Plato, Protagoras, 334ac

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support the view of another eminent researcher George Briscoe Kerferd, ... One of these arguments that may be invoked to support Kerferd's view is Protagoras'.
The biological and medical sources of Protagoras’ thought (Plato, Protagoras, 334ac)

If we take a look at these parts of the textbooks in history of Greek philosophy which discuss the views of the sophists we immediately find that they are mostly concerned with the issues that fall within the broadly understood area of humanities. This widely accepted perspective reflects the general opinion according to which the sophists radically broke with the philosophy of nature - and along with Socrates have contributed to the humanistic turn in philosophy, shifting the focus from natural to moral philosophy. However, the preserved writings of the sophists, as well as the doxographical tradition do not present such an unambiguous picture of the sophists. There are many accounts which provide us with information on the research conducted by the sophists in the field of the philosophy of nature. These testimonies may easily be found in the preserved accounts concerning Gorgias, Protagoras, Critias, Hippias, Prodicus, Polos and Antiphon1. The problem of inconsistency between the prevailing standard of interpretation and preserved testimonies is most often explained by means of a hypothesis, according to which individual sophists gradually shifted from the issues of natural philosophy towards problems typical for humanities. A model example of this way of thinking is the concept of stages of development of the famous rhetorician Gorgias. To support his claim Hermann Diels distinguished three periods in the development of the sophist, corresponding to Gorgias’ allegedly changing interests: 1. the period of his concern with the philosophy of nature, 2. the dialectical stage and 3. the interest in the problems of language and rhetoric exclusively2. Hermann Diels supported the idea of stages in Gorgias’ interests arguing that this corresponds to the development of Greek philosophy in general3. There are many reasons which decided on popularity of this – in my opinion – false conviction

the discussion of

which would require separate paper. But I believe that there are many arguments which

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Z. Nerczuk, Sofistyka a filozofia przyrody, w: Rozprawy filozoficzne. Księga pamiątkowa w darze Profesorowi Józefowi Pawlakowi, Toruń 2005, p. 129–135. 2 H. Diels, Gorgias und Empedokles, „Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin”, 1884, p. 343–368; reprintem in: Sophistik, Hrsg. C.J. Classen, Darmstadt 1976, p. 351–83. 3 H. Diels, op. cit., p. 352: „und doch scheinen mir die Etappen, welche er während seines über hundertjährigen Lebens in seiner Entwicklung zurückgelegt hat, typisch zu sein für den ganzen Verlauf der geistigen Revolution, als deren Stimmführer die Sophisten erscheinen“.

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support the view of another eminent researcher George Briscoe Kerferd, in whose opinion the view that the Sophists abandoned the research of nature is absolutely erroneous4. One of these arguments that may be invoked to support Kerferd’s view is Protagoras’ interest in biology and medicine. Interesting for us is, surprisingly, Plato’s dialogue Protagoras. It is certainly not concerned with the problems of philosophy of nature, but undertakes the topic typical for the dialogues from the so called “Socratic” stage of Plato's development, namely the issue of virtue, which – as we know – was also of extreme significance for the sophists, especially Protagoras and Gorgias5. In the dialogue

Protagoras answering Socrates' question if the virtue can be taught,

presents the well-known myth of two Titans Prometheus and Epimetheus, which is followed by a "strict argument" (logos). One of the issues raised by Protagoras, which was the problem of unity or separateness of virtues, prompts Socrates to consider the relationship between virtues. During this discussion when the relationship between reason and justice is being determined, Socrates suggests to Protagoras, that "these things are called goods that benefit people."6.

However, Protagoras rejects the thesis of Socrates. According to the sophist, it is a mistake to confine the meaning of "good" to something that is referred to as “good” just for the sake of man: “and also when they are not profitable to men I call them good” 7. Socrates immediately demands an explanation: “Do you mean, Protagoras, [...] things that are profitable to no human being, or things not profitable in any way at all? Can you call such things as these good?”

In reply, Protagoras gives a passionate speech:

By no means, he replied; but I know a number of things that are unprofitable to men, namely, foods, drinks, drugs, and countless others, 4

G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge 1981, p. 13. A. Capizzi, op. cit., p. 12; W.K.C. Guthrie, Sokrates, Warszawa 2000, p. 125; Ch.P. Segal, Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos, „Harvard Studies in Classical Philology”, 66 (1962), p. 139. 5 W. Wróblewski, Pojęcie arete w II połowie V wieku p.n.e. Protagoras-Gorgiasz-Demokryt, Toruń 1979. 6 Plato, Protagoras, 333d. 7 Plato, Protagoras, 333de, p. 50.

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and some that are profitable; some that are neither one nor the other to men, but are one or the other to horses; and some that are profitable only to cattle, or again to dogs; some also that are not profitable to any of those, but are to trees; and some that are good for the roots of a tree, but bad for its shoots—such as dung, [334b] which is a good thing when applied to the roots of all plants, whereas if you chose to cast it on the young twigs and branches, it will ruin all. And oil too is utterly bad for all plants, and most deadly for the hair of all animals save that of man, while to the hair of man it is helpful, as also to the rest of his body.

The good is such an elusive and diverse thing that in this instance it is good for the outward parts of man's body, [334c] but at the same time as bad as can be for the inward; and for this reason all doctors forbid the sick to take oil, except the smallest possible quantity, in what one is going to eat—just enough to quench the loathing that arises in the sensations of one's nostrils from food and its dressings. When he had thus spoken, the company acclaimed it as an excellent answer;8.

The content of Protagoras’ speech is an unexpected turnaround in the dialogue. In its preceding part, nothing foretold such detailed discussion of the issues connected with the field of biology and problems of health. To listeners’ surprise Protagoras begins to speak with a serious face about the usefulness of a "dung" and oil, he argues using the examples of horses, bulls, dogs, roots, leaves, shoots, twigs, hair and fur. Protagoras' statement, apart from its "erudite" qualities, has also its rhetorical value. It is not just a simple enumeration of examples, but an elaborate pronouncement9. The disproportion that exists between the discussed sublime problem of good and the triviality of examples (after all he talks about "dung" or olive oil as a harmful agent for fur animals) provokes a comic effect by means of which Plato implements his program of ridiculing the views of the sophist10. It seems that in this passage Plato does not distort the historical view of Protagoras, but presents it in the disqualifying context. 8

Plato, Protagoras, 333e–334c, p. 50–51. Plato, Protagoras, with the commentary of H. Sauppe, translated with additions by J.A. Towle, Boston– London 1889, p. 97: „note the artistic order, exciting surprise and expectation in the listeners”. 10 Th. Gomperz (Greek Thinkerp. A History of Ancient Philosophy, t. 1, London 1920), p. 491: „Further, the speeches put by Plato in the mouth of Protagoras show a respect for the precise value of words; nor does Plato's satirical aim prevent us from recognizing that advance. Thus, when the Platonic Protagoras remarks of the culinary use of oil, that it is intended merely , the humour lies in the disproportion between the subtlety of the expression and the trivial, not to say the repulsive, character of the subject”. 11 DK 80 A 22. DK = Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch von H. Diels, Hrsg. W. Kranz, B. 2, Dublin–Zürich 196913. 12 W. Nestle, Von Mythos zum Logos, Stuttgart 1940, p. 275: „Der starke Beifall, von dem Platon diese Ausführungen des Sophisten durch die Zuhörer begleiten lässt, soll wohl darauf hinweisen, dass es sich hier um ein Haupt- und Glanzstück in der Lehre des Sophisten handelt; und wo sonst sollte dieses seine Stelle gehabt haben als in der )Alh/qeia?“ 13 Plato, Protagoras, J. Adam, A.M. Adam, Cambridge 1893, p. 138. 14 E. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, Columbia (South Carolina) 2003, p. 166. 15 Plato, Protagoras, 322 nn.

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and to a certain number for food he gave other creatures to devour: to some he attached a paucity in breeding, and to others, which were being consumed by these, a plenteous brood, and so procured survival of their kind16.

It can hardly be overlooked that Protagoras - though narrating the myth - shows considerable interest in biology, namely the problem of the survival of the species, even presenting a rule of dependence of the offspring number on their way of nutrition. Let us now move back to a previously quoted passage (334ac). It has its precise structure. Although at first it seems to be a mere collection of examples pointing to the relativity of what is profitable, the presentation itself, however, is interesting for both its content and composition. All the presented examples fall into the categories listed at the beginning which are food (siti a), drinks (pota ), and drugs (fa rmaka), in other words, what sustains life and provides for the growth of living beings. The first reason for differentiating what is good

is a variety of living beings which

are divided into three groups: of men, of animals and of plants. First, for instance, food, drinks or drugs may be unprofitable for man, but good or bad for animals. The usefulness of food is therefore conditioned by species – something else is good, bad and indifferent to people, horses, oxen, dogs and trees. Secondly, good is dependent on the object to which something is applied or quantity of applied substance – for example, the dung is good for tree roots, but bad for leaves. Olive oil is very bad for plants, even fatal to hair of all animals, but is good for human hair. And the last reason that determines the usefulness or harmfulness of food is the condition

in which a person is in. Olive oil, which is a "good" food for healthy people,

ceases to be good when they fall ill. As it is pointed out by the researchers, the fragment quoted above reveals the clear influences of medical thought and practice.17 “The food, drinks and drugs” issue is the basic topic of the medical treatises making the collection of Corpus Hippocraticum. And the words that Protagoras uses to define what is "good" (a)rwgo n) and "bad" (polemiw taton) are characteristic of medical literature of those times. Not without significance is also that the

16 17

Plato, Protagoras, 321b. E. Schiappa, op. cit., p. 166.

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mention on Hippocrates in Plato’s Protagoras is one of only three pre-Alexandrian references to this famous physician18. Taking these facts into account, it is worth taking a closer look at the relationship between our fragment and one of the most intriguing and compelling work of Corpus Hippocraticum which is the treatise On ancient medicine (Peri\ a)rxai hv i)htrikh=v) (VM). It is considered one of the earliest works in the Corpus Hippocraticum and is dated to the last quarter of the 5th century BC19. Although, the treatise is concerned with the issues of the medicine, its significance for the history of philosophy is beyond question20. It contains, among others, the first definition of "cause" which – as it is claimed by M. Vegetti – determined understanding of ai]tion in philosophy21. Moreover - what is really surprising – we may find in the treatise the first documented use of the word "philosophy"22, appearing in the fragment criticising the philosophical search for an answer to the question "what is a human being." In addition, researchers have long paid attention to parallels between some issues discussed in On ancient medicine and the views of Protagoras23. The author of the treatise criticises a “modern medicine”, modelled on the speculative method of the philosophy of nature based on "hypotheses", that is, explaining the causes of diseases with one, two or more principles (in the form of heat, cold, moisture or dryness)24, and recommending to treat the diseases with contraries. The anonymous author of On ancient medicine contrasts this new trend with “ancient medicine”, understood primarily as "dietetics" – the ability to adjust the diet to the condition of a treated person. To demonstrate the validity of ancient medicine, he presents various types of arguments, including thought experiments.

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Plato, Protagoras 311bc. Por. G.E.R. Lloyd, The Hippocratic Question, „Classical Quarterly”, 25 (1975), p. 171. 19 H.W. Miller, On ancient Medicine, „Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association”, 80 (1949), p. 198. 20 G.E.R. Lloyd, Who is attacked in On Ancient Medicine, „Phronesis”, 8 (1963), p. 108: “„On Ancient Medicine is generally acknowledged to be a document of the first importance for our understanding of the development of early Greek thought”. 21 M. Vegetti, Culpability, responsibility, cause: Philosophy, historiography, and medicine in the fifth century, p. 284 nn., w: The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A.A. Long, Cambridge 1999. 22 VM 20. Hippocrates, On ancient medicine, translated with introduction and commentary by M.J. Schiefsky, Leiden–Boston 2005. 23 K. von Fritz (1957), Protagoras, w: Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung von Georg Wissowa fortgeführt von Wilhelm Kroll und Karl Mittelhaup. Unter Mitwirkung zahlreichen Fachgenossen herausgegeben von Konrat Ziegler, Band XXIII, 1 (Fünfundvierzigster Halbband), Stuttgart 1957, p. 915. 24 H.W. Miller, Dynamis and physis in On ancient medicine, „Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association”, 82 (1952), p. 184.

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In one of them, he proposes that someone with a weak bodily constitution eat raw wheat, raw meat and drink water (VM 13). And then asks: what the proponents of the method of hypothesis would treat him with: warmth, cold, dryness or moisture? The only form of cure is a change of diet: instead of wheat, one should give him bread, instead of raw meat – cooked meat, instead of water - wine. Opposing the concept of hypotheses, the author of On ancient medicine shows that much "more power" than heat and cold have “the sour and the insipid and other qualities” (VM 15), since they can even affect objects much less sensitive than human beings, for example a “bladder or a vessel of wood” (VM 15). These, from our perspective, rather naive views, hold a true revolutionary content. The author of On ancient medicine believes that the art of medicine originated with the idea that the diet should be adjusted to the condition of a treated person (VM 5). To be able to apply an appropriate diet (VM 14) a physician must consider the variety of individual elements, such as the constitution of patient’s body or their condition. Such a perspective prompts the author of On ancient medicine to reject any universal rules, based on a vague idea of "human essence" postulated by "physicians and sophists" (VM 20). According to the author of On ancient medicine, this type of research is barren and completely useless. All cognition must be related to experience (empeiria), and the only way to learn who a human being is, is to determine what is their relation to what they eat and drink, how they live and how it affects them (VM 20)25. The above point of view is interesting for our reflections on Protagoras, because several topics contained in On ancient medicine have their parallels in the passage in the dialogue Protagoras. In the Hippocratic treatise the fundamental significance - analogous to what is useful (w)fe limon) in Protagoras's speech in Plato’s dialogue, - has the concept of that what is beneficial (to\ sumfe ron). It plays the role of the main topic of the doctrine expounded in On ancient medicine and of that what inspired people to create craft (techne)26. In addition, in both texts the stress is laid on the importance of an appropriate diet. Not only the diversity of food good for animals and human beings is considered here, but also the necessity to adjust the diet to the condition of health or illness of a patient (VM 8). These parallels are not confined to a presentation of a certain general principle but are reflected in specific examples. 25 26

Th. Gomperz, op. cit., p. 490. H.W. Miller, On ancient..., p. 194.

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As we remember the passage in Protagoras quoted above discussed the diversity of what is good in the case of "foods, drinks and drugs", and pointed to examples of man, horses, bulls and dogs. The author of On ancient medicine writes along the same line that a food suitable for healthy people would have never be recognized, if the man had consumed food and drink proper to: „... the ox, the horse, and all other animals, except man, [as they] do of the productions of the earth, such as fruits, weeds, and grass; for from such things these animals grow, live free of disease, and require no other kind of food 27. We also mentioned the principle of adjusting food to the condition and lifestyle of humans, which Protagoras illustrates in the dialogue with an example of the olive oil given to an ill, only in small amounts. On ancient medicine is a real repository of such examples. According to the treatise, the art of medicine commenced when it was realised that people in different states require different diet. Thus it was acknowledged that the main task of medicine is to determine proper diet (VM 3 and 5). From among many considerations regarding this problem, it is worth paying attention to the fragment that attempts to give an answer to the question "Who is a human?" by defining their relation to food and drinks. In this passage the author of On ancient medicine discusses the impact of cheese (which as he writes has: „less known effects”) and of wine (as the author notes, the effects of its consumption are well-studied)28, in the case of which it is not enough to know that they harm a man if she he consumes one of them excessively, but one also needs to know “what sort of disturbance it creates” and “with what principle in man it disagrees” (VM 20). In both cases, it is necessary to know the specific health condition and physical constitution of a given person (VM 20). The example of olive oil, the excessive consumption of which is harmful to a sick person, as Protagoras tells us in Plato’s dialogue, is nothing but an illustration of the same principle. It is also worth paying attention to the fragment of On ancient medicine, which has a slightly visible counterpart in Protagoras, but it is very important for the entire philosophy of Protagoras and for our reasoning. Author of the De prisca medicina in his criticism of any universal rules of treatment argues that

what should be determining the diet of a healthy and ill person is suitability

which remains dependent on the constitution of man! Food should therefore be tailored to the individual and a dose should be adjusted to their needs. To achieve this goal a physician must 27 28

VM 3. G.E.R. Lloyd, The Hippocratic…, p. 188.

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use a measure. And the measure that makes the cognition possible is neither weight nor number, but "sensation of the body." According to the author of On ancient medicine, a good doctor may commit "small mistakes" – and this is the reason for glory, because "perfect accuracy is seldom to be seen" (VM 9) . These are extremely important remarks when one considers the great problem of accuracy in relation to craft and knowledge (techne and episteme), developed by Plato in his dialogue Gorgias

in which the standard of "number, measure and weight" is the basis of

Plato’s doctrine of genuine craft (techne)29. In the passage in De prisca Medicina, the standard of “number, measure and weight” is directly criticized and the whole practice of a physician is based on sensation (aisthesis)! The last point of reference is Plato's Theaetetus30 the major part of which is devoted to the discussion with Protagoras. Its starting point is the presentation of the famous Protagoras’ dictum: “Man is the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not”31 which is followed by a definition of knowledge. According to Plato’s report Protagoras defined it as sensation, which not only embraced the perceptions, but also the emotions (i.e., pleasures and pains, desires, fears) and dream-images (Cornford, 1935). Identifying a sensation (aisthesis) with knowledge is clearly in the spirit of On ancient medicine. In Hippocratic treatise there is also no universal “knowledge", no universal „techne”, there are only individual people with individual disease symptoms, the diagnosis of which is subject to doctor's sensation (aesthesis). This rejection of all universal principles, the abandonment of unnecessary search for the essence of human being, which are postulated by the author of the On ancient medicine, and focusing on idiosyncratic conditions, on individual cases, finds its equivalent in Protagoras’ equally private theory of knowledge, understood as sensation (aisthesis). And finally, the last of the fragments that I would like to draw attention to. In Plato’s Theaetetus after presenting the definition of knowledge identified with sensation (aisthesis), Socrates undertakes the criticism of this definition and proclaims:

In general I like his doctrine that

what appears to each one

is to him, but I am

amazed by the beginning of his book. 29

Por. F. Heinimann, Mass-Gewicht-Zahl, „Museum Helveticum”, 32 (1975), p. 183–196. Z. Nerczuk, Miarą jest każdy z nap. Projekt zwolenników zmienności rzeczy w platońskim Teajtecie na tle myśli sofistycznej, Toruń 2009. 31 Dillon / Gergel 30

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I don't see why he does not say in the beginning of his Truth that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honoring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in intellect than any other man, [161d] or, for that matter, than a tadpole32.

In the light of our examination, Socrates' words take on an additional ironic dimension. Plato realizes that

from Protagoras’ perspective

the truth is as "elusive and

diverse thing" as the "good" that Protagoras lectured in earlier discussed passage. Let us recall the statement of the sophist in the speech on the “profitable”, devoted to the "favourite menu" of the "horses, oxen and dogs", which were the subject of interest for Protagoras. From here it is not far to "baboons, pigs and tadpoles!" In this way Plato ridicules not only Protagoras’ views, but also their source, namely his interest in the world of nature and medicine, which were likely to be one of the main factors in the development of Protagoras's views on "what is good" and "profitable." However, despite Plato's criticism, disrespect of Aristotle and the oblivion the sophists eventually had fallen into, they were not all dead. They found their successors at the end of the ancient era, among those who renewed Pyrrhonism, also physicians, unknowing codifiers of this type of thinking: Ainesidemos and Sextus Empiricus.

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Platon, Teajtet 161cd. Korzystam z przekładu: Platona, Teajtet, tłum., wstęp, objaśnienia i ilustracje W. Witwicki, Warszawa 1959, p. 50–51.

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