Post - communist parties in Poland after 1989

Post - communist parties in Poland after 1989 Piotr Sula

I.

Introduction

The following article is devoted to the scrutiny of the post - communist parties existing in the Polish political landscape after 1989. Within the Polish context, the category of post - communist parties turns to be highly capacious since simultaneously it refers to the party of the social democratic profile ( the Democratic Left Alliance, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD1), the pheasants’ party ( the Polish Peasant Party, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL ) and the group focusing on the organizational outlasting and maintaining the material status ( the Democratic Party, Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD ). Hitherto conducted research on post - communist parties in Poland was based on two divergent premises; one of them advocated labelling both the SdRP and the PSL the post - communist parties,2 whereas the other promoted focusing merely on the SdRP.3 Nevertheless, in my opinion, both of these parties should be considered as post - communist ones, or as successor parties as former communist parties are often called. The validation of such a classification lies in two arguments. Firstly, even though it can be agreed that the role of the PSL forerunner, the United Peasant Party ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, the ZSL ), was of marginal importance, it is not deniable that the ZSL supported the Polish United Workers’ Party ( Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR ), which justifies treating it as a branch of the ruling camp. Secondly, undoubtedly, in both the organizational as well as the personal aspect, the PSL represents the prolongation of the ZSL. Having taken all these into consideration, I intend to focus in this article on the subject matter of both the SdRP and the PSL. 1 2

3

Till 1999 functioning as the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, the SdRP ). Such an approach to the post - communist parties can be for instance found in : Millard, The Polish Parliamentary Election of September 1993. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 27 (1994) 3, p. 295; Mahr / Nagle, Resurrection of the Successor Parties. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 28 (1995) 4, p. 400; Jednaka, Partie polityczne wybranych państw Europy Środkowo – Wschdoniej. In : Antoszewski / Herbut, Demokracje Europy, p. 124. See for instance : Ishiyama, Sickles into Roses. In : Lewis ( Ed.), Party Development and Democratic Change; Grzymala - Busse, The programmatic turnaround. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 35 (2001) 1, pp. 51–66.

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As far as the semantic issue is concerned, I suppose there is no need to resign from exploiting the term post - communist parties which I am going to use in this article to identify the parties that are successors in the organizational sense, either of the ruling parties ( the SdRP as the successor of the PZPR ) or these accepting the government ( the PSL as the prolongation of the ZSL and the SD ).

II.

Parties and the party system in Poland before 1989

The party system in Poland from before 1989 is not rarely branded as the façade of a multi - party system.4 Such a structure entails the dominance of one of the parties whereas the performance of other groups, called satellite ones, is precisely licensed. Consequently, satellite parties constitute a screen behind which the hegemonic party can autonomously and unrestrictedly steer the decision making. Hence, the multi - party system of this type has nothing in common with the rivalry distinctive to democratic systems. The hegemonic position in the Polish party system was occupied by the PZPR; in turn, the United Peasant Party ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL ) and the Democratic Party ( Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD ) were plainly of a ‘decorative’ function. The SD was relatively the weakest component of this structure, which can be verified by the number of Parliament members after the contractual election of 4th June 1989, with the 27 deputies representing the SD among 460 members of the Sejm ( the lower house ), compared with 173 on behalf of the PZPR and 76 on behalf of the ZSL.5 The election of June opened a new phase in the existence of the satellite parties. As I have mentioned previously, their role before 1989 was confined to keeping up the appearances of democracy. Performing this function was accompanied by the total lack of any impact on the policy of the country. Yet, the situation altered along with the initiation of the democratic transformation process. It could even be argued that the former satellite parties underwent at that time the process of subjectivity, having become fully sovereign actors aspiring to take an active part on the political scene. Paradoxically as well, the structure from before 1989, which then was not comfortable for the ZSL and the SD, provided these parties with indispensable tools that let them fit in perfectly to the new reality. Among these, firstly, the fact of controlling quite a big number of the Parliaments’ seats should be enumerated, this fact, which some years before was of minor importance in the political dimension, suddenly became valuable and, correspondingly, the former satellite parties became an attractive political associate. However, not only the quantity factor ( the number of the Parliament members ), but also the quality features enhanced the potential of 4 5

Sartori, Teoria demokracji, p. 575, 576; Sartori, Parties and party systems, pp. 204–205. Lisicka ( Ed.), System Polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, p. 172.

Post-communist parties in Poland

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the SD and the ZSL, since the organizational autonomy from the PZPR was becoming a symbol highlighting the existence of these parties in the new democratic reality. Thus, it could be ranked as success for the satellite parties that the views indicating the need of settling the coalition between the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD manifested by some PZPR members in years 1982–1987, did not show any effect.6 The former PZPR allies took quite a diverse advantage of their prospective, which matter I will elaborate on further in the article. At this point it is worth noting that the former satellites were credited with trust among groups of anti - communist origin, whereas the PZPR and its successor could just dream of it. When assessing the condition of the PZRP before 1989, it is significant to emphasize its undoubted role in breaking the old regime, which process in Poland took, referring to Huntington’s typology, the form of displacement. This term implies the cooperation of governing and opposition parties in building the new democratic order.7 According to Huntington, the governing body could not implement reforms on their own, as the influence of conservatives on the one hand and those in favour of changes on the other was equivalent within the PZPR. Toppling the government by the opposition, in turn, was impossible since the status of the opposition, powerful as it appeared, was not sufficient for this cause. Therefore, the only solution in these circumstances was cooperation between the government and the opposition. Yet such an attitude within the PZPR prevailed only in the second half of the 1990s since, till the end of 1987, the authorities hoped to introduce political and economic reforms without the cooperation with the opposing parties.8 The above observations convince how huge the influence of the PZPR on the functioning of the political system was before 1989 – the transformations within the party itself induced the democratization process. However, even the reformatory wing of the party was not able to foresee that the system change would have such a radical facet. When reconstructing the reasoning pattern of PZPR politicians starting the round - table conference on 6th February 1989, it has to be mentioned that they were convinced about the possibility to incorporate the opposing parties into the mechanism of the communist country. This goal was to be achieved, in the opinion of PZPR activists, by talking the opposition into so called ‘non - confrontational’ parliamentary elections.9 According to the arrangements settled during the round - table conference, 60 % of parliamentary seats were guaranteed to be taken by the PZPR, the ZSL, and the SD, the next 5 % by parties closely cooperative with the PZPR, like the ‘PAX’ Society ( Stowarzyszenie “PAX”), the Christian - Social Union ( Unia Chrześcijańsko - Społeczna, UChS ) and the Polish 6 7 8 9

Antoszewski, Erozja systemu politycznego PRL, p. 163. Huntington, Trzecia fala demokratyzacji, pp. 156–158. Wiatr, Polska droga do demokracji. In : Kilias et al., Demokracja polska 1989–2003, pp. 42–43. Dudek, Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989–1995, p. 27–28.

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Catholic - Social Union ( Polski Związek Katolicko - Społeczn, PZKS ). It was also agreed that the remaining 35 % of seats in the lower house could be competed over by non - party candidates, meaning the opposition.10 However, in this case there were no guaranteed seats, representatives of the opponent parties were to compete for the seats in Parliament with the ruling camp candidates.

III.

The erosion of alliances and the decomposition of the ruling camp political consequences of the contract election

The Parliamentary election of 4th June 1989 had the nature of a plebiscite, or even more accurately, one of a protest, since for the society, voting on ‘Solidarity’ candidates corresponded with refusing the legitimacy to rule for PZPR members. In other words, very often the electoral decisions were determined by the bias against communists rather than the endorsement for ‘Solidarity’ candidates.11 The results of the election turned out to be surprisingly satisfactory for the opposition, although it has to be admitted that the scale of the success was related to imposing the majority electoral system both in case of the lower house ( the Sejm ) as well as the upper house election ( the Senate ).12 Formally, the pre - electoral unity in the governing camp was to weaken after the election since all the groups co - acting with the PZPR created their own parliamentary clubs or circles. Obviously, their sizes varied greatly. The ZSL and the SD formed clubs of 76 and 27 members, whereas the ‘PAX’ Society, the UChS and the PZKS – circles extending to 10, 8, and 5 members respectively. The largest club of 173 Sejm members was associated with the PZPR. Of a slightly lower number (161 deputies ) was the Civic Parliamentarian Caucus (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny ) uniting deputies originating from ‘Solidarity.’13 Yet, a fact worth underlining is that the above indicated data refers only to the beginning of the Sejm tenure, as the pattern of power in the Parliament underwent quite vital modifications within the next two years. Concluding, the suggestions of M. Laver and K. Benoit concerning the stipulation to analyse party systems also between elections get particular magnitude when scrutinizing the Polish Parliamentary arena after 1989.14 Among the changes on the political scene which took place before the Parliamentary elections of 1991, special attention should be devoted to the transformations both within the PZPR itself as well as within the whole camp it was in charge of until 1989. The very PZPR ceased to exist in January 1990, when, 10 Chmaj, Od stanu wojennego do okrągłego stołu. In : Wróbel ( Ed.), Polska w okresie przeobrażeń ustrojowych, p. 68. 11 Antoszewski / Herbut / Jednaka, Partie i system partyjny w Polsce, p. 46–47. 12 Migalski, Wpływ ordynacji wyborczych. In : Migalski / Wojtasik / Mazur, Polski system partyjny, pp. 58–60. 13 Lisicka ( Ed.), System Polityczny, pp. 173–164. 14 Laver / Benoit, The Evolution of Party Systems. In : American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003) 2, pp. 215–216.


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during the convention, its members took the concurrent decisions on dissolving the party on the one hand and establishing the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej – the SdRP ) on the other, with the party reformers as its leaders. The new party entered also those PZPR activists who were against introducing political reforms.15 Alternatively, those PZPR members who were in favour of breaking all the ties with the past ( among them was Tadeusz Fiszbach ) formed the Social Democratic Union ( Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, from April 1990 known as the Polish Social Democratic Union, Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, PUS ). This initiative attracted merely several dozens of those attending the convention. Undoubtedly bigger interest was induced among Parliament members of the former PZPR as 42 of them gathered in this newly formed Parliamentary club. Yet, the lack of wider support for the party actions leads to its dissolution in the middle of 1991; a great number of its members later joined the Labour Union ( Unia Pracy ).16 Even before the PZPR dissolution, the transformation process within the ZSL had been initiated. During the 11th special party conference in November 1989, the new name of the party was coined, the Polish Peasant Party ‘Rebirth’ (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ‘Odrodzenie’). In rural areas, this group had its opponent in two other parties under the common name PSL. In May 1990, PSL ‘Rebirth’ allied with the ‘Mikołajczykowski’s’ part of the PSL ( pointing to the reference to the group existing in the 1940s ). All these circumstances led to the creation of the Polish Peasant Party ( Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ). A totally different strategy than this of the PZPR and the ZSL was employed by the SD. Its activists decided to keep the name of the party as their history dated back to the pre - World War II - period. The biggest political success of the SD was achieved during the 1989–1991 tenure when its members supported both existing cabinet coalitions – one led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki ( SD representatives having three ministers’ portfolios ) as well as one Jan Krzysztaf Bielecki was in charge of from January on ( one department under control of a SD politician ).17 As I have mentioned, taking part in both coalitions should be translated as a prevalent success of the SD, since during the next years, within this party, there were some identity and organizational problems evident. Of 120 000 members, the party managed to keep not more than 10 %.18 In the organizational aspect, the party was also destabilised by the split of 1993 along with the lack of consistency as far as constructing the election mergers was concerned. In 1997, the SD allied with the Freedom Union ( Unia Wolności ) due to which it had one Parliament member and in 2001 with the Democratic Left Alliance ( Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD ).19 15 Antoszewski / Herbut / Sroka, System partyjny w Polsce. In : Antoszewski et al. ( Eds.), Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej, pp. 118–119. 16 Dudek, Pierwsze lata, p. 88. 17 Antoszewski / Herbut ( Eds.), Leksykon politologii, pp. 540–543. 18 Morawski, Partia w zaniku. In : Rzeczpospolita, 8th June 2002. 19 Olczyk, Miarka dla Sojuszu. In : Rzeczpospolita, 7th May 2001.

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The Democratic Party did not manage to function as skillfully as the PSL in the new political reality. Yet not worse than the latter party did they do in gathering funds for their performance, although in this context the term gather should no be used. The SD budget was almost entirely dependent on money from letting properties which the party had been given during communist times. Those buildings situated in the centres of the biggest cities allowed gaining high income incomparable with the needs of such a small party. The SD affiliates became property administrators rather than active politicians. Probably such a status would have been kept but for the amendment to the law on political parties introduced in 2002. It banned the parties to benefit from letting properties. For the SD, the only solution in such a situation was selling possessions. Upon deciding to do so, the SD established the foundation ‘Self - governing and Democracy’ ( Samorządność i Demokracja ), which was supposed to own the property and to get income from letting. A problem yet has arisen since buildings were not sold, instead, in this matter, only the preliminary contract was signed. Legal inaccuracies have not been clarified till today and it is still difficult to speak of any possibilities of applying any sanctions on the SD. Political parties can be declared illegal if they do not hold accounts for the electoral allocation, yet here the book - keeping of the SD is run faultlessly.20 Thus, the SD actions should be nowadays perceived rather as business not political ones. Nevertheless, I think that some space should be devoted to the reflection on this party, at least to show in how different way the resources inherited from the former system are being capitalised. Having observed the political performance of the SD and other groups on the Polish political scene we can draw a conclusion that we have to deal with a paradox here. Whereas the SD, having a high material status, reveals political passiveness, those groups which face insufficient financial background take an active part on all political arenas ( the electoral, parliamentary and cabinet one ). Perhaps, however, this paradox is only ostensible. Perhaps the SD politicians have come to the conclusion that their party does not need to be as venturesome as other formations since even without its presence on the political arena, the SD will still manage to outlive and consequently, those not in such a comfortable position have to prove ambitious. This would mean that political parties may function even with a legitimacy deficit but would not stand a budget deficit. In this article, I will above all handle the issue of parties which may not be so affluent as the SD but at the same time cannot complain about not having been supplied by the former system with any goods useful under the new conditions.

20 Stankiewicz / Stankiewicz, Partia do robienia pieniędzy. In : Rzeczpospolita, 31st March 2005.


IV.

7

Organizational and programmatic transformations within post - communist parties

The cessation of the communist epoch in Poland was equivalent to the end of the party system in which political parties did not have to ( or could not ) compete. The opening of the electoral market opened a totally new context for the post - communist parties. Yet it is worth noticing that getting prepared for functioning in the structure of open rivalry was much easier for the post - communist parties than for parties originating from the opposition towards the old regime because of the size of controlled material resources. I am mentioning only material ones since having an expanded party formation, considered to be one of the resources constituents, in this situation had a dysfunctional character. Taking no account of the possibility to mobilise territorial structures during electoral campaigns, which was not of no magnitude in the first election after 1989, the expanded party apparatus was filled with values that had nothing to do with democracy. So maybe paradoxically, the SdRP, which had an expanded structure, was in a much more difficult situation than parties of the Solidarity background which had to get organised but at the same time were endowed with such a deficient in the communist camp value, namely, the social legitimacy. Concluding, it is worth noticing that building a modern social democratic party was not an easy assignment in the SdRP position and those difficulties stemmed from the fact that within the party members were those for whom democratic principles were not the sole directive in their public performance. With regards to the above points it can be argued that the SdRP was much more institutionalised than groups emerging from Solidarity in the beginning of the 1990s.21 The suggestion concerning the level of institutionalisation is also applied to the PSL and the SD which simultaneously were not perceived as so responsible for the character of the regime before 1989 as the SdRP. Correspondingly, shaping the ‘democratic’ image could be relatively easier in case of the PSL and the SD. Yet, it is significant to remark that not only do the SdRP and the PSL diverge in terms of the role their predecessors played before 1989, but they also vary in the programmatic and organizational strategies they employed after 1989. From the beginning, the PSL decided to adapt the mass strategy in the context specified by Otto Kirchheimer.22 This term denotes that the PSL, being thus one of not many parties in East Central Europe which applied such an approach, was interested in the development of its members base.23 Its mass character can be 21 See also : Lewis, Political Parties in Post - communist Eastern Europe, pp. 120–121. 22 Kirchheimer, The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. In : LaPalombara / Weiner ( Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, pp. 182–184. 23 Generally in East Central Europe the low interest in taking the active part in the performance of political parties can be observed. This tendency is proven by the data concerning party membership collected between 1997–2000 in twenty European countries ( EU countries, the Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary ). The average result illustrating the percentage of party members in relation to the entire elec-

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also confirmed by the mere fact that the political appeal of the PSL was directed to the entire group ( inhabitants of rural areas ) not to individual voters. This group was loyal to the PSL, which is worth underlining since it was quite a peculiar phenomenon against the background of East Central Europe. This loyalty proved both the class and agrarian character of the former PZPR satellite.24 The mass character of the PSL, as I have noticed above, found its evidence also in the number of the party members. The following table illustrates the detailed statistics including the information on the SdRP members. The PSL, however, was forced to introduce some changes into their strategy. The high level of party membership was of course an effective tool in the electoral campaigns, but in 1995, before the presidential elections, the first paid commercials appeared, thus the strategy of the party had to be altered in a direction which would enable them to broaden the group of supporters without further expansion within the party members’ structure. Such logic resembles the process of transformation of the mass party model into the electoral one in West Europe in the middle of the 20th century.25 However, it does not imply directly that the PSL took the strategy characteristic to electoral parties. Having observed the performance of the PSL, its choice can be rather associated with the strategy of patronage quite often employed in new democracies. The effective functioning of this method is possible only when the party ( the patron ) influences decisions related to the distribution of material goods.26 These goods may take the form either of social privileges for particular groups or filling posts in the public administration. The PSL as the co - ruling party took care, for instance, of keeping the social insurance privileges for farmers; insurance premiums paid to the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego, KRUS ) are much lower than those of the rest of the society insured by the Social Insurance Institution ( Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS ).27 The PSL also took full advantage of the possibility to colonise the administrative structure,28 especially departments which dealt with the issue of the countryside and agriculture ( for example, the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture, Agencja Restrukturyzacji i Modernizacji Rolnictwa ).

24 25 26 27 28

torate reached in these twenty countries was 4.99 %, whereas in the countries of East Central Europe it was below this level ( the Czech Republic in 1999 – 3.94 %, Poland in 2000 – 1.15 %, Slovakia in 2000 – 4.11 %, Hungary in 1999 – 2.15 %). More on this matter : Mair / van Biezen, Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000. In: Party Politics, 7 (2001) 1, p. 9. Szczerbiak, Party Structure and Organizational Development. In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17 (2001) 2, pp. 94–130. On this issue, for instance : Koole, Cadre, catch - all or cartel ? In : Party Politics, 2 (1996) 4, p. 513; Kirchheimer, The Transformation, p. 184. Herbut, Partie polityczne i system partyjny. In : Antoszewski / Herbut ( Eds.), Polityka w Polsce, p. 123. Sula, Ewolucja wizerunku Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. In : Jeziński ( Ed.), Marketing polityczny, pp. 380–381. On the reasons for the birth of clientelism in Central Eastern Europe see : Kitschelt, Divergent Paths. In : Diamond / Gunther ( Eds.), Political Parties and Democracy, p. 316.

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Table 1 : Membership in Polish political parties, 1991–2005 Membership Party The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (since 1999 the Democratic Left Alliance)

1991

1992

1993

1995

1997

1998/ 1999

60,000

–

65,000

60,000

60,000

60,000 150,000

2002

2005

78,471

The Polish Peasant 180,000 200,000 200,000 190,000 200,000 120,000 140,000 140,000 Party Sources : Paul G. Lewis, Political Parties in Post - communist Eastern Europe, London 2000, p. 99; Eliza Olczyk, Sojusz bêdzie wyrzuca³ awanturników. Marek Dyduch, sekretarz generalny SLD, o konfliktach w partii. Rzeczpospolita, 23rd August 2002; www.sld.org.pl; www.psl.org.pl, and own calculation.

Referring to the PSL, it is worth highlighting that this party is deeply rooted in the local social as well as governing structures.29 Such an inclination was proved to some extent by the stable high level of the party membership and the successes achieved in local elections.30 When it comes to programmatic strategies, the PSL, from the very beginning of its performance, was in favour of the extended interventional mechanisms and in favour of the elements of protectionism, which were to secure the sphere of the Polish agriculture.31 Consequently, the PSL presence within the cabinet coalition, which occurred twice during more or less intensified endeavours to enter the European Union, did not disturb evoking Euro - sceptical ambiance.32 Nevertheless, it is worth coming back to the main successor of the communist camp. The scrutiny of the SdRP entails the implication that the effective performance of this party after 1989 was possible, provided that it would break with the communist symbolism. It was not so straightforward since the old regime marked its permanent stamp on each party element. Hence, the adapta29 Sula, Ewolucja wizerunku, p. 380. 30 On local goverments elections of 2006 see for instance : Śmiłowicz, Porażka Samoobrony, klęska LPR. In : Rzeczpospolita, 14th November 2006; Kula, Już wiadomo, kto będzie górą w samorządach. In : Rzeczpospolita, 28th November 2006. 31 Herbut, Partie polityczne, p. 128. 32 Sula, Euro - scepticism in the party system of Poland. In : Dunčak / Fiala / Hloušek ( Eds.), Evropeizace, p. 373.

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tion to new conditions meant the change of the holistic, programmatic, and organisational as well as personnel character.33 The transformation process was initialised, as I have mentioned, in 1990 with the creation of the SdRP with the younger generation at its steers and Aleksander Kwaśniewski as their leader. Yet, it does not mean that the representatives of the older generation were totally removed, leaving them ( with Leszek Miller among others ) guaranteed the approval of the party conservatives for the new strategy. Apart from people, the SdRP also inherited the possessions from its predecessor,34 which it did not want, in contrast to some members, to get rid of. Not a smaller challenge than personnel and organizational transformations was for the SdRP the programmatic reform, the effect of which was to build a new social democratic party. The declarations of the new party activists implied that this transformation occurred all at once. But it is virtually impossible to believe that the SdRP politicians having been socialised in the times of the communist regime suddenly underwent the internalisation of democratic values. The process of ‘timing’ the mechanisms of the democratic country along with the change in perceiving this political order as the non - alternative one by the post communist elites seemed to take longer than a few days of the congress on which the PZPR ceased to exist and the SdRP was brought into being. The necessity of introducing fast changes in the post - communist party was determined by the international objectives of the SdRP which came into view just right after the formation of this party.35 The status of a fully legitimate member of the Socialist International was gained by the post - communists and a few other parties representing East Central Europe in 1996.36 Initially, the SdRP advocated scepticism towards the institution of the free market as a mere point of their political programme.37 Yet, with time, such an approach got justified by the outcome triggered by the market reforms known as Balcerowicz’ plan. In the consequence of the economy reforms social problems appeared, among which the biggest ones were unemployment and pauperisation of large social groups.38 These circumstances became the ground for postcommunists to criticise any further moves of the next cabinets in charge of politicians originating from the former opposition. It is yet worth mentioning that the SdRP support for the extended interventionist mechanisms was gradually limit-

33 Antoszewski, Wzorce rywalizacji politycznej, p. 198. 34 Quite interesting was the very procedure of transfer. The SdRP was formed during the break in the congress of the PZPR, and the communist party returned to debates to among other things enable the transfer of the property to its successor. On this matter see : Dudek, Pierwsze lata, p. 88. 35 Paszkiewicz ( Ed.), Polskie partie polityczne, p. 215. 36 Kik, Miedzynarodówka Socjalistyczna. In : Zięba ( Ed.), Organizacje międzynarodowe partii politycznych, p. 65. 37 Grzymala - Busse, The programmatic turnaround, p. 60. 38 Raciborski, Wybory i Wyborcy. In : Kilias et al., Demokracja polska 1989–2003, p. 214.


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ed and the criticism of reforms was not equal to negating them but rather pointing to too high social expenditure. When it comes to the SdRP attitude to political issues and problems connected with the outlook on life, the fact of the unanimous rejections of such concepts as lustration and de - communisation is significant. The desired regime in Polish conditions is the parliamentary one, in which the president only plays the role of the arbiter. As regards the outlook on life, the SdRP had strictly laic character. It found its reverberation in the fact of criticising the ruling camp, originating from Solidarity, for the introduction of Religious Education to schools, religious symbols to civil institutions and signing up the concordat with the Holy See.39 Thus, the post - communists’ standpoint did not undergo any vital modifications after changing the party label in 1999. Nonetheless, this does not indicate the total lack of any rectification in their views. The introduced changes were the result of the necessity to get immediate support for particular political ventures. There could be mentioned as much as the SLD endeavours to get the support of the Catholic Church hierarchs for the integration process with the EU structures. Before the referendum of 2003, which was to decide about the Polish accession to the European Union, the SLD politicians avoided issues which could discourage Church representatives from verbally advocating the integration process.40 Such a strategy is best illustrated by the declaration made in December 2002 by the SLD general secretary, Marek Dyduch, in which he suggested dealing with the anti - abortion law just after the referendum.41 The Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, quickly pronounced his words infelicitous and declared that the government would not deal with amendments to the anti - abortion law. However, not all the government members identified themselves with such an approach to the matter of abortion.42 Soon it turned out that the secretary’s prognostication from December started to fulfil. The SLD initiated the works on the amendments to this bill in early autumn 2003, so namely not long after the union referendum.43 The above scrutiny leads to the conclusion that both post - communist parties adopted divergent programmatic and organisational strategies. However, this diversity, as it was to turn out, did not eliminate the cooperation on the parliamentary and cabinet arena. The genetic aspect, the common past appeared to play a superior role. Yet, before I will tackle the notion of the post - communists’ performance on the electoral, parliamentary and cabinet arenas, I would like to refer to the means of raising founds employed by the post - communist parties in Poland.

39 40 41 42

Ibid., p. 214. Walenciak, Takiego SLD już nie będzie. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 1st March 2004. Kolczak, Najpierw referendum. In : Rzeczpospolita, 19th December 2002. Czaczkowska / Gottesman, Deklaracja musi być. In : Rzeczpospolita, 24th December 2004. 43 Olczyk, Sojusz idzie na wojnę. In : Rzeczpospolita, 20th October 2003.

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V.

Financial resources of the post - communist parties in Poland

Considering the way of organising political parties and political strategies preferred by these parties inevitably directs our attention to the means of financing their performance. It turns out that a low level of party membership is correlated with a high share of public money in the budgets of the political parties.44 Correspondingly, if such a relation exists, the question arises whether in East Central Europe political parties either did not intend to expand their membership base since they knew they would get the access to the public funds anyway, or they were simply not able to include new members because of the social unwillingness to get involved into politics, which stance was inherited from the communist epoch, and which situation forced them, in turn, to find the country budget as the source of financing their activities.45 It is not my aim though to give the unanimous answer. Yet, I can undeniably assume that finding the instruments of financing their actions was in Poland, but also in other countries moving towards democracy, facilitated due to the role these parties played in the transformation phase, which was not only of ‘the passive receiver’ of reforms but above all of the demiurge of the majority of changes including those determining the legal premises of functioning and financing these parties. It is worth indicating that the issue of financing the political parties’ performance from the country budget was not included in the first act regulating the performance of political parties in Poland ( the act on political parties of 28 July 1990), although even before issuing the new law on political parties on June 27th, 1997, the finances of political parties were replenished by the state budget. Such a situation was feasible, as Parliament members who had their offices financed by the State, by the mere fact of the location of these offices in the party head offices meant at the same time financing the party itself.46 A great majority of parties’ income was acquired from public fundraising but largely also from donations made by private companies.47 Parties gained the possibility to finance their existence from the State budget in 1997 by a virtue of the act on political parties. It was issued during the SdRP and the PSL common rule. It may be worthwhile to remark that during works on the project of this law, the coalition was quite criticised for the proposal of a number of the party members required for the registration of the party. Primarily, it was assumed that so as to register a party it should assemble 10,000 members. Such regulation would denote the end for a great number of parties originating from the Solidarity camp.48 Therefore, this level was lowered in the very act to 1,000 members. 44 45 46 47 48

Lewis, Political Parties, p. 107–108. Sula, System partyjny Republiki Węgierskiej, pp. 24–25. Groblewski, Pieniądze przez biura do partii. In : Rzeczpospolita, 1st February 1995. Subotić, Informacje. In : Rzeczpospolita, 3rd September 1996. Domosławski / Nowakowska, Inne partie do podziemia ? In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 7th November 1994.

PSL

2004 PSL SLD SLD

2005 PSL

570

3,761

216,682 12,542 3,300

0 0 0

67,079 34,371 5,750

2,050

11,560

1,964

77,187

0 0

5,074

583,613 69,031 104,185

1,384,800

14,227

11,628 3,823

0

536,256

1,957

0 0

2,463

47,719

236,763 186,585

463,596 0

562

4,224,556 385,695 2,299,361 258,812 1,693,265 2,837,792 269, 951 1,713,698 184,706 1,157,009

1,224,418 118,316

0 0 0 22,548,359

0

59,862

222,000

642,109 0 318,422 19,297,605

894

937,136

2,595,284

10,528,051 11,222,165

514

31,853,091 7,879,680 26,832,286 728,617 28,416,976 29,948,599 7,311,817 513,996 5,963,637 550,440 4,430,978 645,503 342,956 494 192,960 3,694 496,742 46,395 3,100 59,367 0 28,732,680 2,300 6,178,564

33,583,813 8,043,375 28,136,453 869,113 29,188,556 30,125,499

2003

Sources : The announcement of the National Electoral Commission from 24th May 2004 r. on the reports on the funds resources of political parties in 2003 ( Monitor Polski 2004, No. 25, Pos. 430); The announcement of the National Electoral Commission from 23rd May 2005 on the reports on the funds resources of political parties in 2004 ( Monitor Polski 2005, No. 32, Pos. 456); The announcement of the National Electoral Commission from 5th June 2006 on the reports on the funds resources of political parties in 2005 ( Monitor Polski 2006, No. 41, Pos. 444).

The total income (the sum from points 1-5; with the exception of the electoral fund and point 1 g)). 1. Assets on bank accounts of the party a) the total of funds from physical persons b) the interests of funds in bank accounts and deposits c) derived from selling components of the fixed assets d) derived from practices described in the act of 27th June, article 27 (selling the party’s statute or programme) e) the amount of received allocations f) the amount of received subvention g) the financial means surplus evidenced in part 2 point a) and the funds evidenced in part 2, point b) and c), transferred into the party’s bank accounts 2. The financial means paid into the coffers of the party a) member fees, not exceeding in a year workers’ lowest month salary b) other payments, donations, not exceeding in a year workers’ lowest salary (the register- the first name and surname, address, allocation) c) derived from practices described in the act of 27th June on political parties (the totals not exceeding 10 PLN, derived from selling copies of the party’s programme, its statute or making copies) 3. Intangible assets 4. Other sources not specified in parts 1–3 5. Payments taken with the violation of the act of 27th June 1997 on political parties

SLD

Table 2: The income structure of the post-communist parties in Poland in 2003–2005 (with the exception of the electoral fund, in PLN )


13

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Piotr Sula

Although the SdRP and the PSL acted solidarily in many circumstances, it can be argued that both these interesting parties represent two entirely contradictory models. This opinion refers even to the number of party members which in case of the SdRP is, as it appears from the previously presented data, much lower as well as to the income structure of these parties. It is worth adding that the means of raising funds are not as dependent on the number of organisation members as on the number of resources it controls ( for the PSL, namely, real estates ). The data gathered by the National Electoral Commission ( Komisja Wyborcza, PKW ), the body responsible for the annual verification of financial reports of political parties, indicates that over 60 % of all the funds collected between 2003 and 2005 came from subsidies or budget subvention. This form of financing is guaranteed by the act of 27th June, 1997 on political parties and the act of 12th April, 2001 on the electoral law to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland. Much less of the SLD income came from donations from physical persons ( between 20 and 25 %). The PSL gets its main profits from totally different sources. This is mainly the income from selling properties constituting the party’s tangible assets. They inherited some part of properties from its predecessor ( the ZSL ) and purchased the rest after the electoral success of 1993. These buildings were situated in the central areas of big cities.49 From the information presented in the table it is seen that in the next years only in a lesser extent, if at all, the ZSL took advantage of budget subventions and grants which was the result of having their financial reports simply rejected by the PKW. The outlined differences between the SdRP and the PSL did not yet preclude their cooperation. Contrastingly, their common performance ( more or less effective ) has been staying at the same level since the beginning of the transformation. In the further part of my work I am going to investigate this matter in a broader sense.

VI.

The rivalry of the post - communist parties on the electoral, parliamentary - cabinet arena

The growing importance of the post - communist parties on both the electoral and the parliamentary cabinet scenes is one of the major features of the evolution of the party system in Poland as well as in other countries of East Central Europe. Special emphasis should be put on the fact that both these post - communist parties are the only ones existing on the parliamentary scene since 1989. Yet, it should also be remembered that the SLD till 1993 had the status of a party isolated on the parliamentary level.50 The PSL, in turn, was perceived by the 49 Naszkowska, W PSL dymi. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 11th September 2003. 50 Jednaka, Partie polityczne, p. 123.


15

rest of actors of the political stage as ‘the better part’ of the former ruling camp. Yet this party was working on its image by supporting Olszewski’s government in 1991. The best proof of accepting this party as an associate with full rights by the post - Solidarity circles was seen when President Wałęsa put the PSL politician, Waldemar Pawlak, in charge of the cabinet forming mission.51 Isolated as the SLD was on the parliamentary scene, it achieved a quite satisfactory electoral result in 1991 ( detailed information collected in table 3). It is worth paying attention to one vital fact connected with the participation of the SLD in the parliamentary elections. As I have previously mentioned, created in 1990, the SdRP changed its name into SLD in 1999. Till then the Democratic Left Alliance had been functioning; however, it had only been the political and electoral coalition formed in 1991. This alliance, apart from the SdRP having the crucial role, had comprised from a dozen or so to several dozens groups or organisations. Among these, worth mentioning is, for instance, the trade unions organization – the All Poland Alliance of Trade Unions ( Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ ), the Polish Socialist Party ( Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS ), or the Women’s Democratic Union ( Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet ).52 In the subsequent parliamentary elections, the support for the SLD was systematically increasing. This tendency was interrupted in 2005 when the SLD got the worst of results hitherto. This decrease in popularity of the SLD was associated with numerous accounts of SLD politicians breaking the law.53 The inefficiency in fighting pathologies within the party itself forced some of its members ( among others, Marek Borowski ) to resign from membership and to form the Social Democracy of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Polska, SdPl ).54 The weak result in the parliamentary election of 2005 became for the disintegrated Left the spur to create an alliance comprising the SLD, the SdPl, and the Labour Union, but as well the central Democratic Party, uniting mainly former members of the Freedom Union. This coalition took the name of he Left and the Democrats’ ( Lewica i Demokraci ).55 According to the initial declarations of the LiD members, this enterprise was meant to be of quite a wide timeline horizon. However, what draws attention is the fact that the four - party alliance was not able to settle the matter of leadership just from the start of their performance and in the ambitions pronounced by leaders of the particular parties was the potential source of instability of the central - left wing parties.56 The problem was not solved after the election of 2007, although in the background of the post electoral conflict, the SLD was triumphant. The leader of this party, Wojciech Olejniczak, was chosen the chairman of the LiD parliamentary club. Early in 51 52 53 54 55 56

Sula, Ewolucja wizerunku, p. 383. Antoszewski / Herbut / Sroka, System partyjny, p. 145. Załuska, Sojusz szybko zjeżdża. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 13th February 2004. Kalukin, Drużyna “borówek”. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 27th 28th March 2004. Szymczycha, Lewica w pułapce. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 23rd October 2006. Dębski, Opozycja wciąż niedająca nadziei. In : Rzeczpospolita, 24th January 2007.

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Piotr Sula

Table 3 : Support for the post - communist parties in Poland, 1991–2005 SdRP/SLD

PSL

Number of votes in %

Number of seats in Parliament (in brackets the percentage)

Number of votes in %

Number of seats in Parliament (in brackets the percentage)

1991

12.0

59 (12.8 %)

8.7

50 (10.8 %)

1993

20.4

171 (37.0 %)

15.4

132 (28.7 %)

1997

27.1

164 (35.6 %)

7.3

27 (5.8 %)

2001

41.0

216 (46.9 %)

9

42 (9.1 %)

2005

11.3

55 (11.9 %)

7

25 (5.4 %)

2007

13.1

53 (11.5 %)

8.91

31 (6.7 %)

Source : Data collected by the National Electoral Commission; Marek Migalski, Wpływ ordynacji, pp. 65–77; own calculation.

2008, the LiD politicians are still facing the necessity to answer the question of what the status of the structure is and what its function is, and above all, of how to define its political role for the future. Both the SLD and the PSL prove a high level of government relevance. Both parties twice after the parliamentary elections ( of 1993 and 2001) decided to enter the cabinet coalitions. In both cases, the initiative was on the SLD side. The PSL, consecutively, had the complementing function. Yet, in 1993, the PSL managed to put forward their chairman, Waldemar Pawlak, as candidate for the head of the cabinet. This fact should not be surprising if the political position of the president of that time, Lech Wałęsa, is taken into account. Being biased against candidates suggested by the social democrats, he hinted the possibility of granting support for Waldemar Pawlak as Prime Minister.57 And it was not the first time that Wałęsa confided in Pawlak, since just in 1992, Wałęsa had assigned Pawlak the task ( unsuccessful ) of forming the cabinet for the first time. The cooperation between the SLD and the PSL lasted the whole tenure, although Pawlak kept the position of Prime Minister only till 1995. As a result of the constructive vote of no confidence, the SLD politician Józef Oleksy took over this function. There seem to be two reasons for such a change. Firstly, within two years, when Pawlak was holding the function of the Prime Minister, his relationship with the President worsened. Secondly, whereas the level of tenseness in the very coalition was systematically growing, the SLD reacted to it in a much less compliant manner towards its partner than in the beginning of the tenure. The first months of the coalition, performance was characterised by the SLD acquiescence towards the PSL as the social democrats recognized the PSL 57 Dudek, Pierwsze lata, pp. 297–298.


17

as the only political party interested in a cooperation with the SLD. At the same time, the SLD politicians understood taking over the executive governing body as the chance of getting out of the political ghetto.58 The Prime Minister, Józef Oleksy, resigned from his post in January 1996 as a consequence of the political storm provoked by allegations of his cooperation with Russian secret services. His place in the coalition cabinet was taken by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz ( SLD ) who was performing his duties till the end of the tenure, so till autumn 1997. The next phase of coalition cooperation started for the SLD and the PSL after the election of 2000. The function of the Prime Minister was assigned to Leszek Miller. In government created at that time, its representatives also had the electoral partner of the SLD, the Labour Party ( the UP ). This coalition endured till March 2003, and although the direct incentives for the break - up could be seen in the divergent opinions concerning the issue of bio - fuels and additional fees for drivers including fees for using highways ( so called vignettes ), the animosity between the coalition partners was gradually escalating and such a break- up was only a matter of time.59 Miller’s government from March 2003 to May 2004 had the status of a minority cabinet. Its fall can be seen as the consequence of the scandals in which SLD politicians took part, the inner conflicts and misunderstandings between the Prime Minister and the President. In May 2004, Marek Belka was assigned the office of Prime Minister and he was in charge of the minority cabinet till the end of the tenure, which is till October 2005. The Polish Peasant Party noted its biggest success in the parliamentary election of 1993. Making no mention of the quantity features of the party relevance, it is worth noticing that the most essential achievement of the PSL is the fact of acquiring the position of the hinge party, which means that at present none of the contemporary parties rejects the possibility of cooperation with the PSL. After the election of 2007, the PSL and the Civic Platform entered the cabinet coalition ( such alliance was functioning much earlier at the level of particular provinces ). Hence, there could be the thesis ventured that the role of the PSL stems in a lesser extent from the electoral support but is much more determined by employed political strategies by the PSL.

VII. Conclusions The above enquiry indicates that the post - communist parties, despite the differentiated programmatic and organisational strategies they exercised, have become permanently inscribed into the political landscape of the III. Republic of Poland. Yet, within this context, the doubt appears of democratic credibility of 58 Jednaka, Gabinety koalicyjne w III RP. 59 Wojtasik, Gabinety koalicyjne w Polsce. In : Migalski / Wojtasik / Mazur, Polski system partyjny, p. 234.

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Piotr Sula

the new formations. Since a great majority of members of the post - communist parties acted in the PZPR and the ZSL, it is difficult to accept that the values that constituted the existence of these parties became swiftly extraneous for their members. The seal impressed in the mentality of the party activists after the communist period appears to be the most serious obstacle in acknowledging that the post - communist parties are formations for which democracy is the natural ground. Since 1989, the post - communist parties were attempting to shape their image of the groups fully accepting the democratic character of the inter - parties rivalry. The fact that this process was much more challenging for the Social Democrats also needs highlighting. It seems that accepting the idea of the European integration process and he European values’ at the same time can be interpreted as one of the factors indicating the attachment to democracy. If we agree on such a stance, then the social democrats have to be distinguished as pro - democratic party since they applied the European perspective quite fast. The SdRP found itself in a dubious situation, on the one hand, being inclined to subordinate Poland to the Soviet empire before 1989, on the other one, after 1989 pronouncing the readiness to introduce Poland into the frame of the supranational structures of West Europe.60 The post - communists’ attitudes underwent a deep alternation of which the radical character, let us suppose, was only a superficial change. Nevertheless, the SdRP, and then the SD, should be accounted as the prevalent advocates of the Polish incorporation into the European Union structures. The pro - European attitude of the social democrats gets a more distinctive appearance when compared with the scepticism so characteristic to the Polish Peasant Party as far as the integration with the European structures was concerned.61 Despite the initial doubts referring to the post - communists’ adaptation ( especially from the former PZPR ) to the democratic rules, both post - communist formations seem to be ‘civilised’. However, it does not imply that the SLD is perceived as the potential coalition partner by the other parties, yet it appears that so as to reach such a condition will take not as much time as in case of cutting off the mental umbilical cord joining the post - communists with the preceding system.

60 Migalski, Stosunek polskich. In : Migalski / Wojtasik / Mazur, Polski system partyjny, p. 104. 61 Ibid., p. 123.