. --.vs carriedout by audits to the functionalreviws .- calledorganizational trainingand troublea management and Methods (BOM), the Officeof Organization The audits President. shootingunit locatedin the prestigiousOffice of the consultants. by of DOM have progressedsuch more slowly than thoso performed perhaps in part because of difficultiesin winning the cooporationand support of key ministriesin the eandeavor.While there is an advantageto the national controlof the Senegaleseexercise,one must note the cost of the suail?space at which policy actionsstewLing from these review have materialized.
Trainina or in short on-the-job, either servants of civil training In-service management service civil of a number of feature a been have abroad courses has projects of focus main the Mauritania) (Malaiw, cases ra several projects. a Mauritania, Zn institutes. training sorvice civil beon on strengthening Management the Development through financed study was "training needs assessment' of between the Institute and a twinning arrangement was established Project, (ENA) Administration of in France and the National School Public Admi44stration service of higher level civil training to carry out in-service in Mauritania institution EA -- once a stale The experience has been promising. personnel. -for new civil' service recruits training on preoservice focused exclusively has turned its attentionto improving the skillsof government personnel already government's commitment to Training in thus serving to reinforce in service. improve qualityand reducequantityin the civil service. Development Project is the In Malawv, the sale focus of an Institutional trainingof higher and middle level managers in the civil service. Increasing for managementtraininghas long been viwed by capacity the modest national priority. This view has come to be shared by high extremely an Governmentas implmentationbottlenecksin adjustment recent the Bank, which has attributed personnel in the upper levelsof the trained of programs to the severe shortage of the Malawian the strengthening at aims Thus, the project service. civil Instituteof Management. InvolvedBank staff view this projectas a necessarycomponentto civil they are quickto point out that training servicemanagementimprovement.Still, and skills improvement are necessary but not sufficientconditionsfor reform. The crucialfact remainsthat there are few incentives,financialor otherwise, for newly trained and presumablyimproved managers to return to the civil Thus, the next and necessarystep vill be to pursueimproved personnel service. policies, incentive systems, pay and employment schemes, and performance
29 to date has been done under a evalustion. Host of the work on the project Canadian twinning oxercise which has worked well as a model for building training capabilities. Special
IncentiveSchemes for BiiherLevel Civil Servants
As discussedearlier, Weak incentives systems mean weak civil services. 'topping-up' mochanisms that circumvent civil service salary scales have been seen as a possibleanswer. They are used to attractand retainhighly skilled professionals into government service, in particular so they may perform key economic recovery program tasks. Topping-up mechaniss were explicitly funded in two TALS: tho Bolivia Economic Management Strengthening Operation (EMSO) -- to channel pooled extrafunded a non-govermental agency -- a 'foundation' budgetary rosources for koy posts; and the Ghana Structural Adjustment Institutioal Support (SAIS) project createda Skills HobilizationScheme to hire local consultantsfor governmentpositionsat salarieswell over civil sorvice levels. These schemeswere aimed at creating somethingakin to the establishodand enduring U.S. Sonior Executive Service. While they have succeededin gettingsome skilledpoopleinto governmentservice,they have so mechanisms,not as enduring far boon seen as short-term,incentivo-boosting institutions. Such instrumentsbave been includedin developmentmanagement projects in an attempt to impose a modicum of order on the haphazardarray of aechanisus creatod by govoriuts (and often suppettedby donors) to circumvent civil service remuneration constraints. Policy Studies Studies aimed at providing a technicaldata base for personnelpolicy service reform formulation have been an important component of many civil operations. Development management projects have financed studies to examine salary policy, personnel current practices and reoa mnd future actions on: general employment system creation and maintenance, management information A and career development for civil servants. policy, civil service training, such numboerof studies have focussed on important but poorly understood topics, as the system of fringe benefits and bonuses in Senegal. Host of these studies the needed and feasible were intended to produce action programs specifying steps of furtherreform. It has been arguedthat studieshave sometimessubstitutedfor or delayed action,as in Bolivia and Senegalfor example. The idea is that the Bank and governmentsuse studiesto avoidbringinga conflict,or potentialconflict,to a damaginghead. This cynicismis not entirelyjustified,however;studieshave oftenproducedseriousthoughtaboutimportantand contentious personnelissues, includingwhat is the appropriateand affordablerole for state agencies,and what is the proper size and cost of the civil service. Studies have supplied recommendations that form the concrete basis for Bank-countrydialogueon these topics.
in Development Hanasement
Although many of the activitiesdiscussedin the precedingsection have begun to be impl-emented, several issues meriting attentionhave already
The discussion that follows highlights t4v key points;
most frequentlyby Bank staff workingon these projects. One perhaps unavoidable but nonothelossworrisome feature of these developmentmanagementoperationsis the short-termperspectiveon which they are based; i.e., tho quite limitedeztent to which they have begun to address the longer-torm management Issues.
As noted, the bulk of supported activities
assists SAL cost-containmentmessures. The emphasis on the short-term is understandable but costly. It often comes at the expenseof attentionto longterm strategyand the need to build enduring,sustainablemanagementsystems. In Ghana, for example,with the exceptionof preparingjob inspectorsto carry out tasks in supportof the retronchment exercise,little trainingto build up basic ad4mnistrative skillsof the civil servicehas yet takenplace. In Guinea, the prime goal of TAL I was to reduce numbers in the civil service. So far, therehas been littlesupportfor the resolutionof longer-term,structuralwage issues. A censusof the civilservicewas performed,but therehas not yet been a follow-up to build an iafomation management system to install modern, impartialpersonnelreviewand controlpractices. In the Gambia, the follow-up staff inspoctionprogramwhich was to be carried out by trainedGambiansunder the supervision of ODA long-term technical advisors in the post-retrenchment periodhas ground to a halt, possibly due in part to this failure to internalize these activitiesin the earlierphases of the reform process,and to the lack of comitment to long-term administrativereform by both government and the Bank.
As noted, in several instances computerized data managementsystemshave been installedfor personnelrecordsand these systemshave been linked to the payroll and the budget. This is an accomplishment. But the.absence of a strategicframeworkfor ongoingcivil servicemanagementis troublesome.In the Central African Republic, for example, concerns have been expressed about inadequate attention to factors essential to civil service performance improvementst career development,training,incentivestructures,performance evaluationsywtems,etc. The fear is that unless such changes are implemented, even a smallercivil servicewill remainunproductive.The fundamentalquestions are the long-termonese What kind and size of civil service does the country need? How should lt plan to get there? What should be the ultimate purpose of the reviews of the various legal texts regarding the wage system, the indmiity system,the rightsand responsibilities of civil servants over the long haul? The absence of a strategy has not always been due to the overridingnature of short term SAL demandsor the assumptionthat cost containmentis everywhere and always the first priority. In somw Lnstancesit has been due to a deficit of vision or coherencein the reform programitself. In Jamaica, for example, the Administrative ReformProjectconsistedof a seriesof largelyuncoordinated activities-- including revision of classification systems and pay surveys -the strategicvalue of which was not clearlydefined.
There have been cases in which aversionto strategicconsiderations was the product of consciouschoice. In Bolivia, creating a pool of comparatively skilled and well paid civil servants, to fill key government posts, was accomplished -- withoutenormousdifficulties -- through the EconomicManagement SupportOperation(EHSO). But governmentinterestin larger policy questions (or even studies)on such questionsas overall pay and employmentlevels, or career developmentpolicies,was conspicuously absent. Accordingto observers, gove-ment reticencecould be tracedto the politicalimplications of personnel policy reform: the rationalization of civil serviceincentivesand employment policies would eliminate political patronage opportunities which are alternatively distributedto the 'ins'and 'outs'duringelectoraltransitions. There is thus no clear constituencyfor restructuring the system. In some cases, strategicpolicy concerns have been crowded out by componentsthe usefulnessof which is more iimediatelyapparentto governments. In Mauritania,for example,computerization of the personnelmanagementsystem, whichenjoysconsiderable governmantcomsitment, has beenproceedingon schedule. But a numberof delayshave takenplace in the preparationof a seriesof policy studies. It may be that changesin administrative technologyare perceivedas less threateningpoliticallythan overt examinationof existingpolicies (even though the applicationof the technologymay rendertransparentabusesand fraud by exposing'ghost'workers and doublesalaries,etc.) Zffortsin theseoperationshave concentrated on reformingsystemsin the core ministries of finance and civil service. The costs and benefits of establishina clear linkagesbetweencentralministriesand decentralizedorians have not been well addressed. In the JamaicaAdministrative ReformProject,for e-aple, decentralized personnelunitswere to be set up in lineministriesto coordinatewith the centralMinistryof the Public Service. Nowever,training of sectoralainistry staff never occurred,as the centralministrywas loathe to relinquish control of personneladministration. The questionof sapropriate technoloi' and the capacityof borrowersto internalizenew managementsystemsand procedureshas been an issue in several civil service management operations. Ghana and Mauritania provide two contrasting experiences in this regard. In Mauritania,computerization of the personnel management system occurred through the application of a technical package thatwas developedthroughelaboratefine-tuning by Tunisianconsultants, contractedthrough a twinning arrangementbetween their governmentand the Ministry of the Civil Service. Intensive interaction over a period of many months resulted in a system neatly tailored to the Mauritanian context. Mauritanians were carefully trained, and by the end of a year, were ready to take over the system. Bank staff report that the twinning approach worked so well in Mauritania because of the cultural affinity between the Tunisians and the Hauritanians; and becausethe Tunisians had just lnstalled a similar system in their own country. From the outset, this system was designed to be comprehensive, connecting the payroll and the personnel records of the Ministry of the Civil Service. The design of a comprehensive system grow out of a detailed diagnostic study undertaken as part of Bank sector work on public sector managemnt in Mauritania. Adequate preparation, detaileddiagnosis,appropriate technology,sensitivelydelivered: these are the buildingblocksof success.
32 In Ghana,by contrast,the link betweentha computerizedpayrollsystem- completedearly in the adjustment programbecause of its importanceto demand management-- and a proposedcomputerizedpersonnelmanagementsystem came as en afterthought. Where the Tunisians had carefullycrafted a package for the workingin Ghana the expatriateconsultants needsof the Mauritanians, particular estimated to take only six months to proposed an off-the-shelf-technology, of the linkage is, at time of writing,underway;and install. The establishment it may well work. Still, it seemslikely that therevill be A tradeoffbetween among Ghanaians. speed of installationand the degree of internalization Tho simple and obvious lesson to be drawn from these contrasting experiences is
that dilferent circumstances dictate different approaches.
Hauritaniswas ready from the outset for a comprehensiveapproach, in part because of earlierdiagnosticwork and in part becauso of the good will towsad the Tunisianconsultants. Although successivechanges in the MLinisterof the necessary the degreeof consensus-building CivilServicecreateddiscontinuities, amog variousparts of governmentto win supportfor tho projectwas relatively modest. Ghas presented a much more fractiousand fragmentedcontest,in which each stepof the reformprogramhad to be sold to a videly diverseconstituency. resistanceto reform, that the Ghanaianswould It is unlikely, given the initial have 'bought" a comprehensive personnel system as part of a grand civil service reform strategy so early in the reform program. Indeed, a good deal of the work quite has been performed of the consultants in Ghana -- which overall .- has been gradually to gain the confidence of their counterparts successfully and therebybuild support for the reform program. in TALs and SALs betwega develonmentmnaszement efforts The relationshin SALs pushed these complained that staff. Many is an issue raised by Bank the time that Most estimated too fast. operations management developDnt vas about half of what was actually required allocated for activities officially is that TALs not linked to for implement4tion.The other horn of the dileia SAL conditionality were viewed as 'toothless,'and implementationof these projectswas made thatmuch more difficult. Thus, in civil service freestanding reformthe Bank seemsfacedwith a difficulttrade-offbetweenrealistic,longerand leverage. term timetables In a number of instances,the sequencintof reforms throuth TALs was haphazard. Sometime, a component could not proceed becausean unrelatedaspect up loan thus holding of the TAL or the companion SAL would be delayed, or disbursement. This sometimesseriouslythrew the phasingof the effectiveness In some instances,sequencingof service reform items off-balance. civil had to be alteredbecausethe time requiredto build consensusamong activities key actors had been seriouslyunderestimated. In other cases, the Bank's playerswas inadequate. understandingof tho network of principalinstitutional for a component was aistakenly negotiated vith in at least one instancesupport the wrong agency. The relationship betweenthe Bank and other donors has figuredimportantly in development management operations. Other donors suchas the UNJDTCDand USAID have been active on these issues in a number of countriesin which the Bank is supportingcivil service reform. (Guinea, Ghana, Bolivia and Uganda are examples). The lack of coordinationor a clear divisionof labor among these
33 effortshas resultedin overlappingor conflictingagendas,where there should be complementarity. Lack of agreementaboutterms-of-reference for consultants, operatingschedules and styleshas presentedproblems -- with varying degrees of seriousness -- in Jamaica,Gambia and Ghana,for example. Delays in project implementationhave ensued.
The familiarlament that staff weeks for supervisionwere inadeLuateto imolementation requirements was particularly poignant for thesooperations.This was true for Bank stafftime and for expertconsultancies. For some aspects of dewelopment management, such as the computerization of payroll and personnel records schemes, specialized skills have to be sought outside the Bank; but in and therifore generalist Bank staff several cases, resources were not available thel,felt -- highly technical were forced to superviso -- often inadequately, components. 3.
What the above diseussion of experience suggests is that this group of managemnt operationsconstitutea firstgenerationof projectswhose doevlopment objectivesare, for the most part, tied to the overallagenda of SALs. As such, theyhave only begun to scratchthe surfaceof what is requiredto construct(and civil services.Indeed, sometimes reconstruct) well-managedand well-performing in this area have left untoucheda wide for the ost part, Bank lnterventions range of longer-term, structural issues whose resolution is essential to
sustainableimprovements in governmentadministrativecapacity.These include thereform and institutionalization of systems, procedures and, most importantly. reforms are incentive structures. This study shows that as the shorter-term played out, the need to affecttheseunderlyingsystemicproblemsthroughsecond is becoming more evident, as is their and third generations of projects The uncertain and sometime apparently intractable nature of these complexity. reform project in Jamaica, issues has already felled one successor administrative a more narrow approach to iastitutional where tho Bank is now pursuing development through a financial management project to follow upon the first Administrative Reform Project. A key conclusionis that avoidingcivil servicemanagementproblemswill complex and not make them go away. Some staff argue that the inherently uncertain nature of civil service reform places the field outside the Bank's comparative advantage. They argue, or hope, that on this issue the Bank should in the definition of economically rational policies; confine itself to assisting i.e., tho appropriate and affordable size of the wage bill. But it is wishful thinking to believe that one can separate the formulation of policy from its implementation. For prime example, the Bank cannot simply identify X thousand surplus personnel, and then assumethat the totality of the job of removingthem will be carriedout by the governmentor a bilateraldonor. The challengefor the Bank is to designprojectswhich have measurableshort-runcost-containment outputs,but to do so in the contextof a strategyto solvethe more fundamental managementproblemsin the long run.
Despite the oft-mentioned data constraints affectingthe subjectand the findingsof this paper, some lessons to guide presentand future civil service reform are emerging. These can be summarized as follovs: * The impact of Bank grograms to contain the cost and size of civil servicesthrough emergency pay and employmentreformshas so far boen negligible. Zfforts in mest countriesto reduce the wage bill and to decreasethe number of civLl service employeeshave yielded minimal results. Moreover,attempts to correct distortions in the structure of pay and employment through the decompressionof wages and the rationalization of the remunerationsystem have had but limitedsuccess. This disappointing recordsuggeststhat reformsto date have been insufficiently ambitiousin scope to bring about the degree of change that is needed. Meaningfulchange is going to requiremore forcefulreforms.
- The questionof whethermore aggressivereformsare feasibleis partly a technicalbut mainly a politicalissue. As mentionedin earlier sectionsof this paper, the political*conomyof pay and employment reformsneeds further conceptualand analyticalwork. Nonetheless,it is possibleto hypothesize from the few *xamples of countrieswhere programshave been carried out that the politicalcosts of implementing pay and employment reformshave been lower than most governments(and perhaps even the donors) had anticipated. Organized oppositionto reformshas not resultedin regime destabilization, and social upheavalas a resultof dismissalshas not occurred. In part, this may have been a function of the surprisingcapacity of private sector labor markets -particularlyIn agriculturaland informal sectors,and particularly, but not exclusivelyin Africa -- to absorb surplus government workers. It may also have been a functionof the unexpectedly goodhandlingof politicalfactors,including the skill with which regimes generated supportingcoalitions and managed contestinggroups, for example. What this suggests is that.quite possibly regimes can (for political reasons) and must (for economic reasons)make deeper cuts. How far any given governmentcan push these reformsis, of course,unknown. But the relatively mild consequences of the minimal reforms undertaken so far can, it is hoped, influencegovernments'Derceptionsof politicalrisk and encouragethem to take bolder actions in the future. * Most of the middle-rangeemployment reduction mechanisms such as voluntarydepartureschemes and early retiremnt programs may be useful and politically astute,when appliedin combination with more stringent retrenchment measures. But they have not yet proven to be effectivein reducingemployment in any significant manner. Thus, they do not providE a substitute for biting the bullet through explicit dismissals. * Technicalanalysisand supportactivitiessuch as functionalreviews and competency testing, for example, have been useful in providing a rational
35 basis for cost-containment measures. Their major contribution, however, !ay be the symbolicassurance they providethat the reform process has been undertaken with fair and equitableintantions. * Retraining, redeployment, credit and public works programs for redundant employees have certainly had a utility, but one more symbolic and political than economic. From a financial and technical perspective such programs have had limitedimpact and have provedadministratively difficult. * Som Bank supported reformprograms have promoted interimsolutionsto pay and employmnt problems through specialized incentive schemos for topping up executive level salaries for key goverment posts,or, more broadly, by widely supplementingcivil service salariesthroughdonor financedactivities. Most observers familiar with the use of these mechanismsrecoaize thoir liitations and costs. The problemis that noither hard-pressed governments nor operational staffhave alternativemeans as their disposal. Still,what must be recognized is that these salarysupplementmethodsdo not providoenduringanswersto the fundamntal problems of civil service incentives;indeed, they ultimatsly underminethe likelihoodof devisinga durablesolution. The Bank should not encourageor support such mechanismsin the absence of an action strategyfor long-termstructuralreformas in governmentpay and employmentpolicies. * Most Bank activitiesin civil service reform have concentrated, masures. Considerablymore understandably, on the short-termcost-containment ephasis will have to be given to longer-term management issues if sustained capacity is to take place. The first improvee nt in government administrative now underway have taken an generation of development management projects needs to be paid to devising important step in this direction. More attention a coherent, over-arching strategy for civil service reform, and detailing the by which the strategic goals will be achieved. set of tactics
* Technical Assistance Loans dealing with civil service management issues expertise requiremore staffsupervision time and more resources for specialized suggestthat these factors than has previouslybeen allocated. Most estimsates need to be more or less doubledto ensure successfulimplementation.
* TechnicalAssistanceLoans in Development Management require more time While this is wellprojects. to prepare and implement than do infrastructure recognized, they are too often short-changed in this regard by their dependence requirements of structural adjustment on both the scheduling and substantive lending. On the other hand, such TALs profit from the association with both the policy focus and the increased leveragethat SALs provide. Without SALs, many civil servicereformsin TALs have no 'teeth'. * Many of the institutional obstaclesto carrying out vitally needed civil service reforms can seem overwhelming and insuperable, especially when confronting the 'long-haul' problems. Indeed, the mixed record so far on many of these issues could discourage further efforts. A frequently observed response to this state of affairs has been to decry the Bank's lack of 'comparative advantage' in this field. But a retreat from civil service management reform is tantamount to a denial of the crucial importance of government administrative capacity to implement economic and social programs. A more realistic approach
36 is to try to learn through trial
and error haowto make such programs vorli better.
37 ?AALZ L
CIVIL SUZYCt UiOiU COCIONKWIS La/Cr
CAR CAR CAR
SAL I SAL 21 teao Mt proj ect TAL TAL 11 a1 TAL SAL I SAL 11 I ICo Mgt SuppOrt SAL Dev Mgt SAL 11 TAL III SAL IZI 1D Proj *ct SAL SAL 11 SAL III D0VCMgt SAL I SAL 1I Pub Ada SAL I SA Inat Support SAL 11 SAL I TAL 11 SAL 1S Pt & tEo Mgt ProjOct SAL ECaOgc & ID
Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr
1732 1916 1971
81/05 85/04 86/09 88/06 J8/12
(MS3M) 4.00 8.00 14.00 40.00 13.20
Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr Cc
1307 1434 1844 1259 1659 1926 1963
82/12 83/12 87/09 83/03 86/02 88/06 88/11
10.40 14.20 65.00 9.50 25.00 65.00 14.50
Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr
1812 1865 1599 1600 16W. 2036
87/06 87/12 85/05 85/05 85/12 89/06
15.00 210.00 27.80 6.20 30.00 11.30
Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr Cr
20.00 20.00 45.00 17.00 5.00 23.00
Cr 1777 Cr 1778
86/02 86/02 87/05 88/05 86/08 89/06 81/12 87/04 87/04
20015 1798 1935 2019 1789
89/04 87/05 88/06 89/05 87/05
120.00 10.00 9.70 23.40 9.00
Cr 1831 Cr 1832
MaL Uganda Uganda Gulma CuL±ea GuLnea Cutnea MauriLania Mauritania TolO Togo Malawi Kalawi Niger
S'niga1 Snegs.L S4nfegal Gaabia Gambia Ghana Ghana Chan Chna Guinea Bissau GUL3a±naissau Guinea BLssau Sud4n Zaire Zaire
Cr Cr Cc Cr Cr
1656 1802 1910 1730 2032
LAKOPMAT'IONS TI= CTT ST t ING ISTtS
TABLE 3 C
SeadleeSuagwelUead CS Ceases sltudes
s.ngladoeb SIC 64n4gsdolg Sr CAR SAL Coasa Bitc SAL GuaAs& VAL Bagel SAL JamaSic PA Jamaics SAL Sit Haeigaaia Pt Hlaug&anA TAL Bigot SAL race SAL Sene&ga SAL All Slt Lank. U10 tkastad SAL I Iailand SAL II waga VAL fit
.1 leg UlSIWeca
CAB SAL CAM SAL I Gaml SAL Cho" tAL C"eae SAL Jsica SAL 1I #&a&de Sc USand VAL SI C_-g. SAL Semeg&& SAL III WoHa&asiana SAL Del vi. G"ealne aa.. SAL
- - -- - -- -- -- - -- - - - - - - -
Ba4ngldea CAM SAL CM TAL It CGhna SAL Ghana TAL Hale VAL
Hauscanas SAL Hauaslgao SAL Siamene SAL Senegal TAL
- - - --
Wage Slkgauie PseClag-m.
Ian#60* EBe_ j Cutulag
Uganda £uBC us"SPASee.Soms,ba Z rilecipo SAL comag... SA - - - - -- - -Gab.., - - - SAL -- - -- - -- TSeanial SAL
Benlanc SAL Coage SAL lela.o SAL
of s ageD 1
Bangladeh ItC Bagladash IPA Malawi& CAB SAL Cases Bite VAL t GJmble S&L Gb... SAL Gb.& tAL Guls. SAL Nola& SAL Haal& VAL Janaice PA Jamect- SAL illg H"agtaenle SAL ^aealgaa sism t Kiget SAL lPet. TAL Senegal SAL Siege& Leea" SAL thailand SAL I Shalsand SALII. Soo. SAL III
U-se.sel * gegema
Bolivia CAB SAL
t& SL Ga-m SAL ha. SAL fbs" VAL G".Aoa SAL CG p." SAL 1.lg. SAL Baig& SAL Haseiag&eal SA Mitc SAL geegt SAL IS Susagep SAL 11 tekep e SAL illt Ug"an EBC Ceage, SAL Gaboo SAL Sea Tos 6 luln0alpe SAL Cmwome a. SAL Gaben SA
Bolivia SIC CAR SAL CAa VAL 1 Cases, UeSAL Gamble SAL C Ghana SAL CSha tAL Seal.. SiAL GuVa_ SAL Badgl. SAL HatirSaala SAL Sesegal SAL At "la" Bisau SAL Laos SAL Comeae SAL Ceag SAL Bealas SAL
Cscs,siCb_Iaag IneSs.i_ r essl ram lezlee..
8eAgiedeeb ft CAB S&L CAR VAL a I Cmii. S&L &aC SAL "han TAL GC.le.. SAL J_amIc. II Jamaica SAL il
Hauglgeala SAL regu SAL Sosagal tAL S-eg tAL III tuSgeh SAL V Uganda VAL SO
Cae.eWasBt SAL 9 t SAL epal Moal. SAL Conge SAL Goimea - - - - Bissau - - - - -SAL - -- - -- - - -- - -- - -- - -
- - --
- --- --
ilLMOiWgu OL&OCTION a6ceaMuaa F I
. 55 lb
*.wie *IIetesu5 abile
- 1 51 *2
54459 Ic se- ee4
tbs. ldipac boa bass iAGaMd bi Gvecamm.at eaeos s£ Lb. b.a is Gualm"| Caaaabc Osh' Nacbaos.eft. la Lb. ease .1 G.lessa lead.ol Isg.s eke *9460-Sew eaul.apsaa.. ftlsea so elaae.as ol- she &"s. *1 dolea. l so-eloss 2bos. e4-asagaed
&&1 vwlldosed eSe Lg . pbeCa&."
sochileal ba_b a"
aod lv1uaasi. of Gb.... Cavil heiwic. Salem Uega. - sIn9. J. Wage "via. at 4doe lest. de so leecilos publq.-S'. Guido *.-. egd 4-Cau1soA. l*^osevawi wish &S glos rap &ad Lole"We.'. tlose I siudp. tlb Go"bl AdrAlesa.5.avo seom lftea..a.
~~~SYAIIC! n PdR"U!A1 rct
Ghana £nd of Service avard
4 inonths basic salary 2 months basic salaryon termination cimos complecedyears of service
1 years salarypaid on a monthly basis
40 monchs salary and all cuualatedemployee contribution cowards Che pens on fund
Aaounc 400000 450000 500000
aaouncs Index 207.312 332-560 580-773
7874!050 1129- 347
650000 700000 750000 800000
14064'525 16044L980 2139-2614 Abovo 2164
Sources:Councry Scaff & Recul des Texces Scacucairesdo la Fonc.ion PubLI4ue Culneonno
C0) =1Tf!w01 C]3TL SflYTC!Rl'N.TTom Country
a Benefits as
Salary as % of
1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988
11.93 12.24 12.63 15.65 20.57 21.88.
88.07 87.76 87.37 64.35 79.43 78.12
1980/85 1988 1989
25.37 44.86 43.00
74.63 55.14 57.00
38.00 40.00 43.00 41.00
62.00 60.00 57.00 59.00
-- i984 __CA&u--------1985 1986 1987 Cameroon
Scaff estimates,Coopers& Lybrand report Country staff, de La Fonceion Fublique Pro5raiwe d. Reduction" 'Efficacsie (Senegal). Daca provided by the CGablan authorities.
(USSa) Sao Tome & Principe Congo Gabon Gabon Benin Cameroon
SAL SAL SAL TAL SAL Eco Mgt
Cr Ln Ln Ln Cr Ln
1825 2866 2933 3114 2023 3110
87/06 87/06 88/04 89/08 89/06 89,07
4.00 70.00 50.00 5.00 45.00 9.00
2866 2097 2256 1349 1655 2037 1987 2321 2441 2962 1948 2204 2315 2423 2478 2518 2519 3005 1703 1977
89/07 82/03 83/03 83/04 86/02 89/06 81/05 83/06 84/06 88/06 81/02 82/09 83/06 84/05 84/11 85/04 85/04 88/12 86/05 88/12
70.00 104.50 175.50 12.00 200.00 40.00 300.00 300.80 376.00 150.00 14.00 1O.20 60.20 4.50 55.00 80.00 3.50 100.00 55.00 9.70
Carnroon Thailand Thailand Bangladesh Bangladesh Laos Tuzkey Turkey Turkey Tunisia Guyana Peru Jamaica Jam&Lca Jamaica Cosca Rica Cosca Rica Cosca Rica Bolivia Bolivia Dominica
Ln SAL Ln SAL I Ln SAL 11 Cr PA Cr IPC 13 Cc SAL Ln SAL 1S Ln SAL IV Ln SAL V Lu SAL Ln SAL Ln PS Lu SAL U1 La PA Ln SAL III Ln SAL I Ln TAL La SAL rr Cr RIC Cr Eco M5t scrcnpkleuing Cr SAL
44 TABLE 7
1985 1987 1988 1989
8.7 3.8 '.5 4.6
1 l 1 1
l19J0 1982 1983
7.8 7.3 6.8
Councry scAf. Dep-rcamenco de Inforuacics (Guinea oLssau) and dacs provided by the GambLan aucthoriCieos. Preiminry daca from OfRobinson: CLvil service pay in Africa (Geneva, ILO. forthcomLng)
-U 196**@[email protected]
It I t go6 It
of if' IC-* .ei ot
&co (99 eto
6 cc rr'g eCV *I D os,
99 6* re' cc "?c i6 sor c .4 DC
1 of cc'
Se nt cc
e w*apnp 79sealm t ) SaSi2 _ alms"2 *RMId (s) dsu awa89*19 (3) SaRSM
'st Li I8s
esMo .909 ct9?1 36t1 996t o09c 1oz OCICCOG 4139e t DeI UoVbe Ito9 eI ntos 3 oe,"0ot o090I o6ecot 00t 69' oo co906c 0s o0999 IOro o to 611 1 0oe9 IITo?et nes Soe"C e:occ 's"It 9001.06 K01 0016911 go seo1 WfOC'm s,0L :Cseu. D00191
@@@*@vX 13 990J.
01e¢ I IK
313 901 rIt9"S
in' s smin7Tmm& "m3 S"SoJitU" as" wm
WS*JPI9 (2) in5U1 IgYg ~wwej, wms7v19mn s UUS5mPgt Ci) S ts)__31 tsd Twsez/ C:) i8s_37 PR 0t goau" Stn:,I
~ 69~~ 996£
f1 0( 999t
_3 *. I TSg.aYL SMS, P
(Sinaj va cS "-771s6) oil
19 91 Di If01 Its I I ~99'!? 39 9i LI.
go 9 916
os Itc SPY?I
9l? 591i 99196!t 0109
999g 99-91 069!g 99t9 9o9o
9V61 096!S or9s 9?G9
0! 09t 391
9919 0051i'g I'
WO U* (138d CZ t) a-_-am
~ ~ ~ u. ina"ons nru 9`94I J s *e061 .~~~~~~~~
3s)UVto.L n 199
.St 790.3 U" VWtt} _S
SMISMASSS "Sol3 34M' &91 ITW¶P&
n",ei3 *_1 955a8W`11 flet
CZ) 69C 3901
*yeamm"oft 9sX Ct) U."8 989
_o& umm 7"OSIm
999its) 0_1 1 9 lei
SI&OWIves"*n8'uO C) *89937f3 oc _79903131K (!)
too l79 iniau s
"pro ' p*vi
W s^^Z._" 4696in"
C ,,s o&L.
.as _ u"iae 1*:'a.
*0e .. o 92.7
ta.LUgmmi.4 ~~&8/C.aaw 3~1S~agw (1) U8ICartamg lSht Sw (3) "SUIT" Lu&sgn (2 uSITesl _1ti"oaw (22 WU&8S"t RGI4 (2) NOUIteSal 6m (2)
4 01.88 30.43 2 .47 6.73 32.4 7.67.0
SWege (Slum of CIA From" i UItes salauLes. _" co"ad 4wrt.66 Ca.ain tue Teal.'Z~~~~~~~.aiLu~~~~~ae. Total Iin.e.. I O.SICMufuma 32.s~ax. (1) 481C.aavms bp..e1tia,. (1^ VA4?.saL g_..gLp.ag (22 G48UITSaIA ea4*at (2) 1ST*%a1 . e,.magm) &81?eU a.33 ma )
0 43.9 2..4 203 S.08 50.36 L1.6.1
4 486 .9.3 27.71 6.3
e39 2U." 2.32 9.*.n 52.62 2.5.2
roee (52.2.2.&o. of CIA ?CMOs) Wa5gg i4 Sta.LaL N4t.244*.e & 42. 'Cj svas Z
9 613 13 23 93 4.36 40.04 20.70
2*. 2U8.0 42.4 46.20 70,.10 75.00 2.~~~~23460 2.37.9So 09.90 " 742.0 33.32 24.64 40.7?o 1.44 20.13 2.-?7 34.4 32.36 3*. 3 34.63 6.9 43.38
14m61 (StlamLa .1 CIA Froesa) we.. MA SaLinas. coo"i _ se qaes Cm""% 3nq.LSwm reaMA gN13wt6 Total. * a W4S/CuvW1G IMuiWLeo (2) QUICMWOSU U__esue (2) V4IT8Sa toMitue (m) .CASTsta,& ZotA.aua e WUiTstal I.v.mmm SIT*CaaL les.om (3)
37.60 940 G
£9.2 3.2.4 12.0 .683 204.6 7 to0 44.7 t2.7.,
36.20 147. 0 702. .24.64 75.70 27.2.9 2. 30.99 33.33 3736 2 43.28
63.0 $4.64 216A 24.40 2.4 .5.54 U.2.7
30.30 13 so &9 '0 32 30 '6.20 9It 2.3t.60 '.39 .0 4.30zo 72 :20 34.75 .2.3' 43.2.7 t o- : *. " U.a99 Z#ZZ 37 6 *" 4 s0 ." 3
2.04.64 32.30 272.77 217.11 2303.2 01.70
LIL..60 be.0. 2.79.1 220.51 218.79 02.'4
26.40 2. 70 43.10
34 2a 2220 72 30
47 50 s
9 2.7 Z. .7
37.6 .o.00 56.40
44.34 25.34 29.41 9.32 24.71 2..2
292.23 .19654 232.02 2.' 04 331.23211 2 05 *2.J0 01.40
2'I.2: 2.I 2. 2 :. 50 .0
17 .0I '2 20
regal capmAlcs VWSCwgWmt 11 in.dIatmes (C!) MSSICwav 1_oitt.#o (2) W&SIT1ec&.& io.i&%gies (2) Res/teol, L _Z"Law. (z2 W&SIt?09 ROWmm (32
W"eeg 4" 1alaelg coo me sernise C.au.S 1awinLt9b Trsl £oagLuiss toGal lews wasi Cwfggg _o_L.uao C"IChues
306.30 5e33.3 243.9 30.77
533.06 2.239.00 3700.00
334.00 095.30 2.340 3314.46714.00 30744.00 720.9 2134.3 2391.0 4723.0 10931.0 .3049.00 524.2 929.4 2.420.9 2843.5 56704. 24670.00 2.3.00 M2. 26.07 .3.3 2. 0.7 L'.95
6"ltUsA& 5 atue.s _O (1* WASIT414643.vmme (XI 04/Total. Uwawma (22
sea *Uwt.u a"
yrnL.AtLOa of -ia C.v-L S t.S ale= FT.6g. it.s? 1949. :. &a Oawtas.qtLacte. 4i PLan6e. C4 , e, a _ Ls.IM _ G ah ILas.. ). aA Semik sclt *oeuao . OSts PU (Too. 0 t..aa. Scacsta.c 9at Itl44 *t JmAWN.. MILatuy Pm _ P2ag 4" t t SAI UmiA. *l. Oazta pt4do bytiC^o IL"@ege - 4sLaamS6LSLOO.
?e.a2n Lww A.slAx ea" tqswne w93/C6vvm%s
37 ': :2' *o
*0 20.99 1t3.23
32. 30 3t 9. 8.30
3.9 : 30 r7 l .1s
1.9~~~~~~~~~64 .90s7s 1.868-. .6 20
Rawini. 3 lrves"
(MUI.LL3. of CudLs Wj gea -S3alaia Code& WA SereM.aaa
Co&*=&. 1a2ee4Ltuse T! S&L tZmaLsu.a j 0161 Aawoo ewaLDaw.esi I 4S/C"aVOR% tZapu Ltuie (3 44SiC.uWOeR 1AL2..a. (23 I4S1s%e. LiVofLausia (3) e4IT*sa& 1g.s",ttue c(U w&SIts44 RWO