Political and Economic Challenges

Turkey’s Accession to the European Union

Turkey’s Accession to the European Union Political and Economic Challenges Edited by Belgin Akçay and Bahri Yilmaz

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 10 Thornbury Road, Plymouth PL6 7PP, United Kingdom Copyright © 2013 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Turkey's accession to the European Union : political and economic challenges / edited by Belgin Akçay and Bahri Yilmaz. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7391-7981-9 (cloth : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-7391-7982-6 (electronic) (print) 1. European Union—Turkey. 2. Europe—Economic integration. 3. European Union countries— Foreign relations—Turkey. 4. Turkey—Foreign relations—European Union countries. I. Akçay, Belgin. HC241.25.T9T924235 2013 341.242'209561—dc23 2012037159

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Preface Introduction I: A General Outlook on Turkey-EU Relations 1

2

3

5

6

1

Turkey-EU Relations from the 1960s to 2012: A Critical Overview Beken Saatçioğlu

3

Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies: Past, Present, and Future Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun

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The Credibility of EU Human Rights Conditionality: Turkey’s Case Zerrin Savaşan

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II: Economic Relations: Win-Win Process 4

vii ix

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Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Temporary and Permanent Derogations from the EU’s Economic Acquis? Ronald H. van Ooik and James H. Mathis

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Constraints Regarding Turkey’s Economic Integration into the European Union Belgin Akçay

97

Dynamics of the European Union’s Trade Strategy and Its Imperatives on Turkish Trade Policy: Prospects for a Functioning Customs Union M. Sait Akman

129

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EU Accession and Central Bank Reform in Turkey Aylin Ege and Erman Aksüt

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Turkish Agriculture in Case of EU Membership or Nonmember Status Gülcan Eraktan

183

Turkey’s External Economic Relations: Does the MENA Region Steal the EU’s Role? İdil Bilgiç Alpaslan

213

9

163

Contents

III: Foreign Policy of Turkey: Looking West and Going East 10 Turkey’s Recent Foreign Policy Activism in Its Neighborhood versus Its EU Membership Goal: How Compliant Are Turkey’s Regional Ambitions with EU Foreign Policy? Ömer Kurtbağ 11 EU Candidacy and Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward the Middle East Defne Günay

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231

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12 Europeanization’s Time Constraint: The Case of Cyprus Kıvanç Ulusoy

277

13 Incomplete Peace: Relations between Turkey and Greece Bahri Yılmaz

301

14 The Future of the European Integration Process and Turkey Sevilay Kahraman

317

About the Contributors

335

Preface

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Although Turkey has a long-lasting aspiration for EU membership and has had candidate status for more than a decade, the topic of EU-Turkey relations has not received the attention it deserves from non-Turkish researchers so far, and consequently the international literature on EUTurkey relations is rather limited. In the light of recent global economic and political challenges for the EU and Turkey, a need has emerged for an interdisciplinary approach to study Turkey-EU relations within the wider international political and economic context. This book aims to provide a timely overview of some of the important issues and debates in the changing context of Europe, the changes in domestic politics and foreign policy in Turkey, and the likely implications of these changes and developments for EU-Turkey relations. Within this framework, the book includes articles emphasizing Turkey’s reform process with a view to EU accession, despite the EU’s reservations about “absorbing” Turkey and the eventual decoupling of the Turkish reform process from European integration, as well as searching for alternative forms of cooperation or transitional arrangements that may be possible for Turkey at the time of accession. In this book, different articles have varying degrees of emphasis on the compatibility of Turkey’s policies with those of the EU, policy reforms in Europe and the EU impact on the reform process in Turkey, indepth analysis on individual policy areas, the mechanisms of accession conditionality and their effectiveness on compliance in practice, the shortcomings of the performance of Turkey in its accession efforts, the problem-solving power of the EU in some issues, the controversy about Turkey’s membership in several member states, blockades in negotiations, and the most controversial issues between Turkey and individual EU member states. The book will provide the reader with an opportunity to combine temporal analyses of EU-Turkey relations with more spatial (geopolitical) analyses.

Introduction

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The recent literature on EU-Turkey relations has been broadly characterized by analyses of the Turkish reform process with a special emphasis placed on the country’s compliance with the requirements of EU membership. The literature has also generated a number of insights into the impact of the on Turkey as a candidate country, thereby linking the effectiveness of accession conditionality to the scope and intensity of compliance in practice. However, from the outset, the Turkish case could hardly be considered as “another case” of EU enlargement. Granting Turkey the official status of “candidate country” in December 1999 coincided with the politicization of the EU enlargement policy, also characterized by the prominence of strategic considerations over the liberal democratic norms. This, in turn, has led to the politicization of Turkey’s accession process with an emphasis given to the condition of “good neighborliness” (that candidate states must resolve outstanding border disputes peacefully) alongside democratic and acquis conditionality. Turkey’s rapid pace of democratic reform at home, coupled with Ankara’s proactive role in fostering Turkish Cypriots’ acceptance of the Annan Plan throughout 2004, eventually brought about the EU decision to launch accession negotiations with Turkey albeit with higher adaptation costs for Turkey. The year 2004 not only symbolized the completion of the first round of Eastern enlargement to include ten Central and Eastern European countries, but also the end of the deepening and widening consensus in Europe. Indeed, the latter was a Copenhagen condition for enlargement. It reflected the European concerns about the impact that further enlargement might have on the political, institutional, and cultural unity of Europe. While the goal of building a more political Europe was reduced to another revision treaty instead of a “Constitutional Treaty” by the French and Dutch no-votes, the EU has begun to struggle with an “enlargement fatigue.” The reluctance to enlarge continues to be voiced today with regard to the possible accession of Turkey. Prospects for Turkey’s EU membership are declining in the face of public skepticism in Europe and a waning reform process at home. Enlargement fatigue coupled with the financial and economic crisis has brought issues of identity back to the European agenda. This new context of post-enlargement Europe intensified Turkey’s “particularity” as a candidate state and shifted the debate on Turkey away from the broad patterns of compliance with EU demands toward Turkey’s positive

Introduction

identification with the EU and its constitutive rules. On the European side, the absence of shared identity and of historical responsibility largely explains the EU’s reluctance toward Turkey. From the perspective of Turkey, the perceived legitimacy and utility of EU rules and their resonance with domestic political culture are increasingly questioned. Furthermore, in a rapidly changing European and global order, the EU no longer occupies center stage for Turkish foreign policy either. If further enlargement toward Turkey and some neighbors is to continue, the EU will have to adapt its narrative and its membership policy to the newly emerging condition of a “multipolar” Europe. The rise of Russia and Turkey as regional powers in Europe’s neighborhood has increased the role of the European Neighborhood Policy as the new foreign policy of the EU. The EU now has a shared neighborhood with Turkey; this should not be treated as a struggle for power and influence. Nevertheless, Turkey’s growing aspirations and presence as a regional power, at a time when accession negotiations have reached an impasse, raises a question of compatibility of its neighborhood policies with those of the EU to the south and to the east. This also requires the EU to develop a new strategic relationship with Turkey, alongside the accession process but not an alternative to it, which might help Ankara over time to seek influence in the shared neighborhood through dialogue and cooperation rather than through competition and divergence. In the light of these changes, the editors and contributors to this book felt that it was about time to work on a more interdisciplinary approach to studying Turkey-EU relations within the wider international political and economic context. The book aims to provide a timely overview of some of the most important issues and debates in the changing context of Europe, the changing context of domestic politics and foreign policy in Turkey, and the likely implications of these changes and developments for EU-Turkey relations. As such, its scope goes beyond the formal context of EU enlargement and accession to cover other possible areas of cooperation and also of competition ranging from economy and trade to energy and agriculture. This will provide the reader with an opportunity to combine “temporal” analyses of EU-Turkey relations with more spatial (geopolitical) analyses. The book is divided into three distinct thematic parts. The first part begins with a critical overview of the historical evolution of EU-Turkey relations from the 1960s to 2010. Beken Saatçioğlu shows how several hurdles on both sides have combined to make Turkey’s accession process exceptionally difficult and prolonged. Then, Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun’s chapter provides an analysis of Europeanization of Turkish politics and policies and evaluates past and present of the changing Turkish policies. This chapter also addresses the political dimension of EU-Turkey relations and seeks to explore what went wrong in the Turkish reform process in the context of EU accession in the period spanning 2002 to

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Introduction

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2010. Zerrin Savaşan shows how the EU has promoted human rights changes in Turkey, and as a response, what Turkey did to change and to improve the conditions of human rights in the country. Part II provides an overview of the economic dimension of EU-Turkey relations in terms of whether and to what extent it can be conceptualized as a “win-win” process. The first chapter in this part is by Ronald van Ooik and James H. Mathis. They address the challenge of compatibility of Turkey with the EU’s economic acquis, which might lead to a number of derogations or transitional arrangements for Turkey at the time of accession. Then, in Belgin Akçay’s chapter, we see how certain artificial obstructions and restrictions since 1999 have delayed the process of economic integration of Turkey into the EU. This chapter is followed by Sait Akman’s discussions on the implications of the new trade strategy of the EU on the functioning of the customs union with Turkey, which inevitably raises a question of compatibility of trade policies. In their chapter on the central banking system of the EU, Aylin Ege and Erman Aksüt show that reforming the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in accordance with EU legislation is one of the requirements for the alignment of Turkey with Chapter 17 of the EU acquis, “Economic and Monetary Policy.” Gülcan Eraktan raises the issue of compatibility of the recent Common Agricultural Policy reforms in an enlarged EU with the needs of Turkish agriculture. At the end of this part, İdil Bilgiç Alpaslan substantiates the challenge of trade compatibility between the EU and Turkey further by examining whether the recent growth in the role of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in Turkey’s external economic relations will be sustainable given the EU’s declining role. Part III of the book is concerned with Turkish foreign policy in a bilateral and regional context, which, as a result, have significant implications for its relations with the EU. Ömer Kurtbağ considers whether or not Turkey’s recent activism in its neighborhood has been consistent with its long-established goal of EU membership, and he seeks the key reasons behind the so-called Turkish “drift” away from Europeanization. Defne Günay explains the impact of Turkey’s EU process on its foreign policy toward the Middle East and highlights the gaps in literature on the Europeanization of foreign policies of the candidate countries. As Kıvanç Ulusoy shows, the problem-solving impact of the EU on the Cyprus question is constrained by time, leading to an assumption that the EU’s impact beyond its borders is far from being structural but is actually highly conjunctural in nature. Bahri Yılmaz shows why and how the past and present relations between Turkey and Greece can still be regarded as a case of “unfinished peace.” The book ends with a discussion of the role and place of Turkey in the future of the European integration process. In Sevilay Kahraman’s chapter we see that Turkey, a country that has long been considered as a “challenge” to EU widening (enlargement), is becoming increasingly im-

Introduction

portant for the internal and external aspects of European identity-building, both of which justify a debate on the relevance and role of Turkey within competing visions of Europe. July 20, 2012, Ankara

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I

A General Outlook on Turkey-EU Relations

ONE Turkey-EU Relations from the 1960s to 2012 A Critical Overview Beken Saatçioğlu 1

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Turkey’s European vocation goes back to the foundation of the modern Turkish republic. As Turkey transitioned from Ottoman rule, modernizing reforms underpinned the new republican regime. Since modernization was considered synonymous with westernization/Europeanization, these efforts triggered a process of adaptation to Western liberal norms. In the postwar period, this was pursued alongside a Western-oriented foreign policy, as evident in Turkey’s early memberships in key European organizations such as the OECD (1948), the Council of Europe (1949), and NATO (1952). The country’s unwavering commitment to join the European Union (then the European Community) constituted the backbone of this policy. From the start, several dynamics critically impacted Turkey’s path toward integration in the EU. On the one hand, official EU admission criteria have toughened since Turkey first applied for membership, making its accession harder than had formerly been the case for the other EU candidates. This raised the need to adopt wide-ranging, substantive domestic reforms required for membership. On the other hand, Turkey’s membership prospects have been shaken by factors originating from Europe, such as the EU’s reservations about “absorbing” Turkey and mounting political controversy about Turkish accession in several member states and among the European public at large.

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Turkey’s relations with the EU reflect the ongoing clash between the country’s inherent desire to be recognized as part of the European community of states and the many obstacles that complicate this objective. The purpose of this chapter is to review Turkey-EU relations from the Association Agreement onward. The key issues and political developments (in both Europe and Turkey) that have historically defined these relations will be analyzed.

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TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

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The Early Years: 1963–1998

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Turkey’s formal efforts to join the EU started with its 1959 application for membership in the European Communities following the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The country became an associate member of EEC via signing the Ankara (Association) Agreement on 12 September 1963. The agreement was mainly an economic instrument intended to improve Turkey’s economic performance and ensure its integration into the Community. Turkey’s economic integration was envisaged as a three-stage process that included a five-year preparatory phase, a transition phase, and a final period. A customs union would be established by the end of the transition period that was launched by the Additional Protocol to the Agreement (1970). The Protocol entered into force in 1973, and Turkey thus committed to abolishing customs duties on European industrial exports and adopting the European Community’s Common Customs Tariff (CCT) regarding third countries. A transition period of twelve years was foreseen for the removal of Turkish tariffs on industrial goods, along with a twenty-two-year phase for lifting tariffs on vulnerable industrial sectors. In return, the European Community (EC) would abolish customs duties on industrial products imported from Turkey (with the exception of machine-woven carpets, cotton textiles, and cotton yarns). Petroleum goods would undergo tariff reductions within quota limits. However, the 1973 oil crisis and the global economic recession of the mid-1970s caused problems for the implementation of the transitional stage. On the one hand, the EC was unable to establish free movement of labor with Turkey as foreseen by the Ankara Agreement. On the other, it significantly decreased the preferences it granted to Turkey (as part of its concessions to developing countries). Additionally, quotas were imposed on Turkish textile exports. For its turn, Turkey could reduce tariffs only twice (1973 and 1976) without adjusting to the CCT. Its request for an economic aid package was rejected by the EC, and in 1978, Turkey felt constrained to freeze the terms of the Agreement (Article 60 of the Additional Protocol) (Balkır 2010, 26). In addition, EU financial assistance to

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Turkey-EU Relations from the 1960s to 2012

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Turkey was often inadequate, given that Turkey was excluded from the financial assistance mechanisms designed for EU member states. Thus, at least until its 1999 EU candidacy, Turkey generally received little financial aid due to the EU’s reluctance to fulfill its financial obligations (Balkır 2010, 28–30). Beyond tying Turkey to EEC economically, the Ankara Agreement vaguely committed EEC member states to fully integrating Turkey into the Community (Uğur 2003, 166–67). The only article that referred to the possibility of Turkish membership, Article 28, discussed membership not as an outcome that would automatically result from Turkey’s fulfillment of its treaty obligations but as an issue to be possibly examined by the contracting parties in the event of such fulfillment. 2 Still, the Article was significant since it initially confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for full membership. Yet, subsequent political developments cast doubt on Turkey’s membership prospects irrespective of its adoption of the conditions arising from the Association Agreement. The military coup of March 1971, Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and rising economic and political instability in the country constituted worrying developments for EC member states. The strained EC-Turkey relations reached their peak when civilian democratic regime was replaced by military rule in September 1980. Consequently, the Community froze ties with Turkey and announced that the reactivation of the Association Agreement would be conditional on Turkey’s improvement of its human rights record. 3 Yet, the EC also enlarged to formerly authoritarian countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) during the same period. The fact that Turkey would not be considered for membership in the short term became official when the European Commission rejected Turkey’s 1987 membership application. In a 1989 Opinion, the Commission justified the rejection by arguing that it would not consider any new applications before finalizing the integration of its new member states and the Single Market (Müftüler-Baç and McLaren 2003, 21). More specifically, it emphasized that Turkey’s membership would raise significant problems for the Community:

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In the particular case of Turkey [emphasis added], these two aspects [Turkey’s capability to bear the constraints of membership and the EU’s ability to “absorb” Turkey] are all the more significant in that Turkey is a large country—it has a greater geographical area and will eventually have bigger population than any Community Member State—and its general level of development is substantially lower than the European average (European Commission 1989, para. 6).

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Hence, the Community signaled that Turkey’s membership issue was bigger than its domestic reform problems, as it clearly also depended on the EC’s readiness to integrate it as a member state. The Opinion was

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thus seen as the first major signal that led many in Turkey to doubt the likelihood of EC accession irrespective of democratic progress (MüftülerBaç and McLaren 2003, 21). Suspicions intensified in the post–Cold War period as the EC/EU committed to enlarging to the formerly communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) out of a sense of “moral duty.” The EU’s moral commitment to help these countries “return to Europe” 4 and thus end the ideological division of the European continent (European Council 1989) formed the basis of Eastern enlargement, while Turkey’s EU candidacy was left pending. Subsequent European Council decisions reflected this differential approach even as the EU formulated objective membership criteria. The June 1993 Copenhagen Council conclusions established the official accession conditions yet also noted that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become [EU] members” provided that they fulfill these (European Council 1993, 13). Hence, it was signaled that the conditional membership perspective was primarily directed at CEE. In contrast, regarding Turkey, the EU’s immediate objective was not EU accession per se, but the furthering of economic relations via the establishment of an EC-Turkey Customs Union (European Council 1993, 12). The entry into force of the Customs Union in January 1996 injected an air of optimism about membership into the Turkish government. The ruling True Path Party (DYP) leader and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller presented the agreement as a prelude to Turkey’s EU membership. The government’s enthusiasm quickly faded, however, as it soon became clear that the EU did not consider the Customs Union as a step toward Turkish accession. At least two political developments following the agreement’s signing caught the EU’s criticism and delayed discussion of Turkish membership in EU circles. The first was the sentencing to prison of Kurdish MPs for separatist Kurdish propaganda in late 1994, which led the European Parliament to delay the ratification of the Customs Union. This became an early signal that the EU would push Turkey to solve its democracy problems as a condition for closer ties. The second occurred when Turkey landed its military forces on the Kardak/Imia islets on the Aegean Sea in January 1996 as part of a confrontation with Greece. The EU’s response was fairly critical and reflected its solidarity with Greece as a member state (Uğur 2003, 167). Consequently, it became clear that Turkey’s disputes with its neighbors would complicate its membership not only due to the complexity of the issues at hand but also to the EU’s potentially pro-Greek political stance. The timing of the Customs Union agreement constituted a further sign that the treaty was not motivated by the EU’s desire to fully integrate Turkey. In retrospect, its signing can be considered as the EU’s political move to clear the way for Cyprus’s EU membership rather than a step

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toward Turkish accession. Shortly before signing the agreement with Turkey, EU leaders struck a deal with Greece (which had hitherto vetoed the Turkey-EC Customs Union along with the provision of 600 million ecus of EU financial aid to Turkey) promising to open accession negotiations with Cyprus in exchange for Greece’s approval of the Customs Union with Turkey (Agence France Presse 1995). Still, it was the EU’s December 1997 Luxembourg Summit that most explicitly signaled that Turkey would be excluded from the membership queue in the short term. Luxembourg failed to recognize Turkey as a membership candidate, while acknowledging the candidacy of ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) plus Cyprus. The decision reflected the Commission’s earlier Agenda 2000 report (July 1997), which evaluated the progress of all EU applicants in meeting the membership criteria—except Turkey. In contrast to the eleven candidates 5 that were offered an “enhanced pre-accession strategy,” Turkey was merely given a “European strategy” consisting of far less ambitious cooperation measures (European Council 1997, para. 32). Consequently, even Luxembourg’s simultaneous adoption of a meritocratic, “differentiated approach” to accession (European Council 1997, paras. 10, 26) or recognition of Turkey’s “eligibility” for EU accession failed to encourage Turkey in its efforts to seek membership. In response to Luxembourg, the Turkish government suspended all political dialogue with the EU and refused to attend the European Conference (March 1998) organized with the candidate states. Furthermore, the government announced that it would not negotiate with the EU the political issues EU leaders had presented as justification for rejecting Turkey’s candidacy (Turkey’s democracy and human rights problems, dispute with Greece, and the Cyprus problem) until Turkey was treated on an equal basis with the other candidates. 6 In essence, the government’s reaction was fed by perceptions that Turkey was treated unfairly in Luxembourg compared to the formerly communist CEECs, which lagged behind economically. 7 Indeed, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz went so far as to accuse the EU of attempting to construct a new cultural “Berlin wall” to discriminate against Muslim Turkey (New York Times 1997). But there was another aspect of Luxembourg that crucially contributed to the government’s decision to reevaluate its relations with the EU, and that was the Greek veto. In Luxembourg, Turkish candidacy was blocked by Greece, which insisted on linking membership to the resolution of Greco-Turkish disputes (including Cyprus). Such linkage had been rejected by Turkey from the outset. 8 But Greece’s involvement in the controversy via exercising its veto power worsened the situation, since the EU was now seen as giving in to Greek pressure rather than following the objective principles embedded in the Copenhagen criteria (Uğur 2003, 168–69).

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Yet, Turkey’s initial reaction quickly gave way to the normalization of relations with the EU. Notwithstanding its failure to attend the European Conference and the EU-Turkish Association Council in May 1998, the Turkish government soon went back to the negotiation table with the EU to discuss the European strategy for Turkey. On the EU’s side, the discouraging tone regarding Turkey’s accession simultaneously softened, which additionally helped ameliorate the strained relations. The June 1998 Cardiff European Council proved considerably more welcoming of Turkey’s membership prospects than Luxembourg. At the summit, member states committed to “taking forward the European strategy to prepare Turkey for membership” (European Council 1998, para. 68). In this context, the need to harmonize Turkey’s legislation and practice with the EU’s acquis was recognized as a crucial matter (European Council 1998, para. 68). The Commission’s subsequent, first report on “Turkey’s progress towards accession” (November 1998) discussed this further, along with Turkey’s needed domestic reforms. Although neither the Cardiff Council conclusions nor the Commission’s report contained deadlines or a specific road map for the evolution of Turkey-EU relations or Turkey’s adjustment to the membership criteria, it was clear that Turkey was now being evaluated as a potential EU candidate. Yet, Turkey would have to wait for another year before earning official EU candidacy.

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FROM LUXEMBOURG TO HELSINKI: A CRITICAL EVALUATION

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The negative post-Luxembourg trend in Turkey-EU relations was almost entirely reversed following the EU’s December 1999 Helsinki Summit. The Helsinki Council declared Turkey’s EU candidacy “on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States” (European Council 1999, para. 12). As a result of candidacy, Turkey would benefit from a pre-accession strategy, including an “enhanced political dialogue” on democracy problems and political issues (i.e., disputes with Greece, Cyprus), and an accession partnership specifying the reform priorities required for membership (European Council 1999, para. 12). Although Helsinki fell short of formulating a timeline for Turkey’s accession negotiations, the recognition of candidacy alone was significant for officially placing Turkey in the membership queue, thus helping resolve the “anchor-credibility dilemma” in Turkish-EU relations (Uğur 1999). Consequently, the decision was welcomed in Turkey as a watershed event, finally signaling the EU’s resolve to integrate it, and a major foreign policy success for Turkey. Yet, close analysis of Helsinki suggests that although a positive development, the candidacy announcement did not entirely restore the EU’s credibility in promising Turkey membership contingent on the fulfill-

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ment of the official accession criteria. In retrospect, both the EU’s “Turkey shift” from Luxembourg to Helsinki and the accession conditions formulated in Helsinki were politically loaded. Hence, notwithstanding the EU’s reversal of Luxembourg, Helsinki implied that just like the candidacy decision, membership too would be defined as much by internal EU politics as Turkey’s independent progress in meeting the membership criteria. Thus, the Helsinki announcement came as a “sweetener” after Luxembourg without fully generating an objectively oriented membership process for Turkey. For one thing, politics crucially influenced the EU’s candidacy decision in Helsinki. Turkey’s democratic progress from Luxembourg to Helsinki was indeed negligible, thereby making democratization irrelevant for the candidacy announcement. In contrast, political factors in Europe had shifted considerably between Luxembourg and Helsinki (MüftülerBaç and McLaren 2003, 21–26). The two EU member states that had opposed Turkey’s candidacy in Luxembourg (Greece and Germany) adopted a favorable position toward Turkey in Helsinki due, in large part, to a change in their governments and policy preferences. In Greece, Foreign Minister George Papandreou’s moderate approach to Turkey was reinforced by the Greco-Turkish rapprochement following Greek assistance in response to the August 1999 earthquake in Turkey. Additionally, the Greek leadership increasingly realized that its bargaining position in settling its bilateral disputes with Turkey would be weakened if Turkey were left out of the EU accession process (Uğur 2003, 171). In Germany, Gerhard Schröder’s coming to power reversed the government’s previously oppositional Turkey position as Schröder emerged as the champion of Turkey’s membership cause within the EU. These political developments cleared the way for Turkish candidacy in Helsinki. Second, Helsinki conclusions closely tied Turkey’s membership to political factors. Alongside highlighting compliance with the political membership criteria and the acquis for Turkey’s accession, Helsinki heavily emphasized political matters that could independently complicate membership. Accordingly, Turkey was asked to contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus problem and resolve its “outstanding border disputes” (with the help of the International Court of Justice [ICJ], if necessary) (European Council 1999, paras. 4, 9a, 12). The controversy over these conditions was intensified by the fact that no Cyprus criterion was attached to Greek Cyprus’s EU membership (European Council 1999, para. 9b). Indeed, Prime Minister Ecevit agreed to the Cyprus reference in the Helsinki conclusions only after a last-minute visit from the EU’s high representative for common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana (McLaren 2000, 120). These aspects of Helsinki can be interpreted as early signals that Turkey’s membership would be subject to EU politics and other issues reaching beyond the country’s simple fulfillment of the membership criteria as

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defined in Copenhagen in 1993. Indeed, subsequent developments confirmed this trend, as Turkey came closer to beginning EU accession negotiations. THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD: THE BUMPY ROAD TO MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS

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Candidacy Status and the Launching of the EU Accession Process

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Despite its controversial/political aspects, Helsinki constitutes a turning point in EU-Turkey relations. In sharp contrast to the pre-Helsinki period, the “candidacy carrot” boosted the Turkish political elite’s confidence in the accession process and triggered a process of “Europeanization.” 9 As the prospect of membership materialized for the first time, so did the need to reform in order to realize EU accession. Thus, soon after Helsinki, divisions emerged among political parties regarding the content and implications of the required domestic reforms. 10 Realignments formed along a pro-EU versus anti-EU axis (Öniş 2003, 16–23). The rightwing Motherland Party (ANAP) led the pro-EU coalition, while the antiEU coalition included the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), nationalist elements within the Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the military. Still, despite their reservations about certain EU reforms, these forces remained united in their principled commitment to the EU membership goal. The EU’s reform demands were made explicit in Turkey’s first Accession Partnership (AP) document, issued in March 2001. The document listed specific short- and medium-term reform priorities Turkey would be expected to address. Among these, those that were seen to impinge upon sensitive areas of Turkish politics triggered immediate reaction in political circles, particularly among the nationalist members of the DSPMHP-ANAP coalition government. Priorities such as the resolution of the Cyprus dispute 11 and bilateral matters (with the help of the ICJ, if necessary, as decided in Helsinki), as well as certain domestic political reforms (e.g., abolition of the death penalty, removal of restrictions to education, and broadcasting in minority languages), caused resistance within the government. The leading DSP vehemently criticized the Cyprus condition, arguing that there could be no settlement that would disregard the sovereignty of Northern Cyprus and that allowing Cyprus to join the EU in the absence of a settlement would violate international law. DSP leader and Prime Minister Ecevit even argued that Turkey would otherwise need to reconsider its relations with the EU. 12 Critical voices were also heard within the MHP, especially regarding the death penalty and the expansion of cultural rights for the Kurdish minority. These two matters were opposed due to their implications for

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the conviction of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Öcalan and the threats they could pose for national unity and territorial integrity (linked to a potential secession of Turkey’s Kurdish-populated regions). With so much opposition to EU reforms, it is no surprise that the government’s March 2001 National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), issued in response to the AP, failed to sufficiently address these sensitive reform areas. 13 Nonetheless, the subsequent period saw the passage of critical democratic measures. Crucially significant among these were the October 2001 constitutional amendments and the August 2002 “EU harmonization package.” The 2001 changes concerned thirtyfour articles of the constitution, constituting as such the most comprehensive constitutional package to date. Measures affected key areas such as fundamental political freedoms, the reduction of the military’s political influence (via changes in the National Security Council), abolition of the death penalty, and the use of minority languages. 14 The constitutional amendments were later incorporated into legislation via adopting EU harmonization laws. Among these, the August 2002 package included the most far-reaching reforms, as it abolished the death penalty and recognized the right of education and broadcasting in minority languages. Needless to say, the adoption of these key reforms was enabled by the post-Helsinki shift in Turkish politics toward “a genuinely pro-active, pro-EU coalition” (Öniş 2003, 22). In this respect, the role of interest associations, notably Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists’ Association (TÜSIAD) and the Economic Development Foundation (İKV) was crucial. These organizations effectively pressured the government for democratic reforms required for EU membership. The umbrella organization known as the Movement for Europe 2002 (Avrupa Hareketi 2002) led by İKV unprecedentedly mobilized as many as 175 civil society organizations and lobbied political actors for EU adjustment during the summer of 2002. These democratic initiatives did not go unnoticed in EU circles. Already in December 2001, the Laeken European Council recognized Turkey’s reform progress as a positive development on the way to opening accession negotiations (European Council 2001, para. 12). The Seville (June 2002) and Brussels councils (October 2002) reflected an even more encouraging tone. Reform measures were welcomed as steps that would advance membership on the basis of the same criteria applied to the other candidates (European Council 2002b, para. 6). More important, further discussion of Turkish accession was tied to a deadline, as the December 2002 Copenhagen Council would decide on “the next stage of Turkey’s candidature” (European Council 2002c, para. 25). This announcement further boosted Turkey’s pro-EU policy. Hence, in the pre-Copenhagen period and after, it would fall upon the incoming Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to move the EU accession process forward.

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From Copenhagen to Brussels: The Decision of Membership Negotiations

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The EU’s critical Copenhagen Summit followed AKP’s coming to power in the November 2002 parliamentary elections. Unlike its predecessor Islamist parties (from which it originated in 2001), AKP adopted the agenda of “conservative democracy” reminiscent of the ideology of Europe’s Christian democratic parties. This consisted of the execution of liberal domestic reforms alongside the pursuit of EU membership as a foreign policy goal. Indeed, immediately upon assuming office, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan toured European capitals and lobbied EU leaders for a decision specifying a prospective date for beginning EU membership negotiations. He also pledged that Turkey’s reform process would continue regardless of what the EU decides in Copenhagen (Turkish Daily News 2002). Hence, AKP quickly emerged as the leading member of Turkey’s pro-EU coalition, a policy move partly triggered by the party’s dependence on the EU course as “a necessary safeguard for protecting [its] own identity against the secular state establishment” (Öniş 2006, 124). Consequently, despite initial disappointment over the Copenhagen Council conclusions (which merely decided on a review date, rather than an actual date for beginning accession negotiations), 15 the AKP government held on to its reform agenda. Hence, the “golden age of Europeanization” (Öniş 2009, 23), which had started in summer 2002 (i.e., with the passage of the critical August 2002 package by the DSP-MHP-ANAP government), continued at full speed. Several harmonization packages were passed in view of earning a favorable outcome at the December 2004 Brussels Summit. By the summer of 2004, seven major reform packages (two of which comprised constitutional changes) had been adopted, and a new penal code was adopted in September 2004. These legislative initiatives directly addressed the EU’s political criteria and concerned, among other issues, (1) the expansion of political freedoms (notably via limiting the ban to participate in parliamentary elections and gain membership in political parties to persons convicted of terror acts, thus allowing previously convicted Erdoğan to assume the prime ministry); (2) the right of retrial in civil and criminal cases that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) finds contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights; (3) civilianization of politics via further changes in the National Security Council; and (4) the abolition of the death penalty in all cases. 16 As was the case with earlier reforms, these developments were closely monitored by the EU. In a November 2003 paper, the Commission emphasized the need to implement passed democratic legislation. It also noted that it would issue a report and recommendation to assess Turkey’s political compliance, which would provide the basis of the Decem-

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ber 2004 European Council decision concerning the opening of membership talks (European Commission 2003). In line with this approach, the Commission decided, in its October 2004 recommendation, that Turkey “sufficiently fulfills the political criteria” and recommended the launching of accession negotiations (European Commission 2004a, 3). By recommending the opening of membership talks, the Commission not only advanced Turkey’s membership process but also fulfilled the EU’s earlier commitment to Turkey, which had tied negotiations to political compliance. Hence, the announcement constituted a powerful signal not only for Turkey’s membership prospects, but also and more broadly, the consistency of EU membership conditionality. However, as far as Turkey’s accession is ultimately concerned, the Commission’s recommendation also noted that negotiations’ progress would depend on the EU’s capacity to “absorb” Turkey, in addition to the country’s “convergence with the EU” (European Commission 2004a, 8). This was the EU’s first explicit admission that EU absorption capacity would directly bear upon Turkey’s negotiation process. Clearly, as Turkey’s negotiations approached, the EU felt constrained to consider the concrete implications of Turkey’s membership for its policies, budget, and institutions. In this context, the Commission’s detailed assessment addressing the potential impacts of Turkey’s accession on the EU (which was issued on the same day as the recommendation) is significant in admitting the special nature of Turkey’s membership: “Turkey’s accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics” (European Commission 2004b, 4). Specifically, the Commission explained that the budgetary aspects of Turkey’s EU entry would be substantial, as “Turkey would qualify for significant support from the structural and cohesion funds over a long period of time” (European Commission 2004b, 5). Expected further Turkish immigration to the EU (in the event of membership) was discussed as another difficult aspect and “permanent safeguard clauses” were thus envisaged “to avoid serious disturbances on the EU labor market” (European Commission 2004b, 5). In addition to absorption capacity–related dimensions of Turkey’s membership, ongoing political issues such as the Cyprus question were also emphasized as key considerations in the accession process. 17 While the EU’s insistence on this condition was not new, the fact that it was reiterated on the eve of the Brussels Summit came as an additional factor signaling that accession would be highly difficult—if not impossible— despite starting the membership talks. Against this background, EU-wide debates about the desirability of Turkish accession (regardless of Turkey’s fulfillment of the membership

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criteria) intensified during the months leading to the critical Brussels Summit. Reservations were expressed on a variety of grounds ranging from the more material/financial to the identity aspects of Turkey’s EU admission and were mostly—but not exclusively—expressed by rightwing, pro-integrationist European forces. It would be fair to say that among European politicians, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Angela Merkel led the opposition to Turkey’s membership, as she lobbied EU heads of state and government for their inclusion of a reference to the idea of “privileged partnership” in the upcoming Brussels Summit conclusions. In an October 2004 article, Merkel explained: “A Privileged Partnership between the EU and Turkey is more valuable than an underprivileged Turkish membership in the EU—for both Turkey and the EU” (BBC Monitoring Europe 2004). Her initiative proved especially popular among right-wing politicians such as Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and then French president Nicolas Sarkozy. But concerns about Turkey were raised even within the ranks of the Commission (though not to the extent of openly advocating privileged partnership). Outgoing Commission President Romano Prodi conceded that Turkey’s size, economy, and makeup necessitated “clear precautions” to “prevent Turkey’s integration from weakening the structure we have been building for more than 50 years” (Guardian 2004a). Similarly, the then incoming enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn recognized member states’ reservations and announced, ahead of the Brussels Summit, that he would seek a special provision to allow the EU to indefinitely close its borders to Turkish immigrant workers in the event of Turkish accession (Australian 2004). Concerns were also widely expressed about Turkey’s identity, which was perceived to be incompatible with European culture. For example, in a September 2004 letter to the commissioners, Franz Fischler (the then Austrian Commissioner responsible for Common Agricultural Policy) argued that Turkey is “far more oriental than European” and that there were suspicions about its “long-term secular and democratic credentials,” and warned about Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey (Times 2004). In even more dramatic language, Dutch European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein warned of the “Islamization of Europe” and noted that if Turkey enters the EU, “the relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain” (Guardian 2004b). Hence, based on these wide-ranging reservations, it is no surprise that the December 2004 Brussels Council formulated exceptionally difficult terms guiding Turkey’s EU accession. While agreeing to launch accession talks with Turkey, EU leaders tied Turkey’s membership to unprecedented conditions—conditions that had not been imposed before on any EU candidate. Thus, on the one hand, the EU rewarded Turkey for its progress in meeting the political criteria (which is the official prerequisite for opening membership talks with EU applicants). 18 On the other, it

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formulated the accession process in such a way that the “Turkey concerns” of member states (as well as the Commission, as stated above) would also be sufficiently accommodated. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Brussels Conclusions was the reference to the negotiations’ “open-endedness”:

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These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the Candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond (European Council 2004, 7).

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Although EU leaders also agreed that “the shared objective of the negotiations is accession,” the possibility of a status short of full membership (as allowed by the open-endedness of the negotiation process) was unprecedented and thus shook Turkey’s membership aspirations. The “strongest possible bond” mirrored European political opposition to Turkish membership as it echoed Merkel’s and Sarkozy’s calls for a “privileged partnership” in lieu of membership. The Brussels Conclusions were also controversial in that they fully endorsed the Commission’s October 2004 recommendations regarding the conduct of negotiations with Turkey. It was decided that special arrangements (i.e., long transitional periods) could be considered regarding key areas of the acquis such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies, or agriculture. While similar measures were also envisaged in the accession process of Eastern European EU candidates, they were particularly harsh in the Turkish case since the possibility of “permanent safeguard clauses” was included. Therefore, if imposed, these arrangements would effectively reduce Turkey’s status to that of a second-class EU member state. As for the timeline for the negotiations’ completion, member states agreed that negotiations would be concluded—at the earliest—after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the post2014 period due to the “substantial financial consequences” of Turkey’s accession (European Council 2004, 7). In addition, negotiations could be suspended “in the case of a serious and persistent breach . . . of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” (European Council 2004, 8). 19 It must be stated that even such tough negotiation terms required intense bargaining among EU member states in Brussels (International Herald Tribune 2004). Indeed, controversy about Turkey did not subside even after the Brussels decision was finalized. To the contrary, the postBrussels period saw the strongest supporters of Turkey’s EU membership bid toughen their stance on the latter. 20 Hence, when negotiations officially started on 3 October 2005 with the adoption of the Negotiating Framework (which fully incorporated the Brussels conclusions), this was

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not welcomed as an entirely positive development by Turkey. Although a new chapter in the accession process had begun, both the negotiation terms and the surrounding political developments in Europe suggested that the positive trend in EU-Turkey relations that had marked the immediate post-Helsinki period had now been effectively reversed. Membership Negotiations and Beyond

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In the post-negotiations period, Turkey’s membership prospect has been challenged on a variety of grounds. On the one hand, the EU’s membership requirements have expanded, taking on increasingly controversial, political dimensions. On the other, as Turkey’s accession process advanced following the 2004 enlargement, European controversy about it sharpened, a phenomenon which was also fed by the EU’s “enlargement fatigue” and the rise of right-wing politics in Europe. Cyprus’s accession to the EU in May 2004 brought to the fore new EU demands as conditions for Turkey’s membership. The island’s integration into the Union as a full member state meant that Turkey had to extend the Additional Protocol (to the EC-Turkey Association Agreement) to Greek Cyprus as part of its obligations arising from the Customs Union. Already in June 2004, Turkey was asked to sign the draft protocol for the adaptation of the association agreement to Cyprus (and the other new member states that had joined the EU in 2004). While the Turkish government signed this in July 2005, it insisted that the signature did not amount to its formal recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and that Turkish ports would not be opened to Greek Cypriot vessels and airplanes unless the EU took steps to lift the economic isolation of Northern Cyprus, which had been promised in exchange for Northern Cyprus’s support for the Annan Plan in Spring 2004. Still, starting with late 2005, official EU documents (i.e., the Commission’s regular progress reports, Accession Partnership documents, the European Council’s summit conclusions) consistently raised new accession criteria arising from Cyprus’s EU entry: Extension of the Additional Protocol to Cyprus (i.e., via the opening of Turkish ports to Greek Cypriot access) and normalization of relations with Greek Cyprus, which would also include the latter’s official recognition by Turkey. Cyprus-related issues were not the only political matters raised by the EU in the context of Turkey’s membership. The Commission’s first “enlargement strategy paper” released after the 2004 enlargement added two further conditions that would directly impact Turkey’s (and other EU candidates’) accession: the EU’s absorption capacity and European public support for further EU enlargement. Hence, the EU made it clear that “rigorous but fair conditionality” would not be the only mechanism affecting enlargement. As explained in detail in the 2006 enlargement strategy paper, “[a]ny new steps in the accession process [would still] depend

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on each [candidate] country’s progress in making political and economic reforms” (European Commission 2006, 3). However, “[the EU’s ability to] maintain and deepen its own development, in terms of policies and institutions, while pursuing an enlargement agenda” (European Commission 2006, 17) and European citizens’ support for enlargement would also be considered while deciding on further enlargement. To be sure, as a membership criterion, the EU’s absorption capacity was not first developed in the Commission’s 2005 and 2006 enlargement strategy papers. The new enlargement strategy’s discussion of this condition followed the spirit of earlier EU decisions (i.e., the 1993 Copenhagen Council’s and 1997 Luxembourg Council’s conclusions, as well as the Commission’s 2004 Recommendation, as noted above). What rather seemed controversial was the fact that absorption capacity was now elevated to a whole new level by being given as much force as membership conditionality in the enlargement process. After all, this was the first time when the condition was formally and explicitly recognized as such, as opposed to being viewed as a mere “consideration” in the enlargement process. Needless to say, the strategy’s inclusion of absorption issues did not bode well for Turkey’s accession, given the latter’s potentially high costs for the EU. The significance of the “absorption condition” was compounded by the fact that the EU would now be extra cautious when it comes to bearing new integration costs due to its post-2004 “enlargement fatigue.” Indeed, in retrospect, it would be fair to say that it was the big 2004 enlargement that pushed the EU to develop such a strict enlargement strategy in the first place. As far as the other new criterion, public support for enlargement, is concerned, this too raised negative implications for Turkey’s accession. With considerable public opposition to its membership in Europe 21 and the possibility of facing popular referenda in some member states (e.g., France and Austria) 22 on this question, Turkey encountered increasingly serious problems in the accession process. Thus, the new enlargement strategy made it sufficiently clear that Turkey’s accession would be as much subject to objective membership conditionality as it would be to other, EU-driven factors. Both absorption capacity and European publics’ stance on Turkey are heavily loaded with a political dimension. Indeed, their incorporation in the new strategy was paralleled by the rise to power of powerful Turkey opponents such as Merkel and Sarkozy. Both leaders are known to have publicly opposed Turkey’s full membership out of reasons related to absorption capacity (as well as identity, in Sarkozy’s case). They have consequently emerged as the principal advocates of the privileged partnership initiative in the EU. The net effect of these political developments was a slowdown in Turkey’s EU reform process starting with the second half of 2005. The

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EU’s increasingly questionable commitment to Turkey’s membership (especially signaled via the prospect of “open-ended” negotiations as stated in the Negotiating Framework),and toughening and politicized stance on integrating Turkey as a full member state weakened both the Turkish public’s and the government’s faith in the membership process. Thus, the percentage of Turkish people supporting EU membership fell from 71 percent in spring 2004 to 45 percent in fall 2009, and exhibited a generally declining trend in between. At the same time, the number of respondents who think membership is “bad” has increased considerably (from 9 percent in spring 2004 to 25 percent in spring 2006). 23 In addition, a 2006 national survey found that two-thirds of Turks surveyed had no expectations of full membership in the EU (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009, 127). These negative trends have been paralleled by the Turkish public’s low levels of trust in the EU, enhancing further the rising Euro-skepticism in Turkey. The suspension of membership negotiations over eight acquis chapters 24 in December 2006 due to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports to the Greek Cypriot administration added fuel to the Euro-skeptical feelings in the country. As the then enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, explained, the partial freeze would cause “no train crash” but a definite “slowing down [of the negotiation process] because of works further down the tracks.” 25 The eight chapters relating to Turkey’s obligations to Cyprus under the Additional Protocol would not be opened and no other chapter would be closed until Turkey allowed Greek Cyprus access to its ports. Indeed, since the beginning of negotiations in October 2005, a total of thirteen chapters have been opened and only one chapter (science and research) has been temporarily closed. It is also significant that in 2008 alone, the opening of five chapters was vetoed by France as these were considered to directly contribute to Turkey’s membership prospect (which Sarkozy opposes). So far, as many as eighteen out of the remaining twenty-two chapters have been blocked on political grounds (Erdoğan 2011). This led Prime Minister Erdoğan to argue in a recent article: “This is turning into the sort of byzantine political intrigue that no candidate country has experienced previously. In this treatment, Turkey is unique” (Erdoğan 2011). The extremely slow (and politicized) negotiation process weakened AKP’s resolve to implement and initiate reforms needed for membership, effectively reversing the “golden age of Europeanization.” 26 The postnegotiations period is thus significant for two reasons. First, it resulted in the stagnation (or even reversal, in some areas) of the EU reform process. This was especially evident in the AKP government’s resistance to fully institute fundamental political freedoms in practice, a trend that gained prominence after AKP’s second term in office. In this period, AKP started to rule with an “exaggerated sense of its own power” (Öniş 2010, 9) and increased its pressure on the political opposition and the media, which

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effectively damaged freedoms of the press and expression as well as rule of law. 27 Consequently, Freedom House raised Turkey’s press score to 54 in 2011 from 47 in 2007, while both the OSCE and the European Commission warned that rising pressures on the media may amount to selfcensorship (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2012; European Commission 2010, 21; European Commission 2011, 26). Second, the negotiations process saw the open, public questioning of the EU’s membership commitment at the highest political level. For example, President Gül admitted in an interview that Turkey may never have an “EU year” due partly to the “obstacles” raised by the EU on the road to membership (Ergin 2010). More explicitly, Turkey’s Chief EU Negotiator Egemen Bağış argued that European prejudice against Turkey constitutes the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s progress toward accession (Hürriyet Daily News 2010). Hence, in recent years, Turkey’s leading political class has proven increasingly critical about the EU’s approach to Turkey.

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CONCLUSION

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Turkey is the EU candidate that has sought to join the Union for the longest period of time. Since it first applied for membership in 1987, several hurdles have complicated its EU accession. What slowed the accession process was not just rooted in Turkey’s problems in meeting the three official membership criteria adopted in Copenhagen in 1993. The EU’s reluctance to absorb a large, poor, Muslim country like Turkey, parallel European public opposition to Turkey’s membership, and shifting political dynamics in Europe have also combined to influence Turkey’s progress toward accession. EU member states’ politics have sometimes had a positive impact on the accession process, as evident in the shift from Luxembourg to Helsinki in 1999. More often than not, however, politics within the EU has not boded well for Turkey’s accession. Unlike other Central and Eastern European candidates that had benefited from the support of core EU member states (e.g., Britain, France) in their efforts to join the Union, Turkey has not had a patron in the EU. The isolated, principled support of certain key political figures (i.e., Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder) has fallen short of preventing, for instance, the inclusion of exceptionally strict negotiations criteria in the 2005 Negotiating Framework. In addition, the EU did not have a “moral duty” to embrace Turkey, unlike the case with the formerly communist EU candidates. This additionally weakened the EU’s resolve to include Turkey as a full member state. The post-negotiations period increased European controversy on Turkey’s membership, both among right-wing political forces that have been on the rise in recent years and the European public. Opponents of Tur-

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key’s EU accession became much stronger and more vocal, and they formed “a grand coalition in favor of Turkey’s exclusion from the EU” (Öniş 2009, 29). Together with the EU’s growing, politicized membership demands on Turkey, this enhanced anti-Turkey shift has jeopardized Turkey’s EU entry more than ever. These developments have increased Euro-skepticism both among the Turkish public and the government, which is now halfheartedly committed to the EU reform process. It has been argued that Turkish foreign policy has simultaneously shifted toward “loose Europeanization” and a “soft Euro-Asianism” (Öniş 2009, 35), which in turn arguably reduced the EU’s commitment to Turkey’s membership (Uğur 2010). While it is not certain at this point whether there is a feedback effect between the EU’s decreased commitment to Turkey and Turkey’s reduced pro-EU orientation, it is clear that EU membership has turned into a highly complex foreign policy problem for Turkey. In the final analysis, membership seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, in the years to come. NOTES 1. Assist. Prof. Dr., İstanbul Kemerburgaz University, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. The original Article 28 stated: “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community,” http:// www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=117&l=2 (05.04.2012). 3. For a detailed discussion on how Turkey’s democracy problems affected its relations with the EU during the 1980s, see, for instance, Dağı 2001. 4. For an excellent discussion on how the EU’s “special responsibility” toward post-communist CEE influenced its decision to enlarge to the east, see Sedelmeier 2005. 5. The Luxembourg Council committed to opening accession negotiations with six “front-runner” candidates (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus) in the short term, while supporting the preparations of negotiations with the five “pre-ins” (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania). 6. For a great discussion on this and Turkey’s post-Luxembourg EU policy, see Cem 2005, 62–67. 7. As explained by former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz in New York Times 1997. 8. Indeed, in 1995, as soon as it became clear that the EU would open accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration, the Turkish Parliament made a decision that formally committed Turkey to integrating Northern Cyprus in the event of Greek Cyprus’s EU accession. Hence, it was signaled that Turkey would accept the “Cyprus condition” for membership only if it was also made a condition for Greek Cyprus’s EU entry. 9. The term “Europeanization” denotes a wide-ranging process of national adaptation to the EU during which the EU’s formal and informal rules, policy paradigms, procedures and/or norms are incorporated in domestic policies, political structures, discourses, and identities (Radaelli 2000, 4). 10. For a detailed discussion, see Avcı 2004. 11. This was listed as a short-term priority, to be addressed by the end of 2001.

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12. Statement delivered by Ecevit in response to the draft AP, 18 November 2000, http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/ab/kob2000_06.html (20.06.2012). 13. NPAA largely ignored the Cyprus issue, while merely stating that the abolition of the death penalty would be “considered.” 14. For an extensive review, see Özbudun 2007. 15. The original Copenhagen statement read: “If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” (European Council 2002c, para. 19). 16. For an extensive review, see Müftüler-Baç 2005. 17. In this respect, probably the most forceful statement was made in the Commission’s 2003 strategy paper: “The absence of a settlement [in Cyprus] could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations” (European Commission 2003, 16). 18. As decided by the 1997 Luxembourg Council Conclusions (para. 25). 19. It should be noted, however, that the prospect of suspension is not unique to the Turkish case, as it also concerned Croatia. 20. For example, former French President Jacques Chirac famously noted that Turkey would have to undergo a “major cultural revolution” before joining the EU. Similarly, Tony Blair, a strong advocate of Turkish membership, stated that negotiations with Turkey would be “an issue of controversy for years to come” and would imply a “very big change” for Europe and Turkey (New York Times 2005). 21. In the post-Helsinki period, the EU’s Eurobarometer surveys found that European support for Turkey’s membership ranges merely between 28% and 34% (2000–2008). In addition and more significantly, a considerable number of Europeans (48% and 45% in spring 2006 and spring 2008, respectively) reported that they would oppose Turkey’s accession even if it complied with all the membership conditions (Standard Eurobarometer 65 and 69), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ eb_arch_en.htm (20.05.2011). 22. As evident in Eurobarometer surveys, both countries’ publics are strongly against Turkey’s membership. 23. The numbers are provided by Standard Eurobarometer 61, 65, and 72, http:// ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm (10.04.2011). The original survey question asked to assess support for EU membership is: “Generally speaking, do you think Turkey’s membership of the European Union would be: a good thing, a bad thing, neither good or bad?” 24. The chapters concerned are: free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport, customs union, and external relations because of the trade policy aspects. 25. Speech by Olli Rehn, November 29, 2006, http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=14844 (20.01.2011). 26. For an extended analysis on why the reform process slowed down in the post2005 period, see, inter alia, Patton 2007. 27. Rule of law has come under serious strains with the so-called “Ergenekon,” “Balyoz” and KCK investigations, which led to the imprisonment of AKP critics in the military, the media, and academia, as well as Kurdish activists, based upon allegations of plotting to overthrow the government and terrorism charges. See, inter alia, Doğan and Rodrik 2010.

REFERENCES Agence France Presse. 1995. “EU to Clear Path to Turkey Customs Union, Cyprus Membership.” 4 February. Australian. 2004. “EU Puts Turkey on 10-Year Time Line.” 7 October.

Beken Saatçioğlu Avcı, Gamze. 2004. “Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse in the Post-Helsinki Period: A Case of Europeanization.” Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.), Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, 215–35. London: Routledge. B BC Monitoring Europe. 2004. “German Opposition Leader Defends ‘Privileged Partnership’ for Turkey in EU.” 17 October. Balkır, Canan. 2010. “Turkey’s Road to EU Membership: Economic Outlook.” KozGazdasag 3: 25–40. Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu. 2009. The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cem, Ismail. 2005. Avrupa’nın “Birliği” ve Türkiye. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları. Dağı, İhsan. 2001. “Human Rights, Democratization, and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983–87.” Middle Eastern Studies 37(1): 17–40. Doğan, Pınar, and Dani Rodrik. 2010. “How Turkey Manufactured a Coup Plot.” Foreign Policy 6 (April 2010). Economist . 2011. “One for the Opposition.” 2 June. Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2011. “The Robust Man of Europe.” Newsweek, 17 January. Ergin, Sedat. 2010. “Gül’den AB Çıkışı.” Hürriyet, 16 April. European Commission. 1989. Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commission-opinion-on-turkey_s-requestfor-accession-to-the-community_-december-20_-1989.en.mfa. European Commission. 2003. Continuing Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, COM (2003) 676 final, Brussels. European Commission. 2004a. Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, COM (2004) 656 final, Brussels. European Commission. 2004b. Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective, COM (2004) 656 final, Brussels. European Commission. 2006. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006–2007, including annexed special report on the EU’s Capacity to Integrate New Members, COM (2006) 649 final, Brussels. European Commission. 2010. Turkey 2010 Progress Report, COM (2010) 660, Brussels. European Commission. 2011. Turkey 2011 Progress Report, COM (2011) 666 final, Brussels. European Council. 1989. Conclusions of the Strasbourg European Council of 8–9 December 1989, Bulletin of the European Communities No. 12. European Council. 1993. Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 21–22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1. European Council. 1997. Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council of 12–13 December 1997. European Council. 1998. Conclusions of the Cardiff European Council of 15–16 June 1998, SN 150/1/98 REV 1. European Council. 1999. Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 10–11 December 1999. European Council. 2001. Conclusions of the Laeken European Council of 14–15 December 2001, SN 300/1/01 REV 1. European Council. 2002a. Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 12–13 December 2002 , 15917/02. European Council. 2002b. Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 24–25 October 2002, 14702/02. European Council. 2002c. Conclusions of the Seville European Council of 21–22 June 2002, 13463/02. European Council. 2004. Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 16–17 December 2004, 16238/1/04 REV 1.

Turkey-EU Relations from the 1960s to 2012 Guardian. 2004a. “EU Puts Turkey on a Long Road to Accession: Commission Gives an Amber Light for Entry; Talks to Start, but They Will Stop If Rights Are Violated.” 7 October. Guardian. 2004b. “In 1683 Turkey Was the Invader. In 2004 Much of Europe Still Sees It That Way.” 22 September. Hürriyet Daily News. 2010. “Turkey Must Overcome Bias on Path to EU.” 30 April. International Herald Tribune. 2004. “A ‘Historic Event’ for EU and Turkey: Membership Talks Get the Green Light after Deal on Tacit Recognition of Cyprus.” 18 December. McLaren, Lauren. 2000. “Turkey’s Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish Elite Perspectives on the Issue.” Journal of Common Market Studies 38(1): 117–29. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union.” South European Society and Politics 10(1): 17–31. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, and Lauren M. McLaren. 2003. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey.” European Integration 25: 17–30. New York Times. 1997. “Turkey, Rejected, Will Freeze Ties to European Union.” 15 December. New York Times. 2005. “EU Leaders Raise Red Flags on Turkey.” 5 October. Öniş, Ziya. 2003. “Domestic Politics. International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era.” Turkish Studies 4(1): 9–34. Öniş, Ziya. 2006. “The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy in Turkey: From the Welfare Party to the AKP.” Dietrich Jung (ed.), Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East, 103–28. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Öniş, Ziya. 2009. “The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey: Drifting Away from Europeanization?” DIIS Report 05. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Öniş, Ziya. 2010. “Contesting for the ‘Center’: Domestic Politics, Identity Conflicts and the Controversy over EU Membership in Turkey.” Working Paper No. 2. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University European Institute. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 2012. “OSCE Media Freedom Representative Calls for Legal Reforms after Study Shows 95 Journalists Imprisoned in Turkey,” http://www.osce.org/fom/89370 (10.05.2012). Özbudun, Ergun. 2007. “Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993–2004.” Turkish Studies 8(2): 179–96. Patton, Marcie J. 2007. “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What Has Happened to the EU Process?” Mediterranean Politics 12(3): 339–58. Radaelli, Claudio. 2000. “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change.” European Integration Online Papers 4(8). Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2005. “Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role-Compliance.” Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches, 120–41. New York: Routledge. Times. 2004. “Attack on Turkish Membership Renewed.” 11 September. Turkish Daily News. 2002. “Erdoğan’s Determination Satisfies EU Ambassadors.” 8 November. Uğur, Mehmet. 1999. The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Uğur, Mehmet. 2003. “Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations: The Road to Copenhagen and Beyond.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 5(2): 165–83. Uğur, Mehmet. 2010. “Open-Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU-Turkey Accession Negotiations.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4): 967–91.

TWO Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies Past, Present, and Future Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun 1

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The project of Westernization or modernization defined and justified reforms in the Turkish political, legal, and sociocultural system in order to reach the standards of higher civilization attained in other parts of the world, particularly since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. As the EU started to actively engage in transformation of its environment and the relationship between Turkey and the EU evolved, the EU turned into an agent that has the potential to induce change in Turkey. Since then, the project of modernization has become almost synonymous with Europeanization for Turkey. In academia, on the other hand, Europeanization gained wider recognition as a concept that refers to the impact of the EU on the national level, particularly on its member states. Although Europeanization in the candidate states did not receive much attention in the literature until recently, perhaps because the relationship is hierarchical, the EU impact on candidate countries including Turkey cannot be taken as given just because candidate countries are not given the possibility of opting out during the accession process. 2 Accession negotiations aim at preparing a candidate country for EU membership in all areas of governance and policy standards one can think of, and this is where the EU’s transformative power should peak. The success of the EU enlargement policy as one of the instruments through which the EU transforms its environment comes from the membership incentive offered to candidate countries. The importance of mem-

Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun

bership prospect for the EU’s transformative power can be seen in the mixed record of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which leaves this prospect in ambiguity for the target countries. However, despite the fact that Turkey-EU relations are not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy—which compromises the EU’s transformative power, as will be seen below—Turkey’s story of Europeanization has also been a very tainted one due to the interaction of EU-related and domestic factors. 3 This chapter sets out to present the factors that have limited the EU impact on Turkish politics and policies, despite the Turkish EU candidacy, and argues that the EU impact was greater when the prospect of carrying the relationship to a further level was credible and clear. 4 The significance of the credibility of the EU membership perspective for successful Europeanization can be seen in the fact that the impact of the EU diminished in Turkish politics and policies after 2005, when ambiguity regarding the Turkish EU membership increased as a result of the negative messages coming from the EU and its member states and the blockades in the accession negotiations. The conclusion in this light highlights that the story of the Europeanization of Turkish politics and policies will continue to be tainted and characterized by ups and downs as long as the credibility of the EU’s membership prospects for Turkey remains questionable. The chapter will proceed with a section on the developments until the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 and show that the EU impact was strong during this period because of the motivation provided to the Turkish public and policy makers by the prospect of opening accession negotiations if reforms were carried on. The second section is going to focus on the period after the opening of Turkish EU accession negotiations in 2005 and present the factors that made the prospect of Turkish EU membership unreliable from the Turkish perspective. This section is going to make it clear that the diminishing credibility of the EU membership prospect since then has decreased the EU impact on Turkish politics and policies during this period. The decreasing credibility of the EU not only influenced the process of the EU-induced reform in Turkey negatively, but also recently led to the decoupling of the Turkish reform process from the European integration. This justifies the conclusion that the future of Europeanization in Turkey or the impact of the EU on Turkish politics and policies will continue to be characterized by ups and downs, given that there is no consensus on Turkey’s EU membership between the EU member states. The findings of the previous sections and the implications of these will be discussed in detail in the concluding section.

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Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies

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EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH POLITICS AND POLICIES UNTIL 2005

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Official relations between Turkey and the EU date back to the Association Agreement signed in 1963, the significance of which lies in the prospect it envisaged for Turkish accession to the then European Community (EC), when Turkey becomes able to fulfil the obligations of membership. Since then, the EU has gone through a number of enlargement waves, and in view of the enlargement toward Central and Eastern European countries it detailed the conditions for its membership. The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 stipulated that in order to start accession negotiations candidate countries should be able to assume the obligations of EU membership (acquis communautaire) and meet the economic criteria of a functioning liberal market economy and political criteria including the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minority rights. Turkey officially applied for membership in 1987, at a time when the transition from the military regime of 1980 had gained ground. The European Commission opinion on the application was not an outright rejection of Turkey’s eligibility for membership on the basis that it is not a European country, as was the case with Morocco’s application. Instead, the Commission underlined Turkey’s eligibility, but deferred an in-depth analysis of the application until emergence of a favorable environment, since the EC was busy with its own internal reform process, namely the completion of a single market. As proposed by the Commission then, Turkey and the EC focused on completing the Customs Union—which was envisaged by the Association Agreement—and accomplished this in 1996. The Turkish with the EU facilitated its economic integration with the EU, while political integration lagged behind. The positively influenced Turkey’s economic growth, broadened the diversification of its trade, and contributed to increasing competitiveness of Turkish industry as well (Nas 2011, 56–57). However, Turkish EU membership became increasingly elusive over time, as the EU integration deepened and the role of identity came to the fore. Particularly during the post–Cold War era, various actors emerged within the EU who opposed Turkish EU membership mostly on cultural grounds. Despite the increasing public debate on whether Turkey is European or not, the Helsinki European Council of 1999 granted Turkey the status of candidate country, in line with the EU’s previously established official approach on the eligibility of Turkey as a European country. The EU pressure and the prospect of candidacy provided the motivation for legal and constitutional reforms, particularly on human rights and democratization in Turkey throughout the 1990s. One example of the reforms to secure a promising decision at the Helsinki European Council is the decision of the coalition government of the period to ratify the Con-

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vention against Torture (Kulahci 2005, 397). After the status of candidacy was granted, reforms in Turkey gathered pace in order to start accession negotiations. These reforms focused on the EU’s most significant reservations about Turkish politics and policies, including freedom of expression, human rights, and civil-military relations (Müftüler-Baç 2005, 22). As a result of EU pressure, in addition to the abolishment of the death penalty, changes included allowing broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish, and adoption of a new Civil Code, which reinforced gender equality and freedom of association as well as revision of the Penal Code to include measures against the lack of freedom of expression and widespread cases of torture and ill treatment. The late 1990s also saw indirect EU influence on Turkish foreign policy, as it has provided the context within which Turkish and Greek foreign policy–makers initiated their dialogue. The current relationship between Turkey and Greece—which is free of the risk of major escalation of tension today, despite the fact that they have not reached a stage of complete resolution of their disputes—owes much to the EU impact on both parties. Domestically, the EU-induced reform process served to strengthen the role of civil society organizations and increased their legitimacy as one of the actors that should be listened to; they in turn became vocal supporters of further democratization in line with the EU standards. 5 Therefore, the EU impact contributed to change from the traditional top-down reform process as seen fit by the state elite in Turkey toward the democratization of governance and diversification of actors involved in the process, such as the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are revealed by widespread public debate on reforms. The understanding that the state elite (civil and military bureaucracy) knows what is best and that the state comes before citizens started to lose its dominance. Although there also appeared anti-EU and/or anti-reform societal forces, development of civil society led to drastic change in public debate in Turkey and diminished the taboo subjects in public discussions, especially on interethnic relations (Tunkrová 2010, 37). In addition, the EU-induced reform process contributed to gender equality in Turkish society through positive legislative changes. In 2001, gender equality in marriage was introduced and revisions were made to the laws on violence against women, accompanied by changes to the Constitution in this area in 2004. As a result of these efforts, the 2006 progress report prepared by the European Commission noted that the Turkish legal framework remained satisfactory in terms of gender equality, despite the fact that the implementation was problematic (Tunkrová 2010, 44–45). For instance, whereas “honor killings” are explicitly illegal and the state has removed any differentiation in sentencing for these crimes, they persist. In this sense, as Stivachtis and Georgakis (2011) also note, the problem of securing translation of legal changes into social

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changes in the domestic sphere highlights one of the domestic factors that limit Europeanization in Turkey: the necessity for domestic cultural change, in this case the patriarchal system dominant in Turkish society. Another direct and more significant influence of the European integration process in this period can be observed in civil-military relations. 6 The Turkish army has historically been an important actor, which directly intervened in politics through coups or memorandums to governments in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007. The army’s role in policy making since the 1960 military coup was secured through the National Security Council (NSC), which brought the civilians, including relevant ministers and bureaucrats, together with high-level military command. From the perspective of the military, on the one hand, the EU membership process has been desirable in view of the traditional Westernization project it espoused; on the other hand, the EU requirements threaten its role in Turkish politics since these involve cutting back of some of the military’s powers. Regardless, in the early 2000s, functions and membership of the NSC changed. The number of civilians in the NSC and its secretariat increased, it turned into an advisory body which meets every two months instead of monthly, and it became possible to appoint a civilian as its secretary general. Some of the powers of the NSC were abolished as well, such as the power of supervising the implementation by the government of its decisions and running national security inspections. To give another example of major changes in this area, seats of the military in civilian boards (for instance, in the Higher Education Board and the Board of Inspection of Cinema, Video, and Musical Works) were removed. Thus, the EU pressure has led to a change in the balance within the NSC in favor of civilians and paved the way for a civilianized Turkish foreign policy (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007, 269). Furthermore, as Rabia Karakaya Polat underlined, together with the improvement of the civil society’s role in Turkey, changes induced by the EU on civil-military relations contributed to a process of desecuritization in Turkish politics and society, whereby issues are moved from the security agenda and put back into the political agenda (Polat 2010, 63–66). The motivation for carrying the EU-Turkish relations to another level has thus contributed to the alleviation of ethnic problems, particularly the Kurdish issue in Turkey, and as will be seen below, has increased the Turkish government’s enthusiasm to solve the Cyprus conflict. Overall, the period between 1999 and 2004 has witnessed radical changes in Turkish politics and society due to the EU requirements for reforms in legislation on various issues accompanied by increasing economic stability, unprecedented levels of foreign investment, and growing competitiveness of the private sector. While one should not forget the significance of the efforts of previous governments for reforms in order to meet the EU political criteria in particular, efforts of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which


came to power in 2002, are distinctive in this context. As the European Commission stated in its 2003 progress report, when it first came to power, the AKP accelerated the reform process (Kulahci 2005, 392). The AKP government’s efforts signified transformation of Turkish political Islam, not only under the impact of historically enshrined secularism and successive military coups in the country, but also under the impact of the EU. The understanding that the EU-induced democratization will improve religious rights and freedoms contributed to a mentality shift in pro-Islam intellectuals and the political party. The AKP government completed the abolishment of the death penalty altogether and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Kulahci 2005, 398). In addition, Turkey adopted a new Penal Code on 25–26 September 2004, just a week before the Commission’s 2004 Progress Report was released (Müftüler-Baç 2005, 28). These reforms show that the accession process and the timing of human rights reform in Turkey are directly linked. 7 Therefore, successive reform efforts of different governments during the 1990s and early 2000s have to also be seen in light of the credibility of the EU membership perspective for a healthy assessment of the conditions that facilitate the EU impact on Turkey. The reforms mentioned above came at a period when the influence of the EU on the way of thinking of policy makers, bureaucracy, and the public was perhaps at its highest level due to clear incentives. All of these examples confirm that the scale of Europeanization is higher in Turkish politics and policies if the prospect of carrying the relationship to a further level is credible and clear. This period of major changes in Turkish politics and policies as a result of the EU motivation and pressure, however, was followed by a period of inertia and reluctance to proceed with the EU-induced reform process after the opening of accession negotiations in 2005. The following section will present the factors that led to this outcome.

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A PERIOD OF TAINTED EUROPEANIZATION AFTER 2005

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The opening of accession negotiations with a “debatable” view to membership in October 2005 as a result of these developments was another turning point in relations. The EU declared that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria for membership, including the political and economic criteria, as well as the ability to assume obligations of full membership in terms of incorporating the EU legislation into its domestic system. While Turkish economic integration with the EU has continued unabated, as can be seen in the steadily increasing levels of trade in between and the European direct investments in Turkey since 2005 (Tocci 2011, 91), the start of accession negotiations happens to be the period

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when the EU’s official emphasis on the open-ended nature of the process created significant difficulties in terms of domestic ownership of the Turkish political reform process. The negotiation framework for Turkey was a strict one that enabled the EU to determine opening and closing benchmarks for every chapter in accession negotiations. The EU has also emphasized its absorption or integration capacity for enlargement to take place and foresaw long transition periods, derogations, and even permanent safeguard measures (European Commission 2005). In addition to the EU’s official endorsement of the idea that the completion of accession negotiations will not guarantee membership, the issue was further complicated as it started to increasingly become part of the EU member states’ domestic politics with the coming into power of political parties or leaders who are opposed to Turkish membership, as in France and Germany. Opposition to Turkish EU membership even became part of political campaigns against the Constitutional Treaty of the EU during the failed 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands. As a result of these ambivalent and even negative messages from Europe, the EU’s credibility suffered a major blow, since these led to increasing distrust at both the elite and public opinion level in Turkey. Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult for the pro-EU coalition in Turkey to demand change in line with the EU standards—and thus, the EU influence on Turkey started to diminish. The process of Europeanization was even further complicated as a result of the accession of Cyprus to the EU without the resolution of the conflict on the island. Subsequently, the EU insisted on the opening of Turkish ports and airports to ships and aircraft from Cyprus with a view to expand the Customs Union to cover the new EU member states (implementation of the expanded Additional Protocol). The Turkish government in response emphasized that this can be done if direct trade between the EU and Northern Cyprus (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) is also enabled, in line with the EU Council of Ministers` decision to end the isolation of Northern Cypriots. This was a decision of the Council that was thought of as a safeguard against the failure of the 2004 referendum on the UN’s Annan Plan to resolve the Cypriot issue, in case one of the communities on the island rejected it. In the end, although the Greek Cypriots, who rejected the plan, were rewarded with membership in the EU, the Turkish Cypriots, who voted in favor, were not even given a way out of their isolation. It has been unfortunate that the EU had to renege on its principle to require resolutions of conflicts before a candidate country becomes a member, which in this case meant that the EU has imported an international conflict and ceased to be a neutral party able to exert influence on both parties on the island. This naturally exacerbated the mistrust toward the EU, this time not only in Turkey but also in Northern Cyprus, and made it harder for both of them to take any further steps, since from their


perspective Europe was neither just nor reliable. Therefore, as a result of the EU failure to engage in direct trade with Northern (Turkish) Cyprus due to the Greek (Southern) Cypriot veto, the expanded application of the Customs Union to the recently enlarged EU failed. Just a year after opening accession negotiations, in December 2006, the European Council decided to suspend eight chapters in Turkish accession negotiations that had direct relevance to the issue. The European Council also decided not to provisionally close any chapters until the Commission had confirmed that Turkey had fully implemented its commitments under the expanded Additional Protocol. 8 In addition, Cyprus decided to unilaterally block other chapters, which caused further mistrust toward the EU in Turkey. 9 As Ziya Öniş (2007, 255) pointed out, even in the early months of 2005, there was plenty of evidence that the AKP government had started to lose its initial enthusiasm for an EU-induced reform process. For instance, the government did not repeal Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prohibited insulting the Turkish state and the nation. Negative influence of ambivalent EU messages and problems in accession negotiations can particularly be seen in the failed administrative reform process in Turkey, which envisaged decreasing the powers of the center over the local administrative structures. Concrete steps toward this goal, such as the classification of the regions in line with the EU standards and establishment of regional development agencies, were not followed through after 2006, and the government sought new ways to sustain the control of the local level by the center (Çelenk 2009, 54, 56). Keeping in mind that currently, even the negotiation of the chapter that includes regional policy is not possible, it is obvious that as the prospect of EU membership waned and accession negotiations were slowed down purposefully by the EU member states, Turkish decision makers became more and more selective in initiating reforms that may compromise their powers. Thus, as a result of both domestic concerns and the missing EU support in this policy area, decentralization of administrative responsibilities and even its value as a more effective and democratic way of local governance did not take root in the country. This happens to be yet another example which demonstrates that deeper reforms, the internalization of the EU-induced reforms or their implementation, require increased credibility of the prospect to carry Turkish relationship with the EU to another level. However, despite the stalemate in accession negotiations as a result of the Cyprus issue, the EU influence can even be observed in the Turkish approach to this problem. The parliamentary period of 2002–2007 coincided with the Annan Plan for Cyprus, and its intense schedule of negotiations provided the AKP with an opportunity for the reorganization of civil-military relations during this parliamentary term. The AKP pledged to change Turkey’s traditional stance on Cyprus, which is defined as a “national cause” and an issue of national security based on geopolitical

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and strategic concerns. This was also a starting point for the restructuring of foreign and security policy making under their government (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 8). The AKP government’s open support to the failed Annan Plan of the UN was an explicit and significant change from the traditional Turkish approach (which saw non-solution as the solution in Cyprus) toward openly supporting the solution of the problem and offering various options open to dialogue and cooperation. This change became possible as a result of both the EU impact, including the prospect of carrying the Turkish relationship with the EU to another level by opening accession negotiations, and a change of government in Turkey. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that for the Turks and Turkish Cypriots, the facts that the Greek Cypriots were rewarded with EU membership although they rejected the Annan Plan for the resolution of the conflict 10 and that the EU pledge for direct trade with northern Cyprus never materialized, justify Turkey’s decision not to extend the Customs Union to Cyprus—even at the cost of accession negotiations being blocked by Nicosia. Earlier change in the traditional Turkish approach to the Cyprus issue is not the only example of changes in Turkish foreign policy under the influence of the EU. Even the recent activism in Turkish foreign policy toward other regions owes much to the change in institutional balances in the making of foreign and security policy that became possible as a result of the EU influence in the early 2000s. 11 The change in institutional balance freed the hands of the AKP government, which was in favor of developing closer relations with Turkey’s neighborhood, while some in Turkish society argued that this was a development that would undermine the country’s relations with the West. However, Turkey’s increasing initiatives in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, as well as in Africa, with the objective to build interdependencies in these regions so that the potential for conflict will decrease, are certainly in line with the EU approach to foreign policy and the accession criterion of good neighborly relations. As underlined by Temel İskit, a former Turkish diplomat, “what has changed is that Turkey has begun to democratize. That happened with agreement to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria,” and “this democratization has led to a new spirit of co-operation and compromise” (Kristiansen 2010). Moreover, as many Turkish analysts point out, Turkey’s relationship with the EU and its EU candidacy in particular are part of the reasons behind its increasing appeal and prestige in the Middle East (Çalış 2010, 83). Nonetheless, due mostly to the stagnation in the accession process, the impact of the EU even in this area is also increasingly losing its dominance and arguably has become “an instrument of Turkey’s regional-power objectives” in foreign policy (Kardaş 2010, 132). Although Turkey is committed to the EU membership goal and is a NATO member, its foreign policy actions within the new regional approach may challenge the EU as well as the United States, as


can be seen in its recent objection to the strengthened UN sanctions toward Iran on its alleged nuclear program. In other words, increasing reliance on soft power by Turkish foreign policy–makers is a clear result of the country’s EU-related transformation, brought about not only by political conditionality on democratization, but also by its influence on the way of thinking with regard to legitimate instruments and actors in defining and pursuing foreign policy goals. However, this may not guarantee convergence in foreign policy actions, which is not a desirable development from the perspective of the EU. In the absence of the motivation to carry the relationship with the EU to another level and advance it, in effect, the EU is increasingly likely to become one facet of Turkish multidimensional foreign policy. 12 There are other problems in Turkish accession to the EU, which are perhaps bigger than the Cyprus problem. In addition to the negative impact of the Cyprus issue in accession negotiations, illustrated by the reasoning behind the unilateral veto of France on chapters that it believes will put Turkey in line for accession, 13 there is the issue of arguments against Turkish membership on the basis of essentialist definition of identities. This is related to the ambiguity or contested nature of both the European identity and the final borders of Europe in an ongoing debate, which also harms the credibility of the EU membership prospect for Turkey and therefore the domestic ownership of the reform process in the country. The French position against Turkish EU membership as advanced by former president Nicolas Sarkozy since 2007 rests on the idea that Turkey is neither culturally nor geographically European and shows the significant impact of the currently contested nature of the definition of European identity and the final borders of Europe. The debate on Turkey in France is also tied to the political competition between secularists and Catholics within political parties, civil society, academia, and the media. Whereas the former appreciate the Turkish state’s control of religion, the latter highlight Turkey’s religion as an argument either in favor of Turkish EU membership in a multireligion Europe or against Turkish EU membership on essentialist grounds relating to Turkey’s different religion (Tocci 2011, 97). Similar fragmentation of opinion within this debate seems to be repeated at the EU level, despite the fact that the official policy of the EU so far has been defining Europeanness on the basis of political norms and values (İçener and Çağlıyan-İçener 2011, 20–23; Torun 2006). From the perspective of Turkey, the decision of France under the leadership of former president Sarkozy to block accession negotiations is not really understandable, as France is legally committed to put the issue of Turkish EU membership to a referendum once negotiations are completed. With the likely chance that the French public will say no to Turkish EU membership, French policy makers’ reluctance in showing goodwill and supporting Turkey’s reform efforts is inexplicable. Furthermore, if this definition of Europeanness in terms of cultu-

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ral/religious identification instead of political/economic terms gains wider support within the EU than it currently does, it may eventually perpetuate social, religious, and cultural tension even within existing boundaries of the EU and prove to be detrimental for its transformative and normative power in the international realm. It is also worth noting that while current German government under the leadership of Angela Merkel has also been against full EU membership of Turkey and joined France in support of a privileged partnership short of membership for Turkey, it did not adopt a similar position to block accession negotiations, since this would be a violation of the EU promise that Turkish accession negotiations will follow the path that other candidate countries have been subject to and the principle of pacta sunt servanda in international relations. Compared with the French position of blocking accession negotiations, the German position seems more constructive for sustaining the EU influence on Turkey in terms of encouraging and supporting the reform process. However, even an agreement at the EU level to follow this principle in accession negotiations may not guarantee the Europeanization of Turkish politics and policies. As long as the EU member states do not determine what Europeanness means or where the boundaries of Europe lie in an inclusive manner, the risk of failure of the ratification of Turkish accession—even if the negotiations are completed successfully—in the EU member states or at the European Parliament based on exclusionary answers to these questions will continue to hamper Europeanization of Turkish politics and policies and, in particular, the implementation of reforms. The impact of the missing EU anchor in Turkey’s reform process can also be seen in the increasing polarization of politics within the country during the AKP’s second and third terms in government. In view of the slowing down of the EU-induced reform process, declarations made by the government on its continuing commitment to EU membership do not seem to any longer allay concerns of some segments of the society about the Islamic leanings of the AKP members or their authoritarian tendencies, as it did during the first term of AKP government. The slowing down of the EU-induced reform process and limited enthusiasm in terms of implementation of reforms, on the other hand, can be seen as a result of the decreasing trust that Turkey will one day become an EU member, which in turn makes the government more or less immune to EU influence. As was presented above, during its first two years in government, obtaining a date to open accession negotiations figured high on the AKP’s agenda. Therefore, it pushed major legislative changes through the parliament in order to realize this goal. However, as Marcie J. Patton (2007, 344) also highlights, the government became trapped between the EU’s failure to act reassuringly and nationalist repercussions at home, in particular after the EU started to send mixed signals by simultaneously deciding that the accession negotiations would start in 2005 and warning


that negotiations could be suspended at any time. During the period after the opening of accession negotiations, the Cypriot, French, and the EU decisions further increased the distrust toward the EU and Turkish nationalism, which in turn have been negatively influencing Europeanization in Turkey to this date. Due to this high degree of mistrust toward the EU, all political parties seem to be making rare and instrumental references to the EU, as can be observed in their campaigns over the referendum on constitutional changes in September 2010. Furthermore, debates on democratization attempts, such as the “Kurdish opening” and the project of making a new constitution, take place in the absence of the EU anchor, which increases polarization at both political and societal levels. 14 In the meantime, the AKP government tried to put flesh on the bones of its declarations of commitment to Europeanization and further reforms in this framework. In December 2008, after more than four years’ delay, Turkey launched another National Program for a formal legislative road map toward the EU accession process. In early 2009, the government appointed its first full-time EU accession negotiator with the capacity of state minister. In 2011, the government decided to turn the Secretariat General for European Union Affairs into an exclusive ministry dealing with EU affairs. Despite these, as the European Commission noted in 2010, sources of concern remain: shortcomings in implementation of reforms on issues such as gender equality, efficiency of the judicial system, anticorruption measures, and the military’s formal and informal attempts to influence politics. As the members of the Independent Commission on Turkey also underline, freedom of expression must be secured by narrowing the definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terror Law and ensuring European standards in the interpretation and implementation of restrictive regulations by the courts and security services. Turkey also needs to adopt the EU standards on procurement as another step to full transparency and reducing corruption in government. There is also a crucial need for a new Political Parties Law to strengthen intraparty democracy, encourage youth to enter mainstream politics, bring transparency to party financing, and end a system in which party leaders are too easily able to crush dissent (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, 15). In addition to the continuing need for reforms in these areas, the European Commission continues to call on Turkey to resolve disputes with its neighbors, including Armenia, and as it has done since 2006 notes Turkey’s failure to open its ports to Cyprus, while acknowledging that the constitutional reforms adopted in 2010 served to create conditions for progress in several areas of interest to the EU (European Commission 2010). However, popular mistrust of the EU in Turkey makes it unthinkable for any cabinet to change the Turkish position on not extending the Customs Union to Cyprus without simultaneous EU actions to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus. Even if the EU finally decides to

[2.24]

[2.25]


[2.26]

[2.27]

implement its Direct Trade Regulation with Turkish Cypriots, it is possible that some segments of society will continue to oppose extending the Customs Union to Cyprus. They are likely to oppose a positive Turkish move, pointing out as evidence of the EU’s hypocrisy and consistent unfairness the fact that the Customs Union demands that Turkey grant Cypriot ships and aircraft access to its ports and airports while placing Turkish transportation beyond the scope of this agreement. Therefore, resolution of the Cyprus problem appears to be a necessity, as can also be seen in the fact that Turkey refuses to take part in the meetings under the Cypriot presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012. In addition, ambivalent and negative messages from the EU on Turkish membership, regardless of Turkey’s progress in meeting the EU criteria, continue to arrive. In February 2010, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, visiting Turkey in his capacity as chairman of the G20, stated that he saw Turkey as a Middle Eastern country rather than as part of Europe and that it is necessary to have close ties between Turkey and the EU as much as possible without going any further toward full membership. Moreover, although it was eventually withdrawn, during the drafting of the European Parliament’s resolution on Turkey’s accession progress, representatives of the European People’s Party (EPP) proposed an amendment calling on the EU institutions to study the possibility of establishing a privileged partnership with Turkey as an alternative to full EU membership (Morelli 2011, 11). The combined impact of the factors presented above is the diminished credibility of the EU in Turkey, which negatively influences the EU-induced reform process. In the words of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey wants a “clear target date” and “a timetable for negotiations” through which Europe could “prove” to the Turkish people “that they are sincere.” On numerous occasions, Erdoğan has called on the EU to be “honest,” arguing that if the EU doesn’t want Turkey, they should say it clearly (Spiegel 2007). Erdoğan also underlined that the EU approach toward Turkey is reducing “our goodwill towards the EU,” since “we are struggling to join the EU, but they struggle not to take us” (Champion 2010). Therefore, principal issues remain unchanged in the Turkey-EU relationship, despite the recent adoption of a positive agenda, which has been advanced by the European Commission and accepted by Turkey, in order to accelerate the country’s much-needed reform process in line with the EU acquis (European Commission 2012). However, given the fact that cooperation is going to go forward in areas where the negotiation chapters are still officially blocked, implementation of critical reforms and extension of freedoms will likely continue to be problematic. European skepticism about whether Turkey should be embraced as a member of the EU—fueled by an ongoing debate over the implications of the growing Muslim population and the impact Turkish accession would have on Europe’s future—continues, which leads to an ambivalence to-


ward the EU by the current Turkish leadership and a growing disillusionment with the EU among larger segments of Turkey’s public (Morelli 2011, 11). As of 2012, as a result of various blockages in accession negotiations there are only three chapters left (public procurement, competition, and social policy and employment) that can be opened. However, there are big costs associated with reforms in these areas, which made previous negotiating countries wait until the EU membership prospect was closer. For instance, with regard to the chapter on competition policy, Turkey failed to fulfil the opening benchmark on the transparency of its state aids system, whereas the social policy and employment chapter requires a complete transformation of the Turkish public personnel regime. Requirements for these chapters are obviously more difficult to undertake, especially at a time of global financial crisis. As a result, Turkey currently has no chapters to work on, and the sustainability of the EU-Turkey relationship rests on developments within the framework of the positive agenda without any change to the official blockades in the accession negotiations. Nonetheless, stalemates in Turkish accession negotiations are hard to overcome, as the country’s prospect for membership has never seemed so distant before. As Thomas Diez points out as well, ambiguity and fear dominate large parts of the public discourse on Turkey-EU relations. There is the ambiguity of whether Turkey belongs to Europe or not, coupled with the ambiguity on the commitment of both sides (Diez 2011, 158). Whereas some of the variation in Turkish commitment to the EU integration resembles that in other candidate countries during their accession negotiations with the EU, the ambiguity in the EU commitment toward Turkish membership is peculiar. Although the enlargement toward Eastern and Central Europe did not enjoy enthusiastic support from all member states, none openly opposed it. Moreover, current candidate countries including Turkey do not benefit from the sense of historical and political imperative that informed the European Commission’s activities in pulling Central and Eastern European countries toward the EU at a faster pace. The opinion within the European Parliament is also fragmented, with possible negative effects on the approval of a future treaty of Turkish accession (İçener et al. 2010, 211, 214). Therefore, while the resolution of the Cyprus problem or the recent change of government in France may ease Turkish accession negotiations, questions within Turkey on the credibility of the prospect of the EU membership is likely to remain as a negative influence on Turkey’s political reforms and policies. In other words, in this environment, while the EU needs to take immediate precautionary measures to address problems in accession negotiations, it also appears crucial for the EU member states to decide on what the definition of Europe is or where the final borders of Europe lie, since only positive or inclusive answers to these questions can lead to full credibility of the EU in Turkey. Given the low prospect of a common EU

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answer to these questions in the near future, it seems that the impact of the EU on Turkish politics and policies will continue to be a story of tainted Europeanization characterized by ups and downs. [2.29]

CONCLUSION

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As the sections above demonstrate, the EU impact on Turkish politics and policies has been greater when the prospect of carrying the relations to a further level was credible and clear. Developments until the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 show that the EU impact was strong during this period because of the high motivation provided by the prospect of opening accession negotiations if reforms were carried out. After 2005, ambivalent and negative messages from the EU and its member states influenced the process of the EU-induced reform in Turkey negatively. A clear majority of EU citizens reject the idea of Turkey joining the EU, on the basis of factors such as the economic benefit of Turkish accession, cultural differences, political ideology, and general attitudes toward the EU (Gerhards and Hans 2011). Based on these factors, calls for a privileged partnership or special relationship envisage a relationship between Turkey and the EU that would exclude Turkey from participating in the EU’s political decision making and offer little added value to its present status with regard to the EU. Moreover, it is hard for any country to take upon itself the large number of difficult reforms needed to adopt the EU acquis communautaire if the objective is not full membership. As in other negotiations, there is of course no guarantee that this goal can be reached (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, 44). Nonetheless, deviation from the principle of pacta sunt servanda and calls for alternative relationship models on the basis of an exclusionary definition of European identity increase popular mistrust toward the prospect of Turkish EU membership and make it hard for domestic pro-EU Turkish actors to even make references to the EU in order to justify changes in the Turkish political, legal, and economic systems. As a result of this peculiar interaction between domestic and EU-related factors, one can safely argue that the overall reform process in Turkey, including further democratization and solution of problems such as the Kurdish issue and improvement of conditions of the Alevi community, is increasingly becoming decoupled from the European integration process. While attempts for improvements in these areas increasingly rely on domestic factors, 15 the process of decoupling is of great significance for the future of the EU’s impact on Turkey and Turkish-EU relations. The EU impact on candidate countries is naturally dependent on domestic owners of the process who will promote, demand, and enact reforms in line with the standards of the EU. Although it is natural to expect the filtering of reforms in order to meet the EU conditionality through a candidate country’s sociocultural con-


text, as exemplified by the lingering problem of reinforcement of gender equality in Turkey, the speed and depth of reforms also depend on the credibility of the EU in terms of the prospect of membership. Given these problems, informed observers of Turkish-EU relations who are concerned about the lack of effective mechanisms for sustaining bilateral communication and cooperation increasingly call for using informal strategic dialogue mechanisms between the parties, particularly on foreign and security policy. 16 Nonetheless, informal mechanisms are unlikely to produce the desired impact of facilitating cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, mostly because these do not offer Turkey the reassurance it needs. Instead, making a permanent structured and enhanced cooperation mechanism possible between Turkey and the EU appears to be a more promising alternative in order to revitalize the relationship, since only a formal mechanism may decrease the distrust, in particular within Turkey. Such a process, by not ruling out the prospect of membership, would not only make Turkey more amenable to the impact of the EU again in terms of democratic consolidation and the continuation of much-needed domestic reforms, but would also boost convergence between the two parties in foreign and security policy. This can even satisfy the EU member states that officially oppose Turkish membership, as it will bring Turkey close to a position short of membership and delay the question without a negative Turkish reaction. 17 However, not only such a scheme but even an informal mechanism to revitalize the relationship requires finding a way to overcome the Cypriot veto or the resolution of the problem on the island. Regardless of the resolution of the Cyprus problem or the recent change of government in France, which may breathe life into Turkish accession negotiations, questions within Turkey on the credibility of the EU with regard to its membership prospect are likely to remain as a negative influence on Turkey’s political reforms and policies. Therefore, in addition to the need to take immediate precautionary measures to address problems in accession negotiations, it appears crucial for the EU member states to decide in favor of an inclusive definition of Europe and where the final borders of Europe lie, since only positive answers to these questions will secure Europeanization in Turkey. Unfortunately, given the low prospect of a common EU answer to these questions in the near future, it seems that the impact of the EU on Turkish politics and policies will continue to be characterized by ups and downs, even if solutions to problems in accession negotiations are found. NOTES 1. Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp and Dr. Zerrin Torun, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, e-mail: [email protected] and [email protected].

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[2n1] [2n2] [2n3] [2n4] [2n5] [2n6] [2n7]

[2n8] [2n9] [2n10] [2n11] [2n12]

[2n13] [2n14] [2n15] [2n16]

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2. For a similar conclusion with regard to the EU impact on candidate countries during the Eastern enlargement of 2004, see Sedelmeier 2011. 3. For an analysis of the history of Turkey-EU relations, see Eralp 2009. 4. See also Eralp and Torun 2011a. 5. For a detailed analysis of the EU impact on Turkish civil society, see Diez et al. 2005. 6. For extended analysis of different periods in this area of reform, see Duman and Tsarouhas 2006 and Bilgiç 2009. 7. For similar observations, see Schemmelfennig et al. 2003 and Hale 2011. 8. The eight chapters that are suspended due to the problems in implementing the Additional Protocol are free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, financial services, transport policy, customs union, and external relations. 9. Chapters unilaterally blocked by Cyprus are free movement of workers, energy, judiciary and fundamental rights, education and culture, and common foreign and security policy. 10. For an example, see Sözen 2010, 85. 11. For analyses of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, see Terzi 2010 and Müftüler-Baç 2011. 12. This leads some experts to advance the argument that the EU should build a special relationship with Turkey in the area of foreign policy outside the process of its EU accession; for an example see Krastev and Leonard 2010. 13. Chapters vetoed by France are agriculture and rural development, economic and monetary policy, regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, foreign, security and defense policy, and financial and budgetary provisions and institutions. 14. For further analysis of this consequence, see Alessandri 2010 and Kalaycıoğlu 2011. 15. For extended and recent analyses on these issues, see Kirişçi 2011 and Çarkoğlu and Bilgili 2011. 16. For examples see Eekelen 2009, Grabbe and Ülgen 2010, and Barysch 2010. 17. For measures to revitalize the significance of the EU for Turkish reforms, see Eralp and Torun, 2011b.

REFERENCES Akşit, Sait, and Costas Melakopides. 2008. “The Influence of Turkish Military Forces on Political Agenda-Setting in Turkey, Analysed on the Basis of the Cyprus Question.” Briefing Paper for the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs. European Parliament, Brussels, February. Alessandri, Emiliano. 2010. “Democratization and Europeanization in Turkey after the September 12 Referendum.” Insight Turkey 12(4): 23–30. Aydın, Mustafa, and Sinem A. Açıkmeşe. 2007. “Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 9(3): 263–74. Barysch, Katinka. 2010. “Turkey and the EU: Can the Stalemate Be Avoided?” Policy Brief, Center for European Reform, December. Bilgiç, Tuba Ünlü. 2009. “The Military and Europeanization Reforms in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 45(5): 803–24. Çalış, Şaban H.. 2010. “Dış Politikada Eksen Kaymıyor, İstikamet Düzeliyor.” Habibe Özdal et al. (eds.), Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası, Volume 2, 65–102. Ankara: USAK Yayınları. Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili. 2011. “A Precarious Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the Turkish State, and the EU.” South European Society and Politics 16(2): 351–64.

Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun Çelenk, Ayşe Aslıhan. 2009. “Europeanization and Administrative Reform: The Case of Turkey.” Mediterranean Politics 14(1): 41–60. Champion, Marc. 2010. “Erdoğan: ‘Two Things Will Be Voted on Here,’ Excerpts from the Wall Street Journal’s Interview with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” 9 September, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703453804575479651464540536.html. Diez, Thomas. 2011. “Ethical Dimension: Promises, Obligations, Impatience and Delay: Reflections on the Ethical Aspects of Turkey-EU Relations.” Armağan Emre Çakır (ed.), Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story, 158–75. New York: Routledge. Diez, Thomas, et al. 2005. “File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society.” South European Society and Politics 10(1): 1–15. Duman, Özkan, and Dimitris Tsarouhas. 2006. “‘Civilianization’ in Greece versus ‘Demilitarization’ in Turkey.” Armed Forces and Society 32(3): 405–23. Eekelen, Willem F. Van. 2009. “Transitional Arrangements as Milestones towards EU Enlargement.” Turkish Studies 10(1): 37–55. Eralp, Atila. 2009. “The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship.” New Perspectives on Turkey 40: 149–70. Eralp, Atila, and Zerrin Torun. 2011a. “El impacto de la UE en Turquia: la historia de una europeización empañ ada” (The Impact of the EU on Turkey: A Story of Tainted Europeanization). Culturas 11: 99–112. Eralp, Atila, and Zerrin Torun. 2011b. “Turkey-EU Relations: Just Another Impasse?” Dimitar Bechev (ed.), What Does Turkey Think?, 57–62. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). European Commission. 2005. Negotiating Framework for Turkey. October, Brussels. European Commission. 2010. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–2011.” 9 November. European Commission. 2012. Positive EU-Turkey Agenda Launched in Ankara, MEMO/ 12/359, Brussels, 17 May, available at http://www.europa.eu. Gerhards, Jürgen, and Silke Hans. 2011. “Why Not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries.” Journal of Common Market Studies 49(4): 1–26. Grabbe, Heather, and Sinan Ülgen. 2010. “The Way Forward for Turkey and the EU: A Strategic Dialogue on Foreign Policy.” Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December. Hale, William. 2011. “Human Rights and Turkey’s EU Accession Process: Internal and External Dynamics, 2005–2010.” South European Society and Politics 16(2): 323–33. İçener, Erhan, and Zeynep Çağlıyan-İçener. 2011. “The Justice and Development Party’s Identity and Its Role in the EU’s Decision to Open Accession Negotiations with Turkey.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11(1): 19–34. İçener, Erhan, et al. 2010. “Continuity and Change in the European Union’s Approach to Enlargement: Turkey and Central and Eastern Europe Compared.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10(2): 207–23. Independent Commission on Turkey. 2009. Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle. 2nd report, September. Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2011. “The Turkish-EU Odyssey and Political Regime Change in Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 16(2): 265–78. Kardaş, Şaban. 2010. “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles.” Middle East Policy 17(1): 115–36. Kirişçi, Kemal. 2011. “The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: Limits of European Union Reform.” South European Society and Politics 16(2): 335–49. Krastev, Ivan, and Mark Leonard. 2010. The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), October. Kristiansen, Wendy. 2010. “Turkey’s Soft Power Successes.” Le Monde Diplomatique (English edition), 2 November.

Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies Kulahci, Erol. 2005. “EU Political Conditionality and Parties in Government: Human Rights and the Quest for Turkish Transformation.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 7(3): 387–402. Morelli, Vincent. 2011. European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations. CRS Report for Congress RS22517, Congressional Research Service, 15 March. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union.” South European Society and Politics 10(1): 16–30. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2011. “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European Union.” South European Society and Politics 16(2): 279–91. Nas, Tevfik F. 2011. “Economic Dimension: The Turkish Economy from the 1960s to EU Accession.” Armağan Emre Çakır (ed.), Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story, 46–66. New York: Routledge. Öniş, Ziya. 2007. “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9(3): 247–61. Patton, Marcie J. 2007. “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What Has Happened to the EU Process?” Mediterranean Politics 12(3): 339–58. Polat, Rabia Karakaya. 2010. “How Far Away from Politics of Fear? Turkey in the EU Accession Process.” Lucie Tunkrová and Pavel Saradin (eds.), The Politics of EU Accession, 58–71. London: Routledge. Schemmelfennig, Frank, et al. 2003. “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey.” Journal of Common Market Studies 41(3): 495–518. Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2011. “Europeanisation in New Member States and Candidate States.” Living Review in European Governance 6(1), http://www.livingreviews.org/ lreg-2011-1. Sözen, Ahmet. 2010. “The Cyprus Question in Turkey-EU Relations.” Lucie Tunkrová and Pavel Saradin (eds.), The Politics of EU Accession, 72–89. London: Routledge. Spiegel. 2007. “Interview with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” 16 April, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-turkishprime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-if-the-eu-doesn-t-want-us-they-should-sayit-now-a-477448.html. Stivachtis, Yannis, and Stefanie Georgakis. 2011. “Changing Gender Attitudes in Candidate Countries: The Impact of EU Conditionality—The Case of Turkey.” Journal of European Integration 33(1): 75–91. Terzi, Özlem. 2010. The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy. Surrey, UK: Ashgate. Tocci, Nathalie. 2011. “Elite Opinion Dimension behind the Scenes of Turkey’s Protracted Accession Process: European Elite Debates.” Armağan Emre Çakır (ed.), Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story, 83–103. New York: Routledge. Torun, Zerrin. 2006. “Identity: Stumbling-Block in Turkish Membership to the European Union.” Thilo Bodenstein and Michael Bolle (eds.), After Eastward Enlargement: Political Economy Perspectives on a New Europe, 225–43. Berlin: Berliner EissenschaftsVerlag. Tunkrová, Lucie. 2010. “Democratization and EU Conditionality: A Barking Dog That Does (Not) Bite?” Lucie Tunkrová and Pavel Saradin (eds.), The Politics of EU Accession, 34–57. London: Routledge.

THREE The Credibility of EU Human Rights Conditionality Turkey’s Case Zerrin Savaşan 1

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[3.1]

[3.2]

Turkey was one of the earliest applicants for membership in the European Community. Indeed, making its application to join the EEC in 1959, it chose to cooperate with the Community nearly fifty-two years ago. It became an associate member with the possibility of joining the EU with the Agreement Creating an Association (Ankara Agreement, Article 28), which was signed on 12 September 1963 and came into force in 1964. After twenty-three years from the agreement, on 14 April 1987, Turkey applied for Community membership under the Motherland Party, which took power after free elections. The application was refused by the Community on the grounds of its economic and political situation, poor relations with Greece, the conflict with Cyprus, and particularly, the lack of addressing the protection of human rights. Thus, before the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria by the EU in the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, with Turkey’s application to the Community for membership, the protection of human rights began to have a very significant place in Turkey-EU relations, even it was not under the name of conditionality. Since the adoption of human rights explicitly as a membership conditionality within the Copenhagen Criteria and specifically since the assessment of the criteria through regular reports, Turkey has made important progress in the protection and improvement of human rights in the country. The EU human rights conditionality (EU HRC) policy thus has been

Zerrin Savaşan

the most crucial impetus for Turkey’s improvement in the human rights field. This chapter aims to analyze the effect of the credibility of EU HRC in human rights reforms in Turkey. For this purpose, it first gives a brief background of EU HRC. Then it focuses on the credibility of EU HRC. Furthermore, it scrutinizes Turkey’s case in two dimensions of the credibility of EU HRC: determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions; and certainty of the promise of membership. In the context of the first dimension, this chapter reviews basic documents defining and elaborating the conditions—the Copenhagen Criteria, Agenda 2000, regular reports (RRs), and accession partnership documents (APDs)—to find out whether the EU qualifies determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions. The chapter also illustrates the main shortcomings regarding the first dimension of credibility, giving examples from the provisions in the mentioned documents, particularly in the regular reports. With respect to the second dimension, it examines the impact of the certainty of the promise of future EU membership to Turkey based on three critical breakthroughs: the periods after the Luxembourg summit, the Helsinki Summit, and the beginning of negotiations as open-ended. Based on its findings, the chapter argues that, in Turkey’s case, the first dimension of credibility does not play an important role in the reform process of Turkey, while the second dimension has had an important influence. EU HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

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[3.4]

Historical Evolution

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The EU applies some instruments to strengthen human rights not only for its member states, but also for third countries, through stipulating human rights as an objective of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), applying human rights clauses in agreements with third countries (by introducing trade preferences and assisting these countries on human rights in the development policy), stipulating protection of human rights as part of “differentiated conditionality” (Kahraman 2005, 9, 25) in the neighborhood policy, and lastly as a membership conditionality in the enlargement policy (Savaşan 2006, 53–58). Human rights as a membership conditionality in the EU attained priority in the 1990s, particularly with the declaration of the Copenhagen Criteria. However, it is possible to argue that it has been always a constant for accession to the Union (Fierro, 2003, 137). In fact, its emergence and its roots can be traced back to the 1970s, even to the Birkelbach Report of 1962 on the question of EU membership. As a result of the Birkelbach Report, the enlargement acquis has become structured along two main dimensions: one (regulative) emphasizing the existence of a set

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[3.7]

The Credibility of EU Human Rights Conditionality

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[3.9]

of rules of obligations (the acquis communautaire—the treaties, the institutions, the body of legislation, the international agreements, the accession treaties, the political goals or acquis politique, and the ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 2 —which candidates had to accept; and the second (normative), specifying the values that the candidates’ political systems had to embody and preserve (democracy and human rights, as defined by the Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR]) (Torreblanca 2003, 13). In 1964, it was used as a reference document during the Council’s deliberations on the response to be given to Spain’s application for accession to the Community. Indeed, the European Community rejected Spain’s application to join the Community in 1967, because of the fact that only those states that guarantee democratic practices and respect for human rights and fundamental liberties could be admitted into the Community. It also froze its association with Greece because of the existence of a military coup in that country. 3 Thus, the report represented the initial signals of political conditionality (implied or “implicit” conditionality) (Williams 2004, 55), which would begin to be applied to the applicant states explicitly with the Copenhagen Criteria. Following the Birkelbach Report, through some other nonbinding documents (such as the Document on European Identity [1973], the Joint Declaration by European Parliament [1977], and the Declaration on Democracy [1978]), the importance of human rights and also democratic principles in the Community was reconfirmed. In brief, via these documents, the signals of the criteria that would be made preconditions for membership commenced to be given even in these years. When it came to the 1980s, the issue of human rights was first introduced into the treaties with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA, in its preamble, stressed the determination of the Community “to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights.” Through the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992, respect for human rights was first incorporated in a treaty article (Article F(2), Article 6(1)) as an obligation for the Community. In 1993, via the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria in the Copenhagen European Council, it was made clear that the application to the Union for being a member involved the acceptance of and respect for the human rights principles adopted by the EU. Then, the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), Article 49, adding a new condition to the TEU Article O, essentially enshrined the principles set out in Article 6(1) (after the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2)— respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law 4 —as requirements for membership and made them part of EU treaty law. The ToA thus formalized the political conditions of membership, with an expectation of minority rights (Bartels 2005, 52; Nowak 1999, 692). 5

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THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY

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Conditionality, in very narrow terms, can be defined as “an unequal relationship between the donor and the recipient”; this is also called “aid conditionality” (Fierro, 2003, 94). However, this kind of definition is not adequate for explaining the EU HRC applied to the applicant states in the accession process. It is necessary to seek alternative definitions of the term to define it in accordance with EU enlargement policy. In this definition, there should be two parties that are not equal in power. This is because, in this relationship, one subject determines specific conditions, requires the other party to meet them, and checks whether it meets them or not. The other party has to fulfill the conditions to receive the “carrot” (or incentive, reward) of the relationship, like technical-financial assistance, recognized as a part of EU, and ultimately EU membership, the highest and the most effective reward (“positive conditionality”) (Fierro, 2003, 100). On the other hand, if it does not fulfill the conditions, “negative conditionality” (Fierro, 2003, 100) occurs—the “stick” of the relationship. Thus, the other party is either deprived of the benefits of the relationship (of EU membership by the EU) or subjected to suspensions or postponements until the requirements are met. However, it should be emphasized that the EU has never used the suspension of membership entirely, but rather has preferred to delay the opening of negotiations and the concluding of accession agreements or delay granting the financial aid to stimulate the applicants to meet the requirements. Next to the carrot and stick, based on the “asymmetric interdependence” (Vachudova 2005, 109) between the EU and applicants, the EU can also rely on “political dialogue,” which can provide the exchange of views on the related issues of enlargement and the conditionality process (Fierro, 2003, 102). However, as the applicant is the weaker side of the relationship in this process, dialogue generally is explained as the least effective method, or a less effective method than carrots and sticks. Finally, due to the fact that fulfilling the conditions is a prerequisite for being an EU member and entering into a membership relationship, it establishes an “ex-ante conditionality” (not an “ex-post conditionality”) (Fierro, 2003, 98). With all these in mind, human rights conditionality applied to the applicant states in the accession process can be defined as an ex-ante instrument of the EU in which the applicant state, to attain the benefits of the relationship and not to be subjected to its sticks, has to satisfy certain conditions regarding full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Tocci 2007, 9; Barnes and Randerson 2006, 352).

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[3.14]

THE CREDIBILITY OF EU HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY

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In order to apply HRC in practice, the EU develops deliberate policies, that is, “deliberate conditionality,” to maintain its “active leverage” (Vachudova 2005, 63). It is then necessary to figure out under which circumstances this leverage can be effective, compliance with entry conditions can be made more attractive, and what the role of the credibility of EU conditionality can be in this effectiveness and attractiveness. The theoretical models developed by scholars like Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier can shed light on the way toward analyzing these questions. In one of their articles, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier discuss three models that can be helpful to explain the EU’s rule transfer to the CEECs and its effectiveness (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). These are the lesson-drawing model, the social learning model, and the external incentives model. In the lesson-drawing model, there is no need for EU incentives or persuasion. If these rules are adequate to solve domestic policy problems effectively, then they are adopted by the target state. In the social learning model, in contrast to rational models adopting “logic of consequences,” due to its basis in “social constructivism” (Checkel 2001), “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1998) is adopted. So, actors do not calculate costs and benefits of their behaviors, but they evaluate the applicable norms and other actors’ expectations, and find the right one to do. That is, a state adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules. Legitimacy of the EU conditions, identification of the target state and society with the EU, and absence of conflicting domestic rules (resonance of EU requirements with preexisting norms, values, and practices in the applicant state) are the most important factors that affect the EU’s persuasive power. To this model, for the effectiveness of EU conditionality, the level of perceived legitimacy and resonance of the norms and the identification of the candidate state with the EU should be high enough to reduce the resistance and to increase the support of the conditionality. The third model, the external incentives model, is a rationalist-intergovernmental bargaining model in which the actors of the relationship bargain to maximize their own powers based on their self-interest. The main strategy for bargaining is “reinforcement by reward” (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003, 496; Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, 2006, 3; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 670). This is a “rewardsbased strategy” (Schimmelfennig 2007, 139). The factors in this model that influence meeting EU conditions or resistance toward them are the size of the reward, the credibility of EU conditionality, and domestic costs of conditionality. These factors imply first that the size of the reward should exceed the domestic costs of compliance with the conditions. Moreover, conditionality should be credible, as its existence and

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working is bound to its credibility, as Rehn obviously has put forward in 2006 (Rehn 2006, 15). Credibility here is revealed by Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus as both the “determinacy, clarity and consistency” of the conditions themselves, and the certainty of the promise of membership when the political conditions are fulfilled (and the threat of being excluded from the accession process if they are not fulfilled) (Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus 2006, 3). Of these models, the first one does not require EU incentives, even persuasion, so it is not possible to apply it to explain EU conditionality. The two others are both effective on EU conditionality, so they both should be taken into account when analyzing the impact of EU conditionality on candidate states. In each case, one of them can be more or less effective than the other according to the conditions of the candidate in question (see table 3.1). In Turkey’s case, as mentioned by Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) and Schimmelfennig (2008), the external incentive model appears as the most effective model on conditionality. That is, the success of conditionality is mostly based on political cost-benefit calculations rather than social influence (“interdependence” and “societal salience”) and “transnational mobilization” (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, 515). In fact, societal factors are “ineffective or less effective” when compared to cost-benefit calculation in domestic policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 675; Schimmelfennig 2008). However, in this chapter, the aim is not to examine the relationship between these models and their influence on EU conditionality in Turkey’s case, as there are already studies regarding this issue (as mentioned above). Here, the aim is to analyze how the credibility of EU HRC affects the reform process of human rights in Turkey, as suggested in the conception of credibility developed by Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus (2006, 3). In this conception, the credibility of EU conditionality is explained in two dimensions or elements: determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions; and the certainty of the promise of membership (see table Table 3.1. Effective Factors on EU Conditionality External Incentive Model

Social Learning Model

External factors (regarding EU)

Size and credibility of EU rewards

Legitimacy of the EU’s conditions

Internal factors (regarding candidate)

Domestic costs of conditionality, the impact of veto players

Identification with the EU, and resonance

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3.2). This implies that the conditions of conditionality first of all should be certain, clear, and consistent, and that the candidate states should know that when they progress in fulfilling them, they will receive the reward—full membership status—promised by the EU. In addition, if they fail to comply with them, they should be aware that they will be excluded from EU membership. [3.24]

THE CREDIBILITY OF EU HRC IN TURKEY’S CASE

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In this section, two dimensions of credibility will be examined in terms of Turkey, and on the basis of these dimensions, it will be asked how credibility has affected the reform process in the field of human rights in Turkey.

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Determinacy, Clarity, and Consistency of the Conditions

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While analyzing determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions in Turkey-EU relations in terms of HRC, it is essential to examine the related documents that can give signals about the level of determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions. The EP and Council reports; regular political dialogue meetings; the activities of the Association Council, the Association Committee, and the Secretariat-General for EU Affairs; and informal meetings on a number of issues, including human rights, between the EU and the Turkish authorities discuss of the problems and settlement of disputes related to the adoption of the legislation and also pertain to the supervision of the implementation on human rights. Four documents—the Copenhagen Criteria, Agenda 2000, regular reports, and Accession Partnership Documents (APDs)—constitute the main structure used by the EU to evaluate whether Turkey meets or does not meet the accession requirements. So here, only these basic documents defining the conditions will be examined.

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Copenhagen Criteria

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As is generally known, the criteria for EU membership were elaborated by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, moving the EU “from the Table 3.2. Credibility of Conditionality Conditionality should be credible. This requires: 1.

Determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions

2.

The certainty of the promise of membership and the threat of being excluded if the conditions are not fulfilled

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acquis toward a wider set of reform and transformation targets” (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007, 3). Countries with an accession perspective have to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, including adherence to the aims of both economic and political union. 6 On the political side, they have to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities before they are entitled to enter accession negotiations. As a matter of fact, when the conclusions of the Copenhagen Council are examined, it is seen that the part related to relations with Turkey included no reference to the criteria (European Council 1993, 12). On the other hand, it did not exclude future candidates, as understood from the wording “membership requires” or “candidate country has achieved.” There was a general reference to being a member. In addition, the formalization of these political conditions of membership via the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 49) obviously indicates the necessity of compliance by all candidate countries, including possible future ones. In brief, the criteria are valid for all candidate countries, for Turkey and for possible future candidates. Nevertheless, given the fact that the Copenhagen Criteria do not give a “detailed check list” (Börzel and Risse 2004, 12) of what should be done and what should not be done, it becomes necessary to analyze the other crucial documents, Agenda 2000 and regular reports, which can help fill the gaps of the criteria and help elaborate the details of the accession requirements.

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Agenda 2000

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Agenda 2000, published by the Commission in 1997, reinforced the importance of the Copenhagen Criteria, as with its publication “a more rigorous approach” for compliance began to be raised in the EU (Bartels 2005, 53). This document elaborated the EU’s two-part strategy for enlargement: accession negotiations with candidates, and the preaccession strategy designed to assist these countries in overcoming problems identified in negotiations. However, as it excluded Turkey and did not include a separate opinion on Turkey—the first separate opinion on Turkey was with the 1998 Regular Report—but only involved a separate section (Fierro 2003, 148), it is not possible to find further elaboration on the protection of human rights and what the EU means and wants from Turkey in this field. Still, it can be a useful document to draw conclusions looking to the views and evaluations of the Commission on the CEECs’ position regarding human rights. But, for specific examination on Turkey, it seems that the best way is to focus on regular reports and accession partnership documents.

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Regular Reports

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Beginning with the year 1998, Turkey’s progress in the harmonization of the acquis communautaire, the implementation of the reforms and their effective functioning has begun to be examined by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC). In fact, through regular reports presented to the Council, the Commission ensures Turkey an assessment of the political Copenhagen Criteria (democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights) in conjunction with recommendations for improvement. In the regular reports, under the heading of political criteria (beginning with 2001, it changes to “enhanced political dialogue and political criteria”) (CEC 2001), in the subsection “human rights and the protection of minorities,” there are three main subheadings: civil and political rights (involving issues such as ratification of international human rights conventions, freedom of association and freedom of assembly, conditions in prisons, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions, status of women, and capital punishment); economic, social, and cultural rights (involving the rights of the child, gender equality, trade unions, and cultural rights); and minority rights and protection of minorities. It can be argued that with more detailed wording, the progress reports have contributed considerably to the enhancement of awareness in Turkey of the measures that should be taken to move forward in the accession negotiations and have reinforced Turkey’s efforts for political and economic reform. However, as the reports have not elaborated which issues are more important than others and so have to be taken as priority and fulfilled in a shorter period, and also how such fulfillments are evaluated and how the fulfillment is measured through the regular reports, the European Council commences to establish accession partnership documents (APDs) to set the priorities in an attempt to provide Turkey a single framework for further progress.

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The Accession Partnership Documents (APDs)

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The APDs (adopted by the Council in 2001, 2003, 2006, and 2008) involve the Union’s priority areas of concern, the financial means provided for Turkey to help it implement these priorities, and the conditions applied to this assistance. Indeed, in the APDs, a distinction is made between short-term priorities and medium-term priorities. Thus, they provide a framework further elaborating the Union’s priorities for accession preparations and assisting Turkey in targeting its specific needs in meeting the requirements for membership. For its part, Turkey is expected to draw up a national program (2001, 2003, 2008 programs) including a timetable and specific measures

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through which it can make progress to address the priorities raised by the APDs as a first step, and also to address all other issues identified in the progress reports. The program prepared by Turkey is also subject to annual review by the Commission, so the APDs can be used as a benchmark against which to measure future progress. To conclude, it can be argued that, through these documents, specifically regular reports and APDs, the EU has made the conditionality framework for Turkey more tangible, consistent, and clear, overcoming the “vagueness of Copenhagen Criteria” that has, in general, resulted in the need of the Commission’s interpretation (Barnes and Randerson 2006, 354). However, there are still question marks—shortcomings on the determinacy, clarity, and consistency of conditions, and the EU’s performance when applying this framework and using it to justify why Turkey has met or has not met the requirements. Prominent shortcomings include different standards in the reports, problems in the measurement of progress, and the provisions on minority rights and international human rights instruments. MAIN SHORTCOMINGS ON THE DETERMINACY, CLARITY, AND CONSISTENCY OF THE CONDITIONS

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Reference to Different Standards

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One of the shortcomings that can be raised regarding the determinacy, clarity, and consistency of conditions is the repeated reference in the regular reports to different standards, such as “EU standards,” “European standards,” ECHR and case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the best practices in EU member states, or international standards, to compare to the situation in Turkey and to take it forward to those levels. However, it is substantially ambiguous whether there is a difference between EU and European standards or not; when there is a conflict between these different standards which one will prevail (if it will change depending on the present instance, then how it will be decided and who will decide it?); and how the best practices in EU member states can be determined, with which measures, and who will determine it.

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Measurement of Progress

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Until 2000, the aim of the regular reports has been explained as being to find out whether planned reforms referred to in the previous regular report have been carried out and to examine new initiatives. However, there has been no reference to how progress has been measured (Barnes and Randerson 2006, 354). From 2000 onward, it has been explicitly

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underlined that “progress” has been measured on the basis of decisions actually made, legislation actually adopted, international conventions actually ratified (with due attention being given to implementation), and measures actually implemented (CEC 2000a). The APDs also list the priorities regarding necessary legislation, decisions, conventions, and measures in an obvious way. Yet they also underline that Turkey ultimately has to address “all the issues” identified in the progress reports, together with the priority areas mentioned in the APDs. In the regular reports, however, it is not possible to find an exact list of the decisions that have to be made, legislation that has to be adopted, international conventions that have to be ratified, and measures that have to be implemented. When the regular reports are examined, it becomes clear that the list can change from year to year. For example, the rights of Roma and internally displaced persons are mentioned first in the 2001 report under minority rights; there is no provision about them in previous reports. Access to justice under civil and political rights is seen first in the 2005 report (CEC 2005). Another point worth noting is the EU’s further emphasis on freedom of the press and political pressure on the media in the 2009 report (CEC 2009). This emphasis continues in the last report as well. In addition, beginning specifically with the 2008 report (EC 2008), the EU also calls attention to the “electronic media” and finally, in the 2010 report (EC 2010), “website bans” as a source of concern. This situation raises the question whether there can be additional conditions and changing levels of emphasis on conditions according to the time and changing conditions. [3.50]

Minority Rights

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In the field of minority rights, first of all, it is essential to underline that the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 49) transfers all Copenhagen political criteria into EU law, but with an exception of minority rights protection, not included in Article 6(1), TEU (Bartels 2005, 52; Nowak 1999, 692; Williams 2004, 66–71). Minority rights protection can be accepted in the group of “principles common to Member States” stated in Article (61), TEU, and thus can be admitted indirectly as a condition mentioned under Article 49, TEU. However, it is not possible to talk about common practices regarding minority rights in member states (de Witte and Toggenburg 2004, 68; Nowak 1999, 692). Through the Treaty of Lisbon, “the rights of persons belonging to minorities” are added to the EU law (in Article 2, TEU) as one of the values on which the Union is founded. Nevertheless, the EU Fundamental Charter does not specifically involve minority rights, only refers to the nondiscrimination principle (Article 21), as the previous EU treaties did. Consequently, the EU itself has no common definition of minority (collective or individualist formulation) and no substantial regulation in

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the acquis communautaire regarding minority rights. It also has no single model that can be applied within the EU level and also within the Copenhagen Criteria (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, 500; Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus 2006, 9–10; de Witte and Toggenburg 2004, 67–68) in the scope of human rights conditionality. However, it stipulates the protection of minority rights as a condition of accession, and as it does not formulate common standards in this field, it applies different conditions to different candidates. This situation raises the question of the EU’s legitimacy and credibility. With respect to Turkey, in the regular reports, it is put forward that

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according to the Turkish authorities, under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, minorities in Turkey consist exclusively of non-Muslim religious communities. The minorities associated in practice by the authorities with the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians and Greeks. However, there are other communities in Turkey which, in the light of the relevant international and European standards, could qualify as minorities.” (CEC 2004, 48)

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When the reports are examined, it becomes clear that this attitude—the emphasis of the EU on the existence of other communities in Turkey that can be qualified as minorities—turns to the necessity of granting specific rights to certain Turkish citizens on the grounds of their ethnic origin, religion, or language beginning with 2007 report. The report emphasizes that “without prejudice to the Treaty, the Turkish authorities consider Turkish citizens as individuals having equal rights before the law rather than as individuals belonging to the majority or to a minority” (CEC 2007, 21). The 2009 report gives up referring to the Lausanne Treaty and only asserts that “Turkey’s approach to minority rights remains restrictive” (CEC 2009, 27). In addition, regarding minority rights, in the regular reports beginning with 2003—and even in the last report (2010)—Turkey’s reservation toward the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) regarding the rights of minorities, and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), regarding the right to education, are also expressed as areas of concern. The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages are indicated as the international conventions that should be signed by Turkey to ensure cultural diversity and promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with international standards. Of these conventions, according to the official website of the Council of Europe, the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has not yet been signed by several EU members such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Portugal (Council of Europe 2010). The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

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(FCNM), on the other hand, has not yet been signed by France (Council of Europe 2010). In addition, Turkey’s reservation toward Article 27 of the ICCPR stems from applying the provision in accordance with the regulation in the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 and its appendixes (United Nations 2010), and its reservation to the provisions of Article 13 (paras. 3, 4) of the ICESCR is because of applying the provision in accordance with the provisions under Articles 3, 14, and 42 of Turkey’s constitution (United Nations 2010). Consequently, as there is no detailed text about how it will be applied in the EU and member states—while some of them (e.g., France) still refrain from signing and ratifying the major legal documents on minority rights like the FCNM—it remains a vague area that should be elaborated. So, the ambiguity and inconsistency of the rules and their application is one of the most important reasons to question the credibility of some EU conditions. Nevertheless, in Turkey’s case, the legitimacy of conditionality on minority rights has rarely been questioned in the country (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003, 515).

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International Human Rights Instruments

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In the regular reports (including the 2010 report), there are three other emphasized international legal documents on human rights that are indicated as areas of concern, namely, Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT), the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and three unratified Protocols (4, 7, 12) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Of these, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities entered into force on 18 December 2008. The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture was signed in September 2009, and it is expected to be ratified in the near future (United Nations 2010). Protocol 4 to the ECHR has not been ratified by Turkey yet, but neither has it been signed by EU member Greece nor ratified by another EU member, the UK (Council of Europe 2010). Protocol 7 has not been ratified yet by EU members the Netherlands and Germany, nor has it been signed by the UK (Council of Europe, 2010). The last one, Protocol 12, has not been ratified by ten EU members (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovakia) and not even signed by seven EU members (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Sweden) (Council of Europe 2010). Moreover, despite its references to international human rights treaties, the Union itself has not been a party to any of them, as it did not have a legal personality until the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) granted legal personality to it for the first time (Article 47, TEU). Most important, the EU still has not acceded to the ECHR. The debate on the possibility of the Community’s accession to the ECHR first emerged in the Community in the

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1970s. 7 After thirty-nine years, the ToL has finished the discussions related to the accession, as with its entry into force on 1 December 2009, the EU has become obliged to accede to the ECHR (Article 6/2 TEU and Protocol 8). However, given the procedure under Article 218(2), (3), and (8) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 8 it seems that its accession may take several years. Last but not least, the lack of the definition of the concept of human rights at the EU level in a legally binding document and a legally binding human rights list can also be counted as one of the most important general criticisms made about the clarity of the conditions. Of these criticisms, regarding the latter one, it should be remembered that through the signing of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on 7 December 2000, 9 the EU has attained a human rights list. This Charter has the potential to reduce “the longstanding uncertainty surrounding the identification of the human rights” in the EU, since it can provide a uniform structure and also a credible and consistent system in human rights protection for the EU itself and for third countries (including candidates) (Pinelli 2004, 360; Savaşan 2006, 32–33). Moreover, it can give a detailed description and a better clarification about the political criterion of the Copenhagen Summit (Czuczai 2003, 109). However, it is now too early to give an exact decision about it. The practice in time will show whether it can carry out its potential. Yet, it seems extremely difficult, when the fact of “the constitutional systems [of the member states] differing immensely from one another” is considered (Haapea 2004, 86). To conclude, the examination of the basic documents that give signals about the level of determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions shows that specifically after the publication of regular reports and APDs, the conditionality has become more determinant, clear, and consistent. However, it is still open broadly to the Commission’s interpretation with its reference to different standards and vague measurement of progress. The provisions on minority rights and international human rights instruments also consist of inconsistencies, because of the lack of consistent attitudes toward them in the EU member states and at the EU level. The EU’s lack of a common definition and a list of human rights (until the adoption of the Charter) also gives rise to questions on the consistency of the conditions. Given these shortcomings of the EU in determining clear and consistent conditions, it is normally expected that the question marks and doubts concerning them have affected negatively the credibility of EU’s conditionality and also the reform process in Turkey. Yet, when Turkey’s case is examined, it is seen that these shortcomings have not been seriously discussed and even not questioned in Turkey so far. So, it is possible to claim that the first element of credibility does not have much effect on the decrease or increase of reforms regarding human rights in Turkey. Its role in the credibility of EU conditionality as perceived in Turkey is little if any.

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THE CERTAINTY OF THE PROMISE OF MEMBERSHIP

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Although the first dimension of credibility has not been in the agenda of Turkey so much in the EU accession process, the certainty of the promise of membership and the threat of being excluded from membership have been quite effective in the increase or decrease of the credibility of the conditionality in Turkey. In fact, when the certainty of promise of membership increases, the credibility of the conditionality increases also. This can be understood from the reforms accelerating even in critical areas in these periods. On the other hand, when the certainty of membership decreases and the threat of being excluded increases, the credibility of the conditionality decreases. This can also be observed from the cessation or the reduction of reforms in the country. Particularly in domestically costly areas, no progress or less real progress is achieved in these periods. This part of the study clarifies these arguments by examining the developments in Turkey that have significant implications for the certainty of the promise of membership: the periods after the Luxembourg Summit and the Helsinki Summit and the opening of negotiations as “open ended.”

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The Period after the Helsinki Summit

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For the former argument, the recognition of Turkey as a candidate state in the Helsinki Summit (European Council 1999, points 4, 12) can be submitted as an example, as it has dramatically encouraged Turkey to introduce a series of reforms to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Despite the existence of a hard coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (DSP, nationalist left), the Motherland Party (ANAP, conservative liberal), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, nationalist right) in the country in that period, a number of priority objectives for reforms and legislation were adopted in September 2000. With respect to the enforcement of human rights, Turkey established a number of bodies (Law of 5 October 2000). These bodies are the Human Rights Presidency, the Human Rights Board, the Human Rights Consultation Boards, and the Investigation Boards (CEC 2001, 21). In October 2001, a constitutional reform aimed at strengthening the field of human rights was introduced. In the voting for a constitutional amendment, EU membership emerged as the single unifying theme among the political parties—a first in Turkish history (Kardas 2002, 146). Through the amendment of its constitution, Turkey has made progress toward complying with the political criteria established for accession (European Council 2001, 3). In addition, a new Civil Code was adopted in November 2001 and three sets of reform packages (February, March, and August 2002) were adopted in this term. As a result of these reforms, the death penalty (except in wartime) was

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abolished. In addition, the state of emergency, although extended for four months for two provinces (Şırnak and Diyarbakır), was lifted in two other provinces (Hakkari and Tunceli). Also, important measures were ensured for authorizing languages other than Turkish in radio, television, and education. The 2002 Regular Report welcomed this noticeable progress of Turkey. In three major areas covered by the 2000 Accession Partnership— political, economic, and acquis criteria—Turkey was found successful. Moreover, the determination of the political leaders to go toward alignment with the standards of the EU was appreciated by the EU. In addition, these reforms were found “promising for the future as they demonstrate the will and the capacity of the Turkish political system to make progress even . . . in areas hitherto regarded as highly sensitive” (CEC 2002, 30). Until 2004, under the Justice and Development Party ( AKP) government, which won victory in general elections on 3 November 2002, Turkey continued to take steps to fulfill the main requirements. For example, a reform monitoring group was established to ensure effective implementation of the reforms. Furthermore, the state of emergency was lifted in the remaining two provinces (Şırnak and Diyarbakır). Four more packages of political reform were adopted. They included amendments to different fields of legislation and a wide range of issues related to human rights and the protection of minorities, such as freedom of demonstration, freedom of expression, cultural rights, and civilian control of the military. It is also noteworthy that many regulations, circulars, and other administrative measures were issued by the associated authorities in order to ensure the implementation of the reforms in practice. In the case of international conventions on human rights, in June 2003 the Turkish Parliament ratified both the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. May 2004 constitutional reforms, known as the eighth package, also addressed a number of issues related to human rights and included provisions strengthening gender equality, broadening the freedom of the press, recognizing the primacy of international law over national legislation in the field of human rights, and abolishing the death penalty according to Protocol 13 to the ECHR, which was signed in January 2004. Furthermore, a new Press Law was adopted in June 2004, and in July 2004 a new Law on Associations and a Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts were adopted. In September 2004, Turkey adopted a new Penal Code, with more favorable provisions on a number of areas related to women’s rights, discrimination, and torture. Several legal restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression were lifted by the amendment of the Anti-Terror Law. The process of normalization was begun in the southeast, and a zero-tolerance policy toward torture

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was adopted. Many regulations and administrative measures were also issued to render the effective implementation of the legal acts in practice. Overall, in a very short period after the Helsinki Summit, Turkey adopted two constitutional reforms (2001 and 2004), and eight legislative reform packages were adopted by Parliament between February 2002 and July 2004. These rapid and determined reforms in Turkey show that, even in immensely critical areas for the country, the increase in the certainty of membership provided the increase in the credibility of the conditionality. The more certain conditionality the EU provides, the stronger the enthusiasm in Turkey to facilitate the reform process. Whether there is a coalition government facing difficulties or a single-party government with more power to exercise, the promise of membership can form a basis for more struggle to meet with the EU conditions even in sensitive areas.

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The Period after the Luxembourg Summit

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The first example that can be given in support of the latter argument is the denial of Turkey’s membership at the Luxembourg Summit on 12–13 December 1997. Within three years of this summit, Turkey began negotiations on the Customs Union with the Community. During these negotiations, the European Parliament (EP) asked the Council to suspend the negotiations on the Customs Union, protesting against the trial of six members of the Turkish Parliament. After Turkey’s constitutional reform package, Package for Democracy (involving the amendment of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law), 10 was adopted on 23 July 1995, and the EP’s favorable vote, the Customs Union decision entered into force on 1 January 1996. 11 However, it was then declared by the Commission that Turkey had to act decisively and quickly for improving human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country to prove its “willingness to take steps towards closer ties with the European Union” (CEC 1996, 9). Because of continuing violations of civil and political rights (mostly resulting from ongoing PKK terrorism), emphasis was given to the need for further improvement in the human rights situation for the development of future relations between the EU and Turkey. Then, first, via the Agenda 2000 report of the Commission, Turkey was excluded from the enlargement process. While the report underlines that Turkey demonstrated its ability to adapt to the EU norms in many areas, it made no reference to Turkey's full membership objective. Then, following the Commission’s Agenda 2000, Turkey’s accession was denied at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. The Community reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership (European Council 1997, point 31); however, it again excluded it. This attitude of the Community, confirming Turkey's eligibility for membership but at the same time, excluding it from the enlargement process, was seen as a contradiction by many

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groups in Turkey (EU-Turkey News Network 2006). In addition, CEECs and also the Greek Republic of Cyprus were included in the process in this summit. It was also decided “to open accession talks with Greek Cyprus on behalf of the whole island,” thus “completely disregarding the opinion of Turkish Cypriots” (Sözen 2005, 288). As a reaction to this decision, Turkey declared that it would not accept the EU as a third party regarding the Cyprus conflict or Turkey-Greece disputes remaining outside the contractual context of the membership process. Furthermore, it stated that “it would not communicate with any EU official until the EU changed its attitude towards Turkey” (Sözen 2005, 288). Finally, it stressed that “it would start integrating Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with Turkey in the same way the EU proposed to integrate the Republic of Cyprus” (Sözen 2005, 288). Despite these uneasy relations with the EU, Turkey was still kept on a process of reform, but due to the threat of delay of membership, with less trust toward the EU and with less enthusiasm. In that period, the Turkish Constitution was amended, covering a wide range of issues, such as improving human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and restructuring democratic institutions. However, on the sensitive areas for the country, no progress or very little progress could be accomplished. For instance, despite the arrest of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) so-called leader Abdullah Öcalan, there was no progress on the Kurdish question. Radio and television broadcasting in any of the Kurdish languages was officially not allowed, and using them in political communication or education was forbidden. Emergency legislation remained in force in six provinces. Because of exceptional measures under the state of emergency, the restrictions on the normal exercise of civil and political rights guaranteed by law continued. The implementation of the law on police custody gave rise to many cases of torture. So, the situation concerning civil and political rights in Turkey did not improve significantly, and concerns about torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions continued. Moreover, freedom of expression was widely restricted, mainly on account of the regular application of the Anti-Terror Law and certain administrative measures taken in the aftermath of Öcalan’s arrest, forbidding the use of certain terminology in relation to the Kurdish question in press releases and publications by public institutions and organizations. Regarding the freedom of the press, cases of harassment and police violence against individual journalists continued to be reported by domestic and international human rights organizations. The situation regarding freedom of association and freedom of assembly was not advanced, and several branches of the Turkish Human Rights Association were closed by the authorities either temporarily or for an indefinite period. With respect to freedom of religion, practical bureaucratic restrictions affecting, for example, the ownership of premises and expansion of activities continued.

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The Period after the Opening of Negotiations

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Negotiations of Turkey with the EU were opened in October 2005. However, it was declared that it would be an “open-ended process—the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (Negotiating Framework 2005, 1), unlike the negotiation framework for any other country. So, Turkey’s way with the EU seemed to be “more stages” (“gate-keeping”) (Grabbe 2001, 1018–1019) to comply with and “less willingness” of the EU to commit to a date for accession (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007, 14). Another noteworthy issue is that the argument on the “absorption capacity criterion,” set out in the Copenhagen European Council (1993), began to be raised more often in the EU after Turkey’s membership came into the EU agenda. Furthermore, a few member states have offered alternatives to Turkey’s EU membership such as “privileged partnership ” status (offered by Austria and Germany) or membership in the Mediterranean Union (offered by France). Moreover, both Austria and France have argued for holding a referendum on Turkey’s accession because of its specific characteristics. 12 In October 2010, the Austrian Freedom Party, Belgium’s Flemish Interest Party, the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party, and others held a meeting on the “EU’s situation after the Lisbon Treaty,” in which Turkey’s bid for EU membership was discussed (Levitz 2010). Austrian Freedom Party chief Heinz-Christian Strache explicitly demonstrated that his party and its counterparts would put together a Europe-wide citizens’ initiative (a Europe-wide referendum) to block Turkey’s accession on the basis of Article 11(4), TEU (in accordance with Article 24, TEU), as it poses a threat to EU identity. Both politicians in the EU and also public opinion are, to a large extent, against Turkey’s EU membership. In fact, to the Eurobarometer, only 11 percent of the respondents choose to support Turkey strongly, and 34 percent fairly, so a total of 45 percent (CEC 2008, QA45). However, on the other hand, again a total of 45 percent (fairly opposed 22 percent, strongly opposed 23 percent) are against, “even if Turkey fulfills all requirements of the EU.” That is, nearly half of the EU continues to be against Turkey’s membership and the majority are still critical of Turkey’s future accession (CEC 2000b, 54; CEC 2008, QA44.12). All these negative developments have damaged the certainty of the promise of membership and have resulted in gradually increasing distrust of the EU in Turkey. Skeptical views toward the EU gradually increased from 2002 to 2010. According to a survey conducted between May 18 and June 4, 2002, in Turkey, while 64 percent of Turkish citizens indicate they would vote in favor of full EU membership, only 30 percent were against it (Çarkoğlu 2003, 173). This shows that after the Helsinki decision granting candidate status to Turkey, high expectations and optimism about possible full membership raised the level of support of EU

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membership in the country. However, to the Eurobarometer, after the opening of accession negotiations as “open-ended,” the percentage of people with a positive image of the EU fell from 60 percent to 43 percent, while the percentage of people trusting the EU had fallen from 50 percent in autumn 2005 to 35 percent in spring 2006 (CEC 2006, 15, 19). After negotiations on eight chapters were frozen on 11 December 2006, this distrust has augmented and the objective and technical character of conditionality has also begun to be discussed. So in 2010, in Turkey, trust in EU institutions was only 27 percent, while “not trust” was 60 percent (EC 2010, QA14.4). Consequently, all the above-mentioned factors have resulted in the decrease of the certainty of EU membership in Turkey. However, Turkey has continued its progress in the protection of human rights, despite the decrease of enthusiasm for the reform process. It has improved its situation in the ratification of international human rights instruments and in the execution of ECtHR judgments; in the decline of the cases of torture and ill-treatment; in freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and women’s rights. The amendment of Article 301 (which introduces a permission requirement by the minister of justice in order to launch a criminal investigation on the basis of Article 301) is also another positive step in broadening freedom of expression. Its usage is no longer systematic, and there is a decline in prosecutions compared with previous years (2009–2010 report). Regarding the progress on ensuring compliance with legal safeguards to prevent torture and ill-treatment, the Turkish government requested the publication of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) report (Council of Europe, 2010b) and of its response (Council of Europe 2010), and on 9 July 2010 it was published. Even if it was slightly criticized as “not preceded by a consultation process involving political parties and civil society at large” in the 2010 report (EC 2010b, 8), the constitutional reform package has been welcomed warmly since it has addressed a number of priorities of the Accession Partnership in the area of the judiciary, fundamental rights, and public administration. After the recent constitutional reforms in Turkey, the basis for establishment of an ombudsman institution was also provided. As regards the institutions in charge of monitoring and promoting human rights, in February 2010, the draft law on the establishment of the Turkish Independent Human Rights Institution was submitted to Parliament. Turkey also shows progress in starting the twenty-four-hour Arabic language TV broadcasts in addition to the Kurdish-language TV channel (TRT 6), in advancing the role of civil society organizations, and in the situation of the Roma. However, in highly critical areas, there is still need for further progress. For instance, the Turkish government’s opening of “a wideranging public debate” (called the “Democratic Opening”) on cultural,

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political, and economic matters of the Kurdish population has been “only partly followed” and has fallen short of expectations (EC 2010b, 35). The government’s initiative aimed at improving dialogue with the Alevis community has not addressed specific problems and produced concrete results. The use of any language other than Turkish in political life is still illegal under the law on elections and political parties. The anti-terror legislation still needs to be amended to avoid broad interpretation and to prevent a disproportionately great number of detainees linked to alleged terrorist acts. No progress has been made to deal with the problem of village guards. An overall national strategy has not been developed to address the issue of internally displaced persons (IDP) (due to terrorism and the fight against terrorism). This shows that even if there is a single-party government with more power to exercise, in order to deal with these issues, Turkey requires a serious incentive—a more certain membership perspective. So, the EU’s offer of a more certain membership perspective could be an important driving factor of EU HRC in the context of EU-Turkey relations.

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CONCLUSION

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Based on its findings, this chapter argues that, in Turkey’s case, the certainty of the promise of future membership (second element) affects the credibility of the EU more than the determinacy, clarity, and consistency of the conditions (first element). Indeed, the first element of credibility has not been questioned—nor even discussed—in the country, while the second element has been considerably effective in triggering the country to make reforms in the field of human rights, even in critical areas for the country. In conclusion, it can be argued that the EU’s offer of a more certain membership perspective to Turkey, giving up its ambivalence, can be an important driving factor of EU HRC in the context of EUTurkey relations.

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NOTES

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[3n2] [3n3]

1. Research assistant, Middle East Technical University and Selçuk University, email: [email protected]. 2. The ECJ initially was reluctant to examine complaints regarding the protection of human rights, as it fell within the field of national law (e.g., Stork case, Sgarlata case). Through the approval of direct effect (Van Gend en Loos case) and the supremacy of European law (Costa case), the Court began to contribute to the development of human rights protection (see also, e.g., Stauder case, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, Nold case, Rutili and Hauer cases). For the details, see Zerrin 2006. 3. For the Greece case and Spain cases, see Verney 2006; Piedrafita 2006. 4. To find detailed information on what the terms “human rights” and “fundamental freedoms” mean in Article 6(1), see Nowak 1999.

Zerrin Savaşan 5. For information on the approach of the Community to minority rights, see also Williams 2004. 6. It is also possible to mention additional conditions like “absorption capacity” of the EU set out in the Copenhagen European Council 1993; “the adjustment of administrative structure” introduced by the Madrid European Council 1995, requiring substantial administrative reforms in the candidates; and “good neighbourly relations” stated in Agenda 2000. 7. The debate on the possibility of the Community’s accession to the ECHR emerges through Commission Memorandum, 1979, and EP Resolution, 1979. Then it follows through EP Resolution, 1994, and ECJ ruling, Opinion 2/ 94. 8. It requires a recommendation from the Commission for a negotiation mandate, a unanimous Council decision to open accession negotiations with the Council of Europe, unanimous agreement by the Council to the outcome of these negotiations, the consent of the European Parliament to the Accession Agreement, and ratification of the Accession Agreement in all twenty-seven EU member states and in the remaining twenty countries that are signatories to the Convention. 9. The debate was made on creating a separate list of human rights through EP Resolution 1979 and EP Declaration 1989. Academicians have argued about whether the organs of the Community needs to be constrained by a set of human rights. While some claimed that it needs a bill of rights, others claimed the opposite. For example, Weiler states that the Union did not need “more rights on lists, or more lists of rights.” See Weiler 2000. On the other hand, Haapea stresses that the Charter becoming legally binding is “a crucial step” toward “a fundamental change in the European system of fundamental rights protection.” See Haapea 2004. 10. This Article forbids “written and oral propaganda aimed at disrupting the indivisible integrity of the State of the Turkish Republic, country and nation”; it also forbids “meetings, demonstrations and marches with this aim.” The revised version of Article 8 introduced the concept of intent (or aim to disrupt territorial integrity and political unity) in written or oral propaganda, reduced the duration of imprisonment, and created the possibility of converting prison terms into fines. 11. The CU Decision is not an association agreement, but only a decision of the Association Council, defined as a “decision.” For details about the legal status of the CU Decision, see Başlar 2004. 12. Indeed, in the case of France, there was a constitutional provision introduced in 2005 under former president Jacques Chirac. This provision stipulated a compulsory referendum on the accession of any country with a population of more than 5 percent of the overall EU population. However, as this provision would also make it more difficult for other countries to join and worsen the relations of France with Turkey, the French Senate blocked it on 23 June 2008. Yet, on 17 July 2008, the French Senate General Assembly approved the proposal for this constitutional amendment, also allowing the president to seek a parliamentary vote “if three of five of the Senate’s and the lower chamber National Assembly’s majority consent.” Hürriyet Daily News, 2010.

REFERENCES [ AU: References in bold are not referred to in the text—omit?] Accession Pa rtnership Documents 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/ index.php?p=42260&l=2 (02.10.2010). Agenda 2000, Communication : For a Stronger and Wider Union , Volume I, DOC/97/ 6, Strasbourg, 15 July, http://www.rcie.lodz.pl/dokumenty/pdf/agenda2000_for_a_stronger_and_wider_union.pdf (28.10.2010). Barnes, Ian, and Claire Randerson. 2006. “EU Enlargement and the Effectiveness of Conditionality: Keeping to the Deal?” Managerial Law 48(4): 351–65.

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[3n6] [3n7]

[3n8]

[3n9]

[3n10] [3n11]

[3.93] [3.94]

The Credibility of EU Human Rights Conditionality Bartels, L. 2005. Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements. New York: Oxford University Press. Başlar, Kemal. 2004. “The Legal Status of the Custom Union ‘Agreement’ (The 1/95 Association Council Decision).” Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi 4(1): 1–46. Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2004. “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law.” Prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Center for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, 1–25, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20747/RisseBorzel-stanford_final.pdf (07.10.2010). Çarkoğlu, Ali. 2003. “Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU Membership in Turkey and EU.” Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), Turkey and the European Union, 171–94. London: Frank Cass, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/290/1/stvkaf01974.pdf (01.10.2010). Checkel, Jeffrey, 2000, “Compliance and Conditionality.” ARENA Working Papers 00(18). Checkel, Jeffrey. 2001. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.” International Organization 55(3): 553–88. Commission of the European Communities ( CEC). 1979. Memorandum, Bulletin of the European Communities , Supplement 2/79. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 1996. Report on Developments in Relations with Turkey since the Entry into force of the Custom Union, Com, 491. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2000a. 2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf (02.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2000b. Public Opinion in the European Union, Eurobarometer, Report No. 53, October, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53_en.pdf (14.11.2011). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2001. 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf (02.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2004. 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/ Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_Report_2004.pdf (02.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2005. 2005 Progress Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/ key_documents/2005/package/sec_1426_final_progress_report_tr_en.pdf (02.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2006. Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 65, July, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/eb/eb65/eb65_first_en.pdf (14.11.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2007. 2007 Progress Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/ Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progress_report_2007.pdf (02.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC) . 2008. 2008 Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession , http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/ Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progress_report_2009.pdf (02.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2008. Values of Europeans, Standard Eurobarometer 69, November, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/ eb65/eb65_first_en.pdf (14.11.2011). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2009. 2009 Progress Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/ Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progress_report_2009.pdf (02.10.2010). Council of Europe. 2010a. Democracy, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/6_Resources/ Table_Monitoring_en.pdf (13.11.2010).

Zerrin Savaşan Council of Europe. 2010b. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), http://www.cpt.coe.int/ documents/tur/2010-20-inf-eng.pdf (13.11.2010). Czuczai, J. 2003. “The Place of Human Rights in European Law (EU Charter, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights).” Matra Multi-Country Project , 95–111. Ankara: T. M. C. Asser Institute and Ministry of Justice of Turkey. de Witte, Bruno, and Gabriel N. Toggenburg. 2004. “Human Rights and Membership of the EU.” Steve Peers and Angela Ward (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 59–82. Portland, OR: Hart. Document on European Identity . 1973. Bulletin of the European Communities 12, December, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7db2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf. European Commission . 2010a. Public Opinion in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer 73, August, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/ eb73_fact_tr_en.pdf (14.11.2010). European Commission. 2010b. Turkey 2010 Progress Report, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/ files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/turkey_progress_report_2010.pdf (12.11.2010). European Council . 1978. Copenhagen European Council, Declaration on Democracy, Bulletin of the European Communities 4. European Council. 1993. Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 21–22 June, http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm (28.10.2010). European Council . 1995. Madrid European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15–16 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ en/ec/00400-C.EN5.htm (28.10.2010). European Council. 1997. Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12–13 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ ec/032a0008.htm (28.10.2010). European Council. 1999. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10–11 December, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm (28.10.2010). European Council. 2001. Leaken European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 14–15 December, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf (28.10.2010). European Court of Justice . 1969. Stauder (Case 29/69, ECR 419). European Court of Justice. 1970. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Case 11/70, ECR 1125). European Court of Justice . 1974. Nold (Case 4/73, ECR 491). European Court of Justice. 1975. Rutili (Case 36/75, ECR 1219, ECR 3727). European Court of Justice. 1979. Hauer (Case 44/79). European Court of Justice . 1996. Opinion 2/94 (ECR I-1759). European Parliament (EP). 1979. European Parliament Resolution. Official Journal of the European Communities , C 127. European Parliament (EP). 1989. European Parliament Declaration. Official Journal of the European Communities , C120/51. European Parliament (EP). 1994. European Parliament Resolution. Official Journal of the European Communities , C 44, 14.2.1994, p. 0032 . European Parliament, the Council , and the Commission on Human Rights. 1977. Joint Declaration. Journal of the European Communities , C103/1. EU-Turkey News Network. 2006. Relations between Turkey and the EU, http:// www.euturkey.org.tr/en/tur-eu_relations_dosyalar/history.htm (02.10.2010). Fierro, Elena. 2003. The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Grabbe, Heather. 2001. “How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion, and Diversity.” Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 1013–1031.

The Credibility of EU Human Rights Conditionality Haapea, Arto. 2004. “Between Minimum and Maximum Standards: Current State and Future Challenges of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union,” http://www.helsinki.fi/jarj/kso/juristikerho/Gradu%20lopullinen.pdf (18.09.2011). Hürriyet Daily News . 2010. November, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/ 9456988.asp?gid=237&sz=8955 (10.11.2011). Kahraman, Sevilay. 2005.“The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union’s New Engagement towards Wider Europe.” Perceptions 10 (Winter): 1–28. Kardas, Şaban. 2002. “Human Rights and Democracy Promotion: The Case of TurkeyEU Relations.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 1(3): 136–50, http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number3/kardas.pdf (15.09.2011). Levitz, David. 2010. “Europe's Far-Right Vows to Push Referendum on Turkey's EU Accession,” http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6142752,00.html (18.11.2010). March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders.” International Organization 52(4): 943–69. National Programmes for the Adoption of the EU Acquis. 2008, 2003, 2001. http:// www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=42260&l=2 (02.10.2010). Negotiating Framework. 2005. Luxembourg, 3 October, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf (30.10.2010). Nowak, Manfred. 1999. “Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry to, and Full Participation in the EU.” Phillip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, 687–98. New York: Oxford University Press. Piedrafita, S. 2006. “In Spite of the Costs? Moral Constraints on Spain’s Enlargement Policy.” H. Sjursen (ed.), Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, 44–61. New York: Routledge. Pinelli, C. 2004. “Conditionality and Enlargement in Light of EU Constitutional Developments.” European Law Journal 10(3): 354–62. Rehn, Olli. 2006. “Brussels Must Offer the Balkans a Credible Future.” Financial Times, 2 April, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/85843b30-c269-11da-ac030000779e2340.html#axzz27K23cWId. Savaşan, Zerrin. 2006. “The EU Constitutional Treaty and Human Rights.” Master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2007. “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe.” East European Politics and Societies 21(1): 126–41. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2008. “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness.” Journal of European Public Policy 15(6): 918–37. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Helko Knobel. 2003. “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey.” Journal of Common Market Studies 41(3): 495–518. Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Guido Schwellnus. 2006. “Political Conditionality and Convergence: The EU’s Impact on Democracy, Human Rights, and Minority Protection in Central and Eastern Europe.” Paper prepared for the CEEISA Conference, Tartu, Estonia, http://www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/ id=164447/Schimmelfennig_Schwellnus.pdf (02.10.2010). Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2004. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11(4): 661–79. Sözen, Ahmet. 2005. “Turkey’s Democratization in Light of Its EU Candidate Status: EU Enlargement at a Crossroads.” Kirstyn Inglis and Andrea Ott (eds.), The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity? Groningen: European Law Publishing, 281–305. Steunenberg, Bernard, and Antoaneta Dimitrova. 2007. “Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of Conditionality.” European Integration online Papers 11(5): 1–18, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2007-005a.htm (02.10.2010).

Zerrin Savaşan Tocci, Nathalie. 2007. “Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in Turkey-EU Relations.” Nathalie Tocci (ed.), Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in Turkey-EU Relations, 7–32, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_09.pdf (15.09.2010). Torreblanca, J. I. 2003. “The Enlargement Acquis and External Strategy: A Prelude to Deliberative Foreign Policy.” CPA estudios Working Papers 4(03): 1–26, http:// www.uned.es/dcpa/estudios_workingpapers/CPAestudios4_2003.pdf (15.09.2010). United Nations (UN). 2010. Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9-b&chapter=4&lang=en (13.11.2010). Vachudova, Milada Anna. 2005. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verney, S. 2006. “Justifying the Second Enlargement: Promoting Interests, Consolidating Democracy or Returning to the Roots?” H. Sjursen (ed.), Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity. New York: Routledge. Weiler, J. H. H. 2000. “Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?” European Law Journal 6(2): 95–97. Williams, A. 2004.“The Invention of Human Rights in the Community.” In EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony, 66–71. New York: Oxford University Press.

II

Economic Relations: Win-Win Process

FOUR Turkey’s Accession to the European Union Temporary and Permanent Derogations from the EU’s Economic Acquis? 1 Ronald H. van Ooik 2 and James H. Mathis 3

[4.0]

The accession of Turkey to the European Union is (still) a top priority for the country. In the 2008 National Program of Turkey for the adoption of the EU acquis, for example, the vital importance of accession was formulated in the following terms:

[4.1]

Accession to the European Union is the principal project that will carry Turkey to its goal of prosperity. Turkey’s aim of integration with the European Union is a social reform project that will affect both the present and future of every citizen. It is a great reform movement that will bring universal standards and practices to all areas of daily life, from production to consumption, from health to education, from agriculture to industry, from energy to environment, from justice to security. Accession to the European Union is a national target, supported by our people. This aim, which is also an integral part of Turkey’s strategic vision, fully corresponds to the founding philosophy of the Republic and Atatürk’s ideal for the nation’s integration with contemporary civilization. 4

[4.2]

[4.3]

This chapter surveys recent European Commission monitoring reports on Turkey’s ability to assume the obligations of EU membership in the economic sphere, and then draws a comparison to the two most recent (2007) accessions of Romania and Bulgaria. For this purpose recent

Ronald H. van Ooik and James H. Mathis

(2008–2011) Turkey Progress Reports (PRs) 5 are used for those chapters that are identified as “slow” or “low” in alignment with the EU legal acquis by the Enlargement Strategy Communications (ES) from the Commission (EC 2008a). These aspects are summarized and compared to the same subject areas as they were taken up in the transitional arrangements annexed to the Accession Treaties for Romania and Bulgaria. 6 In some instances additional context is drawn from the final monitoring reports for these countries from 2006. This gives an indication as to the progress achieved near the time of accession and the final recommendations made for entering the accession treaties. To draw a balance with Turkey’s own characterization of the process, we also include references to the most recent (2008) National Programme for the adoption of the EU acquis, as approved by the Turkish government. 7 This approach gives us an idea of how far Turkey has to go in these core market areas in order to resolve a similar accession treaty with the EU that would have comparable transitional arrangements as those of the most recent accession countries. It also provides some insight into whether any derogation from the legal requirements or any transitional arrangements following the accession may be possible for Turkey at the time accession is finally recommended. The study we make is limited to the economic sphere, where these chapters constitute the fundamental market rules of the EU and correspond to areas that overlap with the existing Turkey-EU Customs Union. We would expect some of these subjects to have achieved higher levels of legal integration as a result of the longer-term market rules operating in the Customs Union. We also consider the selection of the two most recent accession countries as the comparative for this study. Because the EU legal acquis is not static, the most recent accessions made to the EU provide us with the best indicators of the current legal markers that must be met by the current accession candidates. For us, attempting to set a comparative to the ten accessions completed in 2004 would require a more intransigent analysis of what aspects of EU law have also changed since that year. One caveat to this type of methodology can be noted, in that the former state-controlled economies of Bulgaria and Romania are not economically similar to the market conditions present today in Turkey. Neither are the comparative candidates of similar size in their economies and foreign markets. This suggests that while it is instructive to compare the derogations and transitions on particular market subjects as between Turkey and these acceded countries, it is also possible to consider that there may be derogations in subject areas that are unique to the previous accessions and potentially unique for Turkey. One example of this might be the greater attention paid to privatization issues in the Bulgaria and Romania accessions, as compared to what might be seen for Turkey in this same category. We will note the points of “apples and oranges” we can identify as the discussion goes forward.

[4.4]

[4.5]

[4.6]


[4.7]

THE ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY REPORTS (GENERALLY) AS TO ECONOMIC AND MARKET ACTIVITIES

[4.8]

The overall tone of the Enlargement Strategy Communications is positive as to Turkey’s economic situation from the more macro perspective:

[4.9]

Turkey is now a functioning market economy in terms of the Copenhagen economic criteria. It should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term, provided that it continues to implement a comprehensive reform programme to address structural weaknesses. 8

[4.10]

More specifically, as to the thirty-three chapters of the acquis, Turkey’s ability to assume the responsibilities of EU membership, the Enlargement Strategy also notes a number of areas where “alignment is advanced”:

[4.11]

Turkey improved its ability to take on the obligations of membership. Progress was made in most areas. Alignment is advanced in certain areas, such as free movement of goods, anti-trust policy and State aid, energy, economic and monetary policy, enterprise and industrial policy, consumer protection, statistics, Trans-European Networks, and science and research. (EC 2010)

[4.12]

The most recent enlargement strategy report, however notes the following “alignment areas” in particular for additional attention: environment, public procurement, freedom to provide services, social policy and employment, and taxation. In addition, enforcement needs to be strengthened in areas such as intellectual property rights and anti–money laundering. Moreover, a number of important obligations taken on by Turkey as part of its Customs Union with the EU have been noted as remaining unfulfilled, particularly in the area of the general system of preferences (EC 2010; Neuwahl 1999). As indicated above, we will survey the most problematic of these chapters presented for the economic sphere, from the 2008–2011 Progress Reports, and draw the comparison to the transitional measures contained in the protocols from the most recent accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria. As also mentioned, the purpose of the exercise is to see what Turkey can learn during the current negotiation phase from past experiences, notably regarding the possibility to obtain temporary and/or permanent derogations from the Union’s acquis.

[4.13]

[4.14]

THE ECONOMIC CHAPTERS IN THE RECENT PROGRESS REPORTS

[4.15]

Freedom of Movement for Workers (Chapter 2)

[4.16]

With regard to access to the labor market, the 2008 and 2009 PRs pointed out that Turkish legislation on work permits for foreigners that


eased procedures and exempted certain professionals from obtaining work permits, including people working on national and international projects, was vetoed by former president Sezer and therefore had been pending before Parliament since 2007. However, in 2010 Turkey succeeded in amending the law on work permits for foreigners, introducing the possibility of preliminary permits for up to one year for foreigners providing “professional services.” Also, foreign experts employed in projects under financial cooperation programs between Turkey and the EU are no longer required to obtain a work permit during their assignment. However, in the Commission’s view, a more comprehensive reform of the law on work permits for foreigners is still necessary. Efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Turkish Employment Agency (IŞKUR) continued. These concerned, in particular, IT infrastructure and training to allow job-matching services in an electronic environment. Further efforts are needed to prepare Turkey for participation in the European Employment Services (EURES) network. For the coordination of social security systems, efforts to build the administrative capacity of the Turkish Social Security Institution continued. Appointment of medium- and high-level managers at the central and provincial level also contributed to consolidation of this institution. Efforts to build “one-stop-shop” social security centers in districts are continuing. There have been no developments as regards preparations for the introduction of the European Health Insurance Card. The Commission, in all its Progress Reports, concludes that, overall, “limited” or “hardly any” progress has been made in this area. Alignment is at an early stage. The administrative capacity needs to be strengthened further. As noted above, the PRs pay some attention to the rights of EU workers in Turkey (work permit, residence permit), but they are silent on the rights of Turkish workers in the EU member states. This seems logical since the reports focus on the alignment of Turkish legislation to the EU acquis—and not the other way around—but this one-sided approach makes it impossible to find indications as to the desirability of transitional measures regarding the freedom of movement of workers (in both directions). Nevertheless, on all previous occasions, transitional arrangements on this sensitive freedom have been laid down in the accession treaties. In the treaties with the eight Central and Eastern European countries that acceded on 1 May 2004, as well as in the accession treaties with Bulgaria and Romania, a transitional period of seven years is provided. This period can be subdivided into an initial period of two years, a subsequent period of three years, and a final period of another two years. 9 Until the end of the first two-year period following the date of accession, the existing member states will apply national measures (or those resulting from bilateral agreements) regulating access to their labor markets by Eastern European nationals. Before the end of this initial period,

[4.17]

[4.18]

[4.19]

[4.20]

[4.21]


the Council shall review the functioning of the transitional provisions on the basis of a report from the Commission. Subsequently, the present member states may continue to apply their restrictive measures until the end of the (2+3 = ) five-year period following the date of accession; they only have to notify the Commission whether they will continue applying national measures or whether they will grant access to their labor market. After those five years, a member state may continue to refuse access to its labor market for another two years, but only in case of “serious disturbances of its labour market or threat thereof” and after notifying the Commission. Hence, even for entering the final stage of the seven-year transitional period, member states do not need approval from Brussels but can decide for themselves whether or not a “serious (threat of) disturbance” exists. [4.22]

Assessment

[4.23]

Given these previous experiences, it is almost certain that transitional measures regarding the free movement of workers will also be laid down in the Accession Treaty EU-Turkey. Hence, after accession EU workers will not be free to work in Turkey and—more importantly—Turkish workers will not have immediate free access to the labor markets of the “old” EU member states. Given the size of the Turkish workforce, the duration of the transitional period may well be longer than seven years. A period of ten years seems realistic, and fifteen years seems possible. As in the case with the Central and Eastern European countries, this period will probably be divided into three subperiods, and the present member states will not be required to seek the approval of the Commission for any extension within the overall period of the extension allowed. It must, however, be questioned whether a permanent derogation from the right of free movement for Turkish workers (and their families) is acceptable from the legal point of view. In this regard it should be noted that free movement of workers, as being part of the broader free movement of persons, is one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market. 10 This has been stressed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on many occasions. 11 Therefore, from the legal perspective, such a permanent derogation negatively affecting workers from just one of the—by then probably some thirty—member states does not seem acceptable. There is no previous example of a permanent derogation being adopted. Moreover, it should be added that the ECJ would probably not have jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility of a permanent derogation for Turkish workers with the internal market provisions. This is because any permanent derogation would be laid down in the accession treaty, which would then have the status of primary Union law. 12 Finally, it must be noted that free movement of Turkish workers is not entirely dependent on the EU-Turkey negotiations on accession: at

[4.24]

[4.25]


present, under the current Ankara Association Regime and more specifically under Decision No. 1/80 of the EU-Turkey Association Council, Turkish workers (and their families) enjoy important rights of equal treatment and residence once admitted by one of the member states. Hundreds of questions from national courts of the EU member states on the interpretation of Decision No. 1/80 (and some on Decision No. 3/80, concerning social security rights of Turkish workers) have reached the ECJ (Rogers 2006, 158; Tezcan/Idriz 2009). In its 2008 National Programme, Turkey proposes to not wait until full membership but to codify this important case law of the ECJ beforehand: Decisions Nos. 1/80 and 3/80 of the Turkey-EU Council laying down the procedures related to the entry of Turkish workers and their families to the EU employment market and their wages and working conditions, need to be updated by taking into consideration the interpretations of the European Court of Justice. There is a need for new Association Council Decisions that will permit our citizens working legally and residing in member states to exercise the right to free movement without having to wait for Turkey’s full membership. 13

[4.26]

Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services (Chapter 3)

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For the freedom of establishment, the Commission contends that gender, nationality, residency, language, and other requirements, such as the one-office rule for pharmacists, continue to be incompatible with the acquis. As regards freedom to provide cross-border services, registration, license, or authorization requirements also continue to be incompatible with the acquis in this specific area (i.e., notably, the Services Directive). 14 Firms already established in a member state are still subject to specific registration and authorization requirements in Turkey. The same applies to service providers, who have to fulfill particular requirements in Turkey in order to obtain the necessary work and residence permits. Sometimes even new restrictions were introduced; this happened for example in 2010 with the adoption of a regulation that made the use of service stations for tachographs in use in vehicles for road transport conditional on the provider producing a Turkish identity card. Work to identify obstacles to exercising the right of establishment and freedom to provide services on a structural basis has not yet started. With regard to the Turkish postal service, all PRs report no progress. A broad legal monopoly remains in place, with no clear indications of further gradual market opening. As for administrative capacity, an independent regulatory authority still has to be established. On the other hand, in the older PRs the Commission reported some progress in the area of mutual recognition of professional qualifications. A regulation on harmonization of the minimum training requirements

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[4.29]

[4.30]

[4.31]


[4.32]

[4.33]

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for regulated professions (medicine, nursing, midwifery, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, and architecture) was adopted and published with the aim of aligning with Directive 2005/36. 15 The Turkish Vocational Qualifications Authority has taken further steps toward becoming operational, including recruitment of staff and adoption of several regulations on staff and working methods. The Commission’s approach to the recognition of foreign service providers as an element of the acquis is evident where it is noted that the principle of reciprocal recognition is “still applied” by Turkey to a number of regulated professions, whereas automatic recognition is the general rule applied by member states under the acquis. 16 One may wonder whether the Commission is not asking too much from Turkey on this point: essentially the country is being requested, prior to its accession, to automatically recognize EU qualifications regardless of whether the existing EU member states recognize Turkish qualifications for the same professions. 17 Thus, for example, a Dutch dental diploma would have to be recognized by Turkey even while a Turkish dental diploma may not be recognized by the Netherlands until the time of accession. While the National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis (ABGS 2008) does not address this question, there is a similar argument that can be made, as noted above for Turkish workers, for an interim “codification” to apply the Union acquis for Turkey when it has met its side of the bargain. This is to suggest that the economic gains possible for both the EU and Turkey can be realized by a “mutual recognition” exercise far sooner than the final accession date. The potential for opening serviceprovider markets in the EU for Turkish providers would also motivate the process of completing this acquis in the Turkish legal order. 18 The Commission’s overall conclusions are not that positive, and together they form a descending line: in 2008 and 2009 “limited progress” could be reported on the right of establishment and freedom to provide services; in 2010 “very limited” progress was reported, and in the 2011 report the Commission concluded that “no progress” had been made. Alignment in these areas is still at an early stage. Alignment with EU law on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications is assessed somewhat more positively, but the same descending line can be seen: from “progressing slowly but at a steady pace” in the 2008 PR to “very limited progress” in the 2011 PR. In the case of Bulgaria, the Commission concluded (in 2006) that significant progress had been made on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide nonfinancial services. Bulgaria was generally meeting the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations, and Bulgaria was expected to be in a position to implement the acquis from the time of accession if the current pace of progress was maintained. Progress had been made in the area of financial services, notably on banking and insurance, but increased efforts were still needed


in specific fields of banking such as capital requirements for investment firms, 19 investment services and the securities market, and protection of personal data. In addition, increased efforts were required on motor vehicle insurance and on the information society. Some progress had been made in Bulgaria on mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Preparations were continuing, but there were concerns that Bulgaria would not be in a position to fully implement the acquis from the time of accession if the current pace of progress was not raised. Swift action was therefore recommended by the Commission in 2006. As for Romania, just prior to its accession good progress had been made with identifying barriers to the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services and removing incompatibilities with the (then) EC Treaty. Romania had a legal framework in place that allowed the provision of services in a temporary manner by EU nationals without the need to obtain further licenses. On the other hand, problems remained in the banking sector (capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms) and the insurance sector (compensation of victims of road accidents by Romanian compensation bodies).

[4.35]

Assessment

[4.36]

As in the case of workers, no indications can be found in the PRs as to the desirability of transitional measures regarding the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. Nevertheless, in the previous accession treaties with the Eastern European countries, no such transitional (restrictive) measures can be found regarding the freedom of establishment of natural and legal persons from the new member states into the territory of the old member states. This led to an increase of migration of self-employed persons from Central and Eastern Europe into the existing member states, given the fact that the free movement of workers was not (entirely) liberalized. Nationals from Poland, Hungary, and others, set up their own businesses or started to work not under the direction of a “boss,” in order to obtain residence permits and to be exempted from national requirements regarding work permits. Numerous cases were referred to the ECJ, which had to rule, inter alia, on the distinction between the concept of “worker” and that of “self-employed person.” 20 Given these previous arrangements, there is a possibility that the EUTurkey accession agreement will also not contain transitional rules for the freedom of establishment as far as the physical migration of self-employed persons is concerned. It would then be of the utmost importance for Turkish nationals to conduct as much economic activity as possible in a self-employed capacity and not as workers. On the other hand, it must be noted that in more recent international agreements than the Europe

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[4.40]

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[4.42]

agreements, the right to freedom of establishment for natural persons was restricted as well. 21 In this respect it should be noted that already under the current Ankara Association regime, Turkish self-employed persons, just like Turkish workers, enjoy important rights, in particular the stand-still rights given to them by Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol: “The Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.” In several judgments, including the famous Tum and Dari judgment, 22 the ECJ ruled that this provision is drafted in clear and unconditional terms so that it can be invoked directly by Turkish self-employed persons before the courts of the EU member states. Moreover, the clause covers the first admission of Turkish nationals, so that they have a (Union law–based) right to enter and to stay in the EU member states, at least if such a right existed on the date of entry into force of the Additional Protocol for that particular member state. For the original members, such as Germany and the Netherlands, that date was 1 January 1973. It is no surprise that in several member states, extensive research is conducted on the rules on immigration of self-employed Turkish nationals that were in force on this date. In the subsequent 2009 Soysal case, the Court ruled that Article 41(1) also precludes the introduction of a requirement that Turkish nationals must have a visa to enter the territory of a member state in order to provide services there on behalf of an undertaking established in Turkey, if such a visa was not required on the date of entry into force of the Additional Protocol. 23 Despite this far-reaching case law of the ECJ, a true freedom of establishment in the EU-Turkey accession treaty would make a difference: access to self-employed economic activities would no longer be dependent on the national immigration rules that were in force on 1 January 1973 (or on the date of accession for member states that acceded to the EU after this date).

[4.43]

Public Procurement (Chapter 5)

[4.44]

This subject is indicated in all recent PRs as a “limited progress” area. The designation of the Ministry of Finance as overall responsible for coordination is noted as positive, but this needs to be supported by a comprehensive program to align with the EU acquis for procurement, particularly on utilities, concessions, and public-private partnerships. All EU member states are also signatories to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The core obligation of the GPA is to provide national treatment for foreign bidders in domestic government procurement. Romania and Bulgaria acceded to that agreement in 2007,

[4.45]


commensurate with their accession to the EU. Turkey is listed as an observer to the GPA but is not designated as a country negotiating accession to it. Many developed and large developing countries are also in this same observer status—Australia, Chile, and China, for example. 24 As for transitional arrangements made on behalf of Bulgaria and Romania, there are no such exceptions, derogations, or transitions set out for these countries for procurement activities. For the Bulgarian example, the 2006 Commission report indicated that the procurement area was in substantial compliance with the passage of a remedies mechanism in accord with EU law and the removal of inconsistent national acts with the overriding legislation. Staff capacity to handle remedies was being expanded, and the assessment indicated that existing progress would be on track for a 2007 accession.

[4.46]

Assessment

[4.47]

This is not an area that has any potential for modifying EU legislative arrangements by derogation. Since existing members grant national treatment access to their procurement markets (and in accord with the WTO GPA), there cannot be access to these EU member markets for tenders without a full measure of reciprocity on Turkey’s part. Procurement is a large part of national GDP, and it is also an area where extensive industrial policy and protectionism is practiced even in advanced, developed economies. At the same time, an open procurement market based on national treatment and transparency offers very large efficiency gains for governments and their budgets. This is overall confirmed by the Turkish government in its 2008 National Programme for the adoption of the EU acquis, which notes the importance of finalizing the new Draft Law on Procurement. This will ensure transparency and impartiality in conformance with international norms, maximize competition and public control in the field of public procurement, and effect harmonization with the EU acquis in the shortest possible time. There is also the need to establish an independent legal or administrative institution to consider applications and to settle disputes in public procurement. No mention is made here of possible derogations (Alyanak 2007).

[4.48]

Competition Policy, Including State Aids (Chapter 8)

[4.50]

Turkey has long had a functioning and active competition authority that is substantially aligned with EU competition law. The Turkish law handles anti-competitive practices and mergers effectively. The most recent (2011) Commission’s overall conclusion is that in the field of antitrust and merger control, Turkey’s alignment record is good. The Compe-

[4.51]

[4.49]


[4.52]

tition Authority enforces antitrust rules effectively, with a satisfactory level of independence. Not included in the national competition law, however, was a state aid regime and regimes for handling public undertakings and for firms granted special and exclusive rights. As the 2008 PR pointed out:

[4.53]

Turkey has not adopted the state aid legislation nor set up an operationally independent state aid monitoring authority. Furthermore, Turkey has not prepared the state aid inventory and has not reported on state schemes, as required by the transparency commitments. There are no rules ensuring transparency of financial relations between public authorities and public undertakings. 25

[4.54]

Since 2010 the PRs have been much more positive on Turkey’s state aid regime. A separate state aid law was adopted, and an informal inventory of aid schemes has been established. As noted above, the Board of the State Aid Monitoring Authority has been appointed and competent staff has been transferred from the Treasury. Training curricula are being implemented. The Authority is now fully set up and has started drafting the relevant implementing legislation. Thus, substantial progress has now been made in the area of state aid, in particular because the State Aid Monitoring Authority was set up. However, further efforts are still required in the area of alignment of existing state aid schemes. For the 2007 accession countries, the Bulgaria 2006 PR indicated that the national law was substantially harmonized and that the criteria for accession had been met. Therefore the chapter was not reviewed. The transitional provisions for Bulgaria did not list any outstanding state aids allowed to be subject to derogations, or other special aid arrangements for regions or sectors. The 2006 report for Romania was more mixed, indicating progress made on state aids but not completed in alignment with EC (now EU) standards. From the September 2006 MR report:

[4.55]

[4.56]

[4.57]

Romania advanced in establishing state aid discipline to an extent that public authorities and industry are now aware of their respective rights and obligations, even if the behaviour of state aid grantors (particularly the Ministry of Public Finance) needs to be improved. State aids in the form of tax exemptions to the National Lottery constitute a case in point. Efforts need to continue to conclude the assessment of aid measures in favour of major companies in need of restructuring. (EC 2006)

[4.58]

The transition annex for Romania also carried some of these issues forward. Aid was permitted in the two forms of corporate tax exemptions for undertakings in twenty-eight listed “Deprived Areas” and for certain royalty exemptions in free-trade zones. These were permitted in the form of regional aid subject to a number of percentage caps, eligible costs definitions, computation periods, and reporting conditions. 26 Romania was required to establish that the conditions were operating within two


months after accession and was required to report on them every six months. The transition annex did not indicate that these aids were required to be discontinued on any set date, but there were major disclosure points set for the schemes three to four years after accession. Steel restructuring was also a subject in the Romania annex. From the September 2006 MR the Commission described the status of this sector as follows:

[4.59]

As regards state aid to the steel industry, the Romanian authorities cooperated closely with the Commission on the implementation of the National steel restructuring programme. Romania continued to observe its commitments not to authorise any aid to steel plants in the National restructuring programme. However, strengthened efforts are needed to ensure steel companies’ return to long-term viability at the end of the restructuring period. Restructuring aid granted to steel companies outside the National Restructuring Programme has been recovered.

[4.60]

The final transition annex allowed for restructuring aid in designated sums with accompanying production cuts to designated companies through 2008. This reflected the completion of the restructuring program as agreed with the Commission by 2009. Monitoring extended through 2009 for the restructuring program.

[4.62]

Assessment

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State aid control is an advanced Community/Union acquis area, but with the reporting caps as set in the EU regulations, there is some flexibility for member states in the overall regime. The control and reporting mechanisms and the transparency aspects all have to be established in every member state in order to avoid market distortions. For the accession candidates, by the time transition annexes were resolved these members all had their institutional state aid regimes in place and either had no inconsistent aid schemes upon which to negotiate transitions (Bulgaria) or had converted their aid into a form of regional aid that could be disclosed and controlled according to the negotiated conditions (Romania). Aid to the steel sector was permitted for two years beyond the accession date as part of a four-year restructuring program to allow the industry to rationalize its production cuts. The clear indication presented here is that Turkey absolutely needed to commence its state aid process, which it has done since 2010. Because of this recent development and also because of the dislocation effects on firms and employment, it no longer seems that an adjustment period for state aids will become a major issue in the further accession negotiations. It seems that Turkey itself was convinced of the need to substantially reform its state aid regime in time: in the 2008 National Programme, it indicated that the fragmented picture of state aid aims needed to be elim-

[4.64]

[4.61]

[4.65]

[4.66]


inated. A system similar to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), forming the basis of the regional statistical classification of the state aid system of the EU, needed to be established in Turkey. Furthermore, it was said that there also was the need to establish a monitoring and supervision authority for state aid to assess the conformity of state aid applications with the criteria set down by the EU acquis. [4.67]

Food Safety, Veterinary, and Phytosanitary Controls (Chapter 12)

[4.68]

This is a large and complex basket of acquis that includes veterinary policies, testing and marketing of food and feed, phytosanitary controls, animal welfare, and zootechnical issues. The 2008 and 2009 reports indicate that there is a limited process of translating and implementing the EU acquis, but it also notes progress in a number of areas. In 2010 the Commission is more positive. Progress was achieved on all key elements for the accession negotiations in this chapter. The adoption of the Framework Law on veterinary services, plant health, food, and feed has contributed significantly to Turkey’s alignment process in the area of food safety and veterinary and phytosanitary policy. In 2011 the Commission added that the restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs is a positive step toward strengthening the official control system. However, further alignment is still needed in order to bring the overall control system fully into line with the EU acquis. Considerable effort is needed in the area of animal health and in bringing agri-food establishments into compliance with the EU hygiene and structural requirements. For the 2007 accession countries, there were transition provisions for this chapter. For Bulgaria the section was entirely dedicated to the processing and distribution of milk, which could not yet comply with the Community (now Union) regulations, and mainly ensuring that this product would not enter free circulation. This derogation was permitted until the end of 2009. Romania received derogations for meat and milk processing that remains on the domestic market. This was a gradual control regime that required the submission of a plan and then compliance by the end of 2009. There was a further derogation for plant-protection products that also was granted to the end of 2009.

[4.69]

[4.70]

Assessment

[4.71]

This is a gradual harmonization process that has to be timed with a final Accession Treaty. A limited derogation and extension can be seen for some products that remain on the local market. However, these derogations, if following the earlier accession pattern, will be limited in time, perhaps not extending beyond two years following accession.


Social Policy and Employment (Chapter 19)

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In the area of labor law, shortcomings in the transposition of a number of directives remain. These include the limited scope of application of Turkish labor law, as existing legislation does not cover all workers in the private sector and excludes workers in the public sector. 27 Child labor, including children working on the streets, remains a problem. Administrative capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is not yet sufficiently developed, although the Labour Inspection Board started harmonizing its inspection practices and has further improved its capacity (although there are still only 384 labor inspectors active in 2011). There has been progress in the area of health and safety at work, where Turkey has attained a good degree of alignment with the acquis. The labor law was revised to prohibit workers without the relevant vocational training qualifications from being employed in heavy and risky work. Still, statistics reveal that there has been a significant increase in fatal occupational accidents and diseases, in particular in SMEs but also for example in the Tuzla shipyards (Istanbul). Further efforts to implement the legislation are needed, including awareness-raising, training, and strengthening the capacity of the inspection bodies. There has been progress in the area of employment policy. In 2010, the unemployment rate amounted to 11.9 percent, down from 14 percent in 2009, and further falling to 9.4 percent in the beginning of 2011. The Turkish labor market is characterized by low labor force participation (from 47.8 percent in 2007 to 49 percent in 2010) and low employment rates, in particular for women (22.2 percent in 2007, below 30 percent in 2010), and high levels of youth unemployment (19.6 percent in 2007, 21.7 percent in 2010). The large size of the informal economy and the marked rural/urban divide in the labor market remain the main challenges. IŞKUR continued its efforts to improve its institutional capacity and the services provided to job seekers. On the subject of social inclusion, the most important piece of recent legislation is the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law, which entered into force in October 2008. It provides general health insurance coverage for everyone under eighteen years of age. This includes foreign nationals who have resided in Turkey for more than a year and who do not have social insurance in their home countries. The health premiums of those who cannot afford to pay are to be covered by the state. In the field of social protection, progress has been achieved. The Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law aims to regulate the pension parameters and the general health insurance system with a view to ensuring adequate and sustainable pensions. The Social Security Institution has been strengthening its capacity to deliver decentralized, one-stop services for disadvantaged people.

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[4.74]

[4.75]

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[4.77]


[4.78]

[4.79]

[4.80]

[4.81]

Regarding anti-discrimination and equal opportunities, the Commission points out that female employment rates and access to education are the lowest among the EU member states and the OECD countries. Important general principles and definitions, such as the definition of direct and indirect discrimination, are lacking in national law. The acquis concerning discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation has not yet been transposed. 28 An effective and independent “equality body” still needs to be established to promote nondiscrimination and equal treatment. Overall, in recent years Turkey has made some progress in the field of social policy and employment. However, ensuring full trade union rights still requires extra attention. The 2010 constitutional amendments regarding trade union rights have not yet resulted in further changes of the legislation aimed at granting full trade union rights 29 in line with EU standards and ILO conventions. Combating large-scale undeclared work is also still a major issue. Further efforts are needed in order to combat child labor. Gender equality in economic and social life should be improved; female employment rates should be increased, and legislation establishing an equality body has not yet been adopted. The scope of the labor law remains limited, and enforcement of health and safety at work legislation needs to be stepped up. The risk of poverty remains high, especially for the rural population and for children. In general, there is a need to increase administrative capacity for the effective implementation of the acquis. In the case of Bulgaria, we can see similar problems in this area, even just before its accession in 2007. Legal alignment needed to be completed and enforced in the areas of labor law and public health. Bipartite social dialogue needed to be further strengthened and the correct participation of social partners in tripartite structures still had to be ensured. Social inclusion, access to quality health care services and education, de-institutionalization, child welfare, and integration of vulnerable groups into the labor market had to be significantly improved. In general, increased efforts were needed to strengthen the administrative capacity to ensure due implementation of the social policy acquis by the date of Bulgaria’s accession. Romania faced similar problems in 2006. The Commission stated that legal alignment still needed to be completed swiftly in the areas of labor law and equal treatment of women and men. Particular attention needed to be paid to completing transposition in the field of public health, such as communicable diseases, tobacco advertising, and blood and tissues. The weak bipartite dialogue still had to be promoted, representativity criteria had to be clarified, and outstanding issues of fragmentation and insufficient capacity of social partner organizations had to be solved. In the area of social inclusion, efforts needed to continue to improve the


situation of vulnerable groups, such as the Roma, and to promote their full integration into society. Still, despite these remaining problems, Bulgaria and Romania did not obtain any derogation in the field of social policy and employment. 30

[4.82]

Assessment

[4.83]

This chapter is a problematic one for Turkey, as can be seen from the above summary. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that many directives in the field of social policy are quite flexible in nature, meaning that many of them contain parts that may be implemented by the member states (so-called optional harmonization) and that member states encountering specific problems are sometimes given longer implementation periods. Apart from these limited flexibilities, it does not seem at all possible to derogate from the EU’s social acquis. This finding is supported by the Bulgarian and Romanian experiences: despite more or less similar problems in the social field, in the end no derogations were accepted. Hence, it is not unlikely that (parts of) this chapter will become a major problem for Turkey. It seems the country is aware of this: in its 2008 National Programme it promised to remedy most of the shortcomings mentioned above. It stated that the Law on Trade Unions for Public Officers has to be enacted and that amendments to the Laws on Trade Unions and on Collective Labour Agreements, Strikes, and Lockouts are necessary; legal arrangements will be introduced regarding job security; measures are required within the framework of studies on the elimination of child labor; and it is considered very important to enact the Draft Law on the Work Permits of Foreigners. 31 As for the elimination of discrimination based on sex, the following matters are required to be fulfilled: to complete the legal arrangements on paid maternity leave and parental leave; to complete the legal arrangements on abolishing the term “head of the family”; to introduce arrangements on equal treatment in terms of social security; to make the necessary arrangements for shifting the burden of proof in cases of sex discrimination to the employer. 32

[4.84]

Environmental Protection (Chapter 27)

[4.86]

This is an extensive and problematic chapter that contains a large number of very expensive requirements. Implementation affects competitiveness in a number of sectors, and resources attributable to the environment compete against other high-priority social requirements. The PRs document the key areas. For so-called horizontal legislation, Turkey has transposed the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) directive to a large degree, but procedures for consulting the public and trans-boundary consultations are not fully aligned. Transposition of the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive is at an early stage.

[4.87]

[4.85]

[4.88]


[4.89]

[4.90]

[4.91]

[4.92]

There has been no progress on transposition of the acquis on environmental liability, public participation, and public access to environmental information. Turkey has not yet started negotiations on the memorandum of understanding on its participation in the EU civil protection financial instrument. In the case of air quality, Turkey has made good progress in alignment with the air quality framework legislation and daughter directives. Progress has also been made on the sulfur content of liquid fuels in domestic heating systems. The administrative capacity for regional air quality has been improved by establishing a clean air center in Marmara. However, no progress has been made on legislation related to the acquis on emissions of volatile organic compounds, on the sulfur content of certain liquid fuels, or on national emission ceilings. Good progress can also be reported on alignment with the waste management acquis (PCBs, waste oils, etc.). The revision of the waste legislation, largely in line with the provisions of the new EU Waste Framework Directive, has begun with the adoption of legislation on solid waste, wastewater tariffs, waste incineration, packaging waste, and the inspection of end-of-life vehicles. There has been little progress, however, in the area of water quality. The institutional framework for water management is not organized on a river basin basis. Transboundary consultations on water issues are at an early stage. On the subject of nature protection, Turkey has aligned with the acquis regarding establishment and management of zoos, but the level of harmonization and implementation remains very low. The continuing loss of habitats as a result of the building of new large water and energy infrastructure in the country is a cause for concern. The list of potential Natura 2000 sites has not yet been compiled. A framework law on nature protection and legislation on birds and habitats have not yet been adopted. A national biodiversity strategy and action plan have been prepared but have not yet been adopted by the government. The Commission’s most recent overall conclusion is that some progress was made toward further alignment in the field of environmental protection. Preparations in the field of environment are at an early stage. Turkey has made good progress on waste management, whereas limited progress can be reported on horizontal legislation, air quality and industrial pollution control, and risk management. Turkey made very limited progress on water quality, chemicals, and administrative capacity. There is no progress to report on nature protection. Investments in the field of the environment need to be increased. Regarding climate change, Turkey made limited progress on awareness-raising on EU climate requirements. However, a more ambitious climate policy still needs to be established, both domestically and internationally. No further progress was made on developing administrative capacity in the field of climate change.


For Bulgaria and Romania the areas of environment and waste management were major subjects for derogations and transitions. The two lists are long—ten pages of the Official Journal for Bulgaria and thirty-one pages for Romania—and they mention (derogations and transitions from) the directives on air quality, waste management, water quality, industrial pollution, and risk management. Many of the transition periods extend from three to five years following accession, and in some cases there appear to be compliance provisions extending beyond those transitions.

[4.93]

Assessment

[4.94]

It is clear that the Environmental Chapter poses serious problems for Turkey; estimates run up to €60 billion in case the country has to adopt the entire environmental acquis. At the same time, the Bulgarian and especially the Romanian cases show that in this area the EU is prepared to accept (many) more derogations and transitions than in most other areas, albeit on a temporary and not a permanent basis. It is therefore of great importance to Turkey, already prior to accession, (1) to start seriously analyzing the many EU directives on environmental protection, and in particular the extremely complex and technical annexes to these directives; and (2) to conduct extensive environmental research in the country (emissions, storage capacities, water quality of the Sea of Marmara, most polluting installations, etc.), so that well in advance, the country is prepared when it comes to negotiating derogations from the environmental acquis.

[4.95]

CONCLUSION

[4.96]

For those areas that are being compared, what is evident is that when it comes to market-based acquis, there is not much available for an acceding member state in the way of substantive derogations or extensions. When derogations are noted, they are narrowly prescribed, already part of a program of alignment, and the provisions tend to be simply allowing the final alignment to occur after accession. This is what happened in the case of Bulgaria and Romania after they joined the EU on 1 January 2007: the two countries still had progress to make in the fields of judicial reform, corruption, and organized crime, and the EU decided to establish a special “cooperation and verification mechanism” to help them address these outstanding shortcomings. Hence, even after their accession the Commission continues to publish progress reports. 33 In most cases these extensions are for two years, and in some cases four or five years; the seven years for freedom of movement of workers is exceptionally long. In all cases there is a significant obligation for transparency and monitoring through that extension phase.

[4.97]

[4.98]


[4.99]

[4.100]

[4.101]

[4.102]

This is a bit of a generalization, and there are exceptions. One is in the area of state aid, where Romania does appear to have a more open regime for certain types of regional aid granted by specific instruments. Another area of note is that of environment and waste management. Here compliance programs are also required, but the period for compliance also appears to recognize the expense involved in harmonization. For an approach that considers the Turkish government’s point of view, we included regular references to the most recent National Programme for the adoption of the EU acquis, approved by the Turkish government. The overall tone of that document shows an attempt to assume all obligations of EU membership, including the obligations in the economic sphere, and not oriented to obtaining temporary and/or permanent opt-outs. We think the 2008 National Programme demonstrates the right approach—even though we understand that Turkey’s campaign for membership has been riddled with political questions regarding the EU’s commitment to admit Turkey in the final analysis. 34 These doubts over Turkey’s ultimate prospects, expressed within both the EU and Turkey, stand as barriers to moving the process of formulating alignment to EU law, especially considering the complexity and expense of this project for Turkey. We witnessed this serious tension, for example, in June 2009 when the chapter on taxation was opened despite the fact that shortly before both President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel had indicated that they would oppose Turkey’s accession. On the Turkish side we encounter the idea—especially among supporters of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi— that the alignment process, and in particular Turkish alignment to the EU’s political acquis, is merely being used by the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi to reinforce its own position, leaving those critics wondering why “Brussels” does not see what it is doing and thereby casting more and more doubts on the desirability of full membership. 35 At the same time, we also take the view that the acquis—and for a significant part—will greatly benefit Turkey and its prospects for economic and social development. This is the direction that Turkey has indicated it would prefer to travel, with or without the concept of European integration in the mix of its policy priorities. One approach to accession that has become gradually evident while reviewing a number of these chapters is to consider realistically how long it will take to match the alignment with the acquis sufficiently to form the basis for a treaty comparable with the 2007 acceded countries. This requires a more functional assessment that also considers some appreciation for the developing pace of harmonization committed by Turkey in many of the subject areas, as we have tried to document throughout this chapter. For all of these different regimes, we can then ask (but of course cannot answer): “Is five—or ten—or fifteen years the time it will take for


Turkey to complete the mission to adopt and implement the Union acquis?” We think that the answer to that question should govern the reasonable expectations of both Turkey and the European Union in the preparation for accession.

[4.103]

NOTES

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1. A draft version of this chapter was presented by the authors at the IKV seminar “Legal Aspects of Turkey’s Accession to the EU” on April 17, 2009 in Istanbul. The authors thank Prof. Haluk Kabaalioglu for the invitation to appear, the seminar participants for their helpful comments and criticisms, and Jennifer Breaton for her research assistance. Any remaining errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. 2. Assoc. Prof. Dr. in European Union Law, Amsterdam Center for European Law and Governance, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, e-mail: [email protected]. 3. Associate Professor in International Economic Law, Amsterdam Center for International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, e-mail: [email protected]. 4. Preamble to National Programmes of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=42260&l=2. 5. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/progress_reports/index_en.htm. 6. Transitional measures are provided for by Article 20 of the Accession Protocol for Bulgaria and Romania, OJ L 157/29, 21.06.2005. (“Transitional Measures. Article 20—The measures listed in Annexes VI and VII to this Protocol shall apply in respect of Bulgaria and Romania under the conditions laid down in those Annexes.”) For Bulgaria, see OJ 2005 L 157/04; for Romania, OJ 2005, L 157/138. 7. See reference in note 3. For a Turkish-authored summation of EU-Turkey relations through this process, see also, Karagöz 2008, 4–9. 8. EC, 2008b, 4. A similar conclusion is in the most recent 2011–2012 ES. See EC 2011, although now Turkey is requested to accelerate the implementation of its comprehensive structural reform program. 9. For the latest accessions, see the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania and the adjustments to the treaties on which the European Union is founded, Annexes VI and VII, OJ 2005, L 147. Hence, the transitional period for these two countries runs from 1 January 2007 until 1 January 2014. For Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, it ran from 1 May 2004 until 1 May 2011. 10. See Article 26(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties” (emphasis added). 11. See, e.g., Case 139/85, Kempf [ECR] 1986, 1741, para. 13: “The Court has consistently held that freedom of movement for workers forms one of the foundations of the Community [now Union], the provisions laying down that fundamental freedom and, more particularly, the terms ‘worker’ and ‘activity as an employed person’ defining the sphere of application of those freedoms must be given a broad interpretation in that regard, whereas exceptions to and derogations from the principle of freedom of movement for workers must be interpreted strictly” (emphasis added). 12. Under Article 263 TFEU (Actions for Annulment) the Court only has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of secondary Union law, i.e., the binding decisions of the EU institutions (such as regulations and directives). Moreover, since accession treaties are concluded between the member states and the applicant state(s), without the EU being

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[4n5] [4n6] [4n7]

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[4n15] [4n16] [4n17] [4n18]

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a party as well (see Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union [TEU]), it is doubtful whether the ECJ is competent to deliver an Opinion, ex Article 218(11) TFEU, on the compatibility of a (draft) accession treaty with Union law. In this procedure the ECJ is only competent to rule on the compatibility with EU law of envisaged “agreements between the Union and third countries or international organisations” (Article 218(11) read in conjunction with Article 218(1) TFEU). 13. In this regard it must be noted that the Association Council can only act by unanimous vote of the two “blocs”—whereby the European one consists of representatives of the governments of all EU member states, the Council and the Commission (Article 23 of the Ankara Agreement). 14. Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ 2006, L 376, 36. 15. Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications OJ 2005, L 255, 22–142. 16. See Article 1 of Directive 2005/36: “This Directive establishes rules according to which a Member State which makes access to or pursuit of a regulated profession in its territory contingent upon possession of specific professional qualifications shall recognise professional qualifications obtained in one or more other Member States and which allow the holder of the said qualifications to pursue the same profession there, for access to and pursuit of that profession.” 17. For service sectors, derogations permitted for EU member states (Germany: construction services) were also extended to Bulgaria and Romania as equivalent restrictions. See Lazowski 2007, 424. 18. The WTO accommodates reciprocal mutual recognition agreements for the qualifications of service providers according to GATS Article VII. 19. Implementation of Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast), OJ 2006, L 177/201. 20. See, for example, Case C-63/99, Gloszczuk; Case C-235/99, Kondova; Case C257/99, Barkoci and Malik (judgments of 27 September 2001); and Case C-268/99, Jany (judgment of 20 November 2001). It must be noted that these cases deal with the former Europe Agreements, but these contained a similar distinction: no free movement for workers, but at the same time hardly any restrictions on the freedom of establishment. 21. See, for example, Article 48(5) of the 2004 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the EU (OJ L 84, 20.3.2004): “Five years after the entry into force of this Agreement, and in the light of the relevant European Court of Justice case law, and the situation of the labour market, the Stabilisation and Association Council will examine whether to extend the above provisions [on the establishment of companies] to the establishment of nationals of both Parties to this Agreement to take up economic activities as self-employed persons.” 22. Case C-16/05, Tum and Dari, judgment of 20 September 2007. The direct effect of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol had already been recognized in Case C-37/98, Savas [2000] ECR I-2927 and Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01, Abatay [2003] ECR I12301. 23. Case C-228/06, Soysal and Savatli [ECR] 2009, p. I-1031. See further, Göçmen 2010. See also the more recent case law on Article 41(1): Case C-256/11, Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011; Case C-186/10, Oguz, judgment of 21 July 2011; Joined Cases C-300/09 and C-301/09, Toprak and Oguz, judgment of 9 December 2010; Case C-92/07, and Commission v the Netherlands [ECR] 2010, p. I-3683 (the so-called Dutch Residence Permits Charges case). On this case law in general, see Tezcan/Idriz and Slot 2010. 24. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm. 25. . 2008 PR, p. 47. The 2009 Report, on p. 49, draws the same conclusion, though it adds that progress was made as regards state aid to the steel industry in June 2009.

Ronald H. van Ooik and James H. Mathis 26. Annex VII, OJ L 157/143. 27. Cf., in particular, Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, pp. 1–8, as amended). Article 1 of this so-called Framework Directive states: “T his Directive shall apply to all sectors of activity, both public and private (industrial, agricultural, commercial, administrative, service, educational, cultural, leisure, etc.).” 28. The acquis in this area consists mainly of Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303). Its purpose is “to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation” (Article 1); the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of these grounds (Article 2(1)). The ECJ has given a far-reaching interpretation to the principle of equal treatment on grounds of age; see most recently, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, judgment of 19 January 2010. 29. The third and seventh paragraphs of Article 54 of the Turkish Constitution were deleted, which provided that “during a strike, the labour union is liable for any material damage caused in a work-place where the strike is being held, as a result of deliberately negligent behaviour by the workers and the labour union” and—more importantly—that “politically motivated strikes and lockouts, solidarity strikes and lockouts, occupation of work premises, labour go-slows, and other forms of obstruction are prohibited.” 30. The only exception can be found in Bulgaria’s accession treaty, which mentions (in its Annex VII) a temporary derogation from the so-called Tobacco Labeling Directive (2001/37)—but this directive falls in the sphere of public health/internal market and not so much in the sphere of social policy and employment. Cf. Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco Investments and Imperial Tobacco, judgment of the ECJ of 10 December 2002. 31. Cf. section 3.1, on the free movement of workers. 32. On the maternity leave issue, see Bakırcı 2006. 33. See, for example, the two Interim Reports from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, EC 2009a. EC 2009b. 34. For a summation of the various political statements in light of the Council’s 1999 decision to treat Turkey as a normal candidate country, see Independent Commission 2009, 8 and 9. 35. For a typical example, see Hürriyet Daily News, “CHP Criticizes EU for Lacking Objectivity,” 3 July 2012. For the most recent—and very critical—Progress Reports on Romania and Bulgaria of 18 July 2012, see http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/ progress_reports_en.htm.

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REFERENCES

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ABGS. 2008. National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, http:// www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=42260&l=2. Alyanak, Servet. 2007. “Public Procurement System of Turkey: Towards Full Membership of the European Union.” European Business Law Review 18: 243–63. Bakırcı, Kadriye. 2006. “Protection of Women Employees before and after Childbirth in Turkish Employment Law.” International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 22: 615–33.

European Commission (EC). 2006. Key Findings of the Monitoring Report on Romania’s Preparedness for EU Accession, MEMO/06/346, Brussels, 26 September, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/346.

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Turkey’s Accession to the European Union European Commission (EC). 2008a. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008–2009, Brussels, 5 November, COM(2008) 674 final, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008_en.htm. European Commission (EC). 2008b. Enlargement Strategy Report 2008, Brussels. European Commission (EC). 2009. Interim Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, On Progress in Bulgaria/Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism , Brussels, 12.2.2009, COM(2009) 69–70. European Commission (EC). 2010. Enlargement Strategy Report 2010–2011, Conclusions on Turkey, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2010_en.htm. European Commission (EC). 2011. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011–2012, COM (2011)666 final, Brussels, 12.10.2011. European Commission (EC). 2012. Progress Reports on Romania and Bulgaria of 18 July 2012 , http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm. European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 2006. Directive 2006/ 123/EC of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, OJ 2006, L 376. Göçmen, İlke. 2010. “To Visa or Not to Visa: That Is the (Only) Question, or Is It?” Legal Issues of Economic Integration 37: 149–62. Hürriyet Daily News. 2012. “CHP Criticizes EU for Lacking Objectivity,” 3 July. Implementation of Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (Recast). OJ 2006, L 177/201. Independent Commission. 2009. “Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey.” British Council and Open Society Foundation, http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=26&level1=14467&level2=14468. Karagöz, R. 2008. “Free Movement of Capital in the Context of Turkey’s EU Candidature.” Ankara Bar Review 5(1):1, 62–86. Lazowski, A. 2007. “And Then There Were Twenty-Seven: A Legal Appraisal of the Sixth Accession Treaty.” Common Market Law Review 44: 401–30. Neuwahl, Nanette A. E. M. 1999. “The EU-Turkey Customs Union: A Balance, but No Equilibrium.” European Foreign Affairs Review 4: 37–62. Rogers, N. 2006. “Turkish Association Agreement Applications: A Myriad of Problems and Some Solutions.” Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 20(4): 283–88. Tezcan/Idriz, Narin. 2009. “Free Movement of Persons between Turkey and the EU: To Move or Not to Move? The Response of the Judiciary.” Common Market Law Review 46: 1621–1665. Tezcan/Idriz, Narin, and Piet Jan Slot. 2010. “Free Movement of Persons between Turkey and the EU: Hidden Potential of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol.” CLEER Working Paper, 2010/2, http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/ 2172010_32302CLEER%20WP%202010-2%20-%20TEZCAN-IDRIS%20& %20SLOT.pdf.

FIVE Constraints Regarding Turkey’s Economic Integration into the European Union Belgin Akçay 1

[5.0]

[5.1]

Efforts for economic integration have increased throughout the world especially since the 1960s as more countries have indicated interest in becoming members of the integration effort, desiring to benefit from the advantages economic integration would bring, such as security and economic benefits. The European Union (EU), established in 1957, is an example of the most advanced economic integration of the world. Turkey is one of the few countries that applied for membership in 1959, very shortly after the establishment of the EU, in order to achieve economic integration. The relationship between Turkey and the EU, which has been ongoing for approximately fifty years, has reached an important stage in recent years, although there have been some disruptions during the course of the intervening years. After the effect of Customs Union (CU) status, granted in 1996 between Turkey and the EU, and of candidate country status in 1999, the integration relationship gained new dimensions. Now, Turkey’s objective is full membership in the EU. However, by the time candidate country status was allotted to Turkey, the conditions for acceptance as full member into the EU had changed. From the first enlargement of the EU in 1973 to the fifth expansion in 2004, it was sufficient to be only a European nation as far as the geographical location was concerned, and such detailed criteria as are required today were out of the question. Since the Treaty on European Union (TEU/Maastricht Treaty), it has not been adequate for a country wishing to become a member of the EU to be only a European state; now

Belgin Akçay

this country should also be a state of law, it should guarantee democracy, and it should have an institutional structure that exhibits respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, the EU decided during the Copenhagen Summit that those countries wishing to participate in the EU should accomplish some criteria established in the context of liberal doctrine, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria, imposing ideological preference as obligation for membership under the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 2 The Copenhagen Criteria are classified into three groups, as political, economic, and compatibility criteria. In addition, at the 1995 Madrid summit it was emphasized that member countries must have created the conditions for their integration through adjustment of their administrative structures (absorption capacity). While it is important that European Community legislation can be transposed into national legislation, it is even more important that the legislation be implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures. This is a prerequisite of mutual trust essential for membership into the EU. As can be seen, by obtaining candidate country status, Turkey has assumed economic obligations in addition to political and legal obligations. However, after EU-Turkey relations entered a new phase in 1999, both parties clearly declared that their intention was full membership, and although it was explicitly stated that the purpose was to advance the economic integration relation between the parties, certain artificial obstructions created in this regard have delayed the progress toward this goal. In this study, the level of economic integration between Turkey and the EU already reached, the efforts Turkey has exerted in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria to achieve full membership after obtaining candidacy status, and the existing restrictions that impede the rapid advancement of this integration relationship will be discussed.

[5.2]

[5.3]

[5.4]

[5.5]

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY AFTER ACHIEVING CANDIDACY STATUS

[5.6]

The beginning of the relationship between Turkey and the EU is much, much older than EU relations with countries that are currently also candidate countries like Turkey, and in fact older than that of numerous other countries that have become full members (such as Spain, Finland, Poland, and Romania). Turkey’s relations with the European Union were initiated on 31 July 1959, with its application to the European Economic Community, and with the Ankara Agreement signed on 12 September 1963, when the content of this relationship was drawn up. The integration process, which

[5.7]

[5.8]

Constraints Regarding Turkey’s Economic Integration into the European Union

[5.9]

[5.10]

[5.11]

experienced an interruption by the decision of the EU in 1982 to freeze its relations with Turkey, was then restarted with Turkey’s membership reapplication in 1987. During the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, candidacy status was acknowledged for Turkey. As agreed at the European Council in December 2004, accession negotiations were launched on 3 October 2005, with the adoption of the Negotiation Framework by the Council of the European Union. The Negotiation Framework document takes account of the experience of the fifth enlargement process and of the evolving EU acquis. The framework includes the principles governing the negotiations, the substance of negotiations, and negotiating procedures, and it lists negotiation chapter headings. Accession negotiations describe the time frame allowed for Turkey to fully and effectively adopt the EU acquis to her own legal system. The EU acquis 3 has been categorized under thirty-five chapters (ABGS 2011). Since 1999, when Turkey received candidacy status, because it was the EU’s objective to establish a single European market based on market economy among the member countries, Turkey has taken more concrete steps in the liberalization of the markets that began in the 1980s. This purpose has mandated that new members have economic arrangements similar to EU-15 countries, and it has led the way to determine the economic criteria (Copenhagen economic criteria) toward this end. Consequently, today it is expected of countries that apply to become members that they have an effective market economy able to fulfill the Copenhagen economic criteria, with the capacity to withstand the powers of the market and the competition existent within the Union. After receiving candidacy status, every country prepares a National Program that defines the priorities for achieving the said criteria,. In 2001, Turkey prepared its first National Program for the adoption of the EU acquis, listing its priorities. 4 In the National Programs prepared later (2003, 2008), Turkey has clearly indicated the importance it has given to this objective by stating, “Accession to the European Union is a national target, supported by our people. This aim . . . is also an integral part of Turkey’s strategic vision” (ABGS 2003; 2004, 1). As a matter of fact, the efforts exerted later by Turkey to achieve this are an indication of the importance placed by Turkey on this objective. In evaluating developments in the economy, it can be seen that Turkey made significant progress in the workings of its market economy and in increasing its power to compete as a result of efforts applied after obtaining candidate country status. Especially with the structural reforms implemented after the gravest economic crisis in the history of the Republic (February 2001) and the application of stable economic policies, the Turkish economy as of 2003 has reached a stable macroeconomic structure with positive attributes. As a matter of fact, the magnitude of the economy, which was $459.7 billion in 1997, grew more than twofold, reaching $1,054 trillion in 2011; the per capita income in Turkey increased

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by twofold as compared to 1997 and reached $14,616 in 2011. Although per capita income in 2010 increased as compared to the previous year, it is approximately at the 48 percent level of the average income existent in EU-27 (IMF 2011; EC 2011, 111). According to a projection made by Goldman Sachs, the per capita income in Turkey for the year 2050 should be around 75 percent of the per capita income within the EU (Goldman Sachs 2008, 2–7). Additionally, when comparing the per capita income between Turkey and the other EU countries, the per capita income in Turkey exceeds the income of those countries that have joined the EU most recently, Romania and Bulgaria (IMF 2011). The Turkish economy, which consistently grew after the 2001 crisis, realized real growth above the average of the EU-27 until the global impact from the subprime mortgage crisis initiated in America. While the Turkish economy grew 4.5 percent on an annual average during the 1997–2011 term, the average growth of the EU-27 was 2 percent. After struggling with high inflation for many years, Turkey has demonstrated significant success in controlling inflation and has overseen an inflation rate decline from two-digit figures (99.1 percent), to a single-digit figure (6.3 percent) in 2009. But this rate increased to two-digit figures in 2011 (table 5.1), largely as a result of the global crisis. Turkey’s inflation rate is currently above the EU average, although it is targeted to be reduced to 4.9 percent during 2011 (SPO 2010, 16). During the decade of 1997–2007, while demonstrating growth quite above EU-27 (except for the periods of crisis), Turkey’s average ranked seventeenth by 2009, moving up six steps in the GDP listing from where it had ranked when it received candidate country status (WB 2011). Moreover, Goldman Sachs (2011), which separated out some countries from Next 11—those that are at least 1 percent of global GDP—has started to call them “growth markets.” Eight countries, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the largest Next 11, currently have satisfied this criterion. These are the economies that are most likely to experience rising productivity coupled with favorable demographics and, therefore, a faster growth rate than the world average going forward. One of these economies is Turkey. 5

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[Table5.1] Table 5.1. Some of Main Economic Indicators 1997

1998

1999 2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005 2006

2007

2008 2009

2010

2011 (*)

EU-27

2.8

3.0

3.1

4.0

2.1

1.4

1.6

2.7

2.1

3.5

3.2

0.7

–4.2

1.8

1.7

Turkey

7.5

3.1

–3.4

6.8

–5.7

6.2

5.3

9.4

8.4

6.9

4.7

0.7

–4.7

8.9

8.5

EU-27

1.7

1.3

1.2

1.9

2.2

2.4

2

2

2.2

2.2

2.3

3.7

1

2.1

3.1

Turkey

85.6

82.1

61.4

53.2

56.8

47

25.3

10.1

8.1

9.3

8.8

10.4

6.3

8.6

10.4

Growth Rate (%)

Unemployment Rate (%) EU-27

10.6

9.9

9.1

9.3

8.6

8.9

9.0

9.2

8.9

8.2

7.1

7.0

8.9

9.7

9.7

Turkey

6.7

6.8

7.6

6.5

8.3

10.3

10.5

10.3

10.2

9.9

10.2

10.9

14.0

11.9

10.5

Public Debt (as % of GDP) EU-27

68.3

66.4

65.8

61.9

61

60.4

61.9

62.2

62.8

61.3

58.7

61.5

73.6

80.1

82.5

Turkey

78

50.4

57.4

57.4

104

93

85.1

59.2

52.3

46.1

39.4

39.5

45.4

41.6

42.4

–2.8

Budget Deficit (as % of GDP) EU-27

–2.4

–1.9

–0.7

1.0

–1.1

–2.2

–2.9

–2.4

–1.6

–0.9

–2.3

–6.3

–6.6

–4.5

Turkey

–7.6

–7.7

–11.5 –15

–33

–12.9 –11.3 –4.5

–0.6

0.8

–1

–2.2

–6.7

–3.6

–1.4

Source: Eurostat 2011; HM 2012.


Inflation Rate (%)

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Turkey has been more successful than most of the EU member countries in achieving the financial discipline that the EU set as a standard for member countries after initiating the objective to establish an area of economic and monetary union (EPB). The strictly applied financial discipline was reflected in the debt figures. While the ratio of the foreign debt to GDP decreased (43.9 percent), the public debt/GDP ratio dropped from three-digit figures to 39.5 percent in 2008. Although this figure did increase to 41.64 percent in 2009, it was much lower than the EU-27 average of 73.6 percent (table 5.1). Especially in 2011, the difference between Turkey and the EU had mounted up, since the debt crisis of the EU (EU-27 82.5 percent, and Turkey 42.4 percent). Additionally, the debt structure in Turkey improved and was converted from short term to long term and then to fixed interest rates. The improvement in the public debt was reflected in the public budget, and the budget deficit/GDP ratio, which was 7.7 percent in 1997, decreased to 1.4 percent in 2011 and remained below the EU-27 average (–4.5 percent) (table 5.1). The ratio of the foreign direct investment (FDI) in the total foreign capital coming to Turkey has comparatively increased from 1997. The ratio of the FDI to the GDP, which was at very low rates such as 0.4 to 0.55 percent since 1997, had increased to 4.9 percent by 2006. However, in 2009 it dropped to 1.3 percent because of the effect of the latest global financial crisis. The structure of the foreign capital coming in in the form of FDI changed as of 2004. Except for the purchase of real estate, while the dominant sector in 2003 among the FDI was the manufacturing industry (60 percent), the share of this sector dropped in the ensuing years, and the coming FDI moved to the service sector, where profit transfers can be made much more easily. For example, at least 60 percent of the FDI coming into the country during 2004–2009 went to the service sector, and the financial sector assumed first place; in 2009 the share of the financial sector was 41 percent. While the total share of EU-27 was 75 percent in 2008, with the biggest share in the FDI, it went up to 79 percent in 2009 (DTM 2012). The latest financial crisis has narrowed the volume of foreign capital movement in all the world. Consequently, the amount of FDI coming to Turkey dropped to half in 2009 as compared to the previous years, and the ratio of the total foreign investment coming against the GDP was below 2 percent by 2009 ($6 billion) (HM 2012). The increasing trend as of 2002, and the ensuing growth of the current deficit, decreased with the effect of the global crisis in 2009, when it dropped to 2.3 percent of the GDP; then it began to rise in 2010. However, it has reached 10.5 percent, although the official estimates stated that the deficit in the coming three years will be at the rate of 4.5 percent of the GDP (SPO 2010, 12). This level is higher than the level of 2006 (8 percent) that the Commission stated was “manageable” in its Progress Reports (CEC 2006, 32; CEC 2007a, 26). When compared to the other countries, the deficit was financed with short-term foreign capital that found the high

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interest rates very attractive, and it is envisioned that the deficit is manageable for only as long as the high interest rates continue. Therefore, the necessary measures should be implemented very rapidly to decrease the deficit even more for macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, Turkish foreign debt is continuing to rise. The foreign debt, which was gross $84.3 billion in 1997, increased about fourfold and went up to $309.6 billion in 2011. However, with the increasing GDP, the total foreign debt in 2008 decreased to 37.4 percent against the GDP and went up to 39.7 percent again in 2011 (table 5.1). The economic policies implemented in Turkey after 2000 were well received by the international markets, and the exchange rate and interest policies made foreign borrowing attractive and consequently increased the debts incurred by the private sector. Especially after 2005, the decreasing portion of the public foreign debt was replaced by the private sector, and the share of the private sector in the total foreign debt exceeded 60 percent (table 5.1). Actually, the abundance of foreign currency in Turkey in recent years stems from the globally increasing liquidity. At the point where we are today, the global liquidity created by the central banks initially has now been replaced more and more by the private equities funded by investment banks via new borrowing tools such as hedge funds and carry trade. With the effect of the increased global liquidity, the terms of the debts have been expanded and the cost of borrowing has been reduced. The optimistic picture the world economy created as a result of the increased global liquidity began to change with the crisis in the U.S. housing mortgage sector toward the end of July 2007. Moreover, this risk has caused lenders to be more careful about the duration of the loans and to be more selective of those who are requesting funds. While this situation has reduced global liquidation, it has also increased the cost of credits. 6 It is obvious that these developments in the world financial markets will cause emerging economies such as Turkey, which has a continued need for foreign financing in increasing amounts, to acquire loans at higher costs, which in turn will adversely affect its economy. One of the positive developments in the Turkish economy since the 1990s is its increasing ability to compete. While the ability of the exports to meet imports, which is taken as the indicator of the ability to compete, was 51 percent in the year 2000, it increased to 65.4 percent during 2008. This ratio, which reached 100 percent for EU-27 in the year 2002, decreased to 83 percent in the ensuing years (figure 5.1). The average level of unemployment in Turkey, which is above the EU-27 average (9.7 percent), began to increase, particularly after the 2001 crisis. However, after reaching 14 percent in 2009 it decreased to 10.5 percent in 2011, because of the high growth rate during recent years. Also, the rate of youth unemployment, which was 15 percent in the 1990s, is continuing to rise (21.5 percent in 2011). These high ratios are

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Figure 5.1. Compare to Competitiveness (%) [export/import] Source: DTM 2011; Eurostat 2011.

indications that new job opportunities have not been created in spite of the high growth rate of the economy. Inability to create the workforce supply in the quantities demanded by the labor market is one of the obstacles in solving the unemployment problem. As is characteristic today in the EU economy, the problem of unemployment continues to be one of the priority issues in the Turkish economy as well. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

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The level of integration preferred by the countries in the economic integration effort (free trade area, custom union, monetary union, or economic union) affects both the degree of integration and the obligations of the parties. For example, while in the economic and monetary union (EPB) phase, which is the most advanced phase of the integration process, the use of the common currency, the free flow of the factors, and adaptation of the economic policies are in question in the Customs Union (CU) integration. The free flow of commodities among those countries party to the CU, and the application of the common commercial policy to the third countries, are in question. Currently, the economic integration between Turkey and the EU depends upon the implementation of the CU, on one hand, and the efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria to advance the integration level for full membership in the EU on the other. The CU process, based on the Ankara Agreement, was concluded with the Association Council Decision

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number 1/95 (ACD 1/95), signed on 5 March 1995 and entered into effect on 31 December 1995, in accordance with article 65 of the decision. This decision enabled the implementation of the provisions of the “Free Flow of the Commodities and Trade Policy” on the goods outside of agricultural products (ACD 1/95, Article 2). The formation of the CU goes beyond a normal CU, as it also covers the harmonization of technical legislation, the abolishment of monopolies, and the protection of intellectual property rights. Moreover, negotiations have been initiated regarding the mutual opening of the public procurement markets, liberalization of trade in services, and the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment. These policies would prepare Turkey for full membership status in the EU. Turkey has achieved great harmony with the EU regarding customs laws with the work it has already conducted in this regard. This situation was mentioned in the Progress Reports prepared by the Commission. Turkey has removed all customs and equivalent taxes on EU industrial products (including the industry share collected from processed agricultural products), has begun to implement the common customs tariffs to third countries, and also has successfully implemented the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which are obligatory in accordance with article 16 of ACD 1/95. As a matter of fact, Turkey has implemented these agreements without receiving sufficient support from the EU (Dönmez 2012, 521–22). One of the indicators of economic integration with the EU is the volume of mutual trade between the parties. Trade liberalization has been an important aspect of Turkey’s economic policy since the early 1980s. The formation of the CU between Turkey and the EU, which covers trade in industrial goods and processed agricultural products, has had a very positive effect on trade between the parties. While the volume of foreign trade between Turkey and the EU was $36.9 billion in 1995, it increased approximately threefold to $138.2 billion in 2008, and in 2011 reached $153.5 billion after dropping to $103.5 billion in 2009 as an effect of the global crisis experienced because the former EU-15 countries were among the most affected by the subprime mortgage crisis (SPO 2012). Turkey has continued its high growth rate in trade with the EU over the last twenty-five years. At the time when the CU came into effect (1985–1995), Turkey’s exports to the EU grew on an annual average by 12.5 percent, and imports by 15 percent. During 1996–2009, the average growth rate of the exports and imports of Turkey, following the CU but excluding the period of crisis, 7 continued with its growth rate in spite of the variety in the number of countries traded with by Turkey. 8 This narrowed down Turkey’s exports to the EU in 2009 as never before (the drop in exports as compared to the previous year was 25.9 percent), since many of the EU countries, especially the EU-15, went into recession with the latest crisis. However, Turkey’s exports to the EU increased again in 2011 (SPO 2012).

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Today, the European Union is Turkey’s largest trade partner. While the share of the total exports to the EU was 46.6 percent in 1997, it increased to 57 percent in 2007 and maintained its high level despite following a downward trend to 46 percent in 2009. However, Turkey’s share of the total exports from the EU went into a upward trend after 2009 and increased slightly to 46.2 percent by the end of 2010. In 2011 this level was ongoing (figure 5.2). Consequently, trade integration with the EU has remained high, although the EU’s share of Turkey’s total trade decreased from 42.6 percent in 2009 to 41.7 percent in 2010 (EC 2011, 2). The other indicator of increase in economic integration is the increased foreign capital movement within the parties. An important part of foreign capital inflow into Turkey in the form of foreign direct investments (FDI) is from the EU. As a matter of fact, the share of the FDI originating from the EU was 76 percent of total FDI inflows in 2010. By the same token, approximately two-thirds of the GDP stock, reaching approximately 20 percent of FDI stock, is of EU origin (EC 2011, 52). As can be seen, the elimination of barriers in the entry and exit of commodities and capital has increased the trade and economic integration of Turkey with the EU. Trade liberalization has intensified economic integration of Turkey both with the EU and the rest of the world. Thus, the openness of Turkey in terms of its total export and import / GDP ratio has increased. Openness depends not only on trade policies, but also on other factors like the sectoral structure and the size of the economy. The ratio of openness for Turkey has gradually increased overall, with exceptions in 2002, 2003, and 2009. 9 While Turkey’s ratio of openness 10 was 33 percent in 1997, it

Figure 5.2.

Share of EU-27 in Foreign Trade of Turkey (%) Source: DTM 2012.

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decreased with the 2001 crisis and then, by increasing every year except 2009, it achieved 35 percent in 2011 (DTM 2012). Turkey currently has a more open economy as compared to the majority of the EU members; for example, in 2006 the openness rate in France was 27.2 percent and in Greece 25.5 percent. On the other hand, it is as open as the major economies of the EU such as the UK (27.9 percent), Italy (27.9 percent), and Spain (29.5 percent) (Baldwin and Wyplosz 2009, 353). In light of the evaluation above, although some problems continue to exist in the Turkish economy, it is clear that Turkey has a market economy whose competitive power is increasing, and also it continues to record progress in many areas, including the provision of macroeconomic stability. At the same time, trade and economic integration with the EU has continued to remain high.

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CONSTRAINTS ON THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION PROCESS FOR TURKEY’S ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Turkey is one of the few countries that have established CU relation status with the EU without becoming a full member. 11 As stated in the previous section, as a result of establishing CU relations and of Turkey’s efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, the economic integration between the EU and Turkey has increased. However, there are certain constraints to the efforts to advance the economic integration further. The first of these constraints is discrimination in the distribution of financial assistance; then constraints that preclude the efficient operation of the CU; and constraints over the negotiations regarding the economic chapters that could contribute immensely to the advancement of commercial and economic integration between the parties. Today, as with many of the EU countries, there are some problems in the Turkish economy, but in spite of this, Turkey is more successful in certain areas than some member countries. For example, like Turkey, several EU countries are struggling with the unemployment problem. While EU countries have an aging population, Turkey has a young and dynamic demographic. Furthermore, Turkey in recent years has to a great degree succeeded in achieving financial discipline, while the majority of the EU countries have not, and Turkey has a more dynamic economy as compared to several of the EU member countries. Although Turkey’s trade and economic integration with the EU lacks some of the opportunities offered to the members, because Turkey is not a full member, it is at an advanced level and bears the characteristics, in many aspects, of having the strength to compete and be a functioning market economy. The Commission, from the first Progress Report (1998) throughout all, has been saying that Turkey has a functioning market

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economy (CEC 1998, 26, 29; EC 2009, 3). Just like most of the EU countries, as a result of the implementations made by Turkey in keeping with its decision at the start of the 1980s to enter into a free market economy, the share of the public sector in the total economic activities has been gradually reduced. In fact, together with the reduced share of the public sector, the total production share of the private sector increased to 89 percent of the GDP in mid-2008 (CEC 2008, 33). Likewise, the public share in the banking sector has also decreased. In the banking sector in 1997, while the share of the public banks in the total assets was 40 percent, it dropped to 30 percent in 2006 and maintained this level in 2010. Again, while the share of the state economic enterprises (SEEs) in the GNP was 8 percent in 1999, it dropped to approximately 5 percent as a result of privatization (EC 2011, 45–46). However, in spite of the progress achieved from the functioning of the market economy, certain problems continue. For example, completion of the formalities in exiting from the market is still expensive and takes a long time. Bureaucratic process and slowness constitute a crucial barrier to the supremacy of the law, and the time lag between the adoption of framework legislation and its implementation is often long, which then diminishes the effectiveness and anticipation of the legal system, and the implementation of the legislation on intellectual property rights is not adequate (EC 2011, 45). In addition to the weakness of the quality of its labor, and in spite of high economic growth and the FDI, which has reached an important level in recent years, high unemployment in the educated workforce, high unemployment rates for the young, and low employment of females, as well as insufficient infrastructure, continue to remain as problems in the Turkish economy (EC 2011, 46). However, as stated in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) prepared as a recommendation for EU member countries and approved by the Council, these problems also exist in many of the EU member countries (e.g., Romania, Bulgaria) (EC 2004; 2010). As stated in the first section, when the EU-27 average is taken into consideration, there are differences between Turkey and the EU with respect to economic development and significant macroeconomic indicators. However, this situation is not unique to Turkey and is characteristic of many of the EU member countries. As a matter of fact, in some of the reports prepared by the Commission, coordination between the member countries on economic policies for the constitution of a single European market was emphasized, and that increased coordination would assist in eliminating the differences in growth, inflation, and competitiveness (EC 2010b, 3; 2008, 286–91).

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Financial Aid

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The primary constraint in advancing the economic integration between Turkey and the EU is the discriminatory attitude of the EU in providing financial aid. Although economic integration of a country with one or several other countries has its positive effects, there is also a negative cost factor. As has been the practice with the EU, costs incurred by the countries that were full members when the CU was established, or costs incurred by countries with weaker economies for the structural reforms they underwent to increase their competitiveness in the establishment of a single European market, were reduced to the extent possible with financial aid provided by the Union budget and other transfers. The financial aid and other transfers made from the Union budget for the financing of various projects are viewed as very important and necessary tools for facilitating and expediting the countries’ economic integration in harmony with the EU, and for eliminating the developmental differences both within the member countries and between the member countries. All countries given candidate status or full membership can benefit from the EU’s financial assistance. In addition to the financial assistance, there are certain funds (European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, etc.) considered as structural funds, which are available to only the EU member countries. These funds, which have existed since the founding of the EU, have become more and more complementary and supplementary, although there have been some changes in their operation and function over time. As with the financial assistance, the purpose of these funds, which are allocated to countries with weak economies, is to reduce the differences in their economies and allow for development between the EU member countries as well as between the regions within the member countries. Thus, it will be possible for all the members to develop together and the objective of a single European market with strong competitive powers will have been achieved. 12 Turkey, as a candidate country, is also benefiting from aid that the EU had committed to give to the candidate countries in the process prior to their membership. However, the aid received by Turkey, when compared to the aid granted to the previous candidate countries, is very limited. For example, when compared with the countries which have received the highest aid, during the period of 1963–2009 Turkey received Euro €3.8 billion, while the total aid received by Greece was €95 billion and by Spain €132.2 billion (figure 5.3). The aid received by Turkey, which has been in a relationship with the EU for over fifty years, is also below the aid received by the countries that initiated entry into economic integration with the EU in the 1990s. The financial assistance given to the Central and East European Countries

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Figure 5.3. Aid Granted by the EU for Some Countries (million €) [net grants] Source: Prepared benefiting from Bilici 2010, 154–56.

(CEECs), 13 which became members on 1 May 2004, and to Bulgaria and Romania, which achieved membership on 1 January 2007, is far above the aid granted to Turkey. Although the aid granted to Turkey in recent years has significantly increased, as shown in figure 5.3, the aid received by the CEECs was twenty times more and the aid received by Bulgaria and Romania was approximately four times more. The natural result of the low amount of aid granted to Turkey is the low annual average aid amount per capita. The amount of aid per capita in Bulgaria and Romania is €520, in CEEC €1,016, in Spain €3,005, in Greece €8,772—while in Turkey it amounts to merely €52.5. In addition to the assistance provided by the EU, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries allocate financial assistance to the EU member countries as well. The EU and the EFTA countries (Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein) signed the European Economic Area Agreement on 2 May 1992 and established the European Economic Area (EEA). Later, during the expansion process of the EU, new members have entered the EEA. As with the establishment of the EEA, EFTA had decided to support EU member countries party to the EEA in order to reduce the differences in the standards of living and to increase the economic and social progress between the member countries and their regions. The total financial assistance paid during the 1994–2009 term with the EEA Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism, at different periods under this scope, amounted to €1,926.6 million (table 5.2). The assistance by the EFTA countries was given to the same countries in the manner financed by the EU.

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[Table5.2] Table 5.2. Aid Granted by the EFTA for EU Countries (million €) EEA Financial Mechanism (1994–1998) (1)

EEA Financial Instrument (1999–2003) (1)

EEA Financial Mechanism (2004–2009) (2)

Norwegian Financial Mechanism (2004–2009) (2)

EEA Financial Mechanism (2007–2009) (3)

Norwegian TOTAL Financial Mechanism (2007–2009) (3)

Share (%)

Greece

121.5

22.1

45.8

—

—

—

189.4

9.8

Ireland

35.5

5.5

—

—

—

—

41.0

2.1

North Ireland 11

0.5

—

—

—

—

11.5

0.6

Portugal

105

21.3

31.3

—

—

—

157.6

8.2

Spain

227

70.2

34.3

—

—

—

331.5

17.2

CEECs

—

—

488.6

567

—

—

1,055.6

54.8

Bulgaria

—

—

—

—

21.5

20

41.5

2.2

Romania

—

—

—

—

50.5

48

98.5

5.1

TOTAL

500

119.6

600

567

72

68

1,926.6

100

Source: (1) EFTA 2002, 47, 51, Table 14 and Table 21. (2) EFTA 2004, 2, 3. (3) EFTA 2007, 1, 12.


Country

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When the aid granted by the EFTA is added to the aid granted by the EU, the difference between the total aid given to those countries and the total aid given to Turkey grows even more profound. When the contribution this assistance will make when applied to reduce the difference in the development of the regions, to create new job opportunities, to improve the quality of the labor force, and to develop the infrastructure required by the economy, is taken into consideration, the importance of the disparities of the existing financial assistance is explicitly illustrated. Actually, the assistance given by the EU to Turkey is less than the financial assistance given by the EU to third countries. For example, the amount of aid received by Turkey is approximately one-fourth of the aid given to the Community of Independent States. 14 Actually, we can see that the EU has not fulfilled the various commitments of aid it has designated for Turkey to date. This is primarily because of the vetoes used by Greece. Additionally, although Turkey is accepted as a candidate country, as of 2004 it has not benefited from the ISPA, SAPARD, or PHARE funds, as have the other countries. One of the justifications for aid to be granted by the EU is to support those countries with weak economies and to increase competitiveness when the member countries enter the Customs Union and encounter trade deficits. In addition to the discriminatory segregation made in the allocation of financial aid, because Turkey is not a full member in the EU and is the only candidate country that has entered the CU without becoming a full member, Turkey cannot benefit from the EFTA financial assistance or other EU structural funds. These funds, allocated for purposes similar to the financial assistance, are to reduce the cost of economic integration by owning up to the market economy of the member country, to eliminate the imbalance in the markets caused by the increased competition in the market, and to augment the ability of the member country to compete. In other words, this is sort of a compensatory mechanism. As can be seen, Turkey is deprived of a compensatory mechanism designed to meet the integration costs to an extent, which would contribute immensely to closing the economic development gap between the EU countries and itself. Turkey’s foreign trade deficit with the EU has doubled as compared to the period prior to the CU. Whereas during 1993–1995, prior to the CU, the trade difference with the EU was an annual average of $4.8 billion, during 1996–2009 the annual average increase was $10.6 billion. 15 The bill for this trade has increased even more with the removal of customs duties and funds for the goods under the scope of the CU as of 1 January 1996. Considering that the foreign trade deficit with the EU constitutes the main part of Turkey’s deficit, the importance of the financial assistance becomes even better understood.

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Customs Union

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Another constraint that prevents economic integration with Turkey stems from the CU relationship established between the EU and Turkey. Although reports prepared by the Commission (e.g., EC 2010c, 5) state that the relationship established between the EU and Turkey is functioning properly, the problems of the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) made by the EU with the third countries negatively impact the functioning of the CU. The difficulties faced by Turkey in concluding FTAs with third countries are due to the unwillingness of certain countries to strike trade deals in the absence of binding mechanisms, and the detrimental effects of this on the Turkish economy (European Parliament 2010). The other problem is that the EU is conducting its FTA negotiations as if it does not have a CU agreement with Turkey and concludes them in this manner. Turkey’s insistence on participation in the negotiations or Turkey’s requests to include a provision related to Turkey in the agreements concluded are ignored. Turkey has attempted without success to enter into an agreement with a third country after the agreement between the EU and the said country entered into effect. Consequently the FTAs do not enter into effect simultaneously with the EU, and this causes problems (Dönmez 2012, 521). Again, the EU is continuing with the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy applications against Turkey, which have to be lifted between the parties after the establishment of the CU (Dönmez 2012, 521). This issue has been raised by Turkey from time to time, but the Union has not paid any attention. In addition to this, although it was envisioned for Turkish experts to take part in some of the committees to assist the European Commission with matters related to the functioning of the CU between Turkey and the Union, only a very limited number of Turkish experts can participate in the committees. In spite of the CU, which is based on the free movement of goods, and with the coming into effect of the European Single Act on 31 December 1992, which prohibits all technical and physical obstruction of the free movement of goods in the EU as of that date, free movement of Turkish goods is hindered from time to time by the EU’s technical obstructions. For example, applying a quota to Turkish products in the event goods are sent to EU countries from Turkey by land and the application of a visa requirement for Turkish businessmen may be considered as technical obstruction—whereas the EU has lifted visa requirements for other countries with which it has not yet established a CU relationship and that are on candidate status or are potential candidates. Although these problems have been raised numerous times, no solution has been reached to date (Dönmez 2012, 521; European Parliament 2010, 5). As a result, it is observed that the requests of Turkey, to contribute to making the CU application more efficient, for various reasons have been ignored.

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The Accession Negotiation Process

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Yet another constraint against rapid advancement of integration is the current procedure for the participation negotiation process. Although participation negotiations have been continuing for over five years, discussion of some chapters has been suspended. To date, indications are that the negotiations are progressing very slowly, as only one chapter (science and research) has been opened (and then temporarily closed), and recently negotiations started during the 2006–2010 period for merely a few chapters. Approximately one year after officially starting the negotiations on 5 October 2005 between Turkey and the EU, eight out of the thirty-five chapters specified in Turkey’s Negotiation Framework Document, which are the subject of negotiations, were suspended on 11 December 2006. Today the number of chapters frozen has increased to seventeen, because of blockage of France and Cyprus’s problem (table 5.3). Almost all of the chapters suspended are related to the economy and directly connected to the CU, whereas the CU heading covers many issues such as the effective operation of the CU, effective protection, and control at the borders. The Commission (EC 2007a, 2), by stating that “there could not be a common foreign trade and development policy of the Union, and the effective coordination of the common agricultural market and economy and money policy without the CU” emphasizes the importance of the CU in creating a single market. Consequently, increasing the number of frozen chapters during five years places a significant constraint against overcoming the problems with the operation of the market mechanism in respect to Turkey and in advancing economic integration with the EU.

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[Table5.3] Table 5.3. Current Overview of Turkey’s Accession Negotiations (as of the end of December 2011) Opened Chapters

Suspended Chapters

*Science and Research

*Enterprise and Industrial Policies (2007)

*Free Movement of Goods

*Financial Controls (2007)

*Customs Union

*Statistics (2007)

*Fisheries

*Consumer and Health Protection (2007)

*Transport Policy

*Companies Law (2008)

*External Relations

*Intellectual Property Law (2008)

*Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide

*Free Movement of Capital (2008)

*Financial Services

*Information Society and Media (2008)

*Free Movement of Workers

*Culture (2009)

*Energy

*Taxation (2009)

*Competition Policy

*Environment (2009)

*Social Policy and Employment

*Food Safety, Veterinary, and Phytosanitary Policy (2010)

*Judiciary and Fundamental Rights *Justice, Freedom, and Security *Public Procurement *Education and Culture *Agriculture and Rural Development (**) *Financial and Budgetary Provisions(**) *Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments (**) *Economic and Monetary Policy (**)


Closed Chapters (*)

(*)Temporarily closed. (**)Chapters blocked by France. Most others blocked because of Greek Cyprus. Source: ABGS 2012.

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Although it may appear that certain justifications brought forward by the EU in connection with the Greek Cypriot section are slowing down the progress of the negotiations, the main reason is that some of the concerns lie in the areas where it is felt that Turkey can cause problems if and when Turkey becomes a full member. The biggest concern is the economic effect Turkey’s large population will cause in the EU. In the event of full membership, Turkey, with its population of 72 million, will become the second largest country after Germany in respect to population. Some of the EU countries feel that in the event Turkey becomes a full member, Turks will gain the right to travel freely and consequently there will be a large surge of laborers to the EU very quickly. Therefore, these countries remain silent, thus drawing out the negotiations, and, as a matter of fact, prefer to continue the relationship toward a different status such as privileged partnership rather than full EU membership. 16 Migration to the EU of a skilled labor force will very likely increase the EU’s GDP. For example, Lejour and de Mooij (2005, 117) found that the effect of migration is potentially important in light of the accession of Turkey to the EU. According to this study, an expected outflow of 2.7 million Turks would reduce the GDP in Turkey by between 1.8 percent and 2.2 percent and increase it in the EU-15 by between 0.5 percent and 0.7 percent, depending on the skill composition of the migrants. On the other hand, Turkey, like most of the European countries, has a low labor movement. The labor movement in the EU is lower than that in the United States because of the differences in language, tradition, and customs; cost of housing; and differences in the social security within the EU member countries. Although there are no restrictions on free movement, Europeans do not migrate outside of the boundaries of their countries and migrate very little even to the regions within their national boundaries. “Throughout the 1990s only 38% of the EU citizens changed their homes. The majority of these people (68%) changed to places either in the same town or city, and 36% of them moved to another town or city in the same region. While moving from one region to another region in the same European country is 21%, moving from one EU member country to another member country is only 4.4%” (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009, 364–65). A similar situation is also true in Turkey. In spite of the high rate of unemployment, movement within the regions of Turkey for cultural factors was on average 7.9 percent for 1995–2000, and in 2009 it was 3.9 percent. Even during the highest migration from the country to the cities from 1965 to 1975, the in-country migration rate in Turkey was approximately 10.3 percent, which remained below the EU average (TUİK 2010; Özgür and Yüceşahin 2006, 20). Approximately half of the movement from place to place occurred either in the same town or within the city. The main reason for Turkish migration, either within the country or abroad, is due to financial difficulties or a lack of job opportunities (Kocaman 2008, 62). Therefore, if sufficient job

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opportunities are created in Turkey, and in the case of full membership in the EU, it is likely that migration out of Turkey will be lower than expected, considering both the low rate of migration within the country as compared to that for the EU and the immigration flows associated with EU enlargement in May 2004. 17 Actually, both the young population demographic of Turkey and improving their quality would contribute to the achievement of the Lisbon objectives, which are an indication of the EU’s intention of becoming a global actor. In fact,

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employment is a key part of the integration process and the effective integration of immigrants into the labour market constitutes an important contribution towards reaching the Lisbon targets for jobs and growth. In the context of the European Employment Strategy, the Integrated Guidelines call for Member States to give consideration to integration of immigrants into EU labour markets. (CEC 2007, 6)

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Therefore, instead of being concerned about the large population and migration of the labor force in case of Turkey’s full membership, it should be considered that preparing this population through training and assisting them to adapt successfully to the Union will contribute positively to the overall EU economy. It is highly likely that the increasing integration of Turkey’s economy with the EU economy will contribute positively to the growth potential of the EU economy. When compared with the 2011 production volume of EU-27, Turkey holds $1.05 trillion, or approximately 0.8 percent of the EU’s GDP ($15.8 trillion) (IMF 2011). If Turkey becomes a full member of the EU, it will be the sixth-largest economy in the EU after Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain, and it will have a much larger economy than the last twelve countries that became EU members. 18 It is estimated that Turkey’s full membership would contribute positively to the growth of the EU economy. As a matter of fact, in the 2004 study by Hughes, he estimated that if Turkey became a member of the EU in 2015, the GDP of the EU-25 would increase between 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent, and following full membership Turkey’s contribution would be at least €15.9 billion— and with a high scenario estimate it might even reach €47.8 billion (Hughes 2004, 7–10). The results of another empirical study for EU-15 by Lejour and de Mooij (2005) coincided with Hughes’s findings. According to Lejour and de Mooij, with Turkey’s accession to the EU-15 internal market, welfare increases by $3.8 billion in constant prices within the EU, as measured by equivalent variation. Also, accession to the internal market yields positive effects for Turkey’s private income (a measure of welfare), which increases by $4.4 billion, while the GDP expands by about 0.8 percent over the long term. The largest impact in Turkey would be apparent in the sectors for textiles and wearing apparel, which would expand by 18

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percent and 15 percent respectively. For the EU, the economic effects of Turkey’s accession to the internal market would be smaller than those realized in Turkey. Another finding of this study is that accession to the CEEC also would have no significant impact on the GDP of the EU-15 (Lejour and de Mooij 2005, 108). Similar results were obtained in the studies conducted by Turkish public agencies (SPO 1998; Şahin 1998). This result is also confirmed by the projections of Goldman Sachs (2008) for Turkey. These projections suggest

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that by 2050 Turkey could become a $6 trillion economy, making it the third largest in Europe after Russia and the UK. Turkey could also rapidly narrow the income gap with the EU. It has the potential to reach the per capita income standards of most new EU member states within the next 15 years. By 2050 it could achieve a per capita GDP level of $60,000, or 75% of the projected EU average. (Goldman Sachs 2008, 2–7)

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The other contribution Turkey’s full membership in the EU would make is in the energy sector. The EU is currently 50.1 percent dependent on foreign energy, and it is estimated that in 2030 this dependency will rise to 68.4 percent (Tanaka 2010, 3–10). The following issues are contained in the EU’s 2007 Energy Action Plan (2010–2014), which is designed to reduce the EU’s dependency on external energy in order for the EU to increase its strength as a global actor and to maintain it; to reduce dependency on petroleum and natural gas as stated in the energy strategy; to increase diversity in energy sources; to increase the share of the renewable energy sources reflected in the total; to reduce energy consumption through savings; and to ensure the security of the supply, all of which are of extreme importance to the EU (EC 2010a). Turkey lies adjacent to countries or regions possessing some 71.8 percent of the world’s proven gas reserves and some 72.7 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves (Roberts 2005, 98). Because of Turkey’s geographical location, it is obvious that Turkey can contribute substantially toward ensuring security for the energy supply, connecting the EU safely to these supplies, and varying the energy routes. (See Winrow 2004; Tekin and Walterova 2007; Barysch 2007, 22; EC 2007b; and Akçay 2012, 18–25.) Aside from the above listed positive effects that Turkey’s full membership in the EU will have, there will be a financial burden on the EU as when the CEEC and some other countries joined as members. As was the case in 2004 and 2007 when new members joined the EU, it will have the effect of decreasing the average GDP per capita when significant budget transfers will be made to Turkey from the EU budget, as was done with the other members. Due to the reasons cited above, these costs will be significantly reduced in the mid and long terms with the contribution the Turkish economy will make to the EU.

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Considering that the EU is an economic integration effort designed to ensure and maintain security and peace in Europe, it cannot be said that the extension of the negotiation process with the candidate country, by bringing forward political issues and even suspending the negotiations and consequently creating artificial constraints for the advancement of the economic integration, overlaps with the EU’s interests. On the contrary, it has been observed that the extension of the negotiation process frustrates the parties and eventually loses both public and political support. Polls conducted revealed that the view of the Turkish public regarding EU membership was adversely affected and had created an “EU fatigue.” In the study conducted by Infakto (2006), the 73 percent of the Turkish public who looked favorably upon EU membership in 1999 had dropped to 62 percent by 2005. In the same study, the 88 percent of the people who thought Turkey would benefit from the membership in the EU in 1999 had dropped to 72 percent by 2006 (Infakto 2006, 5, 7). Similar findings were observed in EU’s Eurobarometer polls. 19 On the other hand, results similar to those in the Turkish public are found for those in the EU as well. Research reveals that more and more EU citizens disapprove of Turkey’s membership in the EU. While those in the EU who supported Turkey’s membership was 42 percent in 2003, this dropped to 31 percent by 2006 (EC 2003, 9). According to the Eurobarometer study in 2006, Turkey was the second country after Croatia that received the least support for membership in the EU: 55 percent of those who took part in the polls conducted in the EU-27 countries and candidate countries Turkey and Croatia opposed Turkey’s membership in the EU (EC 2006, 75). It is highly likely that with the spread of such a point of view, both in the Turkish and EU public, the harmonization to the single market process, if and when Turkey becomes a full member, will be affected negatively— although political and public support are very important for the successful integration of the EU economy and the creation of a single European market. In a report prepared by the Commission, “integration fatigue,” created through the lack of public and political support, was shown as the primary problem that needs to be resolved in the creation of a single market (Monti 2010, 20–21). It is believed that the topics that delay and even halt the negotiations today are subjects that can be solved much easier and more quickly after Turkey becomes a full member. As can be seen, there are both positive developments in the economic integration between the EU and Turkey and constraints that negatively affect the negotiation process. It is highly likely that overcoming the difficulties expeditiously and efficiently, in a process that is simultaneously difficult and advantageous for both parties, will turn into an advantage for all in the short run.

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CONCLUSION

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Trade and economic integration between the EU and Turkey, and between Turkey and the countries which have become full members or are on candidate status, has increased to date, although Turkey does not benefit from the numerous opportunities, because while it has established CU status, it is not a yet a full EU member. Turkey, which has identified membership in the EU as a strategic target, has made significant progress in meeting the EU’s Copenhagen economic criteria in spite of both the discriminatory attitude of the EU in the allocation of financial assistance for Turkey and the financial crisis (2007–2008) experienced throughout the world. Meanwhile, Turkey has achieved a market economy that is quite functional and can resist pressure from today’s competition. Additionally, the Turkish economy has achieved a structural conversion against the agricultural sector with the structural reforms put into effect. Prices are determined by free market conditions except for several sectors where the role of the state in economic activities has decreased to an important degree, and where the competitiveness and openness to external markets has increased considerably. On the other hand, most EU countries have gone into deep recession and come up with a debt crisis, while the Turkish economy has largely overcome the negative effects of global crisis and continued to grow during 2010 and 2011. The EU has just concerns over the negative effects the major labor force movement will have with its large population, if and when Turkey becomes a full member. However, it is thought that these negative effects will actually be fewer than anticipated when balanced by the positive influence of the traditional and cultural features of the Turkish people. The job opportunities to be created as a result of the financial assistance and the structural funds to be transferred in the event of a full membership will reduce movement, and consequently any negative effects may have less impact than expected. Of course, there are difficulties and benefits for both sides in advancing further the economic integration between Turkey and the EU. It is obvious that Turkey will contribute positively to the EU economy with its geographical location, dynamic economic structure, and young population, if the quality of life is improved. As is the case with numerous EU member countries, Turkey has economic problems (high unemployment, shortage of qualified labor, differences in development of the regions, etc.) that are not insurmountable and, as a matter of fact, are believed to be more easily resolved once full membership is obtained. Since Turkey received candidate country status in 1999, its economic integration with the EU has gradually increased, but there are certain constraints and some concerns on certain subjects (especially the large population and free movement of the workers). It is seen that the EU is

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not exerting serious effort in overcoming these constraints because of these concerns. Actually, the concerns the EU has today about Turkey’s full membership existed in the 1960s when the first economic integration relations between Turkey and the EU started, and they also existed when candidate status was granted. Both parties knew that this would bring both difficulties and advantages to the parties, but they initiated this relationship because they expected the advantages to outweigh any disadvantages. The issues of concern today are ones the EU knew at that time, but they were not brought to the agenda and did not cause obstacles in elevating the negotiations to higher levels, in spite of being used constantly after the start of the negotiation process to slow down the process. These concerns definitely do not overlap with the interests of the EU, which aspires to be the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world. From time to time there have been stumbling blocks in fulfilling the obligations on Turkey’s part, and the EU’s part as well. However, the following statements have been especially included in the National Programs prepared after receiving candidate country status:

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Turkey is determined to develop to the most advanced state in keeping with the contemporary civilization level. The most important project which is in the best interest of Turkey and which will make Turkey a country which will manufacture its goods at world standards, share its income fairly, insure human rights, insure the rule of law, participation democracy, secularity, exert efforts for the freedom of religion and will at international standards, exert efforts to be an effective and creative state in the 21st century, is full membership in the European Union. (ABGS 2008, 1)

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This indicates how important integration with the EU is for Turkey. At this point, the stabilizing efforts exerted by Turkey toward this goal in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria are clear, as are the constraints placed by the EU that are to a great degree obstructing this path. The result is a slowly progressing negotiation process, and this development in the EUTurkey relationship, which entered a new turning point in 1999, has frustrated the Turkish people, who have begun to view EU membership negatively in recent years. A similar situation exists with the EU’s public opinion. It is believed that when the EU wants to conclude this relation positively (whenever the conditions have changed), the spreading of this negative point of view on integration with the EU will create an obstacle in the completion of the integration process and will highly likely bring more difficulties to the parties; this should be borne in mind by both Turkey and the EU.

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NOTES 1. Prof. Dr. Ankara University, Faculty of Law, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. The Copenhagen Criteria are classified into three groups: (1) Political Criteria, a constitutional state, existence of human rights, respect for minorities and their protection, and institutional stability guaranteeing democracy from the candidate country; (2) Economic Criteria, including both the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (3) Compatibility Criteria, the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of the political, economic, and monetary union. 3. A country’s accession to the EU requires the adoption of the Union’s system— rights and responsibilities that are linked to the Union’s institutional framework. Turkey has to implement this acquis as of the time of its accession, as it is subject to constant alteration and/or extension. The EU acquis is the total body of the EU’s legal system and rules that are in force. The EU acquis has been constantly evolving. It includes the founding treaties of the EU, those that amend them, secondary legislation (directives, regulations, decisions), treaties signed with the third countries, the decisions of the European Court of Justice, etc. Also part of the acquis are legally binding or nonbinding acts/proceedings that were adopted within the EU framework (i.e., interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, notifications, recommendations, guiding principles, joint actions, common attitudes, declarations, conclusion proclamations, and other acts that were adopted within the framework of foreign security and defense policy), common attitudes, signed contracts, resolutions, proclamations, and other acts that were adopted within the framework of justice and home affairs. Furthermore, international treaties that were concluded between the European Communities/the EU or European Communities/the EU and member states and international treaties that were concluded by member states regarding the Union’s activities/operations are included in the acquis. As of 1 October 2009, the EU acquis has reached up to 14,607 pieces of legislation. See http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=44460&l=1 (28.12.2011). 4. Two National Programs (2003 and 2008) were accepted after preparing the 2001 National Program. See ABGS 2001, 2003, 2008. 5. Goldman Sachs, which introduced the concept of the “Next 11,” or the “N-11” as it has become known, separated out some countries from the traditional emerging markets universe in 2005. Turkey was included in N-11. This was a simple description to bracket the eleven most populous countries and to see if they, collectively or individually, might have BRIC-like potential. A few years after the inception of the two acronyms, it is reassuring to see that most of the positive momentum behind the world economy is being driven by the majority of these fifteen countries. Their success extends beyond their borders and is affecting the lives of all the world’s 6.5 billion citizens. As a result of this, many profound changes are occurring, not least of which is that we are probably seeing the largest and fastest rise of people out of poverty globally in many generations. Therefore, to describe many of these countries as “emerging markets” no longer seems appropriate. Goldman Sachs separated out some of these countries and calls them “growth markets.” Eight countries currently satisfy this criterion: each of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as well as the four largest N-11 countries: Mexico, Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia. See Goldman Sachs 2011, 4–10. 6. For the consequences of the subprime mortgage crisis, see Dwight et al. 2009, 61–82; IMF 2011. 7. The 1997–1998 Asian crisis, the November 2000 and February 2001 crises experienced in Turkey, and the subprime mortgage crisis. 8. With the effects of the Asian crisis, the volume of imports by Turkey from the EU dropped by 3.9% and 15.4% respectively in 1998 and 1999, and this narrowing reached 27.1% in 2001 as a result of the crisis experienced in Turkey in November 2000 and February 2001. In 2009 the volume of imports narrowed by 24.4% as compared to the previous year, and the volume of exports narrowed by 25.9%. See SPO 2002, 2012.

Belgin Akçay 9. Openness is defined as the share of economic activity devoted to international trade. The ratio of exports to GDP measures the proportion of domestic production that is exported. The ratio of imports to GDP measures the proportion of domestic spending that falls on imports. 10. Export + Import / GDP. 11. Other countries are Monaco (1958), San Morino (1991), and Andora (1991), which have established CU relation status with the EU without becoming full members. However, these countries have very small economies compared to the Turkish economy. Agricultural products exclude the agreement like Turkey in only Andora’s CU with the EU. 12. For more details on grants and structural funds of the EU, see EC 2000, 2002; ABGS 2007, 10–19. 13. These countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. 14. While Turkey received a net assistance of €2,202 million during 1963–2006, the total assistance given to the Community of Independent States during 1991–2006 was €7,180 million. See Özcan 2008, 130. 15. During 1993–1995 the trade difference with the EU prior to the CU was $14.3 billion, while during 1996–2009 it was $95 billion. Volume of total exports amounted to $353.46 billion during 1996–2009, while volume of total imports amounted to $448.48 billion. See DTM 2011. 16. Currently there are 2.5 million Turks living in various EU countries. See CEC, 2007b, 3. 17. The expansion of the EU in 2004 made it possible for workers in some CEECs to take up work in the EU-15. Some east to west migration was anticipated as a consequence of the EU enlargement. However, the pattern of immigration across the EU-15 has turned out differently from expected, in part because of transitional restrictions on labor mobility imposed in many of the EU-15. Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK are the only four countries that allowed CEEC workers to move relatively freely across national boundaries upon accession. However, the migration associated with the enlargement of the EU in 2004 has so far proved modest. See Barell et al. 2007; Boerri and Brücker 2005. 18. In current international dollars, GDP of Germany is $2.8 trillion, France $2.1 trillion, UK $2.1 trillion, Italy $1.7 trillion, Spain $1.3 trillion (IMF 2011). 19. According to a Eurobarometer survey, the support for Turkey’s membership in the EU decreased from 66% to 52% over six months. See EC 2006, 61–73.

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Belgin Akçay DTM (General Secretary for Foreign Trade). 2012a. Avrupa Birliği Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri, http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detay&yayinID=376&icerikID=475&dil=TR (23.02.2012). DTM (General Secretary for Foreign Trade). 2012b. Trade Statistics, http:// www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detayrk&yayinID=1116&icerikID=1225&dil=TR (09.02.2012). European Commission (EC). 2000. The Structural Funds (2000–2006), http:// ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/prord/sf_en.htm (10.10.2011). European Commission (EC). 2002. The Enlargement Process and the Three Pre-Accession Instruments: PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/ phare_ispa_sapard_en.pdf (31.10.2011). European Commission (EC). 2004. Commission Recommendation on 2004 Update on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the Member States and the Community (for 2003–2005 Period), COM (2004) 238 Final, 7.4.2004. European Commission (EC). 2007a. Screening Report Turkey Chapter 29, Customs Union, March, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/screening_reports/screening_report_29_tr_internet_en.pdf (10.12.2011). European Commission (EC). 2007b. EU Energy Policy and Turkey, MEMO/07/219,/ 1 June, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/219& format (29.01.2012). European Commission (EC). 2008. Commission Communication on “EMU@10”: Successes and Challenges after 10 Years of Economic and Monetary Union, IP/08/716, 7 May, http:// ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication12682_en.pdf (15.12. 2011). European Commission (EC). 2009. Key Findings of the Progress Reports on the Candidate Countries: Croatia, Turkey, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, MEMO/09/ 449, 14 October, http://europa-eu-un.com/articles/fr/article_9090_fr.htm (10.10.2011). European Commission (EC). 2010a. EU’s Energy Action Plan (2010–2014), 6 April, http:/ /www.euractiv.com/en/energy/commission-outline-new-energy-action-plan-news418551 (18.11.2011). European Commission (EC). 2010. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–2011 , COM (2010) 660, November 9, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/ key_documents/2010/package/strategy_paper_2010_en.pdf (25.12.2011). European Commission (EC). 2010b. Communication on Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination, 12 May, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/ 2010-05-12-com(2010)250_final.pdf (10.12.2010). European Commission (EC). 2010c. Turkey 2010 Progress Report, http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2011/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf (25.12.2011). European Commission (EC). 2011. Turkey 2011 Progress Report, http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2011/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf (25.12.2011). European Council. 1993. Conclusion of Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen , 21–22 June, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf (05.08.2011). European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 2002. EFTA Bulletin 2, November, http:// www.efta.int/content/publications/bulletins/EFTA BulletinNovember2002.pdf (14.11.2011). European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 2004. EEA Enlargement and the New Financial Mechanism, http://www.efta.int/content/advisory-bodies/resolutions-and-opinions/ CCOpinions/OpEnlargement/ view?serachterm=Norwegian½20Financial%20Mechanism (02.12.2011). European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 2006. Annual Report 2006 , http:// www.efta.int (02.12.2011).

Constraints Regarding Turkey’s Economic Integration into the European Union European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 2007. EEA Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism, EEA Seminar, Fall, http://www.efta.int/cont/eea/seminars/EEA-20seminar-20Fall-202007-20Turner.pdf (02.12.2011). European Parliament (EP). 2010. Final Report on Trade and Economic Relations with Turkey, 2009/2200 (INI), 23 August, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A7-0238/2010 (10.11.2011). Eurostat. 2011. Eurostat Yearbook 2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ portal/publications/eurostat_yearbook_2011 (07.01.2011). Gençkol , Metin. 2003. Avrupa Birliği Mali İşbirliği Politikaları . Ankara: DPT Yayınları, . Goldman Sachs. 2008. With or without Turkey: Turkey’s Long-Term Growth Potential, Global Economics Paper 175, http://www.turkey-now.org/db/Docs/Global_Paper.pdf (10.15.2011). Goldman Sachs. 2011. It Is Time to Redefine Emerging Markets, Strategy Series, 31 January, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/gsam/worldwide/viewpoints/ (01.02.2011). H arrison, Glenn W., et al. 2006. Economic Implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union , Policy Research Working Paper 1599, World Bank, http://people.stfx.ca/x2003/x2003ypc/Euro/Economy/Economic%20Implications%20for%20Turkey%20of%20a%20Customs%20Union%20with %20the%20European%20Union.pdf (08.08.2011). HM (Undersecretary of Treasury). 2007. Uluslararası Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırım Bülteni, 11 December, http://www.hazine.gov.tr/stat/yabser/AylikBulten_aralik2007.pdf (17.12.2011). HM (Undersecretary of Treasury). 2012. Foreign Direct Investment, http:// www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/go/km/docs/documents/Treasury%20Web/Statistics/Annual/ V-%20Yabanci%20Sermaye/YSGM.xls#’5.3’!A1 (17.02.2012). HM (Undersecretary of Treasury). 2012. Gross External Debt of Turkey, http:// www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/go/km/docs/documents/Treasury%20Web/Statistics/Annual/ II-%20Kamu%20Borc%20Yonetimi/kamu%20borc%20yonetimi.xls#’2.19’!A1 (17.02.2012). Hughes, Kirsty. 2004. Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement? June, http://www.cdu.de/en/doc/Friends_of_Europe_Turkey.pdf (12.10.2011). İKV (Economic Development Foundation). http://www.ikv.org.tr/icerik.asp?konu=haberler&baslik=M%DCZAKERE%20S%DCREC%DD%20%DDZLEME%20KARNES%DD... &id=1504 (28.6.2011). Infakto. 2006. Türk Kamuoyunun Avrupa Değerlerine Bakışı Araştırması, http:// www.ari.org.tr/pdfs/06_01_02.pdf (9.10.2011). International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2011a. Global Financial Stability Report, April, http:/ /www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/index.htm#SAtables1 (29.04.2011). International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2011b. World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, September, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (8.11.2011). J affe, M. Dwight, et al. 2009. “Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis.” Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds.), Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System , 61–82. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Kocaman, Tuncer. 2008. Türkiye’de İç Göçler ve Göç Edenlerin Nitelikleri (1965–2000), Ankara: DPT Yayınları, April, http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/nufus/kocamant/icgoc.pdf (10.11.2011). Lejour, A. M., and R. A. de Mooij. 2005. “Turkish Delight: Does Turkey’s Accession to the EU Bring Economic Benefits?” Kyklos 58(1): 87–120. Monti, Mario. 2010. A New Strategy for the Single Market, European Commission, 9 May, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf (15.10.2011).

Belgin Akçay N arbone, Luigi, and Nathalia Tocci. 2007. ”Running Around in Circles? The Cyclical Relationship between Turkey and the European Union.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9(3): 233–45. Özcan, Serdar. 2008. Avrupa Birliği’nin Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu Ülkelerine Yaptığı Mali Yardımlar ve Türkiye, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, unpublished postgraduate thesis, Ankara. Özgür, E. Murat, and M. Mehmet Yüceşahin. 2006. “Türkiye’nin Güneydoğusunda Nüfusun Zorunlu Yerinden Oluşu: Süreçler ve Mekansal Örüntü.” Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi 4(2): 15–35. Roberts, John. 2005. “The Turkish Gate: Energy Transit and Security Issues.” M. Emarson and S. Aydın (eds.), Turkey and Europe Monitor, January 2004–February 2005, Nos. 1–14, EU-Turkey Working Papers 11, 98–113, http://eurocapitalmarkets.org/ drupal/system/files/book/1228.pdf#page=103 (15.10.2011). Şahin, Ragıp. 1998. Avrupa Birliği Bütçesi-Fonları ve Türkiye’nin Tam Üyeliği. Ankara: DPT Yayınları. Sta te Planning Organization (SPO). 2002. Main Economic Indicators , March, Ankara. State Planning Organization (SPO). 2004. Türkiye’nin Üyeliğinin AB’ye Muhtemel Etkileri , November. Ankara. State Planning Organization (SPO). 2010. Orta Vadeli Program (2011–2013), Ankara, http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FC5EDB40B4D94DEDA6 (31.12.2011). State Planning Organization (SPO). 2012. Main Economic Indicators, January, Ankara. Tanaka, Nabuo. 2010. World Energy Outlook 2010, Jakarta, 22 November, http:// www.iea.org/speech/2010/Tanaka/Jakarta_weo2010.pdf (15.12.2011). Tekin, Ali, and Iva Waltrova. 2007. “Turkey’s Geopolitical Role: The Energy Angle.” Middle East Policy 14(1): 84–94. Turkish Statistical Institute (TUİK). 2010, http://report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2=&report=adnks_net_goc_duzey2.RDF&p_kod=1&p_yil=2009& p_dil=1&desformat=html&ENVID=adnksdb2Env (10.12.2011). Winrow, Gareth M. 2004. “Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor.” Turkish Studies 5(2): 23–42. World Bank ( WB). 2011. World Development Indicators Database , 27 September . http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (18.12.2011).

SIX Dynamics of the European Union’s Trade Strategy and Its Imperatives on Turkish Trade Policy Prospects for a Functioning Customs Union M. Sait Akman 1

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Turkey is among the EU’s prominent trading partners. It is a key commercial partner of the EU, in 2011 ranking seventh in the EU’s top import markets, with a share over 4 percent, and fifth in its export markets, with a share over 3 percent. The value of trade between the EU and Turkey exceeded a peak of €100 billion (in 2011, it amounted to €110 billion). For Turkey, the EU-27 is the main trading partner, despite a decline in the recent few years in its share of total Turkish foreign trade and investments. In 2010, the EU represented Turkey’s leading export and import destinations for goods, with a share of 46.3 percent and 39 percent, respectively. Almost 70 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into Turkey originated from EU countries during 2005-2010. For over a decade and a half, both sides have been linked by the Customs Union (CU), which provides a basis for a mutual economic and trade integration. Following the initial establishment of the CU, Turkey has largely adopted the Community’s legislation regarding trade policy instruments; trade regime with third countries, almost all (with some exceptions) within the ambit of the EU’s common commercial policy; and other areas relevant to the functioning of the CU. In this context, completion of the CU was an essential stage for the finalization of the transition period stipulated in the Ankara Agreement (the Association Agreement).

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During the initial phase of the Ankara Agreement, the expectation was that the relations based on a CU would lead toward Turkey’s eventual integration into the EU (then the EEC), once Turkey demonstrates that it will be able to undertake obligations that full membership requires. Therefore, initially the CU has not been perceived as an end in itself but as a facilitating stage toward full membership 2 . The operation of the CU overall was generally assessed to be positive for both sides, especially for Turkey in driving the manufacturing sector to improve its competitiveness. Several studies reveal that Turkey’s CU practice helped motivate reforms to keep the Turkish economy in line with the EU, with rising productivity, reduced x-inefficiency, and new business strategies. By providing a preferential status, CU also allowed Turkish industry to exploit its comparative advantage in lower-to-medium technology areas in the EU market. Despite several negative implications for specific sectors, its overall impact is assumed to be positive (K. Yılmaz, 2010). However, the current nature of Turkish-EU relations does not provide the same optimistic signs that the stakeholders had in the early years of the CU. It took almost a troubled decade following the CU to start the “accession negotiations,” which still continue in an “open-ended process,” the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand, as stipulated very openly in the Negotiating Framework document by the EU. In 2006, only a year following the opening of negotiations, the EU decided to suspend talks concerning chapters relevant to the functioning of the CU, allegedly for Turkey’s failure to waive its restrictions with regard to the Cyprus issue (a political-sphere factor). In the last couple of years, not only has Turkey’s membership process lost its ambience, but the CU has become subject to domestic criticism in Turkey, especially among business and political circles that regarded it to be burdensome. 3 It must be remembered that Turkey-EU relations evolve in a dynamic setting. The CU should not be considered as a mere economic relationship leading to a simple trade liberalization between two entities in a static environment. The CU process is not in isolation but evolves in a vigorous surrounding within which the actors’ perceptions, stakes, and expectations change in conjunction with global circumstances. Built on a dynamic structure by its abstract nature, the CU is expected to reflect these changes automatically within its own edifice. However, both Turkish and European policy makers neglected this aspect and let the CU drift, without proper maintenance. At this stage, a brief review of recent developments helps explain the setting within which the European and Turkish policy choices evolved. These choices have naturally influenced general convictions about the CU.

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Dynamics of the European Union’s Trade Strategy

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On the European side, the grand debate over a possible European Constitution has had a psychologically daunting effect in the minds of the people in Europe (as well as political elites) after several refusals in national referenda. The debate ended with disappointment, which was followed by the Treaty of Lisbon (known as the “Reform Treaty”) in late 2009. Meanwhile, the EU has evolved with a motivation to become a global actor. However, Europe has faced major structural challenges to globalization: decline in industrial competitiveness; climate change; and an aging population. The economic downturn has made these issues even more pressing. The Lisbon Strategy addresses these challenges—aiming to stimulate growth and create more and better jobs, while making the economy greener and more innovative. In this milieu, the European Council defined the objective of the strategy for the EU: to become the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion and respect for the environment. On the trade side, it spurred a new strategy leading to Global Europe: Competing in the World 4 in 2006. This strategy had a direct impact on its neighbors’ trade policies depending on the level of trade volume, the dimension of integration, and prospects for future relations. In this regard, Turkey’s position is unique since it is a country in the accession process which has already harmonized its policies—at least to some degree—with the EU; is a CU partner; and has political aspirations for a deeper economic and political integration. Also, the developments in the world economy have been remarkable. The high rates in economic growth in several developing economies (i.e., the BRIC countries), the volatility in energy and food prices, a constant increase in the EU’s trade deficit, rising domestic pressure on environmental matters, and changing expectations of domestic policy actors due to global circumstances have contributed to an overall need for a policy revision in the EU. The stalemate in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations was another critical development that became a turning point for the EU to search for alternatives routes (venues) for fulfilling its immediate need for further market access. An unprecedented event was the world economic and financial crisis that broke the Western economies severely (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, in particular). The EU has taken a series of bold measures to regain stability and sustainability in the financial markets following the deepest economic recession in its history. On the other hand, trade implications of the global economic crisis were severe, resulting in a sharp decrease in the volume of world trade. 5 Meanwhile, the European Commission has launched its Europe 2020 Strategy 6 to get out of the crisis and to prepare the EU economy for the next decade. The Commission’s docu-

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ment reemphasized the novel priorities of the EU’s trade policy as reflected largely in its previous Global Europe action. On the Turkish side, the developments in relations with the EU and global challenges also prompted a strategic change in Turkey’s conduct of its own policy. In the mid-2000s Turkish trade policy seemed to have become more proactive in nature, if not totally independent from the EU perspective. Turkish policy makers preferred an assertive foreign economic policy approach within the broader understanding of strategic relations with the rest of the world. This approach is partly induced by regional political developments in its neighborhood, and partly a direct consequence of its increasing self-confidence, in order to encounter its own way of handling international relations. However, the changing dynamics and underlying motives have also had constraining effects on Turkey in fulfilling its CU requirements. However, Turkey follows an assertive trade strategy to overcome challenges, without duly considering the CU. On the other hand, this self-confident approach (which is thanks to its recent economic performance and its politically rising profile) needs to be sustainable. At this point, several rampant issues need to be highlighted for a proper understanding of long-term ramifications in Turkey-EU relations. A myriad of motives shaping the EU trade policy need further elaboration in order to understand the arguments raised in connection with the CU. The next section seeks to explain the motives that affect the setting within which the EU’s trade strategy is redefined. The third section deals with factors that lead to divergences in the trade policies of the EU and Turkey, as well as challenges they caused for the functioning of the CU. The last section provides concluding remarks.

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CHANGING DYNAMICS OF TRADE STRATEGY IN THE EU: “GLOBAL EUROPE” AND COMPETITIVENESS

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Several challenging developments in the global political economy provide background to the EU’s trade policy change. The first is about the liberalization of economies. The world economy witnessed a process of deregulation in the financial markets that helped shape world production and trade patterns. The liberalization of world trade under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO negotiations stripped away many tariffs and introduced trade-facilitating measures. This was manifest when countries including the EU were on the offensive for improved market access. Although older forms of defensive trade protectionism were not totally outdated, it became clear that its legitimacy was open to challenge as countries became more export-oriented. The second development was increasing rivalry from emerging economies, notably from Asia (Sally 2008). This can be attributed to the

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emerging nature of “global production networking”—i.e., firms establishing foreign subsidiaries to outsource certain functions, and to subcontract the production of numerous components in different countries, mainly in emerging economies in Asia (Shadid et al. 2004, 2–3). Hence, vertical integration in global production processes intensified, putting the annual growth of world trade over the growth of world output. Competitive pressures from emerging economies caused trade deficits in many European countries and in the United States. China’s integration into the global economy by means of deregulation and opening itself to Western investment (as well as its participation in the WTO) further increased the challenges to labor-intensive and lower-to-medium-technology industries in Western countries. The changing center of gravity in the world economy following a progressive rise of investments helped the EU place many emerging countries at the top of the priority list in its external economic relations. A decline in transportation costs, improving information technologies and communication, and innovations facilitated operations in financial markets and for business corporations. This also harnessed for civil society the capacity to share information for their common social concerns about issues as diverse as climate change, public health, food security, and consumer safety—which soon became sensitive issues to broaden the realm of trade policy. The changing nature of comparative advantages made price competitiveness a significant factor in determining success and stability in the market. Combined with the shift in world demand toward upmarket and high-tech products, such developments forced European business undertakings to invest in innovation, design, and research and development (R & D). The global production process also resulted in an import dependency to inputs (and intermediates), whose share rose over 50 percent in the EU. The EU soon had to secure its access to resources (e.g., energy, metals, primary raw materials, and components) in global markets and had to minimize its dependence on external energy sources. A further development was the growing concern over the role of international regimes in governing the world economy amid global challenges. Thus, rising financial instability following a series of successive crises (i.e., Mexico, Russia, Far East Asia, and the recent global economic and financial crisis in the Western economies) led to the questioning of the principles and existing institutional structure of international monetary and financial architecture. The debate currently continues under world economic summits, G-20 meetings, and so on. The responses of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are found to be inadequate, and therefore enhanced governance mechanisms are sought in order to reduce financial vulnerability. A similar development occurred in the realm of trade, as globally induced pressures urged an expansion of the scope of governance under the World Trade Organization (WTO). The

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latter is now expected not only to deal with trade instruments (tariffs, trade measures, etc.) but also a wide range of trade-related domestic regulatory issues. The EU has been an ardent supporter of a more inclusive and broadened WTO regime. However, an ever broadening scope of the WTO regime has faced difficulties. Unsuccessful attempts under a multilateral system seem to encourage the EU, in its Global Europe strategy, to switch toward alternative venues to govern emerging trade-related issues. These developments affected the trade patterns and relative competitive position of the EU, especially in the case of certain member states and several European actors (i.e., multinational corporations and firms), depending on the degree and nature of their involvement in the global economy.

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Two Shifts in EU Trade Policy

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Based on these dynamic events, over the past decade and a half the trade policy of the EU has changed considerably. There have been two major shifts. The first shift refers to the typology of actorness. It can be proposed that the types of actors, as well as their interests, perceptions, expectations, and the degree of their involvement in the EU trade policy process, have been perpetually transformed over time. The traditional scope of commercial policy became subject to critical examination by both old and new types of actors (Young and Peterson 2006). The critics were especially motivated by the redefinition of interests in the wake of transformation in world trade and production patterns. The second shift, largely triggered by the first, was about the conduct of trade relations. By this, two basic elements can be referred to, first, the venue change by the EU in order to satisfy its broader objectives, and second, a behavioral repositioning from a defensive to an offensive outlook in the implementation of agreed-upon goals and priorities. The venue change is relevant to an experimental process whereby the EU seeks to maximize its interests by means other than multilateralism (i.e., the WTO), as the latter was perceived to be insufficient to govern while “policy expansion” and “regulatory influence” are intervening factors in policy process. It should be noted that these shifts are not independent of each other but are actually intertwined issues in the European agenda. Therefore, they need an analysis en masse. Traditionally, the conceptualization of trade policy has largely been confined to exchange of goods in manufacturing and to some extent agricultural sectors, with utmost attention devoted to the implementation of trade policy instruments “at the border.” Regulation of subsidies was one of the exceptional domestic policy issues taken into international trade negotiations within the ambit of GATT/WTO. Until the mid-1990s, the

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trade policy domain largely neglected areas such as trade in services and other trade-related business practices. Thus, both in the EU and elsewhere trade has been a policy realm where its formation process has been a playing area for traditional stakeholders like traders and domestic producers who faced the imminent effects of tariffs, quotas, and similar border measures that regulate trade. Usually business communities and trade unions, with few other interest groups, have constituted older types of policy actors interacting with policy makers under defined policy processes, in order to shape the policy outcomes to accommodate their interests. In time, the European business diversified. Those sectors with competitive power started to ask for a more proactive policy approach embodying further market access abroad. The approach was asked to deal not only with conventional border measures but also with domestic regulatory issues such as nontariff barriers, discriminatory standards, restrictive public procurement policies, violated intellectual property rights, and impeding investment and competition rules in third country markets. Therefore, these actors constantly started to propose an expanded commercial policy scope under changed economic circumstances and in line with the structure of competitiveness they lived in. However, not all policy actors supported the ideas of liberalization and globalization. Among these were European domestic producers and labor unions that had lost their competitive power in senile industries, and new social actors who believed that free trade was not necessarily serving European interests. Besides protectionist figures among older trade policy actors, the impact of globalization was raised critically by the new type of actors, including the ordinary citizens who were insecure about the unpredictable implications of the changing structure of world trade and the economy under global markets. The thematic shift of the trade policy narrative included a wide array of distress, notably concerning specific trade-related topics among actors ranging from environmental NGOs on the protection of animal species (the shrimp-turtle case) to consumer organizations on beef hormones to public health critics of genetically modified goods (M. Baldwin 2006). Paradoxically, the concerns of outward-oriented traditional actors asking for stronger mechanisms for extensive market access and those of inward-oriented actors looking for mechanisms to shield them from the disruptive effects of globalization were both mercantilist in nature. Despite contradictory claims over the liberalization of trade, they nevertheless have a common vision for a more expanded and active policy approach. These concerns were transferred into trade strategy under mechanisms to boost “policy expansion” and a “regulatory influence” on others. In this regard, trade strategy reflects what Jacoby and Meunier (2010) claimed in explaining the efforts by the EU to manage globalization—i.e., efforts by the EU to harness or manage the global challenges so that the “globalisation happens on European terms, with other countries con-

M. Sait Akman

forming to Europe’s ways and standards” (Jacoby and Meunier 2010, 304–5). An Expanding EU Trade Agenda

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To achieve its overall objectives of smart, inclusive, and sustainable growth as put forward in Europe 2020 strategy, the EU reframed its trade strategy in its communication “Trade, Growth, and World Affairs.” 7 The document stipulated that “keeping a competitive edge in innovative, high-valued added products” is important for smart growth and longterm jobs, and that the EU’s “trade policy must capture this by broadening the scope” to take some issues on board. This approach reveals that domestic regulation of economic activities in foreign markets has become vital for the competitiveness and the sustainability of many European firms and multinationals. Largely induced by its own experience of integration, the EU started to question the legitimacy of its partners’ regulations in fields such as investment regimes, public procurement practices, competition rules, technical standards, intellectual property legislation, and other business practices that were mainly sovereign issues of the partner. For the EU, these areas required a harmonization of laws and practices in order to liberalize trade and not to frustrate business activities, just as it was recognized in its own history (Holmes 2006, 816). Ultimately the transformation in global economic activities both in form and about territorial domain induced a change in European public discourse on globalization, giving rise to claims for restructuring the multilateral governance in these new “trade-related” issues. One area of concern was trade in services. Currently, the services sector accounts for some three-quarters of the gross domestic product (GDP) for the EU, and over three-quarters of EU jobs are in the services sector. The EU-27 is the world’s largest trader in services, while its share in global export was 26.6 percent in 2009, bringing a positive trade balance of about $109 billion. The EU-15 increased its services trade balance four times over the last decade. Eighteen EU member states ranked among the top forty exporters of services in 2009, ranking the EU as the first trader in majority of services categories (Hamilton 2011). In services trade, the diversity of the regulatory framework in different countries is the main impediment to trade (Raza 2007, 81). The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has been a central tool to push through market liberalization and to provide the possibility of larger access for the European services industry. In order to reduce compliance costs to national firms providing services abroad, the EU entered into a complex structure of negotiations in services not only in the WTO, but also in an increasing number of bilateral agreements (i.e., Free Trade Agreements [FTAs]).

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Another prominent issue was investments abroad. Europe is the largest provider of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. The EU has a net outflow of FDI in almost all major economies, and this boosted its GDP by €20 billion in the last decade (Hamilton 2011, 11). In order to improve investment conditions in manufacturing and services sectors in third countries, the EU seeks additional disciplines, especially regarding the improvement of transparency of national investment regimes, extension of the nondiscrimination principle, and making all disciplines subject to WTO dispute settlement. The inclusion of the foreign direct investment issue under the commercial policy realm in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 207) was therefore essential to strengthening the EU’s efforts to govern the global investment regime in European terms. The next issue that provided an expansion of the trade agenda in the EU was trade and competition, whereby the EU asked for global governance under its trade strategy via the WTO and bilateral negotiations, especially to ensure that European firms do not suffer in third-country markets from unreasonable subsidization of local undertakings or their anticompetitive practices (EC 2006, 8). Under complex global production schemes, the EU supported bringing new commitments to adhere to a set of principles such as transparency, nondiscrimination, fairness, and enforcement of laws, as well as strengthening the competition laws and regulations of its partners. Finally, the EU intended to expand the boundaries of its trade policy into government procurement, the biggest trade sector that remained largely sheltered from multilateral disciplines. Accordingly, the new strategy gives utmost importance to this area by stating that the EU will press the opening of the procurement market abroad, and look for a more symmetrical access in both developed and large emerging economies.

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Let Them Behave like Us: Forcing Partners to Regulate Their Domestic Markets

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An expanded agenda is required to have regulatory mechanisms in conduct of relations with the trading partners. This approach, as proposed by Jacoby and Meunier, is “to ensure that external challenges brought about by globalisation have as little negative, disruptive effect upon European citizens as possible” (Jacoby and Meunier 2010, 304–5). This is essentially to facilitate the enforcement of the EU rights in third countries with a focus on stronger rules of economic importance for the European actors. Practically speaking, trading partners of the EU are expected to harmonize their laws and procedures, if not to adopt common disciplines with the EU’s domestic rules. This mechanism complements the expansion of the trade policy scope of the EU into areas beyond its traditional boundaries (De Bièvre 2006, 106). The scope goes to cover areas either regulated insufficiently at the multilateral level (WTO+ issues), or not regulated within the WTO mandate at all (WTO–X) (Horn,

M. Sait Akman

Mavroidis, and Sapir 2009, 3–5). Following the difficult and stalled negotiations in Doha Round, the EU brought into its trade agreements provisions concerning regulatory issues including sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, state aids, and intellectual property issues (WTO+), as well as environmental standards, climate change, human rights, social and labor standards, movement of capital, illegal immigration, energy, data protection, and so on (WTO–X). The increase in the scope can largely be attributed to the expectations of trade policy actors who position themselves under the dynamic structure of global economic and political events. On the other hand, it is simultaneously argued that extensive coverage of trade agreements makes them less effective and their legal enforceability weaker, especially for WTO–X issues (Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir 2009, 22). However, the EU’s effort to incorporate these areas in its external commercial relations must give signals for its partners (including Turkey) concerning the prospects of trade policy in the EU. The extension of the debate to propose a broader policy agenda and a regulatory flavor brought not only an impact in terms of domestic trade policy formation within the EU itself, but also a notable change in the conduct of its trade relations with the partners.

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Changing Behavioral Patterns in EU Trade Policy

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As emphasized above, the new trade strategy of the EU reflects a more assertive behavioral positioning, as can be traced in Global Europe and in Trade, Growth, and World Affairs (EC 2006, 2010a). Inspired by the Lisbon competitiveness agenda, a forceful trade strategy with “policy activism” can be argued for. In terms of policy activism, several major practical elements are utilized to support the competitiveness of the European industry and business in foreign markets. First, opening markets abroad (i.e., to reduce tariffs and to deal with nontariff barriers, including restrictive measures, regulations, and procedures by foreign countries) is the most essential objective. Centered around a comprehensive market access strategy, the EU specifically targets markets, mainly emerging economies such as China, Far East Asian countries, India, Brazil, and other Latin American states to achieve further liberalization. The strategy reveals that for each significant partner a specific bilateral arrangement (usually in the form of a deeper and comprehensive FTA) is proposed. The EU provides the partner with the possibility to have privileged access to its larger internal market, if the latter provides the EU’s exports of goods and services with broader market access and an acceptable domestic regulatory environment. The second element is about securing a sustainable and undistorted supply of raw materials (i.e., access to resources), such as the energy and the metals necessary for the production process. The main motive is the

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fact that Europe is dependent on imported intermediates for a sustainable production process. The EU’s production and export performance has long relied on the global sourcing of inputs incorporated in the manufacturing process. Almost two-thirds of inputs were sourced from abroad between 1995 and 2005, with a figure of up to 70 percent in several member states. EU dependency on foreign sources of energy rose to almost 54 percent in 2008, and it is expected to be as high as 70 percent over the next twenty-five years. The increasing pressure stemming from the need to efficiently use energy and other resources, coupled with their environmental impact, has forced the EU to incorporate in its external relations an issue linkage between trade and inputs. Therefore, building stability and predictability is vital in governing relations with the main suppliers, including the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), postSoviet states, and several African countries. Trade agreements unsurprisingly include provisions to help diversify energy supplies, energy security and transit, liberalization of trade in energy products, and elimination of export bans. Third, the changing patterns of trade bring a motive for EU assertiveness. The EU cannot compete with cheap-labor countries but needs to position itself in up-market products by developing the skills of the workforce through retraining and by investing more in research, design, and innovation (especially in sectors such as textiles and clothing, footwear, the automotive industry, cosmetics, and electronics). It can be noted that the EU’s position in up markets is strong, with a market share over 30 percent compared to the United States and Japan with less than 15 percent each and China with only 4 percent. However, the EU’s position has been threatened by the rise of China and other emerging economies that are well prepared for rapid adoption of foreign technologies, R & D investments, and improving education and infrastructure since the mid-1990s. 8 It is also a fact that investment in research and high technology has been lower in Europe compared to figures in its rivals such as the United States and Japan. Therefore, the EU must keep investing in innovation to prevent the risk of being squeezed between high-performing innovation economies, such as Japan and the United States, and the rising powers of developing countries. The strategy also strengthened the enforcement of intellectual property rights in prospective bilateral agreements in order to safeguard its expanding investments in R & D for a knowledge-based economy.

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Practicing Trade Policy by Means of a Venue Change: Counting on the FTAs

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The existing GATT/WTO governance was not responsive to changing priorities of stakeholders. 9 The EU searched for an enhanced governance by bringing such additional topics in an expansionary way into the postWTO agenda initially in 1996 under the so-called Singapore issues. This

M. Sait Akman

initiative, according to the EU’s propositions, was “to address the obstacles that different national rules pose to international economic exchange” (Young and Peterson 2006, 798) 10 . The EU’s determination managed to upload the Singapore issues into the deck of the Doha Development Agenda initially. However, fierce opposition from several developing countries and the EU’s inability to persuade others about the benefits of expanding the scope for global rules under the WTO umbrella finally caused these issues to drop from the agenda in the Cancun meeting in 2003 (Evenett 2007). Some scholars even went on to claim that the EU’s insistence on these new [Singapore] issues led to the failure of the WTO meeting, caused the marginalization of the WTO, and consequently accelerated bilateral and regional trade agreements (Nanda 2008, 8–9). Nevertheless, it was not the end of the dispute, as globalization once spurred a debate over the contested boundaries of the WTO regime. Concerns of policy actors were reflected under a new venue characterized by the EU’s rising bilateral schemes. Practically, the failure of its move to bring these cases into the WTO regime has required the EU to search for additional forums, ultimately causing a venue change especially for the regulation of “behind-the-border” issues in its external relations. This brought a shift in trade policy to greater use of FTAs. The prime reason is linked to difficulties in the existing WTO system, which is considered not to provide an embracing and adequate institutional structure to govern trade-related domestic policies. When the existing WTO provisions did not provide such a basis, the so-called natural fit between the EU and GATT/WTO was broken (M. Baldwin 2006, 932). Ultimately, the failure in the Doha Round to reach the modalities for further trade liberalization induced the EU to turn its face toward FTAs. Developing countries with enhanced capacity to pursue assertive policies and their ability to establish blocking coalitions against traditional hegemons like the EU and the United States 11 prompted a reaction in the EU to critically investigate the role of the WTO as the “natural venue” to accomplish its “deeper aims.” In fact, the emerging international balance of power required much delicate systemic change in the WTO, but the cost of freeriding in the absence of hegemonic powers prevented parties from investing more in the older system for its rebuilding. What followed was a series of FTAs, portraying a new mechanism of the EU’s trade strategy for both regulatory topics and further liberalization of trade. 12 Indeed, in Global Europe it was emphasized that free trade agreements (FTAs), if approached with care, can build on WTO and other international rules by going further and faster in promoting openness and integration, by tackling issues which are not ready for multilateral discussion. . . . Many key issues, including investment, public procurement, competition, other regulatory issues

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Dynamics of the European Union’s Trade Strategy and IPR enforcement, which remain outside the WTO at this time, can be addressed through FTAs. (EC 2006, 10)

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Overall, the EU trade strategy seems to put a strong emphasis on market access based on reciprocal mercantilist thinking. Accordingly, trading partners are expected to open their markets for European goods (mainly for high-value-added, high-tech products) and services, public procurement, and investments; to protect European firms’ interests in their domestic markets (i.e., intellectual property rights); and to regulate their domestic issues in a way not to create an unfair advantage for their national firms. In return, they can achieve reciprocal and preferential access into the EU market.

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CHALLENGES FOR THE CUSTOMS UNION: NEW DYNAMICS AND PRIORITIES AMID DIVERGENCES

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The EU provides a hub that its trading partners have to consider in formulating their own trade strategies. As a leading trading entity, the EU has an imperative role if the partners have large stakes in the EU market and have an ambition to deepen their relations with the EU. However, keeping relations stable with the EU is a challenging issue, as its trade strategy evolves under global challenges. This renders the “common” policy difficult to reach and conduct politically even for the existing member states, as they view global challenges quite differently due to their differing interests and ambitions (Sapir 2007, 7). In the case of Turkey, this is even more striking. The compatibility of trade strategies of the EU and Turkey is important, as both are in the CU and Turkey has a desire to join the EU. However, despite similar concerns Turkey’s trade and production patterns and policy priorities have large divergences and do not necessarily fit to those of the EU. Turkish trade policy as can be traced back in the Turkish Export Strategic Plan (2004–2006) 13 reflects wider objectives. The Export Strategic Plan in 2004 had the general aim of “building up of an export structure conducive towards sustainable exports increase,” while its strategic objectives were to “ensure promotion and marketing of high quality Turkish products in foreign markets”; to “ensure that information relevant to exports are utilised” (i.e., through a comprehensive market access database like that of the EU); to “provide the exporters with inputs at internationally competitive prices”; to “improve exporters’ market access opportunities”; and to “develop structures and functions for better coordination among public and private sectors” (DTM 2004, 14–28). The plan was updated for the 2007–2009 period. Subsequently, the Strategic Plan (2009–2013) prepared by the Turkish Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (UFT) 14 (now renamed the Ministry of Economy) possessed similar objectives. This plan emphasized that for a

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M. Sait Akman

sustainable export increase Turkey needed to restructure itself to specialize in higher value-added products based on R & D and innovation. 15 Hence, the elements embedded in the strategy highlighted the importance of the transformation from lower- to higher-technology products. Despite improvements in Turkish exports and diversification of export markets in the post-CU period, the new strategy had to bear in mind that the export structure must change overall. Accordingly, industrial products dominated Turkish exports, while low- and medium-low-technology products accounted for the majority. However, such sectors are most vulnerable to rising global competition, considering the fact that several new rivals enter markets with reduced prices and competitive production patterns. In this context, the Ministry of Economy adopted the 2023 Strategy in 2009 16 (later improved as The Export Strategy of Turkey for 2023, with the ultimate goal of reaching $500 billion of export volume by 2023, to become one of the world’s ten largest economies, and to take a 1.5 percent share from the world’s trade, as well as to reach 80 percent export/import ratio by the target date of 2023 (DTM 2010). The Export Strategy of Turkey for 2023 also followed the same path, emphasizing the role of a “flexible export structure based on advanced technology and R & D.” In the same vein, Turkey’s Long Term Development Strategy (2001–2023), prepared by the Ministry of Development also envisaged the development of an “export-oriented, technology-intensive production structure, with a strong emphasis on high-value-added products and services.” Apparently, Turkey’s export and development strategies shared similar concerns to those embedded in EU trade strategy. For instance, Turkish strategy proposes the implementation of a proactive export-oriented approach based on keen foreign market access; access to resources in order to reduce Turkey’s import dependency in the production of manufacturing; increase in the share of value-added goods and “up-market products”; and a focus on higher technology sectors. However, a mere similarity in objectives in trade strategies does not mean a full harmony between Turkey’s and the EU’s commercial policies. Several issues lead to differences in their respective approaches and conduct of their trade policy relations with the rest of the world. These issues are guided by a set of factors that relate mainly to mismatch in production and trade patterns, target markets, regulation of domestic policies, expectations of actors involved, venues for trade negotiations, and an overall “understanding of trade strategy.” It should be noted that despite the existence of the CU and accession talks, the divergence is not reconcilable, because the present functioning of the CU and conduct of relations between the two sides do not automatically facilitate it. Therefore, the CU needs maintenance to reflect the changing dynamics of the world economy and rising priorities of the partners as embedded in their long-term objectives.

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Overlap and Mismatch in Export Markets

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With regard to a proactive export strategy, Turkey experienced a radical behavioral shift toward an offensive trade policy orientation starting in the early 2000s. Several motives can help explain the assertiveness in Turkish foreign trade policy. First, it must be admitted that the rising competitiveness of the Turkish manufacturing industries induced by the CU has been an essential element in boosting an export-oriented approach (İzmen and Yılmaz 2009, 177). Second, offensive policy was not a characteristic confined only to Turkey, but a preferred approach by almost all developed and emerging economies as competition in the global context became more stiff, and as the liberalization of world trade has been the trend. Third, following a rapid and dynamic change in the domestic economy as a consequence of its macroeconomic and institutional reforms, Turkish business started to integrate into the world economy and trade more firmly. Turkey’s increasing confidence in this context helped orient Turkish industrial policy actors toward seeking diversified export markets. Globalization has been a compelling reason for Turkey— as for many countries—to penetrate into markets not previously enjoyed. In this respect Turkish policy has a resemblance to the EU’s trade policy activism, which focuses on opening foreign markets. Hence, it is evident that both the EU and Turkey prioritize greater openness in third countries and a wider possibility of market access for their exportables. Finally, the changing parameters of Turkish foreign policy with its regional orientations make economic cooperation and trade agreements important tools to diffuse Turkey’s interests and political power, especially in its neighborhood. This increased the shares of MENA, Russia, the Black Sea basin, and Central Asia as Turkey’s main export destinations (other than the EU). 17 On the other hand, the target markets did not necessarily overlap for the two sides, even though Turkey also covered in its strategy, similar to the EU, a much wider area including the Asia-Pacific region; African, North, and Latin American countries; and so on. For the EU, the “strategic partners” are bigger nations like the United States, China, India, Japan, Russia, and Mercosur (Argentina/Brazil), which represent almost half of the EU trade in goods and services and 40 percent of foreign direct investment. Other important markets for the purposes of EU trade policy include the ASEAN countries, Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Southern and Eastern Neighborhood countries, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. Over thirty countries, including the strategic partners and emerging markets, are regarded as “priority” export markets, whose trade policies are closely scrutinized by the EU (European Commission 2011). 18 For Turkey, initial priority has been for the “neighboring and surrounding countries” since 2000. 19 The main motivation to include the

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M. Sait Akman

remote destinations in its list of target and priority markets was the need to diversify export markets to embrace countries with large and/or potentially expanding domestic markets or with extensive oil revenues. 20 As emphasized in the export strategy, narrower regional concentrations of exports had to be expanded. As figure 6.1 shows, Turkey’s main markets were the EU and Middle East countries, but not Asia or the Americas, though the latter represented the largest destinations for world imports. Turkey selects its partner countries on the basis of political relationships; purchasing power; largeness and openness of their markets; investments; legal and commercial infrastructure; energy policies; capital movements; and the future prospects in bilateral relations, including the desire to sustain its market share (DTM 2010, 152). However, Turkey’s market share in emerging and large markets (which were regarded by the EU as strategic partners) has been very narrow. Another important factor shaping the differences is the increasing role of the new generation bilateral trade agreements as new venues of negotiations in trade policy. Despite their trade liberalization effect for Turkey, its FTA motivations are not necessarily identical with the those of the EU. The EU has a different combination of motives for initiating its FTA deals. Of these, political motives may be influential, as in the case of the Euro-Med and ACP agreements; commercial motives come to the fore in order to neutralize trade diversion vis-à-vis the United States in mar-

Figure 6.1. Destinations for World Imports and Regional Distribution of Turkey’s Exports in 2003 (%) Source: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, revised Turkish Export Strategy Report, 2005.

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kets such as Mexico, Chile, Mercosur, South Korea, and ASEAN. Promoting a European model of integration is another concern, in order to induce others to regulate their domestic policies in European terms and to push harmonization à la acquis communautaire (Woolcock 2007, 3–4). It is also claimed that “enhancing EU competitiveness and promoting EU offensive interests with a focus on market Access” is essential in FTAs with emerging markets, while “building markets” and “improving business environment” are vital in deals with smaller nations (Rodriguez 2009, 6–7). Apparently, for Turkey the EU is a motivation in initiating FTAs. The CU-induced obligation to adopt the EU’s preferential trade regimes (as stipulated in Article 16 of the CU Decision) is one imperative for Turkey. However, in practice the EU’s existing FTAs provide Turkey only with an opportunity in motivating these countries to initiate a bilateral deal, if they are considered in Turkish trade policy as target or priority markets. 21 Hence, these FTAs are facilitating for Turkey in implementing its own market access strategy. In many cases, the EU factor tactically helps Turkey activate its potential partners to initiate the negotiations. 22 In this way, Turkey improves reciprocally its possibility of gaining access to the markets of these countries, which would eventually enter into the Turkish market by means of their FTA deals with the EU anyway. The priority is given to FTAs with countries that approach Turkey’s offer positively 23 and those that do not insist on obtaining concessions in areas that Turkey does not voluntarily open for domestic reasons. Turkey’s FTAs are not designed in complete harmony with the EU, and they constitute a patchwork of several, not-well-defined actions mainly aiming at creating a penetration possibility for Turkish exports. These initiatives do not represent a coherent policy action by themselves but serve the overall objective of diversifying Turkey’s export markets in different regions of the world. Thus, the FTA policy seems to be poorly embedded in Turkey’s trade strategy. Actually, the FTA policy must be in line with Turkey’s aspirations of accession to the EU. Its accession process and the CU linkage oblige Turkey to consider the EU’s strategy in a subtle way, if not to follow it faithfully, by acting more collectively with the EU. However, the respective strategies of both sides reflect an autonomous behavior independent of each other. One compelling reason is that the EU does not consider Turkey’s interests when setting the priorities and objectives embedded in EU trade strategy. The EU seems to be very much preoccupied with its domestic concerns about and macro objectives of growth, employment, and competitiveness, as if accession negotiations with Turkey are a residual game that can be set aside. Turkey’s claim that its priorities must be taken into consideration in EU’s trade negotiations with third countries were neglected as a result of political reasons, and in many cases because of the inactivity in the European Commission driven by political signals coming

M. Sait Akman

from various member states. Being a country destined to join the EU, Turkey faces a serious difficulty of access to decision-making mechanisms in the EU. This point is popularly raised by Turkish policy makers and members of the business community, who claim that their views are not respected in the formulation of the EU trade policy although the EU’s new trade policy orientation will have repercussions on Turkey. Nor does the EU allow Turkey to negotiate jointly with third countries, claiming that Turkey is not a full member yet. This argument may have a legal rationale, but the EU does not show any political will to broaden the “institutional architecture” of the CU so that Turkey’s concerns are better integrated. The most notable step from the EU side was to encourage its trading partners in FTAs that they should launch similar initiatives with Turkey, under the well-known “Turkey clause.” However, this is not a binding clause, and obviously “will not have a practical effect, and will not provide a solution to the problem” (Kabaalioğlu 2010, 50). This argument is explicit if one considers that the third country will have reasons to refrain from concluding FTAs with Turkey (Akman 2010). 24 On the other hand, starting an FTA is one thing, while contextualizing FTAs in Turkish trade strategy is another. In most cases, the coverage of the agenda, priority issues, and the degree of commitments in FTA agreements negotiated independently by the EU and by Turkey with the identical third country may vary substantially. This is a consequence of the differences between Turkey and the EU in connection with their own expectations and prioritization of issues within the framework of their autonomous foreign trade strategies. In this framework, Turkey does not feel itself “obliged to fully adopt the content of the FTAs signed by the EU” and considers its “own priorities regarding industrial and commercial policy.” 25 Indeed, Turkish and EU export market destinations do not overlap. The dissimilarity in trade patterns cause a divergence in their policies toward third countries. As shown in figure 6.2, a substantial share of extra-EU exports goes to (non-EU) European countries, North America, and Far East Asia, while the EU and MENA represent the main export markets for Turkey. MENA and Russia are leading trading partners for Turkey, with the exception of the EU, but their significance is smaller for the EU’s market access purposes. This renders parallel negotiations with the same countries by the EU and Turkey difficult, due to the differences in negotiation terms and priorities. These differences result from concerns largely reflected by the changing stakes of different actors involved in the policy-making process. It is also evident that the product compositions of exports do not overlap due to distinct levels of technology intensiveness of industries, thus making the common position harder to achieve.

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Product Coverage of Exports: Similar Concerns with Different Composition

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Another important shared concern in respective export strategies of the EU and Turkey is the need to increase the technology intensiveness of exports. Turkish export strategy, as mentioned above, stressed the need for support of the production and marketing of branded, higher-valueadded goods and services based on innovation and R & D. 26 It reiterates that the new strategy for exports will have the objective of transition from lower- to higher-value-added goods, while increasing the production of medium-high-tech goods and investing more in high-tech sectors. Indeed, Turkey experienced a structural change in its exports that shifted from conventional and unskilled labor-intensive sectors to more sophisticated technology-intensive sectors requiring more skilled labor. Table 6.1 shows that Turkish exports increased in basic metals, machinery, and equipment not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), and motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers, which are classified as medium-low and medium-high sectors. The total share of medium-tech sectors accounted for 65.8 percent in 2009, while it was only 40.3 percent in 1996. The share of low-tech exports, mainly in textiles and clothing, dropped sharply from 57.8 percent in 1996 to 31.7 percent in 2009. Turkey’s export structure transformed to cover a larger share of medium-tech products, which benefits export opportunities thanks to its geographical position and high growth in its main export markets.

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Source: Calculated from data in Eurostat 2010 and UFT figures (2010). Figure 6.2.

Regional Distribution of Turkey’s and the EU’s Exports in 2009 (%)

M. Sait Akman Table 6.1. Share (%) of Subsectors in Total Turkish Manufacturing Exports (1996–2009) Sector

Group

1996

2000

2007

2008

2009

15 Food products and beverages

Low

12.0

7.2

5.1

5.2

6.2

16 Tobacco products

Low

0.5

0.5

0.2

0.2

0.3

17 Textiles

Low

18.6

18.1

10.7

9.1

10.0

18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur

Low

23.5

21.2

11.7

9.2

10.1

19 Tanning and dressing of leather . . . footwear

Low

1.1

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.5

20 Wood and products of wood, Low except furniture

0.3

0.2

0.5

0.4

0.5

21 Pulp, paper, and paper products

Low

0.6

0.6

0.8

0.8

1.0

22 Publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media

Low

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.

Low

1.2

2.5

3.1

2.8

2.9

23 Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel

Medium low

1.3

1.2

4.9

5.8

3.8

25 Rubber and plastic products

Medium low

2.5

3.1

3.9

3.8

4.2

26 Other nonmetallic mineral products

Medium low

3.8

4.4

3.4

3.5

3.9

27 Basic metals

Medium low

10.9

8.8

12.2

17.9

15.8

28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment

Medium low

2.3

2.6

4.2

4.4

4.7

24 Chemicals and chemical products

Medium high

6.1

5.5

4.0

4.0

4.5

29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.

Medium high

4.0

5.4

7.9

7.8

8.5

31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.

Medium high

3.8

3.2

4.1

4.0

4.3

34 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers

Medium high

4.8

6.8

16.8

15.3

13.5

35 Other transport equipment

Medium high

0.8

3.5

2.7

2.7

2.5

30 Office machinery and computers

High

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

[Table6.1]

Dynamics of the European Union’s Trade Strategy 32 Radio, television, and High communications equipment and apparatus

1.5

3.8

2.7

1.9

2.0

33 Medical, precision, and optical instruments; watches and clocks

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.4

High

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUİK).

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[6.235]

[6.237]

[6.238]

However, the transformation in the structure of exports does not necessarily provide a positive prospect for a couple of reasons. First, Turkish export strategy did not specifically note ways for increasing its industrial competitiveness under the challenge of dynamic comparative advantages. The call to switch into technology-intensive sectors does not go beyond rhetoric unless it is coupled with a comprehensive agenda linking several related policy areas. An active industrial policy aimed at longterm restructuring based on skill upgrading, science and technology planning, technological support and R&D incentives to enterprises, and attracting technology-based FDI has been an important determinant for export upgrading (Lall 2000, 19–20). However, Turkey until very recently failed to pursue an active industrial policy to restructure its manufacturing sectors to transform into high-value-added and technology-intensive exportables. It can be argued that the Turkish Industry Strategy Document promulgated in 2010 27 provides a clear road map by pinpointing the strong and weak points of Turkish industry. However, the document does not put forward under its action plans a comprehensive set of instruments necessary to achieve its overall grand objective of making Turkey the “production base in Eurasia for medium and high-tech sectors” by 2023. Second, in comparison to several emerging economies, Turkey has a distinctively lower share of high-tech exports (see figure 6.3). Indeed, in 2009 high-technology exports in Turkey were reported to be only 2.5 percent of total manufactured exports, according to World Bank estimates. The TÜSİAD Report clearly indicates that Turkey specialized in products/sectors in which the growth rate in world trade was slow. Accordingly, Turkey has managed to adapt to the transformation of international production linkages, but in a passive way, by only increasing its advantages in production processes that developed countries have relinquished for competitive reasons to developing countries. Hence, Turkey has not managed to make up the difference with the EU and other developed economies. 28 In addition to a lower share of high-tech products in exports currently, the more pessimistic scenario lies in world market share and change in Turkey’s share in these products. As table 6.2 indicates, Turkey’s market share in high-tech products 29 increased only slightly in a decade, not

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Figure 6.3. Share of High-Tech Exports in Total Exports (%) Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 2007.

even showing a comparable level of performance with its rivals. Turkey represents only a margin of 0.11 percent of the world’s high-tech exports, with a 0.05 percent increase in its share in a decade. The figures reveal that Turkey has a long way to go to become a base in these products. Table 6.2. Share and % Change in World Market Share, for High-Tech Products [Table6.2] Exporter country

EU-25 USA China ASEAN Japan S. Korea Canada Mexico Other Mercosur Brazil Russia India Turkey Rest of the world

Market share in value terms (%)

% change in market share

2005

1995–2005

18.51 16.47 15.93 11.96 10.33 5.79 2.52 1.90 0.94 0.84 0.60 0.41 0.11 5.22

–2.39 –8.11 12.36 0.73 –6.44 2.45 –0.96 0.46 0.54 0.53 0.25 0.07 0.05 –1.36

Source: BACI, CEPII calculations.


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Third, the Turkish export concentration ratio (CR) by sector does not show a promising trend despite improvements in concentration ratio by export markets. Indeed, Turkey’s CR diminishes with diversification of export destinations. This means Turkey presently exports to more different markets of its products. However, sectoral concentration is increasing, meaning that product diversification in exports is diminishing. This trend is manifest in the 2000s, as depicted in figure 6.4. Differences in product composition and technology intensiveness of Turkish and EU exports shows that in their trade negotiations with third countries, the EU and Turkey have diverging positions as regards liberalization of tariffs, nontariff barriers, and trade-related topics. The EU’s trade negotiating agenda is driven by the need to open markets for its high-value-added exports, while it largely liberalizes if not sacrifices most labor-intensive senile industries by reducing trade protection in sectors such as textiles, clothing, footwear, basic metals, and so on. Indeed, in its Global Europe Strategy, the EU points out that “our core argument is that rejection of protectionism at home must be accompanied by activism in creating open markets and fair conditions for trade abroad” (EU 2006, 6). Thus, an ever increasing number of trade agreements will further decrease domestic tariffs, and this in turn will increase the number and pressuring effects of export industries, while reducing the political power of import-competing sectors. Therefore, each liberalization step will trigger pressure for further trade liberalization (WTO 2007, 57). The impact of this trend for Turkish imports is apparent. The nominal protection rates (NPR) and import values in these sectors are high in Turkey. For example, it is 8.93 percent in textiles, 8.03 percent in footwear, 5.36 percent in base metals, 6.36 percent in transport equip-

Figure 6.4. Turkey’s Export Concentration by Country and Sector (Herfindahl Index, 1990–2007) Source: Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası 2010, 10.

M. Sait Akman

ment, and 5.41 percent in chemicals. These protection rates are higher than the average in these sectors (Togan 2010, 1353). The EU trade agreements will generate competition in several industrial sectors in Turkey by lowering the protection via the common customs tariff. Fourth, export-oriented strategy has forced Turkish firms to minimize their costs by using cheap imported inputs to be able to compete in international markets. The share in total Turkish imports of investment and intermediate goods (under broad economic categories) that are processed domestically for export has been significant. The total share is considerable, with a sum of 85 percent in 2009. In this respect, Turkey serves as a place of industrial assembly relying on inputs produced in other countries (G. Yılmaz 2007, 245–46). It should be emphasized that trading in intermediate goods has been an impetus for Turkish export performance. The variety of these goods allows firms the most appropriate input choice possibility to produce their final products; therefore, Turkey’s dependence on these goods, as in many other trading nations, is understandable. However, concern over rising imports in inputs and raw materials is deeply rooted in new trade strategy, while it is argued to cause current account deficits. 30 Hence a new “input supply strategy” (girdi tedarik stratejisi) 31 is offered to replace import content of exports by domestic content. However, a policy action concerning the domestic procurement of inputs, unless applied properly, shall be a costly process that may bring about resource misallocation. While focusing on increasing the share of medium- and high-tech industries, Turkish export strategy overlooks the fact that industrial supply chains blur the country of origin. Increased vertical integration and the rise of global manufacturing has led to significant changes in traditional trade patterns. Therefore, the true strategy must be to focus on stages of a value-added chain where Turkish industry should position itself, rather than trying to replace inputs with domestic production. À la import substitution policies are inferior, and Turkey must bear in mind that it is itself a part of the global chain and a substantial share of its exports is composed of the intermediates.

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A “Broader” Trade Agenda

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Turkish trade strategy is heavily focused on manufactures, with particular attention paid to the exports leg of trading relations. Market access seems to be the priority issue to diversify Turkish export markets. However, this strategy has certain divergences from the EU trade strategy. Turkish trade strategy does not consider an expansive coverage as articulated by its partner, the EU, in its deeper trade agenda. It is confined to manufactures to a considerable extent, without having a widespread issue coverage that the EU proposes in regulation of trade relations—namely, issues pertinent to trade in services, trade-related areas

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like investment, competition, government procurement, and intellectual property rights. Such issues are important items of the EU trade agenda. 32 One crucial motivation for the EU to switch into the regional arena from multilateralism and its retreat from the role of leadership in the WTO after the Cancun Ministerial can be attributed to the pressuring effect of the domestic need for a new and an expanded agenda. The EU position therefore reflects this need and largely differs from the Turkish trade strategy, which does not take on board, at least comprehensively, the new issues. Though every single issue requires a broader elaboration, it is beyond the aim of this chapter. However, it can be proposed overall that one important reason for the mismatch of trade agendas by Turkey and the EU is largely a result of their respective levels of economic and social development. Turkey is a middle-income economy having the twin characteristics of a developing country specialized in medium-tech products and a domestic regulatory structure largely reflecting its developmental status, and a country with a high ambition to raise its production in higher-technology areas. The latter refers to its concerns over the anticompetitive impact of regulatory measures such as stringent environmental, social, and technical standards. Another concern is its timid approach to open its market in areas like government procurement and services for domestic reasons. Both of these reasons are ultimately the reflections of domestic actors’ interests in setting trade policy. The Doha negotiations also revealed that Turkey’s priorities were not the same as the EU’s, especially in issues that rest beyond the scope of the CU. In nonagricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations, Turkish strategy was largely in alignment with the EU, where both had pressed for further reductions in tariffs by third parties. The adoption of EU’s Common Customs Tariffs urged Turkey to follow the EU in this area. However, the same cannot be argued for areas like agricultural trade negotiations, where Turkey had to resort to its developing country status within the WTO context and largely cooperated with the developing countries. 33 The case in intellectual property protection and TRIPs is more critical, as Turkey has continued to be a target of European arguments that counterfeit goods are still a serious problem in bilateral trade relations. 34 Similar emphasis was made on the government procurement issue, where the EU approach differs widely as it insistently requires Turkey to open its procurement market for European firms. Another point is relevant to standards and technical barriers to trade. The EU has been keen on forcing its trading partners to regulate their domestic framework, while asking in its market access strategy for the elimination of technical barriers applied to European firms. Turkey’s position should be in line with the EU, since it is in the accession process and the adoption of the European acquis is in progress. However, the “adjustment costs, related to the elimination of the TBTs in trade with the

M. Sait Akman

EU have been substantial for the Turkish public sector.” Furthermore, there have been shortages concerning adoption of the technical legislation, establishment of the relevant institutions, and providing the required infrastructure and staff training (Togan and Dogan 2010, 70). The WTO Trade Policy Report for Turkey in 2012 also urged Turkey in the case of SPS “to ensure that measures are taken by scientific evidence and not be [more] trade-restrictive than necessary.” 35 The investments issue is becoming an important aspect of economic relations and trade agreements. In the EU, international investment treaties with third countries have proliferated over time. The main objective in these treaties is to provide a high level of protection for European investments and investors against arbitrary actions of foreign governments receiving the investment. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the member states were in charge of negotiating and signing these investment agreements. With the Lisbon Treaty, foreign direct investment has become an exclusive competence of the EU and an integral part of the EU’s external trade policy (Woolcock 2010). Therefore, it has become imperative for Turkey to align its investment policy approach with the EU policy within the sphere of the EU common commercial policy. However, it seems that Turkey prefers to keep its bilateral investment protection treaties within the scope of its mixed economic commission schemes with third countries, and outside the scope of its trade agreements; therefore Turkey does not consider deeper trade agreements to cover the investment issue extensively. The likely implication of this will be that the EU, while negotiating for its investment interests abroad, can make a trade-off between tariff liberalization and stronger investment protection without considering its implications for Turkish domestic industry. This may result in an increasing dissonance of voices between Turkey and the EU in both bilateral and multilateral venues. The case in services is another factor in the divergence. For Turkey, services negotiations are more complex than is the case in liberalization of goods. Services require the reduction of regulatory barriers to market access and national treatment. However, these are problematic areas as far as the existing level of the domestic regulatory system and institutional coordination are concerned. The negotiations in trade in services need a convergence of the two sides to mitigate differences in their positions with regard to several sectors. While Turkey concentrates on tourism, transportation, and construction, the EU priority areas are mainly financial and banking services, telecommunications, and engineering. The legal and regulatory deficiencies as well as the insufficient level of domestic coherence among public and private institutions in Turkey have left trade in services as a secondary issue. 36 Thus, the problem in the case of Turkey is that its expectations and priorities concerning “beyond-the-border” issues vary greatly from the EU, mainly because of differences in their trade patterns, economic and

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social development levels, and domestic interests. The latter are also relevant to the nature of actorness and the sensitivities perceived by the actors. In issues such as the environment, labor standards, food safety, consumer protection, and human rights Turkish NGOs as new type of actors have not yet developed a comprehensive trade-related rhetoric 37 to involve in the trade policy-making process, while the EU counterparts have better experience. In this context it can be argued that the transformation of actorness in Turkey and the actors’ degree of involvement do not indicate a similar trend pertinent to trade-related areas as in the EU. This eventually led to the formation of different trade policy priorities in negotiations by Turkey and the EU in these matters. [6.308]

Implications of Venue Shift for Turkey

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The deadlock in multilateral negotiations made preferential agreements (e.g., FTAs) a preferred mechanism, overshadowing if not denying the WTO’s role. Major negotiators like the EU seemed to have less need and enthusiasm for WTO multilateralism in achieving market access objectives and in bringing new rules and regulations for trade-related areas. It can be argued that the Doha negotiations became too complex to manage among an increasing number of trading interests. 38 However, several eminent studies reveal that regionalism in world trade has a restraining effect on the multilateral trading system. 39 The “venue change” in trade negotiations from WTO toward regional agreements may have negative effects on Turkish interests in negotiations with non-EU countries. Accordingly, under current trade protection levels, Turkish applied tariffs are comparably much lower than those of its developing country rivals because of the adoption of the EU’s Common Customs Tariff (CCT). As the current stalemate in the Doha negotiations continues without substantial motivation from global actors like the EU, FTAs seem to be the most notable alternative for curbing existing barriers for market access. Thus, under the EU’s new trade regime, Turkey is obliged to negotiate similar FTAs with third countries with higher trade barriers, so that it can level the playing field. This is a burdensome process for Turkey, as its partners are likely to ask for compensatory trade concessions in return in prospective bilateral FTAs (Akman 2010, 29). As a global actor the EU has a capacity to manage regional and multilateral routes concurrently. Nevertheless, for Turkey regional trade agreements may induce a “complexity effect.” As WTO’s Trade Policy Report for Turkey asserted in 2003:

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Turkey’s FTAs makes its trade regime complex and difficult to manage. Future trade agreements could further complicate the trading environment creating a web of incoherent rules and detract from multilateral efforts, given the limited resources available. (WTO 2003, 17)

M. Sait Akman

Hence, Turkey will be disadvantaged in liberalizing trade by means of FTAs if it totally disregards multilateral trade liberalization under the WTO realm. A successful conclusion of Doha Round on terms to be agreed to substantially reduce tariffs especially in non-agricultural products is important for Turkey’s longer-term interests in achieving a competitive and fairer trading system. One example can help illustrate this. If Doha Round is completed successfully in line with the proposed draft modalities for non-agricultural market access (NAMA), the bound tariff rates on chemicals will amount to only 24 percent. This represents a sharp decline from a peak of 437 percent in South Korea. In Mexico, the bound rate will be only 17 percent, instead of 50 percent. This is a much fairer and more acceptable result for Turkish export interests, which have a bound rate of 133 percent on paper but currently apply 3.7 percent tariff only due to the adopted Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the EU. The same is true for many sectors (like clothing, textiles, electrical machinery, vehicles, and paper) constituting a significant share of Turkey’s exports. Trade liberalization is essential for Turkey, as its average applied rates are lower compared to many competing emerging economies. Liberalization under a multilateral scheme can be more facilitating for Turkey in order to obtain further market Access, compared to bilateral FTAs with equally powerful countries like South Korea, India, Brazil, Argentina, Malaysia, and so on. This is because these countries will be forced to reduce their tariffs when faced with increasing pressure from other significant actors such as the EU under NAMA (Akman 2010, 30; 2012). Therefore, it becomes essential for Turkey to be able to conduct its own bilateral relations under the shadow of the EU’s changing trade paradigms without prejudicing its own multilateral prospects under the WTO.

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CONCLUSION

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Turkish exports have displayed substantial increases in the last couple of years, and export markets have diversified significantly. The composition of exports has also continually changed toward more technology-intensive products since 2001. Turkish imports, on the other hand, increased perpetually, leading to growing trade imbalances. Domestic production and exports are largely dependent on intermediates imported from trading partners. Flaws in trade strategy, coupled with insufficient investment in new technologies and knowledge in the industry, along with inertia in the reform process, constitute challenges. Therefore, Turkey faces a high current account deficit problem. Turkish trade strategy reflects these problems, focusing on the need to increase the level of hightech exports, to reduce its import dependence, and to have as broad an access as possible into more sustainable and diversified markets.

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On the other hand, the EU’s new trade strategy is characterized by shifts reflecting the changes in the global economic balance in the last two decades. It uncovers Europe’s evolving priorities in trade negotiations. From the EU’s point of view, three aspects in conducting its trade relations are important. First, the negotiating framework is changing, whereby the EU takes an assertive strategy for its exports to have a sustainable share in foreign markets. This also widens into new areas beyond manufacturing and conventional trade policy matters and extends into traderelated issues. Second, the negotiation venue for the new framework focus too much on regional trade agreements, while the WTO is sidelined. The EU’s free trade deals will affect Turkish interests. Finally, the global economic and social developments change relative power and perceptions of existing and new actors, who ultimately seek to reflect their interests in the EU’s common position in trade negotiations with third countries. It can be argued that Turkey’s trade policy shall not be sustainable by means of a rhetoric of assertiveness without actually considering the dynamic needs for a comprehensive trade strategy, and without fully grasping the motives that cause changes in trade strategy of the EU. A proactive trade policy should not be confined to a superficial “market access diplomacy” but must incorporate global economic realities. As Öniş (2011, 63) lucidly argues, “Over-assertiveness and over-confidence in international affairs can have significant pay-offs in the short term but can also be detrimental to national interest and lead to isolation in the long term.” This indicates that a cheer of activism can only be sensible if complemented by reforms needed to enhance the competitiveness of the Turkish economy and to provide sustained economic growth. Turkey also has to change its linkage in international production chains by moving from standardized products dependent on lower costs into rising sectors and high-value-added processes. Its CU link urges Turkey to follow the developments in the EU. Having failed, Turkey’s position in trade negotiations increasingly diverges from the EU, in spite of the CU, with the likely implications that Turkey acts alone without getting any substantial assistance or solidarity from its main trading partner. In this respect, relations with the EU need to be restored by updating the CU; completing the adoption of the EU acquis; and having a more coordinated action toward third countries, while committing itself to continue its reforms consistently under its European ambition. From the EU perspective, it should be noted that the marginal return of the CU for Turkey is diminishing. This, if assessed together with the element of “open-endedness” of Turkey’s membership, will not only induce Turkey to pursue its own way of foreign (trade) policy, but will render an additional cost for the EU in regaining Turkey in the future.

M. Sait Akman

NOTES 1. Assist. Prof. Dr, Marmara University, EU Institute, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. Although full membership has been Turkey’s vision, “the timing and circumstances” were not clearly stipulated in Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement (Kabaalioğlu 2010, 55). 3. Even Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD), an ardent supporter of the establishment of the CU, in a recent debate questioned the negative effects induced by the EU’s handling of trade issues with third countries without taking Turkish interests into consideration. See TÜSİAD 2008. 4. For Global Europe document, see European Commission 2006, http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (30.01.2011). 5. For the impact of global economic and financial crisis on world trade, and the dimensions of trade protection in the post-crisis period, see Baldwin and Evenett 2009. 6. For external aspects of Europe 2020 Strategy, see. European Commission 2010a. 7. The strategy reflects the aims proposed in the Global Europe Strategy of 2006 in a “path-dependent” way, despite the existence of subtle changes in its substance. 8. See http://www.cebre.cz/dokums_raw/cebre_trade_liberalisation_2.ppt (30.01.2012). 9. For a detailed analysis, see R. Baldwin 2006. 10. For this issue also, see De Bièvre 2006. 11. For developing country coalitions in Doha Round, see Narlikar 2003. 12. For a detailed analysis of the EU’s FTA policy, see Woolcock 2007; Lloyd and MacLaren 2006. 13. For Export Strategic Plan 2004–2006, see DTM 2004. 14. For the Strategic Plan 2009–2013, see DTM 2009. 15. Strategic Plan (2009–2013), Strategic Objective 3, p. 8. In this vein, Zafer Çağlayan, then minister for foreign trade (now “minister of economy”), noted that “Turkish manufacturing previously had to prefer an expansion mainly in low- and mediumtech industries. These sectors are characterized by a rapid relocation of production, limited or decreasing value-added content, and decreasing production and export prices. On the other hand, medium and high-tech sectors dominate world trade, including industries like automotive, machinery and electrical machinery. . . . For this reason Turkey is in need of an export-oriented production strategy to follow this trend” (speech by Z. Çağlayan, March 2010). 16. For 2023 Export Strategy of Turkey, see DTM 2010. 17. Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu 2011 claim that “the expansion of Turkish trade into neighbouring regions is partly driven by internal economic and political developments and partly by the increasing frustration that Turkish businesses experience in accessing the EU’s internal market” (706). 18. Also see EU’s latest Trade and Investment Barriers Report 2012, available at http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/february/tradoc_149143.pdf (29.02.2012). 19. The neighboring countries can be defined as the countries that have common borders with Turkey or that may be reached from Turkey directly without having to cross a third country. These include Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and Armenia. The surrounding countries are those which do not share a common frontier with Turkey but have cultural ties or geographical proximity and are feasible markets in terms of population and/or economic potential. These countries are Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Moldova, and Macedonia. 20. In 2023 strategy for example, the target markets were referred to as the United States, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Canada, Poland, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Jordan, and Qatar. Of these, only countries in italics are those with

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which Turkey has already completed an FTA deal. Poland is the only EU member state considered a target market. 21. For instance, in Turkey’s 2023 export strategy the priority countries list includes those with which the EU had an FTA deal, such as Mexico, Chile, Peru, South Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Africa, as well as many of the “neighboring and surrounding” countries. 22. Personal interview with Ugur Ozturk, from the directorate of the EU, UFT in February 2011. 23. For a list of FTAs Turkey currently is negotiating and those that are in the pipeline, see http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta®ion=0 (29.02.2012). 24. This was obvious in the cases of Algeria, South Africa, and Mexico, which refused for a long time to launch an FTA agreement with Turkey. Other prospective partners such as South Korea, India, and Canada started such initiatives—obviously not as a result of the Turkey clause, but by their own commercial motivations. 25. See http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta®ion=0 (29.02.2012). 26. Until the late 2000s, however, Turkish export strategy underlined only the need for “high-quality products” mainly to create a “good image” about the quality of Turkish goods and to improve marketing and promotion activities. 27. Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı 2010. 28. TÜSİAD-EAF Report, 2011. 29. According to the World Bank, “high technology” covers products with high R & D intensity, such as aerospace, computers, fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals, scientific and precision instruments, optical instruments, and complex electrical and electronic machinery. 30. See. for example, the statement by Z. Caglayan, available at http:// www.kutso.org.tr/dbase/images/zafer-caglayan-yazi-tam.pdf (15.03.2011). 31. For the strategy, see http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/girditedarik/anasayfa.cfm. 32. Global Trade strategy (European Commission 2006, 7). EU trade strategy, as emphasized above, considers “stronger rules in new trade areas of economic importance” to the EU such as WTO–X and WTO+ issues. The EU seeks FTAs with a comprehensive scope to go beyond existing WTO disciplines. 33. For example, in agriculture Turkey sided with the G33 group of developing countries, which raised their concerns over “special products” (SP) and “special safeguard mechanisms” (SSM), which were regarded as controversial issues to deadlock the Doha negotiations. In their press statement, the G33 countries, including Turkey, stated in para. 4: “Ministers insisted that all aspects of SPs and SSM must be incorporated integrally in any modalities to be agreed by July 2006. They further stressed that no modalities in agriculture can be acceptable which do not fully reflect the expectations of the vast bulk of developing countries in the WTO on SPs and SSM.” See http:// www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=88374 (14.03.2010). 34. This was one of the critical issues in the European Parliament’s Report on trade and economic relations with Turkey (2009/2200 [INI]). In minutes, one of the MPs went on to suggest that “we should explain to them [the Turks] in no uncertain terms that anyone who places counterfeit goods on the market is a common thief who crudely preys on owners’ copyrights, patents, or intellectual property rights”! 35. See concluding remarks by the chairperson for Turkey’s Trade Policy Review, 2012, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp359_crc_e.htm (01.03.2012). 36. M. Sait Akman, paper presented under the title “Trade in Services: A Sidelined Area of Negotiations in the Doha Round—The Turkish Context” in Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy International Conference “Beyond the Doha Round,” held in Istanbul in November 2008. 37. This is not to say that Turkey must necessarily develop an interventionist and protectionist position in these matters, nor does it claim that EU rhetoric always transforms into concrete policy action in an effective way. However, this indicates an

M. Sait Akman “agenda mismatch” in trade relations between the EU and Turkey in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. 38. For a discussion, see Akman 2008, 32–36. 39. See Warwick Commission Report 2007; Sutherland et al. 2004; Baldwin 2006; and Bhagwati 2008.

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Akman, M. Sait. 2008. “Doha Kalkınma Turu ve DTÖ: Sorunların Açmazında Çözüm Arayışları.” S. Akman and Ş. Yaman (eds.), Dünya Ticaret Örgütü Çok Taraflı Ticaret Müzakereleri ve Türkiye, 16–54. Ankara: TEPAV. Akman, M. Sait. 2010. “The European Union’s Trade Strategy and Its Reflections on Turkey: An Evaluation from the Perspective of Free Trade Agreements.” Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 12(2): 17–45. Akman, M. Sait. 2012. “Turkey in the World Trading System and the WTO: Activism under Global Challenges and the EU Process.” Journal of AfroEurasian Studies 1(1): 134–72. Aysan, Ahmet Faruk, and Yavuz Selim Hacıhasanoglu. 2007. “Investigation on the Determinants of Turkish Export-Boom in 2000s.” Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 1(2): 159–202. Baldwin, Matthew. 2006. “EU Trade Politics: Heaven or Hell?” Journal of European Public Policy 13(6): 926–42. Baldwin, Richard, and Simon Evenett (eds.). 2009. The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20. London: Vox EU. Baldwin, Richard, Simon Evenett, and Patrick Low. 2010. “Beyond Tariffs: Multilateralizing Non-Tariff RTA Commitments.” R. Baldwin and P. Low (eds.), Multilateralizing Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baldwin, Robert E. 2006. “Failure of the Doha Ministerial Conference at Cancun: Reasons and Remedies.” World Economy 29(6): 677–96. Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2008. Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade. Oxford. Oxford University Press. Dadush, Uri, and Bennett Stancil. 2010. The World Order in 2050. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook, April, http:// www.carnegieendowment.org/files/World_Order_in_2050.pdf. De Bièvre, Dirk. 2006. “The EU Regulatory Trade Agenda and the Quest for WTO Enforcement.” Journal of European Public Policy 13(6): 105–29. DTM (General Secretary for Foreign Trade). 2004. İhracat Stratejik Planı 2004–2006. Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı. DTM (General Secretary for Foreign Trade). 2009. Stratejik Plan 2009–2013. Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, http://www.dstm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/belge.pdf (09.03.2011). DTM (General Secretary for Foreign Trade). 2010. Dış Ticaretin Görünümü-2023 Stratejisi. Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, http://www.economy.gov.tr/ upload/strategy/strategy2023.pdf (01.02.2012). European Commission (EC). 2006. Global Europe: Competing in the World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, Brussels, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (30.01.2011). European Commission (EC). 2010a. Trade, Growth, and World Affairs: Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, COM (2010)612, Brussels: http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146955.pdf (30.01.2011). European Commission (EC). 2010b. Report on Progress Achieved on the Global Europe Strategy, 2006–2010, SEC (2010) 1268/2, European Commission Staff Working Document.

Dynamics of the European Union’s Trade Strategy European Commission (EC). 2011. Seventh Report on Potentially Trade Restrictive Measures (May 2010–September 2010), Brussels. Evenett, Simon. 2007. “Five Hypothesis concerning the Fate of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23(3): 392–414. Hamilton, Dan. 2011. Europe 2020: Competitive or Complacent? Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations. Holmes, Peter. 2006. “Trade and Domestic Policies: The European Mix.” Journal of European Public Policy 13(6): 815–31. Horn, Henrik, Petros Mavroidis, and André Sapir. 2009. Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements. Brussels: Bruegel. İzmen, Ümit, and Kamil Yılmaz. 2009. “Turkey’s Recent Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Performance.” Z. Öniş and F. Şenses (eds.), Turkey and the Global Economy, 173–203. London: Routledge. Jacoby, Wade, and Sophie Meunier. 2010. “Europe and the Management of Globalization.” Journal of European Public Policy 17(3): 299–317. Kabaalioğlu, Haluk. 2010. “Turkey-EU Customs Union: Problems and Prospects.” Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 12(2): 47–57. Kirişçi, Kemal, and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu. 2011. “The Politics of Foreign Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy.” Middle Eastern Studies 47(5): 705–24. Lall, Sanjaya. 2000. “Turkish Performance in Exporting Manufactures: A Comparative Structural Analysis,” QEH Working Paper Series 47, August. Lloyd, Peter, and Donald MacLaren. 2006. “The EU’s New Trade Strategy and Regionalism in the World Economy.” Aussenwirtschaft 61: 423–36. Nanda, Nitya. 2008. Expanding Frontiers of Global Trade Rules. London, Routledge. Narlikar, Amrita. 2003. International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT and WTO. RIP Studies in Global Political Economy. London: Routledge. Öniş, Ziya. 2011. “Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.” Insight Turkey 13(1): 47–65. Raza, Werner. 2007. “European Union Trade Politics: Pursuit of a Neo-Mercantilism in Different Fora?” W. Blass and J. Becker (eds.), Strategic Arena Switching in International Trade Negotiations, 67–96. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Rodríguez, Enrique. 2009. “The European Union Free Trade Agreements: Implications for Developing Countries.” ELCANO Working Paper: 8/2009, February. Sally, Razeen. 2008. New Frontiers in Free Trade: Globalization’s Future and Asia’s Rising Role. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı. 2010. Türkiye Sanayi Strateji Belgesi, 2011–2014 (AB Üyeliğine Doğru). Ankara: T. C. Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı, http:// www.sanayi.gov.tr/Files/Documents/sanayi_stratejisi_belgesi_2011_2014.pdf (10.03.2011). Sapir, André. 2007. “Europe and the Global Economy.” A. Sapir (ed.), Fragmented Europe: Europe and the Global Economy, 1–20. Brussels: Bruegel. Shadid, Yusuf et al. (eds.). 2004. Global Production, Networking, and Technological Change in East Asia. Washington, DC: World Bank. Sutherland, Peter, et al. 2004. The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium. Geneva: World Trade Organization. Togan, Sübidey. 2010. “Turkey: Trade Policy Review 2007.” World Economy 1339–1389. Togan, Sübidey, and Saadettin Dogan. 2010. “Standards, Conformity Assessment, and Technical Barriers to Trade.” S. Togan (ed.), Economic Liberalization and Turkey, 47–70. London: Routledge. Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası (TKB). 2010. Türkiye’nin İhracatında Öne Çıkan Sektörlerde, Temel Pazar Ülkeler, Rakipler ve Rekabet Gücü. Ankara: TKB Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Müdürlüğü. Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD). 2008. Gümrük Birliği Çerçevesinde AB’nin Üçüncü Ülkelerle Yaptığı Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmalarının Avrupa ve Türk İş Dünyasına Etkileri. Yayın No: TÜSİAD-T/2008-06-467, June.

M. Sait Akman TÜSİAD-EAF Report. 2011. Uluslararası Üretim Zincirlerinde Dönüşüm ve Türkiye’nin Konumu (The Transformation of International Production Linkages and Turkey), EAF-RP/ 11-01, http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/eaf_rp_1101.pdf, (01.03.2012). Warwick Commission Report. 2007. The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/report/ uw_warcomm_tradereport_07.pdf (08.02.2011). Woolcock, Stephen. 2007. “European Union Policy towards Free Trade Agreements,” ECIPE Working Paper 3/2007. Woolcock, Stephen. 2010. “The Treaty of Lisbon and the EU as an Actor in International Trade,” ECIPE Working Paper 1/2010. World Trade Organization (WTO). 2003. Trade Policy Review: Turkey. Geneva: WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp225_e.htm (01.02.2011). World Trade Organization (WTO). 2007. World Trade Report 2007. Geneva: WTO. Yılmaz, Gaye. 2007. “Turkey: WTO Negotiations in the Shadow of the European Union.” W. Blass and J. Becker (eds.), Strategic Arena Switching in International Trade Negotiations, 241–69. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Yılmaz, Kamil. 2010. “Taking Stock: The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU Fifteen Years Later.” TUSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Working Paper 1023, July, http://www.ku.edu.tr/ku/images/EAF/erf_wp_1023.pdf (30.01.2011). Young, Alasdair, and John Peterson. 2006. “The EU and the New Trade Politics.” Journal of European Public Policy 13(6): 795–814.

SEVEN EU Accession and Central Bank Reform in Turkey Aylin Ege 1 and Erman Aksüt 2

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[7.1]

Turkey has been trying to achieve alignment with the chapters of the EU acquis since the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, when Turkey’s candidacy was declared by the European Council. Chapter 17, “Economic and Monetary Policy,” is one of those chapters, and it is within the context of this chapter that Turkey is striving to reform its central bank (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey [CBRT]) in order to get close to full membership. In the first Accession Partnership (2001) document, which specified the priorities and intermediate objectives for Turkey on the way to accession to the EU, the medium-term priorities for Turkey in the area of economic and monetary union were established as modifying the Central Bank law with a view to enable participation in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and achieving central bank independence (OJ 2001). In this area, a major reform came on 25 April 2001 with Law No. 4651, which constituted one of Turkey’s responses to the 2001 economic crisis. 3 The changes introduced particularly by this reform were in line with EU requirements. The 2003 Accession Partnership document has clarified the priorities in this area in the medium term as aligning legislation with the EU acquis on central bank independence, prohibiting direct financing of the public sector, and prohibiting privileged access of public sector authorities to financial institutions (OJ 2003). The Screening Report of 2006 referred to the same areas for central bank alignment (EC 2006a). The central bank reform and alignment to the EU system continued very slowly with breaks over the years and no major step as the 2001 CBRT

Aylin Ege and Erman Aksüt

reform. The European Commission is still not satisfied with Turkey’s achievements in this area and pointed out in its 2011 Progress Report on Turkey that legislative alignment is advanced but incomplete. (EC 2011a, 76). Existing literature on central bank reform with a view to EU alignment is not substantial for the Turkish case. Yazgan (2003) is a quite comprehensive study, focusing on central bank reforms in Turkey, covering the whole EU acquis. However, it is a rather early study, thus does not take into account some of the reforms that came about later. Saraç (2002) compares the legal situation before and after the 2001 reform, while Bakır (2005) focuses on the accountability and transparency of the CBRT in addition to its independence—but both are again rather early studies. Although a rather recent study, Bakır (2009) also covers basically the 2001 reform extensively, but its concern is not the remaining reforms necessary for alignment. The aim of this chapter is to explore the current situation regarding central bank reform with a view to alignment with the EU system by investigating both the already-made and the further necessary reforms on the CBRT-related parts of Chapter 17, “Economic and Monetary Policy,” with specific emphasis on the independence of the CBRT, direct financing of the public sector by the CBRT, and prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. The preparation of the CBRT for a single monetary policy and for its integration to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are not extensively considered in this chapter, since they will be implemented just before accession or just before the adoption of the euro. After determining the extent of the central bank reform that is still necessary for alignment with the EU acquis, this chapter also tries to evaluate whether the remaining reforms would be easy or problematic for Turkey. This is done first by drawing some implications from the experiences of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), and secondly, by analyzing whether the new EU arrangements in this area due to the financial crisis would create any problems for Turkey’s alignment.

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CBRT ALIGNMENT WITHIN CHAPTER 17 OF THE EU ACQUIS

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The requirements Turkey must fulfill within the context of Chapter 17, “Economic and Monetary Policy,” are examined by making a distinction between the already-made reforms and the necessary reforms that are not yet realized. This is done under four major categories: the independence of the CBRT; prohibition of the direct financing of the public sector by the central bank; prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to the financial institutions; and preparation of the CBRT for functioning within

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EU Accession and Central Bank Reform in Turkey

the framework of the ESCB and for implementation of single monetary policy. [7.6]

Independence of the CBRT

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One of the requirements Turkey must fulfill within the context of Chapter 17 is the independence of the CBRT. The legislation behind this requirement is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and also stated in Protocol [No. 4] on the Statute of the ESCB, 4 which posits that

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When . . . carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them . . . , neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank, . . . shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, . . . from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Union institutions, . . . the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.” 5

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Turkey has made reforms in accordance with this EU legislation in order to increase the independence of the CBRT, which have been beneficial in reducing the inflation rate as well as in facilitating Turkey’s accession. The positive relation between central bank independence and price stability is referred to by many authors in the literature (Neyaptı 2001; Dragos, Beju, and Dragos 2009; Crowe and Meade 2008; Cukierman 2008). Although “central bank independence is only one of the several institutional devices for ensuring price stability” (Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992, 383), the independence of CBRT, together with transparency and accountability, has contributed to the decline in the inflation rate substantially in Turkey (Bakır 2005, 23). The independence of the CBRT serves for the fulfillment of not only the Copenhagen economic criteria, but also the Maastricht criteria. In fact, price stability, supported by the independence of the CBRT, contributes both to having a functioning market economy (a requirement of the Copenhagen economic criteria) (EC 2011b) and to having an inflation rate that does not exceed the average of the three best-performing EU member states by more than 1.5 percentage points (a requirement of the Maastricht criteria). Hence, the independence of the CBRT is quite significant for fulfillment of both the Copenhagen economic criteria and the Maastricht criteria on the way to accession. Although significant progress has been achieved in the area of the independence of the CBRT, due to the reforms of 2001, the EU is not fully satisfied. It is clearly stated in the Commission’s 2011 Progress Report that the statute of the Central Bank does not fully ensure its independence (EC 2011a, 76). Central bank independence in Turkey is further

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evaluated in this section by making a distinction between functional independence, financial independence, personal independence, and institutional independence along the lines of ECB 2012 and major EU documents on this topic. Functional Independence

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Functional independence of a central bank refers to both goal independence and instrument independence—i.e., first, having a clear-cut primary objective; second, having a certain legal basis that ensures necessary means and instruments for the achievement of this objective, independent of any other authority (ECB 2012). Significant reforms are already realized in Turkey in those areas. First of all, on having a clear-cut primary objective, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Statute of ESCB have very clear provisions, stating the primary objective of the ESCB as price stability. 6 In Turkey, before 2001, the CBRT Law was not completely in line with functional independence. The CBRT had to take into account the development plans and annual programs in carrying out monetary and credit policy in a way that would provide price stability (Saraç 2002). This law referred to price stability, but not as a primary objective in a clear-cut manner. For alignment with the EU acquis, this article was amended in 2001 by Law No. 4651. With this amendment, the CBRT Law now clearly states that “the primary objective of the Bank shall be to achieve and maintain price stability.” 7 Deciding on the necessary means and instruments for the achievement of its primary objective was also provided to the CBRT by Law No. 4651 in 2001. The CBRT Law now states that the CBRT shall determine “the monetary policy instruments that it is going to use in order to achieve and maintain price stability.” 8 Among the necessary reforms that remain for full alignment with the EU is the provision of the CBRT Law, which underlines domestic objectives such as encouraging growth and employment policies of the government. After pointing out price stability as the primary objective, the CBRT Law also states that the CBRT should support the growth and employment policies of the government. 9 As a response to this provision, 2006 and 2007 Progress Reports of the EU raised criticisms by stating that this law should be revised in such a way that the general objectives of the European Union should take precedence over domestic objectives (EC 2006b, 51; 2007, 51). At this point, the portion of the EU acquis to be aligned with is TFEU, which foresees that the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the EU in order to contribute to the achievement of the Union’s objectives. 10 Hence, supporting the general economic policies of the Union, not those of the domestic government, should be the objective of the CBRT. However, this alignment is needed just before

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[7.13]

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accession, because without being a member of the EU or without being guaranteed that Turkey will be a member of the EU within a given period, the CBRT cannot state its secondary objective as supporting the policies of the Union. Thus, this reform is necessary, but it should be made just before accession. [7.16]

Financial Independence

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Financial independence of a central bank, be it the European Central Bank (ECB) or any other national central bank (NCB), requires that adequate financial sources be accessible for the sake of fulfillment of ESCBrelated or other national tasks (ECB 2012, 9). Turkey has already made some reforms in this area, but further reform is again necessary. The CBRT is not subject to the Budget Law (EC 2006a, 3), and according to the CBRT Law reformed in 2001, it has the power to prepare the budget, annual report, balance sheet, income statements, and the agenda of the General Assembly of the Bank. 11 Another reform in this area came on 23 July 2010 with Law No. 6009. In fact, the Screening Report in 2006 had requested that the unrealized valuation gains and losses resulting from the revaluation of gold and foreign exchange reserves due to a change in the value of the Turkish lira should not be reflected in the income statement of the CBRT unless there is a loss (EC 2006a, 6). Article 61 of the CBRT Law was amended in accordance with this request on 23 July 2010, increasing the financial independence of the CBRT. 12 A necessary reform for strengthening the financial independence of the CBRT is within the context of Article 58 of the CBRT Law, which makes the submission of the balance sheet and income statement of the CBRT to the prime minister for approval mandatory for the CBRT (EC 2006a, 6). This impairs the financial independence of the CBRT, so amendment of Article 58 is a necessary reform for Turkey on the way to EU membership for securing financial independence of the CBRT.

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Personal Independence

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Personal independence of a central bank refers to the independence of the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or any other national bank from dismissal for reasons other than those written in the ESCB Statute or the national bank’s law (ECB 2012). For the alignment of the CBRT Law with EU acquis, the governor’s tenure must be secured by CBRT Law via provisions referring to a minimum term of office. This minimum term of office was determined by the Statute of ESCB, specifying the term of office of a governor of a national central bank as not less than five years. 13 The Governor of CBRT is appointed by a decree of the Council of Ministers and the CBRT Law, which was amended by Law No. 3670 of 25 October 1990, specifying the term of

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office of the governor of the CBRT as five years. 14 Thus the minimum term of office of the governor was harmonized with the EU acquis. Four major steps are needed to make the CBRT Law more aligned with the EU acquis in terms of personal independence. The first necessary reform is related to the reasons for the dismissal of the governor. These reasons are referred to as “possible existence of a conflict of interest and the impossibility for him to perform his duties” in the CBRT Law; 15 they should be harmonized with the Statute of ESCB, which states the major reason as being guilty of serious misconduct 16 . The second necessary reform is about the term of office of board members of the CBRT. Under the CBRT Law, 17 this term is stipulated as three years, while it is five years for the governor. The term of the board members must also be five years according to the Statute of ESCB (EC 2006a, 6). Hence, in order to make this term in line with that of the governor and to get aligned with the EU acquis, the term of office of the board member should be increased from three to five years. The third required reform is related to the dismissal of the board members and the members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the CBRT. In the CBRT Law, the reasons for their dismissal are not specified, which creates a threat to their independence. In the Screening Report on Turkey, the EU demanded that Turkey should specify the reasons for dismissal, and that these reasons should be in line with the reasons stated in the Statute of ESCB (EC 2006a, 6). These reasons include not having the necessary conditions for the fulfillment of his or her responsibilities any more or being found guilty of serious misconduct. 18 The CBRT is a joint stock company and is subject to Turkish Commercial Code, which already specifies the dismissal reasons (Yazgan 2003, 128–29). That is why these reasons were not inserted into the CBRT Law again. However, although National Bank of Austria (Oesterreichische Nationalbank), Bank of Italy (Banca d’Italia), and the Bank of Greece (Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος) have the same status as the CBRT—i.e., they are joint stock companies—they specify the reasons for dismissal in their own national bank law as well (Yazgan 2003, 129). Thus, having the status of a joint stock company should not dissuade the CBRT from inserting these reasons into the CBRT Law in order to consolidate its personal independence. The fourth necessary reform is to make it possible for the members of the board to demand a judicial review if they are dismissed, as requested in several Progress Reports (EC 2002, 89; EC 2003, 84; EC 2004, 106; EC 2005, 92). Therefore, necessary reforms should be made in order to make judicial review possible and in this way strengthen the personal independence of the CBRT.

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Institutional Independence

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Institutional independence of the ECB or any other national central bank (NCB) suggests that members of the ECB’s or NCB’s decision-making bodies not take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a member state, or from any other body (ECB 2012). In other words, the decisions of ECB or NCBs shall not be subject to any prior instructions or post-objections coming from the third parties. Regarding the institutional independence of CBRT, the 2001 National Programme stated that no authority will impose instructions on the bank in a way to affect its decisions (OGRT 2001, 507). The reform came with Law No. 4651, which is a milestone in terms of institutional independence. Accordingly, CBRT obtained “absolute autonomy” in exercising its powers and carrying out its duties. 19 Hence, third parties do not have the right to give instructions to the CBTR (EC 2006b, 2). As far as the institutional independence of the CBRT is concerned, the first necessary reform, which is not yet realized and is highlighted in several Progress Reports of the Commission (EC 2004, 105; EC 2005, 91; EC 2008, 59; EC 2009, 61; EC 2010, 67; EC 2011a, 76), is concerned with the determination of the inflation target by the CBRT jointly with the government. The Progress Reports argue that this is against the institutional independence of the CBRT; thus, Turkey is expected to make the necessary reforms, which will enable the CBRT to determine the inflation target on its own. However, Yazgan (2003) argues that since the inflation target will be determined by the sole authority of the ECB after accession, there will be no such problem as determining the inflation target with the government if Turkey becomes a member state (Yazgan 2003, 122–23). Hence, although the EU asserts that this reform is necessary before accession, it will automatically be achieved after accession with the ECB having the sole authority to determine the inflation target. The second necessary reform in this area is related to the role of the prime minister in the event of a disagreement between the governor and the board members. According to the CBRT Law, when there is a controversial issue between the governor and the board members, the prime minister should act as an arbitrator. 20 This is directly contrary to the institutional independence of the CBRT; thus, it has to be abolished. This requirement is echoed in the Screening Report as well (EC 2006a, 5). The third necessary reform in this area is related to the CBRT Law, which requires that the Monetary Policy Committee provide information to the government by preparing reports on monetary policy targets. 21 According to the Screening Report on Turkey, these reports should be expost; otherwise, they would harm the institutional independence of the CBRT (EC 2006a, 5). Indeed, unless they are revised as ex-post, the government always has the possibility of affecting the policies of the CBRT.

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[7.31]

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The last reform in this area is related to the CBRT Law, which makes the reporting of monetary policy by the governor to the Council of Ministers obligatory. 22 This article is a threat to the institutional independence of the CBRT, and these reports should be ex-post in order to cure this situation.

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PROHIBITION OF DIRECT MONETARY FINANCING OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR BY THE CENTRAL BANK

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The financing of the public sector by the CBRT should also be banned by Turkey for alignment with Chapter 17 of the EU acquis. This is also known as a “no bail-out clause,” meaning that states could not pay their debt by printing money via their central banks (Verdun 2010, 326). The EU acquis to be aligned with is TFEU, which prohibits overdraft facilities and/or credit facilities in favor of public institutions. 23 The first and foremost reform also came in 2001 with Law No. 4651, according to which “the Bank shall not grant advance and extend credit to the Treasury and to public establishments and institutions, and shall not purchase debt instruments issued by [them].” 24 The 2001 Progress Report appreciated this reform, stating that “Turkey has made some progress in the adoption of EMU acquis” (EC 2001, 65), and this reform was echoed in Turkey’s 2003 National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (OGRT 2003, 402). Furthermore, with the same reform package, articles of the CBRT Law, which were related to short-term advances to the Treasury and credit to public institutions, were repealed (OGRT 2003, 402). In addition, Article 15/b of the former Banking Law (No. 4389), which obliged the CBRT to grant advances to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu [TMSF]), 25 was repealed. Instead, Article 131 of New Banking Law No. 5411 was adopted, authorizing but not obliging the CBRT to grant advances to SDIF (EC 2006a, 3). Hence, with these reforms in 2001, Turkey aligned herself substantially, though not totally, with Chapter 17 of the EU acquis in terms of prohibition of financing of the public sector by the CBRT. The first and foremost reform that is not yet realized, but is necessary, is related to SDIF. Although the obligation of the CBRT to finance SDIF was repealed in 2001, it is still possible for the CBRT to finance SDIF under extraordinary circumstances, via Article 4.2 (d) of the CBRT Law. This fact was criticized by the Commission in its several Progress Reports, stating that in exceptional cases, such as for the financing of bailing out banks taken over by the SDIF, the possibility of direct financing by the CBRT still remains (EC 2002, 89; EC 2004, 106; EC 2005, 11; EC 2008, 59). Therefore, a required reform for prohibiting direct financing of the public sector by the CBRT is to repeal Article 4.2 (d) of the CBRT Law.

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[7.40]

The second necessary reform under this heading is related to the CBRT Law, which makes the CBRT “the lender of last resort” if a bank has a liquidity or credit problem. 26 The necessary reform to be made on these articles, according to the Screening Report of the EU, is to add some clauses that would safeguard the CBRT if the loans will not be able to be repaid by the bank due to solvency problems (EC 2006a, 7). Indeed, in the absence of this kind of preventive measure, the CBRT automatically becomes the financer and bears the financial costs, which is not in accordance with the prohibition of direct financing of the public sector. Hence, the necessary reform is to add preventive clauses to the CBRT Law.

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PROHIBITION OF PRIVILEGED ACCESS OF PUBLIC SECTOR TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

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Prohibition of privileged access of public sector to financial institutions is another requirement to be aligned with Chapter 17. Although it is not related only to the CBRT, a specific focus on the CBRT reform is helpful to evaluate Turkey’s progress in this area. According to the 2005 Progress Report of the European Commission, banks were still obliged to hold a certain amount of government securities (in the form of Turkish Treasury bonds) at the CBRT (EC 2005, 91), which was not in line with prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. As a response, just seven days after the release of the 2005 Progress Report, this liquidity requirement was abolished (CBRT 2005). Thus, the banks are no longer obliged to hold government securities with the CBRT, which is an important step for the alignment of Turkey with the EU acquis in terms of prohibition of the public sector’s privileged access to financial institutions. Though there are necessary reforms to be made under this heading, they are not related to the CBRT, thus are not analyzed in this chapter.

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[7.44]

PREPARATION OF THE CBRT FOR FUNCTIONING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ESCB AND FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLE MONETARY POLICY

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As it was stated as a development in the 2006 Progress Report of the Commission on Turkey, the CBRT has already changed its profit and loss calculation method related to foreign exchange purchase and sale transactions to “average cost method,” in line with the EU system (EC 2006b, 51). The necessary reforms that are not yet realized under this heading are not problematic, because they are the technical arrangements 27 to be made on accession to the EU or the adoption of the euro. For example, the CBRT Law, which stipulates that the privilege of issuing banknotes in

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Turkey exclusively belongs to CBRT, 28 should be harmonized with the TFEU, which asserts that the European Central Bank has the exclusive right to authorize the issue of euro banknotes within the Union. 29 This harmonization, i.e., transferring the right to issue the banknotes from the CBRT to the ESCB, is not possible before accession to the EU; therefore, there is no problem with this harmonization. This is also pointed out in the 2003 NPAA, which clearly states that after acceding to the EU, the CBRT will be a part of the ECSB and the required harmonization will be achieved at that stage (OGRT 2003, 404). While the reforms for the preparation of the CBRT for functioning within the framework of ECSB have to come into force on accession to the EU, the required reforms in the area of implementation of single monetary policy have to come into force on participation to the European Monetary Union (EMU), i.e., adoption of the euro. The CBRT Law ,which states that the CBRT shall determine monetary policy at its own discretion, 30 should be harmonized with TFEU, which specifies the task of the ESCB as defining and implementing “the monetary policy of the Union.” 31 To put it differently, after the adoption of the euro, the CBRT should transfer its discretion to determine the monetary policy to the ESCB, which will undoubtedly be the case just before the adoption of the euro. It can be stated that the necessary reforms for the preparation of the CBRT for functioning within the framework of the ESCB and for single monetary policy are not problematic, and they will be adopted if Turkey becomes one of the members of the EU and then if it adopts the euro.. It is not yet known whether Turkey will want to adopt the euro or not after the accession, observing the current problems of the Eurozone. As long as Turkey would be willing to adopt the euro and thus to let its exchange rate fluctuate within the limits of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) for at least two years after the accession, the necessary reforms in this area can easily be achieved.

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DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH FURTHER ALIGNMENT WITH THE EU

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In evaluating the complications associated with further reform for alignment, a twofold approach is used. First, the experiences of some CEECs regarding central bank reform are taken into account for drawing some insight for the Turkish case. Second, difficulties posed by the recent crisis for the ECB and the Eurozone member states and their new arrangements to overcome the crisis are considered, and further conclusions are drawn about the impact of this on further CBRT alignment.

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EXPERIENCE OF CEECS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

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Epstein and Johnson (2010) argue that there is a negative correlation between the continuity of domestic institutions and regime and the institutionalization of central bank reforms, because stable and long-lived governments become less open to international institutions’ suggestions (Epstein and Johnson 2010, 1248). This was the case in Romania in the period between 1990 and 1996, when the strong and stable government’s priority was to achieve high employment and income rather than price stability (Epstein and Johnson 2010, 1247). It was only in 1998, under a new coalition government, that assuring price stability became the main responsibility of the National Bank of Romania (NBR), enabled by the new statute of the NBR (EC 1998, 19, 29). Similar to Romania (1990–1996), Turkey has a long-lived government and has had institutional continuity since 2002. Furthermore, similar to Romania’s coalition government’s price stability reform in 1998, in Turkey this reform came in 2001, when there was a coalition government in power. Throughout the period from 2001 onward, an important central bank reform was not achieved under the stable government. This seems to verify the negative correlation that Epstein and Johnson make between stable government and institutionalization of central bank reforms. It is possible, however, to evaluate this situation from a different perspective. First, it is possible to argue that the reforms that were made in 2001 were so comprehensive that most of the important reforms were already covered (Bakır 2009, 584–85). Second, there was an economic crisis in Turkey in 2001, which necessitated “free[ing the] central bank from politics” (Morris 2001). One of the main causes of high inflation during the economic crisis was the government’s access to the CBRT’s resources, and it was necessary to reform the central bank by increasing its legal independence (Bakır 2009, 590). In other words, in 2001, the economic crisis rather than the nature of the government triggered the reforms. CEECs’ experience with respect to individual reform areas would also be helpful in predicting the future path of the CBRT reforms and having an idea on whether these further reforms are really necessary before accession. Regarding functional independence, the required reform is to replace the part that refers to the support of economic policies of the government with a new part referring to the policies of the Union. Most of the CEECs, such as Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, refer to the policies of the Union in their relevant legislation and are thus in line with the EU acquis. However, the Polish case shows that this reform is not a sine qua non for alignment with the EU acquis. Indeed, although Poland has been an EU member since 2004, the Act on the National Bank of Poland (Narodowy Bank Polski) still refers to supporting the economic policy of the

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government, 32 not that of the Union. Hence, referring to the policies of the Union instead of the policies of the government in order to increase the functional independence of the CBRT seems not to be indispensable on the way to the EU. Within the context of personal independence, the central bank laws of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary all explain the reasons for the dismissal of the central bank’s governor, which is in line with the EU acquis (Radzyner and Riesinger 1997, 73). The CBRT Law mentions these reasons, but they should be put in line with the EU acquis. However, the Act on the Bank of Slovenia (Banka Slovenija Act), still does not specify these reasons, 33 despite the fact that Slovenia has been an EU member since 2004. Again, it seems that this may not be a crucial requirement before accession. With regard to the reporting obligations of the Monetary Policy Committee and the governor within the context of institutional independence, the following observations can be made in some CEECs. The Czech National Bank (Česká Národní Banka) is required to submit a report on monetary development to the Parliament at least twice a year. 34 The National Bank of Slovakia must submit its annual report to the National Council. 35 In Hungary, there are annual and regular reports on monetary policy that should be submitted to the government, while in Poland, there are periodic reports that should be submitted both to the Parliament and to the Council of Ministers (Radzyner and Riesinger 1997, 75). As it is seen, reporting exists in CEECs as well, but these reporting obligations are expost. Hence, Turkey should also align herself with the EU acquis by making the reporting obligations of the CBRT ex-post. On the prohibition of direct (monetary) financing of the public sector, the required reform is to avoid financing of SDIF by the CBRT under extraordinary circumstances. However, similar exceptional cases are still valid for CEECs although they are EU members. For example, in case of Slovenia, one of the exemptions to this prohibition is “financing of the Republic of Slovenia’s liabilities to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).” 36 Furthermore, more similar to the exceptional SDIF case of Turkey is that of Slovakia, where the law stipulates that “the National Bank of Slovakia may grant a short-term loan to the Deposit Protection Fund or the Investment Guarantee Fund in order to cover the fund’s urgent and unforeseen needs for supply of liquidity.” 37 This clearly shows that even EU members have exceptional cases when it comes to direct financing of the public sector by the central bank, so Turkey is not far away from alignment by having such exceptions. Another major point is that that legal independence of the central bank does not guarantee its actual independence (Cukierman 2008: 722), and the Hungarian experience is an example. Since the power to amend the central bank law belongs to Parliament, there is always the possibility that the government may decrease central bank independence by chang-

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ing the central bank law. On 30 December 2011, a reform package concerning the Hungarian National Bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank), which decreased the independence of the bank, was passed by Parliament (France24 2011). Although the European Commission demanded that this legislation, which would decrease the powers of the governor of Magyar Nemzeti Bank and increase the influence of Parliament in setting the interest rates, be withdrawn (EUbusiness, 2011), this law came into force and deteriorated the relations between Hungary and the EU. The lesson to be drawn from this case for Turkey is that reforms increasing the legal independence of the CBRT do not guarantee its actual independence. An overall evaluation of the CBRT reforms with a comparison to the CEECs shows that although the legal framework does not guarantee the actual independence of the CBRT, the legal formulation of the independence of the CBRT and the prohibition of direct financing of the public sector by the CBRT are well established and some of the further required reforms are not indispensable, considering that even some CEECs that are already EU members have not yet realized these reforms.

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THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL BANK REFORM

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Since the advent of the Eurozone crisis in early 2010 when the Greek debt crisis erupted, the EU has striven to solve the problem by bailout packages for Greece and also comprehensive fiscal reforms leading to the signing of the Fiscal Compact. 38 The Fiscal Compact obliges the member states to transform the requirements of the compact into their national laws (European Council 2012b), accelerating the convergence of the member states’ fiscal policies. On the other hand, it can be argued that the necessity of fiscal reforms in order to solve the crisis has so far been overemphasized. Arner, Panton, and Lejot (2010) and Salines, Glöckler, and Truchlewski (2012) state that in coping with the financial crisis, the ECB first used its standard instrument (i.e., lowered the short-term interest rates at first), but for maintaining price stability in the medium term, it had to use nonstandard measures, which it emphasized were temporary. Eventually the financial crisis led to only gradual and temporary change in the EMU (Salines, Glöckler, and Truchlewski 2012, 671).On the other hand, Pisani-Ferry (2012) argues that the three basic tenets on which the euro is based have caused the crisis; these tenets are, first, no coresponsibility for public debt; second, strict no-monetary financing (by the ECB); and third, bankssovereign interdependence (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 4). In other words, it is the coexistence of these three tenets, rather than the overemphasized fiscal reasons, that caused the euro crisis, according to Pisani-Ferry. Among

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these three tenets the second one, in particular—no-monetary financing by the ECB—is closely related to the subject of this chapter. Pisani-Ferry argues that since no-monetary financing by the ECB is one of the problems, one of the possible solutions to the euro crisis is a change to the ECB’s mandate by giving it the role of lender-of-last-resort (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 9). This is also echoed by Eichengreen (2012), who states that a monetary union without a central bank that can act as a lender of last resort is not viable. Brkic and Kotarski (2010) refer to the need of a central bank dedicated to economic prosperity. On the other hand, Cukierman (2011) points to the fact that in case of a crisis, the first line of defense becomes the liquidity injections of the central bank, which might endanger central bank independence in the long term, while Klomp and de Haan (2009) find a positive relationship between central bank independence and financial stability. Expanding the mandate of the ECB by giving it the role of preserving financial stability (in addition to its already-existing role of maintaining price stability) via overdraft facilities or directly purchasing government securities from public authorities (which are prohibited by TFEU 39 ) is an issue not only for the EU but also for potential candidates such as Turkey. In fact, if such an expanded mandate is given to the ECB, this means that the entire structure of Chapter 17, with which Turkey must be aligned, should be changed. If the prohibition of direct (monetary) financing of the public sector by the central bank is abolished by expanding the role of the ECB in order to solve any potential crisis, this gives the candidate countries’ central banks the chance of financing public debt by purchasing government securities directly from public authorities. Hence, a possible change to the mandate of the ECB implies a change in the entire process of central bank reform in the candidate countries in the same direction. However, the possibility of such change is rather low. This is because, first, expanding the mandate by including financial stability is difficult, as it necessitates unanimous agreement of twenty-seven members; second, the ECB would be reluctant to buy government securities directly from public authorities as the losses on its purchases would require injection of additional capital, which would in turn make the ECB a vehicle for a transfer in favor of some countries who benefit from the purchases; third, the Governing Council of the ECB’s voting rule is not appropriate for such an action because all the votes, regardless of the shares of the holders, are equal; and fourth, the ECB is not equipped to exercise conditionality (Pisani-Ferry 2012, 10). Therefore, there is unlikely to be a change in the mandate of the ECB or a change in the structure and requirements of Chapter 17, at least in the near future. Thus attempts to cure the present financial crisis by the EU do not seem to affect the central bank reform process of Turkey.

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CONCLUSION

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Considering the reforms already made, Turkey’s alignment with Chapter 17 of the EU acquis within the context of central bank reforms is quite advanced. The major 2001central bank reform not only increased the independence of the CBRT by setting the primary objective of the CBRT as maintaining price stability, but also introduced the necessary arrangements that limit the direct (monetary) financing of the Treasury or any other public institution by the CBRT. The other reforms that are already made can be summarized as follows: giving the CBRT the authority to decide on the necessary means to achieve its price stability objective; giving it the power to prepare the budget, annual report, balance sheet, income statements, and the agenda of the General Assembly of the Bank; not reflecting the unrealized valuation gains and losses in the income statement unless there is a loss; making the term of the governor five years; repealing the former Banking Law, which had obliged the CBRT to grant advances to the SDIF; abolishing the liquidity requirement, which had obliged the banks to hold government securities with the CBRT; and changing the profit and loss calculation method to “average cost method.” Due to the stagnant CBRT-related reform period from 2001 onwards, there remained some reforms that are necessary for total alignment with the EU, which can be summarized as follows: the inflation target should not be determined jointly with the government; the secondary objective of the CBRT should be supporting the growth and employment policies not of the government, but of the EU, which will be the case after accession; the CBRT should not submit the balance sheet and income statement to the prime ministry for approval; the term of office of board members should be made five years for alignment with that of the governor; the reasons for dismissal of the governor should be aligned with the EU acquis and the reasons for the dismissal of board members should be specified; it should be possible for board members to demand a judicial review if they are dismissed; the prime minister should not act as an arbitrator in a disagreement between the governor and the board members; the reports of the Monetary Policy Committee should be made ex-post and the reporting of the governor to the Council of Ministers should not be obligatory; the CBRT should not finance the SDIF under extraordinary circumstances; and the CBRT should be prevented from being the financer when a bank has solvency problems. In addition to all of these, the bank should be aligned with the framework of ESCB on accession to the EU and aligned with a single monetary policy on the adoption of the euro. A comparison with the performance of CEECs shows that Turkey’s alignment with Chapter 17 of the EU acquis in terms of central bank reform can be regarded as well advanced; some of the remaining reforms

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are not indispensable for Turkey on the way to the EU, because there are still some CEECs that have not adopted some of them, though they are members of the EU. The new arrangements regarding the current Eurozone crisis are not basically related with Chapter 17 and therefore do not seem to have major implications for Turkey with respect to central bank reform. A solution suggested as a response to the crisis (though it is not likely to be implemented) is to increase the mandate of ECB by letting it finance debts and provide financial stability. If this unlikely solution became a reality, this would mean a change in the EU acquis in terms of Chapter 17, eliminating the prohibition of direct financing of the public sector by the central bank, with which the candidate countries including Turkey should be aligned. NOTES 1. Aylin Ege, Assoc. Prof. Dr, Middle East Technical University, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. Erman Aksüt, e-mail: [email protected]. 3. * Aylin Ege, Assoc. Prof. Dr, Middle East Technical University, e-mail: [email protected]. **Erman Aksüt, e-mail: [email protected]. Law (CBRT) No. 1211 of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey; Date of Acceptance: 14 January 1970 (amended by Law No. 3098 of 6 December 1984; Law No. 3670 of 25 October 1990; Law No. 3985 of 21 April 1994; Law No. 4651 of 25 April 2001; Law No. 5411 of 19 October 2005; Law No. 5728 of 23 January 2008; Law No. 6009 of 23 July 2010; Law No. 6111 of 13 February 2011), Article 4. 4. Protocol (EU) No C 115/230 of the Official Journal of the European Union of 9 May 2008 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Article 107. 5. TFEU (EU) No C 115/47 of the Official Journal of the European Union of 9 May 2008 on Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 130. 6. TFEU (EU), n. (3), Article 127 and Article 282 (2); Protocol (EU), n. (2), Article 2. 7. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 4. However, it is not possible to achieve price stability without having the other independences, i.e. financial, personal, and institutional independence (Yazgan 2003, 121; OGRT 2003, 400). 8. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 4. 9. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 4. 10. TFEU (EU), n. (3), Article 282(2). 11. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 22 i. 12. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 61. 13. Protocol (EU), n. (2), Article 14.2. 14. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 25. 15. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 28. 16. Protocol (EU), n. (2), Article 14.2. 17. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 20. 18. Protocol (EU), n. (2), Article 14.2. 19. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 4(III). 20. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 26.2. 21. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 22/A c.

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22. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 42. 23. TFEU (EU), n. (3), Article 123(1). 24. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 56. 25. SDIF (TMSF) is a public entity, insuring savings deposits in order to protect the rights of depositors and to contribute to confidence in the banking system. See http:// www.tmsf.org.tr/default-en.html. 26. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 40 I (c) and Article 4.2 (e). 27. The articles of the CBRT Law that are related to definition of monetary policy, the conduct of foreign exchange policy and operations, the holding and managing of foreign reserves, the right to authorize the issue of banknotes and the volume of coins, the definition of the currency unit, the imposition of sanctions, the financial provisions of the ESCB, payment systems, professional secrecy, and the statistical role of the ECB and the European Council. The additional functions to be performed by the CBRT should be revised just before the adoption of the euro (European Commission 2006b, 9). 28. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 4.2 (a). 29. TFEU (EU), n. (3), Article 128. 30. Law (CBRT), n. (1), Article 4. 31. TFEU (EU), n. (3), Article 127 (2). 32. Law on the Act on the National Bank of Poland of 29 August 1997 (legislation in force as of 30 December 2010), Article 3.1. 33. Banka Slovenije Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 72/06—official consolidated version. 34. Law on the Act on the Czech National Bank, No. 6/1993 Coll., Article 3.1. 35. Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the National Bank of Slovakia, Article 39.5. 36. Banka Slovenije Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 72/06—official consolidated version, Article 25.2. 37. Act on the National Bank of Slovakia, Article 24.2. 38. On 2 March 2012, twenty-five EU members (excluding the United Kingdom and Czech Republic) signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact), which aimed at empowering fiscal discipline by a “balanced budget rule,” meaning that the budget of the members should be balanced or give a surplus and the structural deficit should not exceed 0.5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (European Council 2012a). 39. TFEU (EU), n. (3), Article 123.

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REFERENCES

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Arner, Douglas W., Michael A. Panton, and Paul Lejot. 2010. “Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the Global Financial System.” Global Business and Development Law Journal 23: 1–41. Bakır, Caner. 2005. “Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı, Hesap Verebilirliği ve Saydamlığı: TCMB Uluslararası Bir Karşılaştırma.” İktisat İşletme ve Finans 20(233): 20–36. Bakır, Caner. 2009. “Policy Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: Multilevel Governance of Central Banking Reform.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 22(4): 571–98. Brkic, Luka, and Kristijan Kotarski. 2010. “Managing Crisis in the Eurozone.” Crotian Political Science Review, 47(4): 7–26. Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). 2005. Press Release No. 2005-42 of 16 November 2005 on the Communiques on Required Reserves and Liquidity Requirement, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/announce/2005/ANO2005-42.htm (07.06.2012). Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) . 2012. Inflation Report 2012-I : 3, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/research/parapoli/inflation2012I_full.pdf (02.06.2012).

Aylin Ege and Erman Aksüt Council of the European Union. 2012. Fiscal Compact Signed: Strengthened Fiscal Discipline and Convergence in the Euro Area (press release), Brussels. Crowe, Christopher, and Ellen E. Meade. 2008. “Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness.” European Journal of Political Economy 24: 763–77. Cukierman, Alex. 2008. “Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions—Past, Present, and Future.” European Journal of Political Economy 24: 722–36. Cukierman, Alex. 2011. “Reflections on the Crisis and on Its Lessons for Regulatory Reform and for Central Bank Policies.” Journal of Financial Stability 7: 26–37. Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb, and Bilin Neyapti. 1992. “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes.” World Bank Economic Review 6(3): 353–98. Dragos, Christian, Daniela Beju, and Simona Dragos. 2009. “Public and Financial Institutions in Transition Countries: An Overview and Recent Evidences from Central and Eastern Europe.” Public and Financial Institutions in Transition Economie, 7(3): 147–70. Eichengreen, Barry. 2012. “Implications of the Euro’s Crisis for International Monetary Reform,” prepared for the session titled “A New International Monetary Order?” at the Allied Social Science Associated Meetings, Chicago. Epstein, Rachel, and Juliet Johnson. 2010. “Uneven Integration: Economic and Monetary Union in Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48(5): 1237–1260. EUbusiness. 2011. “Barroso Attacks Hungary’s Central Bank Reforms,” http:// www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/hungary-economy.e8u/ (05.07.2012). European Central Bank (ECB). 2012. “Independence,” http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_007.en.html (08.06.2012). European Commission (EC) . 1998. Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards Accession . European Commission (EC). 1998. Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession. European Commission (EC). 2001. Regular Report of 13 November 2001 on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, SEC (2001) 1756. European Commission (EC). 2002. Regular Report of 9 October 2002 on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, SEC (2002) 1412. European Commission (EC). 2003. Regular Report of 8 November 2003 on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, SEC (2003) 1212. European Commission (EC). 2004. Regular Report of 6 October 2004 on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, SEC (2004) 1201. European Commission (EC). 2005. Progress Report of 9 November 2005 on Turkey, SEC (2005) 1426. European Commission (EC). 2006a. Screening Report of 9 October 2006 on Turkey: Chapter 17—Economic and Monetary Policy. European Commission (EC). 2006b. Progress Report of 8 November 2006 on Turkey, SEC (2006) 1390. European Commission (EC). 2007. Progress Report of 6 November 2007 on Turkey, SEC (2007) 1436. European Commission (EC). 2008. Progress Report of 5 November 2008 on Turkey, SEC (2008) 2699. European Commission (EC). 2009. Progress Report of 14 October 2009 on Turkey, SEC (2009) 1334. European Commission (EC). 2010. Progress Report of 9 November 2010 on Turkey, SEC (2010) 1327. European Commission (EC). 2011a. Progress Report of 12 October 2011 on Turkey, SEC (2011) 1201 final.

EU Accession and Central Bank Reform in Turkey European Commission (EC). 2011b. “Economic Accession Criteria,” http:// ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/index_en.htm (04.06.2012). European Council. 2012a. Fiscal Compact Signed: Strengthened Fiscal Discipline and Convergence in the Euro Area (press release), 2 March, Brussels. European Council, 2012b, “The Fiscal Compact Ready to Be Signed,” http:// www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/the-fiscal-compact-readyto-be-signed-(2) (15.07.2012). European Council . 2012c. Speech by President Herman Van Rompuy during the Signing Ceremony of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (press release), 2 March, Brussels, EUCO 39/12 PRESSE 88 PR PCE 32. France24. 2011. “Defiant Hungary Passes Disputed Central Bank Law,” http:// www.france24.com/en/20111230-hungarian-lawmakers-pass-controversial-lawsdespite-international-concerns-central-bank (13.07.2012). Klomp, Jeroen, and Jakob de Haan. 2009. “Central Bank Independence and Financial Instability.” Journal of Financial Stability 5: 321–38. Morris, Chris. 2001. “Turkey Frees Central Bank from Politics.” BBCNews, 25 April, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1296359.stm (03.06.2012). Neyaptı, Bilin. 2001. “Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance in Eastern Europe.” Economic Systems 25: 381–99. Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey (OGRT). 2001. National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, Council of Ministers decision: 19 March 2001, No. 2001/2129, OGRT publication: 24 March 2001, No. 24352 bis. English version available at http:// www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=195&l=2. Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey (OGRT). 2003. National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, Council of Ministers Decision: 23 June 2003, No. 2003/5930, OGRT Publication: 24 July 2003, No. 25178 bis. English version available at http:// www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=196&l=2. Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ). 2001. “Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey” (2001/235/EC), OJ L 85, 24.3.2001. Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ). 2003. “Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey” (2003/398/EC), OJ L 145, 12.6.2003. Pisani-Ferry, Jean. 2012. “The Euro Crisis and the New Impossible Trinity.” Bruegel Policy Contribution 1: 1–16. Radzyner, Olga, and Sandra Riesinger. 1997. “Central Bank Independence in Transition: Legislation and Reality in Central and Eastern Europe.” Focus on Transition 1: 57–90. Salines, Marion, Gabriel Glöckler, and Zbigniew Truchlewski. 2012. “Existential Crisis, Incremental Response: The Eurozone’s Dual Institutional Evolution: 2007–2011.” Journal of European Public Policy 19(5): 665–81. Saraç, Osman. 2002. “Merkez Bankasının Yeni Yüzü ve İşlevi.” Yaklaşım 119: 100–106. Verdun, Amy. 2010. “Economic and Monetary Union.” European Union Politics, Michelle Cini and Nieves Peez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.), 324–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yazgan, Arzu. 2003. “Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası’nın Avrupa Merkez Bankaları Sistemi’ne Uyumu,” Proficiency diss. for expertness, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Foreign Relations Department.

EIGHT Turkish Agriculture in Case of EU Membership or Nonmember Status Gülcan Eraktan 1

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Turkey’s dynamic economy is a complex mix of modern industry and commerce along with a considerable traditional agriculture sector. The importance of agriculture is still observed when the share of the sector in employment (23.6 percent in March 2012) and in the GDP (7.9 percent in 2011) is considered (TUİK, 2012). The figures reflect not only the ongoing significance of the sector but also the traditional character of it. The EEC-Turkey Association Agreement, known as the Ankara Agreement, was signed in 1963. It laid down the basic objectives of relations between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC)— i.e., the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations and the establishment of a Customs Union (CU). Turkey tabled a request for accession in 1987. That application was met with a refusal bringing forward some economic, social, and political arguments and citing the statement “without casting doubt on its eligibility for membership of the Community” (CEC 1989). After delivering this negative opinion from the European Commission on the opening of accession negotiations, the case was not touched up until the fifth enlargement wave of the EU. Twelve years after the rejection of the Turkish request, a major breakthrough in Turkish relations with the European Union took place at the Helsinki European Council of 10–11 December 1999. At the Council it was concluded that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.” With this decision, Turkey was put firmly on the track toward

Gülcan Eraktan

accession; however, contrary to other accession countries, Turkey did not receive a timetable for accession negotiations (Stajono 2007, 12). Although the date of starting accession negotiation was not offered by the EU, Turkey began to implement some important legal and institutional changes also in the agricultural area beginning in 2001. The European Council eventually decided on 17 December 2004 that Turkey qualified to start accession negotiations and fixed the starting date of 3 October 2005. However, derogations and transitory disposition settlements may be imposed on Turkey, and the right of establishing derogations for agriculture, structural funds, and free movement of labor would be permanent. The derogations, permanently available safeguards, are explained in Article 23 in Presidency Conclusions in that manner (European Council 2004, 6). “The EU can consider long transition periods, derogations or safeguard clauses that could be permanently available in sensitive or costly areas such as free movement of persons, regional subsidies or agriculture.” Such restrictions could actually prepare the ground for a “privileged partnership” rather than full membership. It presumably must be some sort of partnership between Turkey and the EU that aims at close cooperation but not full membership. In other words, it is based on the assumption that Turkey can join the EU but without full participation in EU institutions. The negotiations would not be finalized before 2014, and there would be no guarantee regarding the final outcome of the negotiations, according to the Council decision. In spite of all these restrictions, Turkey signed the accession documents of the ten new member states before 3 October 2005 and meanwhile accepted not to take measures to prevent the free movement of goods and services originating from the new member states. Turkey, however, segregated Cyprus from other new member states because of the ongoing conflict with that state due to the insulation and overlooking of political rights of Turkish people living in the island. This fact has been the major reason keeping the negotiation process from making progress. Indeed the European Council suspended the negotiation of eight out of thirty-five chapters in December 2006 since Turkey did not keep to the envisaged political approach; agriculture and rural development and fisheries are two of the chapters that were suspended. Relations between Turkey and the EU have continued for half a century without coming to an end. That situation was regarded as an extremely boring attitude and indignity by the Turkish people. The great majority of the people are not in favor of the future EU membership of Turkey any more. They feel they have been misled, and they have lost their trust in the correctness of the relations. On the other hand, Turkey continues to fulfill the requirements of the alignment process and to take the necessary steps for legislative harmonization. The influences of full membership on the several sectors of Turkey and no doubt on the EU member states have been of great interest in

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Turkish Agriculture in Case of EU Membership or Nonmember Status

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Turkey, but especially in European countries. Some of the studies focus on trade creation and diversification after full membership, some of them are market research that has been conducted, and some investigate costs and benefits of the accession from the point of view of one or both partners and the financial burden of the accession. The purpose of this study is to describe the agricultural environment of Turkey, to interpret some developments, to summarize the findings of several research studies fulfilled in the agricultural area on the effects of full membership on the agriculture of Turkey and the EU member states, and to discuss the weaknesses and challenges of the agriculture sector in Turkey.

[8.8]

HISTORY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

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Agricultural character outweighed in the economy as Turkey applied to the European Economic Community in 1959. The export items did not vary enough and the export of industrial plants and dry fruits had a considerable share in the export of agricultural products and in overall export as well. The share of the export of four products—i.e., cotton, tobacco, nuts, sultanas, and dried figs—varied between 53 and 84 percent of the export of agricultural products and between 45 and 72 percent of overall exports in the 1950s (Eraktan 1988, 29). The significance of the EU for Turkey was closely related to the share of the member states in foreign trade of agricultural products at that time. The share of export toward EU-6 states was between 35 and 50 percent in the 1950s. Greece, Spain, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria exported the same products and mainly to the EU-6 states. The rates of the export of these states on the EU markets were similar too. Therefore it was of importance to keep the market share of Turkey in the EU-6. Turkey should not lose the competitiveness in that market. The intent of Greece, a serious competitor, to sign a partnership agreement with the EU prompted Turkey to go the same way. Taking not only this prospect but also some other concerns into account, Turkey attempted to create a partnership with the EU-6 just after Greece. Some objections and resistance attempts were experienced during the negotiations, while some countries supported the efforts of Turkey. Consequently, a partnership was established (12 September 1963), which would be based on cooperation among the partners according to the 238th article of the Rome Treaty (originally). So the relations of Turkey with the EU began with acquiring a partnership status according to Article 237. Taking into consideration the problems that Turkey experienced economically at that time, the partnership would be realized in three steps.

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Turkey was given a preparatory stage to strengthen its economy with the contribution of the EU, so that Turkey could fulfill the responsibilities assigned to it in the transitional and final phases. Turkey was provided with one-sided preferences so as to enhance the Turkish economy. According to the 11th article of the partnership agreement, the partnership regime involved import and export of agricultural products, and the term of agricultural products included the products registered in Appendix II of the Rome Treaty and in the list completed later on. Turkey acquired customs duty reductions for four agricultural products—raw or nonmanufactured tobacco, raisins, dried figs, and nuts—in the preparation phase. Italy applied to dried figs originating from Turkey the same import duties it applied to other third countries. Germany was principally not imposed customs duties for raisins, as the product was not produced in the country. France and Italy were countries realizing the import of tobacco and tobacco wastes by the monopolies without customs duties. Thus Turkey could benefit only in a very restricted manner from the preferences given (Assoziationsrat 1966, 23–29). Since the preferential quotas given for the mentioned products, except nuts, could not be used entirely, the quotas allocated by individual member states were globalized for the EU-6 by the Turkey-EU Association Council. Besides, implemented customs duties were equalized through implementing Common Customs Tariffs (CCT) after the year 1968 (Assoziationsrat 1968, 35). Additional Protocol, which initiated the transitional phase, was signed in 1970. Quantitative restrictions, customs duties, and the tarifflike protection measures were abolished by the EU for the import goods originating from Turkey, except agricultural products and some industrial products in which production Turkey has a considerable competitiveness. Turkey would align the implemented customs duties to the CCT and abolish the duties implemented for the products imported from the EU in twelve or twenty-two years respectively. A Customs Union (CU) would be established within twenty-two years after the precautions of the CU are taken, and CU would extend to agriculture in case of harmonization of Turkish agricultural policy to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) precisely. For four traditional export products—tobacco, nuts, raisins, and dried figs—and for some other products, customs duty reductions were made or ad valorem taxes were abolished during the transitional phase. A new challenge for Turkey has begun after the completion of the transitional stage. Rules and procedures of the CU were established in the Association Council Decision No. 1/95. The CU was the last stage before the full membership. The CU is intended to cover industrial and processed agricultural products and excluded services and sensitive areas such as Turkish agricultural products. Traditional agricultural products would be included only after Turkey has completed the alignment of

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its agriculture sector to the CAP. Nevertheless, agricultural preferences would not be unilateral any more, but mutual in this stage. Customs duties imposed on processed agricultural commodities have two components; while the share of industrial component in the tariffs was eliminated after the 1995 agreement, the agricultural component continues to be paid. Duties are calculated according to the volume of agricultural products (cereals, milk, and sugar) in the imported processed goods. The partners allocated each other preferences in trade of agricultural commodities mutually according to Decision No.1/98 of the Association Council. Turkey would import live bovines for purebred breeding with 100 percent tariff reduction without tariff quota, while the tariff reductions and tariff quotas are changing according to the peculiarities of live bovine animals other than purebred breeding. Additionally, cuts of bovine meat, milk and cream in special forms, butter, processed cheese, live plants, cut flowers, wheat, barley, rye, maize, tea, some vegetables, and so on, which originate in the EU would be imported into Turkey with tariff reductions and within the quotas (SPO 2001, 390). It seems that over 90 percent of Turkey’s agricultural exports enter the EU either without facing any trade barriers or under some kind of preferential trade arrangement. However, calendar and quota restrictions are essential for the trade. Ad valorem duties are applied to some fruits and vegetables in certain calendar periods of the year, though ad valorem duties ought to be abandoned according to Association Council Decision No. 1/80. Additionally, an entry price is applied to some fruits and vegetables. The Commission puts forward that trade liberalization in agriculture is highly asymmetrical: the EU has granted Turkey very preferential treatment on market access, while Turkey has granted relatively little in return. Roughly 70 percent of agricultural products enter the EU duty free, while fruits, vegetables, and tobacco enter the EU practically free of charge (EC 2004, 33).

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THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN TURKEY AND THE CHANGES IN THE COURSE OF TIME

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Transformation Phenomenon in Turkish Agriculture

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This section is devoted to the description of the general situation of the agricultural sector and to a general overview of agricultural production, and then the agricultural policies implemented presently are provided. Recent developments in the trade between the EU and Turkey and the trade potential are presented last.

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Agricultural Structure in Turkey

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Turkey is a promising country that has some peculiarities, such as having a great economic development potential and being a huge consumer market thanks to its young, dynamic, and large population. Increased industrial and partly agricultural production, capital movements, investments, and foreign trade are the signs of upturn in the economy (WTO 2010). Agriculture accounts for only a small share of GDP (about 8 percent) but a large share of total employment in Turkey. Agricultural employment figures are declining in absolute and relative terms in course of time, but they also change within the year. Though the figures tend to decrease from year to year, some people who migrated from their villages or are employed in other sectors come to their households to work in agricultural activities when their labor is needed, such as in harvest time. The rate of agricultural employment increases in summer and decreases in winter; for example, the rate of agriculture in total employment was 23.6 percent in March 2012 and 26.6 percent in August 2010 (WTO 2010). For comparison with the situation in the EU, agriculture contributes 1.2 percent of GDP and employs 4.7 percent of the population in the EU as a whole (EC 2012, 47). The figures in today’s Turkey resemble the agricultural structure and agricultural economics of the founder states of the EU in some aspects. The share of agriculture was 10 percent in Germany, 20 percent in France, and more than one-third in Italy among the employed civilian working population before the foundation of the Communities (Priebe 1988, 62–63). So the present situation of Turkey is reminiscent of the situation of the EU-6 at that time. Even 24.8 percent of the civilian working population in the EU-6 were in agriculture in 1965, while the share of agriculture in GDP was 11 percent (Stamer 1983, 70). The accession of Turkey would also resemble earlier EU enlargement rounds, since the realizations of the relative GDP per capita and of the weight of agriculture in employment are similar for Turkey and for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and some Central and Eastern European EU members. On the other hand, there are some aspects that legitimately cause us to consider the Turkish case as quite distinct from previous enlargements, as Belke (2005) indicated (Belke 2005, 54–55). One of the most important distinctive features of the Turkish case is the realization of the Customs Union with the EU and participation to the EU internal market for many goods except agricultural commodities. As a result of the increased ratio of overall exports to GDP and the constant share of the EU in overall Turkish trade, the Customs Union with the EU did not lead to trade diversion, but mainly to trade creation (Ulgen and Zahariadis 2004, 21; Danzinger et al., 2005).

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Agricultural Employment

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The number of household members engaged mainly in agricultural work on the landholding was 11.8 million persons total in 1991, while the number decreased to 8 million in 2001. The figure was 5.3 million in 2010 (TUİK 2010). Employment in agriculture is steadily declining not only as the share but also in absolute terms. According to the results of population censuses and household labor statistics, the figures are declining steadily albeit depending on the seasons. The shift of the amount of agricultural employment from one season to another is not occurring only due to the labor needs of agriculture. Agriculture helps partly overcome unemployment problems in Turkey through absorbing the labor force steadily or seasonally. A comparison with agricultural employment figures in the EU member states indicates that the figures in the member states, excluding Romania (19.1 percent), Bulgaria (14.7 percent), and Poland (10.1 percent), are at single-digit rates (EC 2011, 50). It is quite obvious that the high rate of agricultural employment continues to be an indicator of the importance of agriculture in the Turkish economy.

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Land Use in Turkish Agriculture

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The General Agricultural Census is carried out approximately every ten years (a decision has been made by a decree that agricultural censuses be held in the years ending with 1). The number of agricultural holdings has decreased by 25 percent from 4 million in 1991 to 3 million in the 2001 census. A decrease in the number of holdings can be explained by people giving up working in the agricultural area and ceasing their holdings, but the declining total size of the cultivated areas of the holdings is a subject of alarm. This is one of the negative effects of division of agricultural areas in real terms among inheritors and fragmentation. Fragmentation is accelerated whenever the number of inheritors of a holding increases, and after a degree the parcels cannot be divided anymore; in such a case no one cultivates the land in order not to work for sharing the gain. The aggregate size of those kind of agricultural areas is unknown but very large, as it is obvious from the figures of the last two censuses. That situation is likely to continue after 2001 and even to gain momentum. This creates a severe loss with respect to resource use in Turkey. The number of holdings is decreasing in the course of time. The average cultivated area per holding was about 5.2 hectares in 1991, and it increased to about 6 hectares in 2001 as a result of the diminishing number of holdings (TKİB 2009, 25). The number and area of the holdings in each size group has declined between the two censuses. Around 65 percent of farmers have less than 5 hectares of land. The most noticeable

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Gülcan Eraktan

change, however, has been the fall in the share of farms larger than 100 hectares. The decrease in this size group indicates that even the holdings that have the potential of productive and effective use are facing the fragmentation process too. Out of the agricultural censuses a statistical research was performed by the State Institute of Statistics in 2006 depending on the sampling method (TUİK 2008, 2). It may present an opportunity for making a comparison among the results of censuses and the situation of recent years. The results indicate that the share of smaller farms and the share of land used by them in the whole agricultural area are both declining. That is also evidence of abandoned holdings. To make a comparison regarding the size of holdings in Turkey and in the EU does not make any sense because of the different agricultural and economic structure of the EU member states even for the same period. There were a total of 13.7 million farms in the EU-27 in 2007, and 81.8 percent of them had land under 10 hectares. This figure in Greece reaches 89.3 percent, in Cyprus 93.4 percent, in Bulgaria 96.9 percent, and in Romania 97.4 percent—while in Denmark it is 27.1 percent and in Germany 36.4 percent (EC 2009). Therefore, neither a comparison with the EU27 nor with individual member states will help. A comparison regarding utilized agricultural area per holding will not give an idea for the structures either. That figure is 13.1 hectares in Turkey and 12.6 hectares in the EU-27 (EC 2009). Holdings in Turkey, on the other hand, are not only small but also fragmented. However, the rate of holdings with more fragmented lands is decreasing from one census to another. The rate of holdings that are made up of four to five parcels came to 21.6 percent, and the area used by them reached 16.2 percent of the total area in 2006. The number and rate of the most fragmented holdings are declining, and the reason for that shift probably depends on the big loss in size of parcels after the fragmentation process, so that they cannot be divided any more. Fragmentation and migration processes change the types of land use. Population in rural areas is aging as a result of migration of younger household members, and the older people who can hardly cultivate the land prefer to have the land cultivated through tenancy. Shareholding is a common land use form in Turkey. Traditional shareholding dominated in large holdings, especially in the Southeast Anatolia Region, which provides landowners (landlords) a great controlling power not only of agricultural activities, but even of the daily life of the shareholder’s family and the right to capture a bigger share of the goods produced in the holding. As the huge holdings get smaller and fragmented, these traditional relations are weakened and their existence is continued only in some places. The shareholding phenomenon is, however, continuing and changing. Small farms, of which the owners are mostly old, are being tenanted to

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persons who have both an entrepreneurial spirit and also capital for use in agricultural activities. The controlling power is in the hand of the tenant in this case, and the weak side is the landowner. That type of capitalistic shareholding form is being disseminated as a result of the developments that have emerged. A comparison between the data for 1991 and 2001 shows a remarkable shift toward the farms cultivated under more than one form of tenure, and secondly, farms that rent land from others. The shares of the farms that own their land and farms that use land in owner-like possession and cultivate the land under one form of tenure decreased. Holdings that cultivate only the area under their possession came to 85 percent of the total holdings, and the area reached 71 percent of the total in 2006. Another 12.7 percent of the holdings are cultivating land under a form of tenure besides their own area. The rate of holdings that cultivate land under one form of tenure is 2 percent and under more than one form of tenure is 0.2 percent. Land use of holdings shows also the general structure of agriculture from another aspect. Only wood and forest land have enlarged (22.7 percent). All other groups lost their shares at different rates. Agricultural land, cropland, and field crops decreased about 20 percent, and the decline in land under permanent meadows and pastures was about 40 percent. Land left temporarily fallow declined between the two censuses about 14.5 percent. In order to reduce the fallow area, a fallow land reduction project has been implemented in the Central Anatolian region, promoting the production of pulses instead of leaving land fallow. Although the fallow area decreased as a positive impact of that implementation, the situation changed in the course of time concerning the export of pulses. World markets for the pulses deteriorated for Turkish products, the production area of pulses declined, Turkey began to be an importer of pulses, and the project was finished. The land use distribution is changing depending on the size of holdings. The bigger the holdings the larger the share of arable land in the total area of the holdings. The share of fallow area is also increasing, depending on the widening of the lands of holdings. Horticulture and orchard areas concentrate in the size groups of less than 5, 5–9, 10–19, and 20–49 hectares. Smaller farms are more convenient for vegetable, fruit, and flower cultivation. Agricultural holdings are mostly specialized in field crops, and orchards are at the second rank. Animal breeding is mostly performed as a mixed form. Of agricultural holdings, 62.3 percent were being used for both crop production and animal breeding, while the share of holdings doing only crop production reached 37.2 percent in 2006. Holdings in which solely animal breeding activities were performed attained barely 0.5 percent. Depending on that fact, 66.4 percent of the total area was used by mixed farms, while 33.5 percent of the total area was used by

Gülcan Eraktan

holdings doing only crop production, and hardly 0.03 percent of the land was used by animal breeders. Irrigation is a key factor for forming crop patterns; 1.3 million holdings reported that they are irrigating the land, and their irrigated area reached 3.5 million hectares in 2001. The share of irrigated areas was approximately 19.8 percent of the total agricultural area, according to the results of the 2001 census. Irrigated areas are enlarging in the course of time. In 2006, 24.1 percent of the areas used by the holdings was irrigated. In that year, 27.8 percent of arable land, 72.7 percent of the horticulture area, 25.8 percent of the land covered by orchards and other permanent crops (including nursery gardens), 35 percent of permanent meadows, and 58.4 percent of poplar and willow groves were irrigated. The number of holdings producing cereals, sunflower, pulses, potatoes, vegetables, and also permanent crops (fruits and nuts) is declining between agricultural censuses. As to livestock production, holdings owning 1–4 cattle consist of 59.7 percent of total holdings that raise cattle, and holdings owning 10–19 cattle breed the most cattle, with the rate of 25.4 percent of all holdings that have bred stock. The majority of sheep- and goat-breeding holdings, on the other hand, have 20–49 animals, and their share in total sheep and goat breeding holdings reaches 25.3 percent, while 36.1 percent of all sheep and goats are under the possession of holdings with 50–149 animals.

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Production of Agricultural Products

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Crop production has a huge importance regarding total value of farm output; the share of crop production is 72 percent and 28 percent attained from livestock output in 2009. 2 However, the animal breeding sector is passing through a crisis in recent years, and the import facilities introduced in 2010 precipitated the crisis. Especially meat prices, which went through the roof, could affect the increase of livestock value, but it does not indicate any progress. If the rank of top agricultural products of Turkey is considered, cow milk is in the first position. Wheat, tomatoes, grapes, indigenous chicken meat, cotton lint, hazelnuts with shell, and indigenous cattle meat follow cow milk according to production value in 2008 (FAO 2008). Consequently, livestock products fall in the first eight ranks, as if the position and importance of animal breeding is very high in agricultural production of Turkey. Production of some agricultural commodities in Turkey has a unique position in the world (FAO 2008). The share of many Turkish products in world production is the highest among other producer countries (e.g., cherries, apricots, and hazelnuts are in the first rank; figs, watermelons, sour cherries, cucumbers, leeks, and natural honey are in the second rank). The place of Turkish products in world production are changing

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over time. Tobacco, for example, was the major export commodity and had a big share in world production until the last decades, but Turkish tobacco fell to tenth place as time went by. [8.49]

Consumption and Self-Sufficiency of Agricultural Products

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The share of household consumption expenditure devoted to food, beverages, and tobacco can also be an indicator of the importance of food and agriculture in the Turkish economy. The share of food and nonalcoholic beverages is 21.9 percent in 2010, and the share of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products is 4.5 percent (TUİK 2011). On the other hand, the share of household consumption expenditure devoted to food, beverages, and tobacco in the EU-27 was 16.5 percent in 2010 (EC 2011). The most consumed food in Turkey is bread, with other wheat products. Due to many reasons (such as the declining number of wheat-cultivating holdings, a developing wheat-processing industry), the self sufficiency in wheat became less than 100 percent. Turkey is losing sufficiency rates for many products. The situation is only satisfactory for some fruits and vegetables. The degree of self-sufficiency for grapefruit, lemon, mandarin, and orange was estimated as 404.6 percent, 295.6 percent, 209.2 percent, and 120 percent respectively. The degree of self-sufficiency for apricots was estimated to be 1,873.9 percent, 1,279.6 percent for figs, 148.9 percent for pomegranates, and for grape and apple 135.2 percent and 124 percent, respectively. For bananas, with the share of import in total banana supply at 52.9 percent, the degree of self-sufficiency is 47.1 percent (TUİK 2011).

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Foreign Trade of Agricultural Products

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The most meaningful comparison between Turkey and the EU that indicates the relations in agricultural sector can be made concerning the trade of commodities. Share of agricultural products in the foreign trade of both partners is an indicator. In 2010, the share of food and agricultural products in imports of all products was 5.4 percent in Turkey and 6.7 percent in the EU-27, while the share of food and agricultural products in exports of all products was 10.5 percent in Turkey and 6.6 percent in the EU-27. External trade balance in food and agricultural products reached €1.461 million in Turkey, while the amount was €6.832 million in the EU27 in 2010 (EC 2011). EU member states are the major trade partner of Turkey. Of the total export values, 48 percent and 46 percent were obtained from export to the EU member states in 2008 and 2009 respectively. However, these ratios are decreasing over time; they were 39 percent and 38 percent in 2010 and 2011 (TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı 2012). The place of the EU countries in the export of Turkish agricultural products varied between 6.7 percent and 10.9 percent in the 2000s, and Turkey’s share in the import of agricultural

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Gülcan Eraktan

products was about 3–4 percent. A comparison between the export of EU agricultural products to Turkey and the EU import of Turkish agricultural products from Turkey shows that the exports of the EU to Turkey increased as well, but the increase rate in exports of the EU was about 196 percent from 2001 to 2010, while the increase rate of imports of the EU was about 56 percent (EC 2008). Trade of live animals and animal products had no importance either from the export or the import aspects. While the EU member states had no demand for Turkish animal products, Turkey implemented a ban on EU-originated live animals and animal products because of the BSE (mad cow disease) crisis. The ban on imports of live animals and meat was lifted considering the increases in meat prices in 2010, and the implications of overturning the ban for import of animal products and the animal breeding activities of Turkey will be observed in a short time. Though the major export products of Turkey are fresh fruits and vegetables, only some products in that group can be exported in big quantities and almost each year (Akdeniz İhracatçı Birlikleri, 2010). The rank of importance is changing, but the main export products are the same. However, tomatoes, tangerines, mandarins, clementines, oranges, grapes, and cheers are the most important products in recent years.

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Agricultural Policy Implemented in Turkey

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Turkish agricultural policy cannot be determined apart from the current general approaches adopted by most countries of the world. The WTO rulings set the framework of agricultural policies. The Turkish government takes necessary actions to perform the rules of the WTO and additionally to align the agricultural policy of Turkey to the CAP. Support purchase policies were abolished over time. Direct income support payments, which were introduced beginning with the 2000s and targeted both at registering farmers and bringing the coupled payments to an end, were also stopped at the end of the 2000s. The decision to scrap the direct income support system caused a major shift in the agricultural policy of Turkey. Premiums began to be paid within de minimis limits in order to promote the production of some commodities. Area-based support measures were introduced for diesel oil, fertilizer, certificated seed and seedlings, soil analysis, good agricultural practices, and organic agriculture. Compensatory payments are also made for alternative products, which replaced commodities produced more than needed. Premiums and compensatory payments linked to specific sectors have become the main instrument of financial support to Turkish agriculture since 2009. Investment subsidies for milk cow or pure animal breeding, support for rural development investments, premium subsidy for agricultural insurance policies and support to the funds of agricultural insurance, credit allocation with reduced interest rates, support for research and develop-

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ment in the agricultural area and for environmental purposes are other agricultural policy devices that were brought in in recent years. Some regulations are planning for and acting as legislative alignments to the CAP. Alignment concerning horizontal measures, transposition and implementation of the food safety acquis, and setting up all the structures necessary for implementing Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD) funds are some issues that are being considered during the reshaping of Turkish agricultural policy. ALIGNMENT PROCESS OF TURKISH AGRICULTURE TO THE CAP

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Grounds of the Alignment of Turkish Agricultural Policy to the CAP

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The Ankara Agreement (1963) decided necessary actions to be taken for increasing establishment of the CU between Turkey and the European Community and also better functioning of the partnership through catching up with European economic policies (Eraktan 2009, 26–27). According to Article 10 of the agreement, CU would cover all aspects of export and import of goods. That means agricultural products would be the subject of the CU. Article 11 of the agreement envisages that the association would include agriculture and trade of agricultural products that is conducted parallel to the CAP. At the end of the transition period, free trade would be possible only if the Association Council approved the sufficiency of the actions taken for adaptation of the CAP rules. The Ankara Agreement was targeted at establishment of the CU; agricultural products were considered as a component of the CU and strengthening Turkish agriculture was seen as essential even in the preparatory stage. The Additional Protocol (13 November 1970) initiated the transition period. The first and major commitment of Turkey would be to align her agricultural policy to the CAP. The responsibility concerning alignment of Turkish agricultural policy to the CAP was repeated in the Association Council Decision No. 1/80 of 30 June 1980. Association Council Decision No. 1/95 of 6 March 1995 envisaged that extending the CU to agricultural products could come true after it is ensured that Turkey has adjusted her agricultural policies to the CAP. Adoption to the legislation of the EU for the candidate states was included in the Copenhagen Criteria adopted in 1993. All the above-mentioned legislative arrangements that regulate the relations between Turkey and the EU repeatedly stated the obligation of Turkey to align its agricultural policy to the CAP. That obligation has been the responsibility of all the governments made up after the signature of the Ankara Agreement. However, to align to the continually changing and rather costly CAP would be a long-lasting process that cannot be regarded as logical within the chain of relations whose future is

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not clear. Nevertheless, with acquiring EU candidate status in the Helsinki summit carried out in December 1999, the adaptation obligation of Turkey, which had been delayed for over thirty-seven years after the Ankara Agreement, came on the agenda with the determination of not being delayed one more. Needs and Challenges for the Alignment to the CAP

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In its December 2004 meeting, the European Council decided to start negotiations with Turkey culminating in full membership without delay in 2005. The harmonization process of Turkish agriculture and agricultural policy to EU agriculture and the CAP, which began in the first years of the 2000s, accelerated following the declaration of candidate status. The Accession Partnerships were announced in 2001, 2003, 2006, and 2008 by the Council, and Turkey prepared National Programmes for the adoption of the acquis in 2001, 2003, and 2008. The European Union Strategy for Turkey’s Accession Process 2010–2011 Action Plan was announced in March 2010, so the requirements of alignment in the period and the necessary actions for the fulfillment of the needs were indicated there (ABGS 2010). Turkey will take measures for establishing the Integrated Administration and Control System and Farm Accountancy Data Network for developing agricultural statistics. Completion of a strategy concerning the Parcel Identification System, the National Farmers’ Registration System, and also the improvement of agricultural statistics are essential. The responsibilities and obligations of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs would be reshaped through enacting a law on the establishment and duties of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. Regarding institutional progress, some more attempts would be essential, such as accreditation of the Agricultural and Rural Development Support Institution and implementation of accreditation criteria, launching a study on the administrative structure of paying agencies in charge of agricultural, and rural support measures. Harmonization of national legislation with the Common Market Organization, enacting a law on the protection of geographical indications and traditional names of products, making technical arrangements and standardization including quality control of agricultural products, and taking some measures for modernization of agricultural holdings and food establishments are the necessities of the harmonization. The Commission used to evaluate Turkey’s progress on the alignment with the CAP through Regular / Progress Reports. The necessary actions indicated above were announced in the EU documents in evaluating the alignment of Turkey as “making limited or no progress” (EC 2009, 53). Revision of agricultural support instruments in the direction of linking to production is also an issue that was criticized by the Commission with

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the wording “Current agricultural support policies and strategic policymaking are increasingly dissociated from the CAP.” Safety and quality measures constitute an area of major importance. There is insufficient progress in the area of food safety and veterinary and phytosanitary policy, according to the evaluation of the Commission. Turkey’s progress on transposition and implementation of the food safety acquis is evaluated as limited. However, legislative alignment on import control systems has yet to be completed. Implementation of legislation on identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals has not yet started. Legislation on animal health controls has not yet been completed. Turkey continued, on the other hand, timely notification of animal diseases in line with its international obligations. PROBABLE EXPECTATIONS IN TURKISH AGRICULTURE AFTER THE ACCESSION TO THE EU

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Earlier Studies on the Effects of Turkey’s EU Membership concerning Agriculture

[8.77]

Economic outcomes of the process of Turkey’s integration with the European Union on Turkish agriculture and even on the EU (especially from the budgetary burden point of view) have been investigated by many researchers. The results of many studies indicate that Turkish agriculture will not be in the black after an accession to the EU. Neither the trade volumes (or values) of Turkish agricultural commodities exported to the EU would increase considerably, nor would the advantage of EU funds be attractive under prevailing conditions in case of the full membership to the EU. There are several earlier studies on the effects of Turkish EU integration. In some studies the phenomenon was considered from the viewpoint of the costs and benefits of the EU in case of Turkish accession to the EU, and in some studies economic results of the accession for Turkey were analyzed. Methods used vary a great deal.

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Welfare Effects of Turkish EU Membership

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Çakmak and Kasnakoğlu (2002) developed several scenarios under the assumption of membership and nonmembership of Turkey in the EU in 2005. They argue that the welfare results are totally different in membership and nonmembership scenarios. Producers’ surplus would decrease by 16 percent, whereas the consumers’ surplus would increase by 12 percent if Turkey became a member in 2005. Livestock production would be affected more. Assuming that the EU and Turkish agricultural policies remained intact, the membership would be beneficial to consu-

Gülcan Eraktan

mers and would hurt producers. Membership would provide consumers with a relatively high consumption level at a much lower cost (Çakmak and Kasnakoğlu 2002, 23–24). Eruygur (2006) made estimations of the impacts of agricultural policy changes in case of an accession (Eruygur 2006, 196). He estimated high price increases for livestock products in 2015, particularly for meat and milk, under the prevailing policy environment due to the increase in demand that cannot be compensated by supply. High tariff rates have an import-preventing effect, and prices tend to move up significantly. Besides common wheat, corn, sugar beet, sesame, and soybean sectors give signals of high net imports. The study of Arisoy (2010) indicates that gross revenues received from a 1 hectare wheat area is €1.180 in Central Anatolia, where holdings have larger wheat-producing areas considering the situation in the whole of Anatolia. Gross revenue is €694 in Turkey as an average and €925 in the EU (intervention price was used for the calculation of revenues in the EU) under prevailing conditions (Arısoy 2010, 131–33). As the average size of the holdings in Turkey is smaller and the lands are fragmented, wheatcultivating area per wheat holding in Turkey is approximately 3.3 times smaller than that of the EU wheat-producing holdings. Wheat yield in Turkey is 2.5 times less than that of the EU average. Input costs are much higher in Turkey, which increases production costs and at the same time decreases revenues in comparison to EU producers. Though the revenues per hectare do not differ considerably, net revenues per holding highly differ (€5.751 in the Central Anatolia region, €3.191 in Turkey, and €12.048 in the EU). Through applying wheat market mechanism rules to the wheat-producing holdings of Turkey in 2008, the change in revenues was calculated. In this case wheat revenues per hectare would decrease by 46 percent in the Central Anatolia Region and by 48 percent in Turkey overall. Although the unit production costs of the wheat would decrease, net revenues received from wheat production would also decline in Turkey in comparison with the status quo. The decrease in revenues would be bigger than that of production costs, and the gap between revenues of the holdings in Turkey and the EU would be bigger. This shows that Turkey’s EU membership would be disadvantageous for wheat producers in Turkey. Consumers, on the contrary, will use the benefit of decreasing prices. An import increase is also expected.

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Trade Effects of Turkish EU Membership

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Atıcı and Kennedy (2000) modeled agricultural trade policies between Turkey and the EU using a political preference function and came to the conclusion that it is better for Turkey to keep the current protection ratios

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in agriculture. Whenever Turkey accesses in the EU, its political preference function values decrease (Atıcı and Keneddy 2000, 453–56). The competitiveness of Turkish agricultural and food products against the EU was treated in some studies (see Türkekul and Abay 2000, 6–8; Akgüngör et al. 2001; Ferman et al. 2004, 4–9). The results of all studies are similar. Some fruit and vegetable processing industries (grapes and citrus industries) are more competitive compared with competitor EU states; some food industries (tomato paste) in competitor EU states, on the other hand, have more competitive advantage than the industry in Turkey. Turkey’s international competitiveness is limited to resource-based and labor-intensive products. However, Turkey does not have comparative advantage for the sector of live animals and fodder (Kutlu 2004, 4–9). Hughes (2004) suggests that Turkey would be more competitive in the fruit and vegetable sector, while livestock and cereal sectors may face strong competition from EU farmers (Hughes 2004, 19). The abolition of all tariffs or tariff-like protection would certainly be an effective measure for strengthening and increasing Turkish agricultural exports to the EU. However, Grete (2003) argues that the pure terms of trade effects of a CU are surprisingly small (Grete 2003, 227). Turkey would gain about €60 million of export revenue because of export prices above world market level for some fruits and vegetables and would lose about €50 million because of import prices above world market level for milk products. This result, however, is conditional on several assumptions and can change under different scenarios. The analysis of Zahariadis (2005) suggests that deep integration can have a significant positive impact on Turkey’s welfare, but a smaller positive effect on the EU. The benefits of deep integration will be realized in full only when all relevant restrictions—including both standardization and certification—are accounted for (Zahariadis 2005). Cagatay and Guzel (2003) evaluated Turkish export and import sectors using the Lafay Index. Their findings show that Turkey has a comparative advantage for fruits and vegetables, but not for cereals, beverages, and tobacco (Cagatay and Guzel 2003). Çakmak and Kasnakoğlu (2003) performed a study comparing the agricultural situation under member and nonmember status (Çakmak and Kasnakoğlu 2003, 4–6). According to the results of the study, the price level of crop products increases while the price level of livestock products decreases highly. Therefore, satisfaction is expected after the realization of membership only for the producers of some products. However, consumers’ benefit from the overall price would decrease and food expenditures decline. Livestock production is under threat of import boom as it is not competitive within the EU. Any increase in the net exports of crop products can compensate for the increase of net imports of livestock products. According to the evaluation of the Commission (2004), the competitiveness of Turkey’s agriculture and agri-food enterprises is, on the

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whole, less on average than in the EU (CEC 2004, 31). Eruygur and Çakmak (2005) argue that, according to their simulation findings, the winners of a possible enlargement of the CU to agricultural products are the EU countries (Eruygur and Çakmak 2005, 12). Turkey’s imports for agri-food products handled in the study would increase by 12.51 percent in total. Imports of Turkey from countries other than the EU members would also increase, but all of the other partner countries concerned would be subject to substitution effects implying trade diversions for these regions—since the other prerequisite of the Customs Union is the implementation of a common external tariff that provides for some agricultural commodities lower protection levels than the Turkish customs tariffs or vice versa. That implementation would lead also to trade diversion and creation effects for agri-food trade. Additionally, to increase Turkish tariffs to the level of the EU would be contrary to the WTO rules (Article XXIV of GATT), since the bound tariffs would then be increased (Eruygur and Çakmak 2005). According to Yercan and Isıkli (2006), the Turkish horticultural sector has international competitive advantage. This can be interpreted as the comparative advantage that enjoys favorable climatic conditions; competitive cost of production, especially labor costs; and closeness to EU markets (Yercan and Isıklı 2006, 18). Sulamaa and Widgrén (2007) argue that the most substantial trade effects of Turkey’s membership are expected concerning agriculture, since agriculture is not already a part of the Customs Union (Sulamaa and Widgrén 2007, 9–12). Import tariff rate changes are fairly high from Turkey’s point of view. The authors also consider that the impact of dynamic trade effects on welfare is roughly an additional 50 percent, and they have various output effects, the biggest being in agriculture. Burhagen and Temurkan (2008) examined the question “How will a membership in the European Union affect the agricultural sector in Turkey and its trade potential?” and made estimations and predictions (Burhagen and Temurkan 2008, 36–43). The study also examines trade flows of Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy with the EU-15 for each agricultural commodity between 1995 and 2005. For the group of food and live animals, they found that Turkey keeps its comparative advantage over time. Spain and Turkey have a positive trade balance with the EU-15, indicating their competitive strength. However, Turkey’s live animal group has no chance in the EU markets due to the special food safety measures and insufficient presence of live animals in Turkey. Turkey has a comparative disadvantage in the beverage and tobacco group in relation to the EU. For hides, skins, and fur skins, Turkey has a comparative disadvantage, and for the group of oil seeds and oleaginous fruits Turkey has a comparative advantage according to calculations. In the group of animal and vegetable oils and fats, Turkey has a comparative disadvantage, as for many other agricultural commodity groups.

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Fernandez-Alvarez (2008) suggests that domestic demand potential for continental products—i.e., animals, dairy products, meat (mainly beef), and cereals is very great in Turkey. However, as specialization is low, an increase in imports from the EU will become a real necessity. For Mediterranean products (fruit and vegetables, nuts, and to a lesser extent, olive oil, tobacco, and cotton), on the other hand, Turkey would progressively execute its extraordinary export potential through an increase in trade flows to the EU with consequent positive effects on domestic production. The effects would be positive for Turkish consumers too. Market competitiveness would be greatly increased, especially for fruits and vegetables—a sector in which product concentration in the EU is already very high and protection and support measures are rather light. Fernandez-Alvarez adds that in general, the fruit and vegetables sectors are well used to competing in the EU market. However, most Turkish exports of fruit and vegetables enter the EU market free of any trade barriers, so further EU market liberalization will not have immediate and extraordinary effects on the expansion of exports (Fernandez-Alvarez 2008, 488–91). Eraktan and Arısoy (2012) indicate in their study on export problems of fresh fruits and vegetables in Turkey that the EU member states do not prefer Turkish products in many cases in spite of the high share of the EU countries in Turkish export. Only ten EU member states rank among the top twenty destination countries in that concern, and their total fresh fruit and vegetable import from Turkey is about at the same level as the import of the Russian Federation from Turkey by value. The Russian Federation shows a higher index, indicating a higher level of specialization than individual EU member states. However, Turkey is losing the priority in export specialization bit by bit in the course of time, both concerning the Russian Federation and the EU countries that are in the top ten. That situation ought to be a warning for Turkey in respect of losing competitiveness (Eraktan and Arısoy 2012).

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Budgetary Effects of Turkish EU Membership

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Although a full integration of Turkish agriculture seems quite costly if today’s CAP and structural fund rules were applied, calculations made on the impact of the accession of Turkey on the EU budget differ a lot. Given uncertainty on the future of the CAP and on the development of agriculture in Turkey, it is actually not possible to assess in detail the impact of Turkish accession on the EU. The results of the calculations indicate the probable burden of the integration, but also the probable financial benefit for Turkey. The EU considers that Turkish agriculture is one of the most important issues in terms of absorptive capacity due to the important economic and social role and substantial size of Turkish agriculture in absolute

[8.98]

Gülcan Eraktan

terms and the impact it will have on the budget (Sami 2005). The cost of extending the existing CAP, including rural development, to Turkey would amount to €8.2 billion (2004 prices) by 2025 according to the Commission. Of this figure, €2.3 billion would be rural development funding, €5.3 billion direct payments, and €660 million market expenditure (2004 prices) (CEC 2004, 31). How much Turkey would cost the EU budget if it were to enter under present rules was calculated by some researchers too. Derviş et al. (2004) and Gros (2005) argue that under the assumption of Turkey’s accession by 2015, Turkey will benefit fully from the EU’s budgetary support schemes some time after 2020 (Derviş et al. 2004; Gros 2005). Under the growth scenario of Turkey and the EU developed by the authors, maximum budgetary cost of the full membership of Turkey was estimated at €16 billion, which would comprise €8 billion received from Structural Funds, and €9 billion from CAP receipts. The contribution of Turkey to the EU budget would reach barely €2 billion . Flam (2004) indicated estimation of the “tax base” (i.e., VAT and tariff revenue and GNP) and the extent to which Turkish agriculture and regions are eligible for support from the CAP, Structural Funds, and the Cohesion Fund as the way of calculating Turkey’s contributions to and receipts from the EU budget (Flam 2004, 192). The calculation is likely to come up with a large net transfer to Turkey, both because of the size of the agricultural sector and because Turkey is poor relative to the EU-15, argued Flam, and he added that the history of past enlargements showed that rules are changed if an acceding country becomes a disproportionately large net contributor or is a disadvantaged recipient of CAP or Structural Funds support under the existing rules. The results of several studies were summarized in the report prepared in Wageningen University and a synthetic result produced that combines the most convincing estimates of each budget item from these studies (Oskam et al. 2004, 235). The estimate of net budget cost obtained by this process is €20.6 billion in 2004 prices (€25.7 billion at 2015 values). The corresponding gross budget cost of €30.5 billion means that, if the 1.14 percent ceiling applies, about 16 percent of the EU budget would go to Turkey. Grete (2005) calculated a net transfer of €1.7 billion from the CAP would be about 0.3 percent of projected total GDP in 2015 and thus relatively small (Grete 2005, 135). Total annual EU payments for implementing the CAP in Turkey would amount to about 9 percent of projected agricultural production value in 2015 and about €750 per capita employed in agriculture. This would increase to about 12 percent of agricultural production value and about €1,660 per person employed in agriculture in 2025, and that is a substantial increase. All of the transfer accounts, on the other hand, are subject to change due to the modified CAP applications and the transformation of Turkish

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agricultural policy in harmony with the needs. Additionally, not only the changes of price levels but also the exchange rate between the Turkish lira and the euro at the time of accession would affect the budget expenditures. That means a probable accession in the future would pave the way for totally different results. [8.104]

Farmers’ Views on the Impacts of Accession of Turkey on Turkish Agriculture

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There are also a limited number of studies scrutinizing the views of the farmers on the probable effects of Turkey’s full membership on special agricultural products they produce, as cited by Uzmay et al. (2009), such as milk, dried and fresh figs, and cotton. These studies were conducted considering the crop type on which the farmers are specialized, because different effects for different agricultural production activities are expected. Uzmay et al. stated that 38 percent of the cotton farmers in the Aegean Region believed that membership would affect Turkey’s agriculture sector positively, while 19 percent of the farmers expected a negative effect. On the other hand, 35 percent of the farmers have no idea about the effects, and 8 percent said that membership would not affect the sector. In the previous 2000 study of Uzmay, which was conducted in Izmir province, these rates were 32 percent, 5 percent, 31 percent, and 32 percent respectively. Though the interviewed population was different, the proportion of farmers who were expecting a negative effect of membership on the sector (from 5 percent to 19 percent) has significantly increased, while the proportion of farmers who put forward the view the “membership doesn’t affect the sector” has decreased. According to the results of other studies on the milk and fresh and dried figs sectors, the expectation of being positively affected by membership was held mainly among farmers who do not have access to information concerning EU issues (Çicek et al. 2009; Isin et al. 2006, Uzmay 2003). Arisoy (2010) investigated the effects of the alignment of the cereals market regulations for the wheat producers in Central Anatolia and their reactions to the implementation of the rules of the cereals market mechanism and of the EU wheat price level in Turkey. In case of a price decrease due to the alignment to the wheat price level of the EU, 27.8 percent of the producers would give up producing wheat and 20.2 percent of the producers would leave agricultural activities entirely. In such a situation, 9.6 percent of producers are thinking of producing wheat only for family needs (Arısoy 2010, 136). Arısoy found that 59.2 percent of producers are in favor of an EU membership, but 38 percent of the interviewed wheat producers are of the opinion that they would not be able to compete with the EU and would get poorer. The larger the size of the holdings they have, the more obvious are pessimistic thoughts about getting poorer. Owners of the larger holdings are feeling themselves under risk. On the other hand, 22.8 percent of producers expect increas-

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Gülcan Eraktan

ing subsidies and solving market failure problems in case of membership (Arısoy 2010, 171). CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAP AND FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR TURKISH AGRICULTURE

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The results of many studies done on the implications of Turkish EU membership call for several comments. These comments were summarized in the report of Wageningen University as follows (Oskam et al. 2004, 205–6).

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1. With EU membership, agricultural producers lose while food consumers gain, implying income transfer from the rural to the urban sector. Within producer and consumer groups, membership reduces income inequality. 2. With EU membership, fruit and vegetables remain competitive, but cereals and livestock products are uncompetitive. 3. With either full trade liberalization or simply including agriculture in the Customs Union with the EU, considerable changes in the regional distribution of producer surplus would occur. 4. Harmonization with the EU’s health and safety standards yields absolute welfare gains for Turkey, whereas for the EU the gains are conditional on agreements regarding border frictions and certification rules. 5. Apart from the conclusions obtained from previous studies on the subject, some challenges, opportunities, and threats can be considered.

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One of the key challenges for Turkey is to improve prosperity in agriculture and rural society in case of being a member of the EU. Turkey has a large agricultural production potential, but it is still far from being used to its full extent. Would the integration lead to greater prosperity for Turkish farmers? What kind of opportunities might arise in the agricultural area? However, it is inevitable that small and less efficient farms may be more at risk. To face opportunities and challenges is also the fact for the EU in case of a membership. The conditions that create an opportunity or a threat for both parties differ, but there are causes for concern for both sides. For example, the European Commission argues that the inclusion of Turkey would significantly increase socioeconomic disparities across the EU. Increase in surface area would be 18 percent, while the growth of population would be 15 percent and GDP 2.2 percent. Expected decrease in per capita GDP would be, on the other hand, 9.1 percent and the average per capita GDP index would be 79.4 if the average per capita GDP of the EU15 is said to be 100 (CEC 2004, 38).

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From Turkey’s point of view, some structural, social, and economic problems may emerge. One of the most important threats is migration from the rural areas. As is the case at the present time, that problem can be more threatening under the changing production structure and competition pressure of the EU member states in case of a full membership. Migration from agriculture and consequently from rural areas, as the main problem, comes into being for several reasons, such as the desire to get better living conditions, to target higher-income facilities, to create better health and educational conditions for family members, and even to change the present social status in the community. While the migration phenomenon creates per se problems for the destination places, it has a negative effect on the places which were left and the fields of economic activities continuing there. Agriculture is maybe the most sensitive sector in that respect. If migrated households would assign their property, especially land, to people who are disposed to buy or cultivate it through a form of tenure, that would create land mobility and contribute to the enlargement of the size of the holding. Due to the consequences of implementing the division method of inheritance, even the land of households in rural areas is divided among all inheritors. There is neither a tradition of resignation of an inheritance nor a device for promoting resignation, such as to support by credits the inheritors who are disposed to undertake the land and to pay the shares of other inheritors. To parcel the inheritance out is expected in rural areas, and especially among poor people who do not have a profession or hope for their present and future welfare. As it is considered that 85.9 percent of the people employed in agriculture do not have social security possibilities, it is obvious that to keep hold of that land is a guarantee for the future—even if the land is fragmented, unproductive, and inadequate for subsistence (TUİK, 2012). In other sectors besides agriculture, the share of employees who are not covered by the social security system is 29.8 percent. That fact is also a stimulant for people leaving agricultural activities and migrating from rural areas. The fragmented and unproductive parcels that are under the possession of more than one inheritor are not suitable for cultivation by a family. It is mostly not worthwhile and therefore not logical to continue to cultivate such parcels, since other inheritors demand their shares of production. That is a reason for leaving small parcels uncultivated, but the total of such uncultivated areas reach high amounts; their size is unknown and they are not registered. So, the resources of the country are not utilized. The shift in the direction of Turkish agricultural policy at the end of the 2000s has been criticized by EU institutions. In fact, Turkish agricultural policy was being reformed beginning from 1999 in view of WTO requirements, the IMF program, and the prospect of EU accession. Price

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supports and subsidies were phased out and replaced by direct payments to farmers based on farmland. Import tariffs were reduced according to WTO commitments. State enterprises in the agricultural sector were privatized. The reason for the change of policy framework in the last years was not announced officially. However, it can be explained with some facts. To begin with, the production potential of some products was not used efficiently, and their production ought to be encouraged somehow. That necessitated introducing some measures for promoting production. In addition, it was intended to make an application of a direct income support system for a period of about five years in the beginning of implementation. That aspect was not given voice to, but that opinion was discussed during the preparation process of the agricultural reform at the end of the 1990s. That may be a divergence from the rules of the CAP, as it was often mentioned by the EU authorities. However, it should be borne in mind that the single payment system lacks the continuity of an area-based support system; on the contrary, single payment indicates the total of the payments allocated a farmer in a base period. Subsidies paid to Turkish farmers in various ways can convert to a single payment, even so. The matter of importance is that the subsidies are paid within the limits of de minimis and appropriate to the rulings of the WTO. Change in the protection level after the adoption of the EU common external tariff will create a threat for Turkey. Protection of agricultural production through import duties has been one of the main policy methods in Turkey. Therefore, tariff rates in Turkey are much more than the protection of the EU, namely the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) (table 8.1). To use the tariff rates of the EU will cause import duties to diminish and the competition to intensify, not only with the EU member states but also with all supplier countries at the world market. The competition power of Turkish products is gaining importance, thus, not only against the EU member states, but against all countries that supply the same commodities with Turkey on the world market. The impact of decreasing rates would threaten mostly the agricultural production areas, which are presently being protected through import duties and perpetuate themselves in this manner. EU membership for Turkey means opening the markets to all the countries that have made trade agreements with the EU and acquired trade preferences from them. An additional threat will emerge after the conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda. Regarding the temporary conclusions of the negotiations, tariffs will be reduced according to a tiered formula that results in a rapid decline of tariffs for commodities protected with high tariff rates. With nonmember status, the rapidly decreased tariffs will affect Turkish agriculture unfavorably. After membership in the EU, on the other hand, harmonized tariffs will not only be

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Turkish Agriculture in Case of EU Membership or Nonmember Status Table 8.1. Tariff Rates and Duty-Free Imports of Turkey and the EU-27 Tariffs and duty-free imports

Turkey

EU-27

Tariff binding coverage (%)

50.1

100

Simple average of import duties

Final bound

Applied 2008

Final bound

Applied 2008

All goods

28.6

9.7

5.2

5.3

Agricultural goods

60.8

42.9

13.5

13.5

Nonagricultural goods

17.0

4.8

3.9

4.0

Non ad valorem duties (% total tariff lines)

0.1

0.7

4.8

4.6

MFN duty-free imports (%, 2008):

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in agricultural goods (AOA)

22.2

41.3

in nonagricultural goods

39.0

54.8

Services sectors with GATS commitments

77

115

lower, but will be decreased in connection with the decisions of the Doha Development Agenda, albeit not so rapidly. Therefore, the method of protecting some special and sensitive products through high tariff rates will not have a future in Turkey. The abolition of all tariffs or tariff-like protection would certainly be an effective measure for strengthening and increasing Turkish agricultural exports to the EU, as suggested by Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2007, 739). Nevertheless, when the results of all the studies are taken into consideration, an export boom for Turkish products is not expected after an EU membership. A significant import increase would happen as well. The import ban on most live animals and animal products imposed by Turkey was considered as a performance criterion by the EU. Turkey was claiming to impose the ban for public/animal health reasons, but the EU maintained that it primarily served market protection objectives (CEC 2004, 33). Overall, the repeated argument has been that “technical barriers to trade in bovine products, in breach of bilateral commitments, remain an urgent issue.” Removal of this and other technical barriers to trade remains a key component for the accession negotiations on the chapter Agriculture (EC 2009). The ban was abolished as of May 2010 and an obligation was satisfied, while Turkey began to be a net importer of live animals and meat.

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CONCLUSION

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Costs and benefits of EU accession for Turkish agriculture have been considered from several points of view by many researchers. Implications were analyzed mostly regarding welfare, trade, and budgetary effects. The results of major studies indicate a decrease in producer prices and the welfare of producers, an increase in consumers’ welfare, and a slight chance of improvement for export of some commodities. Reformed CAP will not present considerable financial possibilities. The debates on the future of the CAP beyond 2013 show that it is intended to maintain the status quo to a large extent. Linking subsidies to the provision of public goods; focusing on environmental issues; aiming at a demand-oriented, innovative, and competitive farming sector; and promoting food security are the anticipated reform subjects of the CAP. These are goals of agriculture in general. The other subject of sharing the burden of the agricultural sector between the member states and the EU (instead of full EU financing) is, however, not the interest of a state at the stage of accession. The major consequences for Turkish agriculture of the implementation of the CAP are establishing necessary institutions during the alignment process. These are major structural adjustments that need to be done in any case. The Turkish agricultural sector consists of many small-size and family-driven farmers. Though some small farmers continue to consider agriculture as a kind of lifestyle, there is a great pressure on farmers who are making use of traditional farming methods and getting poorer, in the direction of leaving agricultural activities even in the present time. Small and low-productive farmers won’t be able to survive when competition from EU farmers increases. Rural unemployment will increase then. As these people cannot be compensated anymore, the Turkish government will face a bigger challenge in finding and applying job creation policies. Turkey has the potential to significantly increase its agricultural production and improve productivity, safety, and efficiency in the food processing sector, but growth is being hindered through inefficient farming and production techniques, badly managed land and water resources, and poor hygiene and food standards. These are the facts of Turkey, independent of the EU relations.

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NOTES

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1. Prof. Dr., Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Ankara University, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=6226&tb_id=4; http:// www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=6256&tb_id=4.

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REFERENCES ABGS (Ministry of European Union). 2010. European Union Strategy for Turkey’s Accession Process 2010–2011 Action Plan, Ankara, 15 March, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/ strateji/2010_2011_action_plan.pdf (15.09.2011). Akdeniz İhracatçı Birlikleri. 2010. Türkiye Geneli Yaş Meyve Sebze Değerlendirme Raporları 2007, 2008 ve 2009 Raporları, http://www.akib.org.tr/akib.php?HID= (15.03.2011). Andoura, Sami. 2005. “ European Union’s Capacity to Absorb Turkey,” Egmont European Affairs Program Paper, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/06/eu/ EU-Turkey.pdf (22.09.2010). Assoziationsrat. 1966. Assoziation zwischen der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Türkei, Zweiter Jährlicher Tätigkeitsbericht des Assoziationsrates an den Gemischten Ausschuss, 1 Januar bis 31 Dezember. Assoziationsrat. 1968. Assoziation zwischen der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Türkei, Vierter Jährlicher Tätigkeitsbericht des Assoziationrates an den Gemischten Ausschuss, 1 Januar bis 31 Dezember. Belke, Ansgar. 2005. “Turkey in Transition to EU Membership: Pros and Cons of Integrating a Dynamic Economy.” Perceptions 10 (Spring): 53–63. Burhagen, Marie, and Ercan Temurkan. 2008. Turkey as a Member of the European Union: A Cross-Country Analysis of the Potential Impact on the Turkish Agricultural Sector and Its Trade with the EU , master’s thesis, Lund University. Çakmak , Erol H. 2004. Structural Change and Market Opening in Agriculture , EUTurkey Working Paper 10, http://www.erc.metu.edu.tr/menu/series04/0410.pdf (18.10.2010). Çakmak, Erol H., and Haluk Kasnakoğlu. 2002. Assessment of Agricultural Policies and the Impact of EU Membership on Agriculture in Turkey, Ankara, http://people.stfx.ca/ x2003/x2003ypc/Euro/Agriculture/Assessment%20of%20Agriculture%20policies%20and%20the%20impact%20of%20EU%20 membership%20on%20agriculture%20in%20Turkey.pdf (10.10.2010). Çakmak, Erol H., and Haluk Kasnakoğlu. 2003.”The Impact of EU Membershıp on Agriculture in Turkey,” paper presented at Conférence Femise, Marseille, Forum EuroMediterranéen des Instituts Economiques, 4–6 December 2003, http://www.femise.org/ PDF/conf2003/05-1545-3-cakmak.pdf (24.10.2010). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 1989. Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, SEC (89) 2290 final. Brussels, 12 December. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2004. Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective, Commission Staff Working Document, {COM(2004) 656 final} Brussels, October 2004, SEC (2004) 1202. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2009. Turkey 2009 Progress Report Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009–2010 , Commission Staff Working Document {COM(2009) 533}, Brussels, 14.10.2009, SEC (2009) 1334. Council of the European Union. 2005. Presidency Conclusions , 16–17 December 2004, 16238/1/04 REV 1, Brussels, 1 February, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/83201.pdf (10.10.2010). Danzinger, Felicitas, et al. 2005. “The Impact of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU on Turkey’s Exports to the EU: A Reassessment of the Paradox,” DIW Discussion Papers Series, Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research, http:// aei.pitt.edu/6761/01/1147_05.pdf (27.11.2010). Derviş, Kemal, et al. 2004. Turkey and the EU Budget Prospects and Issues, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy Brief No. 6, August, http://www.ceps.be/ book/turkey-and-eu-budget-prospects-and-issues (27.09.2010).

Gülcan Eraktan DPT (Ministry of Development). 2010. Ekonomik Gelişmeler , last modified July, http://www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/View/10048/07.pdf (02.02.2011). Eraktan, Gulcan. 1988. Auswirkungen der Assoziierung der Türkei mit der EWG auf die türkische Landwirtschaft. Publikationen der Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultaet der Universitaet Ankara 1064, Wirtschaftliche Forschungen und Studien 567. Eraktan, Gulcan. 2009. “Türkiye’nin Ortak Tarım Politikasına Uyumu ve Türk Tarımına Etkileri.” Türk İş Dünyası için AB Mevzuatı, Manuals 6, ETCF-EU-Turkey Chambers Forum: 26-35, http://www.etcf.org.tr/EN/doc/kasim_2009_etcf/Manual_6%20Tarim.pdf (12.10.2010). Eraktan, Gulcan, and Hasan Arısoy. 2012. Türkiye’nin Yaş Meyve ve Sebze İhracatında Durum-Sorunlar ve Çözüm Yolları, İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yay, No. 2010-92. Eruygur, H. Ozan. 2006. Impacts of Policy Changes on Turkish Agriculture: An Optimization Model with Maximum Entropy, unpublished PhD dissertation, Middle East Technical University. Eruygur, H. Ozan, and Erol H. Çakmak. 2005a. Trade Implications of Extending the Turkey-EU Customs Union to Agricultural Products. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA: accessed 12438, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12438/1/ MPRA_paper_12438.pdf (12.10.2010). Eruygur, H. Ozan, and Erol H. Çakmak. 2005b. “Trade Implıcations of Extending the Turkey-EU Customs Union to Agricultural Products,” paper presented at the Conference of ECOMOD-MENA, Brussels, Belgium, 2–4 June, http://www.google.com/ search?q=eumed-agpol.iamm.fr/html/publications/partners/mena.pdf&sourceid=ie7&rls=com.microsoft:en-US&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&rlz=1I7_____en (12.10.2010). European Commission (EC). 2006. Agricultural Trade Statistics , last modified October 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/tradestats/index_en.htm (12.10.2010). European Commission (EC). 2009. The 2009 Agricultural Year, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/2009/table_en/en354.htm (17.12.2010). European Commission(EC). 2010. EU-27 Export to Turkey, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/tradestats/2008/eur27ch/page_004.htm (16.12.2010). European Commission (EC). 2011. Agriculture in the European Union: Statistical and Economic Information 2011, European Union Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/statistics/agricultural/2011/pdf/ full-report_en.pdf (25.06.2012). Fernandez-Alvarez, Antonio. 2008. “Turkish Agricultural Trade in the European Union: Opportunities and Challenges.” South European Society and Politics 4: 477–93, http://www.uam.es/centros/economicas/doctorado/deri/publicaciones/Turkish%20agriculture%20in%20its%20way%20to%20the%20European%20Union.pdf (16.10.2010). Flam, Harry. 2004. “Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession.” CESifo Economic Studies 50: 171–210. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2008a. Commodities by the Country, http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx (16.10.2010). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2008b. Country Rank in the World, by Commodity , http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx (16.10.2010). Grete, Harald. 2003. Effects of Including Agricultural Products in the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis for Turkey, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Göttingen. Grete, Harald. 2005. “Turkey’s Accession to the EU: What Will the Common Agricultural Policy Cost?” Agrarwirtschaft 54(2): 128–37. Gros, Daniel. 2005. “Economic Aspects of Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership,” CEPS Policy Brief 69, http://aei.pitt.edu/6611/ (27.09.2010). Hughes, Kirsty. 2004. “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession” paper presented at the European Policy Summit, 17 June 2004.

Turkish Agriculture in Case of EU Membership or Nonmember Status Kutlu, Rasim. 2004. “Türkiye Ekonomisinin AB Ülkeleri Karşısındaki Rekabet Gücü,” paper presented at Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, Gelişme Stratejileri ve Makroekonomik Politikalar, 4–9 May 2004, http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ekonomi/tik2004/cilt3.pdf (27.09.2010). Nowak-Lehmann, Felicitas, et al. 2007. “The Impact of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU on Turkey’s Exports to the EU.” Journal of Common Market Studies 45(3): 719–43. Oskam, Arie, et al. 2004. Turkey in the European Union: Consequences for Agriculture, Food, Rural Areas, and Structural Policy, final report, Wageningen University. Priebe, Hermann. 1988. Die subventionierte Unvernunft: Landwirtschaft und Naturhaushalt. Berlin: Siedler Verlag GmbH. Stajono, Attilio. 2007. “Turkey as a Member of the European Union: An Open-ended Negotiation for over Forty Years,” University of Bologna, Italy, 29 November, http:/ /www.google.com.tr/ search?q=Attilio+Stajano%2C+Turkey+is+a+Member+of+the+European+Union%3A +an+Open-ended&btnG=Ara&hl=tr (07.10.2010). Stamer, Hans. 1983. Agrarpolitik aktuell. Unser Weg in die Zukunft. Frankfurt/Main: DLG Verlag. State Planning Organization (SPO). 2001. Turkey European Union Association Council Decisions , 1964–2000, Ankara. Sulamaa, Pekka, and Mika Widgrén. 2007. Turkish EU Membership: A Simulation Study on Economic Effects, VATT Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, http://www.ecomod.org/files/papers/1608.doc (25.10.2010). TKİB (Ministry of Agriculture). 2009. Ekonomik Göstergelerle Türkiye’de Tarım, 2008. Ankara: Tarımsal Ekonomi Araştırma Enstitüsü. TKİB (Ministry of Agriculture) . 2012. Temel Ekonomik Göstergele r, Ocak-SubatMart, http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FCB9B6FB1CAD205122 (13.07.2012). TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2008. Agricultural Holding Structure Survey 2006, No. 196, 17 December, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=48 (17.10.2010). TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2010. Household Labour Force Survey for the Period of August 2010, No. 192, last modified 12 November 2010, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ (12.04.2011). TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2011a. Results of Household Consumption Expenditures, No. 162, last modified 11 August 2011, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=22 (12.07.2012). TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2011b. “Gross Domestic Product, IV Quarter, Press Release,” No. 10785, last modified 2 April 2012, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10785 (12.07.2012). TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2011c. Crop Products Balance Sheets: Fruits, Nuts, and Beverage Crops, No. 10822, last modified 25 May 2012, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/ PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10822 (12.07.2012). TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2012. Household Labour Force Survey for the Period of March 2012, No. 10845, last modified 15 June 2012, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ (12.07.20012). TU İK (Turkish Statistical Institute), http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=6226&tb_id=4 (12.07.2012). TU İK (Turkish Statistical Institute), http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=6256&tb_id=4 (12.07.2012). Ulgen, Sinan, and Yiannis Zahariadis. 2004. The Future of Turkey-EU Trade Relations: Deepening vs. Widening, Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Paper 5, August, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_12.pdf (26.06.2012). Uzmay, Ayse, et al. 2009. “Farmers’ Views on the Effects on Agriculture Sector of Turkey’s Accession Membership into the European Union: Case Study of Cotton

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NINE Turkey’s External Economic Relations Does the MENA Region Steal the EU’s Role? İdil Bilgiç Alpaslan 1

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In the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis, new trends became prevalent in international economics. In the past, attention was only on north-south trade; recently, south-south trade has started gaining importance. As every opportunity comes with risks, this change carries risks too. We know that countries can supply only the demanded products. Unlike northern demand, which is at the high end, demand from southern countries is usually at the low end, which does not require technological capacity formation. On the other hand, this shift in demand structure enables southern countries to diversify their product and export partner portfolios. As a result, their vulnerability to shocks coming from the developed world declines. Recent data shows that Turkey fits exactly into this picture. Historically, Turkey has been heavily dependent on the European Union (EU) for its imports and exports. The EU market’s bigger size in terms of GDP, the Customs Union Agreement that came into effect on December 31, 1995, and high development level are some of the main reasons for this dependence. Until 2008, the EU’s share in Turkey’s exports ruled high. It was always higher than 50 percent. But since then this share has been declining, and in 2010 it was measured as 47 percent. Another adjacent market is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which had a lower share in Turkey’s exports. This share fluctuated between 11 and 18 percent until 2008. Only then it exceeded the 20 percent threshold. Since 2008, share of MENA has been increasing continuously. 2

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The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the changing trends in the structure of Turkey’s trade and possible reasons leading to this outcome. To our knowledge, there has not been such a detailed analysis of the changing roles of the EU and MENA from a trade perspective. To frame the issue properly, first a brief history of the Turkish economy with a time focus of 1980 onward is given, and then the changing patterns in the trade structure are investigated. In this sense, this chapter will shed light on an untouched yet very important subject.

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OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY (1980–PRESENT)

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The year 1980 was a turning point for the Turkish economy as the first steps toward trade and financial liberalization were taken. One of the main pillars of the new economy was the gradual but significant depreciation of the Turkish lira, which resulted in a decrease of wages over time. Lower domestic consumption led to lower inflation, whereas depreciation of the currency resulted in higher exports and GDP (Selçuk and Ertuğrul 2001, 7). In 1984, the floating exchange rate regime came into effect. In the following years, the money market was liberalized gradually and the capital market started being regulated through the establishment of the Capital Market Board. Even though gross fixed investment increased after the 1980s, the contribution of manufacturing industries was lower than hoped for (Boratav and Yeldan 2006, 40). This meant that the export boom resulted from the capacity building of the previous era and low manufacturing costs, mainly wages. The export-led growth model of this period turned out to be unsustainable, which was shown by the very low annual growth rates of 1988 and 1989. Before the 1990s, growth caused current account deficit, and this had be financed with capital inflows. On the other hand, after the 1990s, capital inflows caused growth, and this in turn resulted in current account deficits. As a result, growth became dependent on capital movements. The changing level and direction of these flows increased the volatility of the growth rate. The economy faced four downturns in 1991, 1994, 1999, and 2001; each was preceded by a boom. In the last three decades, GDP and exports grew in real terms. During this time frame, Turkey managed to grow despite the “volatile” volatility it faced. Meanwhile, not only the GDP grew but also Turkey became a recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio flows. Despite the fluctuations, both of these flows followed an increasing trend since the liberalization of the capital account. FDI declined between 2007 and 2009 but started increasing afterwards. On the other hand, portfolio investments declined until 2008, but after the global crisis, Turkey—as a successful emerging country—attracted funds again. One of the main

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Turkey’s External Economic Relations

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reasons for this reversal was the economic reforms made after the 2001 crisis, targeted at the banking and finance sectors. Those reforms helped Turkey see relatively less loss due to the global 2008 crisis and be treated as a safe haven compared to other developing and emerging countries in Turkey’s league. In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was elected for the first time with a majority and gained the right to establish the government. They were elected again in July 2007 and June 2012. After a long period of coalition governments, three consecutive terms of one-party government brought stability to the Turkish economy. During their ruling period, several steps toward internal and external stabilization were taken. Even though the economy experienced major reforms and continuous improvements, there are many benefits Turkey can capture in the future if the trade and industrialization policies are designed according to the resources available. It has a strategic location that allows access to three continents and seas. It is close to big markets that have funds to spend and strong positions in the global value chain. Reforms we have been seeing are positioning Turkey to benefit from the opportunities brought by the advantages it has. Besides the transition to a floating exchange rate regime and liberalization of the economy, the improvement of the institutions and policies easing the operations of businesses have produced a resilient economy. The reduction in trade barriers and lowering of tariffs accompanying the economic reforms created a favorable environment for Turkish firms to take their place in the global arena. With all these in mind, it is essential to carefully examine the structural transition that has been observed in trade. Observed changes might be originating from the capabilities of Turkish firms, as well as the shift in the global market. Knowing which forces drive trade and why Turkey exports some goods to some countries but not to others will enable Turkey to design policies accordingly and combine trade policies with industrialization policies in a more compatible way.

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CHANGING PATTERNS IN TURKEY’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE STRUCTURE

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After the liberalization of the 1980s, both imports and exports grew. It is a known fact that the Turkish economy has become more open over time. In theory, an economy would benefit from trade once it is open, and the more open an economy the more product choices its citizens have. With the transition to becoming an open economy, Turkish consumers had access to increased variety through imports. Meanwhile, aggregate income increased. The more income consumers had, the more sophisti-

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cated they became, and they demanded more variety. This led domestic producers to diversify their production too. Openness not only improved the product portfolio, but it enabled trade with more partners. Even though Turkey found new markets and partners, one of them maintained its role as the main trading partner: the EU. One main factor contributing to this long-term relationship is their geographic proximity. But certainly, this is not the only reason. Standard gravity models suggest that the higher the income of the export market, the more trade volume would be realized between the two parties. Thus, it is useful to compare the incomes of Turkey and the EU to see why trade volumes kept increasing between the two partners. When liberalization started in 1980, the GDP of Turkey was around US$11 billion (constant 2000 prices). On the other hand, the EU had a combined GDP of almost US$5.5 trillion. The EU was not only a big and close market, but it was also much more developed than Turkey. Development levels of the two trading partners and the difference between these levels are important factors in determining which good is exported to which market. Countries with higher development levels tend to export high-end products to their less developed trading partners. On the other hand, countries with relatively lower development levels tend to export more low-end products to their more developed trading partners. GDP per capita is a good indicator to compare development levels of two markets. In 1980, GDP per capita in Turkey was a little bit higher than US$2,400, whereas GDP per capita in the EU was more than US$11,700. Differences in GDP and development level also resulted in differences in factor abundances. The demographic structures of the EU and Turkey have been different. The EU has an aging population, whereas Turkey has a young and active human capital stock. It is common sense that the abundant factor in a country would be cheaper than other factors. Thus, during the initial phases of development and opening to trade, a country with an abundant factor would produce goods that use its abundant factor intensively. Abundance of labor in Turkey combined with the depreciating Turkish lira resulted in lower wages. The initial trade relation between Turkey and the EU was inter-industry-based, which is the exchange of different industries’ products. Turkey was exporting more labor-intensive products to the EU while importing more capital-intensive products from the EU. Fifteen years after the liberalization, an important step was taken to improve Turkey’s trade. The Customs Union Agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey, which came into effect starting from December 31, 1995. According to the clauses of the agreement, goods could be exchanged without any customs restrictions, but there were some economic areas like agriculture that were not covered by the agreement. This agreement, in addition to the cheap manufacturing costs and the high export-

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ing capability of Turkey, helped it increase its bilateral trade with the EU, and as a result, the EU became the main trading partner of Turkey. Europe is not the only big market that is at close proximity to Turkey. Another big but overlooked market is the aggregate MENA region. Despite the common ties and relatively similar cultures, MENA never exceeded the 20 percent threshold in Turkey’s overall exports until 2008. Even though it seems as if Turkey ignored the MENA market until recently, the low trade volumes between the two parties can be explained using income and development level proxies. In 1980, the combined GDP of the MENA region was almost US$511 billion and GDP per capita was around US$2,700. Even though the initial figures of GDP and GDP per capita for the whole region seem to be higher than the figures in Turkey in 1980, this was mostly the reflection of high oil revenues. Income inequality is a prevalent problem in the region, so these revenues were not distributed to the final consumers. MENA was also at the initial stages of its development and labor was abundant. Thus, MENA supplied only oil and basic manufactures to Turkey. In a similar manner, what Turkey exported to the region was not very diversified. As a result, it is not surprising that the region was not a major export destination like the EU until recently.

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Overall Trade

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Even though there are permanent and long-term trends in Turkey’s trade, some changes are observed after the 2008 global crisis. Figure 9.1 shows clear signs of these new patterns in the export destination choices of Turkish producers. In 2008, the share of the EU started declining, whereas the MENA region increased its share. In 2011, there was no major change to these new trends, and MENA maintained its importance as an export destination while the share of the EU kept shrinking. Even though the main trading partner’s share declined, real exports kept increasing. This meant that Turkish producers made up for the loss they faced in the European market, thanks to other export destinations. One straightforward explanation for this change would be to say that this is the outcome of the contracting European demand, but that would be too simple. Even though there was an immediate contraction in 2009, imports of Europe increased in 2010. These two pieces of information show that Europe might have shifted its export demand to other markets. An important question emerges: Did European consumers changed their preferences in favor of Turkey’s competitors? The other side of the new outlook is related to the increasing share of the MENA region. This increase stemmed from the higher demand of the MENA region, but there are questions to be answered at this point too. One of the most important questions here is related to the identity of the suppliers of this demand. Did existing exporters see MENA as a new

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Figure 9.1. Shares of the EU and MENA in Turkey’s Total Exports Source: United Nations Comtrade database.

destination that helped their survival in the crisis environment, or was it the case that new firms became exporters as the nature of demand changed? There are many explanations to all these questions. There can be demand-sided or supply-sided explanations. Let’s start with the demandsided ones. After the signing of the Customs Union Agreement, Turkey enjoyed its privilege in the EU market for almost ten years. In some manufacturing industries, like durable consumer electronics, it gained advantage. During those years, Turkey was among the top three exporters of some distinct product groups. 3 But this favorable outcome could not be spread to a wider product range. Other developing countries started signing free trade agreements with the EU that allowed them to send exports to this market without duties too. With the accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001, it also became more integrated with global production processes. Not only China, but also several Asian countries and ex-communist countries in the Balkans started exporting their goods to developed markets, including the EU, at low prices as a result of low input costs—mainly wages. As the world became a big supply chain, importers expanded their portfolio of possible purchasing points and searched for higher quality/price ratio. Many European firms established production facilities in the Far East and South Asia to benefit from low manufacturing costs, moved some of their production facilities there, and exported their Asian products to Europe. All these developments increased the competition Turkey faced. One of the main factors contributing to a nation’s competitiveness is the sophistication of its consumers. As consumers become more aware of their options, they shift their demand toward better products, and this

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induces domestic firms to produce better goods. The country moves up on the value chain, and its products are sought by more developed markets. The opposite holds, too. The increase in the difference between the sophistication levels of domestic consumers and the target market’s consumers results in lower demand for the products produced in the country. This approach takes us to another demand-sided explanation. It is possible to relate the sophistication levels of consumers to the development level of a country. In a developing country, citizens become better informed about outside options. Even though the development levels of both the EU and Turkey increased over time, the EU is still at a higher development level than Turkey. It might be the case that the demand structure of European consumers is changing and Turkish producers cannot keep up with this change. The reversal of shares of the EU and MENA in total exports can also be explained from a supply-sided view. Firm level analysis shows that once a country engages in international trade, firms that are above a certain productivity threshold can enter the export market. Firms with lower productivity levels can produce for the domestic market, and the least productive firms are forced to exit the market. This means that firms of different productivity levels coexist in the market, but only some can export. This theoretical framework can be used to explain the existing situation. Only highly productive Turkish firms could export to the EU; the other existing firms were serving only in the domestic market. After the 2008 crisis, Turkish producers that were previously not productive enough to export could have found a new destination for their products. As development levels in Turkey and the MENA region are similar in terms of GDP per capita, this results in similar sophisticaion of consumers. Domestic firms that were producing only for domestic consumers might have seen the other next door neighbor’s inclusion in the global arena as an opportunity. They might have started exporting goods, which are similar to their local supplies in quality, to MENA. This gave previously only local firms a chance to engage in international trade; they might be sending their products to MENA but still not to the EU.

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Intra-Industry Trade

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The changing structure of consumer choices and the opportunities firms capture based on these choices are very important for trade. One of the very important benefits of the comparison of development stages is to enable making forecasts related to what will be traded with whom. Standard trade theory states that countries trade with each other when they have different factor endowments, which means that countries at different development stages would mostly have inter-industry trade. Another interesting phenomenon that originated from empirical work is the existence of intra-industry trade (IIT). When trade data for big and developed


countries is analyzed at a detailed level, it is clear that these countries mostly trade similar products with each other. During the development process of countries, first the number of products produced decreases in order to concentrate the available resources to industries where they will be the most productive. As development continues, the number of domestically produced goods starts increasing again. Thus, the most developed nations produce the highest variety of goods. But consumers demand different features, and thus the intra-industry trade is seen more between these big, developed, and open economies (Bergstrand 1990, 1217). When the development stage is proxied by GDP per capita, it is clear that Turkey is more similar to MENA than the EU. As both partners are not fully developed yet, the intra-industry trade between the two is still very low compared to the intra-industry trade between the EU and Turkey, even though they are at different development stages. A general approach for calculating the intra-industry trade between two partners is to calculate the Gruber-Lloyd index. 4 If the index is closer to 1, this indicates higher intra-industry trade. On the contrary, an index closer to zero can be interpreted as more of one-way trade. For most of the product groups, 5 Turkey has higher intra-industry trade with the EU compared to intra-industry trade with the MENA region, on average. 6 Intra-industry trade with MENA is higher in natural-resource-oriented industries, like agriculture and nonferrous metals. This result is an expected outcome, considering the less developed production capabilities of MENA when compared to the EU. When the top five industries 7 with the highest intra-industry trade are checked, we see that the only declining GL index belongs to the nonferrous metals. This is one of the product groups where intra-industry trade between Turkey and the MENA is higher than between Turkey and the EU. For the other four top industries, intra-industry trade is increasing between Turkey and the MENA, which shows that two partners exchange similar goods more and more. Existence of higher intra-industry trade can be the result of taking part in the same supply chain, either as an intermediate or final good producer. A big market with modernizing industries is a plus for Turkish exporters, as this gives an opportunity to its producers for engaging in trade with their counterparts in the south. At this point, it is important to make a distinction between the vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade. This distinction originated from the quality differences between similar-nature goods. Vertical IIT is used for explaining the trade of commodities with different qualities, whereas horizontal IIT refers to goods of the same quality. Even though IIT between Turkey and the EU is higher compared to the MENA, more investigation should be carried out before coming up with conclusions. First of all, the overall intra-industry index (GL) is far from being 1, which means that Turkey is not well suited for the industry-oriented structure of Europe. Second, trade between EU and Turkey can fit in the definition of

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vertical IIT. This means that there is a quality difference between the products traded even though IIT exists. The difference of the GL index from 1 might be the result of tje lack of horizontal IIT. Turkey needs higher productivity levels and more sophistication during the production processes in order to catch up with EU’s quality demands. This will increase the share of horizontal IIT and draw the GL index near 1. The increasing IIT between Turkey and MENA can also be used to show the importance of this distinction. Turkish companies with medium productivity levels usually produce for the domestic market, as they are below the certain productivity threshold for becoming exporters. As MENA develops its markets, Turkish producers below the threshold can start sending their goods to MENA facilities due to their similar quality standards. This induces more firms to enter the export market. Since these exporters have lower productivity levels and MENA’s needs are oriented toward lower-quality goods at this stage of development, a match may occur and horizontal IIT can take place. The existence of such a phenomenon can be used to explain the increasing share of MENA.

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Revealed Comparative Advantage

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A good way to assess the structural strengths and weaknesses of an economy is to use the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) concept. This can be done by comparing an industry’s trade balance with the overall trade balance. Contribution to the manufacturing trade balance (CMTB) is an RCA indicator that can show whether an industry performs better or worse than the manfucaturing sector as a whole. If we do this exercise for the two target markets, namely the EU and the MENA, we can see the changing patterns of the industry trade balances for both regions. This enables us to see the RCA of the Turkish economy and see whether the strengths/weaknesses are similar in different markets. Different strengths in different markets can induce more firms from different industries to enter the export market. In 2010, the most imported product groups were petroleum and products, road vehicles, iron and steel, electrical equipment, and metal ores/ metal scrap. Two of these groups are not classified as manufactured goods (petroleum and products, metal ores/metal scrap). 8 Besides being among the top imports, road vehicles and iron/steel are known to be Turkey’s strengths. In this sense, analyzing the remaining three products from the CMTB perspective can shed light on important differences between the two markets and Turkey’s performance. Turkey has revealed comparative advantage over MENA in all of these product groups. In the iron and steel industry, Turkey has a more volatile condition against the EU. For the electrical equipment and road vehicles industries, Turkey used to have a deficit with the EU, but that is

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changing and Turkey is gaining comparative advantage in those industries too. This indicator reveals important information, as it shows how the industries are structured in Turkey and its trading partners. For example, iron and steel is a heavy industry that requires high amounts of fixed investment and supportive industries. Since the MENA’s development started relatively recently, Turkey’s iron/steel exports to MENA caused a surplus and foreign currency inflows to Turkey. On the other hand, the surplus for the electrical equipment industry is increasing both for the MENA and the EU. As MENA becomes more integrated with the world, its needs for electrical devices, both for household consumption and industrial production, are increasing. This leads to an increasing foreign currency inflow from the region. Since the beginning of 2000, deficits as a percentage of total trade with the EU started declining; in 2006, Turkey had a surplus with the EU for the first time in this product group. Considering the high-tech orientation of the EU production markets, it is good news that Turkish producers are gaining competitiveness power in European markets in this industry. The road vehicles industry has always been a foreign currency inflow source for Turkey when the MENA region is considered. This is another industry that requires high fixed investment, supportive industries, and local supply chain. It is difficult for a less developed region to develop its own automotive industry. As a close neighbor, Turkey took advantage of this lack in the MENA. The developments in the industry and increasing capacity enabled Turkey become a global production base, especially for light commercial vehicles. This might be a contributing factor to the recent surplus in the EU market.

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Diversity of Exports and Imports

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The degree of diversification in terms of product groups is also a measure of how well connected the trade partners are. A widely used method for measuring diversification is to calculate the entropy, 9 which can be defined as the weighted average of industries that export or import different fractions of total exports or imports. Investigating the time series for entropy makes it possible to see how the diversity of the bilateral trade evolves. 10 Historically, diversity of trade with the EU is higher than the trade with MENA, which is also increasing. These results can be explained using some facts from the economies of the target markets. MENA is a less developed country with a smaller production basket and lower income. This leads to having heavy trade only for essential products initially. As time passes, globalization comes into effect. Consumers become more aware of outside options, and producers become aware of the other intermediate products and look for better (cheaper,

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maybe?) options. As a result, the number of products traded increases. The diversity of bilateral trade not only measures the number of varieties but also takes into consideration the ratio of the industry exports (imports) to overall exports (imports). Thus, increasing diversity can also reflect the increasing trade volume. On the other hand, the high diversity with the EU is a sign of welldeveloped markets and higher compatibility of preferences. This not only enables more inter-industry trade but can also support the high intraindustry trade between the EU and Turkey.

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CONCLUSION

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Located on a peninsula that extends into Asia and is adjacent to Europe and Africa, Turkey is reshaping its growth plans to take advantage of its resources and setting year 2023 goals. The aim is to be among the top ten economies of the world, as well as achieving a sustainable growth path supported by higher trade volumes. Since the liberalization of trade, the Turkish economy has experienced productivity gains, in addition to increased variety of produced goods. This led to a higher level of inclusion in the world markets and becoming a part of the global chain. Even though local consumers’ demand changed due to higher income and sophistication, these are not enough for increasing the trade volume. Sophistication levels between partners and the way business is done are important determinants too. Since 2002, many improvements for mitigating business procedures have taken place in Turkey, and the waiting time for bureaucracy declined. Globalization resulted in higher awareness regarding the outside options, Turkish consumers started demanding more variety and higher quality, and producers started looking for higherquality intermediate goods at lower prices. Some local firms managed to meet the demand and serve local markets efficiently, which in turn resulted in their becoming exporters after passing a productivity threshold (Melitz 2003, 1702). Some firms lagged behind in catching up with the preferences occuring in the markets, and they became second tiers, thus confining themselved to local markets. Another group of firms were forced to exit the market due to lower productivity levels and failure to observe market needs. This is a selection effect that results in many types of firms coexisting in the markets and only some of them becoming exporters. Firms that became exporters not only realized changing conditions in the local markets but also abroad. Turkey, being next to the EU market, had a big chance of getting integrated with European industries and serving as a supply hub. In some sectors, the high intra-industry trade is a proof that this succeeded. It can also be a result of lower labor costs for labor-intensive industries. Even though costs declined locally over time,

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it was not enough to improve trade relations with the MENA region, which is another big market right next door. This shows that the conditions in foreign markets is also a determinant of trade volume, even though the Turkish exporters gained much experience due to relations with the EU and a long history of bilateral trade. This brings us back to our main question: what is happening today that is leading to changing roles of the EU and MENA? Why is MENA’s share increasing in Turkey’s trade? Is this the result of government policies? Is Turkey shifting its axis to the East as many complain? There are many questions that can be asked, and some of them are oriented to the political arena. It is true that the government can affect trade through the bilateral agreements it signs and through subsidies, but export volume is the aggregate sum of many firms’ export volumes. Thus, before asking political questions, it is more important to observe firms and analyze their behavior. A very popular method for analyzing changes in competitiveness of a nation is to use Porter’s Diamond. It incorporates four aspects of the market and brings them together to assess the competitiveness power of industries in a nation. These factors are conditions related to factors of production, demand conditions, existence/absence of supporting and related industries, and firm strategy and rivalry (Porter 1990, 78). Industries can be analyzed using this framework to determine how they position themselves globally. It is also a useful tool in comparing the two adjacent markets, namely the EU and MENA, and see why MENA lagged in becoming a big trading partner until very recently. With industrialization and opening of the markets internationally, Turkey moved up on the value chain and capital utilization increased. Turkey is a big market with a big and young labor stock. This causes labor costs to be low compared to the EU market and reduces the cost of production. For labor-intensive industries, this seems like a big advantage. On the other hand, the cost of capital was higher during the initial phases of liberalization as a result of lack of capital stock. This resulted in less capital usage, and the overall industry oriented itself toward more labor-intensive production techniques. When capital is not intensively used, the innovation capability is limited and product variety increases at a slower pace. Thus, Turkey entered into a vicious circle: the large labor force induced production facilities to focus on labor-intensive goods, and as a result, less capital was demanded. This led to a lag in catching up with the needs of the EU, and Turkey counted on labor even more. On the other hand, unlike the heavy textile exports of the past, the main export items of Turkey nowadays are the capital-intensive goods, as they are what is mainly demanded through intra-industry trade. The EU market is a very important part of the global value chain, and it demands high-quality products as intermediate goods. Turkey was known to be a big exporter of textiles and agricultural products until the beginning of

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the 1990s, but this had to change due to the integration of the Asian countries with the world trade system. Their labor costs are much cheaper, which causes them to gain advantage in these product groups (Markusen and Venables 2000, 205). Thus, Turkey needs to switch to capitalintense industries and increase labor productivity as well. Although there was a mismatch between the capital-intense needs of the EU and the labor-intense structure of Turkish industry, there seemed to be a perfect fit between Turkey and MENA. Turkey had cheap labor, was able to produce relatively higher quality goods, and was close to MENA distant-wise, and both were similary populated—which suggests that bilateral trade between the two partners would be high. But that was not the case, and trade started increasing only very recently. This phenomenon can be explained using two facts. First, even though income levels were similar when Turkey liberalized its markets and abandoned import substitution, there was/is high income inequality in the MENA region. Most of the income is related to petroleum products and is owned by minority groups. Thus, the regular consumer did not have enough money to buy imported goods. Due to the closed nature of the economies, consumers did not get integrated with the world very early, and this prevented their sophistication from increasing. Thus their preferences were not well aligned with Turkish exporters’ products. Whatever they could demand from Turkey would most likely be produced by the second-tier Turkish producers who were not able to become exporters as a result of having lower productivity than the threshold. This shows that even if a country is rich in terms of relatively low-cost labor, it is not enough to export labor-intensive goods to every market. Demand is the driving force of exports, and only if novelties are demanded, it forces local producers to innovate and look for new opportunities. This links the factor intensities in a country and the structure of demand from the outside world. As Turkey positioned itself to become a trading partner of the EU and the dependency ratio increased in the initial phase of liberalization, the supporting industries also shaped themselves around the main exporting industries. Thus, this fostered disproportionate growth of the exporting industries and related industries, for others were not well developed. But because heavy industries and others requiring high amounts of fixed investment also became main exported items of Turkey, this dependence on the EU did not affect Turkey negatively. These industries were also open for innovation, and due to high R & D investments, new products were developed. This enabled those industries’ exports to catch up with the evolving demand of developed countries. Most of these industries also served the domestic market and benefited from the increasing local demand, which helped them reduce their capital costs. Combined with low labor cost, this decline helped Turkish exporters serve international markets with lower priced goods and com-


pete with the developed country products. After the emergence of newly industrializing countries, Turkey’s labor cost advantage eroded slowly and innovation became the pillar for growth in trade. The experience in producing the final products and intermediates of some main exported products, combined with low costs, helped Turkey enter the MENA market effectively. After the liberalization of the 1980s and several crises Turkey experienced, the importance of regulation became obvious. In the initial phases, capitalism was wilder and government support for rulers’ friends made them grow their companies beyond limits. Most of these industrialists owned not only production facilities but also banks where they could get credit at lower interest rates. The importance of competition in the domestic market was not realized, and monopolies in several industries popped up. In the 1990s, failing banks drowned their holding companies, resulting in the closure of big factories. This information and the historychanging 2001 crises led to more regulation to enable fair competition in the markets. Thus, the only way of survival in the market happened to be innovation, and companies that could make a change became advantageous in exports. Especially after 2002, many improvements were made in order to reduce the bureaucracy and increase the ease of doing business. These contributed to more foreign firms coming and investing in Turkey, which helped technological spillovers and increased the technological know-how in many industries. As a result, Turkey increased the variety in its export portfolio and became more diverse. Different target markets with different needs could be served due to the increase in diversity. This opened the doors for more firms to benefit from the spillovers and become exporters, so that Turkey’s dependence on a single market can decline over time, which will give Turkey more negotiation power over its exports. All believe that diversification is good and openness enables diversification. But the case of Turkey is different. The biggest trading partner of Turkey is the European Union, and the demand coming from that market is high end. Producing the goods they demand requires technological capacity formation. Especially after the 2008 crisis, Turkish exporters increased their exports to the MENA market, but the demand from this region is usually low-end type. Considering that there will be immediate effects of the Arab Spring but structural changes will take place in a longer horizon, Turkey cannot expect a change in the MENA region’s demand structure. This is the risky part for Turkey. If Turkey allows the EU’s share to decline and MENA’s share to increase, it might stop the technological transformation Turkey has been experiencing and hurt the economy in the long run. Policy makers have to be careful and not cherish this change without careful inspection. It is important to have MENA as an export destination, but it is essential to maintain trade with the EU at high volumes, which will contribute to Turkey’s overall development.

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NOTES 1. MBA; PhD candidate in the Department of International Economics and International Business Development; researcher in TEPAV, TOBB Economy and Technology University, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. Calculations are made using data from the United Nations Comtrade database. 3. Using Comtrade data between 2000 and 2009, we checked Turkey’s ranking for EU’s imports, especially for consumer electronics. For TVs, fridges, dishwashers, and washing machines, Turkey ranks either 1 or 2. For ovens, including microwaves, Turkey’s rank is either 2 or 3. For small household appliances, Turkey’s rank is much lower (between 5 and 7). All these goods are produced with scale economies, and Turkey, having a ready production capacity and high domestic demand for these goods, has managed to decrease the costs for these product groups over time. As consumers demanded more and better products, even the variety increased. As a result, Turkey gained advantage. This means that distance works in favor of Turkey for goods that are relatively bigger in size. As the size of the exported good decreases, the unit transportation cost gets smaller, so the advantage Turkey has through distance vanishes. 4. Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index, which is calculated as 1–(|Xi–Mi|/(Xi+Mi)). 5. SITC3; two-digit product groups are used for calculations. 6. Intra-industry trade is calculated according to the Grubel-Lloyd index. The closer the GL index is to 1, the more intra-industry trade exists. For each product group, the average of the available year’s GL index is used. 7. Crude fertilizer/mineral (27), chemical material/products not elsewhere specified (59), nonferrous metals (68), scientific instruments (87), gold non-monetary ex ore (97). 8. According to UNCTAD, manufacturing trade consists of product groups 5–8, SITC3. 9. Entropy can be calculated as E = ∑ Pi. ln (1/Pi) (i=1 . . . n), where Pi is the ratio of exports (imports) of industry i to a partner to the total exports (imports) of the industry. For a given year, it is the sum of each industry’s contribution to the weighted average. 10. An increase in entropy means that the diversification with the trade partner increases.

REFERENCES Bergstrand, J. H. 1990. “The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model, the Linder Hypothesis, and the Determinants of Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade.” Economic Journal (December): 1216–1229. Bergstrand, J. H., and P. Egger. 2006. “Trade Costs and Intra-Industry Trade.” Review of World Economics / Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (October): 433–58. Boratav, K., and E. Yeldan. 2006. Turkey, 1980–2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)-Stability, and Patterns of Distribution, http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane/ B&YCEPA2002.PDF Caves, R. E. 1981. “Intra-Industry Trade and Market Structure in the Industrial Countries.” Oxford Economic Papers (July): 203–23. Davis, D. R. 1995. “Intra-Industry Trade: A Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo Approach.” Journal of International Economics , (November): 201–26. Gönel, F. D. 2001. “How Important Is Intra-Industry Trade between Turkey and Its Trading Partners?” Russian and East European Finance and Trade 37 (4): 61–76. Helpman, E., M. J. Melitz, and S. R. Yeaple. 2004. “Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms.” American Economic Review (March): 300–316.

İdil Bilgiç Alpaslan Krugman, P. 1980. “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade.” American Economic Review (December) : 950–59. Krugman, P. 1990. Increasing Returns and Economic Geography . NBER Working Paper Series No. 3275. Markusen, J. R., and A. J. Venables. 2000. “The Theory of Endowment, Intra-Industry, and Multi-National Trade.” Journal of International Economics (December): 209–34. Melitz, M. J. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Aggregate Industry Productivity and Intra-Industry Reallocations.” Econometrica (November): 1695–1725. Porter, M. E. 1990. “Competitive Advantage of Nations.” Harvard Business Review (November): 73–91. Sawyer, W. C., R. L. Sprinkle, and K. Tochkov. 2010. “Patterns and Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade in Asia.” Journal of Asian Economics (October): 485–93. Selçuk, F., and A. Ertuğrul. 2001. “A Brief Account of the Turkish Economy, 1980–2000.” Russian and East European Finance and Trade (December): 6–30. Van Biesebroeck, J. 2011. “Dissecting Intra-Industry Trade.” Economic Letters (February): 71–75.

III

Foreign Policy of Turkey: Looking West and Going East

TEN Turkey’s Recent Foreign Policy Activism in Its Neighborhood versus Its EU Membership Goal How Compliant Are Turkey’s Regional Ambitions with EU Foreign Policy? Ömer Kurtbağ 1

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Turkish foreign policy has recently been characterized by a decentered activism in its neighborhood, while the EU’s apparent chill toward Turkey’s membership bid has played a role in Turkey’s eastward “drift” in regard to foreign policy. However, this assumption is only partly true, since Turkey’s foreign policy is also driven by its growing self-confidence in economic, commercial, and political terms. As a more assertive middle power, Turkey now intends to pursue a soft power–oriented foreign activism within its close proximity so as to forge a Turkish area of interest. On this account, this chapter first seeks to analyze the factors that pushed Turkey toward strengthening its relations with its neighbors, and then undertakes an inquiry into whether or not Turkey’s recent foreign policy orientation is in conflict with its long quest for EU membership, which also requires compliance with EU foreign policy thinking and practice. Theoretically, Turkey’s recent soft power–based understanding and practice of foreign policy, enhanced by the fact of its being a country that is in the process of negotiating for EU accession, seem to fit into the objectives and principles of EU foreign policy. Nevertheless, it also includes a number of areas that are practically at odds with Turkey’s relationship with the Union. Turkey has recently emerged as an influential player in its

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neighborhood, with the help of the pursuit of EU membership; but, paradoxically, its growing clout does not necessarily involve its complete compliance with EU foreign policy in relation to every regional and global issue. It appears that this paradox will be overcome only after Turkey’s full integration into the EU, although it is not too late for both the EU and Turkey to take some steps toward rekindling the relationship and thus overcoming the troubled period. This chapter first examines Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism by outlining the main features and tenets of Ankara’s new foreign policy rhetoric and practice. Second, it discusses the question of whether or not Turkey’s foreign policy reorientation signifies a move away from the EU orbit as it relates to conducting foreign affairs. The chapter ends with an overview of both the future shape of Turkey-EU relations in the wake of their cooperation and discordance in regional and global politics after turbulent years, and the possible hardships and challenges that both sides will encounter in their new directions toward building a functioning order and stability in the troublesome regions surrounding Turkey.

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TURKEY’S RECENT FOREIGN POLICY: A DECENTERED AND UNANCHORED ACTIVISM?

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It is common to argue nowadays that in recent times, under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has been following a new and more independent foreign policy line (Öniş 2011, 47–48). It also has a new foreign policy identity that has been shaped by its growing soft power. Indeed, Turkey is no longer a country whose geopolitical identity is its only asset in regard to its relationship with the West. It is now undeniable that its dual or even multiple identities (secular and Islamic, European and Middle Eastern, etc.) are at least as decisive as its geopolitical standing. As the Turkish people’s hopes for EU membership fade away, and EU policies toward Turkey have not been welcomed by the overwhelming majority of Turks, the Islamic and Middle Eastern dimensions of this identity may have become more apparent in the 2000s, with a great many foreign policy implications (Kardaş 2010, 116). As Fuller asserts, “the JDP [AKP] has vigorously moved toward reviving and broadening Ankara’s long-atrophied relations with the Middle East and Muslim World” (Fuller 2008, 69). But the question here is whether the rise of Turkey has only to do with its changing identity, or if it is the result of a mixture of favorable internal and external factors that enable it to seek more autonomous policies. My argument here will be that Turkey’s new foreign direction has no less to do with its geoeconomic and pragmatic interests defined and shaped by its soft power than its identity-based objectives and aspirations. In what follows, the identity-based critics of

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Turkey’s Recent Foreign Policy Activism

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the AKP’s foreign policy are first addressed, and then other motives and realities underlying it are briefly discussed. Turkey’s current foreign policy course has recently been one of the main discussion points in Western media and academia. According to critical narrative about the new foreign policy direction of Turkey, it seeks, under the ruling AKP, a neo-Ottomanist area of influence in its close proximity by adopting a foreign policy understanding that combines soft power and Islamism at the expense of its Western-oriented trajectory, thereby engaging in an “axis shift” from the West toward the east and the south. This new orientation has to do with a sea change in Turkish national identity in the sense that under AKP rule, the country has become more conservative by abandoning the secular and Westernoriented course that laid the foundation for Turkey’s sixty-year-old cooperation with the West. Here “Turkey’s current foreign policy initiatives are seen to be a revival of the Ottoman vision” or, as perceived by the Western dissenters, the revival of an expansionist neo-Ottomanism (Çandar 2009, 4) since they are grounded in the rediscovery of Turkey’s Ottoman geography and legacy with the aim of counterbalancing its Western and European bonds. As Gardels puts it, “Ataturk’s whole modernization project is today being recalibrated by the ruling Islamistrooted (Justice and Development) AK party, which is seeking to reintroduce piety into public life while projecting Turkey as a neo Ottoman regional power in the Muslim Middle East instead of a mere NATO appendage or European supplicant” (Gardels 2009, 2). In view of this conventional thinking, there is even a paradigmatic shift in Turkish foreign policy making toward embracing a de-centered and unanchored activism, as well as forging an Islamist orbit alongside Iran, Syria, and Hamas, and thus abandoning its long-established alliance with Israel. To illustrate, Soner Çağaptay, one of the most critical observers of the AKP line in foreign affairs, notes that “the AKP has led Turkey to become neither a bridge between European states and the ‘Muslim world,’ nor a European country. If anything, it is becoming the tribune of a politically-defined Muslim world against the West, with an increasingly authoritarian government open to the reality of governance by Islamist politics” (Çağaptay 2010). He also believes that the AKP’s main goal has nothing to do with fulfilling the goal of Europeanization, but rather has to do with opportunistically transforming Turkey into an Islamic republic by taking advantage of the EU-related reforms that it has made during its early years in power. In his view, it is also the AKP’s lack of commitment to EU accession rather than France’s or Germany’s opposition that stalled the membership negotiations. Therefore, Turkey’s search for greater foreign policy independence and its strong regional aspirations under the Erdoğan-Davutoğlu duo are regarded both as an illegitimate effort that alienates the West and a serious setback to its Europeanization project, just as the EU no longer provides the main axis for Turkish

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foreign policy given the stalemate in accession negotiations and the resulting Euro-skepticism on the part of the Turkish elites and public. Although Turkey’s recent “turning” toward the East has been associated with the Islamic orientation of the ruling AKP, it strongly rejects the idea of an axis shift. For instance, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated in a symposium in late 2009 that “there is no axis shift of Turkey. We are standing where we have been standing at the beginning of our political power” (Çandar 2009, 4). For Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former foreign policy adviser to Erdoğan and current minister of foreign affairs, Turkey’s civilization-based assertiveness and multiregional activism are not based on an intention to seek a hegemonic role in the regional context; instead, Turkey’s primary motive is to promote peace and security in a multilateral framework (Davutoğlu 2010). On the basis of this geocultural reading of global politics, Turkey, under the governing AKP, seeks to emerge as a regional peace-promoter and order-instituting player that actively engages in resolving the long-standing disputes surrounding it (Akçakoca 2009; Hale 2009, 144; Öniş and Yılmaz 2009, 9). This novel positioning is now well known as “the doctrine of strategic depth,” a term coined by Davutoğlu himself (Davutoğlu 2009, 8; Danforth 2008, 90; Öniş 2009, 9; Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010, 106; Kınıklıoğlu 2010, 93). His vision indeed attaches considerable significance to Turkey’s relations with the non-Western world, just as he finds Turkey’s relations with the West overemphasized. According to him, the one-dimensional alignment and perhaps obsession with the Western world have even sometimes undermined the broader interests of Turkey, as a pivotal or central country with multiple identities, in its hinterlands. He even suggests that “if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the EU” (Davutoğlu 2010). Thus, under Davutoğlu’s vision and Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey’s foreign policy has released itself from the “static” and “monodimensional” aspects of its status quo–oriented Cold War trajectory, and it has been characterized by a balance between freedom and security, zero problems with neighbors, multidimensional policies, diplomatic flexibility, and a rhythmic diplomacy as the leading principles of the strategic depth doctrine (Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010, 106; Düzgit and Tocci 2009, 1; Türkmen 2009, 119). Despite the abovementioned skepticism reigning over the course of Turkey’s foreign policy, it will be suggested here that Turkey’s recent reorientation in foreign affairs, even with overtures toward countries such as Iran, Syria, and Russia, has actually not been fully and necessarily at the expense of its relations with its Western and European partners. But what is implied here is that Turkey will not simply be driven by what its Western and European ties impose upon it, though it will still remain generally committed to the United States, the EU, and NATO. Indeed, Turkey now seems to have more confidence in suggesting that it no longer needs an EU anchor to influence its periphery, as its regional soft

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power assets grow while those of the EU disappear. After being a status quo power during the Cold War era, Turkey now looks to choose a highly different pattern from the previous one with regard to assessing threats and managing crises in its neighborhood. By developing a more diversified and multifaceted foreign policy vision, its aim is to broaden the traditional limits and scope of Turkish foreign policy–making to new areas in terms of geography, politics, and economics. Turkish foreign policy is no longer shaped solely by security considerations, which until recent years had an enormous impact on the foreign policy thinking of Turkish policy makers (Terzi 2010, 2). On the basis of its growing soft power, Turkey has actually engaged in numerous new openings to the Arab and Islamic world, typified by its conciliation and mediation efforts between Syria and Israel or Syria and Iraq. Its “zero problems with neighbors” policy is also among the best exemplars of this novel vision (Kınıklıoğlu 2010, 9). According to Akgün, “It is apparent that Turkey, from now on, will act more autonomously. If necessary, it will define its interests separately from its traditional allies. Turkey will be less open than it was in the past to unilateral requests from the European Union and US. In short, Turkey will not now do whatever it’s asked to do” (Akgün 2010). After noting that it is its self-defined interests that will possibly drive Turkey in shaping its diversified foreign engagements in the future, Kardaş also opines, “Under the rubric of a ‘multi-axis’ or ‘multi-dimensional’ foreign policy, the Western connection is simply reduced to one of the many external relationships that Turkey juggles” (Kardaş 2010, 131). In light of this assumption, it is now convenient to ask the question of whether or not this new reality of Turkish foreign policy is consistent with its EU membership goal. [10.8]

THE CONSISTENCY OF TURKEY’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY WITH EU POLICIES: A RUPTURE WITH THE EU?

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Turkey’s rising standing in regional and global politics has recently been connected with the process of Europeanization, a useful conceptual device meaning the adaptation of domestic processes, policies, and structures to EU regulations and institutional structures (Terzi 2010b, 5–6, 11). As one commentator puts it, “Turkey’s economic success, legislative improvements, and regional soft power in the course of the past decade are largely a factor of its credentials gained through commitment to a European vocation, and the conditionality attached to this belonging” (Göksel 2010, 9). In other words, the status of EU candidacy was the main “triggering force of change” in Turkish foreign policy rhetoric and actions (Terzi 2010a, 5). Indeed, the EU-induced reforms toward fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria made it possible to introduce legislative changes that expanded the boundaries of human rights and fundamental free-

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doms to new segments of the population (Keyman and Öniş 2007, 19, 90). The “EU anchor” also enabled the AKP to pursue its soft power–based, proactive, and multidimensional foreign policy line, since the role of the military and Kemalist state establishment in foreign policy–making has diminished considerably through the implementation of these reforms (Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010, 102; Alessandri 2010, 88). Following these reforms, which weakened the impact of the Cold War era’s security-based thinking on Turkish foreign policy making, Turkey sought to end the long-standing disputes with its neighbors and increase stability in its near abroad by means of public diplomacy instead of the use of force (Terzi 2010b, 1). For instance, in the absence of this Europeanization process, it would be unthinkable for Turkey to attempt to solve the Cyprus issue in accordance with the UN peace plan in 2004, which failed due to the “no” vote of the Greek side in the referendum to the plan (Alessandri 2010a, 89; Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010, 101; Terzi 2010a, 2–3; Terzi 2010b, 23). Also, the 1 March debacle between Turkey and the United States under Bush in the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003 when the Turkish Grand Assembly refused to allow the U.S. Army to pass through Turkey to attack Iraq from the north was also a sign of Turkey’s Europeanizing foreign policy. Terzi asserts here that, “the parliamentary decision . . . had seemed like the ultimate convergence of Turkish foreign policy with that of France and Germany and was hailed as being more European than that of the Eastern European countries, which were keen on supporting the US and were also just on the brink of acceding to the Union” (Terzi 2010a, 11). With these steps, Turkey was of the opinion that its growing regional clout would be a tremendous asset in spreading European values and principles across the EU neighborhood, and thus it would be a useful bargaining tool in enhancing Turkey’s position in the accession process. However, although the drive for EU membership was very strong in the first term of AKP rule, this was not the case in its second term. Even though its soft power–based policies toward Northern Iraq, Syria, and Armenia were welcomed by the EU, Turkey’s more diversified relations and friendships with regimes such as Iran, Sudan, and Hamas have started to be perceived by many in the West as a Turkish “drift” away from Europeanization. Turkey was viewed “as a ‘privileged outsider’ rather than as a ‘natural insider’ in Europe” (Tocci 2011, 154). So what really drove the AKP and broader public opinion away from the European project? The enthusiasm for EU membership at both governing political elite and public levels started to gradually disappear thanks to a confluence of internal and external factors. First, at the domestic level, it was “the weakening commitment of the AKP leadership to the goal of full membership” that drove Turkey away from the EU project (Öniş 2011, 50; Öniş 2009, 27). It can be suggested that the AKP seemed to have a dual

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identity: during its first term, it had shown its liberal-democratic face as evidenced by its outstanding reforms toward EU membership, but its conservative-nationalistic attitude over a number of issues was also noteworthy in its second term. In fact, Turkey’s religious middle class and the AKP supporters most notably have been increasingly furious with the EU’s demonstrable chill toward Turkey’s membership (Gordon and Taspinar 2008, 50). The support of Turkish public opinion to the EU accession was around 75 percent before the onset of membership negotiations (Çarkoğlu 2004, 23) but in the process it declined to a level of about 40 percent in 2011 (Eurobarometer 2011). This mood has been followed by a mounting wave of nationalist reaction across Turkish politics and, in the end, by a quest for an alternative route in foreign policy, also fueled by the growing sense of national self-confidence. As Öniş notes, it is possible to speak of “a shift in commitment from deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization and a simultaneous shift to soft Euro-asianism” on the part of the AKP (Öniş 2009, 35). In doing this, the AKP often tried to act pragmatically, which was criticized by its opponents as an indication of its inconsistency and impotence as a political actor. But this pragmatism was hardly the case in the aftermath of its 2007 election victory. Indeed, its inaction toward launching a sweeping tide of constitutional and legal reforms after the landslide victory that it obtained, including the introduction of a new constitution in line with the EU accession process, was an enormous mistake at its disposal that it was bound to regret later (Öniş 2009, 27). This grave mistake proved fundamental when the AKP government faced a court case for its full closure in 2008. “Erdoğan and his party were triumphant, but in the heady moments of summer 2007 they lost sight of the hard realities of Turkish politics” (Cook 2009, 107). Therefore, one thing was sufficiently clear in this gloomy picture of Turkish perceptions of the EU: the EU project was no longer at the heart of Turkish foreign policy–making under AKP leadership, though this does not mean that it has been abandoned altogether. When it comes to external factors concerning the disappearance of Turkish enthusiasm for the EU project, the growing anti-Turkish mood among some key EU members led by Germany’s Merkel and France’s Sarkozy governments, which question Turkey’s European qualities and vocation, is the most visible. Their opposition is accompanied by a proposal of the so-called “privileged partnership,” a kind of special status that falls short of full membership while proposing to integrate Turkey into some policy areas without voting rights (Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010, 103; Terzi 2010a, 8; Arvanitopoulos and Tzifakis 2010, 2; Vaisse and Kundnani 2011, 76–77). Obviously, these countries and their present leadership are not very content with the rise of Turkey as an influential, respectful, and prestigious player in regional and global contexts, as their weight fades away gradually in the wake of the emerging Eastern nations. In addition, “the EU’s failure to deal with the Cyprus conflict on an

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equitable basis was increasingly interpreted as yet another case of unfair treatment, even among the key members of the pro-EU, pro-reform coalition in Turkey” (Öniş 2009, 26). Especially after the 2006 European Council decision that suspended the eight key negotiation chapters because of the Cyprus issue, Turkish public opinion shifted farther away from the goal of Europeanization as exemplified by the rapidly declining majority support for membership. In this climate, a more pragmatic approach was apparent in Turkey’s policy toward EU accession, as emotional aspects of this policy have gradually disappeared in the face of EU foot-dragging over Turkish membership (Oğuzlu 2008, 3-4). After the accession negotiations were stalled by the unresolved Cyprus dispute as well as the French and German objections, the EU side has apparently lost most of its leverage in influencing Turkey’s direction in both foreign and domestic affairs (Devrim 2010, 9–10). Third, and more recently, the EU’s removal of visas for all the Western Balkan countries with the exception of Kosovo, while still applying a strict visa regime for Turkish nationals, is another issue of controversy that split both sides. Apart from these, the global financial crisis seems to have made the EU project less attractive and more crisisprone by threatening the monetary and economic union, the very base of EU integration (Öniş 2011, 55; Attali and Pamboukis 2011, 33; Kutlay 2010; Mernitt 2010). Parallel to the crisis, the rise of anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and Islamophobic movements across Europe is also worrying in the sense that the prospect for a more introverted “fortress” Europe grows, threatening both the broader enlargement project and the chances of Turkish accession in the near future (Öniş 2009, 30; Öner 2011, 165). Given all these developments, “the crucial question is not whether Turkey is turning its back on Europe, but rather if Europe is turning its back on the fundamental values and principles that have guided European integration over the last 50 years” (Bildt et al. 2011). The debate inside the EU at this point revolves around the issue of whether the Union remains an outward-looking integration project, or if it will turn into an inward-looking and exclusionary venture. In responding to these kinds of challenging questions, four European foreign ministers, namely Sweden’s Carl Bildt, Italy’s Franco Frattini, Britain’s William Hague, and Finland’s Alexander Stubb, made a strong case for revitalizing “the vision of an open Europe” by arguing that European integration is not yet complete and probably never will be without eventual Turkish accession. With regard to foreign and security policy, their argument is that “we [the Europeans] should also remember that Turkey, like no other country, has the ability to advance European interests in security, trade and energy networks from the Far East to the Mediterranean” (Bildt et al. 2010). In light of these lines, their positioning in the evolving debates over the broader enlargement and Turkey’s place in it is visibly on the side of a multicultural and more open EU, which is in direct opposition to their French and German counterparts’ views. Therefore, in the

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face of declining public support for the European integration project, the Union is desperately in need of, first, a redefinition of what it now stands for, and then a new political narrative that will renew the elements of reputation and admiration that the EU has recently lost. Against this background, it is claimed here that a proactive and multidimensional diplomatic activism on the part of Ankara seems to be in sync with the goal of Europeanization in principle, even though it also sometimes involves Turkey taking some steps that are not necessarily compliant with EU membership for the sake of pursuing its own economic and pragmatic interests. Indeed, it is also arguable that the more independently Turkey behaves in foreign affairs, the closer it gets to the EU, which also seeks an autonomous global role. The question here is how Turkey’s new orientation in foreign policy may serve as an asset in the process of EU accession. The answer depends on the attitudes of both sides toward each other’s specific interests and expectations. As Düzgit and Tocci stated, “The current EU discourse of constructing Europe as a ‘global actor’ necessitates a strong EU presence in the wider neighbourhood” (Düzgit and Tocci 2009, 1). Indeed, Turkey’s bid for EU membership has attracted the attention of Arab nations, and at first sight, Ankara’s flourishing ties with them look to be a tremendous asset for the EU’s deeper reach into the Middle East as a civilian power (Oğuzlu 2008, 12), since both Ankara and Brussels seek to promote peace and stability in the region. Davutoğlu contends optimistically here:

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The paths of Turkey and the EU cannot be considered as two distinct and divergent vectors. On the contrary, they almost always converge. Turkey seeks to establish peace, stability and security in the Middle East; to further integrate the Balkans with the Euro-Atlantic community; to bolster democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia; to contribute to enhanced energy supply and security of Europe; and to strengthen security and stability in Afghanistan and South Asia. So does the EU. (Davutoğlu 2010)

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What is actually implied in this statement is that Turkey’s growing soft power plays a critical and indispensable role in defusing the instabilities and regional problems that could have negative effects on wider Europe. In this respect, Turkey and the EU appear to have convergent, rather than conflicting, interests, although this does not automatically mean a full convergence of mutual interests in every issue and every time. As Terzi puts it, “It is certain that Turkey has adopted the EU rhetoric of ‘good neighbourly relations’ and the aim of ‘developing an area of peace and stability’” (Terzi 2010a, 2). Ankara actually acted in accordance with EU foreign policy goals in handling many regional issues. Some scholars, like Oğuzlu, even assert that “acting as a European country in the non-European Middle East testifies to the Europeanization of Turkey’s foreign policy” (Oğuzlu 2008, 17).

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Here are some examples of this EU-oriented activism on the part of Turkey. Recently, despite the ongoing PKK violence, Turkey has engaged with the Iraqi Kurds. In the absence of U.S. troops, scheduled to withdraw from Iraq in 2011, Ankara is very concerned about the future of Iraqi unity and “realizes that if tensions in Iraq devolve into all-out violence and the country breaks apart, Turkey would be better off with a friendly partner in Iraq’s energy-rich north” (Abramowitz and Barkey 2009). The recent compromise between Turkey and Northern Iraq’s Kurdish regional government appears to be the key to achieving this goal. Turkey has also attempted to promote a process of democratic opening since summer 2009, which aims to extend various cultural and political freedoms and rights to its Kurdish people (Cook 2009, 116; Alessandri 2010b, 29). The visits paid by President Gul to Iraq in 2009 and then by Mr. Barzani to Ankara in June 2010, were important steppingstones in enhancing the dialogue between the two sides in a manner that would permanently mitigate the tension in the region. These openings were also welcomed by the EU, as they emphasize the introduction of further freedoms and cultural rights to “ethnic minorities” while denouncing the violent PKK activities. As an issue complicating Turkey’s accession to the EU, the TurkishArmenian dispute still remains to be resolved, and Turkey’s recent opening to this neighboring country, which started with “football diplomacy” led by both countries’ presidents, has offered a beneficial opportunity to reach a compromise between the two sides (Öniş 2009, 18). Indeed, both the declaration in April 2009 issued by the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey under the auspices of Switzerland, which established a framework for the normalization of relations, and the subsequent protocols signed on 10 October, which set out the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations including the opening of the border, were an immense leap forward (Alessandri 2010a, 90). However, since then, the entire process lies in tatters. Turkey initially received some credit from the Unites States and the EU for this bold move (Üstün 2010, 237)—but then, under the pressure of nationalist quarters, Prime Minister Erdoğan linked the full implementation of the agreement and the normalization of relations with finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, implying the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied lands (although there is no explicit reference to this issue in the protocols). Actually, the underlying reason for Turkey’s initiative was both to ease the pressure resulting from the Armenian “genocide” issue, which is often raised in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere, and to support its EU membership bid by engaging in good-neighborly relations (Abramowitz and Barkey 2009). Finally, added to this conundrum are the nationalist reactions in both countries toward any attempt to handle, let alone resolve, these issues. All these factors complicate both sides’ stand, but perhaps Turkey’s more seriously since it remains confused between pursuing the

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independent player role encouraged by its Western partners and alienating Azerbaijan—which, in fact, cannot easily afford a rupture with Turkey. Another area in which Turkey-EU harmony in foreign policy can be observed is Turkish-Syrian relations. This relationship has undergone a dramatic wave of change in relation to how both nations see and approach each other, ushering in the dawn of a historic new era. After coping successfully with their confrontational past, Turkey and Syria have now been consolidating their friendship launched under the leadership of Erdoğan’s AKP and Bashar al-Assad (Fuller 2008, 72–73; Terzi 2010b, 111). From the years of enmity that shaped relations for decades to a friendship that had no match in Turkey’s past foreign relations, this relationship had been progressing toward establishing an alliance-like bond in economic and political terms, exemplified by the signing of many bilateral trade agreements and cooperation over numerous regional issues such as the future of Iraq. Turkey also showed a strong interest in mediating between Israel and Syria, which disagreed over the status of the strategic Golan Heights, and played a constructive role in bringing the two sides together in order to discuss the dispute in Istanbul in May 2008 (Hale 2009, 151–52). It appears that the recent rapprochement with Turkey best served the Syrian interests since it was helpful to repair relations with the West by means of Turkey’s status as a negotiating candidate for EU accession. Thus, both countries have engaged in developing deeper and wider commercial ties, as exemplified by the growing volume of bilateral trade, soaring Turkish investments in Syria, and last, the increase in the number of Turkish tourists visiting Syria following the mutual removal of visas (Gordon and Taspinar 2008, 58–59). Therefore, in the end, “Turkish policy toward Syria is much more aligned with the EU’s policy of engagement” (Öniş 2009, 17). The Iranian-Turkish rapprochement, despite their history of longstanding geopolitical rivalry, has also been in sync with the EU’s engagement policy until the recent past (Terzi 2010b, 118), when Turkey acted independently of its Western partners by first reaching a nuclear deal with Iran and then voting against the tougher sanctions against Tehran in the UN Security Council in 2010. The two neighbors have gotten closer on many issues such as the struggle with the restive Kurdish separatism and expanding their energy cooperation (Gordon and Taspinar 2008, 55; Fuller 2008, 74, 111; Hale 2009, 153–54). The likelihood of an independent Kurdish state claiming land in their territories worries both countries more than anything else. But they are also cooperating in the energy sector, given Turkey’s increasing dependence on Iranian gas resources. As the second-largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey, Iran has been a vital energy partner for Turkey (Fuller 2008, 74; Hale 2009, 153–54). Gordon and Taspinar maintain that by approaching Turkey on these issues, Iran hoped that it would weaken the ties between Turkey and the West.

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However, they point to the fact that “neither the tactical cooperation on the Kurdish issue nor the expanding energy relationship mean that Turkey somehow thinks a relationship with Iran can replace its traditional relationship with the West” (Gordon and Taspinar 2008, 57). Here one should note that Sunni Turkey will not be so pleased with the idea of a nuclear Shiite Iran next to it, and if this happens one day, the former is not likely to hesitate to have its own nuclear program. Basically, what Turkey intended to do in all these engagements was to fill the leadership and power void in the wider Middle East, which has been left by the weakened U.S. influence in the region, as well as the decline of Sunni actors like the close U.S. allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the lack of any serious European involvement (Abramowitz and Barkey 2009; Gardner 2010; Joffe 2010). In this respect, being more selfconfident with its growing economic clout and at peace with its Muslim identity, Turkey seems to be aspiring to act as a dominant regional player. Arguing a triple rivalry between Turkey, Israel, and Iran for increased regional influence, Gardner suggests, “By emerging as a popular champion of Palestinian rights, Turkey has ended Iran’s ability to make all the running in the region” (Gardner 2010). Through its soft power–based approach to Middle Eastern issues and countries, rather than isolating or antagonizing them, Turkey would be able to diminish the effects of Shiite Iran’s involvement in the region via its rapprochement with Iraq and Syria, as the former was recently more vulnerable to Iran, and the latter was closely aligned with it after the 2003 Iraq War. In addition, such positioning requires Turkey to put an end to the strategic relationship with Israel for the sake of extending its own area of interest and counterbalancing Iranian ambitions in the entire Middle East. In this regard, what is more important and relevant for European interests is the Turkish countervailing of Iranian influence rather than the downfall in Turkish-Israeli relations. Thus, what Turkey sought to do was reduce the possibility of a nuclear Iran, and this appeared to be in line with the EU posture toward this issue, which also backed up Turkey-led diplomatic efforts and negotiations with Iran. Finally, Turkey was also quite active in finding a solution to the political crisis in Bosnia and was warmly praised by local political actors for its conciliatory efforts (Vogel 2010). This activism in the Balkans is also not in conflict with EU interests, and vice versa, since reconciliation in Bosnia serves both Turkish and EU goals. Enhancing the ties with the Balkan nations, most notably Serbia, is a manifestation of the fact that Turkey’s soft power–based foreign policy is actually driven by its realpolitik and pragmatic interests rather than an “Islamist” ideology. After all these steps, which seem compatible with the EU foreign policy line, it is now reasonable to ask if there are also incompatible moves with the goal of full integration with the EU on Turkey’s part in its recent foreign actions. As one analyst states, “Ankara is discovering that many

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of its strategic geopolitical aims are incompatible with those of the US” (Akçakoca 2009). Is this the case with the EU as well? Although as a more self-confident and assertive middle power, Turkey’s recent soft power–based understanding of foreign policy can be considered to fit with that of EU foreign policy, it also includes a number of areas that can be viewed as practically at odds with Turkey’s relationship with the Union. In fact, the recent ineffectiveness of the EU on many regional and global issues, such as the 2008 war in Georgia, the Afghan war, and most important, the global financial downturn that shattered European integration and enlargement is increasingly disturbing for those hoping for a more effective and ambitious EU project. “It is a fact that the EU could not develop an operative policy in the Mediterranean region and Turkey fills this space with all of its geographic, economic, political, militaristic energy. It is clear that Turkey does not turn away from the West. However to satisfy the needs of modern politics it has to develop a foreign policy that targets other fronts too” (Arısoy 2010). Turkey very much acted independently even when it was too costly to its traditional Western ties. One clear example was Turkey’s unofficial invitation of Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in 2006 in the aftermath of the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian general elections. This ill-timed visit has undermined Turkey’s bonds with not only the United States and Israel, but also with the EU, because that move was openly unilateral and inconsistent with the EU posture toward the Arab-Israeli dispute (Öniş 2009, 19). Another instance was the Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, which left a power void that Turkey sought to fill by proposing a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, “which excluded the US and the EU and has declared that its main goal is to resolve all regional issues (especially conflicts, frozen or not) through Russian-Turkish mediation” (Akçakoca 2009). Third, Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gul’s congratulations of Ahmadinejad after the Iranian elections held in 2009, despite the subsequent street protests against his election and the brutal treatment meted out to protesters by the Tehran regime, were also noteworthy for many with regard to Turkey’s growing distance from the West (Danforth 2009). This move was not at all helpful to its ties with the EU, which strongly backed the Iranian opposition; neither was Turkey’s engagement with Sudan’s al-Bashir government (Öniş 2011, 61), which had a brutal record in terms of human rights violations against the Christian community in the Darfur region. Added to these are steps such as the removal of visas for Middle Eastern nations, or the search for free trade areas with neighboring countries at the expense of the terms of the Turkey-EU Customs Union or the EU’s immigration policy (Terzi 2010b, 121). All these actions, of course, have been attacked by those claiming that under the AKP, Turkey has turned its face from Europe to elsewhere. In making these decisions, Turkey has demonstrated that it no longer feels obliged to comply with every EU foreign policy goal, while its other

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priorities sometimes take precedence over EU-related ones. But the EU is not very pleased with this reality, as evidenced by the Commission’s report Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–11, which states clearly that “Turkey’s foreign policy has become more active in its wider neighbourhood. This is an asset for the European Union, provided it is developed as a complement to Turkey’s (EU) accession process and in coordination with the EU” (EC 2010). Rather than complementing EU accession, Turkey’s foreign policy course in the year 2010 strengthened the perception that it is drifting farther away from the EU orbit by following a more assertive and overconfident line in its dealings with the surrounding crises and disputes. Indeed, criticisms leveled against AKP policies escalated in the wake of the Mavi Marmara incident on 31 May 2010 when Israel raided a Turkish charity–led Gaza aid flotilla, and Turkey’s role, together with Brazil, in concluding a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran, as well as its subsequent “no” vote in the UN Security Council in June 2010 against stricter sanctions on Tehran for its nuclear program—each of which was regarded as evidence of such a AKP-led Turkish drift in diplomacy (Öniş 2011, 50–52; Vaisse and Kundnani 2011, 86; Turkey: New Assertiveness…2010). First, the Israeli military attack against the Turkish flotilla to the besieged Gaza dealt a severe blow to the already strained relationship between the two long-standing “strategic” allies. The relationship was now definitely on the brink of complete breakdown. While Israel insisted that it acted in self-defense, Turkey reacted harshly to this unprecedented military raid on the open sea. Ankara also called on the UN Security Council to convene in order to discuss the situation and asked Israel both to make a public apology and to agree to a UN-led independent inquiry (Öniş 2011, 52). The demise of the Turkish-Israeli relationship did not help; rather, it disrupted Turkey’s search for a neutral mediating role between the Arabs and Israel. Second, the recent Turkish handling of the Iranian nuclear standoff was heavily criticized by those claiming that Turkey is in an axis shift by means of its unilateral and independent moves. Indeed, the nuclear swap deal concluded between Iran and the Turkey-Brazil duo has drawn a welcome response from neither the United States nor the European powers, which have already agreed on harsher sanctions against the defiant Tehran regime. The deal was quickly dismissed by the Western nations, which were unconvinced by the inadequate content of the agreement, and which had already convinced other UN Security Council members of the need for further sanctions (Abramowitz and Barkey 2010; Öniş 2011, 52; BBC 2010). Third, Ankara’s subsequent “no” vote in the UN Security Council on the proposed sanctions was not perceived by the EU as a move that was consistent with its policy toward a nuclear Iran. Rather, Turkey’s stance was in direct opposition to that of European powers such as France and Germany on this issue. “Although the episode did not lead to a breakdown in relations with the United States and the

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EU, it certainly was an important episode in the growing perception in the Western community that Turkey was progressively moving in a different direction” (Öniş 2011, 53). The recent tide of popular uprisings in the Arab world, however, indicate that Turkey’s foreign policy is not fully and necessarily independent from its Western partners while it arises as a “model country” for the transforming Arab nations in the face of EU ineffectiveness in responding to these events. The unprecedented popular revolts in North Africa and the Middle East in the early part of 2011, which resulted in toppling some of the entrenched authoritarian Arab regimes, were one of the greatest challenges for EU foreign policy (EURACTIV 2011b). The mass street protests are now called the Arab Spring, which signifies a wave of regime change from the rule of status-quo-oriented totalitarian leaders to more democratic ones, as was the case with Egypt and Tunisia. Nevertheless, the EU did not take a strong stance in responding to these historic developments in line with its disputed position that has long prioritized security and stability concerns over regime change. Indeed, the EU was unable to forge a cohesive policy on this issue and tended to give only ambiguous support to the Arab upheaval, as if the people were against the European policies toward these corrupt regimes rather than mass poverty, lack of democracy, and authoritarianism; thus the EU risked wasting a historic opportunity to transform its southern neighborhood into a more democratic, open, and prosperous region (EURACTIV 2011a; Behr 2011, 1). The Libyan operation led by NATO in support of the opposition forces against the Gaddafi regime also revealed the EU’s military weaknesses once again, while EU members have suffered from the low defense spending and the lack of military capabilities and political leadership, thereby creating demands for further American involvement (EURACTIV 2011c). Therefore, it is possible to say that the Arab uprisings made the EU weakness and short-sightedness in foreign policy crises clearer. During the days of the Arab Spring, Turkey emerged as a “model country” in political, economic, and cultural terms. Its unique democratization experience and particularly the peaceful rise of the moderate Islamist AKP to power are expected by many analysts to attract the Arab protesters and political forces leading the revolutions in the run-up to establishing a more democratic, liberal, and open order (Dede 2011, 24–25). Indeed, while EU involvement remains mostly inefficient, the “Turkish model” has seemed to inspire the popular movements, especially after Turkey’s influence and soft power in the Middle East under Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently grown (Kirişçi 2011, 34). Following the long years of ignorance toward its eastern neighborhood, indeed, Turkey’s recent mediation efforts in the wider Middle East and its involvement with isolated political actors such as Hamas, as well as its open criticisms of Israel, have altered its image very positively in the eyes of the Arab people (Kirişçi 2011, 43; Yılmaz 2011). In addition to Turkey’s

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current democratization, its increasing soft power, and Erdoğan’s personal popularity on the Arab street, flourishing economic, commercial, and cultural ties with Middle Eastern nations are also a factor that makes Turkey a pole of attraction for them. Despite all these qualities of the socalled Turkish model, however, whether or not it is fully applicable in the Arab world seems questionable; Turkey is not so willing to export it to the rest of the region because of the “risks which might range from Arab frustration with the model to Arab alienation leading to a deterioration of Turkish relations with the rest of the region and even with the west” (Dede 2011, 32). But it will probably continue to inspire the sweeping tide of change toward further democracy and openness in the wider Middle East. In view of this, resetting the deadlocked Turkish-EU relations has become more vital, since the EU could have a stronger voice in those regions and transformations through improvement in relations with Turkey as a model country. This is almost a necessity, both because the Arab world also wishes to see a better relationship between Turkey and the EU, and because Turkey’s EU membership goal itself still matters with regard to its attractiveness to the Arab nations. As for how Turkey reacted to these events, despite that the fact that the AKP has not promoted democratic values in its dealings with its Middle Eastern neighbors, in the face of the wave of uprisings it was quick to call Egypt’s President Mubarak to deliver the public demands, while its policy toward the mass revolts in Libya and Syria were blamed for being ambiguous and undecided (SETA Rapor 2011, 40; Atlıoğlu 2011). In Libya, the AKP government immediately focused on the safe evacuation of Turkish nationals working in the country and then both opposed the sanctions against Gaddafi and attempted to stop the NATO intervention into Libya as it sought a peaceful solution to the crisis between the Gaddafi regime and his opponents (SETA Rapor 2011, 41). But in the end Ankara first had to approve the NATO operation, albeit with some reservations, and even took part in it in a noncombat role, and then recognized the opposition as the country’s legitimate representatives (Today’s Zaman 2011). The mayhem in Syria was also a test case for Turkey’s “zero problems policy,” as it forced Turkey to meet the harsh reality with respect to the brutal nature of the Syrian regime, which treated the mass protests cruelly. After Turkey’s warnings toward President Assad for further openness and freedom, Turkish-Syrian relations almost came to a point of breakdown as Damascus was openly critical of Ankara’s handling of the crisis (Atlıoğlu 2011). In both cases, therefore, Turkey’s position has gotten closer to that of the West over time as its diplomatic efforts remained unanswered by the actors involved. This shows that the AKP’s foreign policy was not fully independent of its Western partners as it was claimed, and thus it is possible to argue that pragmatic interests and concerns have overtaken the ideological ones in AKP’s attitude toward the Arab unrest.

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WHO LOST TURKEY? OR WAS IT REALLY LOST?

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Throughout the year 2010, there was growing concern and a vibrant debate among Western governments about who caused Turkey to turn its face elsewhere, i.e., toward the Arab and Islamic world. Walker claims here that “resentment and disenchantment with the EU’s ‘shaming’ rhetoric, which the country has been subjected to for a very long time, is partly responsible for xenophobia and for the revival of the conservativenationalist instincts of the AKP government” (Walker 2009, 9). This view has also been officially expressed by the high-ranking members of the U.S. administration. First, then U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates underlined the inability of the EU to encourage Turkey’s bid for membership: “I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward,” said Mr. Gates, “it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought” (Ghattas 2010). In July 2010, echoing Gates’s comment, President Obama himself reiterated that it was Europe’s reluctance to see Turkey as a full member that led it to search for alternative paths in foreign policy (Barkey 2010). However, putting the blame solely on the EU for “losing” Turkey is only one facet of the reality. The U.S. accusation of EU inaction toward Turkey looks questionable at best with regard to Turkey’s recent disagreement with the United States over Israel and Iran in the Middle East (Economist 2010), because it is a fact that some EU members are displeased with the actions of Israel and are also doubtful about further sanctions against Iran. Indeed, the EU’s part in Turkey’s reorientation toward the south and east in the international sphere can only be a partial explanation for what caused Ankara to look elsewhere. It has more to do with a conspicuous move on the part of Ankara toward shifting the end of the Cold War and the new realities of world geopolitics in Turkey’s favor. Its quest for more independence as an influential foreign policy actor in its region had already been launched by the Turkish administrations preceding current AKP rule (Perissich 2010). As Davutoğlu stressed many times, there exists no axis change in Turkey’s foreign policy; what is sought has only to do with establishing an Ankara-centered axis of peace and stability around the borders of the country (Arısoy 2010). In fact, Barkey notes that “the current Turkish government led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) would have acted the same way even if membership to the EU were imminent” (Barkey 2010). In addition, U.S. involvement in EU affairs on behalf of Turkey has generally been counterproductive, and EU leaders have repeatedly warned U.S. administrations not to meddle with EU-Turkish relations.

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While the debate over who is responsible for Turkey’s drift develops, “the irony is that the Turkish accession process is at risk of breaking down at exactly the time that Turkey’s strategic importance to the EU is rising” (Barysch 2009). The likelihood of such a risk is increasing rapidly given the state of affairs in the EU-Turkish accession process. In the words of Terzi, “As the prospect of Turkey in the EU grows weaker, Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government becomes more preeminent in the Middle East since it is no longer balanced by a strong European perspective, for which the government holds only a partial responsibility” (Terzi 2010a, 13). But it can also be argued from a more optimistic perspective that the recent state of affairs is only a loss of momentum in the accession process (Öniş 2011, 48). In order to reverse this trend, the EU first has to acknowledge that Turkey wants to be treated as an equal and respected partner in terms of foreign and security policy rather than an obedient ally that only acts in accordance with the wishes of its Western partners, thereby sacrificing its own security and foreign objectives and priorities. As one analyst puts it, “Turkey is no longer a minor player. Its momentum should before long carry it to a point where Europeans will be the suitors. And then Turkey can ask them to wait” (Reid 2010). The EU also needs to come to the understanding that it can only reap benefits from Turkey’s rising clout and influence in the Middle East by first abandoning its exclusionary and alienating posture toward Ankara and then recognizing the possibilities that closer cooperation with Turkey would offer. Otherwise, as the prospect for a more ambitious EU project weakens day to day, Turkey’s ascendancy, whether in the form of a complete axis shift or solely a dissociation, is likely to be a liability rather than an asset for Brussels since it will not have enough leverage to further shape Turkish politics. Put differently, despite the fact that Turkey’s strategic utility to the EU increases in the wake of the troubles facing Europe, the EU is so busy with its own existential crisis that it is unable to take advantage of these changing dynamics in Turkey-EU relations. Therefore, as the EU’s capacity to affect the course of Turkish politics gradually disappears, so does its ability to seize the opportunities from Turkey’s rise. Enlargement is still the best available policy tool for the EU if it wishes to cope with the ascendancy of a more self-confident Turkey. In doing this, it first has to clarify the nature of the EU project: a fortress Europe, or an open and multicultural one. It then needs to reappraise its clumsy position toward Turkey in the wake of its declining, and Turkey’s growing, weight in Europe’s neighborhood, and to this end, should assume a stronger part, both in solving the Cyprus dispute and in pushing the Turkish reform process, in order to take advantage of its rise. At this point, notions such as privileged partnership would not be a viable solution to the question of where and how Turkey should be situated in the European integration project. These alternative scenarios might also be

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[10.33]


[10.34]

[10.35]

counterproductive at a time when the EU needs Turkey in its own orbit, thereby pushing Ankara away rather than keeping it anchored. Therefore, in the absence of a real prospect for full Turkish membership, the catalyzing effect of the EU accession process is likely to weaken further. With respect to Turkey’s position, the most realistic choice for it in terms of foreign policy direction, according to Keyman and Oniş and Yılmaz, is to stay tied with EU integration instead of depending only on U.S.-Turkey ties or choosing to pursue a decentered and purely independent route with no solid anchor (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Keyman 2009). Despite the weakening catalyzing effect of Turkish modernization, the EU remains its key partner. Indeed, in 2009, Davutoğlu underlined the need for a strengthened dialogue between Turkey and the EU to elaborate on common foreign policy issues and disputes with the aim of achieving a better understanding between both sides (Akçakoca 2009). EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton shared her views, stating that “Turkey has recently started to become more assertive in its foreign policy. We welcome the increasingly important role of Turkey in the region. In this context we will also look at the ways in which the EU and Turkey can enhance cooperation” (Today’s Zaman 2010). In effect, the two sides still have much in common as it relates to handling multifaceted issues and challenges such as the global financial crisis, energy security, regional disputes, organized crime, cross-cultural and religious intolerance and cleavages, and terrorism. Turkey remains a key partner of the EU in terms of regional security, energy cooperation, and regional trade. As Bağcı points out, “In terms of the EU’s geostrategic interests, Turkey remains indispensable, even though both France and Germany are unwilling to acknowledge this fact. The Turkish policy of both these countries is neither creative nor result-oriented. Nevertheless, Turkey will not walk away from the accession negotiation table” (Bağcı 2010). In other words, all the talk about Turkey’s “turning” away from the West notwithstanding, its ultimate goal of EU membership has no equal yet. This point is also emphasized by Davutoğlu: “Turkey is not reorienting its foreign policy, as some argue nowadays. While Turkey pursues a policy of constructive engagement in its neighborhood and beyond, full integration with the EU is and will remain the priority” (Davutoğlu 2010). Hakura goes even further by arguing that Turkey and the Turkish people are sufficiently committed to their Western vocation and do not intend to dismiss it even “in the absence of a credible EU accession process” (Hakura 2010). The most significant reason for the continuation of this strong European commitment is that Turkey is still dependent upon “the predictability, structural change, and institutional development that EU integration imposes” (Göksel 2010, 10). For this reason, Turkey needs to be aware of the fact that the transformation of its domestic politics still relies heavily on the process of Europeanization, and the deeper its integration with the EU becomes, the more easily Turkey may forge a norm-

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based and credible foreign policy. In doing this, universal values such as freedom, human rights, and democracy should be guiding principles for Turkey, and it should also be careful about not giving the wrong impression by prioritizing its cultural and religious ties over those values. Nonetheless, an overconfident Turkey that is less anchored with EU structures would be an asset for neither the EU nor the wider region (Düzgit and Tocci 2009, 2; Alessandri 2010a, 94–95). In the case of a permanent Turkey-EU rift, relations between the Christian and Muslim worlds will likely be further damaged, while NATO-EU cooperation will also be adversely affected. In addition, the Cyprus dispute may be more complex and intractable in the face of a possible Turkey-EU breakdown. Against this background, it is reasonable to say that Turkey’s having better relations and enhanced economic, political, and cultural ties with its neighbors as an EU negotiating country may help dispel European fears about bordering with the highly unstable and conflict-prone Middle Eastern nations after Turkey’s membership. Ankara’s flourishing ties with its region may be benefited by the EU; however, this should not be taken for granted because Turkey has a limited ability to change the course of events and is unable to prevent every conflict from spreading, while its ambitious foreign policy initiatives have yet to generate concrete outcomes.

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CONCLUSION

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It is obvious that the EU is now in poor shape to pursue and materialize its key foreign policy interests in the wake of handicaps such as the global financial downturn, enlargement fatigue, demographic decline, and growing energy dependence. Its inability to act collectively in responding to these problems and surrounding crises seems to have left a vacuum that other regional players like Turkey are willing to fill. Surely, one should note that it is unimaginable to think of a completely pro–United States or pro-EU orientation from the newly aspirant Turkey, as was the case during the Cold War years. Indeed, Turkey has recently sought to pursue a decentered—or say, Ankara-centered—policy without a solid anchor such as the EU, which has provided the guidance it needs to conduct its foreign policy effectively. The problem here is that EU membership, with its disappearing gains, fades away as an indispensable foreign policy goal in itself for Turkey as a rising middle power in Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Black Sea basin, while it is also arguable that its importance grows increasingly for an EU declining in economic, social, and political terms. Indeed, as a more independent-minded and complicated partner, Turkey is now an exceptional case that requires a more nuanced and sensitive approach on the part of the EU if it wishes to deal successfully with its rising clout and aspirations. The EU desperately

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[10.39]

needs a major overhaul in its recent policy toward Turkey by rekindling the deadlocked accession process and relationship, and making this one of its principal foreign policy priorities. These kinds of recommitments would definitely help keep Turkey anchored in the EU’s orbit. The balance in Turkish foreign policy may recently have tilted toward the east, but this is not to say that its Western connection has been lost altogether, because its commercial, strategic, and diplomatic ties with the EU require it to maintain a more balanced foreign policy. In other words, Turkish foreign policy is neither decentered nor unanchored fully in terms of both meeting the high expectations and achieving concrete results. The recent events in the Arab world and Turkey’s attitude toward them have also indicated that Turkish foreign policy is driven more by its pragmatic interests than the so-called ideological motives behind it. To this end, Turkey should presumably be cautious about being overconfident toward the EU project, despite all the talk about its new regional ambitions and growing soft power credentials. NOTE

[10.40] 1. Assistant professor, [email protected].

[10.41]

Gaziosmanpasa

University,

e-mail:

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Ömer Kurtbağ Bağcı, Hüseyin. 2010. “Turkey Will Not Be Lost to the West.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php?wc_c=476&wc_id=1311&printmode=1 (29.11.2010). Barkey, Henri J . 2008. “The Effect of the U.S. Policy in the Middle East on EUTurkey Relations.” International Spectator 43(4): 31–44. Barkey, Henri J. 2010. “Don’t Blame Europe for Turkey’s Moves Away from the West.” Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/20/opinion/la-oe-barkey-turkey-eu-20100720/2 (20.07.2010). Barysch, Katinka. 2009. “Turkey’s Future Lies with Europe.” Centre for European Reform, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/barysch_guardian_blog7april09.html (08.04.2009). BBC. 2010. “West Sceptical on Deal with Iran.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/ middle_east/8688467.stm (17.05.2010). Behr, Timo. 2011. “EU’s Flawed Arab Spring.” Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March, Comment 5. Bildt, Carl, Franco Frattini, William Hague, and Alexander Stubb. 2011. “Europe, Look Outward Again.” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/opinion/ 11iht-edbildt11.html?_r=1&ref=turkey (01.03.2011). Çağaptay, Soner. 2010. “Turkey under the AKP: Neither a European nor a Regional Power.” Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkeyunder-the-akp-neither-a-european-nor- (03.10.2010). Çandar, Cengiz. 2009. “Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multipolar World.” SETA Policy Brief, No. 38, Ankara. Çarkoğlu, Ali. 2004. “Societal Perceptions of Turkey’s EU Membership.” Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.), Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues, 19–45. London: Routledge. Cook, Steven A. 2009. “Turkey’s War at Home.” Survival 51(5): 105–20. Danforth, Nicholas. 2008. “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP.” Turkish Policy Quarterly 7(3): 83–95. Danforth, Nicholas. 2009. “How the West Lost Turkey.” Foreign Policy, http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how_the_west_lost_turkey (25.11.2009). Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2009. Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2010. “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010 (I).” Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-foreign-policyand-the-eu-in-2010-i--2 (20.02.2010). Dede, Alper Y. 2011. “The Arab Uprisings: Debating the ‘Turkish Model.’” Insight Turkey 13(2): 23–32. Devrim, Deniz. 2010. “AB-Türkiye İlişkileri: Değişen Dengeler.” Deniz Devrim, Jonathan Levack, and Eduard Soler I Lecha (eds.), Yeniden Hız Kazanırken: İspanya’nın AB Dönem Başkanlığında Türkiye. TESEV Yayınları, Dış Politika Analiz Serisi 12. Düzgit, Senem Aydın, and Nathalie Tocci. 2009. “Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest for Regional Leadership and Europeanization.” CEPS Commentaries, Centre for European Policy Studies. Economist. 2010. “If Only It Were That Easy,” http://www.economist.com/node/ 16377190 (17.06.2010). EURACTIV . 2011a. “EU’s Post-Revolutionary Neighbourhood Policy: We Should Not Forget the East,” http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eus-post-revolutionaryneighbourhood-policy-forget-east-analysis-503902 (07.04.2011). EURACTIV. 2011b. “Reflections on the Arab Revolutions,” http://www.euractiv.com/ en/global-europe/reflections-arab-revolutions-analysis-505518 (09.06.2011). EURACTIV. 2011c. “Libya Highlights Europe’s Defence Weakness,” http:// www.euractiv.com/en/global-europe/libya-highlights-europes-defence-weaknessanalysis-505705 (16.06.2011).

Turkey’s Recent Foreign Policy Activism Eurobarometer. 2011. “Public Opinion in the European Union.” Report 75, Spring, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_publ_en.pdf (20.08.2011). European Commission (EC). 2010. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010–11. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/strategy_paper_2010_en.pdf (25.07.2011). Fotiou, Eleni, and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou. 2010. “Assessing Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Role: Rhetoric versus Practice.” International Spectator 45(1): 99–113. Fuller, Graham E. 2008. The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. Gardels, Nathan. 2009. “Will Iran Look More like Turkey, or Turkey like Iran?” New Perspectives Quarterly 26(3): 2–5. Gardner, David. 2010. “Ankara Targets Political and Economic Stability.” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/turkey-2010 (28.06.2010). Ghattas, Kim. 2010. “Are Regional Issues Splitting U.S. and Turkey?” BBC, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us_and_canada/10305519.stm (13.06.2010). Göksel, Nigar. 2010. “From the Desk of the Editor.” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9(3): 9–11. Gordon, Philip H., and Omer Taspinar. 2008. Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Hakura, Fadi. 2010. “A Rising Turkey without Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News, http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=a-rising-turkey-without-europe-2010-09-03 (03.09.2010). Hale, William. 2009. “Turkey and the Middle East in the ‘New Era.’” Insight Turkey 11(3): 143–59. Joffe, Josef. 2010. “Turkey Is Making a Play for Regional Power.” Financial Times, http:/ /www.ft.com/cms/s/0/681fae96-7195-11df-8eec-00144feabdc0.html (06.06.2010). Kardaş, Şaban. 2010. “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?” Middle East Policy 17(1): 115–36. Keyman, E. Fuat. 2009. “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil.” SETA Policy Brief No. 39. Ankara. Keyman, E. Fuat, and Ziya Öniş. 2007. Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press. Kınıklıoğlu, Suat. 2010. “Turkey’s Neighbourhood and Beyond: Tectonic Transformation at Work?” International Spectator 45(4): 93–100. Kirişçi, Kemal. 2011. “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East.” Insight Turkey 13(2): 33–55. Kutlay, Mustafa. 2010. “The Ubiquitous Crisis of the EU: Lack of Visionary Leadership.” Journal of Turkish Weekly, http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=1833, (30.11.2010). Mernitt, Giles. 2010. “Shaping Europe’s Global Role I: Why the EU Badly Needs a New Political Narrative.” Europe’s World, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/ Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/Ar (20.03.2011). Oğuzlu, Tarık. 2008. “The Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?” Turkish Studies 9(1): 3–20. Öner, Selcen. 2011. Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity. Plymouth: Lexington Books. Öniş, Ziya. 2009. “The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey: Drifting Away from Europeanization?” Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report 2009. Öniş, Ziya. 2011. “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.” Insight Turkey 13(1): 47–65. Öniş, Ziya, and Suhnaz Yılmaz. 2009. “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era.” Turkish Studies 10(1): 7–24.

Ömer Kurtbağ Perissich, Riccardo. 2010. “Turkey and the EU: A Play in Search of a Script.” Europeos Commentary No. 5, http://www.ceps.be/book/turkey-and-eu-play-search-script (28.09.2010). Reid, Richard. 2010. “Forget the EU.” Hurriyet Daily News, http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=forget-the-eu-2010-10-13 (13.10.2010). SETA Rapor. 2011. “Batı ve Kaddafi Makasında Libya.” No. 3. May. Terzi, Özlem. 2010a. “Implications of the Enhanced Regional Activism of Turkey for Its Relationship with the European Union.” Cicero Foundation, Great Debate Paper No. 10/8. Terzi, Özlem. 2010b. The Influence of the European Union on the Making of Turkish Foreign Policy. Surrey, UK: Ashgate. Tocci, Nathalie. 2011. Turkey’s European Future: Behind the Scenes of America’s Influence on EU-Turkey Relations. New York: New York University Press. Today’s Zaman. 2010. “EU Backs Turkey’s Constitutional Reform.” http:// www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=215970 (29.11.2010). Today’s Zaman. 2011. “Turkey Throws Weight behind Libyan Opposition.” http:// www.todayszaman.com/news-249402-turkey-throws-weight-behind-libyan-opposition.html (04.07.2011). Türkmen, Füsun. 2009. “Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition.” Turkish Studies 10(1): 109–29. Üstün, Çiğdem. 2010. “Europeanization of Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Black Sea Region.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10(2): 225–42. Vaisse, Justin, and Hans Kundnani. 2011. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. Vatansever, Muzaffer . 2011. “Türkiye-AB Dış Politika Ortaklığı.” USAK , http:// www.usakgundem.com/yazar/1913/t%C3%BCrkiye-ab-d%C4%B1%C5%9F-politika-ortakl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1.html (07.01.2011). Vogel, Toby. 2010. “Realpolitik Turkish Style.” IP Journal, http://www.ip-global.org/ 2010/11/11/realpolitik-turkish-style/ (11.11.2010). Walker, Joshua W. 2009. “Turkey’s Changing Internal and International Dynamics: From ‘Where’ to ‘What.’” SETA Policy Brief, No. 40, Ankara. Yılmaz, Nuh. 2011. “Ortadoğu’da Post-Davos Süreci.” SETA, http://www.setav.org/ public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=68256&q=ortadogu-da-post-d (28.02.2011).

ELEVEN EU Candidacy and Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward the Middle East Defne Günay 1

[11.0]

[11.1]

[11.2]

Turkey’s long-drawn-out relationship with the EU came to a decisive point when the EU granted Turkey candidacy status in its Helsinki summit in 1999. That proved to be a turning point in Turkey’s march toward EU membership. EU candidacy came with the need to summon political will to undertake the reforms necessary to become an EU member and is a continuing process that will touch upon every aspect of Turkish politics. Europeanization is broadly the study of how EU integration impacts domestic policies, administrative structures, institutions, discourses, and actors. Europeanization of foreign policy literature mainly focuses on membership dynamics and their impact on national foreign policies, which complicates the application of this framework to candidate countries (Üstün 2010; Özcan 2008). In the case of Turkey, this translates to the need to conceptualize new mechanisms that link opportunities and constraints posed by the EU and Turkish agency in different contexts such as candidacy and potential membership. This is all the more necessary in the analysis of Europeanization of foreign policy toward regions that do not feature strongly in Turkey’s accession conditionality, such as the Middle East. As argued elsewhere, the process of uncovering mechanisms of Europeanization begins with the observation of a certain empirical regularity (Bache, Bulmer, and Günay 2012). This chapter aims to achieve this by analyzing the change in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East since it was granted candidacy in 1999 and its convergence/divergence

Defne Günay

with the EU in this realm. As Oğuzlu has argued, cases of empirically observed convergence of Turkey’s foreign policy with EU foreign policy understanding can be coined as apparent Europeanization; and the mechanisms through which EU norms gradually become part of national identities and foreign policy practices can be called “true Europeanization” (Oğuzlu 2010, 683). To utilize Oğuzlu’s concepts, I argue that research on “apparent Europeanization” precedes the research on “true Europeanization”; this chapter discusses apparent Europeanization of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East after it was granted EU candidacy in 1999 and a thought experiment on how Turkey’s membership might alter this snapshot picture. To this end, the chapter first gives a brief review of EU foreign policy toward the Middle East; the norms of EU foreign policy will be provided, followed by a summary of their implications for Turkey. Secondly, the chapter summarizes Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East during the 1990s, before Turkey’s elevation to candidacy status until the end of the decade. This section also offers a brief analysis of the level of Turkey’s alignment with the EU with regard to Turkey’s foreign policy toward its Middle Eastern neighbors. Next, a brief overview of the 2011–2012 period and the reversal of Turkey’s previous policy toward the region and its compatibility with the EU’s approach is provided. Finally, potential benefits and costs of Turkey’s membership in the EU will be analyzed, both for the EU and Turkey.

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THE EU FOREIGN POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

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The EU/EC has a relatively long history in foreign policy cooperation. Members of the then EC started foreign policy cooperation in 1970 in the shape of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was transformed into the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991. The Maastricht Treaty and the creation of a CFSP pillar, despite being intergovernmental, came as a brave step toward the goal of establishing a foreign policy for the EU. Not only did it use taboo words such as security, foreign, policy, and common together (White 2001, 96), it also was a symbol of a transformation into a political union from a largely economic integration project. As Smith pointed out, the content was more or less based on the EPC structure (Smith 1996); however, the discourse in the Treaty was very significant. This leap was the outcome of a causal complex whereby the changing international system as well as internal developments such as the goal to establish the Economic and Monetary Union and the inadequacy of the EPC urged European policy makers to create the CFSP (White 2001, 96; Cameron 2007, 29).

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EU Candidacy and Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward the Middle East

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Aside from the CFSP, the EU also adopted foreign policy systems for dealing with its southern neighbors. Stability of these regions is furthermore crucial for the EU, as they constitute important sources of energy supply for the Union (Cameron 2007, 110). Political instability in the region and geographical proximity of the Middle East and the Mediterranean were the drivers behind the EU’s initiation of the Barcelona process in 1995 (de Flers and Regelsberger 2005, 330). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership covers both bilateral and multilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, aiming to achieve cooperation and progress in political, economic, and social aspects of the relationship (de Flers and Regelsberger 2005, 330). The partnership was targeted toward achieving a free-trade area between the EU and the Mediterranean partners, as well as among the Mediterranean partners themselves, by 2010 and was legally based on Association Agreements signed by each partner and financial aid by the EU (Hill and Smith 2005, 265). This was a mix of political and financial instruments at the Union’s disposal to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and to boost regionalism in the southern borders of the Union. New layers of institutional cooperation were added onto this basis until 2010, but the free trade area has not materialized yet. One of those new layers in the EU-Mediterranean/Middle East structure was the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was initiated in 2004. With the initiation of the ENP, the Barcelona process was relegated to a multilateral forum, while bilateral relations between the EU and the southern neighbors were going to be managed by the ENP and its action plans (see the European External Action Service website). The main rationale was to ensure stability within the EU’s neighborhood. As Karen Smith points out aptly, “The ENP is primarily an attempt to create good neighbors: namely, the kind who conform not only to ‘EU values’ generally speaking, but also to EU standards and laws in specific economic and social areas” (K. Smith 2005, 763). This was partly due to the changing geopolitical climate after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as the internal evolution of policy competences of the EU (Cameron 2007). The last layer added on the EU-Mediterranean structure was the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which originally was a French initiative but got adopted by the Union in 2008. The UfM aimed to revitalize EUMediterranean relations and render the partnership more visible by funding projects in areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration, and culture, so as to make a difference in the lives of those living in the region (European External Action Service website). UfM is framed as a “Union for projects,” whereby partners focus on cooperation with cherry-picked partners in projects, without any emphasis on human rights or conditionality (Balfour and Schmid 2008). The UfM incorporates the Barcelona Process but leaves out bilateral relations between the EU and partner countries within the remit of the ENP.

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Yet, as the former Belgian minister of foreign affairs noted, the EU has been dubbed an “economic giant but a political dwarf” in the past, especially in responding to some high-profile international crises (New York Times 1991). The same can still be observed in the cases of initial EU policies toward the U.S. operation in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program, and the Hamas victory in Gaza. The EU was split down the middle on Iraq when the U.S. showdown started in 2002 (BBC 2003). The German response was largely driven by domestic politics, as it was election time for Chancellor Schröder and he ruled out German participation even in a UN-backed operation to Iraq (Hollis 2009, 146). French leadership also refused participation in the U.S.-led operation and wanted to make the UN Security Council the ultimate arbiter in the crisis in order to counter U.S. unilateralism (Hollis 2009, 146). The UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia backed the U.S.led multinational operation and sent troops or contributed otherwise (Cameron 2007, 32). Putting aside the deep clashes regarding the policy, even policy-making style was largely divisive and driven by a directoire approach. The leaders of the five EU countries that offered military assistance to an operation in Iraq got to be invited to dinner by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a gang of eight openly declared their support for the U.S., Germany and France coordinated their positions and made public declarations underlining that the war was not inevitable (Cameron 2007, 32–33). Many countries withdrew troops from Iraq at later stages, sometimes due to changes in government (BBC 2004); however, the initial response to the Iraqi crisis clearly demonstrated that “for the EU, the more external issues at stake are sensitive to international politics, the more internal divisions matter” (Telo 2009, 45). The initial EU response to the crisis was simply no coordination. The Iranian nuclear crisis tells a different story. It tells a story of reunification on the part of France, Germany, and the UK after their deep clash over Iraq (Cameron 2007, 200); however, it also reveals a directoire approach to foreign policy issues. Since 2004, these three countries have been undertaking the diplomatic initiative on Iran as the EU-3. This approach was resented by some other EU countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden, who insisted on the presence of Javier Solana, the EU high representative for the CFSP, on board (Cameron 2007, 201). Afterwards, the EU stood a relatively common front regarding negotiations with Iran, yet the initial response was a directoire approach by the three larger powers of the EU. The EU reaction to Hamas’s victory in Gaza in the 2006 elections displayed another inconsistency in EU foreign policy. Ironically, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one issue that the EC/EU has had a common approach to for a long time. The EU holds a common position, enjoys a single seat in the quartet that leads the peace talks between Israel and Palestine, and has a special representative in the region (Cameron 2007,

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116). The peak of EC/EU activity on this issue was the Venice Declaration in 1980, which called for the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in peace negotiations and labeled Israeli settlements illegal according to international law. Another important declaration was the Berlin declaration of 1999, which called for the creation of a viable Palestinian state (European Union Center of North Carolina 2008). Upon the election victory of Hamas in 2006, the EU faced a dilemma between respecting the outcome of their long-standing call for free elections, and cutting its support for a terrorist organization that was on the EU list of terrorist organizations (Hollis 2009, 151). The EU tried to strike a middle position by asking Hamas to renounce violence and recognize Israel’s right to existence, but when Hamas rejected these conditions, the EU suspended its aid to Palestinian authorities in 2006. This chain of events damaged the reputation of the EU among the Muslim countries of the Middle East. The EU had preached “democratization, yet refused to recognise the winners of a free and fair election in Palestine, which the EU itself had funded and monitored” (Hollis 2009, 151). However, there is also a growing literature on EU foreign policy norms, which usually include secularism, respect for international law, and human rights as the values Europeans hold dear (Tekin 2004, 8). With regard to the specific norms of EU foreign policy, the question of whether or not desecuritization is a basic norm of the EU has been at the center of the debate. Thomas Diez identified two types of norms embedded in the EU governance of foreign policy: organizational and content norms. According to him, the organizational norm was coordination and the content norm was desecuritization (Diez 2000, 4–5). Desecuritization basically refers to the treatment of issues with political rather than military means. In the face of the CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) developments in the EU, the content norm may not seem to be desecuritization anymore. Diez himself also agreed that the EU has been moving away from temporal othering, which took the EU’s violent past as the other in its identity building. Instead, he argues, the EU is moving toward a more conventional othering that is based on geographical exclusion (Diez 2004), which also manifests itself in the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the ENP. A good example of securitization of issues by the EU is the adoption of ESS for the first time in 2003, which pointed to a change in the Union’s conceptualization of security (Joenniemi 2007, 137). In Joenniemi’s words, “After all, the doctrine stands for securitization—and does so despite frequent efforts at toning down security as a departure—due to its mere existence” (Joenniemi 2007, 138). The 2008 update of the ESS points at energy security among other issue areas as a major security concern for the EU. Indeed, the EU eagerly pursues diversity in energy suppliers, transport routes, and building reliable partnerships among the consumer EU, the supplier, and the transit countries (EC 2010).

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The methods and norms of addressing these security concerns are outlined by the ESS as multilateralism, socioeconomic development, and conflict prevention as EU foreign policy norms to be complied with when securing Europe (Joenniemi 2007, 139). Other norms of EU foreign policy, such as multilateralism, socioeconomic development, and conflict prevention can be observed in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). As Casier ably observed, the ENP is structural foreign policy, and “the goal of ‘structural foreign policy’ is to create a favorable or stable external environment by socializing third countries to one’s way of doing things” (Casier 2010, 102). In the case of EU policies toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East, this translates into the spread of EU norms. According to both the ESS and the ENP, it is the Union’s task to create wellgoverned countries in the EU’s ring of neighbors (Joenniemi 2007, 141). In Romano Prodi’s words, ENP was created “to extend to this neighboring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union” (Prodi 2002, as quoted by Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, 86). 2 Therefore the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights has been high on the agenda of the EU-South relations.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

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The demands of the EU from Turkey are embodied in the regular reports prepared by the EU Commission every year for assessing Turkey’s progress toward accession to the EU. One line of conditionality on foreign policy is the alignment of candidate states’ foreign policies with the EU common positions. The 2000 report underlined the need for Turkey to keep its foreign policy in line with the Union as the EU acquis on foreign policy develops (EC 2000, 68). The report acknowledged that Turkey had successfully aligned itself with EU statements and declarations when it was called by the EU to do so since it was granted candidacy at the end of 1999 (EC 2000, 67). The 2002 report also noted that

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Turkey should focus further efforts on ensuring that its foreign policy orientation remains in line with the Union's developing foreign and security policy. . . . In particular, Turkey should ensure that its national policies and practice conform to the EU's common positions, should defend these positions in international fora, and should ensure that all sanctions and restrictive measures can be duly implemented. (EC 2002, 129)

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Another salient issue is the peaceful resolution of crises with respect for international law. The 1998 progress report observed Turkey’s strained relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, such as Syria and Iraq, over the PKK problem and water issues (EC 1998, 51). Turkey’s military incur-

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sions into northern Iraq were also raised in the 1999 and 2000 reports (EC 1999, 47; EC 2000, 67). A clause on the resolution of disputes with neighboring countries, which was to recur in the consecutive progress reports, was also used for the first time in this report. The report reads: “Turkey must make a constructive contribution to the settlement of all disputes with various neighboring countries by peaceful means in accordance with international law” (EC 1998, 53). Another element of the EU foreign policy conditionality for Turkey is the need for Turkey to align its preferential trade regime with that of the Community. The 1999 report emphasized the importance of Turkey’s alignment of its preferential trade policy with that of the EU until 2001 as envisaged in the Customs Union agreement signed between Turkey and the EU in 1995 that came into force in 1996. The EU signed association agreements with its Middle Eastern and Mediterranean neighbors as part of initially the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, also known as the Barcelona Process of 1995) and later as part of the ENP starting from 2004 (de Flers and Regelsberger 2005, 330). Among Turkey’s immediate Middle Eastern neighbors, only Syria has initialed an association agreement with the EU; however, it has been awaiting ratification since December 2008 (EC 2010). Turkey has transformed its foreign policy toward the Middle East significantly since the beginning of the 2000s and adopted a zero problems policy toward its neighbors until the end of the decade. The overall change is observed in a variety of policy areas as well as issues and is attributed to several developments in international politics and domestic politics. 3 However, the EU candidacy process was also an important part of this change as it feeds back into Turkey’s candidacy process. The following section reviews the extent of change in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East between the 1990s and 2000s.

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TURKEY’S PRE-CANDIDACY FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST

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The 1990s were characterized by the end of the Cold War, which dramatically changed the international structure. Turkey found itself surrounded by regional and ethnic conflicts and used these new security threats to regain its strategic importance, which had been lost with the end of the Cold War. One of the goals of foreign policy–making in this period was to reassert Turkey’s strategic importance in an extremely fluid international environment (Sayarı 2000, 171). As in all other periods of Turkish foreign policy, “Turkey’s principal strategic, political and economic relations continue to be with the United States and Western Europe” (Sayarı 2000, 182; Criss and Bilgin 1997).

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Yet, the changing structure of the international system gave Turkey relative autonomy from its alliance with the West. This change in the international structure was coupled with Turkey’s domestic problems; together they caused new problems, including those with the Middle Eastern neighbors where Turkey’s problems such as political Islam and Kurdish nationalism intertwined were perceived as security threats by Turkey’s security elite (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 114). Therefore, during the 1990s “the Middle East became the number one priority for the political and security elite” (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 125). Turkish foreign policymaking in this period primarily aimed at maintaining the regime and territorial integrity of the country “as defined by the political and military elite” (Altunışık and Tür 2005). Kurdish nationalism, the ascendance of political Islam, and the political and security elites’ goal of regaining strategic importance in international politics were the main driving forces behind foreign policy–making toward the Middle East during the 1990s. In terms of Turkey’s foreign policy resources, its military power emerged as an important factor in this decade. After modernizing its military forces, Turkey had the strongest military in its region by the 1990s (Sayarı 2000, 180). A significant development in this period was the increasing importance of the military in the foreign policy–making process (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 92). In 1997, during the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist Welfare Party, the military intervened in politics through a memorandum in which they warned against the expansion of Islamist fundamentalism (Oran 2006, 221). After this intervention, the military gained strong influence in shaping Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East, which was seen as closely linked with issues of Islamism and Kurdish nationalism. These factors resulted in a foreign policy orientation that was still anchored to the West, but at the same time actively seeking to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity against perceived threats mainly emerging from the south. This was mainly done by using hard power, including military power and economic sanctions, rather than soft power and multilateralism. 4 During the 1990s, Turkey’s relationships with its Muslim neighbors were strained and at best unstable. Turkey came to the brink of war with Syria during the 1990s due to several reasons. Syria’s support for PKK terrorism, the dispute over the amount of water to be released by Turkey, and Syria’s agreement with Greece to let Greek war planes use its airspace in case of a disagreement with Turkey were among the reasons (Altunışık 1998, 338; Özcan 2008, 116–17). In 1998 Turkey had a showdown with Syria over its support for the PKK. The 1990s were characterized by Turkish military incursions to northern Iraq in order to fight PKK terrorism, as the central Iraqi government had limited control in the area after the creation of no-fly zones that led to a power vacuum (Özcan 2008, 132). In 1995, Turkey orchestrated an ex-

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tensive military incursion into northern Iraq, which involved 40,000 troops and lasted for six weeks, with an aim to eradicate PKK bases and logistical infrastructure (Sayarı 1997, 47). Some of these incursions also strained Turkey’s already troubled relationship with Iran, as Iran claimed Iranian citizens were hurt in some of the incursions (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 126). Turkey’s relations with Iran were already problematic during the 1990s on the grounds that Iran harbored the PKK (Kirişçi 2000, 51). Other concerns of Turkey emanated from Iran’s aims to export its brand of Islamic radicalism and its support toward some Shari’arist terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. This tension escalated in 1997, when the Iranian ambassador to Turkey advocated adoption of the Shari’a system in Turkey (Martin 2000, 86). In contrast to strained relations with its Muslim Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey strengthened its relationship with Israel, which had already been in a process of normalization in the 1990s as a result of the ArabIsraeli peace process (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 126). This rapprochement was partly the success of a group of policy entrepreneurs, led by the military, over the Islamist circles, who were skeptical of Israel and advocating integration with the Islamic world (Erhan and Kürkçüoğlu 2006, 574). This line of policy that Turkey pursued during the 1990s was reversed in the 2000s. Turkey adopted a rather constructive foreign policy toward its Muslim Middle Eastern neighbors based on diplomacy and the use of soft power, as opposed to the 1990s, which were characterized by troubled relations coupled with the predominant use of hard power. This change was caused by a combination of many factors. 5 The next section briefly reviews Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East during the 2000s.

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TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: ZERO PROBLEMS WITH THE MUSLIM NEIGHBORS

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Despite Turkey’s strained relations with the Muslim Middle Eastern countries and close cooperation with Israel during the 1990s, relations improved with the Muslim Middle East dramatically after 1999 and continued improving until 2010–2011. High-level visits took place between Syria and Turkey for the first time in a long period, along with an increased volume of trade (Özcan 2008, 118). Moreover, Syria and Turkey signed a significant number of bilateral agreements (BBC 2009), including a free-trade agreement in 2004 (Kirişçi 2006, 19–20; Akıncı 2004), an agreement for the joint management of waters of the Asi and Tigris rivers (Kirişçi 2006, 20), as well as a visa exemption agreement allowing each other’s citizens visa-free passage in 2009 (Radikal 2009). Moreover, the two countries also agreed on the construction of a natural gas pipeline,

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which would connect an Arab pipeline with a Turkish pipeline (Altunışık 2010, 152). Therefore, Turkey went beyond normalization of its relationship with Syria, and both parties built up mutual trust and institutionalized bilateral cooperation in areas ranging from trade to energy. Starting particularly from 2001, Turkey’s relations with Iran have also improved. Both countries signed a security cooperation agreement to combat PKK terrorism (Tür 2009, 155). In 2003, senior Iranian ministers visited Turkey for the first time. When Iran breached the agreement concluded with the EU in October 2003 and started its uranium enrichment program while denying transparency of its program to the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vakil 2005, 184), and as analysts started to make it clear that the United States was planning a military operation against Iran (Hersh 2006), Turkey started to declare its views regarding a military operation against Iran. On 19 February 2006 Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül stated that Turkey would not be involved in a military operation against Iran without a UN decision (Söylemez 2006). Increased cooperation between Turkey and Iran also includes cooperation in the energy field, culminating in an agreement signed by Iran and Turkey to develop Iran’s South Pars gas field in order to facilitate the transport of Iranian gas through Turkey to Europe (Altunışık 2010, 155). Therefore, any possible military intervention by the West in Iran is perceived as a security threat by Turkish policy makers (Altunışık 2010, 156). In line with this rather cooperative outlook, the Turkish position on the Iranian nuclear program has been to follow the EU in its call for a negotiated and peaceful solution based on multilateralism (Kirişçi 2006, 82). To this end, Turkish officials repeatedly called on Iran to keep communication lines open and to do its best to compromise (Kohen 2006). In late 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan even went further and stated that Iran’s nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, called Iranian President Ahmedinejad Turkey’s friend (Guardian, 26 October 2009), and argued that the main problem in the Middle East was Israel’s nuclear arsenal (Cagaptay 2009). All in all, during the 2000s, Turkey became increasingly interconnected with Iran, particularly in the energy field, which will “increase its role as a transit country to the EU” (Altunışık 2010, 156). Moreover, Turkey tried to emphasize the importance of continued diplomacy and a peaceful resolution to the conflict, thereby treading the middle ground between a possible military intervention to Iran and the possibility of Iran going nuclear, both of which would be against Turkey’s interests. Turkey has preferred diplomacy over sanctions and military options. For instance, in June 2010 Turkey voted against a UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran. Turkey’s relations with Iraq improved in the 2000s. When the United States asked Turkey to authorize American troops’ use of Turkish bases in the operation against Iraq in 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted against the motion authorizing this. The most striking aspects of this

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decision were the silence of the military on the issue and—although Turkey has been a long-term U.S. ally—Turkey’s rejecting cooperation with the United States due to the lack of legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of the public and the EU (Kirişçi 2004). Furthermore, Turkey kept consultations with Iraqi officials, with an agenda of preventing the war and making the potential consequences of war clear to the Iraqi side (Özcan 2008, 118). After the initial stages of the Iraqi war, Turkey grew concerned over the increasing importance of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, which alarmed Turkey over the possible emergence of a Kurdish state (Tür 2006, 162). Turkish politicians reiterated their concerns over a possible independent Kurdish state and growing PKK presence in the region to their American counterparts several times in different fora (Arı 2009, 136). Turkey’s concerns grew so overwhelming that Turkish armed forces orchestrated a military excursion to northern Iraq in 2008 in order to eradicate PKK bases in that region. After the military operation, Turkey’s policy toward Iraq changed significantly. Turkey started dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish groups and acknowledged the regional government in northern Iraq as the legitimate governing body in the region (Erkmen 2009, 9), which are novelties considering the level of threat Turkish decision makers have traditionally perceived from northern Iraq and the possibility of an autonomous or an independent Kurdish state emerging in northern Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey’s relations with Israel cooled in this period. The AKP hosted a Hamas delegation in Ankara after Hamas won the 2006 elections in Gaza (Cagaptay 2006). This meeting was criticized harshly by Israeli officials, who argued that such a meeting was on equal footing with a meeting between the leader of the PKK and Israel (Zaman 2006). A more recent crisis took place at the Davos Economic Forum, where Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan harangued Israeli President Shimon Peres for knowing how to kill people. In October 2009, Turkey excluded Israel from the joint air force exercise that had been organized since the 1990s with the participation of NATO, the United States, and Israel (Halef 2009). These developments point to a deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel. Coupled with this decline in Turkey-Israel relations, Turkey-Palestine relations improved in the period, as the abovementioned examples illustrate. Turkey also provided humanitarian and development aid and “has been involved in capacity and institution-building activities, such as supporting political reform processes and conducting the Young Palestinian Diplomats’ Training Program” (Altunışık 2009, 150). Even if there were later attempts on the Turkish side to resuscitate relations with Israel, the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel during this period was quite the opposite of what happened during the 1990s. The role Turkey adopted in its relations with the Middle Eastern countries is best illustrated by Turkey’s efforts to foster dialogue and

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attempts at peace brokering. Apart from improvements in bilateral relations with the Muslim Middle East, Turkey also undertook initiatives to come together with countries in the region at different political fora in order to establish dialogue and cooperation. When the Iraq war was looming, Turkey held the first meeting of Summit of Iraq’s Neighbors with the participation of Egypt, Iran, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in January 2003 in order to discuss Turkey’s position on the issue and reach a common understanding as to the concerns of the participants regarding the U.S. showdown on Iraq (Özcan 2008, 138). Furthermore, Turkey also embarked upon a mediation role in peace talks between Israel and Syria in 2008 (New York Times 22 May 2008); however, Turkey lost its mediating role due to its strained relations with Israel later (Hurriyet 11 July 2010). Another example of Turkey’s initiatives for furthering political dialogue and mediation in the region was the meeting of Syrian and Iraqi foreign ministers with the secretary general of the Arab League in Istanbul. The goal of this meeting was to mediate the dispute between Syria and Iraq caused by Iraqi government’s allegations that Syria supported terrorist activity in Iraq. Moreover, this meeting was meant to mark the institutionalization of a security dialogue among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq (Radikal 2009). Turkey also took a joint initiative with the Spanish government of establishing the Alliance of Civilizations under the auspices of the UN in order “to explore the roots of polarization between societies and cultures today, and to recommend a practical programme of action to address this issue” (Alliance of Civilizations 2010). The Alliance came to be one of the most important diplomatic cards of Turkey in the EU accession process (Dağı 2009, 175). Turkey also participated in the 2004 meeting of the G-8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative as a democratic partner (Bağcı and Sinkaya 2009, 100–3). Moreover, Turkey assumed cosponsorship with Yemen and Italy of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, which brings together civil society groups and governments from the region and the G-8 to assist consolidation of democracy in the region (U.S. Department of State 2010). Besides assuming key roles in newly established organizations and helping institutionalize multilateral cooperation in the region, Turkey also leveled up its profile and impact in other institutions, of which it had already been a member. A good example of this is Turkey’s newly acquired high profile in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Even though Turkey has been criticized by the members of the organization for having close ties with Israel, and even if Turkey itself had hesitated to get involved in the OIC due to its ideological reservations in the past, Turkey recently became a high-profile member of the organization. By the efforts of the AKP, a Turkish citizen, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, was elected as the secretary-general of the organization in

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2004 (Bağcı and Sinkaya 2009, 108). Turkish policy makers also actively used the OIC forum to convey their observation that the Islamic world needs to put its house in order through democratization, observation of human rights, and increased participation in politics. 6 Therefore, Turkey has started using the OIC forum effectively to convey messages of the need for democratization in the Islamic world and give the “Turkish experience” as a model that combines modernization and Islam, which also falls in line with the EU aims in the region. Turkish attempts at enhancing dialogue with Middle Eastern countries went so far that in 2010 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan participated in an Arab League summit, of which Turkey is not a member, in Libya and gave a speech. Erdogan stated that Turkey was willing to do whatever needs to be done in order to establish cooperation between Turkey and the Arab League. There has also been a change in the foreign policy tools and resources available to and used by Turkish policy makers toward the Middle East in this period. There is a significant rise of soft power on the part of Turkey, especially through the spread of Turkish soap operas in the region (Halef 2009). Another aspect of Turkey’s soft power in the region lies within its long-standing democracy (Davutoğlu 2009). The Turkish experience of combining Islam in society and secularism and democracy in the government is put forward by Turkish policy makers as a promising model for the Middle East (Kohen 2003). Turkish democracy also endured an important test during the onset of the Iraqi war, when the Turkish Parliament without any political pressure from the military or the government rejected the motion to allow American military passage from Turkey (Tür 2009, 161). This rejection of the motion gained support from the Muslim Middle East (Dağı 2009, 169). These changes in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East were sometimes commended by the EU as further alignment of Turkey’s foreign policy with that of the EU’s. The 2003 progress report, for example, welcomed Turkey’s alignment of itself with the EU decisions, resolutions, and declarations, with a special emphasis on the Union’s declaration calling on the government of Iran to comply with international nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (EC 2003). The 2004 progress report observed Turkey’s continued participation in the Barcelona process and efforts to promote good neighborly relations and resolve human rights issues (EC 2004, 154). The report also pointed out the high level of compatibility between the Union’s and Turkey’s voting patterns in the UN, with exceptions regarding human rights issues (EC 2004, 155). The 2008 progress report reiterated Turkey’s support for the EU position on Iran’s nuclear program, calling on Iran to engage in a diplomatic solution of the crisis (EC 2008, 83). The 2009 report also observed Turkey’s continued alignment with the EU common foreign and security policy, especially with regard to Turkey’s efforts in stabilization of the Middle East and

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relations with Iraq and the Kurdish regional government (EC 2009, 87). Furthermore, Turkey increased its efforts at diversifying its energy links, therefore enhancing its role as an energy corridor to the EU. Turkey improved its relations with both Syria and Iran and signed agreements with both countries. Indeed, the EU has repeatedly acknowledged the role played by Turkey as a transit country for oil and gas to the EU. By signing energy agreements with Syria and Iran during the 2000s, Turkey also bolstered its position in the eyes of the EU as an important energy corridor. However, Turkey has never reached full alignment with the EU in terms of its approach to the Middle East; fluctuations in the level of alignment took place over time and over issue areas. For example, the 2004 report pointed out the exceptions to the compatible voting patterns in the UN as human rights issues. Also, the 2009 progress report highlights Turkey’s nonalignment with the EU’s position regarding Syria, Iran, and Yemen (EC 2009, 87). Indeed, increased activity of Turkey in the region caused some debate as to whether Turkey is reconsidering its allegiance with the West and moving toward the East due to its rejection by the EU (BBC 31 June 2010).

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TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST: BACK TO PROBLEMS WITH NEIGHBORS

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Turkey’s relationship with its Muslim Middle Eastern neighbors has started deteriorating since 2011. This episode is characterized by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and the popular uprisings that first stormed North Africa and later spread to Syria. As Öniş rightly pointed out, in this period Turkish foreign policy has oscillated between ethics and national interest considerations (Öniş 2012). Turkey’s relationship with Syria took a downturn due to the uprisings that have been taking place in Syria since March 2011. The Turkish government’s initial response to the popular demonstrations was to urge Syrian President Assad to reform the existing political system (Öniş 2012). Later, the Turkish government gave support to the Syrian opposition groups and gradually adopted a tougher stance toward Syria. Tension between Syria and Turkey escalated further with the shooting down of a Turkish military jet by Syria in June 2012. After this incident Turkish government declared that it had changed the military rules of engagement so that any Syrian military forces approaching its territory would be seen as threats by the Turkish military. This decision led to the creation of a de facto buffer zone against Syrian military forces in northern Syria (Çandar 2012). Although Turkey had been following a pro-diplomacy approach toward the resolution of the Iranian nuclear dispute, Turkey agreed to host

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part of a NATO anti-missile system in September 2011. This system increased threat perceptions of Iran and therefore led to the cooling of relations between Iran and Turkey (McCurdy and Danforth 2012). The Sunni-majority uprisings in Syria against the Iran-backed Assad regime and Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition also fed into the cooling of relations. Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional Government intensified, especially after the withdrawal of US soldiers from Iraq in 2011 and the growth of Iranian influence over the Iraqi government. When Iraq’s Sunni vice-president, Tariq al-Hashemi, fled Iraq due to charges against him that he was leading death squads against Shiites, he received shelter in Turkey. This strained relations between Turkey and the Iraqi central government, and the friction continued due to the Kurdish regional government’s oil exports to Turkey, which the central Iraqi government has called illegal (Küçükkoşum 2012). Relations with Israel have continued deteriorating since 2010, when Israeli soldiers raided a Turkish humanitarian aid flotilla and killed civilians who were aiming to defy the Israeli blockade of Gaza that was further tightened since Hamas’ election (BBC 31 June 2010). After the Israeli raid, Turkey suspended defense relations with Israel, although trade relations keep booming (Cagaptay and Evans 2012). All in all, these developments have led to a situation where Turkey has found itself surrounded by problems in its Middle Eastern neighborhood. Especially with the Arab Spring, all actors including Turkey and the EU have had to adjust themselves to the new context. These adjustments have also revealed elements of divergence between the EU and Turkey at the tactical level but convergence at the broad objectives in the changing Middle East context. The 2010 progress report of the Commission underlined Turkey’s divergent approach from the EU regarding the UN Security Council voting for imposing additional sanctions on Iran. Deteriorating relations between Israel and Turkey due to the flotilla incident have also been noted by the Commission (EC 2010, 95–96). The 2011 progress report acknowledged Turkey’s initially cautious policy toward the uprisings in Syria and Turkish support for the fleeing Syrians, yet also criticized Turkey for not aligning itself with the EU sanctions on Syria (EC 2011, 107). Regarding the downing of the Turkish jet by Syria, the EU foreign ministers condemned Syria for the incident, yet declared that they would not support any military action against Syria (Guardian 26 October 2012). Underlying these divergent approaches, there is unity of broader objectives toward the region. Both the EU and Turkey want to see democratization, secularism, and stability in the Middle East. Former EU commissioner Gunter Verheugen has already called on the EU and Turkey to join their relative strengths in addressing the needs of the transition countries of the Middle East and Mediterranean (Verheugen 2012). The

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next section is a glance at how Turkey’s possible membership might affect Turkey’s and the EU’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. A SCENARIO OF TURKEY INSIDE THE EU

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Assessing benefits and costs is a difficult task, as it involves multiple variables that are constantly in flux. Even the task of defining a “benefit” and a “cost” brings up problems of imagining the context in which interests and identities of actors interact in a particular way with the projects of and resources available to actors. Despite the difficulties, such thought experiments are useful in the sense that they are mind-opening with regard to possible scenarios for the future, and what must be done to make a particular future materialize. The following section undertakes such a thought experiment by taking the EU’s interest as becoming an influential actor aiming to transform governance structures in the Muslim Middle East toward further democracy, peace, and stability. Turkey’s interest is assumed to be largely convergent with that of the EU: becoming an influential actor in the region through improving its political and economic ties with the Muslim Middle East and promoting peace, stability, and good governance in the region. For the purposes of the following analysis, the Middle East will be delimited to the Muslim countries of the region, excluding Israel. Turkey’s membership to the EU might potentially be beneficial for the EU in terms of enhancing the Union’s foreign policy resources in the Muslim Middle East. First of all, Turkey’s membership would help the EU refute allegations that it is a Christian club. The proposal to include Christian roots of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty was an important illustration of such a discourse on the European identity (Guardian 2004). Turkey’s membership would reinforce the EU’s identity as an inclusive and a normative power that is not a Christian club (Tekin 2004). Also, Turkish policy makers have extensive contacts in the region, which would be helpful to the EU in its relations with the leaders of the Muslim Middle East. 7 As the British foreign secretary and the Finnish minister for foreign affairs pointed out in their coauthored article, “We believe the EU should not wait until Turkey joins to benefit from the strength of its relationships. But only by having a seat at the table will Turkey be able to contribute fully to the security and prosperity of the EU’s member states” (Hague and Stubb 2010). A significant contribution of Turkey’s membership to EU security would be in the energy field. As the EU aims to diversify its suppliers and transit routes in order to break its gas dependency on Russia, Baykal suggests, “It is important to note that Ankara and its relations with the gas-rich neighbouring countries play a predominant role in the future of European energy security” (Baykal 2009).

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However, for all these benefits to materialize the EU has to have a well-defined foreign policy toward the Middle East, which is a challenge. In case of Turkey’s membership to the EU, the Union would become immediate neighbors with Middle Eastern countries. The Lisbon Treaty, which aimed to streamline and simplify the EU decision-making system, came into force in 2009. The treaty introduced new posts such as the permanent council president and the high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, which are hoped to give the EU more visibility in its foreign affairs. However, the same new posts took away the agenda-shaping powers of member state presidencies. This shift in the agenda-shaping powers to the newly created posts raises concerns that if these posts are not used effectively it might lead to a decline in foreign policy activity of the Union (Guardian 2010). All in all, in case of Turkey’s membership, the EU would have to make tough choices and define its objectives and position vis-à-vis the United States in the Middle East. Another drawback of Turkey’s potential membership in the EU would be the possibility that Turkey’s membership might accelerate the already present anti-Islam, anti-immigration political party discourse in the EU member states. European far right parties capitalize on anti-Turkey and anti-immigration propaganda (Tekin 2004), which will also feed into the perception that the EU is a Christian club (Hurriyet 21 December 2010). There are potential benefits and costs of EU membership to Turkey’s ambitions in the region as well. First of all, more alignment of Turkey’s foreign policy with that of the EU can be expected in case of Turkey’s membership. This was also acknowledged by the Commission in one of the progress reports as early as 1999. The report concluded the section on the CFSP by stating that full alignment with the EU acquis cannot be expected from Turkey at that stage, and that “next steps on the alignment of Turkey’s legislation with the acquis will depend on a clear perspective on membership. This will also positively influence co-operation on CFSP matters” (EC 1999, 42). Furthermore, in case of membership, more socialization of Turkey to the EU norms of foreign policy can be expected due to increased contact with other member states of the EU and EU officials in various settings. These mechanisms of socialization are subject to actualization by agency (i.e., Turkish actors agreeing with the norms and promoting them), yet previous studies lead us to such an expectation (Checkel 2005). This brings up a potential cost of EU membership to Turkey. Turkey would lose its flexibility in the choice of foreign policy tools, such as the extension of visa-free regimes. As Emerson and Tocci noted, Turkey has been exceptionally open to its neighbors, all of which “are however on the EU’s obligatory visa list, with further rules that require that the visas be obtained from consulates rather than at the border crossing” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 37). Therefore, being part of the Schengen agreement would entail a more restrictive visa regime for Tur-

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key, which has been used as a foreign policy tool by Turkey in its relationship with its Middle Eastern neighbors, such as Syria, Lebanon, and most recently, Yemen. Likewise, socialization of the foreign policy elite within the EU institutions raises questions as to the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the foreign policy decisions made by the policy makers and bureaucrats (Zurn and Checkel 2005, 1048). The most salient benefit of Turkey’s full membership to the EU is that Turkey would act as an EU member in the region, thereby multiplying its political clout in the region. Middle Eastern leaders are watching Turkey’s EU process closely and give full support to Turkey’s membership (Hurriyet 21 December 2010). In case of Turkey’s membership, the EU and Turkey would combine their soft power in the region and become an influential player.

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CONCLUSION

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Regarding the hypothetical case of Turkish membership, it can be argued that the benefits of Turkey’s membership to the EU outweigh the costs, especially for the EU in the domain of foreign policy toward the Middle East. There is already a certain level of convergence of interests between Turkey and the EU regarding the Middle East, and Turkey’s membership would increase the EU’s credibility in the region as an actor embracing diversity of cultures and religions. Turkey’s membership in the EU would also boost Turkey’s soft power in the Middle East, as it would demonstrate that “the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and secularism are not specific to any particular culture or religion” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 41). However, there are necessary conditions for this mutually beneficial scenario to materialize. First of all, if Turkey loses its relative neutrality in approaching Middle Eastern countries and crises, Turkey’s relationships in the region could turn sour. Turkey’s soft power largely relies on the assumption that it could act as an impartial arbiter among various actors of the region (İdiz 2010). Secondly, Turkey should further its democratization efforts. Losing secularism and democracy as its core values would undermine its power of attraction among the Middle Eastern intellectuals who look at Turkey for inspiration (İdiz 2010). Also, as Emerson and Tocci argued, if Turkey receives preferential treatment despite its failure to comply with the EU’s predetermined conditions for accession, it would set a bad example for future candidates as well as the neighbors of the EU (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 9). Finally, the EU should also define its role and objectives in the Middle East clearly and consistently, and use its newly created foreign policy machinery effectively to tap into Turkey’s and other EU member countries’ resources and experiences in the Middle East.

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From the perspective of Turkey, membership to the EU does not seem to be highly profitable in terms of its relations with the Muslim Middle East. However, when compared to a scenario of Turkey cutting itself off the EU, membership is a much more favorable option. It goes without saying that, in case of full membership, Turkey would lose some of its autonomy and its flexibility in using a variety of foreign policy tools such as visa-exemption agreements as well as trade relations without much of human rights and democratization conditionality. Being a member of the EU would eventually limit Turkey’s options in dealing with its Middle Eastern neighbors. However, a severance of Turkey’s ties with the EU would be doubly detrimental to Turkey’s relationship with the countries in the region, as an important part of Turkey’s soft power in the region derives from its candidacy to the EU.

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NOTES

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1. PhD candidate and associate tutor at the University of Sheffield, Department of Politics, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability,” speech delivered at the 6th ECSA–World Conference, Brussels, 5–6 December 2002. As quoted by Barbé and Johansson-Nogués (2008, 86), 3. For an account linking the changes to Islamization of Turkish politics, see Cagaptay 2006. For a study emphasizing the impact of the changing regional security environment as causing the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the region, see, for example, Larrabee 2007. For an analysis that ties this transformation to the EU process, see, for example, Tekin 2005. 4. “Soft power” is a term coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. (1990). So ft power refers to the power of attraction, shaping what others want rather than what they do, without coercion or use of military means. 5. The capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was also a very important factor behind the change in Turkey’s approach to its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. 6. Similar points have been made by former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah Gül, in 2003. See Kohen 2003. 7. Interview with an EU official, 9 September 2010, Brussels, Belgium.

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TWELVE Europeanization’s Time Constraint The Case of Cyprus Kıvanç Ulusoy 1

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Cyprus has a rendezvous with history. —Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General

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The postwar integration process in Europe has been a symbol of promoting democratization, overcoming deep national enmities and ideological divisions, and resolving border conflicts. This experience of civilized conflict resolution has been incorporated in many European Union (EU) documents, including the neighborhood policy documents, a crucial point in showing that European governance and ways of resolving ethnic and regional conflicts have been projected toward the countries in the European periphery too. Sometimes regarded as postmodern, the EU—as a multilevel polity of multinational integration based on common policies, values, and the rule of law—has been effective in accommodating deep ethnic and regional divisions and border conflicts (Coppieters 2004). It offers solutions, as the cases of Belgian devolutions, Spain’s problem nationalities, the Northern Ireland conflict, and the German unification demonstrate. However, the EU capacity in resolving frozen conflicts such as the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and the Georgia-Abkhasia conflict has been problematic so far. Its contribution to the solution of the Cyprus problem has also been limited. The EU policies toward the principal parties of the conflict—the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey—played a critical role in the current stalemate. This chapter concentrates on the “time” factor, a key variable of the credible EU impact in pressuring the parties toward resolution.

Kıvanç Ulusoy

The chapter proceeds with a theoretical background of the role of time in the EU system and the temporal dimensions of an effective Europeanization. The second part covers how the conflicting parties framed their policies according to the EU timetable regarding Cyprus’ entry to the EU and Turkey’s quest for membership. Both created opportunities and constrained the available policy options of the involving actors. The chapter concludes that despite this leverage of time, the EU’s potential for conflict resolution in the Cyprus case is weak. The EU shaped the nature of the conflict but is powerless in breaking the paralysis and in pushing actors for a visionary solution. The new international context shaped by the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean affected the interaction of the major parties with each other and mobilized domestic actors in Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to push for a radical policy change. But it failed to transform the strategic interactions. It also left the prosolution domestic actors in a limbo, facing an expected collapse of all peace efforts conducted under the UN presence with a parallel timetable of the Cyprus accession to the EU since the early 1990s.

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POLITICIAN’S TIMING OF EVENTS

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“Time” as a conceptual category has so far received little attention in political science in general and European studies in particular. The main works on time have concentrated on strategic interaction among parties or choice-theoretic approaches. Borrowing a metaphor from Popper (1972) underlying the subjective “time of clouds” and the objective “time of clocks,” Almond and Genco (1977) wrote a seminal article on time, particularly underlining that “political time” is not neutral but always manipulated in the interest of competing parties. Focusing on the temporal dimensions of political process, Pierson (2004, 9) underlines the significance of macro structures, the role of temporal ordering (or sequence), and social processes of extended periods of time that cannot be reduced to the strategic moves of actors. There is an inherent connection waiting to be explored between the study of “politics in time” developed by Pierson and an agenda centered on “political time.” Goodin (1998) shows that while rationalist approaches question temporal opportunity structures, “time rules” and “strategic advantages,” and calculations over “policy timing” and “time-efficient” decisions, the constructivist challenges provide themes such as “clocks” and “rhythms” as norms and values, temporal appropriateness, and “ripe time,” the value of temporal routines and procedural temporal legitimacy. The postwar European integration process could be considered as an experience of an intimate linkage between power, legitimacy, and system performance framed by a highly political and institutionalized temporal dimension. In the EU context, time turns out to be an “institutional prop-

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[12.6]

Europeanization’s Time Constraint

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erty” through temporal rules and procedures. Varying in precision, formality, and authority, the European institutional space creates structures of social interactions, patterns of individual behavior, and frameworks of shared expectations (Stone-Sweet, Fligstein, and Sandholtz 2001). Goetz (2009) underlines five dimensions of political time in the EU system. First, the lack of dominant political cycle in the EU, temporal plurality, creates problems of synchronization. Second, the EU operates in linear political time favoring open-endedness, rather than cyclical political time, creating discontinuity in institutional practices. Third, an intensive bargaining occurs over time-setting. Fourth, the EU’s political time is open to memberstate influence. Finally, the politics in the member states are influenced by the Europeanization of political time. The Eastern enlargement required the EU to implement a comprehensive policy with strong temporal dimensions. Goetz (2006, 144–47) considers the critical importance of timing in enlargement as domestic changes and the “relative time” of accession of the candidate countries are closely linked to the EU’s internal transformation. Avery (2009, 263–64) underlines that when and how the date of accession was fixed is crucial in the exercise of the conditionality. It lies at the heart of the accession in driving reform and enabling the EU’s “transformative power.” The question was not “whether the applicant country will join” but “when it will join,” without damaging the credibility of the accession perspective and diminishing the conditionality. The enlargement presented a complex task of increasing policy-making and implementation capacity. The challenges were related to the number of candidate countries, their different characteristics (including economic discrepancy), and the duration of the process taking more than ten years. The enlargement brings various time-related issues, where timing, sequence, speed, and duration of the single steps along the accession created intense conflicts and negotiations. Timing and sequencing of opening negotiation chapters, timetables for the transposition of acquis, and speed of domestic reforms were some of the issues occupying the enlargement agenda. The EU needed to build new capacity to monitor change and encourage the candidates and all other relevant actors over time. The Commission emerged as the central institution of these tasks, as it prepared and implemented the enlargement policy (Lass-Lennecke and Werner 2009, 272). Various temporal instruments of accession management helped the EU guide the pre-accession process. Avery (2009, 256–57) underlines three instruments: the “medium term,” the “road map,” and the “demand for a date.” The medium term perspective provides the initial time frame for the upcoming five years of enlargement preparations after the Commission’s “Opinion” on the candidates in 1996, defining 2002 as a working hypothesis for accession. This led them to develop a realistic time-horizon for the accession and a calendar for their activities, and it obliged the national administrators and legislators to prepare for acces-

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sion. This perspective was strengthened by the regular reports providing annual assessment of the candidates with respect to the achievements of the Copenhagen Criteria. Stimulating competition among them, the reports as the chief instruments of the EU’s soft conditionality power provided the basis for the decisions of the December European Councils; outlined the priorities in the upcoming periods for each candidate, monitoring their implementation; and generated debates where opposition parties could attack undemocratic governments (Grabbe 2002, 260–61). Facing the slowing down of the negotiations in the second half of 2000, the EU proposed a “road map,” considered as “scenario with dates” for negotiations, aiming to guide negotiations toward conclusion in a nottoo-distant future. The EU laid down a plan with fixed sequences and a detailed timetable as to when exactly to open and close chapters. Contributing the momentum of negotiations and discipline to the accession process by pushing the member states to agree on positions by given dates, the Commission provided a timetable for the completion of the remaining chapters until 2002 to push the first six candidate countries not to delay the process, which will be completed by the starting of the accession process of the next group of six countries. Finally, the EU and the candidates engaged in a tough negotiation for the date for accession, which was resolved with the choice of 1 May 2004. This was a sensitive issue in sustaining the power of EU conditionality until the last moment. Avery (2009, 262) claims that “even an indicative date hedged by all sorts of qualifications, the authorities of an applicant country would normally relax, rather than reinforce, their efforts of preparation.” There are few significant dates along which all the above-mentioned instruments of the pre-accession process operated. At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the EU determined the accession criteria impacting the direction and speed of the process. At the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, the EU decided to open the accession negotiations with six countries. The Helsinki Summit of 1999 added negotiations with a further six countries. Finally, the Rome Summit of 2003 officially brought the negotiation process to an end with the signing of the Acts of Accession. Providing periodization, these dates structured the enlargement toward Eastern Europe together with the Mediterranean countries of Malta and Cyprus. They were also crucial for Turkey-EU relations. This chapter concentrates on how the temporal instruments of the EU enlargement structured Cyprus’s accession toward resolving the conflict on the island. The EU, to provide the accession of Cyprus in a unified manner, seriously engaged with Turkey’s candidacy, mobilized relevant actors such as the UN, the United States, and the UK along the accession timetable and synchronized their policies and expectations with the rhythm of the EU enlargement in general and the Cyprus negotiations in particular.

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THE CASE OF CYPRUS

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The Nature of the Conflict

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The Cyprus conflict has been characterized by an incomplete statehood of the Cyprus Republic, which was founded in 1960 as a result of agreements in Zurich (11 February 1959) and London (19 February 1959). To implement the London and Zurich agreements, three treaties—the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment—were signed between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK). The basic structure defined by these treaties outlined the future Constitution, which came into force on 16 August 1960. The situation of Cyprus seems comparable to the four-power status of Berlin accepted after World War II. The sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus were limited when it was founded by the required consent of the guaranteeing powers (the UK, Greece, and Turkey) to any domestic constitutional changes. They had the right to intervene either commonly or singularly to restore constitutional order and state unity in Cyprus. The UK maintains its sovereign military bases, situated on almost 3 percent of the island. The Constitution institutionalized the power sharing between the two ethnic groups, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The mediation efforts in Cyprus started with U.S. President Lyndon Johnson’s attempt after the outbreak of violence between the two communities in 1963. The UK hosted a conference in London in January 1964, followed by the NATO proposal of stationing peacekeeping forces in Cyprus in March 1964. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 186 on 4 March, calling for stationing a peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]). The negotiations in 1964 ended with the rejection of the plan proposed by U.S. mediator Dean Acheson. The Acheson Plan proposed to unite Cyprus with Greece. Turkey would receive the Greek island of Kastelorizo and a military base on Cyprus, which would be divided into two cantons for the Turkish and Greek communities. The plan was rejected by Greece and Makarios, president of the Republic of Cyprus, on the grounds that it would bring Turkey into Cyprus. 2 An important crisis erupted in June 1964, when Turkey threatened to intervene on the island to prevent the intercommunal clash. U.S. President Johnson’s letter to Turkey’s Prime Minister Inonu on 5 June explicitly mentions that “adhesion to NATO, in its very essence means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less could be expected from Turkey. Furthermore a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union.” 3 The intercommunal violence worsened in the fall of 1965, aggravating relations between Turkey and Greece. There was an

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immediate danger of war due to the intervention of Greek troops in Cyprus. The United States prevented a possible Greek-Turkish war by pushing Greece to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and pressuring Turkey in November 1967. During the heyday of the Cold War, mediation efforts from 1963 to 1967 aimed to prevent the open confrontation of the two NATO members—Greece and Turkey. The two communities were not even invited to most of these negotiations. However, attempts between 1968 and 1974 to resolve the constitutional problem through creating an independent and integral state ended with frustration because of a lack of willingness of the parties and their radically different approaches to the conflict. The 15 July coup in Cyprus and the following Turkish intervention on 20 July 1974 completely changed the grounds of the negotiations. The Security Council called for the guarantor powers to restore peace in Cyprus through two conferences held in Geneva and five rounds of talks between April 1975 and February 1976 in Vienna under UN auspices. The Vienna talks brought the division of the island into two distinct “ethnic zones”—the Greek Cypriots being in the South and the Turkish Cypriots in the North after the population transfer from north to south and south to north. The talks were followed by summit meetings outlining the basis for future negotiations. The Makarios-Denktaş Summit of 1977 produced the Four Guidelines (UN 1977) and the Denktaş-Kyprianou Summit of 1979 produced the Ten-Point Agreement (UN 1979). Common to both were decisions to continue negotiations for good will, promote mutual confidence between the parties, and safeguard the independence and unity of the country, having regard to the bicommunal/bizonal character of the state. In November 1981, UN Secretary General Waldheim drafted an Interim Agreement accepted as a basis for future negotiations. The talks went into an impasse, as Kyprianou was unwilling to recognize Denktaş as an equal. This led the Turkish Cypriots to declare the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. The declaration of independence led to the Proximity Talks, conducted under the pressures of the United States and the UK. UN Secretary-General de Cuéllar drafted a comprehensive package of settlement, the Draft Framework Agreement, initially accepted by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Contrary to his initial statement of satisfaction, Kyprianou rejected it after a visit to Greece and a talk with Prime Minister Papandreou. Despite its revisions by the Secretary-General to satisfy Kyprianou’s intransigence, the Greek Cypriot side demanded the immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from the North; the implementation of the three freedoms—freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and freedom to own property anywhere on the island—and the provision of effective international guarantees as a precondition to any settlement. Under the pressure of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)—the communist party—Kyprianou could not continue the talks

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after 1986. In the presidential elections of February 1988, Vassiliou with the support of AKEL replaced Kyprianou as the president. Vassiliou moved to side-step Denktaş and directly deal with Turkish Prime Minister Özal. Ankara refused this, despite relaxation of the relations between Greece and Turkey after the meeting of Özal with Papandreou in Davos. Vassiliou agreed to continue to the talks in Nicosia in 1988 and 1989. Meeting more than forty times, the parties agreed on the general principles of the solution drawn by the 1977 and 1979 summits. The Boutros Boutros-Ghali “Set of Ideas” underlined the political equality of the two communities and two federated states with identical powers and separate territorial administrations (UN 1991). The details were incorporated in the “Set of Ideas” and a map of territorial adjustments created by the Secretary-General in August 1992 (UN 1992). The parties appeared to agree on the “Set of Ideas,” but talks at the UN Headquarters in New York in October 1992 did not produce results (Bölükbaşı 1995). Faced with a deep lack of trust between the two communities, Boutros-Ghali shifted his attention to “Confidence-Building Measures” endorsed by the Security Council, encouraging exchanges of journalists, civil society organizations, and political parties; asking for cooperation in various areas of education, culture, and sport; and aiming at reopening the Nicosia Airport and the return of Varosha (UN 1993). The talks convened in February 1994 produced no concrete results. Clerides, assuming office as the new president of Cyprus in February 1993 after a fierce campaign against the “Set of Ideas,” wasn’t enthusiastic about accepting them as a basis for negotiations. Between 1994 and 1999, only in 1997 (on 9–13 July in Troutbeck, New York, and on 11–15 August in Glion, Switzerland), did the leaders meet for face-to-face talks upon the invitation of the new secretary-general, Kofi Annan. Hitherto the Cyprus conflict has been characterized by a desperate search for a unity of people living on the island in the absence of a unifying identity. The guarantee of peace and stability in Cyprus has been maintained through balancing divergent national interests and communities by permanent negotiations. Hannay (2005, 54), appointed as British Special Envoy in May 1996, underlined that “one, but only one, of the reasons why negotiations had already continued off and on for more than 30 years without any outcome was that they had been conducted in an open-ended time frame.” The EU provided time constraints for the negotiating parties after 1997.

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Europeanization of the Cyprus Conflict

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The relationship between Cyprus and the EU was based on Association Agreement of 1973, projecting a customs union in two stages to be completed by 1977 and 1982. However, the first stage was extended until 1987, and a protocol signed between the European Community and Cy-

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prus projected the gradual establishment of the Customs Union by the year 2001 or 2002 the latest. The Turkish Cypriots did not object to this agreement, as it was considered to benefit all Cypriots and the agreement was signed by Greece and Turkey too. The relationship entered a new phase in the 1980s when Greece became a European Council (EC) member. This showed its first impact in a rather strong statement that the ten EC foreign ministers, including Greece, made in response to the proclamation of the TRNC in 1983. Deeply concerned by this declaration, the foreign ministers underlined that they continued to regard the Kyprianou government as the sole legitimate government of the Cyprus Republic and called upon all parties not to recognize this act. 4 Condemning the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in establishing an independent state, the European Parliament declared that it did not recognize the TRNC and called upon Turkey to cooperate with the UN for a lasting solution in Cyprus (European Council 1983). Since 1981, Greece has pursued a policy of linking the improvement in EU-Turkey relations to the settlement of its bilateral disputes with Turkey. Thus Greece used its membership to gain concessions from Turkey. Greek policy was effective, as it corresponded with the EU’s policy of delaying Turkey’s membership, considered as a major burden hampering deeper integration. In response to Turkey’s membership application in 1987, the EU responded by asking for the reestablishment of political pluralism and improvement of the human rights record and requiring Turkey to solve its bilateral disputes with Greece, including the Cyprus problem (CEC 1989). In April 1988, the Council concluded that the “Cyprus problem affects EU-Turkey relations.” This was repeated at the EU Summit in Dublin in June 1990: “The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, firmly affirms its previous declaration and its support for unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with relevant UN resolution” (European Council 1991). In response to the linkages that the EC established between the progress of Turkey-EC relations and the Cyprus conflict, Turkish foreign minister Yılmaz withdrew from the meetings of the Luxembourg Association Council in 1988. Despite the negative opinion, the Council asked the Commission to prepare a proposal for the progress of relations with Turkey, envisaging the reactivation of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement and the establishment of the Customs Union. The Council in Lisbon stated that “the Turkish role in the present European political situation is of the greatest importance and that there is every reason to intensify cooperation and develop relations with Turkey, including political dialogue at the highest level” (European Council 1992). Greece aimed to benefit the EC’s rapprochement policy toward Turkey in regard to Cyprus’s wish to join the club and to gain leverage over the Aegean disputes. Linking its adoption with the Mediterranean policy, Greece asked the EC to sign the protocol governing the Customs Union

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with Cyprus (Christou 2004, 65). The European Parliament (EP) was assertive in linking the reactivation of the association with the improvement of Greek-Turkey relations as a result of the intense activities of Greek representatives. The EP adopted a resolution stating that “Turkey must be held partly responsible for the situation in Cyprus since the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus was occupied by its troops and underlined that Turkey’s policy towards Cyprus and the Aegean Sea was affecting Turkey’s relations with the EU.” 5 In 1988, during its EC presidency, Greece encouraged Cyprus to submit an application for full membership. The Cyprus conflict entered a new phase with the application of Cyprus for the EU in 1990. Greece and Greek Cypriot governments considered the EU’s rapprochement efforts toward Turkey as an opportunity to place the Cyprus issue on the negotiating table. Stivachtis (2008, 135) underlines that “the decision to apply for membership was purely political and was related to the resolution of the Cyprus problem.” Zervakis (2004, 16) added that “the Greek Cypriots’ turn towards Europe can be seen as a tactical move to neutralize the Turkish military occupation.” The EU accession was vital to the strategic calculations of Greece and Cyprus. Expecting the EU to send strong messages to Turkey to come back to the negotiating table, they rejected the idea that settling the political question constituted a precondition for the Cyprus accession (Couloumbis 1997; Kranidiotis 1999). The membership application also reflected the Greek Cypriots’ frustration with developments related to the UN mediation. They were unhappy with the UN report stating that “Cyprus is the home of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community. The relationship is not one of the majority and minority.” 6 The Security Council adopted a resolution in March 1990 addressing the community leaders as political equals and called them to reach a mutually acceptable solution on an equal footing (UN 1990). In 1993, the Commission’s “Opinion” on the application was positive. The EU believed that the accession of Cyprus would increase security and prosperity and help “bring the two communities close together.” Safeguarding the essential balance between the two communities and expecting that Cyprus membership implies a lasting settlement of the Cyprus question in view of the talks pursued under UN auspices, the EU felt that a “positive signal” should be sent that Cyprus was eligible. As soon as the prospect of a settlement was surer, the Community was ready to start the process with Cyprus that would eventually lead to its accession (CEC 1993). Responding positively to the Opinion and referring to the UN efforts, the Council stated that “if in spite of these efforts, there was no prospect of a solution in the foreseeable future, the Council agreed to reassess the situation in the light of the positions expressed by each side in the intercommunity discussions and to examine in January

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1995 the question of the accession of Cyprus to the EU in the light of this situation” (European Council 1993, 68–69). The EU position regarding the necessity to reach a settlement before the start of the negotiations gradually changed, faced with the Turkish Cypriot intransigence leading to the failure of the UN talks on confidence-building measures (CEC 2005). The EU repeatedly stated that it supported a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question and that the prospect of accession would provide an incentive for this. However, the EU continued to negotiate with Cyprus, although no representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community were included in the delegation. Despite the prospect for settlement seeming no surer than in 1993 and without waiting until 1995, the Council in Corfu in June 1994 included Cyprus together with Malta in the next enlargement (European Council 1994). Arguing that in taking this position the EU member states hoped that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would adopt a more flexible attitude toward settlement, Nugent (2000, 139) claims that “if both recognize that they did not exercise a veto over the Republic’s membership of the EU, they might conclude that their best strategy was to accept the inevitable and extract what benefits they could from the EU in the new context.” The Cyprus membership application provided the EU a significant opportunity to improve relations between Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. Finding itself in an increasingly difficult situation, the EU considered the Cyprus application as a bargaining chip to persuade Greece to change its strong conditionality toward Turkey, to pressure Turkey to improve its relations with Greece and resolve the Cyprus issue, and to push the Greek Cypriots to improve relations with the Turkish Cypriots. This was evident in “Opinion” on the Cyprus application, stating that the Cyprus accession was to be reconsidered in January 1995. This coincided with the completion of the Customs Union with Turkey and provided the EU with the opportunity of a package deal. Pushing Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to reach agreement by linking the Cyprus issue to the completion of the Customs Union, the EU at the same time used leverage over Greece to reconsider its policy toward Turkey. EU traded off the accession negotiations with Cyprus for Greece’s approval of the establishment of the Customs Union with Turkey. Greece did not object to the meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council on 8 November 1993, where it was agreed that the process of the completing of the Customs Union would be by the end of 1995. This policy was not successful in pushing Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to give concessions in Cyprus, knowing that this might not lead to an eventual Turkish accession to the EU. Turkey threatened to move toward unification with the TRNC in case the Greek Cypriot government accedes to the EU. At the Association Council in December 1994, Greece maintained its opposition to the completion of the Customs Union and declared that it would not drop its objections unless a timetable was set for the start of the accession negotiations with Cyprus.

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So far on two crucial occasions increasing European involvement contributed negatively to the Cyprus negotiations conducted under UN auspices. The first occasion was related to the EC membership of Greece. The talks between Kyprianou and Denktaş, under UN Secretary-General Waldheim since May 1979, suddenly collapsed. Bölükbaşı (1998, 422) argues that “Greece’s new prime minister convinced Kyprianu that Denktaş . . . would refuse all Greek Cypriot demands as long as there was no international pressure on Ankara.” The second occasion was related to the unilateral application of Cyprus for EC membership. Following the failure of the March 1990 Summit and Denktaş’s reelection as president of TRNC in May 1990, Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou applied for EC membership on 4 July 1990 without consulting Denktaş. This affected the talks conducted in October 1992 over the “Set of Ideas.” Denktaş objected to this as Turkey was not a member and rejected the clause that Cyprus may join international organizations of which Turkey and Greece are not members. After assuming office in February 1993, Clerides was reluctant to accept the “Set of Ideas.” The Commission’s report on Cyprus in June 1993 collapsed the talks due to Turkish Cypriot resistance. Five rounds of informal meetings between Clerides and Denktaş in October 1994 did not result in action, and UN activities were cut in 1995 due to the fact that the Council in June 1994 announced that Cyprus was included in the next round of enlargement. The Cannes European Council in 1995 declared that negotiations with Cyprus should be opened six months after the conclusion of the 1996 intergovernmental conference that resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997. Formal membership talks with Cyprus started in March 1998.

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Europeanization’s “Time Constraint”

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Kofi Annan, who succeeded Boutros-Ghali as the UN Secretary-General in January 1997, wrote to Clerides and Denktaş on 27 January to hold a new set of face-to-face talks. Despite UN efforts, no substantial progress occurred when the community leaders met in Troutbeck (New York) in July 1997. The meetings in Glion (Switzerland) in September failed to live up to expectations. After that, the leaders did not agree to renew the talks. Despite claiming “the Union is determined to play a positive role in bringing about a just and lasting settlement” (CEC 1997), the good mood between the sides worsened when the EU decided to start membership negotiations with Cyprus as part of the Agenda 2000, outlining the forthcoming European enlargement. Turkey was not included in this project, and EU-Turkey relations were at their lowest level at the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997. The Summit declaration confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but the EU was not committed to Turkey’s accession. Strengthening Turkey-EU relations was conditional on the “establishment of stable and

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satisfactory relations” with Greece; settlement of disputes by legal rules, including the International Court of Justice; and support for a political settlement in Cyprus (European Council 1997). The “European Strategy” offered by the Council for Turkey at the Cardiff Summit in 1998 was far from covering expectations. It lacked financial resources and a clear membership perspective. Turkey strongly reacted to the Luxembourg declaration by freezing its relations with the EU. Rejecting any linkage between Turkey’s accession and resolution of Greco-Turkish disputes, including the Cyprus conflict, Turkey warned the EU through speeding up the process of integration with the TRNC. 7 Despite the fact that participation in the programs was open to them, the EU noted that “no representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community have so far taken part in the accession process due to the negative attitude taken by the Turkish Cypriot leader” (CEC 1998, 6). In August 1998, Denktaş proposed to Clerides to establish a confederation to resolve the conflict on the island, with the prior acknowledgment or recognition of two equal states. The proposed confederation would be a “partnership settlement” that would also entrench the special relationship between Greek Cypriots and Greece and between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. The proposal includes Cyprus’s accession to the EU. 8 The situation worsened when in December 1998 the Greek Cypriot government placed an order for the purchase of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles. The pressures on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots augmented through various court cases issued during the 1990s. In 1994, a European Court of Justice ruling banned export products carrying Turkish Cypriot certificates of origin. In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey committed a continuing violation of the rights of Mrs. Loizidou (a Greek Cypriot) by preventing her from going to her property located in the north of Cyprus. 9 The Court found “the Turkish army exercised effective overall control” and that this entailed Turkey’s responsibility for the policies and actions of the TRNC. In 1994, a European Court of Justice ruling accused Turkey of damaging the realization of fundamental freedoms—the freedom of movement of people in their own country as well as the movement of goods, services, and capital—as a result of the de facto division of the island. 10 These were interpreted by the Turkish side as deliberate and unethical attempts by the EU to strangle the northern economy and force the Turkish Cypriots to comply with Greek Cypriot demands. Surprising everyone, Greek-Turkish relations improved dramatically with the initiatives of the foreign ministers of the two countries—Papandreou and Cem—after the earthquakes in 1999. In June, the G8 Summit decided to “urge the UN secretary-general in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions to invite the leaders of the two parties to negotiations in the fall of 1999.” 11 It was stated that both parties should commit to set no preconditions, put all issues on the table, negotiate in

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good faith until a settlement was reached, and take full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties. The Security Council endorsed this initiative by asking the Secretary-General to invite the Cypriot leaders to hold negotiations in the autumn. It called on both sides, including military authorities, to work constructively with the Secretary-General and his special representative to create a positive climate on the island that would pave the way for these negotiations (UN 1999). In 1999, Turkey and the EU also reached a crucial compromise on the Cyprus issue at the Helsinki Summit. Dropping “a political settlement” as a precondition, the EU guaranteed to “take account of all relevant factors” before deciding on Cyprus’s accession. Greece consented to the EU’s offer to Turkey of the status of a “candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states” (European Council 1999). Turkey was subject to a bigger qualitative upgrade than its candidate status implied with an “enhanced pre-accession strategy” in the same way as the other twelve candidates (Maresceau 2003). The summit gave Greece an opportunity to play the card of external balancing in a sophisticated way. The European card was not used as a security tool but in terms of increasing diplomatic leverage on Turkey to push it deeper into the integration process and play the “European rules of the game.” Greece confined Cyprus and the Aegean issues within the EU context, where it enjoys a comparative advantage vis-à-vis Turkey (Tsakonas and Dokos 2002, 112–13). In December 1999 the first round of “proximity talks,” the beginning of an extended process, started in New York under the direction of the UN Secretary-General’s special adviser for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto. The first round, prepared the ground for future direct negotiations, and subsequent rounds were held in 2000 and 2001; the EU considered that progress toward accession and progress toward a viable solution of the Cyprus problem would reinforce each other. The UN initiative arrived at a time assisting the EU to handle its new round of enlargement with clearer political prospects (CEC 1999, 15). With this prospect, Annan underlined that during 2000 and 2001, UN officials with Commission officials addressed Turkish Cypriot concerns through the EU accession of a reunited Cyprus. Given that economic and numerical disparities would make the unrestricted application of the acquis communautaire in the north problematic for the Turkish Cypriots, Annan personally made the point that special arrangements would be needed to accommodate these concerns in May 2001 in an appeal to EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs (UN 2003, 8). However, Denktaş was increasingly critical of the role of both the EU and the UN in the process and claimed that the EU changed the delicate balance of power within the island (Denktaş 1998). Furthermore, despite considerable international pressures he refused to attend the sixth round of negotiations that had been planned in January 2001. As the talks derailed, the tensions between Turkey and the EU over Cyprus increased.

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EP reporter Poos stated, “If Turkey were to carry out its threat of annexing the north of Cyprus in response to Cypriot accession to the EU and proclaim the northern part as its 82nd province in clear breach of international law, it would put an end to its own ambitions of EU membership” (EP 2001). In September 2001, Annan tried to restart the process with no avail. From the membership application of Cyprus in 1990 until the early 2000s, the European impact on the resolution of the Cyprus conflict was completely negative. The EU policy and the specific gains and losses presented to the parties through integration with the EU had unintended effects. They played into the hands of the most nationalist elements in the conflict. Contrary to the expectations of the EU, the positions of the parties hardened. The Greek Cypriots decided to apply for the EU to increase their bargaining power over Turkey. Greece supported this position, and the EU was far from implementing a hard conditionality against Cyprus (Smith 2003, 131). Faced with this, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots hardened their positions. Instead of communicating the benefits of the EU framework in resolving the issue of sovereignty through the potential mobilization of the subnational entities, the EU underlined the material and the economic offers, regarded by the Turkish side as cheap bribes. The zero-sum nature of the Greek Cypriot gains from membership automatically made the Turkish Cypriot leadership view the EU accession as a threat to their identity and security. Tocci (2006, 331) claims that “what made matters worse was that until late in 2001 the EU players failed to convey the message, through an effective and systematic information campaign, that many of these perceived threats were in fact based on serious misconceptions of EU law and policy.” The tide seemed to reverse by late 2001 as Cyprus approached the accession deadline. On 25 October 2001 Prodi, the head of the Commission, in a speech in Nicosia; in March 2002 Commissioner Verheugen, in his visit to Nicosia in a meeting with the community leaders; and in early May 2002 EP President Pat Cox, in his visit to Cyprus, strongly underlined the “time constraint” that the Cyprus EU accession brings to the settlement (CEC 2002, 26). When the UN announced its plan in October 2002, it did so in light of two crucial dates: 16 April 2003, the date that was set for the signing of the Treaty of Accession, and 1 May 2004, the date set for the Cyprus integration with the EU. Claiming that the EU offered incentives to reach a settlement as well as deadlines within which to reach it, the Secretary-General concluded that a unique set of circumstances that would make a true impact on the attitudes of the protagonists and bring about the required qualitative changes of position had emerged. The new circumstances included the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1250 (UN 1999), the four guidelines of which provided a clear and realistic framework for negotiation; the evolving GreekTurkish rapprochement; the European Council decision in December

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1999 at Helsinki that opened the door to Turkey’s candidature for accession; and as the prospect for the enlargement of the EU by up to ten new members, including Cyprus (UN 2003, 2). On 8 November 2001, Denktaş surprised many by inviting Clerides in a letter to a face-to-face meeting without preconditions. Clerides received the letter in New York, where he was attending the UN General Assembly meeting, and accepted the offer for direct talks only under UN auspices. Denktaş accepted but requested a “one-off meeting” scheduled on 4 December. The good mood was crowned with an invitation from Denktaş to join him for dinner at his house the next evening. Clerides became the first Greek Cypriot leader since 1974 to visit northern Nicosia on 5 December. On 29 December Clerides hosted a return dinner for Denktaş at his house in Nicosia. It was the first time Denktaş had crossed the Green Line since 1974. This good mood led to the initiation of five rounds of direct formal talks between the parties with the aim of reaching a settlement by the end of June 2002, a deadline set by the leaders themselves to reach a comprehensive settlement (Ker-Lindsay 2005, 24–35). The meeting continued until mid-February, concentrating on the issues of security, governance, and territory, without any tangible result. At this juncture Verheugen paid an official visit to Cyprus on 7–8 March and strongly reminded the leaders about the EU’s timetable. Underlining that the EU would make its assessments about the ten candidates in October, Verheugen warned the leaders that the “delaying tactics” would not help and the EU could not tell 120 million people in Eastern Europe to wait until the Cyprus settlement. Faced with the negotiations going nowhere and reaffirming Ankara’s official backing for Denktaş in the middle of the talks, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Cem stated that a settlement in the island requires “the confirmation of two equal separate states, each as a sovereign entity, forming through an agreement a new partnership state” (Cem 2002). The positive expectations from the UN efforts gradually disappeared, but this process gave the UN a detailed understanding of the positions of the parties and the necessary time to generate ways of bridging their legitimate concerns. Endorsing the UN efforts, calling on the two communities to seize the “unique opportunity” for a settlement before the Cyprus accession, and underlining the EU’s preference for the accession of a reunited island, the Council at the Seville Summit stated that Cyprus, as a member state, would need to speak with a single voice and ensure proper application of EU law (European Council 2002a). The Council indicated its wish to accommodate the terms of a comprehensive settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the EU’s founding principles and guaranteed that the EU would make a substantial financial contribution to support the development of the northern part of a reunited island. On 11 November 2002, Annan presented to the parties and the guarantors a “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.” An-

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nan stated that that the “timing” of submitting a written proposal was extremely delicate because of conflicting calendars: Denktaş’s convalescence following open-heart surgery early in October, the Turkish elections early in November, the Copenhagen EU Council (12–13 December), and the looming prospect of campaigning to succeed Clerides (UN 2003, 10). The proposal was constructed in such a manner that the two leaders could sign a two-page comprehensive settlement, the essence of which was that they would commit themselves to finalizing negotiations with the UN, on the basis of the substantive parts of the plan, by 28 February 2003, and submit the plan to separate simultaneous referenda for approval on 30 March 2003. This would allow a new state of affairs to come into being and a reunited Cyprus to sign the Treaty of Accession to the EU on 16 April 2003. The EU endorsed the Secretary-General’s efforts. Underlining that the Commission wanted a reunited Cyprus to join the EU, Prodi stated, “We call on everyone to rally to the process now under way under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General so that we can get a solution before the year’s end” (Prodi 2002). Claiming that the next few weeks would bring a “window of opportunity” for ending the decades-old conflict, Verheugen stated that “the parties involved know that the EU intends to reach a decision in Copenhagen, and it will. I call on everyone involved to make one big final effort” (Verheugen, 2002). The United States endorsed the UN efforts and accepted the EU timetable as the most significant lever on the parties to change their positions. Washington had no interest in shouldering a high-profile initiative on Cyprus because of the war with Iraq pressing in the background. However, knowing that passivity would reduce the pressure for progress and might allow opportunities to slip by, the United States could have squared this circle by doing its utmost behind the scenes to get the Cyprus sides, Turkey, and the EU locked into a negotiating process that could carry forward to 2004 and beyond if need be (Wilkinson 2003, 202). Annan noted the significance of the Turkish-Greek rapprochement and Turkey’s November 2002 elections to table its Cyprus plan. The rapprochement, peace-building efforts between the communities, and the overarching EU process affecting both Cyprus and Turkey gradually gave rise to an unprecedented historical dynamic of a likely convergence of the interests of Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey, and Greece. The transformation of Turkey’s Cyprus policy owes much to changes in domestic politics. Hitherto, Turkey’s policy was based on de-linking the dynamics of its own relations with the EU from the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Soysal (2002, 46) states, “Rational realism is and will remain the most significant aspect of Turkey’s foreign policy. This is the case despite the grave and dramatic nature of the problems faced by the nation in a very difficult corner of the world, and paradoxically, despite the temptations of lucrative and irredentist involvements.” However, the

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Justice and Development Party (AKP) coming to power after the November 2002 elections with an agenda of reform and EU accession took that slight changes in a sensitive foreign policy area such as the Cyprus question could support this policy (Duran 2006, 281–94). The signs of a change in Turkey’s position coupled with societal dissent in Northern Cyprus pressured the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The major signs of change occurred under the pressure of the large demonstrations on 14 January 2003, in which one-third of the population in North Cyprus took part. Denktaş received huge domestic and international pressure and criticism from Turkey acting under the EU timetable (Ulusoy 2008, 324). Annan aimed to secure a deal before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002. However, this was not possible, due particularly to the negative attitude of the TRNC leadership. But instead of speaking about the failure, Annan stepped forward and announced that the UN still saw the chance to reach a deal by 28 February 2003—the original deadline envisaged by the Plan. At the Summit, the EU declared that accession negotiations were completed with Cyprus and the country would accede as a new member. It also stated its “strong preference for accession to the EU by a united Cyprus.” In light of the submission of the UN plan in November 2002 and the launch of bicommunal talks, the Council urged the two communities to “seize this unique opportunity to reach a settlement” before accession of the island. If a settlement was not attained, the application of the acquis would be suspended in the North. The Council invited the Commission, in consultation with the government of Cyprus, “to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union” (European Council 2002b). At the end of the talks at The Hague, Denktaş rejected putting the UN plan to a referendum, benefiting from the intensified strain on the internal politics of Turkey resulting mainly from the Iraq crisis. The Turkish press stated that though the Gül government did want a solution to Cyprus, the fact that it lost control in general during the quarrel over the U.S. troop deployment motion was the biggest factor. In this environment Denktaş managed to stir into action the conservative circles that rule Turkey. Birand states that the armed forces played the most effective role in bringing about the rejection of the Annan Plan (Birand 2003). As a sign of well-established circles’ mistrust of the AKP, Denktaş claims, whatever the strategy of the JDP headquarters could produce, as was laid down clearly at the latest Feb. 28 National Security Council (MGK) meeting, Turkey must be ready for new possible tensions in the entire southern front from Cyprus to Iraq, and must act with the awareness that every stone in that front is linked with each other. We must know that the loss of one playing piece may bring about a total defeat, a retreat from the Cyprus position would land Turkey in a position to retreat in all fronts, including the EU. 12

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On 23 April 2003, shortly after the talks in The Hague, an extraordinary event took place in Cyprus, when the TRNC decided on partially lifting restrictions on citizen movement across the “green line,” the 1974 ceasefire line. Facing the Greek Cypriots moving forward with EU integration, the Turkish Cypriots organized enormous protest against Denktaş. The EU’s condemnation of his rejections required Turkey to make a gesture to restore its credibility. From the breakdown of the negotiations in early 2003 until the Turkish Cypriot general elections in December of that year, no one made any attempt to resolve the conflict. The UN kept its position of contemplating no reengagement without a firm commitment of all concerned to work on the basis of the Plan. However, the EU saw the period between The Hague talks and the anticipated entry of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004 as the next window of opportunity for a settlement and pressured Turkey by implicitly making the resolution of the Cyprus conflict a condition for launching the accession negotiations. The strategy paper stated “the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations” (CEC 2003a, 16). Believing that a solution to the problem could still be found before 1 May, the Commission claimed that in case a settlement was not reached before the date of accession, Protocol No. 10 annexed to the Accession Treaty envisaged the suspension of the acquis in the areas of the country outside the effective control of the Government of Cyprus (CEC 2003b, 4). Papadopoulos gave the impression that Cyprus was simply waiting for its full admission to the EU on 1 May 2001. Denktaş expected that diplomatic inaction until Cyprus’s entry into the EU would bring the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement into complete failure, and by default this would bring partition. Anastasiou (2007, 195) states that “the positive rapprochement gestures exhibited by the two administrations were motivated by a fundamentally unilateralist approach through which each side attempted to enhance its ethno-centrist agenda on the Cyprus problem.” Assessing the negotiations between 1999 and 2003 and underlining the limits of external pressure to deliver a settlement, Hannay (2005, 237) states, “On no previous occasion were external pressures applied so consistently and in such a sustained manner; on no previous occasion was the raw material that emerged from the views of the two sides so skilfully bended and merged. And yet, all that was not enough to achieve an agreement.” He concludes that it was not external pressure; rather, the positive input from Cypriots themselves and from two motherlands would be of crucial significance to produce a positive outcome. The pressures on Denktaş and Turkey increased with the victory of the pro-solution parties in the general elections of TRNC in December 2003. While Denktaş remained the Turkish negotiator, the change of government—the formation of a CTP and DP coalition government led by Talat—created a significant push toward negotiating the Annan Plan and putting it to referendum before Cyprus became an EU member. The AKP

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government backed by the reformist sectors of media, business, and bureaucracy made a forward step to support the start of intercommunal negotiations. The decision of the National Security Council to return for new talks on 22 January 2004 was followed by a meeting of Erdoğan and Annan in Switzerland. On 10 February, Annan met with the sides in New York. This meeting was followed by the opening of the Plan for discussions in Cyprus and Burgenstock on 19 February and 24 March. However, the unveiling of the last version of the Plan on 31 March changed the mood in the Greek side. Papadopoulos, with a dramatic speech, called for the rejection of the Plan on 7 April. 13 The Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan in the referendum held on 24 April 2004. [12.47]

CONCLUSION

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When the EU candidacy of Cyprus was launched in the 1990s, EU policy was based on strictly following the conditionality framework, arguing for the settlement of the conflict and reunification of the island before the accession. The EU supported the UN’s role as mediator and argued that the membership carrot would constitute an incentive for resolution. When the last round of negotiations leading up to the Annan Plan got into the substance of a possible agreement in the late 1990s, the EU timetable and the strict conditionality applied for the candidates—Cyprus and Turkey—were indeed brought on board by the UN mediators. The future context of EU membership was regarded as a part of the resolution plan. However, it was never possible to synchronize the moments at which both sides were under pressure to settle the Cyprus conflict. The sequencing of Turkey’s slow progress toward membership and the Cyprus negotiations presented an insoluble problem. No one doubted that if Turkey’s candidature had been proceeding to a positive conclusion in parallel with Cyprus and with the negotiations for a settlement, all would be concluded together. But this was not on offer. At the Helsinki Summit the EU, facing with the threat of Greece to hold the whole enlargement hostage to the accession of Cyprus, left the Turkish Cypriots with a disastrous outlook. Denktaş cast himself easily in the role of the unreasonable party until the elections in December 2003. This was reinforced by Turkey’s decision in the interest of its own EU accession to change the balance decisively in favor of the Annan Plan, proposing the formula of letting Annan “fill the blanks” where there might remain differences between principal parties. Finally, when the Greek Cypriots were under the greatest pressure, particularly up to March 2003, Turkey was not convinced with the EU offer to pressure Turkish Cypriot leadership. When Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were prepared for the genuine negotiations for settlement, particularly from late 2003 onwards, the EU pressures on the Greek Cypriots had already been relaxed.

Kıvanç Ulusoy

This chapter claims that EU conditionality has not been applied consistently with respect to the membership of Cyprus. The strongholds of conditionality with regard to the fundamental freedoms and good neighborliness and the underlying “time constraint” crucial in pushing the candidates for domestic reform and foreign policy change was deliberately ignored. Instead, the EU stuck to its timetable, hoping that the membership carrot for Cyprus and time pressure for getting a date to start accession negotiations for Turkey would be enough to push for a solution. Cyprus was apparently put on a fast track to membership despite serious doubts that it meets all the membership conditions. Declining to use its leverage explicitly and never threatening to use a stick toward Cyprus, the EU ignored the numerous violations of fundamental freedoms, relating to freedom of movement within the country, international travel, and migration caused by the division of Cyprus. Politics prevailed over the objective conditions of membership. Greece prevented the EU from implementing a different policy, but other members also appeared reluctant to accept Turkey to the club. There were no stable institutions guaranteeing the respect of democratic order and fundamental freedoms in Cyprus. In particular, the Republic negotiated the accession of the entire island with a northern part outside its control. Incorporating the whole territory of Cyprus to the Union, the EU inevitably accepted that the acquis would be applied only in the areas controlled by the Greek Cypriot administration. The EU constantly underlined that Cyprus met the economic conditions and the northern part would be supported by EU funds. Instead of communicating how the membership would resolve the crucial aspects of the Cyprus conflict such as the sovereignty issue, the EU preferred to put pressure on Turkey to ask for good neighborliness and contribute to a resolution of the issue and the TRNC leadership to agree to join the negotiation team. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership regarded the economic incentives as cheap bribes, and pressures of negotiation as unjustified and an unethical policy. Finally, the experience of the Cyprus negotiations from 1990 to 2004 demonstrated that two issues would play a significant role if the conflict were to be resolved in the foreseeable future. First of all, Turkey’s accession prospect to the EU will determine the resolution of the conflict. If Turkey progresses and the accession comes closer, resolving the Cyprus issue will become a necessity and require parties to display a more compromising position. If Turkey’s membership prospect disappears, this will inevitably affect the Cyprus conflict in a negative way. Any weakening of the EU commitment toward Turkey would be perhaps fatally damaging to prospects for a settlement. Another key in resolving the Cyprus conflict is related to the regional balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In particular, the progress of relations between Greece and Turkey turns out to be a key factor both for solving the Cyprus problem and a complete resolution of other disputes between them. Without a settle-

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ment of the Cyprus problem, settling other bilateral disputes seems difficult. Turkey and Greece need to put more effort into bringing about a settlement of the Cyprus problem, to increase the chances of settling their bilateral disputes. In the contrary case, they put their relationship in the inevitable risk of regression in the long run. [12.52]

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NOTES 1. Associate professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul University, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/acheson_plan.html. 3. “President Johnson’s Letter to Inonu,” Middle East Journal 20, no. 3 (1964): 354. 4. Declaration of 17 November 1983, EC Bulletin, 1983/11. 5. Resolution of Relations between the EC and Turkey, Official Journal, C317, Brussels, 1986; Resolution on the Escalation of Tension in Cyprus, Official Journal, C289, Brussels, 1986. 6. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices, S21183, 8 March 1990. 7. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices, S21183, 8 March 1990. 8. See http://www.mfa.gov.tr. 9. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 ECHR, ser. A, 1995. 10. ECJ case C-363/93, Lancry and others, ECR 1994, I, p. 3957. 11. Conclusions of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers, Cologne, 10 June 1999. 12. “Denktaş Arrives for Crucial Cyprus Summit,” Turkish Daily News, 5 March 2003. 13. See “Declaration by the President of the Republic Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos regarding the referendum of 24 April 2004,” press release, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 7 April 2004.

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Kıvanç Ulusoy Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 1995. Communication of the Commission to the Council in View of the Reexamination of the Question of Cyprus Accession to the European Union . SEC (95), 2005 Final, Brussels. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 1997. Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. Bulletin of the European Union, supplement 5/97. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 1998. Regular Report on Cyprus. Brussels. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 1999. Regular Report on Cyprus. 6 October. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2002. Regular Report on Cyprus Accession to the EU. 9 October, SEC 2002, 1401, Brussels. Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2003a. Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards accession of Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. 5 October (final). Commission of the European Communities (CEC). 2003b. Regular Report on Cyprus Accession to the EU. Brussels, 9 October. Conclusions of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers. 1999. Cologne, 10 June. Coppieters, Bruno. 2004. Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery. Gent, Belgium: Academia Press. Couloumbis, Theodore. 1997. “Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974.” Thesis 1(4): 10–17. “Declaration of 17 November 1983,” EC Bulletin, 1983/11. “Declaration by the President of the Republic Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos regarding the referendum of 24 April 2004.” 2004. Press Release, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 7 April. Denktaş, Rauf. 1998. “EU Threat to Island Balance of Power.” European Voice, 22–28 January. “Denktaş Arrives for Crucial Cyprus Summit.” 2003. Turkish Daily News, 5 March. Duran, Burhanetin. 2006. “JDP and Foreign Policy as an Agent of Transformation.” H. Yavuz (ed.), 281–94. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. European Council. 1983. Resolution on Cyprus, Official Journal, C217, Brussels. European Council . 1990. Presidency Conclusions , Dublin, 25–26 June. European Council. 1992. Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon, 26–27 June. European Council. 1993. “Council Conclusions on the Commission Opinion on Cyprus Application for Accession.” EC Bulletin, 4 October. European Council. 1994. Presidency Conclusions, Corfu, 24–25 June. European Council. 1997. Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg, 12 December. European Council. 1999. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 10–11 December. European Council. 2002a. Presidency Conclusions, Seville, 21–22 June. European Council. 2002b. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, 12–13 December. European Parliament (EP). 2001. Report on Cyprus Application for Membership to the European Union and the State of Negotiations), 17 July. Goetz, Klaus. 2006. “Beyond Differential Impact: Territory, Temporality, and Clustered Europeanization.” Attila Agh and Alexandra Ferencz (eds.), Deepening and Widening in an Enlarged Europe: The Impact of the Eastern Enlargement, 137–61. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Goetz, Klaus. 2009. “How Does the EU Tick? Five Propositions on Political Time.” Journal of European Public Policy 16(2): 202–20. Goodin, Robert. 1998. “Keeping Political Time: The Rhythms of Democracy.” International Political Science Review 19(1): 39–54. Grabbe, Heather. 2002. “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire.” International Political Science Review 23(3): 249–68. Hannay, David. 2005. Cyprus: The Search for a Solution. London: I. B. Tauris. Hoffmeister, Frank . 2006. Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession . Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Europeanization’s Time Constraint Ker-Lindsay, James. 2005. EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kranidiotis, Yannis. 1999. “Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach.” Thesis 2(3): 43–50. Lass-Lennecke, Katja, and Annika Werner. 2009. “Policies, Institutions, and Time: How the European Commission Managed the Temporal Challenge of Eastern Enlargement.” Journal of European Public Policy 16(2): 270–85. Maresceau, Marc. 2003. “Pre-Accession.” Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, 9–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nugent, Neil. 2000. “EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus Problem.’” Journal of Common Market Studies 38(1): 131–50. Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Popper, Karl. 1972. “Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man.” Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. “President Johnson’s letter to Inonu.” 1964. Middle East Journal 20(3). Prodi, Romano. 2002. SPEECH/02/463, European Parliament, Brussels, 9 October. Protocol on Functional and Structural Cooperation with TRNC . 1998. 13 January. Perceptions 3(1). Resolution of Relations between the EC and Turkey . 1986. Official Journal, C317, Brussels. Resolution on the Escalation of Tension in Cyprus. 1986. Official Journal, C289, Brussels. Smith, Karen. 2003. “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality.” Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, 105–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Soysal, Mumtaz. 2002. “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy.” Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, 37–46. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stivachtis, Yannis. 2008. “Cyprus’ Entry into the European Union.” Andrea Riener and Yannis Stivachtis (eds.), Understanding EU’s Mediterranean Enlargement, 135–77. Brussels: Peter Lang. Stone-Sweet, Alec, Neil Fligstein, and Wayne Sandholtz. 2001. “The Institutionalization of European Space.” A. Stone-Sweet et al. (eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe, 1–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tocci, Nathalie. 2006. “EU Accession and Conflict Resolution in Theory and Practice.” John McGray and Michael Keating (eds.), European Integration and the Nationalities Question, 329–45. New York: Routledge. United Nations (UN). 1977. The Four Guidelines, S/12723. United Nations (UN). 1979. Ten-Point Agreement, S/13369. United Nations (UN). 1990. UN Resolution 649, 12 March. United Nations (UN). 1991. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/ 23300, 19 December. United Nations (UN). 1992. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/ 24472, 21 August. United Nations (UN). 1993. Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, S/26026, 1 July. United Nations (UN). 1999. Resolution 1250, 29 June. United Nations (UN). 2003. Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1 April, S/2003/398. Verheugen, Günter. 2002. SPEECH/02/462, European Parliament, Brussels, 9 October.

THIRTEEN Incomplete Peace Relations between Turkey and Greece Bahri Yılmaz 1

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The Turkish-Greek conflict has a special place in the foreign policies of both countries and remains an anything-but-settled issue in the international arena to this day. Neither Turkey nor Greece is ready to fully cooperate for the settlement of the conflict. The two countries represent different political approaches to the resolution of disagreements. Ankara is of the opinion that all disputed issues have to be discussed and negotiated as a “total package” (package approach). Athens, on the other hand, seems to feel that, as a first step, the dispute between the two neighbors over the continental shelf should be brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and that at a later point other disputes can be resolved (step-by-step approach) (Kramer 2000, 172). In July 1999, Athens started to change its attitude toward Turkey and introduced a conciliatory approach. The Turkish and Greek foreign ministers, İsmail Cem and Yorgo Papandreou, adopted a positive stance and initiated a new rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. The ministers decided to begin with noncontroversial issues, and a remarkable softening of attitudes could be observed in return. The recently reelected prime ministers of both countries, R. Tayyip Erdoğan and Kostas Karamanlis, have promoted the conciliatory approach and are organizing regular meetings. Presently, both sides are very careful to avoid making a false move that could disturb this peaceful atmosphere and neighborly political relations. 2

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At the same time, however, there is no sign of a breakthrough concerning the controversial issues. None of these meetings have been able to reach a significant compromise in resolving the main disputed issues. One of the main handicaps on both sides is the reaction of the opposition parties, the media, and the public. The Greek government, in particular, when intending to take a step toward rapprochement with their neighbors on the other side of the Aegean are usually accused of “national betrayal” and risk losing the next election. The main aim of this chapter is to examine past and present relations between Turkey and Greece. In the first part, a brief summary of the relations between the two sides of the Aegean during the time of the Ottoman Empire and after will be given. This will help us understand the background shaping the contested issues between the two neighbors. Then the most controversial issues will be discussed, but excluding the Cyprus conflict between Athens and Ankara. Obviously, the Cyprus issue needs a more detailed and separate analysis, which cannot be given in the scope of this chapter.

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AN AEGEAN TRADITION: NEIGHBORS BUT NOT FRIENDS

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The conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) by the Ottomans in 1453 and the following four hundred years of Ottoman rule left a lasting impression on the Greek people. Over generations, many Greeks maintained their hostility toward Turkey, even after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Prejudices as well as nationalist and populist speeches from both sides made the situation more complicated. It seems to be quite difficult for Turks to understand the feelings of Greeks—what it meant to live under occupation for centuries, even if the Ottoman rulers were largely tolerant with regard to religious practices, language, and cultural life. After establishing a nation state in 1830–1832, Greece followed an expansionist policy against the Ottoman Empire. Under the influence of the “Great Idea” (Megali Idea), Greece attempted to occupy the western part of Anatolia, including the city of Istanbul, create a Byzantine Empire under Greek sovereignty, and bring all Greeks into a great nation state. This dream was destroyed with the final defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor in 1922, which remains a bad memory with many Greeks until the present day. The defeat of the Greek army, on the other hand, gave Turks the chance to reassert their control over all of Anatolia and establish their own nation state in 1923. With the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the Friendship, Comparison, and Arbitration Treaty in 1930 under Atatürk and Venizélos, the countries entered a phase of temporary peace. Despite worsening relations between the two neighbors during the Second World War, Turkey and Greece were still able to avoid any seri-

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Incomplete Peace

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ous crisis. This changed radically when the Cyprus dispute broke out, first between Britain and Cyprus’s Greek population, then in 1955 between the Turkish and Greek communities. The outbreak of violence in both countries disrupted their relations, and the minorities in Greece and Turkey suffered massively due to the conflict over Cyprus. The most serious violence against the Greek community took place in Istanbul on 6–7 September 1955. State-organized mobs destroyed Greek shops and places of worship in Istanbul and Izmir, making the Greek minority destitute and compelling them to migrate to Greece. The Zurich Agreement signed by Ankara and Athens on 11 February 1959 and the London Agreement signed by Turkey, Greece, and Britain on 19 February 1959 aimed at establishing an independent Republic of Cyprus based on the two main ethnic communities. Britain, as the third signatory country, was to have observer status and be granted permanent military bases on the island. Violence between the two communities on the island resumed in the 1960s and constituted the main motivation for the intervention of the Turkish army in Cyprus in 1974. All these struggles and disputes between the two countries left behind the same bitter feeling in the minds of the Greek people and fundamentally determined their attitude toward Turkey, which of course influenced Athens’ policies. As former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt acknowledged in his memoirs, the animosity between the neighbors has a historical dimension that goes beyond the present Cyprus dispute (Schmidt 1990, 408). Apart from the Cyprus dispute, which extended through the 1960s and culminated in a military intervention of Turkey in August 1974, there are four other issues that determine the quality and extent of GreekTurkish relations. The first three, known as the “Aegean conflict,” are still on the agenda, and the fourth issue is closely connected to the presence of national minorities in both countries and the Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church located in Istanbul. • Delimitation of the exploitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea • Greece’s intention to extend its territorial waters beyond the present six nautical miles (nm) • Greece’s military buildup on the eastern Aegean Islands and the Dodecanese • Minority issues and the position of the Orthodox Patriarch (Fener Patrikhanesi) in Istanbul The main points of the dispute between the two countries will be briefly discussed below. 3

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The Dispute over the Continental Shelf

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The dispute started with the Convention on the Continental Shelf, ratified on 29 April 1958 and put into effect on 10 June 1964 (Platzöder and Graf Vitzthum 1984, 58–63). This convention, which was confirmed by the Third Maritime Law Conference in Jamaica in 1982, deals “with the exploration and economic exploitation of natural resources in the seabed and subsoil of submarine areas outside the area of territorial waters, to a depth of 200 meters or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas” (Article 1a). Article 1b adds “to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coast of islands” (Platzöder and Graf Vitzthum 1984, 58–63). Another important point that the convention makes is “If the coastal state does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal state” (Article 2.2). The demarcation of the continental shelf is regulated in Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Convention: “Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be determined by agreement between them” (Platzöder and Graf Vitzthum 1984, 58–63). It is interesting to note that Greece has signed both conventions and Turkey has not. This indicates that Athens, unlike Ankara, believes that its national interests are better protected as a signatory, and it has consequently based its far-reaching claims on the above-mentioned conventions. According to Athens’ interpretation, each island in the Aegean Sea has its own continental shelf. 4 Athens interprets Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Convention (which states that “the boundary line is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured”) as meaning that the boundary line should pass through the East Aegean islands and Turkish coasts. This way, the Aegean Sea would become, as far as the exploitation of seabed and sea soil is concerned, a “Greek sea” and no room remain for Turkey’s exploitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Ankara, for its part, bases its claims on the status of the Aegean Sea as a “special case” that can only be solved if the two countries reach a final agreement, which means that Ankara prefers a political solution to a judicial one. The Turkish government argues that Turkey’s continental shelf is a natural extension of the Anatolia mainland in the Aegean where it crosses the Greek continental shelf. As a result, Ankara claims that it is impossible to draw a median line between the Turkish coasts and the

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Greek Islands. It believes that the two countries can only come to an understanding on the sharing of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources on the basis of consent, fairness, and equity. Additionally, it argues that nobody can keep Turkey from exploring and exploiting the continental shelf on which sovereignty rights can be exercised. 5 The dispute about the continental shelf has been ongoing for a long time. 6 It began with the Greek government’s request for oil exploration in the Aegean Sea in 1962. Interestingly, until 1 November 1973, Ankara did not react in any way. It became a problem only when the Turkish government made concessions and issued a permit to the Turkish oil company Türk Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) for research activities in the oil fields, including twenty-seven areas in the Aegean. The Turkish government’s decision was an outcome of the first oil shock in October 1973, which manifested itself in a slowdown of production, higher inflation rates, and balance-of-payment difficulties. Athens reacted to Ankara’s decision very sharply with a note of protest on 7 February 1974, and announced that Turkey had violated Greece’s sovereignty rights in the Aegean. Turkey in turn sent the research ship Çandarlı, accompanied by several warships, to explore the Aegean Sea. All of a sudden, the situation became very serious, as the military government in Athens declared its intention to extend its territorial waters from 6 to 12 nm, which prompted the Turkish leadership to announce that any Greek initiative to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean beyond the 6 nm limit would be treated as a casus belli. Ever since, this part of the Aegean dispute has remained unresolved. After Turkey decided to send yet another research ship, the Sismik I I 7 to the disputed waters, the Greek government tried to place the bilateral dispute before an international jury and called for the UN Security Council with the aim of having Turkey condemned in an emergency meeting and any kind of Turkish research activities in the disputed waters prohibited. Meanwhile, Athens entreated the International Court of Justice in The Hague to pass a sentence on the definition of the continental shelf in the Aegean. In both cases, Athens was surprised by the decisions made by these international organizations. In its Resolution 395 adopted on 25 August 1976, the UN Security Council called upon the two neighbors to resume direct negotiations in order to solve the Aegean disputes about the continental shelf. Likewise, the International Court of Justice in its ruling on 11 September 1976 “determined the Aegean continental shelf beyond the territorial waters of the two littoral states as ‘areas in dispute’ with respect to which both Turkey and Greece claim rights of exploration and exploitation.” 8 On 19 December 1978 the International Court of Justice declared that it lacked jurisdiction to settle the matter. It seems that the only way to resolve this dispute between Greece and Turkey is through bilateral negotiations. To this day, the two countries

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have met several times but they have been unable to settle the dispute on the continental shelf and reach a consensus or an agreement, which would certainly create huge economic benefits for both countries. The Dispute about Territorial Waters

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The second dispute about the Aegean concerns the delimitation of the breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean. By referring to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1958 and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Athens attempted several times to extend its territorial waters to 12 nm from the mainland and the Greek Islands. 9 Although Athens has occasionally stressed that it does not intend to insist on its position, which is supposedly supported by international law, it does not want to give up the legal principle prescribed by the international conventions either. 10 Even so, the Greek government has not hesitated to threaten Turkey repeatedly. In the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the extension of territorial waters was set at 3 nm. During the golden age of TurkishGreek relations, Athens decided unexpectedly in 1936 to extend its territorial waters to 6 nm. Ankara’s reaction was to extend its territorial waters to 6 nm in 1964 in spite of the harsh reaction from Athens, which seems to have been related to the Cyprus issue at the time. A comparison of the “distribution” of the Aegean Sea according to the Greek proposal with the status quo is quite informative in order to understand the core of the dispute. If Greece’s territorial waters were extended from 6 to 12 nm, its share of territorial waters in the Aegean would increase from 43.7 percent to 71.58 percent, whereas Turkey’s share would increase only slightly from 7.47 percent to 8.76 percent. However, a more interesting change would take place in the share of the international waters: namely, the share of the international waters in the Aegean would decrease from 48.85 percent to 19 percent. This proposed extension of territorial waters to the 12 nm limit would have the following implications for Ankara:

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• It would greatly reduce the extent of international waters in the Aegean Sea. The international waters in which the Turkish navy and air force units can at present conduct military exercises freely under the provisions of the current law would be significantly reduced and consist of small isolated patches, given that military activities other than for transit purposes or in emergency situations are not allowed in foreign national waters. Likewise, the fact that submarines cannot pass submerged across a given country’s territorial waters and that military aircraft cannot fly over them constitutes another reason for rejecting the Greek proposal in this regard. • It would cut off Turkish ports in Western Anatolia from the high sea.

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• It would make the Mediterranean–Black Sea passage Greek. On this issue, Turkey counts on support from Russia and other states whose ships and vessels have to pass through the Aegean Sea. Ankara fears that, were Athens’ proposal to extend the territorial waters from 6 to 12 nm accepted, Turkey would find itself on the losing end. Therefore, Turkey opposes Greece’s attempts to create a fait accompli in the Aegean and has since 1976 treated any Greek initiative to extend the territorial waters in the Aegean beyond the 6 nm limit as a casus belli. 11

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The Demilitarized Status of the East Aegean Islands

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The third contentious issue between the two neighbor states is the demilitarization of the East Aegean islands. In order to understand the context of this issue, it is necessary to clarify the legal status of the Northeastern Aegean Islands and the islands further south. According to Articles 12 and 13 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) and Article 4 of its annexed Convention, the first group of islands (Limnos, Samothrace, Imroz, Bozcaada, and the Rabbit Islands) and the Straits of the Dardanelles should be completely demilitarized. The Convention of Montreux in 1936 only allowed for the militarization of the Dardanelles but not the islands. However, since the militarization of the other islands was not mentioned in the Convention, Athens drew the conclusion that the Lausanne Treaty was replaced by the new Convention and decided to militarize the abovementioned islands on the basis of the Montreux Convention. 12 The militarization of Limnos Island by Greece affected not only bilateral relations between the two countries but also relations with NATO. Since the end of 1950, Ankara has been resisting the inclusion of the island Limnos in NATO maneuvers in the Aegean Sea. In the 1980s the conflict over Limnos reached its peak, and NATO decided to exclude the Greek Island Limnos from its military maneuvers. Since then, Athens has been boycotting all NATO activities in this region. As far as the second group of islands is concerned, which includes the Aegean islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria, as well as those of the Dodecanese group, the Treaties of Lausanne, Article 4 of the Convention for the Straits (1923), and the Paris Peace Treaty, Article 14, Paragraph 2 (1947) forbid the militarization of these islands: “These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised.” 13 Nevertheless, Greece began to militarize the islands of Rhodes and Kos, arguing that Turkey would occupy one or more of the Aegean islands as soon as the Cyprus conflict flared up again. With the partial invasion of Northern Cyprus by the Turkish Army in 1974, the situation in the Aegean escalated. Athens argued that the Greek islands, which are very close to the western Turkish coast, were in danger of Turkish occupation. In turn, Turkey established an “Aegean Army,” which is charged

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with stopping any kind of attack from the Aegean Islands and does not fall under NATO command. 14 Turkey claimed that all measures taken by Athens were an expression of Greek expansionism or the Megali Idea (the ‘Great Idea’ of the unification of all Greeks), which it considered to be supported particularly by the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek army. Ankara demanded the demilitarization of the East Aegean Islands as decreed by the abovementioned international treaties. It does not hesitate to emphasize that in the event of Athens resorting to faits accomplis it will take any measure necessary to defend its given rights and interests in the Aegean. 15

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The Minorities Dispute

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Another source of conflict between the two neighbors is the “minority issue,” which has existed for longer than any other of the above-mentioned issues. The “minority issue” came to the forefront with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the final defeat of the Greek army in Western Anatolia in 1922. The Turkish national government wanted to establish a nation state with a homogenous Turkish population rather than continue a multiethnic state as the Ottoman Empire had been. Besides several other measures aimed at homogenizing and Turkifying the Anatolian population, a compulsory exchange of population with Greece took place in 1923 in the context of the Treaty of Lausanne. However, the two regions exempted were the Turkish minority of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul, as well as the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. It was agreed in the Lausanne Treaty (Articles 37–44) that all Greeks who had settled in Istanbul before October 1918, whose number was estimated at around 110,000, were to be exempted from the population exchange. Likewise, the Turkish community in Western Thrace, estimated at around 120,000, was to remain under Greek rule. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, whose name was not mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne (Işık 1988, 18), was permitted to continue its activity in Istanbul as the religious representative of the Greeks of Istanbul (Lausanne Treaty, Article 44), as long as it limited its activities to religious matters. This assurance was only verbally given by the chief Turkish delegate, İsmet İnönü. Interestingly, the Lausanne Treaty did not use the terms “Greek” and “Turkish” as reference to the ethnic communities. Instead, the terms “Moslem” and “non-Moslem” were preferred. The Turks of Western Thrace and Greeks of Istanbul could exercise their rights as citizens of the respective countries. In addition to civil rights, both communities were allowed considerable freedom to practice their religion and maintain their cultural identity. While the Turkish minority in Western Thrace had a relatively low educational level and was mainly employed in agriculture in one of the less developed areas of Greece, the Greeks of Turkey were mainly settled in the metropolis Istanbul, very active in the econom-

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ic life of the city, and of a higher social class than the majority of people in Turkey. Although the majorities in both countries questioned the loyalty of the remaining minorities, no open hostility toward minorities occurred between 1923 and the mid-1950s. After 1955, the Greek and Turkish minorities of both countries were negatively affected by the Cyprus issue— beginning with anti-Greek demonstrations and culminating in the riots of 6–7 September 1955 in Istanbul and Izmir, which besides the physical damage caused severe shock to the minorities in Turkey. 16 Subsequently, thousands of Greeks left Istanbul, the city in which their families had been living for centuries as an integral part of the multiethnic cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire, and migrated to Greece. 17 The second exodus took place in March 1964 as a result of the Convention of Establishment of 1930, 18 which permitted Ankara to expel Greek citizens living in Turkey on six months’ notice. It is estimated that around 9,000 Greek citizens left Turkey within a few months. 19 In republican times, the number of Greeks living in Istanbul decreased rapidly from 100,000 in 1923 to 5,000 in 1988. Currently, the Patriarchate gives spiritual support to around 3,000, most of whom are members of the centuries-old Greek Community of Istanbul, and it is expected (Oran 1995, 105) that in twenty to twenty-five years the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul will have to close because the remaining Greeks will have died of old age. Alexandris has noted that “the Patriarchate of Constantinople is slowly but steadily dying from inanition.” (Alexandris 1983, 319). On the other side, it is notable that the Greek Cypriots repeated the pattern of forced exodus and forced the Turkish Cypriots to leave Cyprus beginning in the 1960s. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 concerning minorities was based on the balance of interest of the Turkish and Greek communities in their respective countries. However, due to the large reduction in the number of Greeks living in Turkey, Athens no longer shows any great interest in the Greek minority or the Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul. The core of Turkish-Greek controversies over minorities therefore centers on the Turks of Western Thrace. At the time of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the population of Turks was estimated at 120,000 out of a total population in Western Thrace of about 190,000 (Bahçeli 1990, 177). This community consisted of about 50 percent Turks, 34 percent Pomaks (who speak a Bulgarian dialect and Turkish as a second language), and some 16 percent Gypsies (who speak Romany and Turkish). Although the population of Western Thrace has decreased over the years, the number of Turks remained almost unchanged and was estimated at around 120,000 in 1981. But pressure was exerted on the Turkish minority as Athens and Ankara became more hostile toward each other in the course of the Cyprus conflict in the 1960s, which was followed by an authoritarian and ultranationalist military junta period in Greece between 1967 and 1974, and the 1974 military intervention prompted by the junta’s clumsy involvement

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in a coup in Cyprus. One of the natural outcomes of harassment, discrimination against and administrative obstruction of the Turkish minority (de Jong 1980, 96) was the realignment of the landholding structure in Western Thrace. While Turks owned 84 percent of the land in Western Thrace at the time of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, they now hold only 20 percent of the land in the region, though they make up 34 percent of the population (Wilson 1980, 17). Greek authorities have used different methods to reduce landownership of the Turkish minority. First, the Greek authorities have periodically expropriated land in Western Thrace in the public interest—for the building of military bases, industrial sites, or universities (Oran 1995, 122). Second, the authorities expropriated small landowners and compensated them with equivalent land elsewhere, with the aim of creating larger units of land and thereby increasing economic efficiency. Finally, Turkish landownership was made extremely difficult by the Greek authorities (de Jong 1980, 96). The complaints of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace have mainly concentrated on the situation of schools, higher education opportunities for Turks, and election of the religious leaders (muftis). Until the reign of the military junta these were elected by the community and since 1974 have been appointed by Greece’s Minister of Religious Affairs. The appointments to the position of mufti by Athens without any approval of the Turkish community have increased tension within the Turkish community. 20 It is obvious that the pattern of confrontation between the two rivals in the form of discrimination and various types of pressure caused large-scale emigration of Turkish Greeks, of respective minorities, and kept the tensions high between the two countries. It would be better to say that in Greece, and even more in Turkey, the belief in ethnic homogeneity as a guarantor for state security needs to be further questioned; that in the long run the concept of “ethnic belonging” needs to be fully replaced by the concept of citizenship; and that it must be understood that minorities cannot be used as hostages, bargaining chips, or pressure instruments. Therefore, the security and well-being of minorities in the respective countries depends merely on détente, creation of trust, and improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey. The reopening of the Heybeliada seminary in Istanbul is another contentious issue. Most presidents and prime ministers visiting Turkey point out the significance of this particular matter. According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and the members of the Orthodox Church are citizens of Turkey. If the seminary is to be reopened, this can happen only with the permission of the Turkish Ministry of Education. The Turkish government is not against the reactivation of this religious school, but only as a department of Orthodox Theology under the roof of one of the state-owned universities in Istanbul. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, on the other hand, demands that it should be an independent

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international school. In other words, the Patriarch has given the impression that he wishes to establish an independent “Orthodox Vatican,” the next step of which would be official recognition from the international community as a separate and independent entity. [13.47]

CONCLUSION

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The following conclusions can be drawn from past and present experiences of Turkish-Greek relations:

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• Since 1923, several attempts have been made to reconcile the two neighbors. First, Turkish-Greek détente was realized by Venizélos and Atatürk in the 1930s. In January 1988, former Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his counterpart Turgut Özal initiated another phase of improved relations with their meeting in the Swiss spa of Davos. The next meeting took place between Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz in Paris in October 1991. In 1999, the foreign ministers of both countries, İsmail Cem and Yorgo Papandreou, made a fresh attempt, which was recently followed by the rapprochement between prime ministers Erdoğan and Karamanlis, whose chemistry was apparently right. This friendly relationship has been maintained since 2009 by Erdoğan and newly elected Prime Minister Yorgo Papandreou. • Greek-Turkish relations still suffer from memories of grief and distrust essentially stemming from the Ottoman era and post-Ottoman times. As Eliot A. Cohen quite rightly notes, “to be an empire . . . is to be envied, resented, suspected, mistrusted, and, often enough, hated” (Cohen 2004) by others, and therefore, the two neighbors inevitably have to live with this legacy. For Greece, even after more than 170 years since the establishment of the independent Greek state, there is a memory of Ottoman rule, and all Greek leaders try to keep Ottoman heritage alive and pass this on to the following generation. On the other hand, for Turks, the liberation of Western Anatolia in 1922 of Greek troops is perceived as a turning point for modern Turkey and the beginning of a new era, while their perception of Greeks as “former untrustworthy and recalcitrant subjects” still brings to bear upon their psychology. What is needed is the questioning of national myths and exposure of continued myth making in both countries. • The direct involvement of the great powers and international efforts did not bring significant success in the long term. For example, the arms embargo the United States imposed on Turkey in the 1970s after its intervention in Cyprus complicated matters rather than helping the two sides overcome their differences. In this re-

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spect, the benefit of U.S. involvement is limited unless the dispute begins to escalate. For example, in the case of the İkizce (KardakImia) rock dispute in January 1996, which concerned ownership of a certain geographical formation in the Aegean Sea whose legal status had not been determined by international treaties, a military confrontation could only be avoided thanks to American mediation as well as Turkish and Greek prudence. • The significant changes in Greek-Turkish relations in the 1990s and 2000s may be explained as follows: First, the Greek government headed by Andreas Papandreou (PASOK) in the late 1980s and the early 1990s declared its opposition toward Turkey’s full membership in the EU. Therefore, Turkey blamed Greece as an “insurmountable obstacle” to Turkey’s membership. However, Simitis/ Yorgo Papandreou realized that most EU member countries that were likewise opposed to Turkey’s full membership were hiding behind Greece in its fight against Turkey’s membership. Ever since, Greece has been in support of Turkey’s membership, perhaps not enthusiastically but at least paying lip service. • Second, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek part of Cyprus) is an EU member. Turkey’s full membership depends overwhelmingly on support by and the votes of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus in the final stages of the decision-making process. As long as Athens and Nicosia insist on keeping Turkey outside the EU for the next two decades, Ankara may be forced to continue making compromises on the Cyprus and Aegean issues while the Greek side need not pay any price. Moving from “fragile détente” over “constructive rapprochement” to “close partnership” will depend mainly on Greece’s goodwill, as well as favorable international conditions. As a matter of fact, as long as Turkey is not ready to accept a one-sided consensus concerning the Aegean and Cyprus issues, neither Athens nor Nicosia will be ready to support Turkey’s EU membership. It is a give-and-take process. As a telling example, Athens opposed Turkey’s intention to join the Customs Union in 1994 and the start of the negotiations process with the EU in 2005 until Ankara closed an eye to Cyprus’s EU membership. • Interestingly, in this context, Öniş and Yılmaz (2008) argue that Turkey would benefit from so-called proactive policies such as “partial withdrawal of troops from Northern Cyprus . . . the reopening of Greek Orthodox Halki (Heybeliada) . . . the removal of the ban on the public use of the ecclesiastical title of the Ecumenical Patriarch” (Öniş and Yılmaz 2008, 123–49). Here two basic questions arise: How far should the Turkish government go in its onesided consensus policy? And is this an effective way for Turkey to get Greek and Greek Cypriot support for its EU membership application? (Öniş and Yılmaz 2008, 146–47).

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• In this context it should also be mentioned that the Greek government is generally more successful at internationalizing these bilateral issues and getting sympathy for their situation. A close scrutiny of Turkish-Greek relations and the history of Turkish foreign policy shows that Ankara fails at presenting and defending its stance on the international stage. Likewise, it is interesting to note that in many disputes including the Cyprus issue Ankara was slow in advancing its arguments. One case in point is the dispute over the status of the Aegean, in which Ankara’s lethargy encouraged Athens to attempt to change the status quo as set down in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. • It is commonly accepted that the EU made a mistake in accepting the Republic of Cyprus as a full member in 2004 without solving the Cyprus issue along the lines of the UN Plan for Cyprus Settlement, also called the Annan Plan. 21 With its premature decision, Greece gained a much stronger position than Turkey to achieve its political goals and the EU became a prisoner of its own Cyprus policy. Understandably, none of the EU member countries would like to be involved in the Aegean and Cyprus issues. • Our experience with past Turko-Greek conflicts shows that the present issue cannot be solved by the use of military force. In general, it seems possible to solve contentious issues between the two countries through bilateral negotiations. The political leaders of both countries have to understand that they have no other choice but to live together and solve their disputes in a peaceful way through the gradual step approach and well-prepared bilateral negotiations that acknowledge both sides’ political interests. A long-standing and solid solution to the issues discussed above should start with the improvement of the economic relations between the two countries. In other words, mutual economic interests should have priority over differing political interests. Relations could be based on intensified economic cooperation, aiming at full economic integration of the two countries in the long term. • Within the framework of the Customs Union, the economic relations between the two countries have developed remarkably. 22 Turkey and Greece could cooperate closely in the tourism sector and trading of goods and services. Such cooperation would have significant economic benefits for both sides. At the current state of affairs, the total amount of trade volume between Turkey and Greece was around $3 billion for 2007, which is still very low in comparison to other EU member countries. 23 Foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two countries is improving significantly. 24 The tourism sector has made a remarkable improvement during the last few years due to no-visa regulation for Greek citizens who want to enter Turkey. 25 Another interesting field of cooperation could be

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the so-called Italian pipeline, which envisages the transportation of oil and natural gas from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran via Turkey and Greece to Brindisi in Italy. 26 • As a next step it could be possible to extend economic cooperation to FDI and joint ventures not only between countries but also in the Balkan, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean regions, which are already members of both the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and of the Barcelona Process. If Turkey joins the European Union in the foreseeable future, it will be easier to tackle these disputes between two member countries, because free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor will force the two countries to settle their longstanding problems. In other words, the borders between the two countries will disappear, and therefore, the disputes will lose their present political implications. • In order to achieve peaceful coexistence, Greece and Turkey have to initiate and intensify confidence-building measures. In other words, economic cooperation should be accompanied by other incentives such as exchange of students and tourism. Both parties must try to solve one problem at a time by concentrating for the start on noncontroversial topics, such as environmental issues, intensified exchange programs for young people and scholars, and sport activities. 27 For these purposes, it seems necessary to leave behind public prejudices and certain aspects of one’s historical heritage. The business societies of both countries have already made a first step and founded the Greek-Turkish Business Council, which meets regularly. 28 As a next step, Greek and Turkish history curricula should be examined to correct the negative images each nation has of the other. A well-known example of this is the improvement of the postwar French-German relationship. Exchange programs at all educational levels and Turkish and Greek language classes as an integral part of the educational systems of both countries would be constructive in establishing a stable and peaceful relationship between the two nations sharing common traditions and attitudes. Surely, all these measures can in the long run help bury the hatchet and contribute to a better mutual understanding. NOTES 1. Prof. Dr., Sbancı University, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Clogg 1983, 123–49; Öniş and Yılmaz 2008. 3. Various aspects of Greek-Turkish relations have been discussed, and there is a sizable literature of which the following titles are the most important: Bahçeli 1990; Axt and Kramer 1990; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 1996; Bölükbaşı 1992, 28–51; Tsakonas and Dakos 2004.

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4. For the Greek position, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece 1996, 1–3. 5. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 1996, 2. 6. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Axt and Kramer 1990, 18–23. 7. Its original name was Hora, and it had been deployed in two different, equally disputed, areas of the Aegean. Greece’s opposition leader Papandreou added fuel to the flames with his demand to “sink the Hora.” However, both sides kept cool and the Greek government contented itself with monitoring Sismik’s research activities. 8. Paper presented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 1996, 2. 9. Since then, Turkey and Greece have both extended their territorial waters to 12 nm in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic. 10. Paper presented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece 1996, 4. 11. Elekdağ, 1996, 41–42. The Turkish Grand National Assembly passed the following resolution unanimously in its 8 June 1995 session: “The Turkish Grand National Assembly hopes that the Greek government will not make the decision to extend her territorial waters in the Aegean beyond the six mile limit in a way that would disrupt the balance established by the Lausanne Treaty. However, it confers . . . all the necessary authority, including military measures, to the Government of the Republic of Turkey to protect and defend the vital interests of Turkey in such an eventuality.” 12. Greece argues that the right to install military forces has been recognized by Turkey, quoting the statement made by former Turkish Foreign Minister Rüştü Aras to the National Assembly on 31 July 1936. Letter by former Turkish Ambassador in Athens to the Greek government, dated 6 May 1936. See Wilson 1996, 105; Ludwig 1988, 71. 13. See Paris Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Italy, 10 February 1947, Article 14/2. 14. Greece claimed that Turkey was not a partner of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947. 15. According to the Greek daily newspaper To Vima, Turkey should have warned Athens through diplomatic communication more than ten times in the period 1974–1982. See. Axt and Kramer 1990, 30. The Turkish Daily News has already confirmed this news. See Turkish Daily News, 1984, 5. 16. The New York Times, 7 September 1955, reported that “more than 400 shops, mostly Greek-Armenian owned, were totally wrecked by the rioters. Seven hundred homes were damaged as were a dozen churches.” 17. Ioannis Kolettis describes Istanbul as “the dream and hope of all Greeks.” Mango 1985, 143. 18. See Observer News Service, 22 April 1964, and Times, 13 August 1964. 19. New York Times, 20 April 1965. 20. “The appointment of a Gipsy Muslim without any qualifications whatsoever as mufti of Didymotichon (Evros province) . . . is illustrative of Greek policy” (de Jong 1980, 97). 21. For the discussion of this issue and references, see Öniş and Yılmaz 2008, 138–39. 22. For economic cooperation, see Papadopoulos 2008. 23. See main indicators, SPO 2008. 24. For Turkish trade and economic relations, see Öniş and Yilmaz 2008, 131–34. “As of 2004, there were 76 Greek companies investing more than $60 million, mainly in the fields of information technology, agricultural, plastic, pharmaceutical, fishing and tourism. Whereas Turkish investors with only four companies investing total of $487.000, mainly in land transportation, information technology, and services sector. In 2006 46 percent of shares of Finansbank were bought by the National Bank of Greece and 70 percent of the shares of Tekfenbank were bought by EFG Eurobank of Greece. (The total capital inflow for these two deals was $2.8 billion and $182 million respectively).” 25. The number of Greeks who visited Turkey was 412,819 in 2007, while the number of Turkish citizens who had traveled from Turkey to Greece in the previous year was only 180,775. See The Statistical Year Book of Greece, 2008.

Bahri Yılmaz 26. “Russia Seeks Oil and Gas Pipeline Deals with Greece,” Financial Times, 4 September 2006. 27. Athens and Ankara signed several bilateral agreements in different fields. For more information, see Öniş and Yılmaz 2008, 130–36. 28. The Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed on 4 February 2000 with the aim of establishing the Turkish-Greek Joint Economic Council.

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REFERENCES

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Alexandris, Alexis. 1983. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations. Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies. Axt, Heinz Jürgen, and Heinz Kramer. 1990. Entspannung im Ägäiskonflikt? BadenBaden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft. Bahçeli, Tözün. 1990. Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955. London: Westview Press. Bölükbaşi, Süha. 1992. “Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies, and Prospects.” Clement H. Dood (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects. Cambridge, UK: Eothen Press. Clogg, Richard. 1983. “Troubled Alliance: Greece and Turkey.” Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Cohen, Eliot A. 2004. “History and the Hyperpower.” Foreign Affairs 83(4). de Jong, Fred. 1980. “The Muslim Minority in Western Thrace.” Georgina Ashworth (ed.), World Minorities, vol. 3. Sunbury, UK: Quartermaine House. Elekdağ, Şükrü. 1996. “2½ War Strategy.” Perceptions 1(1): 33–57. Işık, H. Esat. 1988. “Main Principles of the Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic,” paper presented at the 19. Eğitim Dönemi Konferansları, Ankara. Kramer, Heinz. 2000. A Changing Turkey: Challenges to Europe and the United States. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Mango, Andrew. 1985. “Remembering the Minorities.” Middle Eastern Studies 21(4). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 1996. “The Aegean Status Quo” and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, “Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean,” paper submitted by Carnegie Forum on the United States, Greece, and Turkey, Carnegie International Center, 30 September–1 October, Washington, DC. Öniş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. 2008. “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?” Political Science Quarterly 123(1): 123–49. Oran, Baskın. 1995. “Batı Trakya Sorunu” (“The Western Thrace Question”). Strateji 4: 105–22. Papadopoulos, Constantine A. 2008. “Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to Politics?” Occasional Paper 8.8, March, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford. Platzöder, Renate, and Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (eds.). 1984. Seerecht/Law of the Sea. Baden-Baden: Textausgabe. Schmidt, Helmut. 1990. Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn. Berlin: Siedler Verlag. Tsakonas, Panoyatis J., and Thanos Dakos. 2004. “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century.” Leonore Matin and Dimitris Clerides (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, 101–25. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wilson , Andrew. 1984. “The Aegean Dispute.” J. Alford (ed.), Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance , 90–130. Aldershot, UK: Gower.

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FOURTEEN The Future of the European Integration Process and Turkey Sevilay Kahraman 1

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Andrew Shonfield (1973) once called the European integration process “a journey to an unknown destination,” which suggests that there is no specific destination point for the European project. And in fact, the very purpose and character of the EU has always been an ambiguous and controversial topic. Alternative visions among European actors for the political future of Europe, which may simply be defined in terms of federalism versus intergovernmentalism, have also been causing a number of not wholly resolved tensions on the very nature of European integration—the tension between the need for common European policies and national separateness, the tension between uniform integration and differentiated integration, the tension between European integration and Atlantic solidarity, and the tension of Civilian Power Europe versus Military Power Europe—all of which can be reformulated under one general puzzle: deepening and/or widening of the EU. 2 What makes this systemwide debate so profound and controversial is its linkage with the EU’s motto “United in diversity.” It is basically through the successive enlargement rounds that the EU has been confronted with an ever-increasing challenge of managing diversity. The recent Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were no exceptions in this regard. Throughout this chapter, it is argued that the current debate on diversity is no longer a “conventional” one that is mainly related to the overall imperative of adjusting to a more heterogeneous Union by means of incremental reforms of the EU’s institutions, procedures, and key policies. The debate has ceased to be a solely structural adaptation process for

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the EU; instead it has become increasingly interwoven with Europe’s identity and its borders. It was the first time that the question concerning the identity of Europe clearly became an issue. It is often asserted that the last round of enlargement is fundamentally different from the previous ones in political and economic terms. Nonetheless, integration with the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) was strongly justified on the grounds of Western Europeans’ historical mission and responsibility toward them. Eastern countries’ demands for a “return to Europe” eventually paved the way for their eventual membership in the EU. 3 Enlargement, simply defined as a process of institutional expansion, has created new borders and neighbors for the Union toward the east and south. Assuming that only a few of those neighbors might be eligible for EU membership in the long run but all are in need of EU assistance and guidance to embark upon far-reaching reforms at the domestic level, the EU launched its new and comprehensive neighborhood policy in 2004. 4 With this initiative, the EU has aimed at stabilizing its new neighborhood so that the new soft security threats widespread in these regions would not threaten its own area of freedom, security, and justice. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is, however, characterized by a strong value dimension, since it “involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives.” ENP countries’ actual commitment to shared values will determine the degree and intensity of their Europeanness and their eligibility for access into the internal market and participation in EU programs. Thus, with its official discourse of “common values,” the EU has initiated a process of pan-European identity formation beyond its borders, parallel to pan-European regulatory convergence. 5 The external dimension of the EU as a union of values is beyond the scope of this chapter. The aim is rather to elaborate on the post-enlargement European order with a special emphasis placed on the politicalcultural diversity management of the Union. In so doing, this chapter establishes a linkage between the two central debates and practices of the EU: deepening and/or widening, and unification via diversification. By overviewing the debate on diversity on the European level, the chapter shows that the notion of diversity remains both a structural issue, often identified with the method of differentiated integration, and a cultural issue, simultaneously referring to the diversity of state identities and integration toward multiculturalism. Next, Eastern enlargement as a process of diversification is analyzed, which leads to the argument that the EU has prioritized cultural unity and a common European identity formation in an enlarged and diverse Union. Finally, alternative discourses and visions for the future of Europe are reviewed, with a special emphasis placed on the role and relevance of Turkey in the project of European political integration.

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The Future of the European Integration Process and Turkey

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS DIVERSITY

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As mentioned earlier, European enlargement is a process of reunification that abolishes the old East-West divide. Yet, enlargement can also be seen as a process of “unification via diversification” (Toggenburg 2004a). It entailed not only a widening but a diversification, simply defined as an increase in the diversity of (inner-EU) structures and the diversity of (national) identities and cultures. The fear is that, despite the intensive process of mutual adaptation, the hitherto post-Communist new members are not yet truly compatible with the Western European ones (Zielonka 2006, 66). They are much poorer than the existing member states. Their democracy is far from being fully consolidated. Their economic, legal, and administrative structures need further reform, which has been one of the reasons behind the issue of postaccession compliance in the new member states. Besides the continuing need for structural adaptation, the newcomers would need some time to internalize EU norms, rules, and procedures. New EU members also have their own distinct histories and culturally diverse, multiethnic societies, hence not so dissimilar from Turkey (Zielonka and Mair 2001). Thus, a major problematic of the post-enlargement Union is the question of political-cultural diversity, on the one hand, and the perceived necessity of a common European identity on the other (Blokker 2006, 5–6). When the welfare state is in a deep crisis, the emphasis on European integration by means of a consensus in political economic terms is substituted with an identity component of the European project, characterized by an attempt to provide social cohesion by cultural means. Indeed, this is the current situation in Europe. The coincidence of the identity/diversity debate in Europe—already sharpened with the current economic/financial crisis—with the accession process has influenced debates on Turkey: the country is increasingly perceived as a challenge not only for the “process” of integration as a whole but also for the “project” of an ever closer Union. Before discussing the diversity impact of enlargement for the EU, it will be useful to overview the debate on diversity on the European level. The notion of diversity remains vague, if not ambiguous (Toggenburg 2004a, 2). While diversity is often welcomed in democracy and economic studies, mainstream studies of European integration tend to view diversity as the antithesis of (social) cohesion. In the literature on European integration, the notion is usually identified with convergence and integration. From a legal (EU constitutional law) perspective, there seem to be three different forms of diversity: the diversity of (national) identities, the diversity of (European) cultures, and the diversity of (inner-EU) structures (Toggenburg 2004a, 2). The diversity of European structures corresponds to the differentiated European integration that has emerged as an alternative governance

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model to the original uniform model of European integration (Junge 2007, 391–403). Under this pragmatic method, not all member countries are required to participate in all policy making at the European level; instead, participation has become dependent on the willingness and/or ability of the member states. Until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), we could talk about a degree of de facto flexibility in European integration that mainly took the form of multispeed Europe (allowing member states to implement common policies at their own pace as an interim arrangement). The EMU opt-outs of Britain and Denmark marked the first examples of de jure flexibility (or two-tier Europe). Since then, there has been a growing acceptability of flexible modes of integration in various internal and external policy fields. Nevertheless, “it will thus most likely be the case that a more flexible Europe emerges out of informal practice rather than out of concerted attempts at constitutional design” (Miles 2002/2003, 3). Since the mid-1970s, differentiated integration has been utilized as a pragmatic strategy for reconciling pressures of enlargement with the momentum of integration (completion, consolidation, and deepening). The difficulty in achieving consensus and overcoming unanimity in an enlarged Union has turned differentiated integration into a supplement and/or alternative to the extended use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in Council decision making. Hence the simultaneity of deepening, enlargement, and differentiation (Kolliker 2005). Further differentiated integration remains as the most feasible way forward for those who are explicitly opposed to federalist ambitions of deeper European integration. For Zielonka (2006, 66), the EU will be a much more diversified entity following enlargement. A more diversified Union will look more like a neo-medieval empire than a neo-Westphalian state. The former is about soft borders, overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements, and multiple cultural identities (Zielonka 2006, 12). Similarly, De Neve has compared the EU to a multilayered “European onion,” segmented not only by policy areas and levels of government but also by subgroups of European states (De Neve 2007, 504). For him, the European Onion will have the added value of giving a sense of direction to those subgroups for shaping the European project. Moreover, promoting the EU inner layers might effectively allow multiple outer layers of the EU, as a result of the gradual adoption of the acquis communautaire by new and would-be members (De Neve 2007, 514). Accession negotiations may therefore be transformed into a step-by-step (graduated) integration process that differ from the current “to be, or not to be a member state” style of negotiations (De Neve 2007, 513). The potential risk of the subgroups of European states is that only some of them—which also overlap with more demanding policy areas— might be more attractive to outsiders. In such circumstances, it might not

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be easy to distinguish merit-based decisions from political ones. For example, Turkey, which has comparative advantage as a Customs Union partner of the EU, might be willing to join the internal market group/ zone, but would not be granted the free movement of persons for political and security reasons. So, choosing the “right” policies for inner and outer differentiation would become as important as promoting multiple layers inside and around the EU. Moreover, in some policy fields such as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the acquis might be more normative/political than regulatory in nature; this may, in turn, work against the participation of nonmembers. Diversity, secondly, refers to the variety of national identities (cultures and languages) existing within the EU. Article 6 (1) of the TEU obliges the Union to “respect the national identities of its member states.” This commitment to diversity has been confirmed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states in its Article 22 that “the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” Such an exclusive reading builds on a state-centered view and equates “diversity” with the possibility of the states to resist over-Brusselization (Toggenburg 2004b, 16). Hence, diversity here is understood as the defense and autonomy of national identities. Similar to the current situation in the Union, the extent to which the new members’ citizens identify as Europeans can be attributed (primarily) to instrumental (economic) benefits (Buonanno and Deakin 2004, 95). Labor mobility and Schengen may be seen as being essential for creating a sense of Europeanness. Derogations on labor mobility for the new member states have created a sense of unfairness among the CEE citizenry, reinforcing the notion of “otherness” (Buonanno and Deakin 2004, 97). So did Schengen, by creating new barriers at border crossings between the CEECs and neighboring countries (Buonanno and Deakin 2004, 99). It has been suggested that “European social democracy could well be the internal dynamic that links Western, Central and Eastern Europe into a transnational state and produces a European identity” (Buonanno and Deakin 2004, 102). Even greater differences characterize the CEECs, despite similarities in vision with regard to the EU as a free market and security zone. Security issues, however, were complicated by the Atlanticist preferences of the accession countries, which in the early years in particular made them see the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as in direct competition with NATO. Moreover, the fact that the newcomers have acquired full sovereignty more or less two decades ago may lead them to emphasize the common European objectives less than their national and sectoral interests, and to resist processes of Europeanization and Brusselization. Yet, sooner or later, they will be socialized within EU structures and learn to enjoy the new benefits of EU membership.

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In its third sense, diversity refers to promotion of multicultural diversity in the Union, alongside shared commitment to the notion of multinational diversity and polity. What is at stake here is not the diversity among member states, but intrastate diversity (in terms of various forms of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity within the single member states). This inclusive (or offensive) view of diversity goes beyond the identity-based perceptions of the member states and may commit the EU to norms for minority protection applicable across the Union (Toggenburg 2004b, 16). However, the EU’s involvement in the definition of minorities might give rise to one-size-fits-all solutions that work against the very diversity among the member states (Toggenburg 2004b, 16). Promotion of minority and cultural rights has appeared to be an important aspect of enlargement discourse and practices. In response to the perspective of membership and the EU’s conditionality leverage accompanying it, the candidate countries have adopted legislative changes. Even though minority rights do not fall under the competence of the EU, the spillover effect of enlargement has brought the topic to the EU’s internal domain. 6 The Constitutional Treaty establishes an overall and official motto of the Union, the notion of “United in diversity.” The Preamble contains the following paragraph:

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Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny, convinced that, thus “united in its diversity,” Europe offers them the best chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth, the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope.

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The EU’s motto combines unity with diversity and integration with autonomy. Every further step of integration has to take into account the caveat of not endangering diversity among the member states (Toggenburg 2004b, 17). The new motto seems, therefore, to foster the diversity of member states’ identities. Next we can analyze the enlargement politics of the EU in terms of its impact on the meaning of being “united in diversity.”

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EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AS A PROCESS OF DIVERSIFICATION

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Toggenburg (2004a, 4) has argued that the enlarged Union is not going to provide any harmonized model of multiculturalism, while it would add a further European dimension to the internal diversity of the member states. Similarly, Blokker (2006) has characterized the EU enlargement politics as an example of “diversion from difference” and the enlarge-

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ment process itself as one of “assimilation,” in which the prospective members need to shed their otherness in favor of common Europeanness. The enlargement strategy of the EU is a dualistic one, comprising elements of inclusion and unity on one hand and differentiation and diversity on the other. The logic of inclusion dictates that all candidates are assessed with regard to their fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. These criteria reflect a particular interpretation of the EU’s own constitutive values and amount to a more particularistic vision of Europe adjusted to the context of Eastern enlargement. The EU monitors progress in “sameness” through screening and regular reports. From another perspective, however, enlargement strategy has clearly led to divisions and also what Kuus (2004) has referred to as the “reinscription of otherness” between the candidates, by favoring Central European countries over Eastern European ones. This was justified by their historical belonging to European rules and traditions, despite the legacy of the Communist rule shared by all. Somehow contrary to the new motto, the accession process has been less characterized by diversity and more by unity (Blokker 2006, 13). This, in turn, has led to a particular mode of incorporation—namely, assimilation, which favors the promotion of a homogeneous set of common values rather than the recognition of diversity and intercultural understanding, or simply, multiculturalism in post-enlargement Europe (Blokker 2006, 15). Accordingly, the East European countries shed their Eastern identity in favor of a singular definition of Europe (Kuus 2004, 6). Such practices of assimilation do not contribute much to the formation of a transnational European political community, however. As distinct from its ultimate success as an exercise of top-down-policy Europeanization, accession has not led to comprehensive convergence of political cultures and collective identities among the countries of old and new Europe (Kuus 2004, 11). Further, the “identity Europeanization” process and the socialization of newcomers into the normative environment of the EU would continue after their accession, enabling them to be still perceived as the “internal Other” (Blokker 2006, 17). In the case of Turkey’s accession, the emphasis seems to be more on diversity than unity. The EU, so far, has not been particularly successful in the management of the diversity impact of the accession. Despite the persistent official acknowledgment of Turkey’s eligibility for membership in the Union, the opening of accession negotiations has triggered an intensified public debate on Turkey’s Europeanness, parallel to an elitelevel debate, without much input from EU institutions and actors. The motto “United in diversity” and the idea of forging a common destiny imply interaction and dialogue between diverse cultures (Blokker 2006, 17). Turkey remains a test case for a more inclusive EU model of multiculturalism, eventually transcending the self-perception of the member states’ identities. In this regard, Turkey constitutes a challenge

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both to internal and external components of European identity. The meeting of the European Ministers of Culture in Thessaloniki in May 2003 stated that “Europe as a continent of culture can neither accept the threat of cultural homogeneity, nor the threat of the clash of civilisations. The European answer to all this is to insist on safeguarding and promoting cultural diversity.” As far as Turkey is concerned, these two components of identity may not always find themselves in a positive sum relationship to one another. While the country is often perceived as a threat to internal cohesion and solidarity of the Union by those who subscribe to the notion of a politically deepening Europe, the advocates of the Union as an emerging strategic actor tend to view Turkey as an asset for such a global role. This brings us to ongoing debates among member states regarding the nature and purpose of the EU and the relevance and role of Turkey within competing visions of Europe.

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ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES AND VISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY

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The concomitance of the enlargement process with the constitutionalization process points to renewal of attempts to accelerate the political integration of Europe, also marked by a shift of focus away from the “process” of integration toward the European “project” itself. Furthermore, since the late 1990s, the European project has been in a qualitative change that might sustain different visions as well as the articulation of political and cultural diversity and difference in Europe (Blokker 2006, 19). Sjursen (2008) has divided the conceptions and discourses of the EU into three categories: the pragmatic discourse of the EU as problem-solving entity promoting free markets and regional security; the normative discourse of the EU as values-based community ensuring solidarity; and the principled discourse of the EU as rights-based postnational union promoting democratization. The discourse about the EU as problem-solving entity tends to be pragmatic, with membership seen as a question of efficiency and utility, and often linked to arguments about extending the free market or, more recently, to reinforcing security (Sjursen 2008, 4). The EU is viewed as a borderless entity opening itself to additional countries when and if they meet the criteria of membership. With regard to Turkey, however, the pragmatic argument has pros and cons. Turkey’s accession is supported because it enhances European security, but it is equally opposed due to the perceived risk of new and unstable borders with some Middle Eastern states. On economics, Turkey would become a market for other European countries and a source of dynamism, but it could also be a financial burden as a result of its economic backwardness (Schmidt 2009, 3).

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The normative discourse of a bordered, values-based community is connected to projects focused on making of the EU a “political union” as opposed to only a free trade area (Schmidt 2009, 5). Identifying borders with the norms and values of the Union, the supporters of this discourse tend to exclude those countries that would not fit their underlying conception of a values-based community. Wimmel (2006) has examined the impact of national borders and of European finality visions on public discourse, based on a case study of Turkey’s accession into the EU. He has found that whereas Turkish membership was predominantly rejected on the continent, this was not the case in Britain. Similarities and divergences regarding Turkey were first and foremost the result of, and linked with, competing visions of Europe’s finality, especially regarding various constitutional ideas and cultural principles. The two most important and contentious points shaping French, German, and British national public spheres intensely are first, the deepening/widening conflict specific to Turkey, and the questions of whether Turkey belongs historically and culturally to Europe; and second, whether cultural and religious differences in general should lead to exclusion of Turkey from Europe, or the culture and identity conflict. Against this background, the Turkey question was partly exploited as an instrument supporting or repressing different conceptions of the EU’s future. In the case of Turkey, deepening refers not only to reform and consolidation of the Union’s governance (political and economic), or simply furthering political integration by means of institutional and policy reform, but also to a collective identity-formation (social integration) based on contending understandings (cultural-religious identity fundamentals or normative values). Regarding the culture and identity argument, in both national public spheres a transnational cleavage between the respective newspapers was established. With cultural-religious reservations, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and Le Figaro journalists fought against Turkish EU membership by arguing that collective identity is an essential precondition for a politically integrated Europe, which could only develop and consolidate itself within the solid framework of Christian-Western value perceptions (Wimmel 2006, 18). For them, Turkey is synonymous with a Muslim country/population rather than a secular government and regime. In contrast, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Le Monde journalists tried to justify the opposite position, whereby common collective identity as an important basis for a politically integrated Europe must not necessarily be supported by a special cultural-religious vision. More decisive was the political compliance with, and the social acceptance of, universal freedom and human rights, which already were, or at least could be, practiced successfully in Muslim countries too (Wimmel 2006, 17–18). So, different from past and present candidate states, Turkey is required to

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achieve political compliance at the governmental level and internalization of European common values at the societal level (social acceptance). Thus, as far as the culture and identity conflict is concerned, opinions seem to be shaped by two alternative visions of Europe: a Christian Europe defined in cultural and religious terms and a values-based European community that is particularistic and exclusive. The second vision also entails a cosmopolitan (also democratic and secular) Europe, which is more universalist and inclusive. Concerning the widening and deepening conflict, in France and Germany a relatively broad consensus existed that accession of Turkey was highly problematic in the context of a deepening Europe, because this move would presumably reduce the EU’s capacity of problem-solving as well as the institutional ability to act, and would substantially complicate the rule of consensus finding, simply known as the absorption/integration capacity. This position was held more or less intensively in both countries by the conservative and/or economic-liberal, as well as by the rather progressive and/or social-liberal newspapers (Wimmel 2006, 18). In Britain, the journalists of two newspapers usually characterized as Eurosceptic (Financial Times London and The Guardian) intensively pushed forward Turkey’s perspectives on joining the EU. This public support, as well as fundamental differences of opinion and interpretation concerning Turkey between the German/French and the British quality press, can only be understood with reference to the dominant vision of Europe’s finality in each country. Indeed, the Turkey debate in Britain was torn between Euro-skepticism and a particular vision of Europe’s finality: as an association of sovereign nation-states basically in fields of economy and external security, or as an amalgamation of a broader free trade area and a more Atlanticist EU. Apparently, the British vision contrasted sharply with the continental vision of a European federal state, implying that there existed a state-dependent cleavage in Britain, in contrast to camp-dependent cleavages in France and Germany. In fact, the pan-European debate on Turkey’s application to join the EU was welcomed by British journalists as a means for downplaying the continental federal visions and demonstrating the feasibility of a multicultural Europe as a future model rather than a backward “Christian club.” The British journalists advocated a strategy to drive forward their own favored finality vision by promoting more cultural-religious diversity in Europe. They stated explicitly that the development of a transnational collective identity was not a necessary precondition for the effective functioning of an economic community (Wimmel 2006, 22). So, their vision of Europe’s finality was nonstatist and more diverse in character, and stood in marked contrast to the essentialist cultural reading of Europe. And it is mainly the former vision that tends to facilitate a likely membership of Turkey in the long run.

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Wimmel’s qualitative discourse analysis of the public discussions dealing with Turkey in three major EU countries confirms his thesis that the impact of national borders on public discourses about the Turkey debate depends on different and contested visions of Europe’s finality, which have dominated current national discourses about the EU until now. These visions can be analyzed along two dimensions: the widening and deepening debate, and the culture-identity conflict. Unlike other candidates, Turkey provokes a debate in both dimensions. In the case of the CEECs, the cultural identity dimension has been an enabling and a supporting factor, but in the case of Turkey it turned out to be a constraint or a divisive issue rather than a unifying one. Depending on their particular visions for Europe’s finality, but also on their own self-identification along a left-right dimension, leading journalists of Britain, France, and Germany have tended to view Turkey either as a facilitator, a contributor, or an obstacle to their preferred end result of European integration. A related research question could be whether this correlation between Turkish discourse and Europe’s finality is an indicator of the Europeanization of discussions on Turkey beyond national borders, albeit with some variation in national public spheres. With enlargement to the CEECs, and also during enlargement to Greece, the EU discourse focused on a rights-based postnational union, resting on adherence to democratic principles and human rights rather than feelings derived from culture or history (Sjursen 2008, 6). The emphasis on universal principles is also evident in the Turkish reform process from 1999 to 2004 (Avcı 2006). However, contrary to the case of Eastern enlargement, Sjursen has not found a reference to a common European heritage (and a certain sense of collective “us”) in the justification of enlargement to Turkey (Sjursen 2002). Turkey is described as an important security partner rather than as a “natural” part of the European family (Sjursen 2008, 10). Even though the opening of negotiations with Turkey reveals the EU’s commitment to universal rights, the exclusionary items of the Accession Negotiation Framework might be interpreted as the continuity of interest-based considerations instead of purely normative ones in the minds of European political leaders. Schmidt adds a fourth discourse to Sjursen’s threefold conceptualization of the EU as a polity, namely, the strategic discourse of the EU as global actor “doing international relations differently”—in particular by pursuing interest-based, values-based, and rights-based external policies simultaneously. In the context of enlargement, this vision of the EU may be about stabilizing the external environment than about transforming it into a normative one compatible with its norms of policy and law, and transforming it into a postnational, rights-based order. Unlike the British political elites who attach great value to Turkey in the context of the strategic discourse, Sarkozy suggested that the EU was to preserve its values-based and rights-supporting heritage involving

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centuries of civilization and of European humanism—and to have borders that stop before Turkey (Schmidt 2009, 11). Turkey would, therefore, simply be excluded from Europe as a “project of civilization.” The debates on the EU’s international identity have been revolving around two basic discourses that, despite some variations over time, have converged with one another and re-established themselves as the foundations of an overall official discourse. The first basic discourse emphasizes the unique history and development of Europe as the center of Western civilization. This shared civilization and heritage point to a distinctive role of the EU in world politics: first, by means of its stabilizing effect in contemporary world politics; and second, through its conduct of external relations inspired by an “ethics of responsibility” toward others. The latter role entails a civilizing impact in international politics, and guiding and leading others along the lines of European rules and standards or the European model of law and governance. Arguably, such identity construction is spatial (geographical) and exclusive for distant outsiders, but temporal and more inclusive for states and regions on the EU’s borders. The second basic discourse around which European identity has centered is the conception of Europe as a community of shared values. Externally speaking, it corresponds to Normative Power Europe. The widening of the EU as a normative entity depends upon the willingness and ability of outsiders to cooperate with the EU and adopt its norms and values. This, in turn, leads to a more open and inclusive Union having flexible borders, or the motto “Values as borders.” In other words, the spatial dimension of this identity formation is viewed less in geopolitical and more in normative terms. The successive EU enlargement rounds in general, and the recent widening to the east in particular, have provided the Union with a distinct opportunity for combining its historical civilian power (and civilizing impact) with normative (transformative) power toward the candidate countries. The evolving membership conditions (the original Copenhagen Criteria and beyond) and the (pre)accession conditionality subsequently attached to them, have enabled the Union to export not only its rules and standards (the acquis) but also its norms and values beyond its borders. The values and norms that form the basis of the European community and its policy of enlargement (liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights, including protection of minorities) do have a universal status. However, combined with specific European rules and standards, and implemented through various EU mechanisms of influence, those “universal” values and norms have acquired a particularistic (and distinctive) character—that is, a European character—throughout accession. This, in turn, has enabled analysts of enlargement to identify the process of candidates’ adaptation to basic EU norms in their domestic and foreign conduct as “Europeanization.” The latter comprises initial commitment and actual compliance and socialization of several domestic

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actors and structures at various levels. It is worth stressing that, in the case of certain new members states (Bulgaria and Romania, for example), compliance and socialization have had to continue during the postaccession period. Europeanization is not the only expected impact and outcome of the enlargement process. Similar transformation is expected to take place in the new eastern and old southern neighborhood of the EU. Indeed, a similar normative and transformative logic can be found in the neighborhood policy of the EU:

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Enhanced interdependence—both political and economic—can itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable development within and without the EU. . . . The EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and friendly neighbourhood—a “ring of friends”—with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations.” (European Commission 2003, 6)

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The EU’s responsibility in this process is one of a guiding and monitoring actor that encourages the neighboring countries to move forward in the path for liberalization, modernization, and democratization, thereby rendering them more European over time. Depending on the individual neighbors’ commitment to shared values and their actual compliance with key EU norms, these countries may be rewarded with access to the Union’s internal market and institutions in exchange for fulfilling conditions related to human rights, political institutions, and, especially economic governance (European Commission 2007, 2). ENP’s core feature, therefore, is open-endedness. Turning back to ongoing debates in Europe, in the post-Lisbon period, political elites have been trying collectively to define a new common vision for the EU. Given the existing differences in national identities and also member states’ divisions over the global role and responsibilities of the Union as well as over the appropriate governance arrangements in different policy fields, this is not something easy to attain. Nonetheless, Schmidt (2009, 12) offers a preliminary vision of the Union as a “regional state” that accommodates differing levels and degrees of membership. This requires the abandonment of conceiving of the future of Europe from within the state paradigm, instead framing it in terms of world politics and order beyond the state (as an empire or as a pluralistic civilization) (Henry 2010). Leaving an overview of “beyond the state” types of concepts in the search for the future of Europe for another study, it can be suggested that the member states must sooner or later agree on some drastic changes in EU policy making and implementation and in its policy of membership. They must give up on unanimity on EU decisions and uniformity in their application. Further, they must abandon the rigid division between who is “in” and who is “out” by introducing the concept of graduated membership (Schmidt 2009, 12).

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Schmidt (2009, 12) summarizes what kind of political entity the EU will turn out to be as follows:

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The result is differentiated membership in the EU regional state in which some countries would envision the EU as a borderless free market and security area while participating in the Single Market and ESDP; other countries might envision the EU as a values-based community while participating in most policy areas; and yet others would envision the EU as a political union by participating in all sectors in a more deeply integrated way using enhanced cooperation.

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CONCLUSION

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As the political and constitutional debates and the economic and financial crisis across Europe have demonstrated, European (political) integration defined in terms of process and project remains highly contested. It is not only at the elite level, however, that questions regarding the nature and purpose of the EU are voiced, but also at the level of European publics. Central to ongoing political debates and contestation is the coexistence of the alternative interpretations and practices of the EU’s new motto of “United in diversity.” Thus, a major problematic of the postenlargement Union is the question of political-cultural diversity, on the one hand, and the perceived necessity of a common European identity on the other. It can equally be observed that the identity-diversity debate in Europe has coincided with an intensified debate on the accession process of Turkey. It is further argued that the return of the cultural dimension of the European project and of enlargement in particular has brought about a new context to EU-Turkey relations, different from the previous and the current candidate states’ relations with the EU. The debate on Turkey is no longer framed as a normal (mainly technical and seemingly objective) exercise of accession but as an existential challenge to the very purpose and nature of the European polity. As a result, Turkey has often been associated with the competing visions of Europe and has been perceived as a challenge to the process of integration and to the European project simultaneously. Arguably, the debate about Turkey’s future membership in the EU is first and foremost centered on issues of identity, ideas, and values. Interests, power, and institutional setups are not unimportant, but they nevertheless play a secondary role. Seen from this perspective, it may be argued that Turkey’s accession as a process of identification has failed to transform Turkey into “temporary other” but has invoked the image of Turkey as “different other” (Diez 2004). Turkey’s accession not only constitutes a challenge but also divides the EU.

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Throughout this chapter, it is argued that the current debate on diversity is no longer a “conventional” one that is mainly related to the overall imperative of adjusting to a more heterogeneous Union by means of incremental reforms of the EU’s institutions and procedures and its key policies. The debate has ceased to be a solely structural adaptation process for the EU; instead, it has become increasingly interwoven with Europe’s identity and its borders. Similarly, the question of Turkey in national and European public discourses has been strongly related to two contentious issues of European integration: widening and deepening conflict, and culture and identity conflict, which together influence ideas and visions on the finality of Europe. For the continental Europeans who prioritize continued political deepening to an ever-expanding Union, Turkey underlines the danger of enlarging without deepening, and this inevitably leads to their opposition of Turkey’s accession on the grounds that the Union should deepen first on the road toward the consolidation of its political integration. Conversely, some of those who advocate Turkey’s membership (such as Britain) have long disfavored the idea of Europe as a political union and simply view Turkey as a positive obstacle on the road toward political union in line with their “widening first” strategy. Widening and deepening conflict are no longer separable from the cultural and identity conflict, especially in postenlargement Europe. As can be seen in the recent enlargement and constitutionalization processes, the EU has formally committed itself to promoting multicultural diversity alongside its adherence to the notion of the EU as a polity of multinational diversity. However, currently Turkey is increasingly perceived as a challenge by those who defend an essentialist reading of European identity and also by those who tend to support a more cosmopolitan Europe. Not only the EU official discourses but also national discourses of the member states have emphasized the element of diversity but not much unity with Turkey. What is perhaps needed on the part of Europe, in the long run, is a different framing and interpretation of Turkey that entails not only the recognition of its diversity from Europe but also its differences and singularities—an interpretation that might approach Turkey no longer as a promising model of moderate Islam but as a particular case of late modernity (Kaya 2004). Such a reading will be quite different from the European portrayal of diversity and difference in a singular and linear narrative of progress, which dominates classical modernization thinking (Blokker 2006, 17). Arguably, Europe should advance its own (post)modernity project so as to tolerate and eventually include Turkey. In the short term, however, the leading European and Turkish actors should accelerate their efforts—either acting together or alone—for cultivating a communicative and deliberative mode of understanding and dialogue across societies. On the part of Europe, such a strategy might eventually foster a sense of transnational solidarity among the peoples of

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Europe and could make a more effective contribution to the convergence of favorable views and opinions on Turkey than the already declared commitment of some European political leaders to hold an eventual referendum on the membership of Turkey. The question of Turkey in Europe is too significant not to be viewed as a structural challenge to the institutions and policies of the EU. NOTES 1. Assoc. Prof. Dr., Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations, e-mail: [email protected]. 2. These areas of tension can be subdivided into the tension between the classical Community method and the alternative policy modes, the tension between the EU’s external and international objectives and internal or interrelational ones, the tension between the EU official rhetoric and real achievements, and the division of the member states into small versus big states, old versus new member states. 3. Eastern enlargement has achieved the reunification of Europe, thereby bringing an end to the artificial Cold War divide of the continent. This divide reflected competing discourses on European values. From its very beginning, European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. While the common values of Europe were seen as characteristic of democratic Western Europe as opposed to the Eastern socialist bloc, the latter also claimed to be the “representative of the European idea, the bearer of its heritage and future” (Balibar 2004, 89). 4. Most of the EU neighbors are (pre)transition countries, which are undergoing the process of transformation from either colonial or Soviet-style traditions to Western standards of liberal democracy and market economy. 5. For a critical analysis of the value dimension of the ENP that argues that the abstraction of shared values within the ENP results in a policy that formally promotes such values but, in practice, amounts to the EU’s own reading of them, see Leino and Petrov 2009. 6. The EU’s insistence on minority protection as the criterion for membership that even current members are not expected to meet has led to criticisms of the EU as being inconsistent or even hypocritical. For a detailed analysis, see De Witte 2002.

REFERENCES Avcı, Gamze. 2006. “Turkey’s EU Politics: Consolidating Democracy through Enlargement?” Helen Sjursen (ed.), Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity, 62–77. London: Routledge. Balibar, Etienne. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Blokker, Paul. 2006. “The Post-Enlargement European Order: Europe ‘United in Diversity’?” European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (EDAP) 01: 1–32, http:// www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/activities/Bookseries/edap/Documents/ 2006_edap01.pdf (10.10.2010). Buonanno, Laurie, and Ann Deakin. 2004. “European Identity.” Neil Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement, 84–102. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel. 2007. “The European Onion? How Differentiated Integration Is Re-shaping the EU.” Journal of European Integration 29(4): 503–21.

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The Future of the European Integration Process and Turkey De Witte, Bruno. 2002. “Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Minorities.” Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, 131–58. New York: Routledge. Diez, Thomas. 2004. “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17(2): 319–35. European Commission. 2003. Communication from the European Commission. Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final. Brussels. European Commission. 2007. Communication from the European Commission. A Strong Neighbourhood Policy, COM (2007) 774 final. Brussels. Henry, Nicholas. 2010. “Politics beyond the State: Europe as Civilisation and as Empire.” Comparative European Politics 8(2): 262–80. Junge, Kerstin. 2007. “Differentiated European Integration.” Michelle Cini (ed.), European Union Politics, 391–403. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaya, İbrahim. 2004. Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Kolliker, Allkuin. 2005. Flexibility and European Unification: The Logic of Differentiated Integration. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kuus, Merje. 2004. “Europe’s Eastern Enlargement and the Re-Inscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe.” Progress in Human Geography 18(4): 1–18. Leino, Paivi, and Roman Petrov. 2009. “Between Common Values and Competing Universals: The Promotion of the EU’s Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy.” European Law Journal 15(5): 654–71. Miles, Lee. 2002/2003. “Editorial Review: Moving towards a Hub and Spokes Europe?” Lee Miles (ed.), Journal of Common Market Studies, Annual Review, 41: 1–12. Schmidt, Vivien. 2009. “European Elites on the European Union: What Vision for the Future?” Paper prepared for presentation for the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) biannual meetings, Los Angeles, 23–27 April 2009, 1–20, http:// www.euce.org/eusa2009/papers/schmidt_12A.pdf (02.10.2010). Shonfield, Andrew. 1973. Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination. London: Penguin. Sjursen, Helene. 2002. “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy.” Journal of Common Market Studies 40(3): 491–513. Sjursen, Helene. 2008. “Enlargement in Perspective: The European Union’s Quest for Identity.” ARENA Working Paper 05, 1–17. Toggenburg, Gabriel. 2004a. “United in Diversity: Some Thoughts on the New Motto of the Enlarged Union.” Paper prepared for presentation for II Mercator International Symposium: Europe 2004: A New Framework for All Languages? Catalunya, Tarragona, 27–28 February 2009, 1–6. http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/pdf/simptoggenburg.pdf (25.10.2010). Toggenburg, Gabriel. 2004b. “The Debate on European Values and the Case of Cultural Diversity.” European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (EDAP) 01, 1–24, http:// www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/activities/Bookseries/edap/Documents/ 2004_edap01.pdf (12.10.2010). Wimmel, Andreas. 2006. “Comparing German, French, and British Discourses on Turkey’s Application to Join the European Union.” Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) Working Paper 111, 1–40. Zielonka, Jan. 2006. Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zielonka, Jan, and Peter Mair. 2001. “Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged Union.” West European Politics 25(2): 1–18.


[J01.0]

Belgin Akçay is a professor in the Department of Economic Policy at Ankara University. In addition to her academic experience, she has worked in different positions in government. She holds the Jean Monnet Chair of EU Economic İntegration at Ankara University.

[J01.1]

M. Sait Akman is an assistant professor of European integration at Marmara University EU Institute. He has been a visiting fellow in the Economic Policy Research Institute of Turkey (TEPAV) and serves as academic consultant to the World Trade Organization’s Institute for Training and Technical Capacity and secretary general of Turkish Universities’ Association for European Studies (TUNAECS).

[J01.2]

Erman Aksüt is an international relations expert who graduated from the Middle East Technical University in 2012 with a major in international relations and a minor in economics.

[J01.3]

İdil Bilgiç Alpaslan is a PhD candidate in the Department of İnternational Economics and İnternational Business Development and also has been working as a researcher at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) at TOBB University of Economics and Technology (TOBB ETU).

[J01.4]

Aylin Ege has been affiliated with the Department of Economics of Middle East Technical University since 1993 and is an associate professor. She was head of the Economic Policies Group of the EU Affairs Department of the State Planning Organization (SPO) from 1988 to 1993, where she coordinated economic studies on Turkey’s adaptation to the EU.

[J01.5]

Gülcan Eraktan retired as the head of the Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Ankara University, in 2011. She undertook responsibilities at several levels in research projects financed by international organizations (FAO, the World Bank, Volkswagen Foundation, GTZ, DFG, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, DAAD).

[J01.6]

Atila Eralp is a professor in the Department of International Relations and a director in the Center for European Studies (CES) at Middle East Technical University (METU).


Defne Günay is a PhD candidate in politics at the University of Sheffield. Her research is in the areas of Europeanization, foreign policy analysis, philosophy of social science, EU-Turkey relations, and EU enlargement.

[J01.7]

Sevilay Kahraman is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University and a fellow at the European Studies Centre (METU).

[J01.8]

Ömer Kurtbağ is an assistant professor at Gaziosmanpaşa University. He graduated from the University of Uludağ, Department of International Relations in 1998.

[J01.9]

James Haley Mathis has been an instructer, academic coordinator, and managing editor in the Department of International Law at the University of Amsterdam since 1994. He was coordinator of the training program organized by the European Commission and the Government of Vietnam in 1999 and 2003.

[J01.10]

Beken Saatçioğlu is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at İstanbul Kemerburgaz University. She was a postdoctoral researcher at Institute for European Integration Research (EIF), Austrian Academy of Sciences, until the end of 2011.

[J01.11]

Zerrin Savaşan is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at Middle East Technical University. She was educated at Ankara University (BSc in law) and METU (MA in European studies).

[J01.12]

Zerrin Torun is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations and the Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

[J01.13]

Kıvanç Ulusoy is an associate professor of political science at Istanbul University. He was previously a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence.

[J01.14]

Ronald H. van Ooik is an associate professor in the Department of European Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam.

[J01.15]

Bahri Yılmaz is a professor at Sabancı University. He has worked in different positions at several academic institutions and in government. He holds the Jean Monnet Chair in the fields of the EU at Sabancı University.

[J01.16]