Policy instruments for Indigenous Peoples and

Policy instruments for Indigenous Peoples and Disaster Risk Reduction A Case Study of Māori participation in Disaster and Emergency Management, Aotearoa New Zealand

Abstract Indigenous Peoples possess ancient wisdom and valuable knowledge on environmental hazards and disasters. Much of this knowledge is relevant to non-Indigenous Peoples. As current concerns on disaster risk reduction emphasise a multi-level, multi-national approach, Indigenous knowledge can help international, regional, national and local organisations to address complex hazards including climate change and sea-level rise. However, despite the important insights and unique risk profiles of Indigenous communities, they are often marginalised in the relevant policy-making processes. This report provides an overview of the international policy in this area and examines the experiences of Māori (the Indigenous People of Aotearoa New Zealand) in the legislative and policy areas relevant to hazards and disasters. Research on how Māori responded and continue to recover from the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010-11 provides a useful window on how a diverse urban Indigenous communities are impacted by, and seek influence in, disaster and emergency management and disaster risk reduction.

Simon Lambert [email protected]

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1

Contents 1.

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4

2.

Policy and Institutions for Disasters and Emergencies............................................................................ 5 2.1

Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 5

2.2

Policy and Institutions for Disasters ................................................................................................ 6

2.2.1 2.3

International Context ...................................................................................................................... 8

2.3.1

3.

Indigenous Peoples and the UN .............................................................................................. 8

2.4

International Organisations and Agreements ................................................................................. 9

2.5

International Indigenous Programmes .......................................................................................... 10

Government and Legislative Framework for DEM in Aotearoa New Zealand ...................................... 11 3.1

Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management ............................................................... 11

3.1.1

Analysis & Planning Unit ........................................................................................................ 12

3.1.2

Development Unit ................................................................................................................. 13

3.1.3

Capability & Operations Unit ................................................................................................. 13

3.2

Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002 ...................................................... 13

3.2.1

Civil Defence Emergency Management Regulations 2003 .................................................... 14

3.2.2

National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy.................................................... 14

3.2.3

National CDEM Plan............................................................................................................... 15

3.3

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups ............................................................................ 15

3.4

Director's Guidelines on various aspects of CDEM........................................................................ 17

3.5

Other legislation relevant to CDEM ............................................................................................... 17

3.6

Summary........................................................................................................................................ 19

3.8.1 4

Scale ......................................................................................................................................... 6

Roles and Responsibilities ..................................................................................................... 22

Disaster and Emergency Management: recent experiences of Māori .................................................. 23 4.1

Māori participation in DEM through the Canterbury earthquakes ............................................... 23

4.1.1

Response................................................................................................................................ 24

4.1.2

Recovery ................................................................................................................................ 24

4.1.3

Reduction and Readiness ...................................................................................................... 25

4.2

International Indigenous Experiences ........................................................................................... 26

4.3

Current and Future Research in Aotearoa New Zealand............................................................... 26

4.4

Observations: Control F Māori ...................................................................................................... 28

4.5

Summary........................................................................................................................................ 29

5.

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 31

6.

References ............................................................................................................................................. 32

7.

Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 37 2

7.1

Risk Management Definitions ....................................................................................................... 37

7.2

Appendix 2: MCDEM Organisational Chart ................................................................................... 41

Figures Figure 1: International framework for disaster risk reduction ............................................................................ 9 Figure 2: The Four 'R's framework for DEM ...................................................................................................... 12 Figure 3: National Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups) ........................................ 16 Figure 4: Key organisations and their relationships in disasters and emergencies .......................................... 20 Figure 5: Relationships between key legislation for the land use management of natural hazards ................ 21 Figure 6: NSC 6 Resilience to Nature's Challenges structure ............................................................................ 27 Tables Table 1: Hierarchy of activities in disasters and adaptation ............................................................................... 7 Table 2: Paradigm shift in disaster and emergency management .................................................................... 10 Table 3: Roles and Responsibilities ................................................................................................................... 22 Table 4: Aotearoa NZ Policy hierarchy (after Handmer and Davis 2009).......................................................... 29

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1. Introduction This report examines how Indigenous Peoples can interpret, frame, and implement disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies. The approach is to first review the international policy arena, particularly the various United Nations programmes then investigate how Māori participate in the legislative and policy framework for disaster and emergency management (DEM) in Aotearoa New Zealand, identifying leverage points for improving Māori resilience. The aim is to explore how Māori and other Indigenous Peoples can contribute to, and benefit from, wider DRR programmes. A key concern is the urbanisation of Indigenous communities resulting in their exposure to new and evolving hazards and disasters including greater exposure to technological risks. Māori - 85% of whom live in towns or cities - have perhaps a greater insight into urbanisations than many other Indigenous Peoples, and Māori in Ōtautahi/Christchurch have the unfortunate experience of a series of destructive earthquakes that tested DEM in their city. African researcher Victor Okerie considers ‘every disaster a storyteller’ (Victor Okerie, pers. comm.). This report will draw on research by Māori researchers on the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes which devastated the Christchurch CBD and large areas of the Eastern suburbs, home to many Māori communities. This research tells a story of how Indigenous Peoples living in urban communities are affected by, and can in turn effect changes to, disaster and emergency management policy. Disasters are not ‘natural’ (although they may be a function of natural hazards) but social events and as such are within the purview of state administration and political agendas. As Maria Bargh (2013) points out, the research literature on Māori political participation in Aotearoa New Zealand is sparse. Too often Māori politics is dichotomised as a Māori versus Pākehā landscape of simplified cultural identities and practices that hides the complexity of Māori political engagement. Tahu Kukutai (2004, p. 86) argues for a more nuanced interpretation of who and what we are, noting a flaw in ‘race- and ethnic-based policies [in] that they belie the cultural and socio-economic diversity that exits within historically marginalised groups’. However, Indigenous Peoples are not peripheral to state legislation. As Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014) and others point out, the violent oppression and discrimination of colonial states against their Indigenous Peoples places those Indigenous societies at the very centre of state philosophising and operations. Similar challenges exist in disaster risk reduction discourse where Indigenous communities are labelled as either terminally vulnerable – being poor, dispossessed, racially and culturally abused - or endlessly resilient, able to counter whatever comes their way be it economic decline, social stigmatisation or massive disaster. Certainly, Indigenous communities may exhibit inspiring resilience to natural hazards (Campbell, 1997) but equally it is difficult and sometimes impossible to absorb the effects of a mega-earthquake, cyclone, tsunami, flood, military invasion and so on. An important nexus of resilience discourse and state policy for Māori is manifested in Te Tiriti o Waitangi which sees an ongoing dialogue between Māori and the Crown as described in a volume by Veronica Tawhai, Katarina Grey-Sharp and other Māori researchers (Tawhai & Gray-Sharp, 2013). In that volume, Haami Piripi (2011) offers a timely reminder that while the intent of public policy and services has varied considerably over the post-contact period (170 years for Maori), the ‘methodology, focus and delivery [of public services] … serve[s] the purposes of the government in office.’ It is the intent of this working paper to contribute to this dialogue by highlighting the importance of disaster and emergency management for Māori and draw attention to key legislation, policy instruments and organisations involved in DEM for ongoing debates concerning Māori development, including the need for comprehensive long term DRR.

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2. Policy and Institutions for Disasters and Emergencies Are disasters like the Bible’s portrayal of the poor (Mathew 26:11; Mark 14:7) and to be ‘always with us’? In a world of increasing complexity and interconnectedness, with seemingly endless, all-encompassing risks (Beck, 2006), are we bound to experience ever greater losses to earthquakes, tsunami’s, volcanic activity, cyclones, floods, landslides, extreme weather, drought or fire? The most destructive of a series of earthquakes that struck the city of Christchurch between 2010 and 2011 killed 185 people; 115 died in a single poorly constructed building (Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, 2012a), another 41 were killed by unreinforced masonry (Shaw, 2013). In other words, most of the deaths would have been prevented if better legislation and policies were enacted and enforced. Around the world we see disaster fatalities from unsafe building design and practices, poor or corrupt zoning decisions, naïve development programmes, systemic failure of officials to perform their designated roles, and political leadership and whole societies that ignore the risks of regular and potentially destructive natural hazards and growing concerns over technological activityies. As Mark 14: 7 goes on to say of the poor, ‘whenever you want, you can do good for them.’ This report continues to build the case for explicit, empowered roles for Indigenous Peoples in the fundamental civic duty of disaster and emergency management, with an ultimate aim of reducing risks – doing good – for all peoples.

2.1

Overview

Thomas Birkland (1997, 2006) drew our attention to the dynamics of policy change in the aftermath ‘focusing events’ such as disasters.1 While it may be ‘intuitively sensible’ that societies do not debate earthquakes or terrorist attacks until they actually occur, Birkland found an connection between the event, the nature of the event (for example if it stems from a natural hazard, a technological system, or an identifiable group or community), and the configuration of actors who seek to address the subsequent policy issues. One of the fundamental reason focusing events are given the attention of politicians, policy makers and the public is that they provide evidence of policy failure. To reiterate, while natural hazards are a realty of human existence, disasters themselves are not natural but, in the words of joint publication by the World Bank and United Nations, ‘result from human acts of omission and commission’ (World Bank/United Nations, 2010, p. 1). The conclusions of that work provide a justification and impetus to this report, with four main findings (pp. 1-2): 1. A disaster exposes the cumulative implications of many earlier decisions, some taken individually, others collectively, and a few by default; 2. Prevention is often possible and cost-effective; 3. Many measures, private and public, must work well together for effective prevention; 4. The exposure to hazards will rise in cities but greater exposure need not increase vulnerability.

A constant refrain in many national and multinational reports is the rising cost of damage caused by disasters (World Bank/United Nations, 2010, Fig 1.15). While loss of life is always tragic, it seems the sheer cost of recovering from a major disaster is uppermost in official strategy. Expensive disruption to business and communities and the pointed, often emotional and visceral, challenges to policy bring in wider questions about the nature and ability of modern democracies to deal with large-scale disasters including slow onset environmental issues such as droughts and climate change. Rutherford Platt (1999) examined the interplay between US federal assistance and the increasing impotence of central in the face of state and local governments and individuals challenging any form of government control or interference. The US, as with many other countries, has seen a massive increase in the number and complexity of state agencies established to mitigate disasters and yet this system is regularly overwhelmed and found inadequate, at 1

Birkland cites John Klingdon’s 1984 text ‘Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies’ as introducing the term.

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least in the eyes of the public and taxpayers. Sheila Jasanoff (2010) distinguishes between management of disasters and emergencies and the identification and attempted control of risks (often associated with single causes) and governance which is embedded within the socio-political environment from which risks originate. The wider administrative landscape is now dominated by a technocratic approach in which relies on ‘sound science’ which is kept separate from the murky politics and subjectivity by impartial peer review. Despite increasingly sophisticated science, growing databases, more specialised education and training and refined risk modelling there seems to be an ineradicable gap between experts and the lay public. Research in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics has highlighted how people perceive risk and apportion investment and mitigation efforts. Individuals often display ‘loss aversion’ biases in being more concerned with the cost of a particular action than the benefits (Rabin, 1998). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed people systematically misperceive probabilities and risks, overestimating low probability events and under estimate high probability events. People also underestimate risks of events they have not experienced and overestimate the risks of those they have. Coupled with a status quo bias – people prefer things to stay the same even if losses are more than fully compensated (Riccardi, 2007) – the implications for disaster risk reduction are that political leaders and policy makers will struggle to implement desired or necessary change when tax payer and voter support is lacking. Birkland went on to describe three outcomes for policy change post-disaster. Firstly, changes in policy can prevent or mitigate future disasters. Secondly, they could fail to improve the situation, or make it worse. Indeed Birkland argues this is the current context for US disaster policy as the Federal government increasingly shifts risks from individuals to society as a whole. Finally, policy change could have no impact ‘because it is hampered by the usual dynamics of multiple levels of government…or the resistance of local officials or target populations (p. 181).

2.2

Policy and Institutions for Disasters

Handmer and Dovers (2007) provide an excellent text for practitioners in disaster and emergency management and policy that begins by noting disasters can challenge the very legitimacy of government through the sudden appearance of ‘apparent chaos and disruption and highlighting the weaknesses and limits of government’ (ibid., p. 2). They also note the opportunities for political benefits as politicians can display ‘leadership and empathy with the affected’. Handmer and Dovers point out the paradox of the less visible processes of policy development and implementation for DRR ‘may carry little political reward’, indeed may require considerable investment for long term security. Table 1 lists a hierarchy of activities in the policy space that provides a useful schematic of the general outline for policy introduction. 2.2.1 Scale Scale is an important criteria for identifying and responding to hazards and disasters. Jane Rovens (2011) emphases regional collaboration, defining this as a cross-border framework necessary to address risks and naming the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (directly impacting 13 countries on two continents), Hurricane Katrina (directly affecting four states) and the 2010 floods in China (impacting 28 provinces and over 140 million people) as events that illustrate this. Nation-states are clearly a fundamental unit of analysis due to their sovereign responsibilities and political contingencies. Thus most of this report examines Aotearoa New Zealand’s legislation and policy for the purposes of enabling Maori to better understand the strategic and tactical political and administrative contexts for disaster and emergency management and subsequent DRR opportunities. However, Aotearoa New Zealand has a significant regional role (along with Australia) as evidenced by the response to Cyclone

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Pam which had devastated the Pacific nation of Vanuatu while also causing considerable disruption to the north-east coast of Aotearoa.2

Level 1 Social goals

2 Institutional systems and policy processes

     

3 Policy objectives

 

4a Policy implementation in the public sector

  

4b Policy implementation in the private sector



5 Emergency management

 

  



What (is done)? Who (does it)? How (do they do it)? Negotiation of what is valued. Political system, executive, electorate, policy and communities, media. Highly variable within political and institutional traditions, rules and styles. ‘rules of the game’. Political system, governments, inter-governmental organisations, policy and epistemic communities. Highly variable over time, jurisdictions and issues but still within political and institutional traditions, rules and styles. More precise goals and targets expressed in formal policy statements. Largely the role of governments in various kinds of partnerships with nongovernmental interests. Design and implementation of policy programmes and instruments; monitoring and evaluation. Government organisations/agencies and industry and community partners including international organisations and commerce. Through various strategies involving resources, statuary authority, information dissemination etc. Provide infrastructure, services, insurance etc. within regulatory and market settings relevant to response/recovery/reduction/readiness. Private firms, consultants, sole operators. Independently, in industry associations or contracted by government. Via all of the above as well as individuals, households and formal or informal collectives. Preparedness for and response to events. Emergency management sector, key partners and related sectors (e.g., health, security). Professionalised, highly responsive and rapidly changing in the face of events, policy shifts, community preferences, media etc.

Table 1: Hierarchy of activities in disasters and adaptation Source: Dovers and Handmer (2007; Table 1.1, p. 14).

Large-scale disasters not only cross international and internal borders, they may also overwhelm state capacity for disaster relief. The state itself may be the cause of disaster. Rao (2014: p. 113) describes the impacts of government demolition of slum dwellings in Delhi, enabled through neo-liberal ideology that sees urban planning in India produce ‘the conditions for its own failure and [aggravate] the situation of those who are rendered perpetually at risk’ Clearly there is an interplay between regions and states. But the fundamental scale for responding to an actual disaster, and the location at which DRR strategies must have effect, is the local. For it is local communities – family, neighbours, schools, shopkeepers – that are the first responders. Configuring policies so that local communities including Indigenous communities are empowered to act in their best interests over time is perhaps the greatest challenge of DRR. While the following sections deal directly with the

2

Unfortunately, none of Aotearoa New Zealand’s new defence helicopters could be taken to Vanuatu due to logistical difficulties and because they are not cleared for "island-hopping" (Editorial, 2015).

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international organisations and agreements aimed at DRR, this is to foreshadow how such approaches and interpretations can better act for the interests of local scale life.

2.3

International Context In many parts of our increasingly globalised world, processes such as badly planned and managed urban development, environmental degradation, poverty and inequality and weak governance, are driving levels of disaster risk to new heights. Given that our current approach to both public and private investment tends to discount disaster risk, the potential for future loss is enormous. This poses a critical threat to economic development, social welfare and environmental health. Margareta Wahlström (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2014, p. v)

Disaster and emergency management has an international context as well as the obviously local and regional. Multilateral arrangements have evolved to mitigate the humanitarian needs of large disasters, many of which overwhelm poorer countries. Many disasters and some emergencies do not obey state boundaries, and comprehensive response and recovery activities will often require international aid. An explicit link has been made between DRR and sustainable development as disasters are seen to challenge communities and governments across environmental, economic, social and cultural contexts Discourse on international disaster response law (IDRL) is evolving out of international humanitarian laws. Concerns over climate change and sea-level adaption are forcing greater cooperation between states although the current impasse over effective policies shows there is some way to go before solutions are in place. 2.3.1 Indigenous Peoples and the UN The United Nations has enabled Indigenous Peoples to promote their domestic agendas on the international stage and to support a collective approach to common issues to counter the historical strength of states and multinational corporations. There are several different fora within the UN organisation, notably the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues which is an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social Council. The UN Commission on Human Rights continues to be an important organisation (and has also been framing international law in dealing with disasters). However, the predominant neoliberal agenda continues to impede Indigenous agendas, and considerable practical and institutional issues remain (Charters, 2007). The participation of Indigenous Peoples in the UN and other multilateral organisations has led to important acknowledgements of Indigenous rights for societies and communities identifying themselves as Indigenous around the world. An important attempt at defining indigenous came in the International Labour Organization Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169) which highlighted the importance of self-identification: 1. … (a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; (b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

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2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply. The concept of self-identification is echoed by The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples which, in addition to the ILO position, noted:   

2.4

A strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; Distinct social, economic or political systems; and Distinct language, culture and beliefs.

International Organisations and Agreements

As with national legislation, there are many interconnected and overlapping international regimes. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) was established in 1999 is tasked with the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), agreed to by the 168 member states of the United Nations in 2005. The HFA is one of several multilateral approaches to DRR and climate change adaption (CCA) (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: International framework for disaster risk reduction

The UN Conferences and meetings around the HFA provide a useful conceptual sounding board for state and local strategies. Table 2 shows the paradigm shifts in how risks are framed, the main policy tools to deal with these risks, and the required knowledge, main actors and multilateral goals related to addressing these risks.

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Risk perception Problem recognition Examples of main policy tools Required knowledge Actors

Link

Old paradigm Exogenous Need for effective response and recovery Contingency plan, emergency training

HFA Exogenous Need for disaster risk reduction Early warning system, engineering solutions Risk and loss assessment

Disaster management agency

Disaster risk management throughout layers of government; various stakeholders (public, private, NGO) Millennium Development Goal

New paradigm Endogenous Risk is embedded in development processes Land use planning, risk proof investment, eco-system management Risk, loss and socio-economic impact assessments Wider and deeper stakeholder involvement, especially private sector and local level actors Sustainable Development Goal, Climate Change Policy

Table 2: Paradigm shift in disaster and emergency management

DRR and CCA encompass a raft of strategies to reduce vulnerabilities to environmental hazards. The most important – and controversial - organisation is the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) that has articulated scientific concerns over rapid climate change. The UN Framework Convention for Climate Change was adopted in 1992 and led to the Kyoto Protocol (1997) which legally binds developed governments to emission reduction targets.

2.5

International Indigenous Programmes

The multilateral approaches briefly summarised in the preceding section have various openings for Indigenous societies but as noted above, it is difficult for Indigenous Peoples in general, and smaller, isolated, marginalised Indigenous communities in particular, to wield much influence in the outcomes.The ability of Indigenous Peoples to influence the particular disaster management policies relevant to their local situations is contingent upon the historical and socio-economic contexts in which they live. However, Indigenous Knowledge is increasingly incorporated into DEM and DRR. A UNISDR Conference in Geneva in 2013 heard some of this knowledge with an Indigenous Panel making recommendations (see Lambert, 2014a) including:    

Recognition and better use of indigenous perspectives and knowledge by incorporating these in HFA2. Support for the creation of regional indigenous networking to give voice to indigenous advocates for disaster risk reduction. Advocacy, through respective National Platforms, for ‘a seat at the table’ and for the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in national disaster risk reduction planning. Opportunities for Indigenous participation in regional and international forums.

Ongoing projects to describe and analyse Indigenous communities and their disaster risk reduction needs, aspirations and contributions are taking place (Lambert, Athayde, Yin, Baudoin, & Okorie, 2014). While the remainder of this report details the participation of Māori in relevant DEM policies and legislation in Aotearoa New Zealand, international Indigenous examples will be drawn on in selected sections to reinforce the global significance of IK in DRR and the ‘obligations of opportunities of efficiencies’ (Lambert, 2014a) through better integration of Indigenous groups and philosophies into DEM at local, national and international levels.

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3. Government and Legislative Framework for DEM in Aotearoa New Zealand The brutal colonial history of Aotearoa New Zealand has been dealt with in many other publications. For those wishing to understand the basics, several excellent general history texts are available (Belich, 1986, 1996; King, 2003) including a growing literature on the Treaty of Waitangi (Hayward & Wheen, 2004; Orange, 1987; Tawhai & Gray-Sharp, 2013). More detailed tribal histories are now being published by Māori historians (see, e.g., Mitchell & Mitchell, 2004). Current Māori frustrations often centre on the complexities of legislation dealing with Māori land ownership and management and the difficulties in dealing with multiple Crown agencies controlled by successive governments who rarely need bother with a distinct Māori electorate. Haami Piripi (2011) offers a chronology for Maori and Crown engagement:   

1835-1945, the Iron Century 1945-1984, the Maori Development Era 1984 onwards, Reforms and Market Forces

Again, readers interested in the details of this history are directed to Piripi’s and other’s expert literature. This report is situated in the current phase which has seen Māori voices are crystallising through post-Treaty Settlement organisations such as the Iwi Leaders Group and the Iwi Chairs Forum (although these groups of fiercely contested by many Maori. See, e.g., Rata, 2011) and various industry groups in the primary sector (particularly agribusiness, fisheries and forestry). Representation for iwi and hapū groups is enabled through legislation such as the Resource Management Act (1991) and the Local Government Act (2005). The Maori Council has also been active in promoting policy for Maori (and has had some significant victories; see ). However, it remains difficult for Māori to collectively organise to effect policy changes, particularly in a space in which, as the brief literature above tells, long term benefits are not necessarily enacted in view of short term costs. What follows is an overview the state control and operation of DEM activities and strategies in the country. Whatever policies Māori seek to enact in disaster risk reduction will involve interaction with these policy instruments.

3.1

Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

‘Resilient New Zealand: Communities understanding and managing their hazards.’ Ministry Vision

The Ministry provides policy advice to government, supports DEM planning and operations, coordinates at local, regional and national levels, and manages the government response for large scale civil defence emergencies (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2015). In April 2014 the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) transferred from the Department of Internal Affairs to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC); roles and responsibilities were unchanged. The DPMC coordinates the National Security and Resilience Plan and crisis management at the national level. The transfer ‘is expected to strengthen the alignment between MCDEM’s functions and strategic direction and those of the national security, risk and intelligence community’ (Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 2014, p. 1). The Ministry continues to lead coordination of civil defence emergencies. The overarching MCDEM strategy is through a risk management approach to the four R’s: reduction, readiness, response, recovery (Figure 2).

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i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

Reduction generally refers to efforts taken prior an event that help to reduce or avoid the potential effect of an event e.g. planning regulations in earthquake prone areas or risk reducing considerations in the EIA prior land development etc. Readiness refers to horizontal and vertical organisational and institutional integration that is in place for dealing with varying scales of events. For example involving communities in the planning processes, community programs, professional developments, education etc. Response refers to the 5 stage process starting at a single agency incident (locally contained/onsite coordination) and ending at the national emergency or nationally significant emergency level. ‘Response’ as a policy instrument can have a number of different effects which are determined by the scale of the event. Recovery refers to the stage that starts after the initial response and ideally takes into account the social, emotional, economic and physical wellbeing of individuals and communities, integrates all stakeholder in the stages ahead, aids the transition from post disaster to ‘business as usual’, and reduces future risks and exposure to hazards.

The CDEM Act (2002) defines recovery activities means activities carried out under the Act or any civil defence emergency management plan after an emergency occurs, including, without limitation: (a) the assessment of the needs of a community affected by the emergency; (b) the co-ordination of resources made available to the community; (c) actions relating to community rehabilitation and restoration; (d) new measures to reduce hazards and risks.

Figure 2: The Four 'R's framework for DEM

The Ministry ‘aims to put the right tools, knowledge and skills in the hands of those responsible for designing and implementing solutions at the local level. It does this by working closely with local government, utilities and the emergency services involved in civil defence emergency management’. Three business units implement this strategy(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2015). 3.1.1 Analysis & Planning Unit Responsible for research and development of DEM concepts including the coordination of scientific advice and the ‘application of research, national planning, the development of guidance and doctrine and 12

international engagement’. The Unit also manages relationships with other Departments and agencies at the national level. 3.1.2 Development Unit Responsible for engagement and liaison with CDEM Groups and local authorities on their statutory responsibility for delivering all aspects of DEM to their communities. Also responsible for assisting CDEM Groups to implement national guidance and plans in the region, monitor and report Group performance and development including implementing the evaluation process, assisting CDEM Groups to enhance capability development and managing the resilience fund process. 3.1.3 Capability & Operations Unit This unit has two main functions: CDEM capability development and National CDEM operational readiness and systems. CDEM Capability responsibilities include the analysis, development and implementation of measures to support the availability of the requisite range of high quality educational opportunities for CDEM stakeholders. National CDEM operational readiness responsibilities include the management of the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) and its systems, processes and staffing, hosting of the CDEM Emergency Management Information System (EMIS), management of the National Warning System and the National Exercise Programme. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002)

3.2

Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002

The key legislation for disaster and emergency management in Aotearoa New Zealand is the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002 (New Zealand Government, 2002) which came into effect on December 1st, 2002. (Minor amendments were made in 2012). The purpose of the Act is to:      

improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural and environmental well-being and safety of the public and the protection of property encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk by identifying risks and applying risk reduction management practices provide for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response and recovery in the event of an emergency require local authorities to coordinate Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) through regional groups across the “4Rs” (reduction, readiness, response and recovery) and encourage cooperation and joint action between those groups integrate local and national CDEM planning and activity through the alignment of local planning with a national plan and strategy encourage the coordination of emergency management across the range of agencies and organisations with responsibilities for preventing or managing emergencies.

Three key terms in the legislation are hazard, emergency and risk. A hazard means something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency. An emergency means a situation that: (a) is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance,

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technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and (b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and (c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant and co-ordinated response under this Act. Risk means the likelihood and consequences of a hazard.

The CDEM Act makes no mention of Māori, marae, hapū or iwi. While the Act is the overarching element in the CDEM Framework, other elements are:      

CDEM Regulations made under the Act; National CDEM Strategy; National CDEM Plan 2006, and its Guide; CDEM Group Plans; Director's Guidelines on various aspects of CDEM; Other legislation relevant to CDEM.

Each will be discussed briefly below, with details drawn mainly from the Ministry webpages. Links to selected webpages, plans and other legislation are embedded in the text. 3.2.1 Civil Defence Emergency Management Regulations 2003 The Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Regulations (2003) came into force on 1 June 2003. They cover the form and use of the civil defence logo; the form for search warrants; the forms for declaring, extending, and terminating a state of national or local emergency. Māori, marae, hapū or iwi are not mentioned in the Act. 3.2.2 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy The overall direction of disaster and emergency management is set out in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy (2008b) which notes (p.7): …the role of Māori as an important community stakeholder. The Māori worldview incorporates a special relationship with the environment, expressed inter-generationally through kaitiakitanga. The environment forms the base from which cultural, spiritual, emotional, and physical sustenance flows. Because of this perspective, Māori have a particular interest in the management of hazards and associated risks, including risks that may be posed to wāhi tapu sites and other sites of significance. It is important that whānau, hapū, iwi and the wider Māori community are involved in CDEM planning. In addition, Māori communities often have important resources for response and recovery, such as marae for use as emergency shelters, and Māori welfare and support services.

This is, however, the only direct mention of Māori in the Strategy.

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3.2.3 National CDEM Plan The National CDEM Plan (New Zealand Government, 2005) sets out the hazards and risks to be managed at the national level, and the civil defence emergency management necessary to manage those hazards and risks. It also sets out the roles and responsibilities of central government, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups and other agencies such as lifeline utilities, emergency services and non-government organisations. The plan was developed by the Ministry and key stakeholders including representatives from CDEM Groups, local authorities, emergency services, government agencies, and lifeline utilities, and was made under sections 39(1) and 45(b) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002. The purpose of the Plan is to state and provide for the hazards and risks to be managed at the national level and the CDEM arrangements necessary to meet those hazards and risks. The Plan also provides support to the management of local emergencies. The Plan gives effect to the principle of supporting the management of and recovery from emergencies in the community and provides the framework for that support from the national level, to the regional level and again to the local level. Māori are mentioned in S 49 (3d) in relation to psychosocial support with ‘iwi and Māori providers’ as support agencies.

3.3

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups) are a core component of the CDEM Act. A CDEM Group is a ‘consortium’ of local authorities in a particular region that work in partnership with emergency services in undertaking CDEM functions within their region (see Figure 3). Their functions include to:       

identify and understand local hazards and risks and implement cost effective risk reduction measures; provide, or arrange to provide, suitably trained people and an appropriate organisational structure, to conduct effective CDEM; provide, or arrange to provide, other resources necessary for effective CDEM; undertake response and recovery activities; if possible, assist other groups implement CDEM when assistance is requested; promote awareness of the Act and related legislation, and monitor and report on compliance; prepare and implement a CDEM Group plan.

15

Figure 3: National Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups) Source: MCDEM (2015)

CDEM Groups are established as joint standing committees (of local authority mayors and chairpersons or their delegates) under the Local Government Act 2002. The CDEM Act 2002 gives direction on voting rights and funding liabilities but remains flexible in other administrative aspects to reflect varying CDEM Group circumstances. It is important to note that under this approach:  

 

member local authorities have equal status; individual local authority autonomy remains with mayors retaining the right to declare an emergency within their territorial boundary; each Mayor and Regional Chairperson agreeing to plans under which the CDEM Group operates; and each local authority is responsible for planning and provision of CDEM within its district; if a local authority is split by the boundary between two regional councils, the local authority can choose which CDEM Group it wishes to belong to; formal linkages are required to be made with emergency service providers. 16

CDEM Group Plans use the four R’s as policy instruments to define different phases of disaster management, which could help categorising various types of activities for each phase. This may also lead to other policy areas such as planning and corresponding instruments such as EIA. Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu have been legislated as a key stakeholder in the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act (2011).

3.4

Director's Guidelines on various aspects of CDEM

The Director has the authority under the CDEM Act to issue technical standards and guidelines the purpose of which is to assist organisations with responsibilities under the Act to properly exercise those responsibilities. Guidelines and standards have been issued by the Director on a range of CDEM–related issues. They are grouped in different series as follows:     

Director’s Guidelines (DGLs) Best Practice Guides (BPGs) Technical Standards (TS) Information Series (IS) Supporting Plans (SPs)

Again there is little explicit mention of Māori in these guidelines although there are several instances such as in Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management DGL 1/02 (2002, p. 13) which notes, “[t]he CEG may choose to co-opt other persons from time to time. Representatives from rural fire authorities, lifeline utilities, private health providers, disability groups, volunteer groups, Māori and Pacific peoples’ communities or other ethnic and cultural groups may provide specialist advice or assist in integrating the activities of many contributors to CDEM outcomes. Such diverse representation may be managed through co-opted status on the CEG (e.g., rural fire) or through temporary working groups or subcommittees.” Another instance where Māori are explicitly mentioned is in DGL 07/08 (Mass Evacuation Planning) which notes Māori as being one of several ‘vulnerable groups’ to consider (Ministry for Civil Defence and Environmental Management, 2008a, p. 25). This document also remarks upon Māori cultural practices for engagement: Māori prefer a kanohi ki te kanohi (face-to-face) approach and when engaged in this manner are most likely to collaborate with Local Authorities and CDEM Groups in developing culturally appropriate plans that will support the overall evacuation plan. Māori communities are also an excellent source of volunteers to work within their communities during emergency situations. (ibid, p.25) This practice is, of course, just the beginning and is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful collaboration with Māori.

3.5

Other legislation relevant to CDEM

Legislation relating to CDEM is not just limited to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 but includes various Acts that, for example, regulate activities of particular CDEM participants, assist in land use planning, hazard identification and management, and emergency responses. They include (but are not limited to) the:  Biosecurity Act 1993 17

 Building Act 2004. The key sections of this Act are: Section 35 Section 37 Section 71 Section 72 Section 73

Content of project information memoranda Additional certificates that must be attached to project information memoranda Building on land subject to hazards. Includes a definition of natural hazard Building consents for building on land subject to natural hazards must be granted in certain cases Conditions on building consents granted under section 72

 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 In this legislation, S17(2) states that Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu must have the opportunity to provide an input into the development of the Recovery Plan for the CBD, along with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and Environment Canterbury.         

Defence Act 1990 Earthquake Commission Act 1993 Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 Fire Service Act 1975 Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 Health Act 1956 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 Local Government Act 2002. Key sections of the Act are:

Section 4

Section 10

In order to recognise and respect the Crown's responsibility to take appropriate account of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and to maintain and improve opportunities for Māori to contribute to local government decision-making processes, Parts 2 and 6 provide principles and requirements for local authorities that are intended to facilitate participation by Māori in local authority decision-making processes. (1) The purpose of local government is— (a) to enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, communities; and (b) to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality local infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions in a way that is most cost-effective for households and businesses.

In performing its role, a local authority must have particular regard to the contribution that the following core services make to its communities: (a) network infrastructure: Section 11A (b) public transport services: (c) solid waste collection and disposal: (d) the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards: (e) libraries, museums, reserves, recreational facilities, and other community infrastructure. Gives local authorities the power to make bylaws, including for the purpose of protecting, promoting, Section 145 and maintaining public health and safety. Section 163 Specifies powers in relation to the removal of works in breach of bylaws. Provide for Long Term Plans that describe the activities of local authorities. This can include Sections 93-97 descriptions of local authority activities as well as the management of natural hazards.

18

Explicit engagement with Maori are noted in Section 81 of the Local Government Act: Section 81

Contributions to decision-making processes by Māori (1) A local authority must: (a) establish and maintain processes to provide opportunities for Māori to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority; and (b) consider ways in which it may foster the development of Māori capacity to contribute to the decision-making processes of the local authority; and (c) provide relevant information to Māori for the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b).

 Maritime Transport Act 1994  Public Works Act 1981  Resource Management Act 1991  The RMA (1991) contains explicit acknowledgment of Maori as a matter of national importance. Considerable literature now exists on the theory and applications of this legislation (Love, 2003; Ministry for the Environment, 2003; Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 1998; Selby, 2010; ThompsonFawcett & Sims, 2002; Tutua-Nathan, 2003).

Section 6(e)

3.6

…the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga.

Summary

Explicit DEM legislation and regulations rarely note Māori as distinct component of wider New Zealand society or a distinct community with specific needs or aspirations. However, the extensive related Acts, notably the Local Government Act (2002) and the Resource Management Act (1991) do have explicit roles for Māori (notably as ‘iwi’ via such instruments as Iwi Management Plans). Monitoring and evaluation are critical policy instruments to review performance as well as initiate any necessary adjustments and reforms. It is hoped that the small but important academic literature on Māori responses to the Canterbury earthquakes will provide some impetus to better incorporating Māori as important participants, indeed as a Treaty partner, in subsequent policy and legislation review (See Families Commission, 2012; Kenney & Phibbs, 2014a; Kenney & Phibbs, 2014b; Lambert, 2014b, 2014c; Paton, Johnston, Mamula-Seadon, & Kenney, 2014; Potangaroa, Wilkinson, Zare, & Steinfort, 2011).

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Figure 4: Key organisations and their relationships in disasters and emergencies

The wider legislative catchment (see Figure 5) sees opportunities for Māori – perhaps primarily as iwi authorities but also in sectoral blocs such as in agribusiness, tourism, fishing and forestry to influence policy dealing with environmental hazards, responding to climate change and sea-level rise, social housing, urbanisation and rural decline, regional development and so on.

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Figure 5: Relationships between key legislation for the land use management of natural hazards (Source: Quality Planning, 2014)

21

3.8.1 Roles and Responsibilities The nature of disasters and emergencies means they are not bound by tidy administrative boundaries and will require extensive collaboration between government agencies, non-governmental agencies, the private sector, and communities. If the event is sufficiently large it may also require an international presence (such as Urban Search and Rescue, a network with United Nations oversight). Table 1 lists the main organisations and their roles in DEM in Aotearoa New Zealand. Table 3: Roles and Responsibilities Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM)

Regional councils

Territorial authorities

Emergency management officers Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups

Engineering Lifelines Groups

Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority

To support the functions of the Director of CDEM in overseeing that arrangements are in place nationally to manage hazards across the 4Rs in the event of a civil defence emergency. This involves promoting for, advising on and monitoring the integration and coordination of policies, planning, procedures and resources across agencies at both the national and local levels (CDEM Act 2002). Control the use of land for the purpose of the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards (s30 RMA 1991). Section 62(1)(i) of the RMA requires a regional policy statement to specify objectives, policies and methods relating to the avoidance and mitigation of natural hazards. In accordance with s62(2) of the RMA, if a regional council does not set out responsibilities for functions relating to natural hazards, then the regional council retains the primary responsibility. Control the effects of the use of land for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards (s31 RMA 1991). Territorial authorities are also given the authority to control subdivision under s31(2) and have discretion under 106 to refuse a subdivision consent where the land is subject to hazards, or the subsequent use of the land will exacerbate the hazard. Carry out specific initiatives and ensure that procedures are in place at the local level for hazard and emergency management (CDEM Act 2002). Based on regional boundaries, they comprise representatives from local councils, emergency services, health boards and other organisations that are involved with emergency management (see figure below) (s12-24 CDEM Act 2002). A voluntary group of organisations with representatives from territorial authorities and major utility and transportation sector organisations. These voluntary organisations support their members in meeting their obligations with respect to networks providing the basic necessities of life and services essential to limiting the extent of an emergency. Engineering lifeline groups are co-ordinated at the national level by the National Lifeline Engineering Committee. The agency leading and coordinating the ongoing recovery effort following the devastating earthquakes of September 2010 and February 2011.

Source: Quality Planning Website

In this array of organisations, Māori have multiple access points as individuals and collectives. The following section examines the key legislation and its associated administrative and operational supports for DEM and actual and potential sites for Māori participation and influence.

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4

Disaster and Emergency Management: recent experiences of Māori To reiterate, hazards are a natural part of any environment with planetary scale issues increasingly featuring in DRR strategies. Disasters arise out of particular social circumstances such as the location, design or maintenance of housing and infrastructure, poverty, and so on (Cutter, 2010; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Maori knowledge (mātauranga Maori) and institutions have been noted in previous studies of disasters environmental hazards (King, Skipper, & Tawhai, 2008; King, Goff, & Skipper, 2007). Urban spaces have been identified as posing particular challenges in DEM not least because of their sprawling growth, often coastal or riverine environmental hazards, and growing population which often underserved communities with particular DEM needs and aspirations (Albala-Bertrand, 2003; Guillaume, Li, Hutchinson, Proust, & Dovers, 2010; Kreimer, Arnold, & Carlin, 2003; Pelling & Wisner, 2009; Wisner, 2003). Māori are now primarily city dwellers with 85% living in urban areas (including many of those that have emigrated to Australia and now live in one of that countries coastal cities). This makes the recent experiences of residents in Otautahi/Christchurch who were impacted by a series of earthquakes in 2010-11 as providing unique insights in how, among other things, local and national DEM dealt with the disaster.

4.1

Māori participation in DEM through the Canterbury earthquakes

Christchurch is unique in that it is the scene of Aotearoa’s largest disaster since the 1931 Napier earthquake. The seismic details of the events are well-known (Tasiopoulou, Smyrou, Bal, Gazetas, & Vintzileou, 2011). The first event occurred at 4:35am on 4th September 2010, leading to the Christchurch City Council (CCC), Waimakariri District Council and Selwyn District Council each declaring a local state of emergency for their respective areas. Each established their own Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) that was run by a Local Controller. The Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group set up an EOC in the Environment Canterbury premises in Christchurch. The Local Controllers were in charge of their district’s response to the earthquake, including building evaluations. All three local states of emergency ended at midday on 16 September 2010. The most destructive event occurred at 12:51 pm on February 22nd, 2011. The CCC declared a local state of emergency at 2.45pm. The designated primary emergency operations centre in the main council building was inaccessible and so CCC staff established an Emergency Operations Centre in the Christchurch Art Gallery. At 10.30am on the following day, the Minister for Civil Defence declared a national state of emergency at which point the local state of emergency ceased to have effect and the National Controller became responsible for the overall response. This state of national emergency was extended 10 times before ending on 30 April 2011. In its report to the Royal Commission (Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, 2012b) the CCC refers to uncertainty about whether to declare a local state of emergency after the Boxing Day, 2010, aftershock. In the end, it established an Emergency Operations Centre, but did not declare a local state of emergency. The Council considered the damage observed in the city did not meet the requirements for declaring a state of emergency set out in the CDEM Act. The Royal Commission commented on this decision in its report and considered that ‘a building safety evaluation operation should only be triggered by a state of emergency. This is because the wide-ranging powers Controllers have under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 significantly reduce the rights of property owners.’ (ibid., p. 18). In other words, ‘removing the rights of property owners outside of a state of emergency is not appropriate.’ For these reasons, the Royal Commission did not believe that there is a problem with the existing CDEM framework or its empowering legislation that needs to be specifically addressed: it is the local authority’s decision whether or not to declare a state of emergency. Anger and frustration marked many public submissions on post-disaster recovery in the city (Gilbert & Elley, 2013; Miles, 2012; Young, 2012). Confusion between the roles and responsibilities of a number of CCC units concerned with building recovery activities after the September earthquake was highlight in one report that 23

identified various units needed to work together in an integrated way (Griffiths & McNulty, 2011). Other findings (ibid, p. were that the Building Recovery Office and the Building Transition Evaluation Team ‘did not work together in a coordinated way, resulting in some information sharing problems, owners being told incorrect information about their buildings, and a number of inaccurate or contradictory messages being released to the media and wider public.’ The government established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) in April 2011 ‘to lead and coordinate the recovery.’ Key factors in the decision were that ‘existing legislative framework and institutional arrangements would not be adequate to meet the needs of the recovery’ because of the scale of rebuilding required; the need for a multi-pronged recovery effort and clear governance, leadership, and coordination across central and local government, iwi, NGOs, businesses and the community; the need for timely and effective decision-making, and potentially for direction across multiple agencies and providers; the need for coordinated engagement and more effective information management in order to build and maintain confidence in the recovery process (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012). A major complicating factor was the ongoing and regularly significant aftershocks after the February 2011 event which delayed rebuilding and wider recovery efforts and, in the words of the CERA Report, ‘further highlighted the need for strong leadership and coordination of recovery efforts.’ Previous research has described the disaster experience of Māori and other Indigenous Peoples as a series of overlapping disasters in which our communities are simultaneously responding and recovering to one or more disasters and are theoretically to engage in reduction and readiness strategies (Lambert 2015). Explicit approaches for Māori to engage with CDEM depend the contingencies affecting the particular collective. While larger iwi authorities may have considerable resources, small trusts administering isolated landblocks may be unable to participate on an equal footing with the government, councils, private companies or other Māori trusts and incorporations. 4.1.1 Response The response from Māori organisations, including those with a strong traditional basis, was immediate, spontaneous, and directed towards all those impacted by the disaster (Anderson, 2012; Lambert, 2014b; Paton et al., 2014; Thornly, Ball, Signal, Lawson-Te Aho, & Rawson, 2013). Key concerns voiced by Māori were an initial lack of communication with DEM organisations; a lack of coordination between emergency services, volunteers and NGOs; lack of coordination between iwi organisations; and delays in the provision of services such as portable toilets in neighbourhoods with significant numbers of Māori residents (Potangaroa et al., 2011). Māori tertiary education institutions developed strategies to deliver courses to students who were relocated out of their classrooms into a mainstream social ‘club’ (2012). The subsequent engagement of Māori language students and non-Māori club members was enriching for all and an example of the spontaneous neighbourliness and a reassuring expression of community spirit in troubled times. Overall, research interprets the response period as reasonably positive, aided by such identifiably ‘Kiwi’ contingencies as communal barbeques and ‘long-drops’ (backyard toilets), a strong Māori presence in the NZ Defence Forces was reassuring to many Māori, and a general ‘can do’ attitude to emergency repairs and temporary accommodation. 4.1.2 Recovery The most significant development for Māori in the recovery phase has been the formal inclusion of local tribe, Ngāi Tahu as a stakeholder in the rebuild (along with the city and regional councils) (New Zealand Government, 2011). This legislation was enacted only a few weeks after the February 2011 event. Research by Rae (2013) compared post-disaster planning for Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan and Ōtautahi/Christchurch. While a more participatory approach has evolved through the Taiwanese recovery to a major earthquake in 1999 this is not as extensive or as formal as Ngāi Tahu’s formal rebuild stakeholder role. But while Ngāi Tahu have acquired considerable experience around the resourcing and skills needed in disaster response as well 24

as benefitting from their extensive property portfolio, a formal role for Ngā Maata Waka, i.e., those Māori who do not trace their lineage through Ngāi Tahu (and who comprise a majority of Māori in the city) does not feature in planning thus far, other than through ad hoc community and committee representation open to all. A Ngāi Tahu initiative, “He Toki Ki Te Rika/Inspiring Māori leadership in trades” that was launched in 2011 as a partnership between Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology, Ngāi Tahu, Te Tapuae o Rehua, and The Built Environment Training Alliance (2012). This initiative, drawing on the history of the 1960’s Māori trade training programme that began in Christchurch, aims to develop Māori tradespeople who are not only skilled in the required trades but also aware of the significance of ‘being Māori ’. Engagement in the recovery stage may hold the greatest effect for Māori communities, as they would play a key role in the shaping of a place. Māori can inform this (and other) phases through Cultural Impact Assessments (CIA) documenting cultural values, interests and associations within an area or concerning a resource. CIAs ‘should be regarded as technical advice, much like any other technical report such as ecological or hydrological assessments.’ Terms such as ‘Tangata Whenua Impact Assessment’ or ‘Tangata Whenua Effects Assessment’ have also been used to describe this tool. Although there is no statutory requirement for applicants or the council to prepare a CIA, an assessment of impacts on cultural values and interests can assist both applicants and the council to meet statutory obligations in a number of ways, including:    

preparation of an Assessment of Environmental Effects (AEE) in accordance with s88(2)(b) and Schedule 4 of the RMA; requests for further information under s92 of the RMA in order to assess the application providing information to assist the council in determining notification status under ss95 to 95F; providing information to enable appropriate consideration of the relevant Part 2 matters when making a decision on an application for resource consent under s104 of the RMA; consideration of appropriate conditions of resource consent under s108 of the RMA.

CIAs may also be relevant to proposals of national significance that are lodged with the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). Major infrastructure or public works projects of national significance are highly likely to require assessments of cultural effects. Cultural values reports (CVR) are variations of CIAs. These can be used in assessing or providing background information when preparing plans. CVRs can identify and describe values pertaining to an area or resource and differ from CIAs in that they may not include a description of effects as they do not relate to a specific activity. However, they may address broad level impacts of development occurring or anticipated in that area. Cultural values reports can provide direction as to the relevant issues and how these should best be addressed. 4.1.3 Reduction and Readiness While the ‘first’ two phases of DEM have received the most media attention and public comment, it is in the areas of reduction and readiness where communities and society can best effect risk reduction to future disasters. Several of these have been noted under ‘recovery’, namely community consultation, policy and legislative overview, reviews and appeals processes. The consenting process, for example, requires an EIA which can be simplistic and limited in detail but nevertheless offers the opportunity for Māori to document issues and build the case for policy change. While government, council and industry EIA’s are often detailed, the integration of local knowledge including seeking mātauranga Māori/Māori knowledge. Research in partnership with Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu by Kenney, Johnstone, Paton, Reid, and Phibbs (2012) is ‘identifying, and documenting the ways cultural factors facilitate recovery and sustain resilience in Māori communities impacted by earthquakes’. Initial analysis suggests that cultural, relational and moral technologies interact to create a framework that supports recovery and sustains resilience in Māori 25

communities. The research is intended to facilitate ‘a review of tribal social/ emergency services and practices, and supporting programme development aimed at building Māori capacity in disaster preparedness, as well as promoting community recovery and resilience’ and, presumably, reduction and readiness. In the readiness phase, Māori collectives would benefit from any efforts to strengthen social capital and networking at the community level. The formal and informal inclusion of marae in Civil Defence exercises and could help to not just educate and plan for a disaster but also uphold and further develop Māori traditions and identity. Obviously, it would be useful to have CDEM staff trained at a Marae level, because such staff would be most effective when they are familiar with the local people and existing capacities.

4.2

International Indigenous Experiences

Similar contributions by Indigenous groups have been observed in other countries. Wadsworth, SerraoNeumann and Low-Choy (2013) describe the role of Indigenous Rangers in the response to Cyclone Yasi which struck North Queensland on February 3rd. 2011). The effectiveness of this network was reliant on strong relationships within and between Indigenous communities in North Queensland and the Ranger Programs that trained staff in delivering critical skills and resources as a part of the response for local communities facing natural hazards and disaster. The importance of cultural factors in post-disaster recovery has been examined internationally. The relocation of Taiwanese Indigenous communities after Typhoon Marakot (August 2009) from mountainous Wutai to lower elevations was overseen by the Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council. Initial postdisaster operations were framed in terms of physical needs; issues such as housing were attended to at the expense of intangible factors such as the cultural impact of relocation. When Indigenous populations are displaced they face changes to their community structures as well as the intensification of challenges to their cultural resilience. Yi-Wen Chen Yung-sen Chen (Dept. of Geography, National Kaohsiung Normal University) presented on the attitudes of the Indigenous residents of Kucapungane to the same disaster, noting that recognition and alertness to the hazards differed with age and that recognition of hazards declines over time. Affected residents chose to move and adapt to a new life in Rinari and these decisions were not merely influenced by the typhoon disaster. The role of Indigenous Knowledge (IK) in DRR is gaining traction in many areas. The potential of Indigenous fire knowledge in Australian and US wildfire management has been noted (Eriksen and Hankins (2013). Shaw, Sharma and Takeuchi (2009) presents a range of case studies across the Asia-Pacific region (Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, China, Vietnam and Japan) on how IK contributes to better scientific understanding of hazards and disasters.

4.3

Current and Future Research in Aotearoa New Zealand

Various research institutions and government departments conduct research on DEM, and in each are opportunities for Māori to participate although capacity remains a major constraint. The Natural Hazards Research Platform was established in 2009 to provide a stable research investment environment in this area. The platform is led by Geological and Nuclear Science (GNS) and includes the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) as a co-anchor organisation supported by the Universities of Canterbury, Massey, and Auckland and Opus Research. Subcontracts enable wider collaboration. The annual budget is approximately $17 million with around 150 participating scientists working on five themes:    

Geological hazard models; Predicting weather, flood, and coastal hazards; Developing regional and national risk evaluation models; Societal resilience: social, cultural, economic and planning factors 26



Resilient buildings and infrastructure.

RiskScape is a software programme, begun with government funding in 2004, that comprises ‘a modular framework to estimate impacts and losses for assets exposed to natural hazards’ (RiskScape, 2015). The programme is the result of a collaboration between GNS and NIWA and other Hazard Platform partners and such as GeoScience Australia, and regional and district councils. Development and enhancement is still ongoing and it is aimed at risk analysis of natural hazards in NZ. A significant new strategy in Aotearoa New Zealand’s science funding has seen eleven National Science Challenges (NSC) organised around key themes, one of which (NSC6) is ‘Resilience to Nature’s Challenges/ Kia manawaroa – Ngā Ākina o Te Ao Tūroa’ that has requested $21.85m (GNS 2015). The outcome of this NSC is intended to be that ‘New Zealand is a nation of people who have transformed their lives, enterprises and communities to anticipate, adapt and thrive in the face of escalating nature’s challenges.’

Figure 6: NSC 6 Resilience to Nature's Challenges structure Source: (Geological and Nuclear Sciences, 2015)

As Figure 6 shows, ‘Māori’ are to be a key feature of the Challenge. One of the mooted projects is the ‘Vision Mātauranga Co-Creation Laboratory’ which ‘will expand to include contemporary Māori roles in resilience in New Zealand, addressing not only rural Māori communities, but culture, self-organisation and resilience of urban Māori communities and non-iwi affiliated Māori. Further expansion is expected to fit with the increasing land, investment and business portfolio run by iwi organisations’ (Geological and Nuclear Sciences, 2015, p. 47). The Natural Hazards Research Platform research is to be integrated into the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges work programme, becoming part of the National Science Challenge: ‘This may involve developing and extending some of the research programme elements within the Challenge and/or creating new programmes’ (Geological and Nuclear Sciences, 2015, p. 13). 27

Research is a ‘given’ in any culture, being part of any collective strategy that is still reliant on tactical abilities as held by individuals and communities. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Indigenous People sit both within and alongside Western philosophy, utilising Western tools and techniques (meaning an appreciation of Pākehā history and philosophy is vital), while maintaining their own unique approaches and philosophies. The contests around Vision Mātauranga funding show that by accepting and using mātauranga and Kaupapa Māori, Pākehā exhibit an essential modern skill: the ability and pragmatism to assimilate ‘all forms or aspects of social activity without exception’, to understand and apply, not only of one particular methodology but any methodology or variation (Feyerbend, 1975, p. 10). Likewise Māori and other Indigenous Peoples must be able to pass from one approach to another ‘in the quickest and most unexpected manner’ (ibid.). Good research is supported from above and below, is networked both here and overseas, and will be disseminated to all those who need to know. At all levels this requires understanding, vision, commitment, courage, cooperation, and perseverance. Research in Aotearoa will draw on iwi capital (economic, environmental, social, and cultural) through education, training and mentoring programmes, and be reliant on the sophistication of their public and private, local and global relationships. In this sense, it might be said some research (environmental science, sustainability, biodiversity, etc.) is taking an Indigenous turn.

4.4

Observations: Control F Māori

One of the methods used for this report has been to search for ‘Māori’ as a keyword in the legislation, reports, associated documents and statements including those that have proliferated in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes. What is remarkable is the rarity of a Māori presence, even as a named interest group or stakeholder. And where Māori are named it is where they absolutely as that of ‘iwi and Māori providers’ as psychosocial support options in S 49 (3d) of the National CDEM Plan. There is the occasional cliché presence as in DGL 07/08 on Mass Evacuation Planning and its mention of the Māori cultural logic of face-to-face contact being more likely to lead to collaboration, hardly a radical concept regardless of the ethnic group being considered. According to the MCDEM, processes around revising the CDEM Plan involved ‘engagement with over 60 agencies, including Te Puni Kokiri (TPK). Throughout this process, we rely on our partner agencies in turn to engage with their stakeholders, sector and interest groups via their existing networks. As such, while we did not specifically request [Te Puni Kokiri/Ministry of Māori Development] to distribute the consultation document, we have confidence that they may have done so on their own accord throughout the public consultation period’ (MCDEM communication, March 9th 2015). With regards to research, as noted in the section above, various research programmes either existing or are being established in which Maori can participate. However, research remains difficult for Maori due to a lack of capacity, institutionalised racism, naivety and ignorance on the part of mainstream researchers and organisations. Concerns over the minimal involvement of Māori in research led to the introduction of a ‘Māori responsiveness’ strategy to guide state funding several years ago (Lambert, 2008). However, as the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST3) readily acknowledged (Simpson & Meha, 2004), there is no single definition of ‘Māori research’. The terms ‘Māori development’, ‘Māori advancement’, ‘Māori specific investment’ and ‘Māori responsiveness’ capture attempts at Māori participation in research strategies. These strategies crystallised into a Vision Mātauranga (VM) component inserted into all government calls for proposals:

3

Renamed the Ministry of Science and Innovation and again restructured into a ‘Super Ministry’ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, MBIE.

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Te Pūnaha Hihiko: Vision Mātauranga Capability Fund aims to strengthen connections between Māori and the science and innovation system. Through the fund, MBIE is looking to foster a greater understanding of how research, science and technology related activities can contribute to the aspirations of Māori organisations and deliver benefit for New Zealand. (Ministry of Business, 2014, p. 1)

Despite the establishment of VM, engagement with Maori remains fraught, for Maori and non-Maori. National Science Challenges processes have brought these tension out. For example few Maori researchers were formally participating in the initial discussions for the third NSC6 bid; this followed a similar practice on an earlier, rejected, bid that held just one formal hui involving five Maori researchers (two of whom were managers of participating research institutes; see GNS 2013, p. 50). At one of the few hui for the third bid it was announced that ‘iwi weren’t interested’ and only those iwi or iwi/hapū organisations already engaging with participating researchers were included in the initial funded work. Other NSCs are equally difficult for Maori to participate in, echoing confused funding strategies in the Maori research space, particularly around Centre of Research Excellence (CoRE) bidding; see Pihama (2014) and Smith (2014). Thus while the strategic inclusion of Maori researchers and communities is now pervasive through ‘VM’ requirements, the culturally safe tactical engagement of Maori is rare.

4.5

Summary

Maori have multiple access points in influencing legislation and policy on DEM. Key legislative instruments such as the Resource Management Act (1991) and the Local Government Act (2002) have explicit wording around the engagement of Maori interests and the possibilities of formal participation in processes under the Acts. While the Civil Defence and Emergency Management (2002) lacks the explicit inclusion of Maori, its various policy instruments embed local organisations with which Maori organisations such as iwi authorities can seek formal or informal relationships.

Table 4: Aotearoa NZ Policy hierarchy (after Handmer and Davis 2009) Level 1 Social goals

What?

Who?

How?

 Negotiation of what is valued.  Political system, executive, electorate, policy and communities, media.

2 Institutional systems and policy processes

 ‘rules of the game’.

3 Policy objectives

 More precise goals and targets expressed in formal policy statements.

 Political system, governments, inter-governmental organisations, policy and epistemic communities.

Maori participation  Treaty of Waitangi; korero/debate on cultural identity and practices.  Multiparty democracy with Maori political movements, representatives elected by mixed member proportional voting system; option of Maori electorate (with Maori allowed to vote and stand in general electorates).  Iwi/hapū authorities; Incorporations and Trusts; Maori media.  Western/British parliamentary system; Tikanga; bicultural approaches.  Advocacy, lobbying, networking.  Kaupapa Maori research.  Maori assert explicit policy statements on their DEM needs and concerns.

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4a Policy implementation in the public sector

4b Policy implementation in the private sector

5 Emergency management

 Largely the role of governments in various kinds of partnerships with non-governmental interests.  Design and implementation of policy programmes and instruments; monitoring and evaluation.  Government organisations/agencies and industry and community partners including international organisations and commerce.  Through various strategies involving resources, statuary authority, information dissemination etc.  Provide infrastructure, services, insurance etc. within regulatory and market settings relevant to response/recovery/reduction/readi ness.  Private firms, consultants, sole operators.  Individuals, households and formal or informal collectives.  Preparedness for and response to events.  Emergency management sector, key partners and related sectors (e.g., health, security).  Professionalised, highly responsive and rapidly changing in the face of events, policy shifts, community preferences, media etc.

 Ongoing political pressure and presence.

 Evaluation and monitoring of Maori-centric KPIs.  Continued presence in multilateral organisations and regional programmes.  Cultural diplomacy.

 Ongoing political pressure at all levels; assertion of statuary rights to participate (e.g. Iwi Management Plans); advisory committees.  Formal stakeholder roles for tribal organisations post-disaster.  Maori businesses employ risk management plans.  Maori consumers more informed of risk implications.  Individuals and whanau/families increase their aware of disaster and emergency practices.  Maori institutions informed and prepared for disasters and emergencies.  Maori liaison positions in emergency services; training and education programmes for kura (schools), marae, Maori providers etc.  Research examining Maori risk reduction needs and aspirations.  Media campaigns to highlight risks and risk reduction strategies; promotion of Maori roles and support.

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5.

Conclusions

Considerable political efforts have constructed an array of organisations geared towards managing disasters and reducing the risks from future disasters at national, regional and international scales. Through the highlevel political and scientific debates around disasters and hazards, paradigm shifts have occurred in how disasters are framed with risks perceived as endogenous (emanating from social contexts) with risk embedded in development processes and requiring contextualised land-use planning, risk proof investments and eco-system management. Socio-economic impact assessments are now seen as fundamental to better disaster management and there is an acknowledgement that wider and deeper stakeholder involvement, especially private sector and local-level actors. Indigenous Peoples are increasingly asserting their rights as local-level actors. Through their demands for self-determination, they assert their insights, practices and philosophies into, among other things, disaster risk reduction strategies. We know that Indigenous communities are knowledge holders for important insights into environmental hazards; they also have unique interpretations and approaches for the social contexts of resilience and disaster recovery. Assimilating these perspectives is difficult and fraught for Indigenous advocates. While considerable progress has been made, the sheer political complexity coupled with implicit and explicit opposition means policies and legislation cognisant of, and supportive towards, Indigenous cultures remains incomplete. For Indigenous Peoples, the collective ownership and decisionmaking models that exist will be a fundamental approach that, while challenged by the multilateral structures, can still provide benefits to, and from, the hierarchy of countries and organisations. In a disaster or an emergency, Indigenous communities, like other impacted communities, act as first responders and make rapid and critical assessments. Some of these responses are generic, others will be dependent on local knowledge some of which may be specifically sourced and used as Indigenous knowledge, framed by their unique Indigenous cultural logics. In the Canterbury earthquakes the intimate community linkages and culturally-nuanced networks of trust enabled Māori to support their own members and automatically and spontaneously extend this to Pākehā and Tauiwi. Collaboration with Indigenous groups in disaster and post-disaster management is increasingly acknowledged and supported, albeit with difficulties and miscommunications. The recovery phase of the Canterbury earthquakes has proven longer, more tiring and more contentious than many predicted, with many individual Maori and their families worse affected than other groups. However, the local tribe, represented by Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu, is a formal stakeholder in the Canterbury rebuild – as is their right as their Treaty right - and is currently profiting through residential and infrastructure developments. Explicit legislative and regulatory approaches exist for Maori to influence law and policy and while all Maori can theoretically participate, those tribes in a post-Treaty settlement phase of development are better resourced to influence these processes. The role for Ngā Maata Waka (i.e., non-local Maori) remains diffuse and given the demographic realities of this sector of Maoridom being large, considerable risks remain for Maori communities in urban settings. Isolated rural communities also remain at risk through increasingly complex hazards exacerbated through climate change, sea-level rise, and the lack of modern infrastructure to support communities in a pre- or post-disaster situation. Few Indigenous Peoples are in the position of Ngāi Tahu, post-disaster, in furthering their own development (albeit with ongoing and not insignificant constraints). As Indigenous groups and their businesses become larger, more confident, and a part of the politico-economic landscape of their wider societies, further recovery roles can be expected to flourish in the unfortunate (but recurring) disaster events. Long term disaster risk reduction strategies that benefit Indigenous communities will require great collaboration, extensive research with Indigenous partners, and focused political programmes.

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7.

Appendices

7.1

Risk Management Definitions

(Source: Quality Planning 2015) AEP (Annual A term used to describe the frequency or probability of floods occurring. Large floods occur Exceedance Probability) rarely, whereas small floods occur more frequently. For example, a 1% AEP flood occurs (or is exceeded) on average once every 100 years. A so-called 100-year flood does not mean that there is only one flood of this size every 100 years. It means that there is a 1 in 100 chance in any given year that a flood of this size or bigger will happen; it is therefore more correctly called a 1% AEP flood. In any given year, there is about a 65 percent chance that there will be at least one 1% AEP flood in populated catchments of New Zealand (NIWA 2007). Block slide: A translational slide in which the moving mass consists of a single unit or a few closely related units that move downslope as a single unit (Wold, 1989).

Debris avalanche Debris flow

Earth flow

Hazardscape Lateral spreads

Liquefaction Mitigation measures

EDITORIAL NOTE: Translational in this context means the movement of a mass in such a way that every point moves in the same direction from one place to another more or less over the same distance. A very rapid to extremely rapid landslide on a steep slope which is unconfined to a channel. Debris avalanches often initiate debris flows. A form of rapid mass movement in which soils, rocks, and organic matter combine with entrained air and water to form a slurry that then flows down a slope in a confined channel. Debris flows are associated with steep confined gullies (Wold, 1989). A bowl or depression forming at a head where unstable material collects and flows out. The central area is narrow and usually becomes wider as it reaches the valley floor. Flows generally occur in fine-grained materials or clay-bearing rocks on moderate slopes and with saturated dry conditions. Dry flows of granular material are also possible. Earth flows have a characteristic 'hour glass' shape (Wold, 1989). The landscape of all hazards in a particular place or the net result of natural and man-made hazards and the risks they pose cumulatively across a given area. The result of the nearly horizontal movement of geologic materials, distinctive because they usually occur on very gentle slopes. The movement is caused by liquefaction triggered by rapid ground motion, such as that experienced during an earthquake (Wold, 1989). A process that causes some soils to lose their strength and behave more like a liquid than a solid during an earthquake. Mitigation involves taking steps to reduce the likelihood of a natural hazard occurring or the consequence of its impact. Mitigation aims to reduce the likelihood of a natural hazard occurring and/or reduce the consequences of a natural hazard event.

Natural Hazard

Mitigation measures will differ depending on the activity, location and nature of the particular hazard but may include:  structural measures, for example, constructing a stopbank and raising floor levels within areas subject to flood hazard  non-structural measures, for example, re-vegetating a hillside to reduce landslide hazard. RMA 1991 definition of natural hazard ’Natural hazard means any atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including earthquake, tsunami, erosion, volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, sedimentation, wind, drought, fire, or flooding) the action of which adversely affects or may adversely affect human life, property, or other aspects of the environment.' CDEM Act 2002 definition of hazard ’Hazard means something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency.'

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Net present value

Building Act 2004 definition of natural hazard ’Natural hazard means any of the following: erosion (including coastal erosion, bank erosion, and sheet erosion) subsidence inundation (including flooding, overland flow, storm surge, tidal effects, and ponding) slippage.' The net present value (NPV) method of evaluating a major project allows the changing value of money over time to be considered. Essentially, it helps find the present value in ‘today's dollars' of the future net cash flow (or the value) of a project. It is then possible to compare that amount with the amount of money needed to implement the project. If the NPV is greater than the cost, the project will be beneficial. If there is more than one project being evaluated, it is possible to compute the NPV of each, and choose the one with the greatest difference between NPV and cost.

Overland flow path

The route taken by stormwater which becomes concentrated as it flows overland, making its way downhill following the path of least resistance towards the stormwater network, streams or the coast. Overland flow paths vary in width depending on the shape of the ground over which they flow, but once the contributing catchment area exceeds 30,000 m2, they are referred to as major overland flow paths. Overland flow paths include secondary flow paths which result when the piped stormwater system gets blocked or when the capacity is exceeded. Secondary overland flow paths are the backup stormwater system. Precautionary Principle Defined as "the lack of full scientific evidence shall not be used as reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation"(1992 Rio Declaration). Qualitative analysis In the context of natural hazard management qualitative analysis means using words to describe the magnitude and likelihood of potential consequences arising out of a natural hazard event. Quantitative analysis In the context of natural hazard management means using numerical values for both the magnitude and likelihood of natural hazard consequences that may occur. Readiness Developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens. These include self-help and response programmes for the general public, as well as specific programmes for emergency services, utilities, and other agencies. Recovery Activities beginning after initial impact has been stabilised and extending until the community's capacity for self-help has been restored. Reduction Identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from natural or man-made hazards, taking steps to eliminate these risks where practicable and, where not, reducing the likelihood and the magnitude of their impact. Response Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after an emergency, to save lives and property, as well as to help communities recover. Rockfall One or more pieces of rock falling from a steep rocky slope whether one at a time or all at once. Rotational landslide A landslide in which the surface of the rupture is curved concavely upward (spoon shaped) and the slide movement is more or less rotational about an axis parallel to the contour of the slope (Wold, 1989). The SMUG system Acronym for Seriousness, Manageability, Urgency, Growth where: Seriousness is the relative impact in terms of people and/or dollars Manageability is the relative ability to reduce the risk (through managing the hazard or the community or both) Urgency is the measure of how imperative or critical it is to address the risk (associated with the probability/likelihood of the risk from the hazard, including return period considerations) Growth is the rate at which the risk will increase (through an increase in the probability of the extreme event occurring, an increase in the exposure of the community, or a combination of the two). The SMUG system, advocated by the Ministry in 2002, has been subsequently modified by many CDEM groups. Many groups removed the 'urgency' component (as it may be

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adequately covered under 'seriousness') and expanded the 'manageability' table to include the subcomponents of 'difficulty' (how difficult the hazard is to manage) and 'effort' (how much effort is currently being put into managing the hazard). Manageability ratings were then given to each subcomponent for each of the 4 ‘Rs' (reduction, readiness, response and recovery), thereby a manageability rating derived from eight manageability values. The 4 'Rs' of community Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery resilience Topple A block of rock that tilts or rotates forward, eventually to fall, bounce, or roll down the slope as a rockfall (Spiker & Gori, 2003). Often also used for the whole event, including the rockfall deposit. Transitional slide A landslide in which the mass of soil and rock moves out or down and outward with little rotational movement or backward tilting (Spiker & Gori, 2003). Risk management definitions: as per AS/NZS standard 4360 Consequence

Means the outcome or impact of an event. NOTE 1: There can be more than one consequence from one event. NOTE 2: Consequences can range from positive to negative. NOTE 3: Consequences can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively. NOTE 4: Consequences are considered in relation to the achievement of objectives.

Event occurrence Means: of a particular set of circumstances. NOTE 1: The event can be certain or uncertain. NOTE 2: The event can be a single occurrence or a series of occurrences. Frequency:

A measure of the number of occurrences per unit of time.

Hazard:

A source of potential harm.

Likelihood:

Used as a general description of probability or frequency. NOTE: Can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively.

Monitor:

To check, supervise, observe critically or measure the progress of an activity, action or system on a regular basis in order to identify change from the performance level required or expected.

Probability:

A measure of the chance of occurrence expressed as a number between 0 and 1. NOTE 1: ISO/IEC Guide 73 defines probability as the 'extent to which an event is likely to occur'. NOTE 2: ISO 3534-1:1993, definition 1.1, gives the mathematical definition of probability as 'a real number in the scale 0 to 1 attached to a random event'. It goes on to note that probability 'can be related to a long-run relative frequency of occurrence or to a degree of belief that an event will occur. For a high degree of belief, the probability is near 1' NOTE 3: 'Frequency' or 'likelihood' rather than 'probability' may be used in describing risk.

Residual risk:

The risk remaining after implementation of risk treatment

Risk:

The chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives NOTE 1: A risk is often specified in terms of an event or circumstance and the consequences that may flow from it. NOTE 2: Risk is measured in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event and their likelihood. NOTE 3: Risk may have a positive or negative impact. NOTE 4: See ISO/IEC Guide 51, for issues related to safety.

Risk analysis:

A systematic process to understand the nature of and to deduce the level of risk.

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NOTE 1: Provides the basis for risk evaluation and decisions about risk treatment. NOTE 2: See ISO/IEC Guide 51 for risk analysis in the context of safety. Risk assessment: The overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk avoidance

A decision not to become involved in, or to withdraw from, a risk situation.

Risk evaluation:

A process of comparing the level of risk against risk criteria. NOTE 1: Risk evaluation assists in decisions about risk treatment. NOTE 2: See ISO/IEC Guide 51 for risk evaluation in the context of safety.

Risk

The process of determining what, where, when, why and how something could happen.

identification: Risk management: Risk

The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards realising potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects. The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of

management

communicating, establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring

process:

and reviewing risk.

Risk

A set of elements of an organisation's management system concerned with managing risk.

management

NOTE 1: Management system elements can include strategic planning, decision-making, and other

framework:

strategies, processes and practices for dealing with risk. NOTE 2: The culture of an organisation is reflected in its risk management system.

Risk reduction:

Actions taken to lessen the likelihood, negative consequences, or both, associated with a risk.

Risk treatment:

Process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk NOTE 1: The term 'risk treatment' is sometimes used for the measures themselves. NOTE 2: Risk treatment measures can include avoiding, modifying, sharing or retaining risk.

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7.2

Appendix 2: MCDEM Organisational Chart

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