Institute for Development Research, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. and ... former, while grassroots organizations are vital to the latter. Participatory ...
World Development, Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 1467-1479, 1996 Copyright 0 1996 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0305-750X/96 $15.00 + 0.00
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Participation, Social Capital, and Intersectoral Problem Solving: African and Asian Cases L. DAVID BROWN
Institute for Development Research, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. and
Boston University, Massachusetts, U.S.A. and DARCY ASHMAN*
Institute for Development Research, Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. and
School for International Training, Brattleboro, Vermont, U.S.A. Summary. - Cooperation in policy/program implementation between state and nongovernmental actors can sometimes solve intractable development problems, but such cooperation must span gaps in culture, power, resources, and perspective. This article provides a comparative analysis of 13 cases of intersectoral cooperation among public agencies, nongovernmental organizations, grassroots groups, and international donors. The analysis reveals two successful implementation patterns: nongovemment organization (NGO)-mediated cooperation and grassroots-centered cooperation. Different forms of social capital are central to the two patterns. Indigenous NGGs with credibility across sectors are critical to the former, while grassroots organizations are vital to the latter. Participatory decision-making and mutual influence are essential to grassroots-centered cooperation, but less so for NGG-mediated collaboration. Copyright 0 1996 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd
1. INTRODUCTION Poverty, lack of employment, poor education, ill health, and environmental degradation often interact to make sustainable improvements in the lives of millions of people in developing countries extraordinarily difficult (Ackoff, 1974; Chambers, 1983). Problemsolving activities that do not mobilize the information and resources of the right set of actors may treat symptoms rather than causes or be frustrated by systemic forces that preserve the status quo. Designing and implementing significant long-term change may require joint action by many different actors - grassorganizations nongovernmental roots groups, (NGOs), private corporations, government agencies - who together have the knowledge and resources required. But interaction among such actors - from different institutional sectors, unequal in power, with very diverse interests and perspectives - often produces misunderstanding, conflict, and power struggles rather than effective collaboration in policy/pro-
gram design and implementation that addresses critical development problems (Gray, 1989). This article seeks to identify ingredients associated with successful development policy and program problem-solving efforts that bring together public sector and nongovernmental actors at different levels and with varying degrees of access to power and resources. The analysis examines 13 cases of multi-
*The authors express their appreciation for financial support for this research from the Rockefeller Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Institute for Sustainable Development. In addition, we could not have carried out this analysis without the insights and support of our colleagues at the African Association for Literacy and Adult Education, the Society for Participatory Research in Asia, and the Synergos Institute. We have also benefited from comments from Noreen Clark, Jane Covey, Peggy Dulany, John Gaventa, Miguel Murmis, Barbara Rusmere, Bruce Scheamr, Lee Sproull, Rajesh Tandon and many others involved in this program. 1467
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party cooperation in Africa and Asia. We hope that better knowledge of these actors will enable more effective cooperation on intractable development problems in the future. Section 2 provides the conceptual background for this analysis. The possibilities of interorganizational cooperation to solve problems have drawn a good deal of attention in recent years, as researchers and practitioners have recognized that many urgent problems are beyond the capacities of single organizations (e.g., Gray, 1989; Trist, 1983; Chrislip and Larsen, 1994). In Section 3 we discuss the cases, the methods by which case data were collected and formulated, and our approach to comparative analysis. Section 4 presents the results of this comparative analysis. Section 5 considers implications of these results.
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND Cooperation among diverse organizations has emerged over the last decade as an important way of dealing with problems too large or complex for single organizations to handle. Interorganizational cooperation has helped resolve problems as diverse as improving urban schools (Waddock, 1993). articulating national policies for coal production and use (Gray and Hay, 1986), enhancing urban leadership networks (Brown and Detterman, 1987), promoting regional economic development in declining areas (Trist, 1986), and enhancing national capacity to compete in the semiconductor industry (Browning, Beyer and Shetler, 1995). It is not easy or simple to develop interorganizational cooperation, especially when the parties have histories of conflict. But the results of such cooperation, once instituted, can be impressive. The chasms to be bridged in cooperation across sectors can be deep. Organizations from different sectors - public agencies from the state sector, corporations from the market sector, and nonprofit, NGOs from the civil society sector - may have fundamentally different views of appropriate ends and means (Wuthnow, 1991). Power inequalities among organizations can undermine their abilities to communicate effectively and foster unexpected and intractable explosions of conflict (Brown, 1982). Culture and value differences can trigger emotionally charged escalations that are difficult to discuss or resolve (Kanter, 1977). Differences in power and culture are inevitable when, as in the cases examined here, problem solving for program implementation requires cooperation among grassroots groups, international agencies, NGOs, and government agencies. Multiparty cooperation in problem solving is not unknown in developing countries, as these cases illustrate, but it is not common. Increasing recognition that the state alone cannot solve many development problems sets the
stage for more intersectoral cooperation in the future (Esman, 1991). This analysis will seek to understand how differences in power and culture are handled in successful cooperation. Earlier analyses of some of these cases (Brown, 1995; Brown and Tandon, 1993) have identified factors that will be examined in more detail here. There is evidence, for example, that preexisting organizational and interpersonal linkages are important for bridging the chasms of wealth, power and culture that may separate the parties (Waddock, 1993). “Social capital,” in the form of networks of association and relationship, mutual trust, and norms of reciprocity, can support cooperative problem solving (see Coleman, 1990, pp. 300-321; Putnam, 1993, p. 167). High levels of social capital are associated with effective government and rapid economic development at the national level (Putnam, 1993). We expect that preexisting organizations and relationships will support joint action across differences in interest and perspective among the parties to these cases. Even when initial linkages exist, however, effective cooperation requires some degree of mutual influence that allows all the parties to influence and to be influenced. When the parties have little history of cooperation or histories of conflict, for example, the issue of mutual influence and the management of conflicting interests can be central (Brown, 1982). Initial analyses of these cases suggested that they are characterized by both cooperation and conflict (Whyte, 1975). What patterns of interaction among unequally powerful parties are associated with success? Do efforts to promote participation, in the sense of shared influence and control over critical decisions (World Bank, 1994), really lead to mutual influence and more success? In short, this analysis seeks to assess factors that are critical to the success of development problem solving among diverse parties. In particular we are interested in the contributions of social capital and participation in designing and implementing sustainable improvements through interorganizational initiatives.
3. CASES AND METHODS This study compares 13 cases of intersectoral cooperation in policy and program implementation from Asia and Africa. These cases were developed as part of a program of research carried out by an international consortium of agencies from Africa, Asia, North America and South America. Members of the consortium included the African Association for Literacy and Adult Education (AALAE), the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), Grupo Esquel in South America, the Highlander Research and Education Center, the Institute for Development
PARTICIPATION,
SOCIAL CAPITAL.
AND INTERSECTORAL
Research (IDR), and the Synergos Institute. The authors prepared the comparative analysis described in this paper on behalf of that consortium. The cases, briefly described in Table 1, represent a wide range of policies and programs, as well as countries. They all involve cooperation across sectors (e.g., state agencies and civil society organizations) and power differences (e.g., community groups and international donors). They also all achieved some level of success in solving the problems they attacked. They treat a variety of problems, from health services (Bangladesh, Sudan) to income generation programs (India, Malaysia, Lesotho), to improving economic productivity (Zambia, Uganda, Indonesia), to improving physical infrastructure (Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Philippines). This sampling strategy grew in part from the Consortium’s interest in examining a wide range of cases, and in part from the scarcity of successful cases. The resulting sample does not allow easy comparison across cases on many dimensions, however. The results have to be treated with some caution, even though one can argue that any patterns that emerge from such a heterogeneous sample reflect the operation of fundamental factors. In essence we cast a wide net in the hope of identifying some very general processes in operation (see Yin, 1984). The Consortium chose case studies as a way to obtain detailed information about the evolution of Table
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cooperation among diverse partners, and we have used comparative analysis to identify underlying patterns and factors without losing sight of the uniqueness of the individual cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1984). We hoped to gain access to many perspectives in developing these cases, so we selected case writers for their credibility with many parties, and especially their access to low-power parties whose views might otherwise be lost. Case writers used a common set of questions to examine the evolution of cooperation, in a “process-tracing” approach that sought to capture the experiences of different actors (George and McKeown, 1985). The case writers used the same basic set of questions to collect data and write the cases. In Asia, the case writing and analysis process was coordinated by the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA). In Africa, the coordinating agency was the African Association for Literacy and Adult Education (AALAE). In each region a casewriters’ workshop clarified the case questions and research procedures. Case writers then developed drafts, and a conference brought together case writers, representatives of case parties, and outside resources to discuss the drafts and the lessons to be learned from them. Then the case writers revised the cases. Several regional analyses of these cases have been developed for Asia (Brown and Tandon, 1993; &hearer, 1993; Tandon, 1993) and Africa (Nyambura, 1994; Nyambura et al., 1995).
I. Intersectoral cooperation cases in Aj?ica and Asia
AFRICA Kenya Cookstove Program: to promote (Houghton, 1994).
environmental
protection
Lesotho Credit Union Program: to improve rural poverty conditions Sets’abi, 1994). Sudan Popular Health Program: to improve (ElSheikh and Wangoola, 1994).
the availability
through
distribution
of new fuel-efficient
by making sources of credit available
(Braimoh
of health services to the urban poor refugees
Uganda Fishing Program: to revitalize fishing villages in Northern Uganda (Odurkene,
cookstoves and
in Khartoum
1994).
Zambia Integrated Rural Development: to promote food security, market access, and reduced emigration Province (Machila, 1994).
from North Western
Zimbabwe Water and Sanitation: to expand the number and quality of water and sanitation facilities available in Gwanda District (Nyoni, 1994). ASIA Bangladesh Immunization Program: (Hussain, 1991).
to provide
expanded
immunization
program
for children
throughout
Zndian Biogas Program: to build biogas plants for poor rural families in the state of Orissa (Bezboruah Indian Workers’ Initiative: to revive and make profitable Indonesian Irrigation Program: to turn responsibility users (Pumomo and Pambagio, 1991). Malaysian Youth Technology Centers: to encourage
the country
and Banejee,
1991).
a “sick” industrial plant closed by its owners (Chadha, 1991).
for maintenance
and control over small irrigation systems to local water
rural youth to undertake local economic activities (Rahim, 1991).
Pakistan Urban Sanitation Program: to build sewage systems in Karachi slum areas (Rashid, 1991). Philippines Urban Upgrading: to improve housing and other facilities in Manila slum area (Rosa%Ignacio,
1991).
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This analysis is based on the revised cases from each region. We have sought to identify critical ingredients and patterns in the evolution of cooperative problem solving without losing sight of the unique stories of each case. In practice we have used an iterative process of data display and analysis that produced a series of matrices of data from the 13 cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We began by examining information about the reach and sustainability of the programs, to see if the cases could be grouped in terms of their impacts. The resulting clusters of cases of varying degrees of success have been used to identify factors and patterns associated with success. It is difficult to identify simple “causes” or “effects” in these complex cases. Events are almost always multiply determined, and variables interact over time to make one period’s effect into another period’s cause. Nonetheless, factors and patterns may be identified that help to explain the cases, and those explanations can help in planning and implementing future actions.
4. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS This analysis begins by assessing program effects to distinguish more and less successful cases. On the basis of those distinctions, subsequent discussion focuses on elements of social capital and patterns of participation across power differences in the course of project evolution that might explain variations in success. (a) Program success Assessing the relative success of these cooperative programs is not a simple matter. The measurement of such outcomes is always a thorny problem, and these measures must be regarded as tentative. Since the cases focused on quite different problems, they are not easily comparable in terms of their solutions. We have chosen two variables on which the cases can be meaningfully compared: (i) program reach, in terms of people immediately affected by their activities, and (ii) resources for future sustainability, reflected in support from various constituencies. Program reach refers to a rough calculation of the number of people that the program has immediately affected. Programs rated as having “wide” reach appear to have affected more than 100,000 people; programs rated as having “medium” reach have affected from 10,000 to 100,000 people; programs rated as having “narrow” reach have affected less than 10,000 people. The assignment of cases to these categories is not a statement about their potential; some programs with narrow reach at the time the case was
written may have wide impacts later on. This measure does not assess many impacts of these programs. It is difficult to calibrate the different impacts of, for example, immunization and water supply. But the capacity to affect large numbers of people is an important aspect of program effectiveness, and “scaling-up” to reach thousands of people is no small achievement (Tendler, 1989; Uvin, 1995). Resources for sustainability include the energies, skills, financial support, and policy commitments that sustain improvements introduced by the project, especially as external resources are withdrawn. Assuming that international donor organizations are short-term actors in these programs, this analysis focuses on resources that are available from other actors, such as government agencies (GOs), NGOs, and grassroots organizations (GROs). “High” support for sustainability reflects substantial commitment from GOs, NGOs, and GROs to continuing the program; “medium” support indicates commitment from two; “low” support indicates commitment from one or fewer. This is a rough measure. Strong support from one constituency may be enough to continue a program. But widespread support among diverse groups reflects success in building cooperative relations as well as in securing future resources from many quarters. On the basis of these dimensions, we can divide the cases into the three groups. Five clear success cases - two African and three Asian - had both wide reach and many resources for sustainability. They are presented at the top of Table 2. Three questionable success cases - two African and one Asian - had relatively narrow reach and few resources for sustainability. They are listed at the bottom of Table 2. Five mixed success cases - two African and three Asian - exhibited mixed outcomes on the two dimensions, and appear in the center of Table 2. (b) Social capital and success The social capital of a society or a region has been defined in terms of relationships that are grounded in structures of voluntary association, norms of reciprocity and cooperation, and attitudes of social trust and respect. High social capital has been found to be associated with cooperative social problem solving, effective government, and rapid economic development (Putnam, 1993). There is reason to believe that social capital can also promote more effective cooperation and social problem-solving at the level of interpersonal and interorganizational relations as well (Waddock, 1993; Uphoff, 1992; Tendler and Friedheim, 1994). Table 3 examines two aspects of these cases that reflect the presence of social capital: (i) the existence of local organizations and networks and (ii) the existence of relationships or contacts
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Table 2. Outcomes ofcooperation* Cases
Reach of Impacts
Resources for Sustainability
Wide: 70+ credit unions with 19,000 members; affect lives of 200,000 people.
High: GO supports program; NGO key supporter; GROs committed.
Pakistan Urban Sanitation
Wide: 6,000 lanes organize to build 64,000 latrines to affect 250,000 people.
High: GO cooperates; GROs expand.
Philippines Upgrading
Urban
Wide: Establish ownership; improve 90% of dwellings for 170,000 residents.
High: GO reluctant support; NGO key promoter: GROs mobilized.
Bangladesh
Immunization
Wide: National immunization from 2% to 80%; child mortality down 20%.
High: GO approves NGOs support expansion; GROs want more.
Wide: 40+ new clinics serve estimated 1.6 million clients in Khartoum.
High: GO wants help; NGO is committed, GROs want service.
Wide: Built 45,000 biogas plants, affecting more than 200,000 people.
Medium: GO program; NGO expanding; GROs not involved.
Indonesia Small Irrigation Systems
Medium: New policy transfers control of irrigation systems to water users.
Medium: GO needs policy; NGOs support; GROs not organized.
Uganda Fishing Program
Medium: Technical assistance and gear to 10,000 fishermen and 300 self-managed groups.
Low: GO support not clear; No local NGOs; GROs not viable?
Zimbabwe Sanitation
Medium: Built 50 new wells, 300 dams, 7,000 latrines for 30,000 people.
High: GO initiated; NGOs support; GROs support program.
Narrow: Restart plant; re-employ 600 workers; set precedent for future.
Medium: GO wants change; NGO starting; GROs interested.
Narrow: Start 30+ Youth Centres with 3-4,OOO members; encourage new efforts at income generation.
Low: GO committed; GROs weak interest.
Zambia Integrated Rural Development
Narrow: Provide technical assistance to 200+ new groups and 5,000+ farmers.
Low: GO limited support; NGOs not involved; GROs few viable.
Kenya Cookstoves
Narrow: Initial group distributes 5,000 cookstoves; inspires 22 new groups.
Low: GO little support; NGG little support; GROs not viable.
Clear Success: Lesotho Credit Unions
Sudan Popular Health
Mixed Success: India Biogas Program
Water and
India Workers’ Initiative
Questioned Success: Malaysia Youth Centres
*GRO: Grassroots
Organization;
NGO: Nongovernmental
Organization;
among the parties that span differences in sector and power. The existence of local organizations indicates the presence of social capital among local groups that enables action to protect their interests in program decision making. The existence of dense networks of active local organizations indicates high levels of social capital. Without organizations to represent or act for their interests, local populations may become recipients or implementors of programs with relatively little influence on decisions that shape project goals, plans, and outcomes. In these cases, two forms of local organization were active participants: GROs, such as credit unions in Lesotho or lane organizations of urban slum neighbors in Pakistan, and networks of grassroots organizations (GRNs), like ZOTO in the Philippines or the Credit Union League in Lesotho.
GO: Government
NGO expands role;
NGOs not involved;
Organization.
The first column of Table 3 describes the extent to which local organizations and networks were active in these projects. “High” indicates many active GROs and strong GRNs involved in the project; “low” indicates few active GROs or GRNs (or none at alI when the category is not mentioned); “medium” refers to some active GROs and relatively passive GRNs. The results reported in Table 3 suggest there is some support for the idea that social capital is associated with program success. Strong GROs and GRNs appeared in three of the live clear successes, two of the mixed successes, and none of the questionable successes. On the other hand, such social capital is not an ingredient in all the successful cases: There were cases of clear and mixed success characterized by medium or even low levels of social capital as indicated in dense networks of effective local organizations.
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Table 3. Social capital* Cases
Grassroots
Clear Success: Lesotho Credit Unions
Intersectoral
organizations
relationships
GRO; Strong. Credit unions viable. GRN: Strong. League negotiates with Government and donors.
High: University has links to GOs and international agencies; Rural workers have University and local links.
Pakistan Urban Sanitation
GRO: Strong. Lane GROs created. GRN: Strong. Lanes combine to negotiate with GO.
Medium: OPP has contacts with elites; builds close relationships with lanes; avoids contact with GOP.
Philippines Urban Upgrading
GRO: Strong. Mount initial challenge. GRN: Strong. ZOTO active; creates UGNAYAN to challenge WB and GO.
Low to Medium: Little link at outset; GRNs build contacts with Bank and GO insiders for information.
Bangladesh
GRO: Medium. GROs help organize. GRN: Medium. Not heavily involved.
High: Big NGO and NGO Association leaders well-linked to INGOs, GOs, GROs.
GRO; Medium. Communities to invite clinics.
High: NGOs have many contacts with GOs, elders, business leaders, MDs.
Immunization
Sudan Popular Health
Mixed Success: India Biogas Program
can choose
GRO: Low. Program focused on families rather,than groups.
High to Medium: early NGO links to GROs and GOs reduced later.
Indonesia Small Irrigation Systems
GRO: Medium. User associations over irrigation in pilot tests.
Uganda Fishing Program
GRO: Medium. Organize fishing, credit, and self-management groups.
Medium: INGO has GO sanction but limited contacts as expatriate agency,
Zimbabwe Water and Sanitation
GRO: High. Local associations key. GRN: High, ORAP links GROs.
Medium: NGO links to GO, INGO, but vary with political conflicts.
India Workers’ Initiative
GRO: High. Union guarded plant for years without pay. GRN: Medium. Unions question initiative
Medium: Union leaders key links to workers, GO, and Supreme Court.
GRO: Medium. Youth groups are prerequisite to establishing Centers.
Low to Medium: Youth Minister link to GO; few contacts with other sectors.
Zambia Integrated Rural Development
GRO: Low. Effort fails to create independent ongoing GROs.
Low to Medium: GTZ linked to GO but not to other parties.
Kenya Fuel-Efficient Cookstoves
GRO: Low. Keyo not sustainable. GRN: Medium. Present but active.
Medium: Many contacts among GO and NGOs; no sustained bridges.
Questioned Success: Malaysia Youth Centres
*GRO: Grassroots
Organization;
GRN: Grassroots
Networks;
take
High: NGO does research, training to help GO and GROs implement policy.
NGO: Nongovernmental
Organization;
GO: Government
Organization.
Social capital is also indicated by the existence of individuals or organizations with the intersectoral relationships that enabled contact among parties with different interests and backgrounds. Such “bridges” between sectors facilitate the recognition of common problems and shared interests in problem solving. The presence of individuals and organizations with intersectoral relationships represents higher levels of social capital for cooperative problem-solving. In Table 3 the second column indicates level of social capital on the dimension of intersectoral relationships: “high” ratings indicate extensive intersectoral contacts by bridging organizations and individuals; “medium” indicates some contacts across sectors,
sometimes moderated by problems of credibility; “low” reflects relatively few credible and enduring cross-sector contacts. Intersectoral relationships appear to be linked to success in cooperative intersectoral problem solving. Three of the clear successes, two of the potential successes and none of the questionable successes reported the presence of individuals or organizations that served as bridges across sectoral differences. The presence of intersectoral relationships was not associated with all successful cases. Some clear and mixed successes displayed medium or even low levels of intersectoral relationships. When the two forms of social capital are examined
PARTICIPATION,
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AND INTERSECTORAL
together, however, it becomes clear that they may act as substitutes for one another. All but one of the clear and mixed successes displayed high levels of either local organization or intersectoral relationships. Strong grassroots voice (as in the Pakistan, Philippines and Zimbabwe cases) may compensate for low levels of intersectoral contact and credibility, and effective bridging organizations may compensate for low levels of grassroots organization (as in the Sudan and Indonesian cases). Bangladesh, Questionable successes were characterized, in general, by less of both kinds of social capital. (c) Patterns ofparticipation in decision making Cooperation among unequally powerful parties may take a variety of forms. The appearance of cooperation in some cases may reflect lack of awareness or fear of direct challenges; in other cases disagreements and conflicts reflect mutual influence that enables both parties to be heard (see Brown, 1981). When parties of unequal power have different interests, we would expect some disagreements in the formulation and implementation of programs that affect those interests. The absence of conflict raises questions about the extent to which mutual influence exists in such relationships. When power inequalities among the parties are important in their relationship, the evolution of participation and mutual influence can be central to the long-term expansion and success of cooperation. We treat participation here as a “process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions, and resources which affect them” (World Bank, 1994, p. l), and we seek to understand the extent to which these programs were characterized by the existence or development of mutual influence among unequally powerful parties. The evolution of interorganizational and intersectoral cooperation follows a sequence that has been identified in a number of settings. The sequence includes at least three phases, including problem framing, direction setting, and implementing chosen solutions (e.g., Gray, 1989; Waddock, 1993). The first three columns of Table 4 describe the extent to which grassroots groups influence decision making at different phases of these cases. Framing the problem involves defining the issues and, by implication, the range of solutions possible. A ‘high” rating in this table reflects active participation by grassroots groups in the initial definition and analysis of the problem. Some active grassroots groups defined the problem for other parties, as ZOTO in Manila redefined an urban redevelopment program to be urban upgrading by local residents. A “medium” rating refers substantial participation by NGOs but not by grassroots groups. In Bangladesh, for example,
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NGOs helped redefine the problem from expanding immunization services to mobilizing grassroots organizations to bring children in for vaccinations. A “low” rating reflects little participation in problem defining by either grassroots or NGOs. Neither NGOs nor grassroots groups participated significantly in defining the problem to which the Indian biogas program was a response. Once the problem is defined, the parties must agree on setting directions to solve it. In Table 4 a “high” rating reflects substantial influence by grassroots groups in setting program directions. The neighborhood organizations in Manila, for example, took an active role in defining implementation plans for urban upgrading. A “medium” rating reflects participation by NGOs more than grassroots groups. Thus in the India biogas program, NGOs developed plans and technologies with little participation by grassroots organizations. Finally, a “low” rating reflects little participation by either NGOs or grassroots groups. The phase of implementing the program is particularly subject to conflict over pragmatic details. This column of Table 4 reflects whether grassroots groups and NGOs could sometimes win in the inevitable disagreements with other actors. A rating of “high” reflects occasions in which the preferences of grassroots groups and NGOs prevailed in conflicts over implementation. For example, the credit union federation in Lesotho won a major argument over leadership succession with donors and government agencies. A rating of “medium” refers to some demonstrated ability to confront differences directly and successfully, as in the constructive arguments among NGO and Ministry of Health staffs in the Bangladesh immunization campaign. The more common “low” rating reflects little evidence of direct disagreement by grassroots groups or NGOs with other actors. The last column of Table 4 describes the extent to which experience in the programs appears to have catalyzed new initiatives by low-power parties, initiatives above and beyond the activities required to implement the program. This column reflects the extent to which the program empowered low-power parties to take further action. A “high” rating in this column refers to clear evidence that grassroots groups participating in the project subsequently undertook further development initiatives. The lane organizations in Pakistan, for example, carried out health projects, family planning activities, and income generation projects after their success in latrine construction. A “medium” rating reflects more sporadic increases in grassroots initiatives or NGO activities. Some mothers in Bangladesh, for example, became more active in seeking other kinds of health care for their children and some NGOs experimented with other joint activity with government agencies after the immunization campaign. A “low” rating indicates that participation did not catalyze new initiatives. Few of the new grass-
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organizations or programs continued in Zambia after the project ended. The patterns of participation in Table 4 vary considerably across the cases. Mutual influence is most common at the direction setting stage, where all the cases exhibited either high or medium levels of mutual influence in decision making. Participation was less common at the problem-defining phases, where it required either highly organized grassroots groups at the start or special attention to enabling grassroots influence. The least participation was displayed in the implementation phase, in part perhaps because the criterion of grassroots victory in a conflict with more powerful parties was a difficult test. All the programs displayed some level of participation, but some differences across the cases were dramatic. In four cases - Lesotho Credit Unions, Pakistan Urban Sanitation, Philippines Urban Upgrading, and India Workers Initiative - there is a clear pattern of high participation throughout the program. In some, such as the Indian and Filipino cases, grassroots organizations existed prior to the program; in others, such roots
as the Lesotho and Pakistan cases, grassroots organizations were created by the program and involved from the start in its decisions. It is worth noting that three of these four high-participation cases were classed as clear successes, and the same three also appeared to have catalyzed high levels of grassroots activity outside the program. We return to this issue in the discussion section. The other cases display mixed patterns of participation, with four rated medium - Bangladesh Immunization, Sudan Popular Health, India Biogas, and Zimbabwe Water - and five rated medium/low - Indonesia Irrigation, Uganda Fishing, Malaysia Youth, Zambia Rural Development, and Kenya Cookstoves. Some of the medium participation cases were also classified as clear successes. Most of the questionable successes were characterized by relatively low participation. The clear success cases display two different patterns. Three of them exhibit high levels of grassroots voice across all three phases, while the other two have mixed levels of participation. Questionable successes
Table 4. Grassroots voice in the evolution of cooperation* Implement: GRO, NGO win arguments with other actors?
Catalyze New Initiatives: New local actions result?
High: Time and informal process to form new GROs.
High: Unions win in conflict with donors, extension agents, government parties.
High: Unions diversify projects; members take on new initiatives.
High: GROs (lane organizations) define sanitation as key problem.
High: Direction set by GROs in lanes and NGO supporting them.
High: NGO and GROs challenge GO takeover of project successfully.
High: GROs take on MCH, family planning; other projects; NGO does new programs.
High: GRO (ZOTO) questions detinition of project as urban redevelopment.
High: GROs shape program direction with World Bank and GOP.
High: NGO and GRO demand Bank and GOP support self-help in sanitation work.
High: GRO widens coalition and trains new generation of urban organizers.
Bangladesh Immunization
Medium: NGOs help GOB and donors see GRO role in immunizing campaign.
Medium: NGOs help define program direction and GRO participation.
Medium: NGOs press government agencies to cooperate with GROs to mobilize mothers.
Medium: Rural women more active on health programs; NGOs take on new roles with GOs.
Sudan Popular Health
Medium: NGO and GoS define urban health as problem.
Medium: GROs invite program entry; NGO professionals make program decisions.
Low: GROs not challenge NGO or professionals in decision making.
Medium: NGOs get stronger and expand services; GROs less involved.
Frame Problems: GRO, NGO key to defining problem?
Set Direction: GRO, NGO active in shaping program?
High: Organizing philosophy stresses GRO influence from staK
Pakistan Urban Sanitation
Philippines Urban
Cases Clear successes: Lesotho credit Unions
Upgrading
Table 4 continued on next page
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Table 4. Continued* Implement: GRO, NGO win arguments with other actors?
Catalyze New Initiatives: New local actions result?
Medium: NGOs help Go1 define technology and program.
Medium: NGO argues with state agency over program and payment.
Medium: NGO and NGO networks expand programs; GROs not part of project.
Low: Go1 defines costs of managing irrigation as problem.
Medium: NGO helps focus on GRO as key participants in managing systems.
Low: GROs needed for program but direct conflict not accepted.
Medium: Form new user associations, benefits or new actions limited.
Low: GoU and INGOS start program as relief effort.
Medium: Becomes more participatory; rural workers with local communities.
Low: INGO-GoU disagreements but NGOs and GROs not challenge.
Medium: New GROs organized to support local selfmanagement.
Zimbabwe Water and Sanitation
Medium: GoZ and NGGs focus on water and sanitation as important problem
High: INGOs and GRO (ORAP) help define program and organize communities.
Low: GoZ not tolerate dissent in sensitive political context.
Medium: Create new associations and enhance NGO networks.
India Workers’ Initiative
High: GRO (union) frames possibility of buying out factory.
High: GRO defines business plan; new organization to manage plant; takeover strategy.
High: GRO fights with owners, other unions, Go1 agencies and wins.
Medium: Workers learn to manage plant; NGO coop building capacity for management.
Medium: GoM sanctions new centres with agreement of GROs (youth clubs).
Low: Political and cultural norms make conflict rare; GROs define specific programs.
Low: Youth clubs not expand into new roles and actions.
Frame Problems: GRO, NGO key to defining problem?
Set Direction: GRO, NGO active in shaping program?
Low: Go1 defines need for alternative energy sources.
Indonesia Small Irrigation Systems Uganda Fishing
Cases Mixed successes: India Biogas Program
Program
Questionable Successes: Malaysia Youth Low: GoM defines Centres problem of keeping youth in villages.
but
Zambia Integrated Rural Development
Low: GoZ and donor frame problem.
Medium: Design intended to involve GROs, but not very successful.
Low: GRO anger and alienation not expressed directly or effectively.
Low: Few GROs or programs continue; GO-donor relations worse.
Kenya Cookstoves
Low: GoK and INGOs see energy problem; GRO wants income.
Medium: GRO active but dependent on GoK for market.
Low: Conflict among INGOs; NGO and GRO withdraw.
Low: GRO not take on new problems; not sustainable market.
*GRO: Grassroots Organization;
NGG Nongovernmental
Organization;
exhibit relatively low participation. Mixed successes display varying levels of participation. The dimensions of conflict and participation appear to interact. High levels of participation are associated with moderate to intense conflict, and low levels of participation are associated with low conflict. Cooperation that mobilizes the resources of grassroots groups to solve problems can produce social turbulence, challenging government and donor
GoX: Government
of Country X.
organizations when their proposals violate the interests of other actors, as in the Lesotho, Pakistan and Philippine programs. But such cooperation can also produce long-lasting programs that mobilize many resources, and those resources may not be available without the mutual influence that is associated with challenge and conflict. In addition, these cases suggest that high participation also catalyzes grassroots initiatives beyond the immediate project, and so creates
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possibilities for increased local self-reliance and further challenges to other actors.
5. DISCUSSION These cases indicate that cooperation across sector differences, power inequalities, and cultural differences can improve the quality of life of poor populations. Such cooperation does not always work, but sometimes joint efforts can improve the lives of thousands, even millions, of people. These cases all achieved some level of success. The most successful programs expanded to affect many thousands of people, mobilized significant resources for sustaining their programs, and sometimes catalyzed a wide range of other local activities by beneficiaries. This section identifies lessons from these cases. Table 5 summarizes assessments of program success with the patterns of participation and mutual influence in evolving cooperation. Stakeholder participation in development efforts (especially by grassroots people) has recently reemerged as an important issue in promoting sustainable development (see, e.g., Cemea, 1987; World Bank, 1994). Thus, these lessons have potentially broad applicability. If participation were essential to success of intersectoral problem solving, we would expect all the cases to fall on the major diagonal in Table 5. In fact, eight of the 13 cases follow that pattern, suggesting there is a relationship between program reach and sustainability and the development of mutual influence across power inequalities. Long-term success tends to be associated with higher degrees of participation and influence by grassroots partners and NGOs. This has been true even when, as in the Pakistan Sanitation and Lesotho Credit Union cases, no grassroots organizations existed at the outset of the program. But what of the other cases, especially since some
of them illustrate clear success? We believe that, in these cases, two quite different patterns for developing successful intersectoral cooperation are reflected. We have labeled these patterns grassroots-based cooperation and NGO-mediated cooperation. Grassroots-based cooperation involves mobilizing local resources and information to solve problems that require ongoing energy and attention from local groups. This pattern requires nurturing local organization and capacities to carry out the project, especially when such organizations do not exist at the beginning of the program. Examples of clear successes in this mode include the Lesotho Credit Union Program, the Pakistan Urban Sanitation Program, and the Philippines Urban Upgrading Program. In these programs the role of grassroots organizations and networks was central to program decision making from the start. Where the programs expand to cover large areas, it may be necessary to build networks of grassroots organizations that can represent their members in dealing with regional and national agencies. Mutual influence among parties is important to mobilizing grassroots resources, and the resulting collision of interests and concerns can be expected to generate conflicts among parties that might be suppressed in other settings. So the implementation of grassrootsbased programs may be marked by conflict and turbulence as well as cooperation, but the programs are also likely to catalyze further development initiatives by grassroots groups. In Table 5 cases that seem to fall into the pattern of grassroots-based cooperation are marked with a “(G)“. In contrast, NGO-mediated cooperation depends upon NGOs that act as bridges among donors, govemment agencies, and grassroots populations. This pattern of cooperation can deliver services and technical assistance to solve problems that do not require longterm investments of time and energy by grassroots constituencies. Examples in this study include the
Table 5. Participation pattern and degree of success* Participation Degree of Success
pattern
High
Mixed
Clear Successes
Lesotho Credit Unions (Cl) Pakistan Urban Sanitation (G) Philippines Urban Upgrade (C)
Bangladesh Itmuunization (N) Sudan Popular Health (N)
Mixed Successes
India Workers Initiative (Cl)
India Biogas (N) Zimbabwe Water and Sanitation (G)
Questionable Successes
*G: Grassroots
Low
Indonesia Irrigation (N) Uganda Fishing
Malaysia Youth Centres Zambia Integrated Rural Development Kenya Cookstoves based cooperation;
N: NGO mediated cooperation.
PARTICIPATION,
SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND INTERSECTORAL
Sudan Popular Health Program, the India Biogas Program, and the Bangladesh Immunization Project, which were defined to deliver services that depend on the technical capacities of NGOs or government actors rather than grassroots resources. Responsiveness to local needs turns on the abilities of key bridging organizations, usually NGOs, to represent grassroots interests to other actors. Such projects require less grassroots participation in decision making and less management of interorganizational conflict than projects that respond directly to the concerns of grassroots organizations. They are also less likely to generate independent grassroots initiatives on other matters. Cases that seem to fall into the pattern of NGO-mediated cooperation are marked with an “(N),‘. Both patterns produced clear successes, but participatory decision-making was more essential for grassroots-based cooperation. Successful grassroots-based initiatives are clustered in the high-participation column of Table 5. Successful NGO-mediated initiatives fall in the moderate or even the low participation columns. Where the cooperation of grassroots groups is needed, systematic efforts to promote grassroots participation and to foster mutual influence are vital to long term success. Both patterns of cooperation are influenced by the availability of social capital, but they vary in the importance of the different forms of social capital described in Table 3. Grassroots organizations and networks were consistently rated high, as might be expected, in the cases of grassroots-based cooperation. The creation and strengthening of social capital in the form of local organizations and networks is an essential task in building intersectoral cooperation that mobilizes and utilizes local resources and energies for problem solving. For successful NGG-mediated cooperation, such local organizations are valuable but not essential. For NGO-mediated cooperation, in contrast, the intersectoral contacts form of social capital appears to be essential. All of the cases of NGO-mediated cooperation were distinguished by high levels of intersectotal contacts that supported initiating and implementing cooperation. Indeed, in all four of those cases, indigenous NGOs carried out bridging roles to link the parties, manage conflicts, and foster joint learning. Government organizations or international NGOs, while important actors, were not as effective at managing conflict or fostering joint learning as indigenous
PROBLEM SOLVING
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NGOs, who could identify with grassroots groups as well as other actors. Such local champions are major actors in the clear successes and are absent in the questionable successes. Several influential studies have focused on social capital as a central element in social problem-solving, but suggest its roots are buried in centuries of cultural evolution (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Other investigators suggest that social capital can be created to support political and economic development (e.g., Tendler and Freedheim, 1994; Fox, 1994). These cases suggest that social capital is both an important base for cooperation across sector and power differences and an important product of such cooperation. In the course of these programs, local organizations were strengthened or created, bridging NGOs expanded their activities and their credibility with other actors; norms of reciprocity, cooperation and trust were established among previously unrelated or antagonistic parties. When decisions were made in Lesotho and Pakistan to create local organizations to help define local problems and actions, decision makers opted - intentionally or not - to create social capital as well as to work on sanitation and credit problems. When decisions were made to work with bridging NGOs in Bangladesh and the Sudan, decision makers fostered the creation of new social capital as well as the use of preexisting resources. Existing stocks of social capital support intersectoral cooperation and mutual influence; intersectoral cooperation and mutual influence can expand those stocks for the future. Uphoff (1992) has suggested that explosively rapid improvements may be possible when development problem solving combines existing social values with new ideas and institutional arrangements that reinforce each other. These cases suggest that active participation in intersectoral problem solving and implementation by NGOs and grassroots organizations can generate social capital that fosters future problem solving, which will generate more social capital . . . and so on. The implication for development policy implementation is that implementation arrangements will become increasingly effective to the extent that they can facilitate the creation of social capital. In a world beset by vicious cycles and downward ecological, economic, and political spirals, we can use some virtuous cycles and upward spirals in which development results are achieved and the “poor get richer.”
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