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C 2005) Systemic Practice and Action Research, Vol. 18, No. 5, October 2005 ( DOI: 10.1007/s11213-005-8486-2

Peirce and Beer J. R. Stephens1 and T. Haslett2,3 Received August 10, 2004; accepted August 25, 2005 This paper considers the philosophical background of Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems Diagnosis (VSD) as profoundly influenced by Charles Peirce. In a general sense, our work discusses the VSD theory base in the development of a model for actionable theory in organizations. This paper examines VSD theory in the Beer trilogy ‘Brain of the Firm,’ ‘The Heart of the Enterprise’ and ‘Diagnosing the System’ and we propose that a sound set of VSD action principles can be derived from this trilogy. We contend that the philosophical background underpinning these principles is important. Using Beer’s ‘Decision and Control,’ we consider that philosophical background and link Operational Research and the interdisciplinary learning within Cybernetics to modern general systems theory. We explore Beer’s viewpoint on the Peirce depiction of four main methods of fixing belief; tenacity, authority, a priori and finally the scientific to assist in that expansion. We consider how knowledge of Beer’s perspective on making sense of the world is important in the linkage of VSD theory to the managerial problem arena. We relate the Peirce methods to previously reported problem solving exercises involving the VSD ideology, which we will develop individually at a later date. This paper reflects our desire to express the interpretation of VSD theory in a language that the well-informed manager may readily translate into the third step of testing theory in practice. KEY WORDS: Operational Research; Cybernetics; Viable Systems Diagnosis (VSD); management; action; Practitioner/Scholar.

1. INTRODUCTION—THE MANAGER AS A PRACTITIONER/SCHOLAR There is extensive agreement (Espejo et al., 1996; Flood, 1999) that a good understanding of the Viable Systems Diagnosis (VSD) theory base can be derived from the Beer trilogy Brain of the Firm (1971), The Heart of the Enterprise (1979) and Diagnosing the System (1985). This paper is concerned with what we term 1 Greyhound

Racing Victoria, Melbourne, Australia. of Management, Monash University. 3 To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of Management, Monash University; e-mail: [email protected]. 2 Department

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to be the ‘well-informed manager,’ a manager who reads widely in the theory of management, is involved in discourse about that theory and seeks to use that theory as the foundation for action in the business context. This paper addresses the question of what a well-informed manager needs to understand of this body of theory to be able to act in the business context. We believe this is possible if managers pay sufficient attention to some fundamental thinking and theory on which the trilogy is grounded. We have previously expressed similar opinion (Stephens and Haslett, in press) regarding the practitioner/scholar action context and the thinking and theory that underpin the trilogy. Here we argued that some principles identified from Cybernetics and Management (Beer, 1959) are crucial to the modern understanding of VSD theory. We emphasized that a fundamental understanding of the nature of control—as self-emergence from a system, the concept of the organizational machine—as a cohesive collection of items, people and information forming some purposive system and Ashby’s (1956) Requisite Variety—as being smarter than the situation you are trying to manage were fundamental tenets for the practitioner/scholar seeking to test theory in the business context. We reiterate our opinion that a sound set of action principles derived from Beer’s primary works should be considered before managers tackle the trilogy and we see the principles outlined in this current paper as complementing and adding to our previous work. In this paper we argue that principles which can be identified from Decision and Control (Beer, 1966) are vital to the modern understanding of VSD theory in the workplace. We see our well-informed manager operating in a practitioner/scholar action context. Our specific context involves a group comprising six PhD candidates and their supervisor conducting Action Research (AR) in a diverse range of organisations (Haslett et al., 2002). Five candidates are part time students and full time managers. The interactions of this group, which has worked together for the past six years, are seen as central to the development of the well-informed manager. The context has two fundamental, yet clearly interrelated components. One component involves the collective learning group, which affords a forum for methodological, ethical and practical dialogue. The group has congruity in learning backgrounds, having completed a Masters programme in systems theory and thinking, completing a masters level AR project with their current supervisor and being involved in individual exchange programmes within their organisations. The second component involves the individual exchange programmes. The dynamic relation between a PhD candidate and an active manager constantly contributes to the development of the practitioner/scholar with a strong theoretical base involving systems thinking and reflective learning being developed to inform managerial practices. It is in this context that the ideas of this paper have been developed. This paper arises from two exchange programmes involving two separate organizations and four cycles of AR. The first involved a redefinition of the role and a subsequent restructuring of the Board of a not-for-profit organization with an

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annual turnover of $100 million. The second was conducted in the umbrella authority for this organization and involved the development and integration of VSD into the strategic capability of the organization. The researcher was, successively, the CEO of both the organizations. This AR has involved the development of a model for actionable theory in organizations, which takes the form of a three-step process. The first step of that development involves the definition and explanation of an appropriate theory base, the second the interpretation of that theory into a coherent set of potential action principles and the third using reflective learning cycles to test and develop that theory in a business context (Stephens and Haslett, 2002b). 2. THEORY BASE Stafford Beer’s assertion that ‘a more sophisticated kind of science is needed to aid the decision making process of top management (Beer, 1966, p. 15) recognises that the principles of scientific management (Taylor, 1911) are fundamental to operations of organizations. It also provides differentiation for the construction of an appropriate theory base involving top management who are typically concerned with decision-making and control processes. Beer proposed that the decision-making and control processes of large and complex systems needed to involve a more complex and action orientated science. We understand ‘science’ to involve the testing and validating of hypotheses (or theories) through experimentation in the business context and the further development of the theory. Beer’s subsequent bequest to management action, Viable Systems Diagnosis (1959, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1979, and 1985) evolved over some 40 years. VSD engages the principles of Operational Research (OR) and the interdisciplinary use of the sciences or cybernetic theory to help solve problems involving decision-making and control in organizations. Our work engages VSD as an appropriate theory base to involve the first two steps of the model for actionable theory. The paper reflects our opinion that there is a need to express the interpretation of the theory in a language that the well-informed manager may readily translate into the business context 3. ORIGINS OF OR, CYBERNETICS AND VSD Historically, OR has its roots in the first half of the 20th century. RADAR in 1938, then further combat and communication interventions during World War II accelerated the influence of OR. The post war era, where Beer is recognised as one of those who took OR from the army into industry, coincided with a challenge to traditional linear or ‘reductionist’ thinking. This challenge accelerated the somewhat unconventional interdisciplinary engagement of the sciences in general systems theory. It encouraged the development of OR theory and the nature of feedback and control mechanisms into a diversity of systems including

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organizations and their management. The translation of OR to involve manageable action in organisations was termed by Weiner (1948) as a new field of scientific endeavor—cybernetics. Beer’s work has been perhaps more correctly cited (Flood, 1999) as operational research and management science (ORMS) and Russell Ackoff and C. West Churchman are other noted contributors to the field. VSD engages the principles of OR and the interdisciplinary use of the sciences or cybernetic theory to help solve problems involving decision-making and control in organizations. This brief historical pr´ecis connecting the roots of interdisciplinary learning to general systems theory and the linking of VSD theory to the managerial problem arena is designed to help managers solve problems in organizations through a contemplation of their role as organizational thinkers. We have previously argued that some fundamental principles we identified from Cybernetics and Management are crucial in the linkage of VSD theory to the management problem arena. We believe that consideration of these principles can encourage managers to think differently about their organizations, to think differently about their role as organizational thinkers and to consider how theory can lead to action. An example is Beer’s principle of control as self-emergence from a system, as a fundamental tenet for managers wishing to develop Beer’s ideas in a business context. From this principle we believe managers may learn to view control, not from the narrow sense of the giving of orders and directions to various parts of the organisation, but from an abstract sense equating to what actually surfaces from their whole organizational system as they (as part of that system) decide, react and adapt to normal everyday occurrences. We believe that from considering this ‘control’ principle, managers may begin to think differently about their organizations and the part they play in organizational change. Beer (1966, p. 402) acknowledged that ‘managers work under great pressure very often, and have little time to think freshly about the nature of the problems which their good practice handles.’ He encouraged managers to set aside some time—to purposely think about the nature of the management role and the deliberation of what the rational processes of the brain are really like. Stacey (1993, p. 98) supports Beer indicating that scant regard is paid to the way in which ‘managers make sense of the world and the manner in which their shared beliefs affect what they do.’ Our major concern is the linkage of theory and action and the processes of thought that enable this. Our point of view is quite simple; how do managers understand theory if they do not think about the thinking which constructed that theory? 4. MANAGERS THINKING ABOUT VSD THINKING We believe that many managers make sense of the world through an unconscious, devotion to a form of reductionist/quasi-scientific thought. By this we mean a reliance on single cause and effect connections that the scientist endeavours

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to establish in a laboratory. Such an approach seeks to remove the influence of what, in a business context, is a turbulent environment. We are not saying that confronting management problems using this thinking is wrong. In some immediate and pressing situations, such ‘fire fighting’ approaches may be appropriate. We are emphasizing that reductionist/quasi-scientific thinking is founded on the stereotype of the immediate applicability of clear and definite, stable and repeatable actions and reactions. And we contend that, in the longer term, management problems are often not dealt with adequately by such an approach. We would argue that the use of systems approaches (Ulrich, 1988, Von Bertalanfy, 1968) to such situations involves a more comprehensive and holistic approach. There are a significant variety of such systems approaches available to managers. Two examples serve as an indication of this variety. Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) developed by Checkland (1985) was defined by Checkland and Scholes (1990, p. 1) as ‘an organised way of tackling messy situations in the real world.’ Richardson and Pugh (1981, p. 1) describe System Dynamics (SD) as dealing with two important features of managerial problems. The first of these is that the problems are dynamic, that is having quantities, which change over time. The second is that they involve feedback. Another important perspective of SD is that of Sterman (1994, p. 308) who observed ‘that the structure of the system gives rise to behaviour.’ Both of these approaches involve ways of understanding the complexities of modern organizations and it is this aspect of Systems Thinking that we wish to discuss in relation to Stafford Beer. We consider knowledge of Beer’s perspective on making sense of the world to be very important in the linkage of VSD theory to managerial problems. Beer’s viewpoint is profoundly influenced by the thoughts of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). Strongly influenced by the Kantian system of categories, Peirce is said to be the founder of American pragmatism, which permeates the thoughts of Russell Ackoff, C. West Churchman, E. A. Singer (Britton and McCallion, 1994), John Dewey, David Kolb, and Beer. Peirce depicts four main methods of fixing belief; tenacity, authority, a priori and the last of which alone is the scientific. Beer describes the method of tenacity: The first method of fixing belief isolated by Peirce might be called the method of tenacity. It begins with a viewpoint, capriciously formed. Perhaps this was something learned at mother’s knee; it might have been revealed by a sailor in a pub; or it is an idea culled from this morning’s newspaper. Typically it is what ‘they’ are saying (and they ought to know). At this stage, the viewpoint has no special merit for the man who expresses it, for its casual origins are understood—it is not a belief. However, it is brought out—and increasingly brought out—to be aired. Gradually it becomes inculcated as a habit of thought; eventually it is indeed fixed as a belief. (Beer, 1966, p. 17)

Beer however did not consider the conditioning processes evolving from tenacity as totally inappropriate, so long as the social economic and industrial

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environments change slowly. We interpret this conditioning to mean that the affixing of belief by tenacity, where that tenacity has exhibited consistency over (stable) time, gives some ‘rigour’ to the process. But managers need to be aware of the limitations of fixation by tenacity in volatile and dynamic environments. In our organizations, we have found that VSD has the potential to shift tenacity based managerial belief. We have previously reported (Stephens and Haslett, 2002a) on a problem solving exercise involving the VSD ideology. Here we employed VSD principles to help reconstruct tenacity-based information into a ‘local’ knowledge base of a group of octogenarian Board members many of whom had grown up with the organization since the 1950s. We have also used some of the systemic aspects of scenario planning (de Geus, 1994), interactive planning (Ackoff, 1981) and rational planning approaches (Stacey, 1993). In particular, System Dynamics simulation techniques (Sterman, 2000) were helpful in the analysis and understanding of ‘tenacity based’ problems. In this approach, the mental models or axioms, which Beer asserts managers take for granted as being true, are subjected to examination using mathematical models derived from the direct experience of the managers. In the end, it needed two interventions using a range of systems interventions as (Flood and Jackson, 1995) would suggest. The end result was recognition on the part of the Board that its current skill base needed to be re-invigorated with new talent and that it was time for older members to encourage and facilitate that process. Peirce saw another way of establishing belief without being scientific as being by the method of authority. Beer believed authority to be a significant method that occurs when people see their role in an organization as being an indivisible part of that system. He said that the method of authority is about people yielding to the culture of the organization or its acknowledged way of doing things. Beer considered authority to be an irrational process but one that already (1966) partly controls organizations by curtailing innovation and creativity. We have noted wide-ranging ‘authority’ examples in organizations. Policies arising from organizational power and politics including employee attendance at meetings, methods of discourse and contribution to decision making processes are significant examples. On the other hand, relatively minor behavioural ‘expectations’ such as dress standards, passing opinion on policy or suggesting alternative behaviours can incite some fairly major consequences. Quoting the words of Peirce, we believe that the method of authority can be acutely emphasised as: When complete agreement could not otherwise be reached, a general massacre of all those who have not thought in a certain way has proven a very effective means of settling opinion. (Beer, 1966, p. 22)

Beer highlighted the negative influence of authority as having the ability to de-create or smother a competent man while he still goes about his work. He referenced William Whyte’s (1963) Organisational Man as one who conforms,

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often unconsciously to the culture of the organisation. Organisational man ‘thinks by the method of authority’ and must not elicit creative information. We see advances in socio-technical systems including search conferencing techniques (Emery, 1980), learning cycles involving tacit/explicit knowledge development (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), systems thinking (Senge, 1990) and advances in participatory action research techniques (Reason and Bradbury, 2001) as assisting managers who are confronted with problems which may arise from the fixing of belief using the method of authority. We have previously reported (Stephens and Haslett, 2001) on organizational success using a rudimentary VSD information structure template. Here we adapted a defective organisational ‘belief by authority’ system to create a quite rigorous and scientifically orientated routine, which has continued to deliver positive outcomes over time. Beer described the third method of fixing belief, that of a priori, as being particularly susceptible to misunderstanding and likely to be confused with science itself. He described a priori as involving a series of axioms, which we take for granted as being true, rather than having been identified through direct experience. The axioms contain unexpressed assumptions that are instinctively accepted in the mind as being self evident, as if they existed ‘prior to’ experience. The rationalitybased example given by Beer is: Our stocks are rising fast, but they are rising in proportion to our turnover, so that’s all right. This managerial remark is no trumped-up example: it is often heard. It sounds utterly rational. But the implicit axiom that stocks ought (in some sense) to vary proportionally with turnover is simply not verifiable in most cases. (Beer, 1966, p. 28)

By explaining the mathematics fundamental to this case, Beer showed how a batch size of stock can actually rise as the square root (rather than direct proportion) of turnover, disproving the initial assumption. Everyday a priori examples include our inherent misuse or disregard of meteorological ‘theory’ to assume a warm temperature/weather fine or solid showers/farmers happy status, but let us consider problems arising from managerial a priori belief systems. Our anecdotal experience verifies Beer’s cited example. We find that a priori problems are normally related to (mathematical) inexperience in various disciplines. Examples we have encountered involve managerial assessment of accountancy documentation (assessment of cash, depreciation schedules and capital acquisition) and inventory/time lag inconsistency issues. A priori belief increases defective intelligence and contributes to conditions that are not quite as anticipated. It seems to us that particularly inexperienced managers may be instinctively drawn toward direct linear causation, rather seeking or experiencing more qualified (scientific) opinion. We believe a priori belief has consistencies with the Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) tacit/explicit argument. Nonaka says that although ‘tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are not totally separate but mutually complimentary entities,’ objective explicit knowledge has its roots in the rationality of the mind

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and subjective tacit knowledge involves knowledge by experience. We believe that the process of defining and understanding the distinction between these two forms of knowledge is effectively the same as moving from the third to the fourth method of fixing belief. Peirce’s fourth method of fixing belief is that of science. Beer described science as intentional where man instils rigour into rationality: the process is clear and definite, testable and repeatable. The important emphasis here, in relation to ideas of science and scientific method, is on the process and how Beer defines it. Beer sees man being part of and influencing organizational ‘experiments.’ This is similar but not identical to laboratory based empirical science. We believe Beer consistently viewed his work as the pragmatic interrelation of the manager (scientist) with ‘in vacuo’ scientific fact in the organization (laboratory). Beer stated that ‘the first principle of control is that the controller is part of the system under control’ (1972, p. 25), further (Kybernetes, 2000, p. 559) some 30 years later, that we live in a world still rife with ‘reductive processes that have dominated our culture’ where scientific methodologies clearly alienate the scientist from the experiment. As such, Beer believed pure science fails to adequately consider the diverse exchanges of variables in practice. To emphasize this point we cite a prophetic Beer aphorism: We incline to live our lives via heuristics and struggle to control them by somewhat lifeless algorithms. (Beer, 1972, pp. 51–57)

We consider that this profound statement epitomizes both individual and organizational reality some 30 years after it was written. We believe Beer’s pragmatic approach portrays the realities of organizational life where ‘predictions of the effects of change in one department considered ‘in vacuo’ is fairly accurate, but the interaction of those effects with the effects of change in other departments creates a totally new kind of system out of the whole. The kinds of measurements he (the manager) has been using change their nature and let him down’ (Our emphasis, Beer, 1966, p. 41). To emphasize this point we again revisit Beer’s principle of control as self-emergence from a system. We believe that managers need to view control, not from the narrow sense of the giving of orders and directions to various parts of the organisation, but from an abstract sense of what surfaces from their organizational system as they (as part of that system) decide, react and adapt to everyday occurrences. We see the ‘what surfaces from’ as the consideration of everyday feedback that forms a normal, but integral part of our ‘self-emergent’ systems. We believe that within a manager’s belief system there must be a clear understanding that he/she as the controller is (a) an inseparable part of the system under control and (b) must interfere with, influence and change that control system. The controller/control statement is central to our argument, but if interpreted in the light of idealised applied science leads to a misinterpretation of

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the intended interrelation of the manager with ‘in vacuo’ scientific fact in the organization. To emphasise this point Beer noted an OR characteristic where solutions may be located quite ‘external’ to those possibilities contemplated by (scientific) management. The corollary being that a best solution may be excluded by scientific limitations. Beer cited a wartime example involving the sinking of submarines with depth charges based on pure mathematics. Here the ‘idea in vacuo’ measurements should have, but did not statistically measure up. Employment of the interdisciplinary based OR involved other variables including weather patterns, water currents, temperature and the interference of people to produce significantly better results. To conclude his scientific belief, Beer stated that the scientist needs to engage in interdisciplinary approaches of wide and varied dimension until these approaches seem to make no substantive difference to the answers he is getting. Beer’s argument that science is the most effective method of fixing belief comes down to the fact that reality is interpretable through different disciplinary lenses. This is concisely summed up in the following quote: In fact, the tremendous breakthrough of modern science in physics, in genetics, in biochemistry and many other subjects is largely due to a realisation that the converse is a collection of probabilities, and to the development of mathematical techniques capable of uttering descriptions of nature in these terms. The universe as hard solid separate things that collide with each other and bounced off, that rubbed against each other and lost energy, that became involved in sequences of events which could nearly be labelled ‘causes and effects’ may still be the universe of engineering; but as the universe of science is has gone forever. (Beer, 1966, p. 55)

We reiterate that Beer’s perspective was heavily influenced by Peirce’s four methods of fixing belief. It is, in our opinion, significant in the linkage of VSD theory to the managerial problem arena. The significance for modern management we believe is two-fold. First, it seems logical that the engagement of not useless, but fundamentally flawed belief systems, will increase defective intelligence and therefore contribute to unusual conditions that are not quite as anticipated in organizations. Second, given this philosophical background, the fundamental VSD emphasis on the modelling of information flows to provide for corrective feedback emerging from everyday organizational behaviours is not the least bit surprising. It was perhaps armed with this perspective that Beer developed his thoughts on the OR and VSD dependence on modelling, but that is the subject for another paper. Nonaka defines knowledge as a dynamic human process of justifying personal belief toward the ‘truth’. We therefore beg management to recognize the use and deficiencies involved with the methods of tenacity, authority and a priory and to move toward the method of science in the pursuit of that truth.

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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS In our work, we find that it is the unscripted emergence of unusual conditions within generalized organizational continuity and pattern that disturbs managers’ minds. As managers operating in a practitioner/scholar action context, our work in progress continues to develop the three-step model for actionable theory in our organizations. This will be the subject of a future paper. This paper has set out the deeper elements of our theoretical position, albeit in relatively abstract terms. We continue to struggle with the problem that Beer’s work is dense and complex. Our work is designed to provide a bridge to that work for the well-informed practitioner manager. It remains our desire to express the interpretation of VSD theory in a language that the well-informed manager may readily translate into third step experimentation in the business context and the further development of the theory. We reiterate our view that for the modern manager to gain an actionable interpretation of the VSD theory base, a sound set of principles emanating from Beer’s primary works must be considered before tackling the noted Beer trilogy Brain of the Firm, The Heart of the Enterprise and Diagnosing the System. We strongly believe that ‘it is a primary aim of industrial cybernetics to harness this ability of a system to teach itself optimum behavior. To do it, however, it must know how to design the system in the first place as a machine for teaching itself. There must be exactly the right flow of information in the right places; rich interconnectivity; facilities for growth of feedbacks and many one transformation circuits; and so no (Beer, 1957, p. 57). We restate that primary definitions and principles identified from Cybernetics and Management are crucial to this interpretation. From Decision and Control we believe that the historical linkage of OR and the interdisciplinary learning within Cybernetics to modern general systems theory is an important principle for managers who are developing actionable plans in their organizations. By exploring Beer’s perspective on making sense of the world according to Peirce’s four main methods of fixing belief, another principle involving defective intelligence entering our organizational information flows emerges. These principles complement and add to our previous work. We believe that consideration of these principles can encourage managers to think differently about their organizations, their role as organizational thinkers and how VSD theory can lead to action. REFERENCES Ackoff, R. L. (1981). Creating the Corporate Future, Wiley, New York. Ashby, R. (1956). An Introduction to Cybernetics, Chapman and Hall, London, UK. Beer, S. (1959). Cybernetics and Management. Wiley, UK. Beer, S. (1966). Decision and Control, Wiley, UK. Beer, S. (1968). Management Science, Wiley, UK.

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