acknowledge, admit, advise, agree to, apologize, etc. .... 'I am sorry' may not really be the same as ...... apologize when he wants her to repeat what she says.
Pragmatics In English Novels of the Nineteenth Century A Study in Speech Act Theory
Dr. Maysa'a Kadhim Jibreen
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To
1. My Father : Thank You ---- With My Apology
2.
My Teacher : Prof.Dr.Misbah M.Al-Sulaimaan Thank You ----- With My Gratitude
٢ Table of Contents
Title List of Abbreviations List of Tables List of Figures Chapter One: Introduction Chapter Two: Speech Act Theory Notes to Chapter Two Chapter Three: The Speech Act of Complaining Notes to Chapter Three Chapter Four: The Speech Act of Apologizing Notes to Chapter Four Chapter Five: The Speech Act of Thanking Notes to Chapter Five Chapter Six: Conclusions, Recommendations andSuggestions Bibliography Appendix I: The Speech Act of Complaining Appendix II: The Speech Act of Apologizing Appendix III: The Speech Act of Thanking
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٣ List of Abbreviations A CP FTA(s) H IA(s) IFID No. S SAT SRs
Action Cooperative Principle Face Threatening Act(s) Hearer Illocutionary Act(s) Illocutionary Force Indicating Device Number Speaker Speech Act Theory Semantic Rules
List of Tables No. Table (1): Table (2):
Subject Page Illocutionary, Perlocutionary Effect and Social Functions of Thanking The Speech Act of Thanking with Reference to its Semantic Properties
List of Figures No. Figure (1): Figure (2): Figure (3): Figure (4): Figure (5): Figure (6):
Subject The Communicative Act in Hard Times Our Modified Model of the Communicative Acts in Novels Responders to Thanks and Apologies A Revised Model Positive / Negative Face with Reference to Thanks Positive / Negative Face with Reference to Responders
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٤ Chapter One Introduction 1.1 The Problem: The study of expressive speech acts has received a great deal of attention by linguists and philosophers. However, to the best of our knowledge, no work concerning the study of expressive speech acts in English novels of the nineteenth century has previously appeared. This thesis is an attempt to fill that gap. The meaning of any text is best realized when linguistic competence and pragmatic theory of language are taken into consideration. Novels are best understood in terms of Speech Act Theory since they represent ‘a macro-text act’ (to use Hatim and Mason’s (1990) term) which are reflections of the real world with real speech. The real reader is part of the context, thus, part of the interpretation of the utterance. This is due to the fact that a real reader receives the intention of the real author who wants to achieve a certain perlocutionary effect on a certain sociocultural context. Consequently, tackling any literary text without pragmatic theory constitutes a real problem. As a result, the present study attempts to answer the following questions: 1Whether Speech Act Theory can be successfully applied to novels, and whether fictional and conversational speech acts can be analysed and established similarly. 2How to formulate Felicity Conditions for literary acts of complaining, apologizing and thanking. 3How to derive some Semantic Rules, from the Felicity Conditions set, for determining the Illocutionary Force Indicating Device for the speech acts under discussion. The present study attempts to answer such questions and suggests some remedies for solving them.
1.2 Aims of the Study: 1234567-
The study is an attempt to achieve the following aims: Studying three expressive speech acts, namely complaining, apologizing and thanking in four English novels of the nineteenth century. Setting some Felicity Conditions for establishing the status of the acts of complaining, apologizing and thanking. Deriving some Semantic Rules, from the Felicity Conditions set, for determining their Illocutionary Force Indicating Device. Showing the type of speech act (explicit / implicit or direct / indirect) used by the novelists of the nineteenth century. Showing the frequency of using these speech acts. Showing the similarities and differences between the grammatical structures of literary acts and natural conversational acts. Giving some recommendations for pedagogical implications and some suggestions for further studies.
٥ 1.3 Hypotheses: 1-
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The study hypothesizes that: Speech Act Theory can be applied to literary works in general and novels in particular since they are very rich in having most of conversational patterns in which different acts are used (expressives, directives, commissives, assertives, etc.) Being familiarized with the characteristics of the speech acts under discussion, one can set some Felicity Conditions for establishing their status. Having set some Felicity Conditions, one can derive some Semantic Rules for determining their Illocutionary Force Indicating Device. The language of the nineteenth century novelists is characterized by using explicit performatives (direct speech acts) rather than implicit performatives (indirect speech acts). The grammatical structures of literary speech acts run parallel with those of natural conversational acts. The speech act of complaining is used both explicitly and implicitly, whereas the speech acts of apologizing and thanking are used explicitly.
1.4 Procedure and Data Collection: 1-
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The procedure used in this study can be summarized as follows: Four English novels of the nineteenth century will be chosen in which three expressive speech acts (complaining, apologizing and thanking) are going to be specified. A theoretical background of Speech Act Theory and pragmatic theory of literature will be reviewed. A set of Felicity Conditions will be set for specifying the speech acts in question. Some Semantic Rules will be derived from the Felicity Conditions set for determining their Illocutionary Force Indicating Device. A thorough analysis will be given in terms of subject, agent, mood, voice, tense and type of speech act (explicit / implicit or direct / indirect).
1.5 Scope of the Study: Any study is by nature limited. This study is no exception in that it limits itself to the following: 1It is confined only to three expressive speech acts, namely complaining, apologizing and thanking because of time and place limits. 2English novels of the nineteenth century reflect clearly the uses of these speech acts because these novels reflect different classes of that age such as upper classes, middle classes and lower classes whereby one can find how these people interact and use their social manners rather than their usage of mentality or any other complex ideas as in the case of the twentieth century (the age of many conflicting and different movements and ideologies).
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The study is limited to Charles Dickens, Emily Brontë, Charlotte Brontë and William Thackery since they represent the whole century (they are considered by many literary critics as representation of their age because of their masterpieces).
1.6 Value of the Study: The present study , to the best of our knowledge, is the first attempt to study expressive speech acts in English novels of the nineteenth century. As a result, it is hoped that it will be of a great value to: 1Teachers of novels through explaining the different types of structures (grammatical, semantic, pragmatic and philosophical) and themes underlining the literary language of the English novels. 2Students of literature, linguists, writers and syllabus designers in order to help the Iraqi learners to overcome some of their problems in this pragmatic area in literary texts such as novels. 3Stylisticians, literary critics and / or anyone who is interested in literature, particularly novels from a linguistic point of view through the identification of the major pragmatic characteristics of the literary language.
1.7 Plan of the Study: The present study falls into six chapters. It also includes two lists of references, namely: (1) References and (2) Analysed Texts. In addition, it includes an abstract in Arabic. Chapter One, the introduction, specifies the nature of the problem, it also sets the aims of the study, hypotheses, scope of the study, procedure, value of the study and plan of the study. Chapter Two presents a review of some of the relevant studies that have been conducted by linguists and philosophers such as Speech Act Theory, Felicity Conditions, classification of the Speech Act Theory and the pragmatic theory of literature. Chapter Three involves the concept of the speech act of complaining, its structure, data analysis and it ends with the discussion of findings. Chapter Four begins with the concept of apologizing. It also includes its structure as well as a whole section for findings and discussion. Chapter Five presents the concept of thanking, its structure, data analysis and it ends with the discussion of findings. Chapter Six draws some conclusions, recommendations for pedagogical implications and some suggestions for further research.
٧ Chapter Two Speech Act Theory 2.1 A Diachronic Account of Speech Act Theory: Many years ago, Leech (1983:9) mentions that, the subject of pragmatics was rarely mentioned by linguists. In those years, pragmatics was treated as a ragbag into which recalcitrant data could be stuffed and where it could be equally forgotten. Today, the subject of pragmatics is very common in linguistics. Many people would argue that it is impossible to understand the nature of language itself unless one knows how language is used in communication, i.e., pragmatics. How has this change come about ? Leech (1983: 1-4) argues that the whole recent history of linguistics can be described in terms of successive discoveries. Post Bloomfieldian linguists identify linguistics as the science which means phonetics, phonemics, morphophonemics, syntax and semantics. However, it was considered so abstract in being beyond the horizon of discovery. After Chomsky, all this has been changed; he, in the late 1950s, discovers the centrality of syntax and has regarded meaning as too messy for serious contemplation, in this respect, he is similar to the structuralists. But, by accepting ambiguity and synonymy, Chomsky (1957) opens a door for semantics. Subsequently, Chomsky’s disaffected students of the generative semantic school, goes a stage further in considering semantics a base for linguistic theories. Once meaning has been admitted to a central place in language, it is difficult to exclude the way meaning varies from context to context. Hence, semantics spills over into pragmatics. The generative semanticists try to apply the paradigm of generative grammar to the treatment of presupposition and illocutionary force, i.e., pragmatics, but the attempt has been failed. As a result of the strict limitation of generative grammar, it has lost its position as the dominant paradigm of linguistics. Many linguists have found that their intellect and imagination are surrounded by other approaches than those allowed for generative grammar. These approaches have the effect of undermining the paradigm of Chomsky. They are sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, text linguistics, discourse analysis, conversational analysis and pragmatics. In the earlier 1960s, (Katz and Fodor (1963); Katz and Postal (1964); Katz (1964); began to find out how to incorporate meaning into a formal linguistic theory. Lakoff with others (1971) argue that syntax could not be separated from the study of language use. So pragmatics is hence on the linguistic map. Therefore, linguistics is moved from narrow discipline taking into consideration form, meaning and context, i.e., attention in pragmatics is given to meaning in use rather than meaning in abstract (cited in Leech, 1983: 2). The main problem that was raised in the pragmatic tradition as mentioned by Mey (1993: 109-110), was that of the limitations of semantics which was based on truth conditions(1). In other words, philosophers who were working in the truth functional tradition are most limited to one particular class of sentences, the so called declaratives.
٨ 1. It’s cold outside. (We can go outside if we wish to test the truth or falsity of the declaration). However, if the following example is uttered, 2. Happy birthday? one can talk about the truth of his feelings, or about the truth of the fact that one actually did pronounce those worlds, but not about the truth of the wish ‘happy birthday’, or any other wish (e.g. good luck, congratulations, well-done). This is due to the belief that words that do things in the world, are ‘speech acts’. Therefore, a theory of speech act has been proposed. Lyons (1977: 726) mentions that the origin of the term ‘speech act’ refers back to the translation of the German word ‘Sprachakt’ of Bűhler (1934) to have the meaning of ‘act of speech’, however, Austin and his followers do not use it in this sense, but in a rather abstract sense (see 2.1.1 , 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). According to the social interactionists’ view, language results in acts of speaking or writing when someone speaks, says or writes something to someone else (hearer) at a certain time in a certain place. The situation is often as part of a longer discourse or interchange. These acts of speaking and writing are ‘speech acts’. Thus, a speaker intends to communicate with a H. It is Grice (1957, 1971, 1975) who recognized that such an intention is reflexive. A theory of speech acts can be traced to the language philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of language as a social game. Levinson (1983:227) traces the history of the philosophical excess, namely “the doctrine of logical positivism which asserts that every sentence should be verified otherwise, it is meaningless”. It is this movement which Wittgenstein actively attacks in a philosophical investigation with the well-known slogan “meaning in use”. He (1953) insists that utterances are activities or language games in which they play a role. Despite the parallels between Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language usage and language game, Austin’s theory of (1962) is an autonomous theory. In the same period, Austin launched his theory in a series of (1955) lectures published posthumously as How To Do Things With Words. Wittgenstein’s dictum that “meaning in use undergoes Austin’s work; for Austin, the question is what does language do in the world?” and “how does it work?”. This theory was developed by the American philosopher Searle, who has been taught by Austin at Oxford in the fifties, and who became the main proponent and defender of the former’s ideas in the United States and subsequently worldwide. The concept of speech act is the first major category of pragmatic structures (or rules of use). It is also called ‘illocutionary force’. It describes “the speaker’s intention to issue a command, ask a question, make a promise, etc”. The speech act analysis is in part “a response to philosophers like Russell who claimed that all languages could be analyzed into atomic propositions with corresponding truth values”. Austin proposes that some utterances such as ‘I order you…, I christen you’… etc are events in themselves. (Bates, 1976: 13-14). Katz (1977: 22) mentions that for Austin, speech act is a theory of utterances that constitute acts of one kind or another”. Austin talks of “phonetic
٩ acts, phatic acts and rhetic acts” instead of talking about the phonetic, phonological, morphological, syntactic and semantic structures of the sentence. Searle’s (1969) speech acts are, in fact, Austin’s illocutionary acts in the sense that he assigns the term speech acts to “those acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with sets of constitutive rules”. In the field of language acquisition, Bates (1976) associates the term ‘speech act’ with the illocutionary force of an utterance while he denotes the status of that utterance such as promise, threat, request, etc. to the field of applied linguistics. James (1983) adopts a more general view of speech acts implying that “when we do things through language, we perform what Austin (1962) called speech acts” (Al-Hindawi, 1999: 3). van Oart (1997: 69) remarks that the great insight of speech act theory is to make language return to the collective scene of the human community. “It is only in context of such a collective scene that one can understand the radically communal origin of representation”. Many speech act interpreters have focused on this collective scene in order to undermine, the objectivist’s notion of truth value, on one hand, the “romantic myths or the autonomous self whose individual creativity is understood as independent of the communal context on the other”. Hence, Fish’s (1980: 197) interest, for instance, in SAT is reflected in his affection for the notion of ‘interpretive communities’. Simply, “the concentration on the study of speech acts is that all linguistic communications involve linguistic acts”. The unit of linguistic communication mentioned above, is not a word, symbol, or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act. The production of sentence tokens more precisely under certain conditions is a speech act and speech acts are “ the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication”. Therefore, a theory of language is part of the theory of action. This leads us to the conclusion that a pure study of the formal features of language without studying their role in speech would be incomplete as if baseball were studied only as a formal system or rules and not as a game (Searle, 1969: 16 – 17). Similarly, Al – Sulaimaan (1997: 1 –2) traces the important role speech acts play in language and communication by stating that “the eighteenth century grammarians believed that understanding language is a matter of understanding speech acts”. This theory ‘speech act’ is being described as an interdisciplinary one, this is because it has attracted the attention of modern and contemporary scholars from a variety of disciplines such as anthropologists, (e.g. Malinowski, 1922), linguists (e. g. de Saussure, 1916 and Firth, 1957), psychologists (e. g. Bühler, 1934, etc), sociologists (e. g. Mead, 1934; Garfinkel, 1967), sociolinguists (e. g. Hymes, 1971), literary critics (e. g. Scott, 1962), pragmaticits (e. g. Gazdar, 1979; Leech, 1983), Stylists (e. g. Spitzer, 1948 (cited in Trosborg, 1994), Leech, 1969), philosophers (e.g. Strawson, 1950; Grice, 1957; Austin, 1962) and generative transformationalists (e.g. Chomsky, 1957 and 1965). Therefore, SAT plays important roles in a number of fields. Katz (1977: XII) assures that interst in SAT within linguistics is confined mainly to linguists who are fond of describing the
١٠ conceptual factors that intense the use of sentences in speech at the expense of grammatical competence and formal methods. Other roles are in the field of linguistic anthropology and literature. As far as the latter is concerned, Pratt (1977) has argued that treating literature as a conventional form is subjected to rules for the performance of speech acts. This encourages a view of literary texts as rhetorical endues that shape and are shaped by social values and practices. The speech act theorists who work with a literary text are interested in its particular illocutionary and perlocutionary forces in a given community of readers. As far as the former is concerned, Hymes proposes that to understand how language works is to enact social realities taking into account the illocutionary and perlocutionary meaning of utterances from the member of the language community’s point of view. Therefore, the speech act is viewed as the essential component of more complex discursive activities, such as speech events , speech situations in which it participates (Hymes, 1971: 193). Many philosophers contribute in a way or another to the establishment of the SAT starting from Wittgenstein (1953), Grice (1957), Austin (1962) to Searle (1969). For Wittgenstein (1953), meaning is a matter of use and language is viewed as rule-governed uses, i.e., he gives more importance to the socio-cultural aspect of language (Al-Sulaimaan, 1997:2). Grice’s contribution to SAT is his concept of the S’s meaning. For Grice, S’s meaning (non-natural meaning which is equivalent to intention) is prior to sentence meaning (which equals to literal meaning). Grice suggests the notion of conversational implicatures used in SAT in order to explain how the H understands a speech act by inferences. Thus, he criticizes Wittgenstein’s view of meaning as use describing it as a source of confusion and suggests an alternative distinction in terms of ‘literal meaning’ and ‘implicated meaning’ (for similar view, see Davis, 1984: 486). Meaning for Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), has become a matter of illocutionary acts such as promises, threats, warnings, statements, apologies, complaints, thanks and declarations rather than mere isolated propositions or truth conditions (see 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).
2.1.1 Austin’s Account of Speech Act Theory and His Critics: The philosophical sources for the sort of analysis are the influential works of Austin and Searle. These works have produced an entire tradition in the philosophy of language, and called for SAT for meaning. The central strategy of this theory is to “see language as a tool for doing things and to explain what bits of language mean in terms of what they are used to do” (Martin, 1987: 83). The concentration of this section will be on the first philosopher Austin. Austin, an heir to Wittgenstein, stresses the connection between forms of social life and forms of meaning. His writings are that it is better for us to deal with language first as “an activity, conventionally defined and subject to norms operative in the various situations where we speak” (Rosaldo, 1982: 210).
١١ Austin’s SAT was launched at the time of rising the slogan ‘meaning in use’ by Wittgenstein (1953). Austin’s work is a reaction to some traditional and influential attitudes of language. These attitudes are: a. The basic sentence type in language is declarative (i.e. a statement or assertion). b. The meaning of utterances can be described in terms of their truth or falsity. c. The principal use of language is to describe states of affairs (by using statements). Some of these assumptions are associated with the philosophers known as logical positivists, a term originally applied to the mathematicians and philosophers of the Vienna Circle. The approaches of logical positivists concentrate on the fact that the meaning of a sentence is reducible to its verifiability, i.e., the extent to which and by which it can be shown to be true or false. Austin’s dissatisfaction with these views is exemplified in the question “what sort of act do we perform in uttering a sentence?” rather than with “what do sentences mean?” Such question is due to: First, language is used for more than making statements, i.e., it is used to express many other functions such as promises, requests, and suggestions. Second, utterances cannot be either true or false. Austin makes two important observations: The first is that not all sentences are statements and “much of conversation is made up of questions, exclamations, commands and expressions of wishes”, e.g.: 1. Excuse me! The second observation is that “even in sentences with the grammatical form of declarations, not all are used to make statements” (they are in themselves a kind of action), e.g.: 2. I promise to take a taxi home. This kind of utterance is called performative utterance (Saeed, 1997: 207). This, in brief, is the philosophical content in which Austin first puts forward his famous distinctions between constatives and performatives. Performative-constative is a straightforward translation of Austin’s paper ‘performatif-constatif’ which he wrote in French and presented at an Anglo-French conference held at Royaumont in March, (1958) (Warnock, 1973: 13). Allan (1998: 7) states that constatives have the property of being true or false. Their function as it is referred to by Lyons (1977: 726) is to describe some event, process or state-of-affairs. The performative utterances, by contrast, cannot be either: they have their own special function, they are used to perform an action. To issue such an utterance is to perform an action, which could hardly be performed in any other way with so much precision, e.g.: 3. I name this ship ‘liberti’. 4. I welcome you. 5. I advise you to buy this house. Austin’s point is that making such utterances (in addition to others) under the right conditions, speaker performs, respectively, an act of naming, welcoming, and advising. Today, it is used to speak of acts rather than actions. For Austin (1962: 15-18, 25, 39), being true or false is the question of constative. However, the interesting question for him is to ask about performatives
١٢ whether they are happy or not. Being happy or not means whether the act is felicitous (the act must be performed correctly, completely and sincerely in the appropriate context) or infelicitous (the act is insincerely performed). Roughly speaking, the distinction between constatives and performatives is based on the distinction between “saying something and doing something by means of language (where the expression ‘saying something’ means asserting that something is or is not so)”. This distinction between saying and doing is reflected in the title of Austin’s Oxford Lectures ‘Words and Deeds’ (Lyons, 1981: 174-75). However, in simple words, Austin (1962: 40-50, 55, 69, 143) argues that there is no theoretically sound way to distinguish between performatives and constatives. This is due to the fact that performatives (such as warnings) can be assessed as true or false, and constatives can be assessed in terms of felicitous/infelicitous distinction as well, e.g.: 6. Ahmed’s children are bald. This utterance is infelicitous if it is the case that ‘Ahmed’ has no children. Utterances of the form ‘I state that…’ are “usually characterized as constatives because they state something, but they are similar to performatives of the form ‘I promise that…’, ‘I know that…’, etc.”. As a result, one can say that (a) both can be true or false (b) both can be felicitous or infelicitous with regard to the conditions surrounding them and (c) both are realized by forms that can be re-written using the generalized performative formula ‘I hereby (verb) you that …’. Even the truth and falsity of statements is a matter of context. It is difficult to distinguish between performatives and constatives. Coming to view that all utterances are performatives, Austin abandons this distinction and opts for that between explicit and implicit performatives. Lyons (1981: 175) defines an explicit performative as “the one in which the utterance inscription contains an expression that makes it explicit, e.g.: 7. I promise to help you. Such a sentence contains a performative verb (e.g. promise) in addition to the fact that the sentence contains a first-person subject and is in the simple present indicative form. Allan (1998: 7-9) states that Austin refers to the fact that a S performs explicitly different acts such as naming, apologizing, etc. These acts are considered to be genuine when they meet certain conditions. These conditions are: Necessary condition 1: An explicit performative clause compiles with the normal grammatical rules of the language and contains a verb that names the illocutionary point of the utterance, e.g.: 8. I promise to call Ali tomorrow. The S, in this example, uses an explicit performative clause to make a promise. Allan then presents a short list of performative verbs such as accept, acknowledge, admit, advise, agree to, apologize, etc. Necessary Condition 2: The performative verb must be in the present (non past, non future, non perfect) tense because the IA is defined at the moment of utterance. Compare, e.g. 9. (a) I promise to take Mary to a movie tomorrow. (b) I promised to take Mary to a movie tomorrow.
١٣ ‘I promise’ in (9.b) reveals that ‘a promise was made’. Necessary Condition 3: A performative may occur in either the simple or progressive aspect. A performative verb normally occurs in a simple aspect, perhaps for the same reason the simple aspect normally occurs on the spot football matches, etc. However, there are occasions where a performative may occur in the progressive aspect, e.g.: 10. (a) I am requesting you to tell me your decision. (b) I request you to tell me your decision. The ground for claiming (10.a) to be a statement about a request are no stronger than the grounds for claming the same about (10.b). Necessary Condition 4: A performative clause must be declarative real, actual and factual, i.e. it denotes an actualization of the IA. An explicit performative clause cannot be interrogative, imperative , or subjunctive, e.g.: 11. Get out of here! This condition also places constraints on the modal auxiliaries that may occur in performative clauses and so there is a link with tense because past and present tenses are realized, they locate things that are happening or have happened. However, the future is irrealis “unactualized, nonfactual, unreal and this links the future with subjunctive mood and modality”, e.g.: 12. I will hereby promise to visit you next time. I am in town. In this sentence, the modal ‘will’ is used in its root meaning one’s will, desire, want, hence insist is on carrying out the IA named in the performative verb ‘promise’. This sentence refers to an ongoing act that can be glossed ‘I will with these words make the promise to visit you next time’. Thus, if Ali utters this sentence to his friend, but then does not visit him next time he is in town, his friend can chide him with breaking his promise: ‘But you promised to visit!’. Compare the performative of (12) with the predicted promise in (13): 13. Tomorrow when I see her, I will promise to visit next time. I’m in town. The adverb ‘hereby’ which is called ‘the legalistic-sounding adverb’, inserted into a performative clause, “will mark the verb as performative provided that hereby is used with the meaning “in uttering this performative” (see Austin, 1962). This adverb cannot legitimately be inserted between ‘will’ and ‘promise’ in (13) since promise is not a performative verb. If the modal ‘will’ denotes an actualized event, namely the future act of promising (to take place tomorrow), it is used in its epistemic predict and is irrealis. The pattern established by ‘will’ is generally holding for modal auxiliaries with performative verbs which actualize the IA such as might, can, must, etc. Necessary Condition 5: The subject of the performative clause is conducted by “the fact that the speaker is an agent either himself or herself or another person or institution, whichever takes responsibility for enforcing the illocution described by the performative verb”. This influences the form of the subject noun phrase. In most of the examples so far, the subject is ‘I’. However, others such as (14) and (15) have ‘we’; (16) and (17) are passive voice, and “the authorization is made either on speaker’s behalf or behalf of someone else”; in (18) there is a third person subject where “an authorized agent utters the performative on behalf of the court”, e.g.:
١٤ 14. We, the undersigned, promise to pay the balance of the amount within ten days. 15. We hereby authorize you to pay on your behalf a sum not exceeding $500. 16. You are hereby authorized to pay … 17. Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted. 18 The court permits you to stand down. (The verb ‘permits’ is performative since it is the issuing of this utterance which actually grants the permission). Explicit performatives can be negative. The illocutionary force of a refusal, for instance, can be borne by either ‘I refuse your request’ or by the negative performative in (19), where ‘I don’t grant’ is uttered at a relatively higher pitch than ‘your request’, e.g.: 19. I don’t grant your request. Contrast this with the same sequence of words uttered with a disjuncture after ‘don’t’, and a lower pitch level for ‘grant your request’ in (20) which is a paraphrase of (21). (20) and (21) are not refusals, but statements about a refusal: 20. I don’t grant your request. 21. I don’t [as you claim] grant your request. Now, the question that forces itself is what is implicit or primary performative? Lyons (1981: 175) explains implicit or primary (non-explicit, constative) performative as “there is no expression in the utterance – inscription itself” which makes explicit the fact that: 22. I’ll pay you $5, is to be taken as promise rather than a prediction or a statement. The nature of the act in implicit performative becomes general and is indicated by factors such as grammatical mood and modal verbs, intonation, tone of voice, adverbs, connectives, as well as extra-linguistic gestures or features accompanying the utterance (see Al-Sulaimaan, 1997: 10), e.g.: 23. ‘Shut it’, do resemble ‘I order you to shut it’. It is an implicit order by using a common device of the imperative mood. Sometimes, one can qualify the force of ‘I shall’ by adding the adverb ‘probably’ or in an appropriate sense by adding ‘without’ or at a more sophisticated level, comes the use of the special verbal device of the connecting particle; therefore, one may use the particle ‘still’ with the force of ‘I insist that’, etc. (for additional information on features of implicit performatives, see Austin, 1962: 7377). Austin (1971: 16) states that there are two norms in which the performative expression can be: explicit and implicit performatives. Implicit performative formula “will be more primitive and less precise, or one might almost say more vague”, e.g.: 24. I shall be there. There will be no telling just considering the words, whether ‘I am declaring an intention, making perhaps a fatalistic prediction or making commitment’. Explicit performative formula, however, is less primitive and more precise since it is a relatively recent phenomenon in the evolution of language and consequently going together with the evolution of more complex forms of society and science (see also Austin, 1962: 71-73).
١٥ Lyons (1977: 728-29) mentions that there are two points that should be emphasized in connection with the distinction between primary and explicit performatives: First, the fact that “a primary and an explicit performative may perform the same speech act does not imply that the sentences in question have the same meaning”. Typically, an explicit performative is more specific in meaning than a primary performative. In the appropriate circumstances, if I say 25. I promise to be there at two o’clock, I can hardly deny that a promise is made, but in saying 26. I shall be there at two o’clock, unless the context is used to exclude the possibility of any other interpretation, I may claim that ‘I’m predicting’ rather than ‘promising’ that ‘I shall be there at two o’clock’, and the fulfilment of my prediction is conditioned upon factors over which I have no control. Second, it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of being explicit that “it has the form of declarative sentence with a first person subject and that the performative verb is in the simple present tense”. This is due to the fact that one can find performatives with the performative verb in the passive as in (16) and (17) above and, on the other hand, one can find performative verbs, like ‘promise’ being used in the simple present tense with a first person subject in constatives. In certain circumstances ‘I promise to be there’ is interpreted as a statement. One can usually, however, as Austin (1962) points out, settle the question, in particular instances, by “asking ourselves whether it would be possible to insert the word ‘hereby’”. This is due to the fact that the adverb ‘hereby’ is indubitably an explicitly performative utterance. Generally speaking, however, “in default of ‘hereby’ or something equivalent to it in the utterance or in the context in which the utterance is produced, explicit performatives do not carry any definitive indication”, at least in their verbal component, of their status. Concerning the grammatical structure of explicit performatives, they have the form of declarative sentences; this gives them, as Austin says “a thoroughly constative look”. Because of the problems mentioned above such as concerning the use of passive, not necessarily first person singular and constative form of explicit performatives, Austin (1962: 5, 57, 64, 66) was unable to “find a convincing grammatical or lexicographical criterion that would cover all performatives to the exclusion of constatives”. Moreover, the availability of a performative formula does not solve all the problems of finding grammatical criteria for performatives since the criteria are sometimes in themselves are problematic, e.g., the use of the present tense “need not always convey an action concurrent with the time of speaking”. Nor can one be sure of the equivalence of implicit and explicit performatives, e.g.: 27. ‘I am sorry’ may not really be the same as 28. I apologize. One is able sometimes to do something through speech (e.g. insult) without a performative (as it is mentioned above). Consequently, the distinction between constatives (saying something) and performatives (doing something) has been abandoned and replaced by the distinction between explicit and implicit performatives. The latter distinction, in return, leads to the third distinction that is ‘to say something is to do something’.
١٦ Austin (1962: 94) asserts that in the full normal sense, to say something means to do something which includes “the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain meaning” (with its sense and reference). These three components correspond to phonetic act, phatic act and rhetic act respectively. These acts constitute what Austin calls, i.e., locutionary act. Locutionary act is one of the components or facets of speech acts; others are IAs and perlocutionary acts. Sadock (1974: 8) states that Austin recognizes and describes a fundamental trichotomy among the things one does when uses language. According to Austin, linguistic acts fall into three categories which he calls locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Locutionary acts are those that are performed in order to communicate. Their locutionary act is “the domain of fields, such as phonetics, phonology, syntax and semantics”. Allan (1998: 5) says that in performing a locutionary act, a speaker uses an identifiable expression ‘e’ (which consists of a sentence or sentence fragment from language L) spoken with identifiable prosody ‘p’. Locutionary acts, therefore, are symbolized by the form and it has the sense or the intention ‘M’. By prosody, it is meant “patterns of pause, pitch level, stress, tone of voice, and the like; its counterpart in the written medium is punctuation and typography’. Normally, a locution demands that S and H have knowledge of the grammar, lexicon, semantics, and phonology of language. Austin (1962: 109) includes “the act of referring as part of the locutionary act”. Locutionary act, in conclusion, is the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference. Locutionary acts are the domain of phonology, syntax and semantics (as stated above). This fact is proved by Austin (1962: 95-96) when he divides locutionary acts into three components: phonetic act, phatic act and rhetic act. The phonetic act is “merely the act of uttering certain noises”. The phatic act is “the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e., noises of certain vocabulary, confirming to and as conferring to a certain grammar”. The rhetic act is “the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference”, e.g. 29. ‘He said that the cat was on the mat’. It reports a rhetic act. One of the general points that Austin tackles in discussing these three components is that to perform a phatic act, you must perform a phonetic act in performing one, I am performing the other; but the converse is not true, for if “a monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from go, it is still not a phatic act”. (For a detailed discussion concerning phonetic act, phatic act and rhetic act, see Austin, 1962: 95-98). In general, to perform a locutionary act, one may perform an IA at the same time as Austin (1962: 98) claims. Although Austin has originally specified these three acts (locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts) as speech acts, the term ‘speech act’ has generally been reserved for the illocutionary force of an utterance (Bates, 1976: 15). The reason behind this is that “using language involves more than simply stringing out and stocking up abstract propositions”. For communication to take
١٧ place, one must indicate that one is doing with these propositions and one must also be able to comprehend others (Sadock, 1974: 12). IA is the most significant act in the hierarchy of speaking. Austin (1962) “alerts us to the fact that speaker does something in uttering U to hearer in context C”, e.g. ‘states an opinion or a fact’, ‘confirms or denies something’ as in ‘it is not true that Marilyn Monroe committed suicide’, ‘makes a prediction’ as in ‘it’ll rain tonight’, ‘a promise’ as in ‘I’ll be with you in five minutes’, ‘swears an oath’ as in ‘I swear allegiance to the President’, etc. In utterance U, “speaker performs an illocutionary act in using a particular locution to refer, such that U has the illocutionary force” of a statement, a confirmation, a denial, a prediction, a promise, a request and so forth (Allan, 1998: 6). IA may have more than one force. Allan (1986: 175) and (1998: 6) distinguishes between ‘an illocutionary force’ and ‘an IA’. The IA is what S does in uttering U to hearer H in context C, whereas the illocutionary force F is “a property of the utterance U that S issues in performing the illocutionary act”. In other words, what S’s utterance U of sentence with prosody to H in C indicates that S is doing. It is stated above that an utterance has more than one illocutionary force; however, many utterances have only one message to convey, and this particular illocutionary force is the illocutionary point, e.g.: 30. I’ll make tea. It may have more than one illocutionary force: it has the force of statement about a future act, but it may be used with a second illocutionary force, i.e., to make a promise. If this is recognized in the action of S, then that promise is the illocutionary point of the utterance (for further information concerning the differences between act, force and point, see also Mey, 1993: 154-55). IAs are conventional forces of utterances. There are numerous ways in which our intended illocution can be communicated. The most straightforward is to mention directly what one is doing in making a particular utterance, e.g.: 31. I promise you that I’ll mend the spinnaker. An utterance of this form which contains a first-person singular subject and a verb in the simple present (which conveys the intended force of the utterance) is called an explicit performative, or sometimes just a performative (explicit performative has been tackled above) (Sadock, 1974: 9). Similarly, Bates (1976: 15) states that IAs are explicit performatives since they are signalled by the presence of the explicit performative verbs (e.g. I order you …) in addition to other elements such as intonation, the mood of the verb, punctuation in written language, or extra-linguistic context in spoken language. Austin admits that one, as an operational test, “can paraphrase the hypothetical illocutionary force of an utterance as an explicit performative: if the act performed is an illocutionary act” (Levinson, 1983: 237). Allan (1998: 6) remarks that S’s perlocutionary act is an “act of achieving a particular perlocutionary effect on Hearer as a result of Hearer’s recognition (what he/she takes to be) the locution and illocutionary forces in U”. Therefore, a perlocutionary is H’s behavioral response to the meaning of U not necessarily a physical or verbal response, may be a mental or emotional response of some kind.
١٨ Other perlocutions are such things as: intimidating H by threatening, getting H to do something by means of a suggestion, a request, etc. An effect of U which is not the result from hearer recognizing the locution and illocutionary point of U is not “a perlocutionary effect, but some level of gestural effect”, e.g., responding to a raised voice or an angry look. The purpose of speaking is more often to cause an effect in the H; therefore, most of what one say is aimed towards the success of perlocutionary acts: “we want our statement to be accepted, our questions to be answered, our requests to be enacted and advice to be taken, etc.” (Allan, 1986: 177). The distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts can be explained by looking at the following utterance in terms of its locution, illocution and perlocution: 32. Leave the car, or I will shoot. Its locutionary act is saying ‘leave the car, or I’ll shoot’), its IA that of threatening and its perlocutioary act is the effect on the addressee (being frightened) (for further details, see Al-Sulaimaan, 1997:11). The above mentioned distinction is a general one which is based on the previous given definition of each act. Particular distinctions have been made by Austin (1962) between each act. One of these is the distinction between locutionary act and IA. Levinson (1983: 236) states that these two acts are “detachable, and; therefore, the study of meaning may proceed independently, but supplemented by a theory of illocutionary act”. Searle (1973: 143) remarks that Austin’s distinction between locutionary and IAs is the distinction between meaning and force or between sense and reference. However, Searle states that this distinction is eliminated since the meaning of the sentence “determines the illocutionary force of its utterance in such a way that serious utterances of it with that literal meaning will have that particular force”. However, both of these two acts are conventional. By conventional, Lyons (1981: 187) means that most of speech acts are cultural-specific in that “they depend upon the legal, religious or ethical conventions and practices institutionalized in particular societies”. It has been mentioned above that the distinction between IA and perlocutionary act is more troublesome than that between illocutionary and locutionary acts. Levinson (1983: 236-37) states that ‘shoot her!’, for example, in appropriate circumstances, has the illocutionary force of ordering, urging, advising the addressee to ‘shoot her’, but the perlocutionary effect is frightening the addressee. Therefore, the IA is “what is directly achieved by the conventional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in accordance with a conventional procedure”. In contrast, the perlocutionary act is specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is; therefore, not conventionally achieved and it is often indeterminate. The distinction is troublesome due to the fact that while one would be able to identify the perlocutionary effects with the consequences of what has been said, “illocutions have also directed on in-built consequences”. There is what Austin (1962: 117) calls the ‘issue of uptake’ including “the understanding of both of the content of the utterance and its force by its addressee (s)”. In addition to the ‘uptake’, there is the need for the ratification of a bet or an offer, while certain
١٩ illocutions such as promising or declaring war have consequential actions specified (for detailed distinction between illocutions and perlocutions, see Austin, 1962: 103-04, 107-08, 117-120). In fact, this is what Austin’s theory of speech acts, is all about. It is a theory of pragmatics “(in etymological sense of pragmatics: the study of action, or doing)”. Moreover, it is “a theory of social pragmatics: a theory of saying as doing within the framework of social institutions and conventions” (Lyons, 1981: 175). One of the outstanding contributions to the philosophical work is Searle’s (a very influential systematization of Austin’s work). Through his writings, SAT has most of its impact on linguistics (Levinson, 1983: 237-38). This work will be discussed in detail in the following section.
2.1.2 Searle’s Account of Speech Act Theory and His Critics; In the previous section, an elaborated discussion of Austin’s account of SAT has been given. It has been mentioned that Austin stresses the connection between forms of social life and forms of meaning. His notions have their roots in language bound to relatively limited and ritualized domains. As a result, thinkers began to question Austin’s concern, “abounding his interest in the institutional constraints on talk in favour of more universalizing views of what it means to say that utterances are acts at all”. Therefore, most recent writers have come to concentrate on how our deeds or utterances are shaped by what the individual ‘intends’ or ‘means’, without paying attention to the social and cultural contents in which meanings are born. Searle is one of those recent writers who, unlike Austin, does not “primarily tend to view familiar acts of speech as social acts, but as the embodiments of universal goals, beliefs and needs possessed by individual speakers”. Moreover, whereas Austin discovers the illocutionary force in speech by concentrating on conventional acts that have the power to change the world, Searle uses “promising in place of Austin’s oaths of marriage to serve as paradigmatic of our ways of doing things with words” (Rosaldo, 1982: 210-211). Searle (1969: 3-4, 16, 22) does not study speech acts only because of their intrinsic interest and importance, but also because he believes it is to be the best approach to the philosophy of language in general, to the provision of “philosophical illuminating descriptions of certain general features of language, such questions, truth, meaning and necessity”, to answering questions such as “what is the difference between saying something and meaning it and saying it without meaning it” or “how do words stand for things”, etc. The most substantial support Searle provides for this belief is the following: (a) the performative of a particular speech act is a literal meaning of a sentence in a certain context, (b) it is part of our notion of speech act that there is a possible sentence (or sentences) the utterance of which in a certain context will (in virtue of its or their meaning) constitute a performative of that speech act, (c) because of ‘a and b’, a study of the meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a study of speech acts. In ‘c’, Searle brings out what it is to perform such subsidiary ‘propositional acts’ such as ‘referring and predicating’. In ‘a’, there is no treatment at all. In ‘b’, Searle maintains what he calls the principle of expressibility (it will be discussed later on). (d) speaking a language is performing abstractly acts such as
٢٠ referring and predicating in addition to acts such as making statements, giving commands, etc. These acts are in general “performed and made in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements”. This means that the account of an IA is performed under certain conditions and “extract from them sets of semantic rules for the use of the linguistic devices which mark the utterances as speech acts of different kinds”. Despite the differences between Searle and Austin in viewing speech acts, Searle’s work is considered as a kind of modification and development of Austin’s. Searle’s first contribution to SAT is his distinction between locutionary and IAs. He (1973: 143-46, 148) states that the distinction between locutionary and IAs is the difference between uttering “a sentence with a certain meaning, in one sense of meaning which Austin characterizes as sense and reference (the locutionary act) and uttering a sentence with a certain force (the IA). The difficulties that one encounters with Austin’s distinctions are: First: the distinction cannot be completely general, but it can be interesting because some locutionary acts are IAs. This can be illustrated briefly as follows: the concept of an utterance with a certain meaning (a locutionary act) is indeed different from the concept of an utterance with a certain force (an illocutionary act). However, “there are many sentences whose meaning is such as to determine that the serious utterance of the sentence with its literal meaning has a particular force”. Therefore, the class of IAs will contain members of the class of locutionary acts. It is true that the concepts are different, but they denote overlapping classes. Second: Austin’s distinction between locutionary and IAs is the distinction between the simple meaningful utterance and the successfully performed complete IA. According to Austin, “the successfully performed complete illocutionary act requires all sorts of conditions not required by the locutionary act”. Searle, on the other hand, states that since the conditions required for successful performance of the act are a function of the meaning of the sentence, to seriously uttering such sentence with its literal meaning is to perform all IAs of giving an order. What is left for such sentence is only the distinction between “that part of trying to perform an illocutionary act which consists in uttering the sentence seriously with its literal meaning, and actually succeeding in performing an illocutionary act”, and this is a much less intensity distinction than the original one, i.e., between locutionary and IA. Searle, therefore, concludes that the original locutionary-illocutionary distinction is best designed to account for these cases where the meaning of the sentence is force-neutral (its literal utterance does not serve). No sentence, Searle adds, is completely potential even the most primitive of the old fashioned grammatical categories of indicative, interrogative and imperative sentences, i.e., they already contain determinations of illocutionary force. For this reason “there is no specification of a locutionary act performed in the utterance of a complete sentence which will not determine the specification of an illocutionary act”, (Searle, 1969: 406-24). The fact that locutionary and IAs are inseparable (since meaning and force are inseparable) is further supported by Searle’s assumption that Austin’s ‘rhetic’
٢١ act cannot be separated from the IA and this is the second contribution of Searle to SAT. To end up discussing the distinction between locutionary and IAs, Searle states that indeed the concepts locutionary and IAs are different just as the concepts ‘terrier’ and ‘dog’ are different. However, this conceptual difference is not sufficient classes of acts, hence; every locutionary act is an IA. (Searle, 1973: 14649). Speaking a language, according to Searle, is “engaging in a form of behaviour that is governed by constituitve rules”. In a normal utterance at one and the same type, a S performs four different acts. He performs: (a) an utterance act (by uttering words, morphemes, or sentences, (b) a propositional act (by referring and predicating), (c) an illocutionary act (by questioning, stating, requesting, etc.), (d) a perlocutionary act (by achieving some effect on the actions, thoughts, etc. of his/her H). “These various speech acts, are in general made possible by (and are performed in accordance with) certain rules for the use of linguistic elements” (Searle, 1969: 16, 24-25, 37) and Cohen, 1970: 545). These acts are not separate things that speakers do, but in performing an IA, one performs propositional acts and utterance acts. It should not be thought from this that “utterance acts and propositional acts are means to ends rather, utterance acts stand for propositional and illocutionary acts” in the way in which, e.g. “making an x on ballot paper” stands for voting (Searle, 1969: 24). This is so since utterance acts consist simply of uttering words, morphemes, whereas propositional, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts result from the utterance of words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain intentions. It should be noticed again, however, that these three acts are not “spatiotemporally discrete and independent, but are mutually interdependent which occur simultaneously” (Searle, 1969: 24 and Al-Hindawi, 1999: 13). Despite the fact that these acts work simultaneously and they are interdependant acts, there are differences between them. It has been stated above that utterance acts are different from propositional, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as far as their constituents are concerned. Now, the question that forces itself is what is the difference between propositional acts and illocutionary acts? Before distinguishing between propositional acts and IAs, an important remark should be made concerning the IA. Like Austin (1962), Searle’s SAT is simply a theory of IAs for the same reason mentioned in section (2.1.1), i.e. for communication to take place, one must indicate that one is doing with the abstract propositions. Searle (1971: 42) illustrates the reason further by stating that in a typical situation involving a S, a H and an utterance by the S, a number of acts are associated with the S’s utterance. He / she may perform some acts within the class which includes informing, irritating, and so on or he / she performs certain acts such as making statements, asking questions, etc. All of these are IAs, which are necessary for communication to take place. IAs are not symbols, words or sentences, but “the production of the sentence token under certain conditions” is the IA and it is the smallest unit of linguistic communication.
٢٢ Therefore, to “construe them under the category of linguistic communication necessarily involves construing their production as speech acts”. To perform IAs is to engage in a rule –governed formal behaviour. As a result, Searle argues that things such as asking questions or making statements are rule governed in ways similar to those in which getting a base hit in a baseball. Thus, the notion of an IA is explicated by studying acts of Felicity Conditions for the performance of a particular kind of IA. When one deals with the propositional acts, actually one deals with the content of an utterance. The distinction between them, in various forms, is now common in philosophy. Frege (1892), for example, places considerable emphasis on the distinction between “thought or proposition and its assertion or judgment as true”. To make the distinction clear, Frege is careful to place a special assertive sign in front of an asserted sentence. This distinction plays an essential role in Strawson’s (1950) views on propositions and truth. Hare (1952) introduces the term ‘phrastic’ for propositional content and ‘neustic’ for illocutionary force. Later on, Hare (1970) suggests that illocutionary force is in fact a mixture of neustic (speaker commitment) and a further element, the tropic (the faculty of the propositional content) (Levinson, 1983: 242). Different IAs often have features in common with each other, for example 1. Will (predicate) John (reference) leave the room (prediction)? 2. John (reference) will leave the room (prediction). 3. Would have (predict) John (reference) left the room (prediction)? The first example expresses an IA of question; the second expresses an IA of assertive while the third expresses an IA of wish. Yet, in the performance of each, the S performs some subsidiary acts which are common to all four IAs in the sense that in the utterance of each, the S refers to partial person ‘John’ and predicates the act of ‘leaving the room by that person’. The reference to that person ‘John’ and prediction of the same thing of him in each of these IAs includes Searle (1971: 42-44) to state that there is a common content in each of them; that is of the clause that ‘John will leave the room’. This is what Searle calls it ‘the proposition’. He states that “in the utterance of the sentence, the speaker expresses a proposition”, but Searle does not say that the sentence expresses the proposition. The proposition that ‘John will leave the room’ expresses in the utterance of all (1-3) examples above, but only in example (2) is that proposition asserted. An assertion is an IA, but “a propositional act is not an act at all, but although the act of expressing a proposition is part of performing certain illocutionary act”. Therefore, Searle concludes that there is a distinction between IA and the propositional content of an IA. However, not all locutionary acts have a propositional content as in ‘hurrah for Manchester United’. ‘down with Caesar’ or ‘ouch’. Searle (1969: 156) maintains that symbolically, one can represent the sentence as containing Illocutionary Force Indicating Device and a propositional content indicated as F(p), but for the three examples above, the formula will be F(n) where ‘n’ is replaceable by referring expressions. From the grammatical point of view, propositional acts are parts of sentences: grammatical predicators for the act of prediction, and proper names,
٢٣ pronouns and certain other sorts of noun phrases for reference. The characteristic grammatical form of the IAs, on the other hand, is the complete sentence (it can be one word sentence as in ‘ouch!’). Thus, “the propositional act is a genuine abstraction from the total illocutionary act and so construed no propositional act is by itself an illocutionary act”. However, propositional acts can not occur alone; that is, “one cannot just refer and predicate without making an ‘assertion’ or asking ‘a question’ or performing some other illocutionary act”. The linguistic correlate of this point is that sentences (not words) are used to say things. Moreover, this point asserts what is mentioned before that propositional acts and IAs in addition to perlocutionary acts, are interdependent acts and they work simultaneously (Searle, 1969: 25). From the semantic point of view, the distinction between propositional act and IA is made through the indicator in the sentence. For a large class of sentences used to perform IAs, it is possible to say that the sentence has two parts (not necessarily separate): the propositional indicating element and the function indicating device. The function indicating device shows what “illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence”. Functional indicating device in English includes word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb and finally a set of performative verbs (sometimes the content of the actual situations will make it clear what the illocutionary force is without invoking the appropriate functional indicating device). In addition to these indications, there are two kinds of rules (regulative and constitutive that will be discussed below) which are different from rules of prediction and reference, i.e., for propositional act (the concentration will be on IAs rules rather than on prediction and reference) (Searle, 1971: 43 – 44). Therefore, terms like ‘proposition’ and ‘prediction’ normally originate, as “tools of logical analysis, when we decide to consider the content of an utterance in abstraction from its author, date and physical manifestation”. Thus, to talk of a propositional act, or an act of prediction is trying both to carry out such an abstraction and to refrain from carrying it out at one and the same time (Cohen, 1970: 556). To end up discussing this distinction, i.e., between propositional and IAs, Searle believes that the propositional act “which expresses the propositional content of the utterance is separable since a proposition does not include indication of the illocutionary force”. For Astington (1986: 7), propositional acts cannot be performed separately from IAs, but can be separately considered since the same proposition may have different IAs in different contents. Many philosophers follow Searle’s distinction between propositional act and IA such as Furberg (1969) and Strawson (1973) rather than between the locutionary act and the IA of Austin (Forguson (1973) is one of the philosophers that follow Austin). As far as perlocutionary act is concerned, Trosborg (1994: 20) believes that Searle accepts it and uses the same term with the same meaning. Searle (1969: 23) defines it as “consequences or effects of such acts have on the actions, thought or belief, etc. and the hearers” as in ‘warning someone’, I may alarm or score. Therefore, Searle does not come with something new concerning perlocutionary act.
٢٤ Trosborg (1994: 18) argues that Searle’s distinction between the intended message and the goal behind it, is a reflection of Austin’s distinction between IAs and perlocutionary acts. In conclusion, Searle’s facets of SAT is divided into utterance act, propositional act, IA and perlocutionary act (locutionary act is illuminated within illocutionary act with the rhetic act while other components of locutionary acts are merged into utterance act). This is Searle’s third contribution to SAT, i.e., clarification of the facets of SAT. Searle (1989: 20, 539) criticizes Austin’s distinction of performativesconstatives since “stating and describing are actions as are promising, threatening, thanking and apologizing; and some performatives (such as warnings) can be true or false”. Moreover, statements can be made explicit performatives if a performative verb is used as in: 4. It is raining. 5. I hereby state that it is raining. In addition to Searle’s criticism of Austin, Searle also rejects Austin’s (1962) distinction between explicit and implicit performatives as he believes that performatives are those which Austin calls explicit performatives (containing a performative verb). The performative marker is not always a performative verb, but it can be a noun as in the following: 6. I’ll buy you a nice tie, and that is a promise. However, not every occurrence of a performative sentence is a performative use as in: 7. I promise too many things to too many people. This sentence reports a habitual practice. As far as performative verbs are concerned, Searle (1979: 9) states that “an illocutionary verb should be used performatively hence not all the verbs that are listed in Austin’s classification are performative verbs”, due to the fact that verbs such as mean to, regard to, etc. are not performatives. However, Searle (1969: 30) agrees with Austin (1962) in the sense that performative verbs have the property of showing the illocutionary force of an utterance and this view is very clear in adopting Searle’s notion of the IFID. Despite Searle’s criticism of Austin in some of the notions related to SAT. Searle is similar to Austin in being one of the non-descriptivists. Philosophers of performative utterances are in disagreement as to the question (which has divided them into two groups: descrptivists and non-descriptivists), whether performative utterances are true or false? Austin (1962: 15) argues that when one says ‘I promise’, ‘I apologize’, one is performing the act of promising and apologizing. Non-descriptivists in this sense, do not describe and reject the descriptive approach in judging such utterances as true or false. To them, the S does not make any assertion about what he/she does, but just does it(2). However, when one says ‘I promise’, or ‘he promises’ or ‘I apologize’, ‘he apologizes’, one is describing the act of ‘promising’. Tawfiq (1994: 9) states that this point is still debatable among both linguists and philosophers. Some of them, like Harris (1978), Taylor and Wolf (1981) in
٢٥ addition to others are called the non-descriptivists. Therefore, they support Austin in his argument. Edmondson (1979), Bach and Harnish (1979), Spielman (1980) and Wiggins (1971), on the other hand, reject this idea and “maintain, that in issuing a performative utterance, we are not only performing the act in question, but also describing it”. Those linguists and philosophers are called descriptivists. It has been mentioned above that to perfrom IAs is to engage in a rule governed form of behaviour. Acts such as making statements, asking questions, etc. are rule-governed. A set of necessary and sufficient conditions are proposed by Searle (1971: 40) for the performance of a particular kind of IA. He extracts from it a set of semantic rules for the use of the IFID. As far as these conditions are concerned, Searle (1969) calls them FCs which facilitate the performance of a particular kind of an IA. Regarding Searle’s rules that are responsible for the performance of particular kind of an IA, Levinson (1983: 238) maintains that Searle (1969: 13) appeals to a distinction by Rawls (1955) between two kinds of rules: regulative rules and constitutive rules. The first type of rules control antecedently existing activities, e.g. traffic regulations while the second type creates or constitutes the activity itself, e.g. the rules of playing a game. Searle (1971: 41 - 42) illustrates further the distinction between these rules as follows: regulative rules regulate “a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the existence of the rules”. Constitutive rules, on the other hand, do not only constitute, but also regulate “an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rule”. Characteristically, regulative rules take the from of imperatives, e.g. ‘officers are to wear ties at dinner’. Some constitutive rules take a complete different form, e.g. a checkmate is made if the king is attached in such a way that no mover will leave it unattached. Generally speaking, regulative rules have the form ‘do x’ or ‘if y do x’, whereas constitutive rules have the form ‘x counts as y’ (for the same view concerning SAT, see Ferrara, 1980: 233-234). Therefore, the hypothesis that lies behind the distinction between constitutive rules and regulative rules is that the semantics of a language can be regarded as a series of systems of constitutive rules and that IAs are performed in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules. The rules that link IFIDs with their corresponding IAs are of constitutive rules, e.g. “if I warn you not to touch the dog, that count as undertaking that it is not in your best interest to touch that animal”. Of course, it will only be a felicitous warning if all other felicitous conditions are also met (Levinson, 1983: 238). Searle (1971: 52) provides us, for example, with four constitutive rules of an IA of ‘promising’, these are: Propositional constitutive rules, preparatory rules, sincerity and essential rules. In addition to these rules, Searle’s other contribution to SAT is that of the principle of expressibility: Whatever can be meant can be said. Searle (1973: 151, 153-54) believes that “often we mean more than we actually say”. For instance: 8. a. Are you going to the party? b. Yes. But what is meant is ‘yes, I am going to the party’, not ‘yes, it is a fine day’.
٢٦ Consequently, the principle of expressibility as Searle (1969: 20) suggests, is important in making speech act rules as part of linguistic competence and for the integration of SAT into linguistic theory. Searle’s other contribution to SAT is his concept of indirect speech act. Searle draws a distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. In utterances with one illocutionary force (each of which expresses one illocutionary act), the IA is expressed via a particular sentence type (e.g. imperative, interrogative or declarative) which is usually associated with it, typically, an utterance with one illocutionary force called a ‘direct speech act’ (Al-Hindawi, 1999: 34). In addition to the fact that this type of speech act is performed through a sentence type associated with it, Levinson (1983: 263-264) points out that it can also be achieved by means of explicit performatives. In both cases, the direct speech act is said to be literally based and denoted by a literal force. In utterances with two illocutionary forces, Al-Hindawi (1999: 34) states that a direct speech act can also be performed via a sentence which is usually associated with and consists in the literal meaning of the words uttered. However, in these cases, the direct speech act is of secondary importance for the speaker (i.e., it is not the one primarily to be attained by the speaker). In two illocutionary force utterances, the additionally performed speech act is called ‘indirect speech act’. Simply, indirect speech acts are defined by Searle (1979: 31) as “cases where a speaker says onething and means that, but also means something else”, e.g.: 9. Can you pass the salt? The direct speech act is a question, but the indirect speech act is a request. Therefore, Searle’s distinction between direct and indirect speech acts depends on a recognition of the intended perlocutionary effect of an utterance on a particular occasion: How one does more than one thing at once with his / her words. The multiple function of an utterance is part of the important issue of indirect speech act. For clarification, see example (9) above. The problem that is correlated with the concept of indirect speech act is: How do people recognize the indirect speech act? Searle (1975a) discusses this problem by raising the following question: Do people have the ability to choose the indirect act as most contextually act? Searle (1975a) argues that speakers do indeed have access to both: He labels the direct use as the literal use of the speech and the indirect, the non-literal use, e.g.: 10. a. Can you pass the salt? b. Please pass the salt. 11. a. I wish you wouldn’t do that. b. Please don’t do that. As a result, Searle’s view of how one understands indirect speech acts combine three elements: the FCs of direct speech acts, the content of the utterance and principles of conversational cooperation (such as the Gricean maxim of relevance, … etc.) Following Searle (1975a: 73-75), Saeed (1997) states that it is possible to sketch briefly how these three elements of knowledge are used by examining example (10a) above. In everyday situation, the H by the assistance of the content can tell that the S should already know that ‘he/she can pass the salt’. Therefore,
٢٧ he/she recognizes that the question violates the FCs for a question. However, the assumption of Cooperative Principle leads the H to search for another point in the utterance: It is a search for indirect speech act, i.e., the H will ask himself/herself: “What is the purpose of this utterance?” The H knows that: (a) a condition for request is that the H can actually carry out the desired act, (b) to say ‘yes’ is to confirm a preparatory condition for doing act, (c) ‘passing salt around at table’ is a usual part of ‘meals’, so this is a reasonable goal for the S to entertain. Consequently, from these elements of knowledge, “the hearer infers that the speaker’s utterance is likely to be a request”. It is interesting at this point to compare the already presented occurrences of indirect speech acts with the ones presented by Grice (1975) under the name of conversational implicatures. Brown and Levinson (1987: 31) point out that Grice (1975) uses the term implicature “to account for what a speaker can imply, suggest or mean as distinct from what the speaker literally says” (for further detail about Grice’s maxims, see Grice, 1975: 45, James, 1983: 128 and Verschueren, 1987: 2021). The question that forces itself is: What kind of relationship is there between direct and indirect speech acts? In some cases of indirect speech acts, the relation between the direct and the indirect acts is more regular and systematic than others since “the meaning of the indirect illocution is effectively determined by the literal meaning of the utterances”. (Al-Hindawi, 1999: 35) Bach and Harnish (1979: 70) maintain that through the first act, the H can identify the indirect act. Therefore, these cases are considered as ‘conversationally indirect’. What the S primarily intends to mean is the indirect illocutionary force rather than the direct illocutionary force as in example (10) above. Since the relation between the direct and indirect illocutionary forces in ‘conversationally indirect speech acts’ is of systematized nature, it is possible to formulate it into particular categories of sentences depending on the type of the speech act intended to be achieved. Therefore, six categories of sentences have been proposed by Searle (1975a) as possible realizations of indirect directives (for further clarification of these categories, see Searle, 1975a: 64 – 67). Experiments by Clark and Schunk (1980) (cited in Saeed, 1997: 217-218) confirm the claim that “the literal meaning of an indirect request is an important element in the perceived politeness of the act”. Thus, example (12) is more polite than (13) though both of them are ‘indirect requests’, e.g.: 12. May I ask you what it is? 13. Won’t you tell me what time it is? The first sentence focuses on S’s action, while the second focuses on H’s action. This point raises an interesting issue: why do speakers employ these indirect acts? Politeness is one motivation which make certain indirect expressions so conventionalized. In addition to these systematic cases of expressing indirect speech acts, there are cases in which the relation between what is said and what is indirectly done is not systematic. Indirect acts of this sort are, according to Searle (1975a), “used for
٢٨ hints, irony and metaphor” (Al-Hindawi, 1999: 36). An example which is presented by Widdowson (1975) (cited in James, 1983: 125) may be possible hints for commanding the hearer to clean the windows, e.g.: 14. a. I can’t see through these windows. b. Somebody’s forgotten to clean the windows. Since these cases cannot be systematized, they are referred to as ‘nonconventionally indirect speech acts’. Searle (1975a: 62) states that primarily the S intends to mean the non-literal meaning of the utterance (i.e., the indirect speech act) by way of performing a direct act which is constituted by merits of the literal meaning of the utterance. Bach and Harnish (1979: 71) argue that it is true that in most cases the indirect act is non-literal, however, it can be literal, e.g.: 15. The bull is about to charge. In this example, both acts (warning and stating) are constative and the propositional content is the same. Therefore, both acts are literal. The indirect act of warning is performed by means of stating, is accomplished by recoursing to shared knowledge that bulls are dangerous. It is stated above that in most cases, indirect speech acts are non-literally based, e.g.: 16. I’m sure that the cat likes having its tail pulled. In this example, a mother may intend to state directly and non-literally that she is sure that the cat hates having its tail pulled. Moreover, she indirectly intends (by means of this non-literal statement) to request her hearer to stop pulling the cat’s tail. Searle (1979: 163-64) attacks two well-known approaches to SAT, namely, ‘the performative deletion analysis’, deriving from the work of Ross (1970) and the conversational postulates to the study of indirect speech acts, the best-known exposition in an article by Gordon and Lakoff entitled, ‘Conversational Postulates’ (1971). Both of these theories represent wrong explanations of the data concerning speech acts and in different ways, both made the same mistake of providing powerful explanation to account for certain facts. Starting with Ross’ (1970: 223) article, his paper concentrates on the fact that declarative sentences must be analysed as “being implicit performatives and must be derived from deep structures containing an explicitly represented performative main verb”. Ross, then, provides us with fourteen syntactic arguments to state that every declarative sentence must have an indirect object ‘you’, a higher subject ‘I’ and possibly abstract performative verb as the main verb of the highest clause. Therefore, every declarative sentence of English, Ross (1970) concludes, has a deep structure of the form ‘I say to you that S’ or ‘I tell you that S’, etc. Furthermore, it is easy to extend types of arguments to other types of sentences, in this case, the final conclusion will be that “all English sentences have a performative verb in the highest clause of their deep structure”. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) see hearers as employing shortcuts known as ‘conversational postulates’. These are “rules that are engaged whenever the hearer is encountered by conversational principles to search for an indirect speech act”.
٢٩ The importance of these postulates is to reduce the amount of inference involved in tracing the indirect act. The relevant postulate for example (9) above is conversational postulate: Ask (a,b) CAN (b, Q) REQUEST (A, B, C) This postulate is interpreted as “when a speaker asks whether b can do Q, this implies a request for b to do Q”. Thus, these postulates are a reflection of the conventionality of some indirect acts. Therefore, Gordon and Lakoff (1971), argue that the speaker does not only use perlocutionary, sincerity, essential and propositional content rules, but also an extra set of rules called ‘conversational postulates’. These postulates “enable us to have one speech act to entail another one” (see Gordon and Lakoff, 1971: 63-84). Searle’s objection to both theories, i.e., Ross and the one by Gordon and Lakoff’s is that “both fail to use the resources of existing theories of speech acts”. When confronted with puzzling data, both theories postulate a solution which demands the introduction of extra and unnecessary elements. He believes that if each theory had “a proper understanding of the role of speech acts”, that would enable us “to account for the data without introducing these extra elements” (for further detail, see Searle, (1979: 162-179). Finally, performatives for Searle (1989) and Verschueren (1992), cannot be regarded as indirect speech acts, i.e., their performative meaning is not extracted from assertion via Gricean implicatures. Moreover, explicit performatives can be regarded as instances of declarations of speech acts’ class which bring changes in the world. In conclusion, we will adopt Al-Sulaimaan’s view (1997) that speech acts can be classified into (direct or explicit) performatives (including performative verb or expression) and non-performative (indirect or implicit) speech acts (without a performative verb or expression).
2.1.3 Others’ Account of Speech Act Theory: Many philosophers contributed in a way or another to the establishment of the SAT such as Austin (1962); Searle (1969, 1971, 1975a-b, 1979); Grice (1957, 1961, 1969, 1971, 1975, 1978); Strawson (1964, 1973); Furberg (1969); Forguson (1973) and Warnock (1973). Austin, Searle and Grice, for example, have made use of the methods of analytical philosophy to develop a theory of language use that analyses how speakers communicate their ideas and thoughts in the performance of speech acts. Since a detailed discussion on Austin’s and Searle’s account of SAT have been fully tackled in previous sections, an account of other philosophers’ work of SAT is going to take its turn. Grice is one of those philosophers. Grice’s contribution, as stated by Martin (1987: 84-87, 94-97) to SAT, is his concentration on the intention of the native speaker to produce illocutionary force. Grice attempts to deal with this fact by specifying that only certain types of things that one does with utterances are the ones that explain its meaning. Grice’s emphasis on such restriction is that he thinks that essentially someone’s meaning by a bit of language involves the S’s intention to affect a H in some way, for example,
٣٠ 1. Please, pass the salt. The S, in this example, intends to ‘get someone to pass the salt’ and the way he/she tries to accomplish this is by revealing ‘to someone that she/he has this intention’. A S can achieve certain kinds of effects on a cooperative H by means of getting the H to realize that the effects are derived or intended by the S. According to Grice, this is primarily the way language is used and “it is the capacity for use in this way that makes a bit of language means what it does”. It is possible now to summarize Grice’s contribution to SAT as follows: The meaning of a language token contains in its intentional use, the S’s desire to accomplish his/her intention to get the H to do something by revealing to the H that the speaker has this intention. Therefore, “what a speaker S means by a particular token (utterance) on a particular occasion, then, is explained in terms of S’s intention”: He/she wants to reveal to the H that S wants to respond in a certain way and thus to get H to respond in this way. Now, the question which can be raised is what kind of intentionality does the S intend? Illocutionary or perlocutionary one? Suppose that ‘Fred’ utters example (No.1) above to ‘Sally’. One of ‘Fred’s intentions’ is ‘requesting salt from Sally’. As soon ‘Sally’ recognizes such an intention, the intention has been successfully recognized. ‘Fred’ does not only want to make this request, but also to ‘get the salt passed’. The success of this intention does not consist entirely of her recognition of it, but of her doing it. This particular sort of verbal intentional act regarding a H is called ‘an IA’ and the intention to do this sort of act is called an illocutionary intention. Therefore, in this example, ‘Fred’ has ‘the illocutionary intention’ to perform the IA of ‘requesting’ of ‘Sally that she passes the salt’. Moreover, ‘Fred’ has also the intention to get ‘Sally’ (not only to recognize such intention) to ‘pass the salt’ and if this intention succeeds, ‘he gets Sally to pass the salt’. However, this act with this intention are not illocutionary. The success of this intention does not consist entirely of ‘her’ recognition of the intention. ‘Sally’ may recognize or understand that ‘Fred’ has this intention in saying what ‘he’ does and yet not ‘pass the salt’. This kind of act is called perlocutionary act (a kind of act that one does intentionally by means of language) and its intention is called a perlocutionary intention (the intention to do the perlocutionary act). ‘Perlocutionary acts’ are performed by means of ‘IAs’. Similar acts which are done intentionally by means of the IA of inferring the H that, for example, 2. It is raining, They are all perlocutionary acts. Acts which are, however, not intended effects on a H, they are neither perlocutionary nor IAs, for instance, suppose ‘Sally’ intentionally surprises the H or awakes him/her up by (suddenly and loudly) making the noise as in (2) above. These are all intended effects on the H, but they are neither IA nor are perlocutionary acts. Therefore, not every type of intention is an illocutionary intention nor it is perlocutionary intention as it has been illustrated above or in any other similar example such as ‘doing nothing at all except make that noise’. Grice, (1975) presents two lists: one for ‘perlocutionary act’ and the other for ‘IA’. A good test for distinguishing between them is by what is called
٣١ ‘performative’, i.e., IAs can be named in sentences of the form ‘I hereby …’. It is a good test since all what is required from “the hearer to do in order for an illocutionary act to be accomplished is to hear and understand the utterances”; thus, merely the S accomplishes the act by speaking them. At last, it is the turn now to understand what all this has to do with S’s meaning? Since Grice deals with the intentionailty of the S, this means that he deals with S’s meaning rather than with sentence meaning. Grice does recognize the difference between ‘the speaker’s meaning’ (non – natural meaning which is equivalent to intended meaning) and ‘sentence meaning’ (natural meaning which is equivalent to literal meaning). The SAT says that S’s meaning is specified by the illocutionary intention behind the speech of the individual. This is due to the fact that intention and belief of the S are private items. In the current version of the SAT, the S’s meaning of an utterance is given by the S’s intention to produce (certain kinds of) effects on the H. Sentence meaning, on the other hand, is a public matter. Grice’s idea (1975) is that the sentence meaning of a particular token “can not be explained by the illocutionary intentions of the speaker of that token, but rather the illocutionary intentions people in general have when uttering tokens of that type”. His/her intentions in this way, tell what he means, but what his/her utterance really means is given by the illocutionary intentions people in general have when uttering it, namely, to make ‘a polite request’ that they have handed ‘the salt’ (for further detail concerning S’s meaning and sentence meaning, see Davis, 1984: 469-486). It is mentioned before that a theory of speech act can be traced back to the language philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of language as a social game. Levinson (1983: 227) traces history of the philosophical excess namely logical positivism(3). Meaning for Wittgenstien is “a matter of use and language is viewed as rule–governed uses”. He gives more importance to the socio-cultural aspects of language rather than to its assertive role. Grice (1975) criticizes this view of meaning as use describing it as source of confusion and suggests an alternation distinction in terms of literal (natural or sentence meaning) and implicated (non-natural meaning or S’s meaning). It is mentioned above that Grice suggests the notion of conversational implicature, used in SAT, to see or explain how a H understands the speech act by inferences. Grice’s work (1975) “integrates the analysis and language into a theory of human rationality and action” (for a similar view, see Davis, 1984: 486). In addition to those philosophers (Austin, Searle, Grice and Wittgenstien) who contributed a lot to SAT, other followers or scholars of pragmatics and performative utterances had taken their role in presenting, modifying and developing SAT such as Ross (1970); Sadock (1974); Katz (1977); Bach and Harnish (1979); Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981); Leech (1983) and Haverkate (1984). Sadock’s (1974) book is another contribution to SAT. His book is entirely a linguistic work in which he tries to let “the methodological vigour of generative grammar and the facts of natural languages, especially English, determine the outcome of the analysis”. He uses a theory of generative semantics to investigate
٣٢ speech acts so that he can test this theory (Sadock wants to give a formal account of fundamental aspect of communication, i.e., IA). Sadock believes that within the framework of performative theory, it is possible to mark illocutionary force in a unified way. Therefore, he generalizes that: Illocutionary force is that part of the meaning of a sentence which corresponds to the highest clause in its semantic representation. (Sadock, 1974: 19) Searle (1989: 19) states that one of his hopes when he was working on the theory of speech acts was to find a way to integrate SAT into a theory of generative grammar of some kind. In linguistics, Sadock’s book is the most serious attempt to do a SAT. However, it has been a disappointment to Searle that there is no such an interpretation. Another contribution to SAT is that of Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981) Speech Act Classification: A Study in the Lexical Analysis of English Speech Activity Verbs. Their (1981: 3-5, 70-71) aim or goal is to lay the foundations for a sound theory of linguistic behaviour that have to be taken into consideration. The criteria for judging these relevant aspects is made dependant on the language itself with reference to its speakers. The lexicon of a language, Ballmer and Brennestuhl have found, tells something about what is linguistically relevant for the speakers of that language. The verbs themselves denote speech acts, various aspects of behaviour and speech activities. Therefore, from these verbs, it is possible to find out “what the language tells us about the structure of linguistic behaviour” (since verbs are considered as indicators of what the speakers of a language regarded as relevant in their linguistic behaviour and many of its aspects) (for further comments, see Leonardi and Sbisa, 1984:5). The book is divided into two parts. The first part is to start from the set of verbs: listing and categorizing them according to a well-specified system. The categorization is made depending on the similarities of meaning. The result is then “structuring of relevant part of the lexicon into semantical categories”. These semantical categories, in turn will reflect linguistic behaviour in its various aspects. As an additional step is to group the semantical categories which are similar. As a result of such procedure of categorization, models will exist. Therefore, a complex classification of speech act designating verbs(4) into categories and models and even groups of models are arrived at. The categorization of verbs in the models or the models themselves can be brought into a natural order, each presupposes the other. The result of the procedure of categorization is called a typology. Two ways are found of speech act designation verbs: (a) with respect to similarity of meaning, b) with respect to presuppositional ancestry (or simply presuppositions). The second part of the book starts with the directions of the lexicon. In addition to such directions, the book contains two portions of lexicons: by means of an explicit listing of speech act designating verbs, the first portion is the representation of the speech act classification. The second part is “an alphabetical list of the categorized verbs with indications about the categories in which they occur”. This is in brief Ballmer’s and Brennestuhl’s model of classifying speech acts.
٣٣ Another approach to SAT is Leech’s model. Verschueren (1984: 459-60) denotes that Leech (1983) adopts Anglo-Americans’ definition of pragmatics as the study of topics such as deixis, implicatures, presupposition, speech acts and conversation. Leech classifies what he labels ‘the general pragmatics’ (which is concerned with the rather ‘abstract study of the general conditions of the communicative use of language’) into two distinct axes: pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics(5). Leech’s (1983: 406) opinion concerning politeness phenomenon is that he promotes it to “the basic, all important pragmatic factor which, in addition to the CP, governs most instances of linguistic interaction”. The result of such interest on the phenomenon of politeness is that Leech draws an over-extension of the notion ‘politeness’. The notion of politeness and impoliteness are not only invoked as a motivation for beliefs and attitudes, but also for all instances of implication and indirectness, thus disconsidering the fact that “depending on the context, a lack of explicitness often be interpreted as more rather than less impolite”. Verschueren (1984: 462 - 64) then, states that Leech defines the contrast between grammar and pragmatics in terms of eight postulates. After presenting the main features of Leech’s model, Verschueren (1984: 466-468) criticizes Leech’s model as follows: First, he does not offer a satisfactory treatment of performativity, i.e., “he does not approach the meaning of speech act verbs from a clearly angle as verbs used within an interactional context to talk about verbal interaction. He is not able to give a reasonable explanation why certain verbs can be used performatively, whereas others cannot. Leech’s such a mistake cannot allow him to avoid defining explicit performative utterances as descriptive (see Leech, 1983: 181-82), i.e., they are descriptive and performative at the same time. Second, the notion of implicature has been taken a central role in his work as if it were swallowing up everything that Leech considers ‘speech acts. Therefore, he introduces two fold extension of the notion: (a) the speech act rules that are formulated by Searle (1969) are called by Leech as ‘implicature’. Verschuren, however, criticizes this extension since it confuses application with derivation. How? It is true that the sincerity condition that “S believes that P” is considered as a specific application of Grice’s (1975) maxim of quality, scarcely it can be said to be heuristically derived from it. (b) confusing application with derivation underlies a second over-extension: “utterance-specfic application of the maxims are called implicatures”. Thus, if ‘A’ asks: 3. When is Aunt Rose’s birthday ? and ‘B’ replies: 4. It’s sometimes in April. Leech (1983) claims that “B believes that Aunt Rose’s birthday is in April” is an implicature arrived at through Grice’s (1975) maxim of quality. This implicature such as “B is not aware of which day in April is Aunt Rose’s birthady” is an implicature derived via the maxims of quality and quantity. In this case, the former is an application and only the latter is a derivation. The consequence of Leech’s position is the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts: “All illocutions are indirect in that their force is derived by implicature”. A variation, however, is existing in their (implicatures) degree of
٣٤ indirectness which cannot account for systmatically. Leech (1983) makes a distinction between sense and force (which are two kinds of meaning). The extension of the notion implicature is a consequence of that thesis, i.e., distinction between sense and force. However, it is hard to say why this is so or why Leech extends the notion implicature to be explained in terms of a single concept such as presupposition, for example: 5. Is she BADLY hurt ? 6. IS SHE badly hurt ? In (5), for instance, “S implicates that S is already aware of the fact that she is hurt”. In (6), “S implicates that S is already aware that someone is badly hurt”. Such meanings are easily derived from the contrastive stress. Thus, there is no need to arrive at these meanings through or via the CP and its meaning. As a result, Veschueren (1984) believes that Leech’s (1983) approach does not simply lead to the loss of useful distinctions. Third, despite Leech’s introduction to an apposition between grammar and pragmatics, Leech’s apposition is only “an attempt to keep pragmatics as grammatical as possible”. Hence, aspects of linguistic interaction which are uncontrollable have no part to play in a theory of communication. Leech, for instance claims that perlocutionary effects are not part of pragmatic studies since “pragmatic force has to do with goals rather than with results”. It is hard for someone who is primarily interested in the empirical study of conversational process to understand such a claim. This final position of Leech’s apposition between grammar and pragmatics, leads as Verschueren considers, to a number of problems, for instance, the concept of politeness that used by Leech is what typical use politeness is relative to some form or behaviour. General pragmatics, however, confines its attention to this concept in the absolute sense since “relative politeness is therefore variable on many dimensions, according to the standard or set of standards under scrutiny” (for further information concerning the problems with Leech’s politeness, see Verschueren, 1984: 469). Leech (1983: 73-76) states that the interpretation of the illocutionary force is a role that has only relation to pragmatics; any attempt to achieve such an interpretation by using grammatical arguments will cause a state of “overgrammaticization”. The final contribution to SAT which is going to be discussed is Haverkate’s (1984) book. In this book, a theory of speech acts is a theory of S and H with reference to the propositional content of the IAs performed by the participants (S and H). Haverkate’s (1984: 9,14,16-17) work is analysed in terms of the propositional and illocutionary subact of the speech act and the preconditions underlying its successful performance. The starting point is the description of “a set of specific relations holding between propositional structure and certain types of information concerning the speaker and the hearer”. (Such information is defined by the obligations deriving from the type of IA performed). The analysis of propositional content is carried out at the level of both the semantic and the syntactic components of the proposition. The analysis of the interactional roles of
٣٥ the H and the S, on the other hand, is undertaken within the framework of Searle’s speech act classification (1979) which rests upon the distinction between assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. Thus, to achieve a coherent analysis of the interactional roles of S and H, Haverkate (1984) uses Searle’s (1975b) classification of IA as a frame of reference. This classification rests upon the distinction between assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. The linguistic output of “performative speech act is characterized by a lexical expression of illocutionary act, the speaker performs, in producing that output”. In most cases, moreover, performative utterances contain an overt reference to the participant indicating their particular involvement in the illocutionary point of the speech act, e.g.: 7. I tell you that I have seen him with my own eyes. (assertive). 8. I request you to speak a little after. (directive). However, two exceptions to the rule (reference is made explicit to the S and the H) are made: First, the class of declarations is composed of ceremonial formulas(6). Such formulas lack an explicit reference to the S, H or to both of them as shown in: 9. You are fired. A subclass of the class of declarations consists of archaic performatives (called majestic plural) that are characterized by first-person plural reference. Its use is restricted to certain ‘official documents; signed by or in ‘the name of civil’ or ‘clerical sovereigns’ such as ‘kings and bishops’. The second exception to the rule that performatives contain a first-person singular pronoun is typical of the class of the so-called ‘hedged performatives’. They are defined by Fraser (1975: 187) as “syntactically defined by the presence of a modal or semi-modal verb”. In addition to such formal property, modal auxiliaries, hedged performatives do show another formal property that is appropriate for the present analysis, i.e., first-person plural reference “which obviously serves the purpose of downgrading the responsibility of the speaker for the act specified by the proposition”, e.g.: 10. We must inform you that you are fired. 11. We regret that we must inform you that you are fired.
Variants of example (9)
Concerning Haverkate’s performatives , the following conclusion can be drawn: The analysis of S and H indicating expression in performative utterances calls for a basic distinction between declarations on one hand, directives, assertives, commissives and expressives on the other. The referential structure of the former is peculiar in the sense that they may lack an explicit reference to the participants, whereas the latter is characterized by both first and second reference. Therefore, “performative speech acts are not appropriate candidates for applying referential strategies. This is due to the fact that speakers who perform them are to avoid defined syntactic patterns”. Despite the fact that each of the previous mentioned models has a number of inadequacies which a following model tries to overcome and modify, they are
٣٦ still considered by linguists and philosophers as contributions to SAT. They constitute in presenting, modifying and developing SAT as has been referred to above.
2.2 Felicity Conditions: 2.2.1 Austin's Felicity Conditions:
1.
2. 3. 4.
It has been noticed previously the fact that the main theme of Austin's book of (1962): How to Do Things with Words is the replacement of the original distinction between performatives and constatives by a general theory of speech acts. The original distinction was supposed to be a distinction between utterances which are sayings (constatives) and utterances which are doings (performatives). Austin's careful research, however, show that making a statement or giving a description is just as “performing an act or making a promise or giving a warning”. Therefore, Austin concludes that statements, descriptions and so forth are other classes of IAs similar to promises, commands, apologies, bets and warnings. Coming to view that all utterances are performatives, Austin abandons the original distinction between constatives and performatives and he opts for that between explicit and implicit performatives in which constatives are a particular kind of performatives (Searle, 1973: 119 - 120). Now, the question which forces itself is how does Austin evaluate performative utterances? The answer is as follows: The utterance is said to be happy or felicitious if the illocutionary force of a sentence takes effect. The utterance is said to “be unhappy, infelicitous or misfiring, if it goes away for some reason”. The factors that determine whether a particular IA succeeds are termed ‘FCs’ as in a bet; it cannot take place unless both parties are in agreement. Crystal (1985: 120) further defines FCs as the ones used in the theory of speech act to refer to “the criteria which must be satisfied if the speech act is to achieve its purpose”. Austin (1962: 14- 15) proposes a typology of conditions which performatives obtain if they are to succeed or be happy. They are as follows: Preparatory Conditions: These include (a) there should be an accepted conventional procedure with its conventional effect (the procedure consists of the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances). (b) The participants and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the particular procedure. Executive Conditions: These include (a) the procedure should be executed correctly and (b) completely by all participants. Sincerity Conditions: The participants must conduct themselves by having the intention. Fulfilment Conditions: The participants should conduct themselves subsequently by coming out what they have intended. The violation of one or more of the above conditions will make the performative utterance (in one way or another) unhappy or infelicitous. Austin's thoughts concerning FCs on speech acts are presented at a very early stage in theorizing about speech acts.
٣٧ His adaptation of FCs concentrates on determining the ways in which an IA might go wrong as Austin (1962: 39) describes, taking into his consideration, the ultimate purpose of determining the criteria for a successful act of communication between S and H (for further detail about Austin’s conditions, see Tawfiq, 1994: 11-12). Searle (1969) on the other hand, makes a significant contribution to the SAT concerning FCs. They are not merely used for determining the ways in which IA might go wrong, but when they are specified for a certain IA, they form a set of essential and sufficient conditions for the performance of that act. If all these conditions are fulfilled, the act will be a successful performative; and if the act has been a successful performance, all the conditions have been fulfilled. Therefore, Searle (1969) reclassifies Austin's FCs into a new typology. They will be discussed in the following section.
2.2.2 Searle's Felicity Conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
1. 2. 3.
Searle (1969) made a significant contribution to SAT concerning FCs, but with different treatment and purpose. Searle (1969: 23) develops and asserts the view that speaking is a rule governed form of behaviour. “The basic unit of which speech act consists in the production of an utterance under certain conditions labelled as FCs”. According to this view which is widely accepted by other philosophers and linguists, the IA coincides with the complete speech act. Searle (1969) modifies Austin's FCs as follows: Propositional Content Conditions: They specify constraints on “what can be expressed in the proposition of a sentence”, for example, all commissive illocutionary forces have such type of conditions in which the S predicates a future act of himself. Preparatory Conditions: Searle evaluates Austin's convention of the preparatory conditions since they ensure the successful performance of the act (provided that other conditions are met). These conditions specify contextual requirements. For example, a S promises to do something under the presupposition that his/her future action is good for the H, despite the fact that it is not clear to neither the S nor to the H that the former will do the action. Sincerity Conditions: They have the same sense of Austin's condition in the sense that they specify the required beliefs, intentions, …. etc. of the S as they are reflected in the performance of the IA. For example, promising has the sincerity condition that the S intends to do what he/she promises himself/herself to do. Essential Conditions: These are constitutive rules that determine the types of IA. For a promise, the H should be informed of S's intention to promise irrespective of whether the S is sincere or not. Searle (1969: 62 63) derives from these conditions, a set of semantic rules (SRs) for determining the IFID. These rules are: Propositional Rules: These rules focus upon the “textual context”. Preparatory Rules: These rules focus upon “background circumstances”. Sincerity Rules: These rules focus upon “speaker's psychological state.
٣٨ 4.
The Essential Rules: These rules focus upon “the illocutionary point of what is said”.
2.2.3 Others’ Felicity Conditions: Like Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), Haverkate (1984) also made a significant contribution to SAT concerning FCs. His model is analysed in terms of the propositional and illocutionary subacts of the speech act and the preconditions underlying its successful performance since the first part of his work: Speech Acts, Speakers and Hearers: pragmatics and Beyond (1984) concerning the propositional and the illocutionary acts of the speech act has been previously discussed (see 2.1.3). Haverkate (1979: 93- 98) follows Searle's (1969) FCs, but with certain modification to increase its (Searle's framework)descriptive power taking the modified model as a frame of reference. Haverkate (1984) discusses the following types of preconditions: 1. Sincerity: Generally speaking, it is concerned with the “intentional state of the speaker which underlies the performance of the speech act”. Therefore, it is the only precondition that is inherently speaker- centered. Moreover, it is a relevant precondition for defining each type of speech act in a specific way. For example, if one asks a question, one ought to know the information asked for. Empirically, the sincerity precondition can be illustrated by the so- called “paradoxes of Moore”. These paradoxes account for the fact that “no contradiction may hold between the illocutionary point of the speech act and the intentional state of the speaker” which is responsible for the performance of that speech act. 2- Non- obviousness: It is inherently hearer- centered in the sense that “the hearer is casually involved such that state of affairs may not hold in order for the speaker to successfully perform the speech act”. Therefore, it is not obvious, for the S to make an assertion, that H knows the inference he/ she wishes him/ her to convey, e.g. 1. It was a fantastic match, you know. With regard to directive acts, non- obviousness is defined as “a presupposition on the part of the speaker that the hearer will not carry out the required action of his/ her own account”. In other words, the S is performing the directive act. For this reason, this precondition is reflected by interrogative utterances expressing questions, concerning the future behaviour of the H, 3. Willingness: In general, this precondition underlies the successful performance of directive acts and, in particular, the requestive acts. Willinginess is a typically hearer - centered precondition. The reason behind this is that to make a request, for instance, “the speaker presupposes that the hearer is willing to do the act specified by the proposition of the corresponding utterance”. 4. Ability: It deals with “the capacity of the speaker or the hearer to perform a certain act”. Therefore, what determines the ability of acting persons is the following: (A) Their inherent capacities (both mental and physical). (B) External circumstances which are related to the time and place of action.
٣٩ Furthermore, the important factor which determines the distinction between the ability of the S and that of the H is speech act dependent. The former deals with commissive acts, while the latter deals with directives. It is clear that the correct performance of commissives presupposes the fact that the S is able to fulfil his/her promise to the H. 5. Reasonableness: It is a general precondition underlying the successful performance of assertives, directives and commissives. It refers to the fact that the S must be able to indicate the reason (s) he/she has for performing the speech act. Thus, when performing an assertive act, for example, S should be able to “motivate why they believe that the proposition expressed refers to a true state of affairs”. 6. Obviousness: In Haverkate (1979: 143-147), obviousness is a specific speech act not mentioned by Searle (1969). It is defined as “a precondition that is not related to the interactional behaviour of the speaker or the hearer, but to the structure of the situation of utterance”. It is used in the performance of commissive and directive acts. The linguistic manifestation of this precondition may involve reference to the S, the H, or no reference to either of them.
2.3 Classification of Speech Act Verbs: Various attempts have been made to classify speech acts or speech act verbs, e.g., Austin's (1962) classification of illocutionary force; Searle's (1975b) taxonomy of IAs, Bach and Harnish's (1979) taxonomy of communicative IAs; Ballmer and Brennenstuhl’s (1981) classification of speech act verbs; Leech's (1983) classification of illocutionary verbs; Haverkate's (1984) classification of IAs and others (for further detail, see Al-Sulaimaan, 1997: 30). In the following subsections, we will discuss Austin's (1962) classification and Searle's (1975b) taxonomy.
2.3.1 Austin's Classification of Illocutionary Force: Austin (1962: 151) identifes five classes of illocutionary verbs. They are as follows: 1. Verdictives: These are “typified by the giving of a ‘verdict’, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator or umpire”. Austin (1962: 153) provides us with (27) examples of such verbs among which are the following rule, diagnose, analyse, value, characterize, convict, …etc, e.g.: 1. I value this work as good. 2. I convict you of stealing the house. 2. Exercitives: Austin (1962: 155) points out that these verbs represent the exercising of right, power or influence. The exercitive performative verb makes a decision “in favar of behalf or against some a certain course of action or advocacy of it that something is to be so as distinct from a judgement that it is so”. Among the (42) examples of verbs that Austin gives are: appoint, dismiss, sentence, ….etc, e.g.: 3. I appoint you director. 4. I sentence you to a year imprisonment.
٤٠ 3.
Commissives: These verbs which are “typified by promising or otherwise undertaking”, “commit the speaker to go through a certain course of action in the future”. Austin’s examples for this class range to (33) of which are the following verbs: promise, undertake,…etc., e.g.: 5. I promise to do it. 6. I undertake to finish the job by Friday. 4. Behabitives: These verbs are related to attitudes and social behaviour. These have the notion of “reaction to other people's behaviour and fortune”. Moreover, they have” the notion of attitude and expressions to somebody's past conduct or imminent one”. Among the (33) verbs that Austin provides are: apologize, thank, welcome, ….etc., e.g.: 7. I apologize for losing your camera. 8. I thank you for your help. 5. Expositives: These verbs are “used in the acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting arguments and the clarifying of usages and of references”. The examples that Austin provides to represent this class are: state, tell, affirm, testify, …etc., (Austin, 1962: 162-163), e.g.: 9. I state that he did it. 10. I tell you that Mary has succeeded. Searle (1975b: 350) points out that Austin (1962) advances his five categories very tentativelly and thinks that the taxonomy seriously needs to be revised because it contains several weaknesses. Searle (1975b: 351- 354) criticizes Austin's classification of illocutionary force with regard to: (1) Austin's confusion between illocutionary verbs and IAs; (2) not all listed verbs are illocutionary verbs; (3) no consistent principle of the taxonomy of IAs are constructed. As a result of (2 and 3), there is: (a) a great overlapping from one category to another and, (b) a great heterogencity within some of the categories and finally, many of the verbs in the categories do not satisfy the categories' definition (not all verbs satisfy the definitions Austin gives for each class) (for a detailed discussion of these criticisms, see Searle, 1975b: 350- 354). In agreement with Searle (1975b), Leech (1983:176) attacks Austin for “commiting the grave error of supposing that verbs in the English language correspond one to one within categories of the speech acts” (for similar views, see Allan, 1998: 11).
2.3.2 Searle's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts: 1. (a)
(b) (c)
The five categories that Searle (1975b: 356-364) sets are as follows: Representatives (Assertives): In the classical sense of Frege (1892), these speech acts are essential and thus carry the values true or false. Therefore: The illocutionary point is to “commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition”. The direction of fit is words-to-world. The psychological state expressed is belief in the proposition expressed or issued.
٤١ (d)
2. (a) (b) (c) (d) 3. (a) (b) (c) (d)
4. (a)
(b)
(c) (d)
5. (a) (b) (c) (d)
Most of Austin’s expositives and many of his verdictives are contained in this class since they have the same illocutionary point, but they are different in other features of illocutionary force. The simplicit test for a representative is to characterize it as true or false. Examples are: state, affirm, report, etc. Directives: The illocutionary point is the S's attempt to get the H to do something. The direction of fit is world-to-words. The sincerity condition or the psychological state expressed is the S wishes (desires or wants) the H to do something. The propositional content is the H does some future action A. Some of Austin's behabitives are: order, command, request, etc. Commissives: The illocutionary point of this act is to “commit the speaker (again in varying degrees) to some future course of action”. The direction of fit is world- to- words. The sincerity condition or the expressed psychological state is S's intention to do something. The propositional content is always that the S does some future action A. This class contains Austin’s commissives except shall, intend or favor. Example of Searle's commissives are promise, commit, threaten, etc. Expressives: The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content. In performing an expressive, the S is neither trying to get the world match the words nor the words match the world. The truth of the expressed proposition, is rather presupposed. The expressed psychological state is a wide range of feelings and attitudes. The propositional content ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either S or H. Examples are: apologize, condole, welcome, congratulate, thank, etc. Declarations: The illocutionary point is to bring into existence the state described in the proposition. The direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to-words. The psychological state expressed is non- assumed. The propositional content corresponds to reality (world). These are the main characteristics of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality. Thus, if 'I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman', then 'you are chairman'. Examples are: declare, name, nominate, appoint, etc.
٤٢
6. (a) (b) (c)
Searle (1975b: 360-61) points out that some members of the class of declarations overlap with members of the class of representatives. The reason behind that: one is not only assure the facts in certain institutional situations, but one needs an authority to lay down a decision. Consequently, Searle dubs the existence of a new class. This class is called representative declarations. They share with representatives, unlike the other declarations, a sincerity condition. “The judge, jury and umpire can logically speaking lie, but the man who declares war or nominates somebody cannot lie in the performance of his illocutionary act”. Hence, Searle includes a sixth class, i.e., 'representative declarations' (see Al-Sulaimaan, 1997: 32). Representative Declarations: The illocutionary point is to give an authoritative decision about some facts. The direction of fit is the decision must correspond to the facts, the decision given then becomes the fact (words-to-world and world-to-words). The sincerity condition is the belief in the proposition issued. Examples are: acquit, find, guilty, grade, etc.(see AL- Sulaimaan, 1997: 3233). Therefore, Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981:57) report that Searle's classification is characterized by: 1. “Telling people how things are”. 2. “Trying to get them to do things”. 3. “Committing ourselves to doing things”. 4. “Expressing our feelings and attitudes”. 5. “Bringing about changes through our utterances”. It has been previously referred to (see 2.3.1, P. 66) that Searle criticizes Austin for the deficiencies in his classificatory schema. For instance, the categories that Austin establishes are not mutually exclusive, the definitions of speech acts that Austin provides are too wide and so on (for Searle's criticism of Austin, see Searle, 1975b: 351- 354). To evaluate Searle's classification, Mey (1993: 169) believes that, in many respects, it resembles Austin’s. First, both classificatory systems have five categories. Second, “Searle's category of commissives is more or less conceptually, identical with and extensionally coterminous to, the class defined by Austin under the same name”. However, several of Austin's verbs do not fit in this class such as intend, favour, etc. as has been indicated above. Third, Searle's classification is similar to Austin's since the former has been also criticized for its deficiencies.
2.3.3 Concluding Remarks: From what has been reviewed so far, one can say that Austin (1962) adopts performative criteria such as ‘feature + performative’ for classifying illocutions similar to adherents of performative hypothesis such as Ross (1970) and Sadock (1974). Leech, (1983: 215) on the other hand, suggests that such a feature is not needed for the classification since it is a lexico and grammatical feature rather than pragmatic one. There is no need, Leech comments, to suppose that “speaker's of a
٤٣ language like English have to learn precisely which verbs they are permitted, by the grammar of that language, to use as performative”. While Searle (1969) concentrates on illocutionary point, direction of fit, psychological state and context, we will adopt Searle’s model and use his features in order to set some FCs for the speech acts under discussion.
2.4 The Pragmatic Theory of Literature: It has been shown that SAT plays an important role in everyday conversation (see 2.1). Moreover, Pratt (1977: 86) provides another way of which SAT is important in the sense that, in addition to the utterances in their surface grammatical features, it discusses these utterances in terms of the context in which they are made, the intentions, attitudes, the relationships between participants and generally in terms of the conventions and the unspoken rules that play important role when the utterances are made and received. Similar to Pratt’s (1977: 86) view of speech act, is his view of literature. He states that literary works, similar to all of our communicative activities, are context – bound. Literature, then, is itself a speech context. Therefore, the way people produce and understand literary works depends “enormously on unspoken, culturally-shared knowledge of the rules, conventions and expectations that are in play when language is used in that context”. Hence, as definitions of thanking, explaining and or persuading must include the context unspoken information on which the participants are relying, so must a definition of literature. For Ohmann (1971), literature corresponds to the traditional category of imaginative literature (novels, stories, poems, plays) by which he calls it “nonhonorific sense”, which includes all such works regardless of quality. His definitions of this category of utterance rests on his observation that the appropriateness conditions of Austin (1962) for IAs do not seem to apply to statements made in works of literature because literary utterances do not have any illocutionary force. For example, a declarative sentence in a lyrical poem, for example, one cannot meaningfully ask whether the person making the assertion is qualified to do so, whether he believes what he said and made the statement under appropriate circumstances, and so on. These appropriateness conditions, Ohmann concludes, fail to apply to literary utterances since the latter do not have any illocutionary force. Hence, they are called quasi-speech acts. Ohmann (1971) argues that the reader, specifically imagines a S and a set of circumstances to accompany the quasi-speech act, and makes it felicitous or infelicitous. He, moreover, comments on the fact that a literary work is a discourse whose its illocutionary forces are mimetic. By mimetic, Ohmann means imitative. Therefore, a literary work imitates a series of speech acts, which have no other existence in reality, By doing so, “a literary work leads the reader to imagine a speaker, a situation, a set of ancillary events, and so on” (for further detail, see Pratt, 1977: 89-90) Al-Dulaimi (2001: 71) believes that Ohmann’s(7) analysis leads him to “the conclusion that the reader of literature is an observer rather than a participant”. Moreover, Ohmann (1971) adds that literary works are acts without consequences
٤٤ of the usual sort, discourses with the usual illocutionary rules suspended and “sayings liberated from the usual burden of social bond and responsibility”. Chapman (1973: 14) thinks that literature may be much more than it would be understood as a style, despite the fact that there is value in attempting to treat it as one. He, furthermore, elaborates on this by stating that “any profitable approach through linguistics must deal with literature as an examinable part of the available realizations of langue”. If it is to find any readers at all, it cannot deviate too far from the expectations of the speech community. These deviations, in time, can be decided by methods applicable to more familiar and humbler paroles. Thus, langue and parole work together successfully. This view, Chapman (1973: 14) continues his discussion, is favoured in some periods and cultures. Literary language in these periods and cultures, has gained such prestige that other styles have been judged good or bad according to their resemblness to it. Non-literary users, moreover, try to incorporate literary features into personal communication. The development of national languages has been affected by the prestige of a dialect used for literature and individual writers have left their mark on common speech. Thus, this kind of influence has had the unfortunate effect of isolating literature from regular methods of investigation. Although linguistic methods of analysis are useful in interpreting literary texts, some problems emerge. This is the other extreme that Chapman (1973) refers to. He states that some linguists, on the other hand, view literature as too deviant for their attention. Therefore, they dismiss it from their study. The main problem of interpreting literature in terms of linguistic methods of analysis, Watts (1981: 9) thinks, that linguistic methods “seldom aim at interpreting literary texts at all, but rather at discovering empirical evidence for the validity of the theories of language on which they are based”. Similarly, Culler’s theory (1985) (cited in Al-Dulaimi, 2001: 72) runs the risk of depending on parole for the generation of its langue. He states that: One need not struggle, as other theorists must, to find some objective property of language which distinguishes the literary from the non-literary, but may simply start from the fact that we can read texts as literature and then require what operations can involve. Therefore, a need to interpret literature in terms of pragmatics is so needed. Sell (1995) defines literary pragmatics as the field which deals with the pragmatics of literary writing and reading in which context – realization is of great importance(8). However, Al – Sulaimaan (1997: 33 – 34) believes that, by referring to a number of literary scholars with their contributions (for example, Rudrum (1987); Bonheim, 1990, Ventola, 1991; Sperber and Wilson, 1993; Verdonk, 1993; Sell, 1995; and Sell and Verdonk, 1995), interest in the written medium has increased and research in it has much attracted literary scholars. Literary pragmaticists are concerned with both language and literature in their linguistic and socio – cultural contexts. Concepts and methods that belong to a variety of twentieth century discipline are made use of by literary pragmaticists (see Engler, 1990; Peterson, 1990; Stephens and Waterhouse, 1990; Carter and Nash, 1990; and Brőnnimann – Egger, 1991).
٤٥ In addition to that, Sell (1995: 30-36) argues that literary pragmaticists as not mainly concerned with linguistic interaction between the characters are portrayed in literary texts, but “between the real writers as speakers of literature and their real readers or listeners”. The question, however, that may force itself now is how do literary pragmaticists look at both writer and reader (implied by the text) and to the context? Sell (1995: 31) states that the literary pragmaticists look at both writer and reader (implied by the text) “as being aspects of the real writer and reader, between whom there is an interaction in the real world”. Context for literary pragmaticists is an inference performed by the readers, listeners in their processing of the text (the character’s dramatized inferences are included) or story (Sell, 1995: 36). Context, however, has been viewed differently in the 20th C. Al – Sulaimaan (1997: 35) states that structural linguists distinguish between language and its socio-cultural context, in other words, the gap between them is made wider by the structural linguistics(9), till interest in texts has shown by some linguists (see Van Dijk, 1976; de Beaugrande, 1980; and de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981). Text is defind by Van Dijk (1994) as a cognitive model (content model) as “a represention of knowledge and experience in episodic memory in the form of, perhaps, a mental schema”. It has been mentioned that literature is viewed as a superordinate langue and every literary work is viewed as a case of parole (see Culler, 1971 and 1975, who is one of the literary structuralists of the 1960s and 1970s). The rapid development of linguistic pragmatics in the 1970s and 1980s witnessed differences of emphasis. Leech (1983) and Levinson (1983) for example focus on topics such as deixis, implicatures, presuppositions, speech acts, and conversations. On the other hand, Verschuerven (1987) as one of the continental pragmaticists deals with wider issues as a result of viewing context in a more multi – dimensional approach including anthropological, linguistic, sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic and the like. Despite these different strands, all pragmatic activities have a common feature that they make a connection between linguistics, both of the uses of language and the context of linguistic use (Al – Sulaimaan, 1997: 36). SAT of literature; however, looks at context in a more sensitive way, Hussein (2001: 48) thinks that since Austin makes a distinction between using words to say something and using them to do things, there is a possible relation between a text and communicative context. Text cannot be understood as saying something instead, there is a fact that the S makes use of words in the text to do something. What is important for SAT of literature is “the speaker’s intention behind using his/ her words”. For example, the S’s promising, threatening, intending or predicting when he/ she utters the sentence: 1. I’ll leave you. Therefore, SAT of literature brings text and context together. Al – Sulaimaan (1997: 36) discusses the fact that SAT is also an important attempt to bring linguistics and literature clear together. This fact is also adopted by the researcher.
٤٦ As its name suggests, SAT of literature is directed towards developing the SAT of Austin (1962), Strawson (1964), Searle (1969) and Grice (1975) so as to cover literary texts. Al – Sulaimaan (1997), moreover, suggests that the fullest account in Pratt (1977) and Petrey (1990) has a strong influence on the later literary pragmatics. Implicatures have the same value in the area of pragmatics as speech act. As a matter of revising the reader’s memory, the researcher is going to define it following Al – Sulaimaan’s (1997: 37). They (implicatures) are “unstated propositions which a reader or listener conventionally deduces from what is actually said”. This notion is best accounted for by Grice’s (1975) article “Logic and Conversation”(10). It has been mentioned above that the best interpretation of literature is to be in terms of pragmatics. To elaborate more on this fact is to refer to what van Dijk (1976: 23) mentions that a number of literary phenomena, while cannot be treated in the framework of a theory based on current syntactic and semantic generative grammars, they require the relationship between a text structure on the one hand, and the structure of the context and FCs for SAT on the other hand. Recent researches in philosophy, logic and linguistics has studied such a relationship under the often differently interpreted labels of pragmatics. Hussein (2001:48) refers to the fact that Van Dijk “seems to be preoccupied with the specific requirements that a general pragmatic theory must be fulfilled in order to be successfully applied [SIC] in the study of literature”. Hussein’s view of Van Dijk is a reflection of what the latter himself states: van Dijk (1976 : 36) claims that one must treat literature itself as a specific speech act with its own appropriateness conditions. A more refined version of that approach would be to distinguish between narrative or fictional speech acts, lyrical speech acts, dramatic speech acts. It is the intention of the S to change the system of the H that is considered as the basic feature of a pragmatic theory of natural language. The drawback of such a treatment, van Dijk (1976: 36) continues his discussion saying that other speech acts, e. g.: assertions, questions, commands, etc., also occur in literature and it seems problematic to have more than one speech act at the same time. However, this difficulty is not faced by distinguishing between macro – speech acts and micro – speech acts, “the first determines the whole discourse, the second merely characterizes the individual sentences of the discourse”. Such a proposal, therefore, is consisted of the more general observation that, for example “a whole discourse functioning as a command may well contain assertions or questions”. Even in criticism, Hussein (2001: 43) states that the pragmatic theory comes to take an essential place. Abrams (1975) (cited in Hussein, 2001) believes that sometimes one can criticize the audience and thus such a criticism is a pragmatic theory. It is called so because it chiefly looks at the work of the act as a means to an end, an instrument for getting something done, and tends to judge its value due to its success in achieving that aim.
٤٧ To make concluding remarks concerning the relationships between pragmatics in general and speech act in particular and literature, two different points of view are remarked here: The first one is shown by Ohmann who was the first who applied SAT to the situations in his (1971) article ‘Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature’. It has been mentioned before and it is properly to elaborate it in more detail that Ohmann (1971) believes that a poem or any other work of literature which violates those conventions will violate the FCs that Austin (1962) has put. For example, if I want to promise that I have no intention of honouring, or if I bid four spades in a chess game,… etc., those and similar circumstances will deviate the illocutionary force of any utterance and render the speech act void and null. Thus, “there is no point in asking whether the author is the appropriate person to utter, or write, that the speech act is not pertinent”. Thus, one may ask: What illocutionary status, Ohmann (1971: 254) suggests a poem for example, does have? Ohmann’s conclusion is that the illocutionary force of a poem is mimetic, in other words, “a literary work purportedly imitates a series of speech acts, which in fact have no other existence”. Thus, the speech acts in a poem are thus quasi speech acts; the usual application of the FCs is only to allow mimics to take place. The author imitates “the speech acts of an imagined speaker, and the reader imitates or conjures up an imaginary situation that derived by the imagined speaker” ( for further detail, see Levin, 1976: 146-147). The second point is hold by Pratt (1977: 88) and other literary pragmaticists such as Kobernick (1985: 62). Both of them agree on the interrelationship between speech act and literature. The former believes that speech act approaches to literature, enables people to describe and define literature in the same terms of describing other kinds of discourse. SAT views a person’s ability to deal with literary works as part of his/her general ability to handle possible linguistic structure in specific contexts. Similarly Kobernick (1985: 62) comments on the relevance of the SAT which is applicable to the analysis of literary texts especially plays, as well as of everybody conversation. Moreover, he comments on the importance of SAT on any or all of the following levels: isolated passages, series of exchanges with topical shifts, character functions and dramatic structure. These two different points of view represent two conflicting views concerning the status of literary discourse. Al-Sulaimaan (1997: 37-38) comments on these views as follows: These views are formalists and non-formalists: Pratt (1977) and Kobernick (1985) represent language and a work of literature as “an action performed in the real world with real speech acts”. Moreover, they believe that both texts, i.e., literary and non-literary texts are “communicative interactions, in a particular context, between participants who, in the case of literature, are fictionalized personae” (similar view is adopted by Culler, 1971; Van Dijk, 1976 ; Pratt, 1977; and others). To elaborate this view, let’s choose Van Dijk’s view. It has been mentioned above that Van Dijk (1976) claims that literary phenomena require the interpretation of pragmatics other than syntactic and semantic general grammar. Moreover, Van
٤٨ Dijk (1976: 48) firmly claims that only via alternative worlds, the relationship between the literary discourse and the real world can best be achieved. For him (1976: 52), literary texts require the speech act with the same FCs as those holding in the real world. Hence, he says: Actions in some imagined world are represented such that, by non-conventional implicature, in which the reader knows the writer’s intention that he, the receiver, should act in the same way in reality. In those cases, the constructed worlds or situations are deontic models of the actual world: They picture, what should be done in the physical world. (Van Dijk, 1976: 48) Similar view to Van Dijk is Schmidt’s (1976: 168). In his article ‘Toward a Pragmatic Interpretation of Fictionality’, he concludes that syntactic or semantic levels alone cannot define poeticity. Furthermore, he thinks that no particular class of utterances can describe literary texts as fictional. Ohmann (1971) is one of those who represent the other view (formalists). Formalists think that in literature, the status of speech acts is problematic since they do not occur in the real context of situation. As a result, literature does deal with pretended speech acts, or imaginary speech acts but not with real ones. In addition to such belief, they state that literature has “its own special language that is systematically different from ordinary, casual, everyday, colloquial language”. The same view is adopted by Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Levin, 1976; Lyons, 1981 and others. For more elaboration, let’s take Searle’s (1979: 63) response to the attempts of the non-formalists. Al-Sulaimaan (1997: 38) states that both Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) “exclude all parasitic forms of communication such as telling jokes or acting in a play or writing a poem”. Searle (1979: 63,65) responds, however, to the non-formalists with suspicion. This reponse is adopted according to the view that a novelist is “not performing the IA of making an assertion, but the IA of telling a story or writing a novel”. Searle, instead of the new domain of literary illocution, invokes a notion of pretended act. He concludes that “the author of a fictional work pretends to perform a sequence of IAs, normally of the assertive type”. Al-Sulaimaan (1997: 39) comments on Searle’s view as follows: Two statuses of acts are allowed by Searle: Real and pretended, he does not reject any of the standard components of the speech act model. Searle (1979: 74) believes that imagination plays a great role in human life: The crucial role, usually underestimated, that imagination plays in human life, and the equally crucial role that shared products of the imagination play in human social life. And one aspect of the role that such products play derives from the fact that serious speech acts can be conveyed by fictional texts, even though the conveyed speech act is not represented in the text.
٤٩ Al-Sulaimaan’s comment on Searle’s view is further supported by van Oart (1998: 442-43) Searle in his article of (1979) ‘The logical Status of Fiction’ states that the best way to study fiction is to refer to pragmatics, with particular reference to SAT. In pragmatic discourse, the author or S is held accountable for his/her assertions that match up to reality. The fictional discourse, on the other hand, argues that the author is not held accountable for the truth of his statements. Therefore, Searle chooses a model depending on speech act concept in which “language functions in the context of an overall illocutionary act”. Similarly, Van Oart (1998: 444-445) argues that the problem of fiction is solved due to its departure from pure literature or semantics to the realm of intentionality and psychology that are better studied within the realm of SAT. Thus, in addition to language users, linguistic meaning depends also on the fact that “there exists an independent world to which it can refer”. Therefore, language is not “a mere mimetic doubling of the world”, but on a separate world, “a world of the imagination that is not answerable to the fundamental ontology of natural science”. It is not only Searle who believes in the fact that there are two acts: real and pretended. Literary critics also denote that the writer conveys a real or serious speech act through the performance of the imaginary speech act or representation of speech acts that constitute the work of fiction (see Searle, 1979: 74-75). Levin (1976: 141-42), in his comment on Searle’s claim, suggests that having an implicit higher sentence in its deep structure of the form: “I imagine myself and invite you to conceive a world in which…”, determines the illocutionary force of any literary utterance. In this respect, Levin (1976: 154) points out: A poem is a speech act in which the poet, by his use of deviant language, includes his auditors to perceive as literally true a world for whose properties and existence, this language is the only evidence. Sell (1995: 129) states that Levin makes imagination, “the imagining of a world in which neither the writer nor the reader really exists, poetry’s definitive and exclusive property”. Gray (1978: 192) comments on Levin’s claim saying that specifically, Levin neglects the fact that the poet is irresponsible by doing any act and; therefore, he obviously intends to make his theory to deal with or treat poetry as comparable in import knowledge (for further information concerning the formalists’ view, see Ohmann, 1971). Watts (1981: 173) in his study of Dickens’ Hard Times presents the following diagram to show the relationship between the narrator and the reader. It is as follows:
٥٠ Dickens1
Reader1
Dickens2
Reader2
Narrator1
Fictional Reader
characters other characters Narrative world Fictional world
Fig.(1): The Communicative Act in Hard Times
The simplicity of this diagram should not decieve us of not looking into the complexties which can be produced along the axis between Dickens2 and Narrator1 and; therefore Reader2 and Fictional Reader. Many critics of Hard Times appear to ignore the simple fact that their communication with Dickens can only take place within the fictional world. They are unable to recognize their role as fictional readers and thus do not “construct and/or accept a picture of their primacy communicative partner, the narrator”. On this fact, Watts further elaborates by stating that if the reader recognizes the fictional role he/she is expecting to play, he/she can easily involve himself in a communicative interaction, by an extension with the author, with the narrative personality. However, if he/she does not recognize this role (as in the case of anonymous omnipresent narrator), he/she is in a state of (or about to forget) forgetting that the primary communicative interaction is within the framework of a fictional world. For this reason, many critics are unable to distinguish between Dickens and the narrator (through discussing the structure of the text) (Watts, 1981 and 1992). As a conclusion, Watts argues that “no adequate theory of narratology should ignore the differences between Author1 Author2 and Narrator1”. Again, there is no such a theory which simply should claim that there should be an essential direct relationship between the context and the narrative world (the context is within the fictional world) and biographical facts that are known of the author as a historical person. To close off Watts’ discussion, a theory of language in use is best situated to describe and interpret the written fictional narrative text than either a theory of
٥١ linguistic competence or a theory of stylistics and/ or poetics. Moreover, a fictional narrative text creates a further level of communication within the fictional world between an assumed (non-participation) narrative personality and his/her idealized audience, i.e., communicative partner (or the fictional reader). As a result, an adequate communication can not occur if the latter is not ready to accept and recognize his/her role as the narrator’s partner within the fictional world. As far as the choice of this novel is concerned, Watts intends to show how Dickens’ Hard Times, which is considered as a fictional narrative text with an anonymous omnipresent narrator, can be re-assured by applying the literary theory (Watts, 1981: 43). In conclusion, the following remarks are stated: First: The distinction between literary and non-literary language is not so sharp since both play a great role in communication. Whatever else it is, a speech act of some kind and hence deserves much attention by literary scholars as well as linguists and philosophers. Second: A literary text has two realities: Therefore, it is called ‘a multi-layer construct of reality’. On the other hand, it has its ‘psycho-socio-physical reality’. This is done since the literary text (a novel) for example, is produced by a real author who wrote it with a certain intention to be transmitted to the real receiver (reader) to achieve a certain perlocutionay effect with that of socio-cultural context (Al-Sulaimaan, 1997: 46-47). The other reality is the fictional (or semi-fictional world) and this reality constitutes the world of the text. We will apply this to the novel since the characters of the novel (narrators, readers, fictional readers and/ or other characters) have interest within the fictional world in the same way as the natural dialogues(11). Moreover, they should follow the same pattern of the social conventions adopted by the real S and/or reader at the time at which the text is produced. The characters, narrators and readers, should interact (verbally or non-verbally) within that world to achieve successful performance of SAT in general and expressives in particular. To fulfil this aim, suggested FCs for performing complaining, apologizing and thanking that are not much different from the acts the speakers use in natural conversation are put forward. Therefore, it is quite easy to apply the SAT to the 19thC. novels. Third: The novel is therefore defined as a ‘macro text act’ (by adopting Hatim and Mason’s (1990) term) which is performed in the real world with real speech acts. The real reader is part of the context and; therefore, part of the interpretation of the utterance. The following model(12) may make our view more explicit:
٥٢
The Real world Socio-Cultural-Context Author Adresser1
Text Act
Reader Adressee1
Verbal / non-Verbal Narrator Adresser2 Character A Addressee
IA
Fictional World
Fictional Reader Adresse2 Character B Addresser
Fig. (2): Our Modified Model of the Communicative Acts in Novels
٥٣ Notes to Chapter Two (1) Much of the semantic work done by philosophers of language during the sixties and early seventies rested upon the truth-functional definitions of semantics in the Carnapian tradition and continued by philosophers such as David Lewis (1972). (2) The hot debate between the descriptivists and the non-descrpitvists is represented and discussed in many research works (see Leech, 1983: 181-184, Najam, 1990: 35-36, and Lewis, 1972: 210). (3) It is the movement which Wittgenstien actively attacks in his philosophical investigation with the well-known slogan “meaning in use” (1953) and the insistence that utterances are activities or language games in which they play a role. (4) Verbs which designate speech acts, speech activities and any aspects of linguistic behaviour are called by Ballmer and Brennstuhl as speech act designating verbs or simply speech act verbs. Philosophers and linguists call them performative verbs. However, since there is not clear distinction for delimiting performative verbs (as for instance the use of verbs in the first person singular present indicative action in the performative utterance), Ballmer and Brennstuhl are not making use of a narrower usage of ‘performative verb’. (5) Sociopragmatics deals with certain local conditions of language use in different utterances among different social classes. Pragmalinguistics, on the other hand, deals with particular sources which are provided by a given language for maintaining particular illocutions. (6) Thus, they are called ‘ceremonial performatives’. Fraser (1975: 87-211) describes them as those verbs denoting acts, which rely on the existence of some codified legal, religious or similar activity for their successful performance. Such acts are always performed by the use of a performative sentence as ‘I hereby pronounce you man and wife’. (7) Ohmann has changed his position somewhat in his more recent, but equally important publication, ‘Speech, Literature and the Space Between’ in New Literary History (1974) (cited in Pratt, 1977: 89). (8) Al-Sulaimaan (1997: 50) states that until the mid of the 1980s, most pragmatic analysis was done on spoken language and much less on written language as in the works of van Dijk (1976), Pagnini (1980), Sbisa and Fabbri (1980), Watts (1981), Adams (1985) and Sell (1985a-b). (9) Al-Sulaimaan (1997: 50) states that linguistic structuralism was attracted to langue rather than parole in the tradition of Saussure and behaviarists. Behaviouists, following Bloomfield, neglect meaning. Transformationalists focus, on the other hand, on sentences. (10) For its application to literature, see Pratt’s book of (1977) and Petray’s book of (1990). Therefore, a number of theses (MA and Ph.D.) have applied Grice’s implicatures to certain literary genre such as Al-Dulaimi’s (2001). (11) In this respect, the researcher clearly follows the non-formalists’ view that has already been adopted by Culler (1971), Short (1981) and others as has already been mentioned before. (12) It is a modified model of Watts’ (1981: 43) figure.
٥٤ Chapter Three The Speech Act of Complaining 3.1 The Concept of the Speech Act of Complaining: The speech act of complaining is one of the expressive categories. This category includes moral judgements which express the speaker’s approval and disapproval of the behaviour mentioned in the judgement (Trosborg, 1994: 311). In the speech act of complaining, the events mentioned in the proposition take place in the past. This act is in essence retrospective in that “the speaker passes a moral judgement on something which she/he believes the complainee has already done or failed to do, or is in the process of doing” (Trosborg, 1994: 311). The speech act of complaining has been listed under different categories by many scholars from different perspectives. Austin (1962: 150-162), for example, classifies IAs into five categories taking into consideration English verbs (see 2.3.1). Austin (1962: 159) defines behabitives as the inclusion of “the notion of reaction to other people’s behaviour and features and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone’s past conduct or imminent conduct”. According to Austin’s classification, Al-Sulaimaan and Muhammed (2001: 2) conclude that complaining is a kind of performative which concerns behaviour towards others to illustrate attitudes and feelings. Austin’s (1962) behabitives are included amongest Searle’s (1975b) expressives. Behabitives seem not to be well defined to Searle, but seem to involve notions of what is good or bad for the S and H in addition to attitudes. Searle labels Austin’s behabitives as expressives (for Searle’s classification of IAs, see 2.3.2). According to Norrick (1978: 278), expressives are those speech acts that express feelings and emotions, rather than beliefs and intentions. Therefore, expressives are distinguished from other IAs by the types of psychological conditions they express. Searle (1975b: 345-50) proposes twelve dimensions in which IAs differ from one another (for the discussion of these dimensions, see 2.3.2). One of these dimensions is the illocutionary point. Searle (1979: 15) believes that “the aim of the illocutionary point of expressives is to express the psychological state specified in the propositional content”. Such verbs as thank, apologize, complain,… etc. have no direction of fit. In performing an expressive act, the S is neither trying to get the world match the words; nor the words match the world, therefore, the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Mey (1993: 131) agrees with Searle in the sense that the illocutionary point of expressives expresses a certain psychological state; which have no direction of fit, in which a wide range of psychological states can be expressed and in which the propositional act ascribes a property or an act to the S or the H. The performance of an expressive act, therefore, establishes an interpersonal relation between the S and the H because “the former expresses a psychological state brought about by a state of affairs that involves the latter” (Al-
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Sulaimaan and Muhammed, 2001: 2). From this point of view, Haverkate (1984: 23) describes expressives as ‘S and H centered’. Trosborg (1994: 10) relates complaining to the expressive IA in which the S expresses his/her negative feelings towards the H “who is made responsible for a prior action which was against the speaker’s interests”. The question that can be raised now is: What’s is the illocutionary function of the speech act of complaining? Generally, Leech (1983) proposes four types of illocutionary functions which call for different degrees of politeness and attempts a classification according to how illocutionary functions relate to the social goal of maintaining comity (Trosborg, 1994: 20-30). These functions are as follows: Competitive: It competes with the social goal, e.g. ordering, asking, demanding, begging. Convivial: It coincides with the social goal, e.g. offering, inviting, greeting, thanking, congratulating. Collaborative: It is indifferent to the social goal, e.g. asserting, reporting, announcing, instructing. Conflictive: It conflicts with the social goal, e.g. threatening, accusing, cursing, reprimanding. Of these, only the first two types are the ones which chiefly involve politeness. Competitive function involves politeness of a negative character. Convivial function on the other hand, involves positive politeness in the sense that politeness seeks opportunities for comity. Conflictive functions by nature, designed to cause offence. Finally, collaborative functions are similar to conflictive functions in the sense that politeness is irrelevant. It is concluded that polite speech act largely corresponds to Leech’s (1983) category of convivial functions. Therefore, the act of expressive psychological attitudes in cases where it is positive such as pardoning, thanking, congratulating, praising, tend to be intrinsically polite. However, verbs such as cursing, threatening, accusing, and reprimanding which express psychological attitudes in a negative way, are said to be intrinsically impolite. These acts, therefore, have conflictive functions since the illocutionary goal of complaining for example, conflicts with the social goal: The S expresses negative feelings and reactions towards H. Because of their offensive nature (complaining speech acts) in the sense that they are highly threatening to the social relationship between S and H, Leech (1983: 105) demonstrates that “politeness is out of the question”. To use Trosborg’s (1994) terminology, complaining, then, is “an abusive act”. Some speech acts are intrinsically threaten face, those acts are referred to as ‘face- threatening acts’, abbreviated as FTAs. The notion of face is derived from Goffman (1974) and further developed by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987). They (1987: 62) treat the aspects of face as ‘basic wants’. They distinguish between positive and negative face depending on Durkheim’s (1915) distinction between positive and negative rites (for further detail, Trosborg, 1994: 25). Positive face means “the individual’s public self-image” while negative face means “the desire for freedom of action to project this image” (Watts et al, 1992: 7). Therefore, a complaint about the quality of someone’s work threatens
٥٦ his/her positive face, while telling someone they cannot have a drink after a certain time is a threat to their negative face (Grundy, 1995: 133). Face means the public self image of a person. It refers to one self’s emotional and social sense. “A description to protect self image and hearer’s face” equals politeness. Thus, ‘complaining’ is out of politeness (this proves the fact that is described above concerning complaining’s conflictive function) in the sense that “it costs its face”. Hence, Brown and Levinson (1978) consider it as a FTA. It has been stated before that complaining expresses negative feelings and emotions. The question that may be asked at this moment is: How can you communicate throughout using these negative and offensive feelings?. Language provides us with one of the most effective ways to accomplish and ensure communication; that is through using politeness strategies. This conclusion may contradict the facts that have already been made, i.e., complaining is a FTA and; therefore, politeness is out of question. However, these strategies or to use Trosborg’s term (1994) mitigating devices, lessen or minimize the impact of threatening or cost on or to H. Thus, through mitigating devices or politeness strategies, a complainer wants to avoid a direct confrontation with the complainee. Trosborg (1994: 315-319) classifies these strategies into four types: a. No explicit reproach: To avoid direct confrontation with the complainee (H), the S focuses on the undesirable event and the illocutionary which according to the S’s point of view, follow from the complaining and leave out the agent (who is indirectly responsible for that event). Despite the fact that this strategy is weak, it might be used successfully to prepare for a more forceful strategy, e.g. the use of hints (Str. 1) in: 1. The kitchen was clean and orderly when I left it last. b. Expression of annoyance: A complainer can express his/her annoyance, dislike, etc, concerning a certain state of affairs he/she considers bad for him/her. This category includes annoyance (Str. 2) and illconsequences (Str. 3): The former occurs when the complainer implies that he/she holds the competence responsible, but avoids mentioning him/her as the guilty person. The latter results from an offence for which implicitly the compliance is held, e.g.: 2. Don’t look at these things, all over the place. 3. I’ve already spent ten minutes. Oh, quarter of an hour I think it was, cleaning up the bathroom itself. c. Accusation: In this category, the agent of a complainable is established. This category includes two strategies: Indirect (Str. 4) and direct (Str. 5) accusation. In the former, the complainer asserts that the complainee is connected with the offence. Therefore, the complainee is a potential agent of the complainable. The latter can directly accuse the complainee of doing the offensive action, e.g.: 4. Look what I just found in my cupboard, your dirty clothes. (indirect) (The complaining implies the complainee is guilty). 5. What about those clothes I found in the cupboard this morning, You just stuffed them in, all the dirty ones. (direct) (explicit accusation).
٥٧ d.
Blaming: “An act of blame presupposes that the accused is guilty of the offence”. This category includes three levels or with “respect to the explicitness with which the complainer formulates his/her moral condemnation of the accused”: 1. Modified Blame (Str.6): “The complainer expresses modified disapproval of an action for which the accused is responsible”: 6. You could have said so, I mean, if you had so much to do. 2. Explicit Condemnation of the Accused’s Action (Str.7): In this strategy, the complainer explicitly states that the act is bad for which the accused is held responsible, e.g.: 7. You never clean up after you, I’m sick and tired of it. 3. Explicit Condemnation of the Accused as a Person (Str.8): “The complainer explicitly states what is implied at all other levels, namely, that she/he finds the accused a non-responsible social member”, e.g.: 8. Oh no, not again: you really are thoughtless. Among these (8) sub-categories, the first strategy is the most indirect strategy, whereas the eighth strategy is the most direct one. In addition to the four above mentioned politeness strategies of ‘complaining’ (that are classified according to directness level) that lessen the impact a complaint is likely to have on the accused, there are other devices that have the same function. These are: First, the use of modality markers (internal modifiers: downgraders). The inclusion of these modifiers will first: lessen the impact of the complaint, and second: make the complaint sound more polite. Upgraders, on the other hand, increase the impact of a complaint on the H. By increasing these internal modifiers (downgraders and upgraders), it is possible to maintain the same level of directness with different degrees of politeness. Downgraders include: Downtoners (e.g. adverbial sentence modifiers such as just, simply, etc. and adverbials expressing tentativeness (e.g. perhaps, maybe), understates (a little bit, a second), hedges (e.g. adverbials such as kind of, sort of, somehow, etc.), subjectivizers (e.g. ‘I think’, ‘I suppose’,.. etc.), cajoles (‘you know’, ‘you see’, …etc) and appealers (‘Okay’, ‘right’,…etc). Upgraders include intensifiers (such as ‘such’, ‘so’, etc), commitment upgraders (include sentence modifiers such as ‘I’m sure’, I’m certain’,… etc) and lexical intensification (e.g. ‘You’ve stained’/ ‘ruined my carpet’). Second, external modification. Within external modification, there are a number of factors that increase and decrease the direct confrontation with the complainee. Those that increase it are eight in number such as aggravating the offence, repeated action, lack of consideration, no excuse, a breach of contract or promise, deceived expectation and appeal to the complainee’s moral consciousness (for further information concerning these increasing factors, see Trosborg, 1994: 331333). Decreasing factors are called supportive moves that successfully support an act of moral condemnation. In other words, they are factors that a complainer must be able to show in order for his/her complaint to be justified. In addition to that, they serve to provide face saving arguments by having a number of elements or moves (to use Trosborg’s termingology).
٥٨ a.
b.
c.
d.
Supportive moves include: Preparators: Mean the successful organization of the conversation in which a complaint is issued. Within this move, the complainer is preparing the speech act by “means of utterances that break the ground or warn the complainee that a complaint is forthcoming”, e.g.: 9. Situation: Term paper not handed in. Listen, Lene, there is something I want to talk to you about, you remember our agreement, don’t you? Disarmers: to avoid providing an act that is too face threatening to the complainee is an important task for a complainer. To do this is to employ disarming strategies, e.g.: 10. Look, I don’t want to be variable about it. Providing evidence: A complainer must be able to show that the complainee has in fact performed or failed to perform the undesirable action, e.g. A complainee assumes that he/she has kept his/her promise of handing in complainer’s term paper and insists that the paper he/she has is only a copy, complainer provides evidence on the contrary: 11. It’s not a copy. Look, I signed it, the signature is in ink, see. Substantiation: The complainer should substantiate moves by providing arguments or facts to the effect that “proposition (P) is bad”, e.g.: 12. The deadline’s today. Out of these four moves, disarmers are very important supportive moves that decrease complainer’s confrontation with the complainee (Trosborg, 1994: 329331). In addition to those moves, there is another strategy which has the same function as the above mentioned moves. This strategy is called complaint perspective. In this strategy, speaker – hearer perspective of a complaint presents a particular point of interest. In the act of complaining, avoid mentioning of the complainee downtones the impact of the complaint on the complainee (as it has been already discussed). In this case, ambiguity might arise with regard to addressee. However, this ambiguity can be resolved by having a number of ways that accomplish the relationship between complainer and complainee. Haverkate (1984: 56) distinguishes between focalizing and defocalizing expressions. The former means the speaker’s intention of mentioning the role of the referent in the described proposition by: First: ‘Speaker-perspective-I’. This includes the proper pronoun ‘I’ or both proper and common nouns. Second: ‘Hearer-perspective-you’. This includes the proper pronoun ‘you’ or common nouns: 13. I / Daddy/ Uncle Sam prefers your child to be well-behaved (Here, the S ‘I’ or other common and proper nouns identify him/ herself as the complainer and he/ she is responsible for issuing blame). 14. I hadn’t expected you (Susan/ my daughter to behave like this) (Here, the H (complainee) is responsible for the complaint) (for further information concerning these expressions, see also Trosborg (1994: 323, 325). Defocalizing expressions, on the other hand, involve the S’s aim of minimizing or avoiding articulating the role of the referent in the described
٥٩ proposition by either using the ‘speaker-perspective-we’ or by ‘hearer-perspectiveit’. The first type of defocalizing expressions is ‘speaker-perspective-we’ includes a number of categories such as: a. Class inclusive reference: In the act of complaining, a class inclusive reference is established as an important tool for a complainer who defocalizes his/her personal points of view by attributing them to a specified class rather than to him/herself, e.g.: An employee may speak on behalf of the whole staff. Therefore, the pronoun ‘we’ is used to refer only to the S and H. b. All inclusive reference: In contrast to (a), this class is not limited to any particular class of persons. It is rather a general reference which is found in generic statements, e.g.: 15. We/one should not tolerate torture of human beings. (We or one reference to S, H or undefined set of other persons). c. Pseudo-indirect reference: In complaint situations, this kind of reference is usually used by persons of superior social status, e.g. by teachers who address their pupils, e.g.: 16. We don’t want your fact on the table, do we? (we is used to refer to S). Sometimes, ‘we’ is used to refer to H ‘you’ in order to express solidarity and interest, e.g.: 17. Then we are to have a nice warm bath. (Trosborg, 1994: 323-325) The second type of defocalizing expressions is defocalizing reference to the complainee ‘hearer-perspective-it’. This category has connection with implicit or non-specific reference to the agent of the complainable. This kind of reference, because of the intended reference may be any person, is very useful for the strategic purpose of minimizing information concerning the agent who is responsible for the undesirable event described in the proposition. The reasons behind avoid mentioning the agents are: First: The agent may be unknown to the S. Second: Identifying the agent may be of little importance to the S. In the act of complaining, the S suppresses the identity of the agent for the sake of strategic purpose of avoiding direct accusation or blame of the H. Third: The presupposition is true, the blame is directed at the complainee through no reference is made to him / her. Therefore, the categories described are agentless passives, constructions with neutral agents (one, someone, etc) and constructions in which the undesired state of affairs has been made the focus of attention, e.g.: 18. There is a terrible dent in my car. A generalization may be used successfully to avoid personal confrontation (with respect to both the S and H to protect their face). Generalization is a two- edged weapon: (1) it prevents the H from being directly attacked by the S in such generalized situations, (2) there exists a consensus with respect to the S’s point of view (complainer). (Trosborg, 1994: 325-326). From what has been said, one may conclude that the act of ‘complaining’ is an utterance in which S expresses his/her negative feelings or annoyance (disapproval, etc) because of a past or on going act that is not always held by H, i.e.,
٦٠ in some cases, complaining to someone who is considered as a complainee, but he/she is not an agent e.g.: When one suffers from certain pain, one would say: 19. That hurts. H is not responsible 20. It pains me for the past A 21. Oh, my God! (see Al-Sulaimaan and Muhammed, 2001: 4)
3.2 The Structure of the Speech Act of Complaining: Given these properties of the speech act of ‘complaining’, one should know the structure (grammatical, semantic and philosophical) under which this speech act may be correctly performed (or structured). The discussion will be started by examining the syntactic structure implied in expressives (in general) and speech act of complaining (in particular). Searle (1975b: 357) and (1979: 23) states that expressives characteristically require a gerundive transformation of the verb in the lower node structure of the sentences, e.g.: 1. I apologize for stepping on your toe. 2. I thank you for giving me some money. The deep structure of these sentences is: I verb you + I / you Vp gerundive norm Where / (stroke) means there is a choice of one of two elements. The explanation of the obligatory gerundive is that in expressive category, there is no direction, of fit, i.e., the S is neither trying to get the world match the words nor the words match the world; rather the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Standardly, the forms that admit direction of fit, ‘that clauses and infinitives’ are impermissible. Therefore, neither (3) nor (4) is possible: *3. I apologize that I stepped on your toe or I apologize to step. *4. I thank you that you paid the money or I thank you to pay. However, the point of discussion is “not all of the permissible nominalization transformations are gerundive”, the point is that they must not generate ‘infinitive phrases’ or ‘that clauses’, thus either 5. I apologize for behaving badly or I apologize for my bad behaviour, is grammatical, but not (3) or (4), and to repeat, these syntactical facts are consequences of the fact that there is in general no direction of fit and the truth of the proposition expressed in an expressive is presupposed. The symbolization of this class; therefore, must proceed as follows: E (P) (S/H + property) Where parentheses indicate optionality, E indicates the illocutionary point common to all expressives, is the null symbol indicating no direction of fit, (P) is a variable ranging over the different possible psychological states expressed in the performance of the IAs in this class and the propositional content ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either S or H.
٦١ To apply this formula to complaining act, for example, the following result will occur: the illocutionary point of complaining is to express complaining, there is no direction of fit between the words and the world, a person who complaines for H’s action expresses annoyance and this property is specified in the utterance by a complainer towards a complainee. As far as the philosophical structure of the speech act of complaining is concerned, Searle (1969: 54-71) proposes a set of FCs for performing the act of promising and claims that one can formulate other conditions for other types of speech acts. These FCs should be obtained, otherwise the speech act in question would be performed insincerely. Norrick (1978: 279-282) proposes a further analysis of the IAs classified as expressives in Searle’s (1975b). His analysis is concerned with distinguishing between members of this class and discussing their social functions. The proper way of differentiating the members of expresives is to depend on FCs rather than depending on emotions. Emotions play secondary role in, first, differentiating the members of expresseives and second, determining their social functions. As far as the social functions are concerned, they mean the kinds of effects which a S intends to cause by performing such acts. In other words, the social function necessarily includes its perlocutionary effect, e.g. the illocutionary point of apologizing is to express regret, its intended perlocutionary effect is to get the addressee to believe that he/she is contrite. However, the social function may be to display good manners, to assuage the addressee’s anger or to get of the hook and be on one’s way. It has been already referred to, that Norrick (1978) distinguishes between members of expressives depending on FCs which also determine their social functions. These FCs are: 1. The Factive Condition: As Searle (1969) has stressed, expressives are associated with “the speaker’s presupposition of the proposition expressed”, e.g. a person who uses a sentence such as (6) to perform an act of complaining must believe that the S (complainer) does this act: 6. “I am on the point, sometimes, of complaining that they – but I’ll not…” (Wuthering Heights, Ch. VII, p.70). This type of presupposition is of the factive kind. The verb complain is factive in the sense that it requires a complement which indicates a propositional presupposed truth. If no complement occurs, semantic and pragmatic considerations permit reconstruction of the presupposed proposition. Factive presuppositions are conventional implications corresponding to Grice’s (1975). They depend solely on semantic information. In conclusion, the condition that the S should presuppose the truth of the propositional content of expressives and accept the state of affairs it specifies (explicitly in the complement introduced by ‘for’ or ‘on’) as factual is called factive condition (Norrick, 1978: 282). 2. The Value Judgement Condition: In addition to the factive condition which determines the successful performance of expressives, Norrick (1978: 283) states another preparatory
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constraint which expressives must meet to be successful, i.e., value judgement condition. This, and the following condition, are Searle’s (1969) preparatory conditions. In this condition, i.e., the value judgement, the S makes a value judgement with respect to the effect of the recognized state of affairs on the patient, i.e., the affected person. Applying to the act of complaining, it is concluded that S feels that the state of affairs has affected him/her, and thus he/she makes his/her value judgement of that offensive act (Al-Sulaimaan and Muhammed, 2001: 5). 3. The Role Identification Condition: Another constraint Norrick (1978) places upon the successful performance of expressives is that “the speaker identify [Sic] the roles of agent (the person responsible for the state), patient, and, in some cases, observer”. By observer, it is meant the (a person cognizant of the state beside the patient). The S identifies those roles with himself/herself or with the addressee to whom the IA will be addressed. Failure to recognize responsibility the state leaves S with no reason to for example, apologize. In terms of these three conditions, Norrick (1978: 284) schematically provides us with a generalized formulation of expressive speech acts as follows: (Agent) / value/ (patient) (observer), where ( ) indicates optionality and ll offers the choice positive or negative act. Norrick (1978) provides us with a general formula for all expressives; yet, he does not specify certain expressive acts. It is left for us to modify his formula and apply to a specific expressive speech act that we want to discuss. To apply our modified formula to the act of complaining, the formula will be as follows: Agent (S): complainer, value: negative, patient (H): complainee. Al-Sulaimaan and Muhammed (2001: 6) set some FCs for the successful performance of complaining. They are as follows(1): The Propositional Content Condition: S expresses the proposition of complaint in his/her utterance/and or behaviour in the hope that H will alter this offensive state of affairs in future. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Past A done by H. b. A has an unhappy consequences on S. c. S views H as responsible for A. The Sincerity Condition: S feels unhappy for a past A done by H. The Essential Condition: S’s utterance counts as an expression of annoyance (disapproval) to make H recognize that the past A does not satisfy S. From the above mentioned set of FCs, some SRs for the use of the IFID have been derived by Al-Sulaimaan and Muhammed (2001: 6). The Propositional Content Rule: Complaining should be uttered only in the context of a sentence, the utterance of which put responsibility.
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a. The proposition of complaining is to be uttered only if there is a past A which has unhappy consequences on S. b. The proposition of complaining is used only if S views H responsible for A. 3The Sincerity Rule: ‘Complaining’ is uttered only if S feels unhappy for A. 4The Essential Rule: The proposition of ‘complaining’ is to be uttered only if S’s utterance/ and or behaviour counts as an expression of annoyance to make H recognize that the past A does not satisfy S. We will adopt Al-Sulaimaan’s and Muhammed’s FCs and SRs since they are simpler, clearer and more economical. The ground has now been prepared for a full dress analysis of the speech act of complaining. The data to be presented in the following sections will be analyzed by using our adopted FCs as a model for establishing the status of complaining in four English novels of the 19thC.: Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, Hard Times and Vanity Fair.
3.3 The Analysis of the Speech Act of Complaining: In this section, our adopted model of the FCs for the speech act of complaining is going to be applied to different examples derived from Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, Hard Times and Vanity Fair.
3.3.1 Wuthering Heights: Text (1): 1. Ch. II, p.30: With this insult, patience was now at an end. I uttered an expression of disgust, and pushed past him into the yard and running against Earnshaw in my haste. Interpretation: The way Heathcliff treats Mr. Lockwood is very stiff, he treats him as a stranger and wants him to share a bed with Hareton or Joseph. This insult puts an end to the Lockwood’s patience. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Lockwood’s annoyance is expressed through his disgust (behaviour) and pushing him into the yard in the hope that Heathcliff will change his behaviour with him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Heathcliff insults Lockwood and treats him badly. b. Being so, Lockwood complains and becomes unsatisfied. c. Lockwood considers Heathcliff as responsible for insulting him. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mr. Lockwood is unsatisfied and annoyed by Mr. Heathcliff’s insult. 4. The Essential Condition: Lockwood’s expression of disgust is considered as an expression of complaining to make Heathcliff recognize that he treats Lockwood in a bad way and he recognizes that. Text Analysis:
٦٤ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. IV, p.30: He complained so seldom, indeed of such stirs as these that I really thought him not vindictive. Interpretation: Hindley, Earnshaw’s son, gives Heathcliff a blow because the latter wants to exchange the colts that Earnshaw brought them, Hindley does not accept, but is forced to do that after hitting him (because Heathcliff forces him to do so). Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Heathcliff expresses his seldom complaint in his behaviour in the hope that Hindley will never do it in the future. 2. Preparatory Conditions: a. Hindley gives Heathcliff a blow. b. This blow has unhappy consequences on Heathcliff. c. Heathcliff considers Hindley as responsible for this bad behaviour. 3. Sincerity Condition: Heathcliff is unhappy for a past action done by Hindley. 4. The Essential Condition: Heathcliff’s disgust is counted as an expression of complaining to make Neally (H not complainee) recognize that to blame, in her turn, Hindley (the real complainee and he has already recognized that because he treated Heathcliff badly). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
1.
2. a.
3.
Text (3): 3. Ch. IV, p.48: I persuaded him easily to let me lay the blame of his bruises on the horse. Interpretation: Neally wants to avoid problems; therefore, she wants to persuade Heathcliff that the one who should be blamed is the horse not Hindley (this is what she wants him to tell Earnshaw and others). Establishing the Status of Complaining: The Propositional Content Condition: Heathcliff expresses his blame of Hindley in the hope that he will not do it again. This is what the readers are acquainted with, but here, Neally persuades Heathcliff to blame the horse which hits him, not Hindley in the hope that this offensive action will never occur to him. The Preparatory Conditions: The horse hits Heathcliff. b. This action has unhappy consequences on Heathcliff. c. Neally persuades Heathcliff to consider the horse (not Hindley) is responsible for that. The Sincerity Condition: Heathcliff is unhappy for the hit that the horse does.
٦٥ 4.
The Essential Condition: Heathcliff’s behaviour is counted as an expression of annoyance to make Neally recognize that. She recognizes that by persuading him to lay the blame on the horse not on Hindley. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
Text (4): 4. Ch. VIII, p.67: He neither wept nor prayed: He cursed and defied: execrated God and man, and gave himself up to reckless disspation. Interpretation: Catherine’s brother, Hindley, has a wife who is dead. Therefore, he complains and curses (he loves her too much). Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Hindley expresses the proposition of complaint in the utterance ‘defied and cursed’. He is complaining from man and God (because God takes her life and because she suffers from human beings) in the hope that his wife’s death did not occur. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. His wife is dead. b. He is complaining from man and God. c. God and man are responsible for that. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Hindley is unhappy for his wife’s death. 4. The Essential Condition: Hindley’s curses are counted as complaining to make others (God and man) recognize that his wife’s death does not satisfy him and they recognize that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. VII, p.70: “I’m on the point, sometimes, of complaining that they – but I’ll not….”. Interpretation: Heathcliff is complaining of those pitiful, silly friends of Catherine, they are Edgar and Isabella. Heathcliff wants her to accompany him, but she wants to accompany Edgar and Isabella. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Heathcliff expresses the proposition of complaining in the utterance: ‘Those pitiful, silly friends of yours’ in the hope that they will not continue accompanying her again. 2. Preparatory Conditions: a. Catherine accompanies Edgar and Isabella as her close friends. b. Accompanying Edgar and Isabella, makes Heathcliff complain. c. Heathcliff considers Catherine’s friends responsible for his complaining.
٦٦ The Sincerity Condition: Catherine always prefers Isabella and Edgar’s company than Heathcliff’s. This has unhappy consequences on Heathcliff (because he loves her and hates him). 4. The Essential Condition: Heathcliff’s utterance is counted as an expression of annoyance to make Catherine recognize that spending most of the time with Edgar and Isabella makes Heathcliff complain. Catherine recognizes that, but she does not take care of Heathcliff. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. 3.
Text (6): 6. Ch. VIII, p.70: “What are you on the point of complaining about, Heathcliff?”. Interpretation: Catherine asks Heathcliff of what he is complaining from? It has been mentioned before that Heathcliff is complaining from Edgar and Isabella because he loves her too much(2). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 2nd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. VIII, p.72: Little Hareton, who followed me everywhere, and was sitting near me on the floor, at seeing my tears commenced crying himself, and sobbed out complaints against “Wicked aunt Cathy”. Interpretation: Catherine wants to be alone with Edgar, but Neally tries to work beside her, this disturbs Cathy, that’s why she slaps Neally making her crying. Hareton loves Neally too much, so when he sees her crying, he sobs complaining and curses her aunt. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (8): 8. Ch. IX, p.82: and told how I saw him quit the kitchen just as she complained of her brother’s conduct regarding him. Interpretation: Cathy loves Heathcliff, but to marry him, means she will be degraded. She wants him to be full of power as far as money is concerned. She wants him to be away of her brother’s authority. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
٦٧ Text (9): 9. Ch. X, p.96: But one day, when she had been particularly wayword, rejecting her breakfast, complaining that the servants did not do what she told them. Interpretation: The surface meaning of this utterance is that Isabella complains of her servants who are no longer obeying her. But the real (deep meaning) reason of her complaining is that Catherine does not let her walk with Heathcliff (Isabella loves him). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (10): 10. Ch. XI, p.104: But she had likewise dropped her fretful complaining and we found it a great comfort. Interpretation: Isabella was (as already has been stated) complaining explicitly from her servants, but implicitly from Catherine for preventing her from going with Heathcliff. Now, she drops her complaining because of Heathcliff’s presence for the second time. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (11): 11. Ch. XI, p. 106: His first words revealed that he did not clear his wife of blame. Interpretation: Isabella fells in love with Heathlciff, but her brother, Edgar, does not accept this because he knows quite well that Heathcliff wants to take revenge on him because he (Edgar) marries Catherine (Heathcliff’s beloved). Thus, he blames his wife because she is responsible for letting Heathcliff into Edgar’s house. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (12): 12. Ch. XI, p.109: Besides, he might come and bring a string of abuses or complainings. Interpretation: The interpretation of this text and its FCs are the same as in text (No. 11). Text Analysis:: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (13):
٦٨ 13. Ch. XII, p.118: “Hush”, I cried. Interpretation: Cathy loves Heathcliff more than her husband loves him . The last time, there was a quarrel between her husband and her lover. Her husband returns back to discuss the matter concerning Heathcliff with her. He (Edgar) believes that he means nothing because she loves Heathcliff. Therefore, she is complaining from him. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (14): 14. Ch. XIV, p. 133: “I blamed her, as she deserved, for bringing it all on herself”. Interpretation: Neally blames Isabella for the bad state that Isabella lives in Wuthering Heights with Heathcliff (Isabella chooses this by herself). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (15): 15. Ch. XIV, p.138: “Well, Mr. Lockwood, I argued and complained, and flatly refused him fifty times”. Interpretation: Neally complained of Heathcliff’s insistence on going to Grange to see Catherine. He puts her in a critical situation forcing her to agree to his friend. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (16): 16. Ch. XVII, p. 152: “Hush, Hush!”. Interpretation: Isabella accuses Heathcliff to be non-human but Neally does not accept. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (17): 17. Ch. XXI, p.187: “Oh, confound the vapid thing!” He’s absorbed in drying his feet, and never looks at her. Interpretation: Heathcliff wants to take Edgar’s fortune so he decided to make Linton Heathcliff’s son, marry Cathy, Edgar’s daughter, but he does not pay attention
٦٩ to Cathy. Linton is sick; therefore, heathcliff cries at his son to take notice of Cathy in the way he speaks with her. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative , Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (18): 18. Ch. XXI, p. 190: “You take papa’s side, Ellen: you are partial”. Interpretation: Cathy is complaining from Neally because she took Edgar’s side against Heathcliff and his son. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (19): 19. Ch. XXIII, p.201: The invalid complained of being covered with ashes; but he had a tiresome cough and looked feverish and ill, so I did not rebuke his temper. Interpretation: There is no fire since there is no coal, therefore, Linton feels cold. When Cathy brings coals to him, he is complaining from the masks that cover the coals. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (20): 20. Ch. XXIII, p. 203: “Hush, master Heathcliff !”, I said. Interpretation: Linton wants (as his father plans) to marry Cathy. Cathy does not want that because she believes that their love (brotherly) is everlasting. This disturbs Linton making him informing Cathy of her mother’s fact (that she loves Heathcliff more than Edgar). This makes Neally complain because she does not believe this fact. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (21): 21. Ch. XXIII, p. 204: “I can’t bear your talking”. Interpretation: When Linton wants to tell Cathy the truth of the love-relationship between his father and her mother, Cathy becomes angry to the extent she gave the chair (that Linton sat on it) a violent push and caused him to fall against one arm. Then, he coughed for a long time. This makes Linton complaining and uttering the words “spiteful, cruel thing”. Text Analysis:
٧٠ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (22): 22. Ch. XXIV, p. 208: She complained of headache and left me. Interpretation: Cathy starts loving Linton and she wants to see him all the time, but neither her father nor Neally Welcomes this idea. Therefore, she makes use of the chance that both of them are sick to see Linton. When Neally insists, on days of staying and talking with Cathy, Cathy resists this idea claiming that she has a headache. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (23): 23. Ch. XXVI, p. 224: “I cannot bear it, Catherine”. Interpretation: Heathcliff plans for making love relationship between Linton and Cathy for the sake of getting Edgar’s (Cathy’s father) future. Therefore, he obliges Linton to go and see Cathy despite of his sickness. Linton tries to make Cathy love him and he begs her to stay with him. If she refuses, Heathcliff will kill Linton. Cathy’s refusal in addition to Linton’s own pain, lead to Linton’s complaining. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
3.3.2 Jane Eyre:
1.
2. a. b.
Text (1): 1. Ch. 2, p.17: “unjust! – unjust !”, said my reason. Interpretation: Jane Eyre is complaining from all people who are around her: John Reed’s tyrannies, all his sisters’ proud indifference, all his mother’s tyrannies, all the servants’ partiality and all Reed’s children, make her suffer and never make her pleased. Leaving Jane alone into the red room, makes her suffering too much. Establishing the Status of Complaining: The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her proposition of complaining in her utterance ‘unjust-unjust’ in the hope that her sufferings will be ended in the future. The Preparatory Conditions: Life in Gateshead Hall (which is represented by Mr. Reed and her children and particularly in a red room). This life makes Jane unhappy and wants to leave this place because of their bad treatment.
٧١ c. Those people are responsible for Jane’s sadness, suffering and complaining. 3. The Sincerity Condition: She is unhappy because of being in red room. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as a kind of complaining to make readers (implicitly) and those people (Mrs. Reed and her children (explicitly) recognize the bad state Jane is in. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. 2, p.19: “What a dreadful noise! It went quite through me!”, exclaimed Abbot. Interpretation: Abbot, is complaining from Jane’s loud voice because she wants anyone to help or let her out. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Abbot expresses the proposition of complaining in her utterance ‘what a dreadful noise’ in the hope that Jane stops crying. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane is crying loudly to make others help her to go out. b. This makes Abbot complaining. c. Therefore, Jane is responsible for Abbot’s complaining. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Abbot is unhappy or unsatisfied because of Jane’s crying. 4. The Essential Condition: Abbot’s utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make Jane recognize that and Jane recognizes that, but she continues her crying. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. 4, p.36: Now, uttered before a stranger, the accusation cut me to the heart. Interpretation: Mrs. Reed accuses Jane of being deceitful she told Mr. Brocklehurst that she has had bad reputation. This hurts Jane to the extent it will cut her heart. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mrs. Reed accuses Jane of being deceitful in front of Mr. Brocklehurst in the hope that he will keep an eye on her and guard against her fault. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mrs. Reed accuses Jane of being bad woman. b. This makes Jane unhappy.
٧٢ c. Therefore, Mrs. Reed is responsible for Jane’s unhappiness. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane is unsatisfied because of Mrs. Reed’s accusation. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make the readers (implicitly) recognize the type of life she lives in and they recognize and to make (by using her facial expressions) Mrs. Reed and Mr. Brocklehurst (explicitly) recognize that Jane is unsatisfied with Mrs. Reed’s speech and they recognize. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch. 4, p.39: A ridge of lighted heath, a live, glancing, devouring would have been a great emblem of my mind when I accused and menaced Mrs. Reed. Interpretation: When Mrs. Reed accuses Jane of being deceitful, Jane becomes angry and she talks badly with Mrs. Reed saying that she wants to leave the house and goes to Lowood school. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her annoyance in her utterance “I accused and menaced Mrs. Reed” in the hope that Mrs. Reed stops talking badly about her. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane wants to defend herself against Mrs. Reed’s accusation. b. Jane’s speech has bad consequences on her. c. Jane considers Mrs. Reed as the only responsible person for her misery and for making Jane angry when she talks with her. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane feels unhappy because of Mrs. Reed’s treatment and accusation (of being bad woman). 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of annoyance which is so flaming to make Mrs. Reed estimate her bad treatment and her long suffering and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. 8, p.80: She was not, I was told, in the hospital portion of the house with the fever patients, for her complaint was consumption, not typhus. Interpretation: Jane is talking about Helen, one of her pupils in Lowood school. Helen is complaining from consumption, she is in need of care; therefore, she is taken away from the hospital of the school. Establishing the Status of Complaining:
٧٣ 1.
2. a. b. c.
a. b. c.
3. 4.
The Propositional Content Condition: Helen expresses her complaining from her sickness through her suffering in the hope that she will soon get rid of it. The Preparatory Conditions: Consumption infects Helen. She is complaining from it. Implicitly, Mr. Brocklehurst is responsible for Helen’s complaining (since he does not take care of the school). Explicitly, consumption is the real reason of her complaining. One the implicit level (deep level): The school is very dirty. Jane is complaining. The dirtiness of the place (since no care has been provided by those who ran out the place especially Mr. Brocklehurst) is the reason behind Jane’s complaining. The Sincerity Condition: Helen is unhappy because of her sickness. On the implicit level, Jane is unhappy because of the dirtiness of the school. The Essential Condition: Helen is complaining to make the readers or those who ran out the place recognize the reason behind Helen’s sickness. Implicitly, Jane is complaining to make those who ran out the place recognize the real reason behind Helen’s sickness. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
Text (6): 6. Ch. 4, p.39: “I will indeed send her to school soon”, murmured Mrs. Reed, sotto voice, and gathering up her work, she abruptly quitted the apartment. Interpretation: Jane is accusing Mrs. Reed of being harsh with her and she demands from Mrs. Reed to send her to school, therefore, Mrs. Reed decides to do so. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mrs. Reed expresses the proposition of complaining in her murmur in the hope that Jane stops talking badly with her and getting rid of her. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane talks badly with her (Mrs. Reed). b. This leads Mrs. Reed to be angry with her and finally she decides to admit her to school. c. Jane is responsible for making Mrs. Reed angry or annoyed. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mrs. Reed is unhappy because of Jane. 4. The Essential Condition: Mrs. Reed’s utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make Jane recognize that she (Jane) makes Mrs. Reed annoyed. Text Analysis:
٧٤ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. 10, p.87: Then, I cried, half desperate”. Interpretation: Jane Eyre lives eight years in Lowood school, she wants something new. This related to her restless nature, she does not want to remain in the same place (this is related to Charlotte Brontë’s characteristics that she loves changing since her father is very restrictive). Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her annoyance in her utterance ‘half desperate…’ in the hope that Mrs. Reed will treat her in a good way in the future and take her back to her home. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane lives in isolation. b. Staying in the same place (in isolation having nothing only to do her duty) makes her complaining. c. She accuses Mrs. Reed directly, though implicitly of being in this school. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane feels unhappy because of being in Lowood place (she feels alone). 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of annoyance to make Mrs. Reed recognize that her action (when she treats Jane badly and bringing her to this school) has bad consequences on Jane. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (8): 8. Ch. 12, p.110: “Anybody may blame me who likes, when I add further, that now and then, when I took a walk by myself in the grounds…”. Interpretation: Jane wants to move from her place to another because she has a restless characteristic (she reflects Charlotte Character, she wants to move to see the world more clearly, but can’t because of her father); therefore, she thinks that others will blame her. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: She expresses others’ feeling towards her that might blame her utterance ‘anybody may blame me who likes’ in the hope that she will be content in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane wants to move from one place to another. b. Therefore, she expects that others will blame her. c. Others (including readers) accuse her as being responsible for the difficulties she outfaced. 3. The Sincerity Condition: She is unhappy because of others’ blame.
٧٥ 4.
The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of others’ blame (others blame her) to make Jane recognize that she is responsible for their blame and she recognizes that by saying anybody may blame me who likes: (since she is discontented). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (9): 9. Ch. 14, p.134: “Stubborn?”, he said, “and annoyed”. Interpretation: Rochester wants Jane to accompany him, he asks her to speak of whatever she likes, but she speaks of nothing. Therefore, Mr. Rochester is annoyed. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
Text (10): 10. Ch. 17, p.164: “I wish I had as good; not that mine are to complain of”. Interpretation: Leach (one of the charwoman) is not complaining from having lower wages, but she is complaining from Pool because she has higher wages than Leach. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (11): 11. Ch. 17, p.168: “Nonsense if she objects, tell her it is my particular wish”. Interpretation: Rochester asks Jane to accompany his daughter, Adèle and Jane refuses to accompany her (because she thinks that in this party, she has no place). This makes Rochester complain; therefore, he threatens her to fetch her in the case she resists on refusing to go with him. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (12): 12. Ch. 17, p.176: “Oh, don’t refer him to me, mama! I have just one word to say of the whole tribe; they are a nuisance”. Interpretation: Explicitly, Blanche complains from her mother because her mother asks her to tell Rochester something related to Jane but implicitly, Blanche is complaining from all servants since Jane is one of them. Text Analysis:
٧٦ Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (13): 13. Ch. 17, p.177: “Oh, gracious, mama! Spare us the enumeration!”. Interpretation: Blanche and her mother will talk about servants, Blanche is complaining too much of them, she gave examples of them, therefore, she decides to change the subject and not to talk about it any more. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (14): 14. Ch. 18, p.186: But the longer I considered the position, education and C., of the parties, the less I felt justified in judging and blaming either him or Miss Ingram for acting in conformity to ideas and principles instilled into them, doubtless, from their childhood. Interpretation: Jane loves Mr. Rochester and she thinks that he also loves her, but when she sees them in the party and how he and Miss Ingram are confirming with each other, she blames them for they do not have love towards each other, but because they are of the same class and social status. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (15): 15. Ch. 18, p.188: “How provoking!”, exclaimed Miss Ingram, “you tiresome monkey” (apostrophizing Adèle). Interpretation: While visitors are waiting for Rochester, Adele declares that Mr. Rochester has arrived. Unfortunately, it was not Mr. Rochester, but a man similar to him. Therefore, Miss Ingram expresses her annoyance. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (16): 16. Ch. 21, p.222: “You never told me that before: you always said you had no relation”. Interpretation: Rochester is complaining from Jane since she has not told him that she had relations. Text Analysis:
٧٧ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (17): 17. Ch. 21, p.230: “A sickly, whining, ping thing!” Interpretation: Mrs. Reed is complaining from Jane, she dislikes her because her husband (Mr. Reed), Jane’s cousin, likes her too much. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (18): 18. Ch. 21, p.233: Eliza generally took no more notice of her sister’s indolence and complaints. Interpretation: Georgenia is complaining of whatever around her, what she wants is only to go with her aunt away from his family, she does not care of what happened to her family. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (19): 19. Ch. 21, p.299: “Solitude! solitude!”, he reiterated with irritation. Interpretation: Rochester is complaining from Jane (Jane discovers that Rochester marries another woman) because she decides to leave him. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (20): 20. Ch. 35, p.411: “Insufferable – unnatural – out of the question”. Interpretation: Jane refuses to marry St. John because he does not love her (he wants her only as a tool). Therefore, his sister ‘Diana’ complains of him. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (21): 21. Ch. 37, p.434: “Cruel, Cruel deserter! Oh, Jane”. Interpretation: Rochester loves Jane too much so when she comes back again, he expresses his annoyance because she left him.
٧٨ Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (22): 22. Ch. 37, p.439: “A crippled man, twenty years older than you, whom you will have to wait on? A poor blind man, whom you will have to lead about by the hand?”. Interpretation: After Jane’s departure, Rochester wants to help his wife to be out of fire. Because of this accident, he becomes a crippled man. Therefore, he is complaining from his own state and wants this state to be clear for Jane. Since she loves him, she accept him in any state. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, (a crippled man), Implicit (Rochester), Subject: 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit.
3.3.3 Hard Times: Text (1): 1. Ch. 1, p.10: “I have been tired along time”. Interpretation: Louisa expresses her annoyance to her father. Her father deprives her from going to the circus, so she is tired of being ordered not to do this and to do that. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Louisa expresses the proposition of complaining in her utterance ‘I have been tired along time’ in the hope that her father will change his way of treating her as a woman that should be scientific. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Louisa’s father is very stiff in treating his children. The most important thing for him is facts. b. Being so, Louisa becomes annoyed. c. She implicitly accuses her father as being responsible for her annoyance. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Louisa is unhappy because of her father’s treatment. 4. The Essential Condition: Louisa’s utterance counts as an expression of annoyance to her father, Mr. Gradgrind, to make him recognize that his bad treatment annoys his children. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. 2, p.12: “I do not know of what of everything, I think”. Interpretation:
٧٩
1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
Louisa again expresses her disapproval of her father’s way of treatment: life according to him is about facts no more, no less. Thus, going to the circus is something naive, away from science. Establishing the Status of Complaining: The Propositional Content Condition: Louisa continues expressing her annoyance by saying ‘I have been tired of everything, I think’, in the hope that her father will change his treatment, since he treats them as machine humans. The Preparatory Conditions: Mr. Gradgrind (Louisa’s father) is very stiff and hard-hearted man. He does not pay attention to his children, he only gives orders. Being so, Louisa is annoyed and she is complaining for along time. Her father is responsible for that sort of complaining, he is the main source for Louisa’s disapproval. The Sincerity Condition: Louisa is unhappy because of her father’s treatment. The Essential Condition: Louisa’s utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make her father recognize that his treatment causes them suffering for along time or being tired for along time and he recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit.
Text (3): 3. Ch. 4, p.12: “She kept a chandler’s shop”, pursued Bounderby, “and kept me in an egg-box. That was the cot of my infancy; an old egg-box”. Interpretation: Mr. Bounderby is complaining from his grandmother who treated him badly, she was the wickedest and worst old woman that ever lived. She is the cause behind Mr. Bounderby’s being a vagabound and humiliated person by everyone. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mr. Bounderby expresses the proposition of complaining in his utterance “and kept me in an egg-box. That was the cot of my infancy; an old egg-box” in the hope that he will have another person (implicitly grandmother) who takes care of him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Bounderby’s grandmother treats him badly. b. Being so, Mr. Bounderby complains or is unsatisfied. c. The one who is responsible for Mr. Bounderby’s complaining is Mr. Bounderby’s grandmother. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mr. Bounderby’s is unhappy because of the way his grandmother brought him up, i.e., bad.
٨٠ 4.
The Essential Condition: His utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make H, i.e., Mrs. Gradgrind recognize that Mr. Bounderby suffered a lot when he was a child. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit.
Text (4): 4. Ch. 4, p.16: “You’ll rub a hole in your face”. Interpretation: Mr. Bounderby wants to leave, so he kisses Louisa’s cheek. This disturbs her. Thus, she rubs the cheek he has kissed, with her handkerchief, until it was burning. After doing this for five minutes, Thomas complains. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Thomas expresses the proposition of annoyance in his condition “What are you about, Loo?” her brother sulkily demonstrated “You’ll rub a hole in your face” in the hope that Louisa stops rubbing her check in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mr. Bounderby kisses Louisa’s cheek. b. This disturbs Louisa making her rubbing her cheek with her handkerchief for five minutes. Louisa action makes Thomas feels with disapproval or annoyance. c. Louisa is responsible for his annoyance. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Thomas is unhappy because of Louisa’s action. 4. The Essential Condition: Thomas’ utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make Louisa recognize that she disturbs him by her repeated action and she recognizes that by saying “you may cut the piece out with your penknife if you like, Tom I wouldn’t cry”. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. 5, p.18: Then came the Teetotal Society, who complained that these same people would get drunk, and showed in tabular statements that they did get drunk. Interpretation: Mr. Bounderby describes the state of Coketown in which the society complains from the people who are sacred goat directed at the same time as the state of Gradgrind’s children. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: The Teetotal society expresses the proposition in its behaviour in the hope that those people would give up drinking in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. People in Coketown drank too much.
٨١ b. c.
This makes society in a bad state. People who drank too much, danced and watched illegal scenes are responsible for the bad state of society. 3. The Sincerity Condition: The Teetotal Society is unhappy because of the bad behaviour of those people. 4. The Essential Condition: People’s (who live in this society) utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make others who are bad recognize that they did wrong things. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person plural, Implicit 3rd person singular (Mr. Bounderby), Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. 5, p.18: That they were restless, gentlemen; that they never knew what they wanted. Interpretation: Those people who live in Coketown, they drink too much, dance, live upon the best and think fresh butter. On the explicit level, they are complaining since they do not know what to do. On the implicit level, they are complaining from the society since it does not provide them with what they are in need of. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Those people express the proposition of complaining in their behaviour in the hope that implicitly, the society will give them what they deserve in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Those people need more than they have, i.e., they do not feel with satisfaction. b. Thus they are complaining. c. They regard the society they live in, is responsible for their unsatisfied state, but explicitly, they are responsible for their restless state. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Those people who live in Coketown feel unhappy because they did not feel with satisfaction, they need more than what they have. 4. The Essential Condition: Peoples’ behaviour is counted as an expression of complaining to make other people such as those who belong to the Teetotal Society recognize that they are unsatisfied with their own and present state and they recognize that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular (Mr. Bounderby), Explicit 3rd person plural, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (7):
٨٢ 7. Ch. 13, p.68: “I come home desperate. I come home wi’out a hope, and mad wi’ thinking that when I said a word o’ complaint, I was reckoned a onreasonable hand”. Interpretation: Stephen is complaining from his wife because she is mad. He wishes that his wife is going to die so that he can marry Rachael. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Stephen expresses the proposition of complaining in his utterance: ‘I come home wi’out a hope, and mad wi’ thinking that when I said a word o’ complaint’ in the hope that his wife will die in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Stephen loves Rachael and his wife is mad. b. Being mad and still alive makes, Stephen complain. c. His wife is responsible for Stephen’s complaining. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Stephen is unhappy for his wife’s madness and her being a live. 4. The Essential Condition: Stephen’s utterance is counted as an expression of annoyance to make Rachael recognize that his wife is responsible for his complaining and she recognizes that by putting her hand on his mouth to stop him from saying more. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (8): 8. Ch. 14, p.70: “Don’t shed tears”, said Mr. Gradgrind. “Don’t shed tears. I don’t complain of you”(3). Interpretation: On the explicit level, there is no complaining. However, on the implicit level, Mr. Gradgrind is complaining from Sissy’s father since he is the direct reason behind her (Sissy) failure in the school. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mr. Gradgrind expresses the proposition of complaining in his utterance: “I understand you. You still refer to your father”. ‘Well if your training in the science of arriving at exact results had been more successful, you would have been wiser on these points’ in the hope that Sissy will try to study hard and change her ideas into scientific ones in the future (without paying attention to her father’s interference). 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Sissy is not a successful student in the school. Her father does not support her to succeed in the school. b. Carelessness leads Sissy to get low results in the school and this is what Mr. Gradgrind is disappointed about. Therefore, implicitly or explicitly, he is complaining.
٨٣ c. Mr. Gradgrind and even Sissy consider Sissy’s father responsible for that. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mr. Gradgrind is unhappy because of Sissy’s results. 4. The Essential Condition: Mr. Gradgrind’s utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make Sissy (though she is not responsible for her failure) recognize that her father committed a great fault when he did not support his daughter in her study and she recognizes. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (9): 9. Ch. 5, p.114: “Now, what do you complain of?” ,asked Mr. Bounderby. Interpretation: Mr. Bounderby asks Stephen of the general things that people complain of. Stephen’s utterance avoids indicating complaining, but his implicit intention is that he wants to reflect his own intention through people and Mr. Bounderby should think of them. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Stephen expresses implicitly his own complaining from the rich as Mr. Bounderby does in his utterance “Deed we are in a muddle. Sir, Look round town-so rich as tis and see the numbers of people.. look how we live and where we live.. look how you consider of us, and write of us…” in the hope that Mr. Bounderby will treat them in a good way in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mr. Bounderby treats workers (the poor) badly and gives them low wages. b. Being so, Stephen and other workers complain. c. Mr. Bounderby implicitly is responsible for Stephen and other workers’ complaint. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Stephen is unhappy for Mr. Bounderby’s bad treatment. 4. The Essential Condition: Stephen’s utterance ‘Deed we are in a muddle. Sir, Look round town- so rich as tis and see.. who can look on’t, Sir, and fairly tell a man ‘tis not a muddle?’ is counted as an expression of annoyance to make Bounderby recognize that he is responsible implicitly for Stephen and others’ complaining and here he recognizes that by saying “we will make an example of half-a-dozen Slackbridges. We’ll indict the black guards for get them shipped off to penal settlements”. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 2nd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (10):
٨٤ 10. Ch. 9, p.135: “Here’s my mother who never has anything of her own, except her complaints”. Interpretation: Tom needs money and no one helps him: His father draws a line and ties Tom to it from his childhood, his mother always complains from pain. Thus, only his sister is able to help him, but she does not. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
3.3.4 Vanity Fair:
1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
Text (1): 1. Ch. 2, p.8: “Hush!”, cried Miss Sedley. Interpretation: Miss Sharp and Miss Sedley finished their school (at Cliswick Mall). Miss Sharp hates Miss Pinkerton too much to the extent that if Miss Sharp sees her (Miss Pinkerton) floating in the water, she will not help her. Miss Amelia Sedley is a good creater, she does not accept to talk badly about her teacher. Establishing the Status of Complaining: The Propositional Content Condition: Miss Sedley expresses her complaining in her utterance ‘Hush’ in the hope that Miss Sharp stops talking badly about Miss Pinkerton. The Preparatory Conditions: Miss Sharp continues speaking badly about Miss Pinkerton. Being so, Miss Sedley is complaining from her (Miss Sharp). Miss Sharp is, thus, reponsible for Miss Sedley’s annoyance. The Sincerity Condition: Miss Sedley is unhappy because of Miss Sharp’s bad speech. The Essential Condition: Miss Sedley’s utterance is counted as an expression of complaining to make Miss Sharp recognize that she is talking badly about her and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. 2, p.8: “O Rebecca, Rebecca, for shame!”, cried Miss Sedley. Interpretation: The interpretation of this text and its FCs are the same as in text (No.1). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (3):
٨٥ 3. Ch. 3, p.17: Luckily, at this time he caught a liver complaint, for the cure of which he returned to Europe, and which was the source of great comfort and amusement to him in his native country. Interpretation: Joseph Sedley was in the East India Company’s civil Service in Boggley Wollah which is situated in a fine and lonely district. He had lived for about eight years of his life, quite alone, at this charming place. Scarcely seeing a Christian face except twice a year. Unlike the case he receives at his place; therefore, he is complaining. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Joseph expresses the proposition of complaining in his behaviour in the hope that he will never go to India in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Joseph as lived in India for about 8 years. b. Living in India, makes Joseph complaining from being alone. c. His work is responsible for his complaining. 3. The Sincerity Condition: He is unhappy because of being away from his home. 4. The Essential Condition: Joseph’s feelings or behaviours are counted as an expression of complaining to make his family recognize the bad state he was in. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
Text (4): 4. Ch. 3, p.21: “Pooh! Nonsense!”, said Joe, highly flattered. Interpretation: Joe gave Miss Sharp peper from India which she can’t bear. His father told him that this lady wants to marry him; therefore, he shows his complaining by uttering ‘nonsense’. This is so since she does not have the same status as he. Establishing the Status of Complaining: The Propositional Content Condition: Joe expresses the proposition of complaining in his utterance ‘Pooh! Nonsense!’ in the hope that his father stops talking about this subject again. The Preparatory Conditions: His father talks about Miss sharp’s will to marry Joe. Being so, Joe is complaining from this speech. His father is responsible for his complaining. The Sincerity Condition: Joe is unhappy for his father’s speech. The Essential Condition: Joe’s utterance is counted as an expression of annoyance (disapproval) to make his father recognize that his speech does not satisfy Joe. Text Analysis:
٨٦ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. VIII, p.63: “I’m friendless and alone, yesterday I was at home, in the sweet company of a sister, whom I shall ever cherish!”. Interpretation: Implicitly, Sedleys are responsible for her (Miss Sharp) loneliness. Explicitly, Miss Sharp is complaining from being alone after her separation from Amelia at Sir Pitt’s house. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Miss Sharp is expressing her complaining in her utterance ‘Now, I’m friendless and alone; yesterday I was at home, in the sweet company of a sister, whom I shall ever ever cherish!’ in the hope that Amelia will understand her complaining. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Crawley’s sent for Sharp, this family is different from Sedleys’. b. Being so, Sharp is complaining since Crawley’s looks at her with contempt unlike Sedleys’. c. Sedleys’ is implicitly responsible for what Rebecca is complaining of, but explicitly loneliness is the reason. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Sharp is unhappy because of Crawley’s family because she feels alone. 4. The Essential Condition: Sharp is explaining her complaining to make Amelia recognize that Sharp is unhappy. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. VIII, p.63: “Alas! It was safe to insult poverty and misfortune”. Interpretation: Rebecca continues her complaining from being away from Sedleys’ house. She insults her misfortunes. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rebecca expresses the proposition of complaining in her utterance ‘It was safe to insult poverty and misfortune’ in the hope that Amelia understands Rebecca’s bad state. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rebecca left Amelia’s home that she feels with rest at it. b. Being so, she wrote a complaining letter to Amelia. c. Sedley’s family implicitly is responsible for her complaining but her poverty and misfortunes are explicitly responsible for her complaining. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rebecca feels unhappy because of her own present state.
٨٧ 4.
The Essential Condition: Rebecca expresses her complaining to make Amelia recognize that Rebecca is in a bad state. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
Text (7): 7. Ch. XIV, p.118: “Pooh. She will be well in a fortnight, when I shall go back”. Interpretation: Briggs feels jealous of Miss Sharp because she takes care of Crawly, Briggs’ friend. Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Miss Sharp expresses her complaining in the utterance ‘Pooh’ in the hope that Briggs stops her jealousy. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Briggs feels jealous of Miss Sharp. b. Being so, Rebecca is unsatisfied. c. Briggs is responsible for Sharp’s complaining. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Sharp is unhappy because of Briggs’s jealousy. 4. The Essential Condition: Sharp is unhappy (expresses her annoyance by her utterance) to make Briggs recognize that she disturbs Sharp. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (8): 8. Ch. XVIII, p.167: “But listened to all her story of complaints and misfortunes”. Interpretation: Amelia’s father has lost all of his fortune. Old Mr. Osborn hears of this and refuses to let his son, George Osborn, marries her. Amelia is complaining for Dobbin, a friend of Osborn, from the fact that she should leave Osborn (despite their love). Establishing the Status of Complaining: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Amelia expresses the proposition of complaining in her behaviour in the hope that Dobbin will do something to help her. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. He and his father force Amelia and Osborn to leave each other. b. Being so, Amelia is complaining. c. Their families especially his, is responsible for their separation. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Amelia is unhappy because of their separation. 4. The Essential Condition: Amelia’s behaviour (feelings) is counted as an expression of complaining to make Dobbin recognize their separation and her annoyance. Text Analysis:
٨٨ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (9): 9. Ch. XXV, p.234: “About their complaints and their doctors, do ladies ever tired of talking to each other?”. Interpretation: Rebecca and Briggs have not met for a long time. Therefore, each one starts talking about their complaints. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person plural, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (10): 10. Ch. XXV, p.235: “Though why should I complain of her”, Rebecca added, “though I have been her tool and the victim of her arts, do I not owe my dearest Rawdon to her?”. Interpretation: Rebecca blames Mrs. Bute, who considers Miss Crawley as that odious and designing woman of being careless towards her daughter. Moreover, she (Rebecca) complains from Mrs. Bute since the latter uses the former as a tool to her arts. Thus, Rebecca is certainly complaining. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (11): 11. Ch. XXIX, p.268: “Pooh! Jealous!”, answered George. Interpretation: Rebecca accuses Amelia of being jealous from her because Rebecca lives now with Rawdon. Moreover, Amelia lost her fortune since her father’s misfortunes. Rebecca’s speech annoys him to the extent he accuses all women of being jealousy. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (12): 12. Ch. XXXI, p.290: That organ which he was accused by Rebecca of not possessing began to thump tumultuously. Interpretation: Rebecca accused Joe of being stiff with her two years ago. His heart forgot her while it is beating to his sister. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
٨٩ Text (13): 13. Ch. XXXI, p.292: “For shame, Rebecca! bad and wicked woman- false friend and false wife!”. Interpretation: Amelia is very worried about her husband, she likes her husband. She accuses Rebecca of being careless about her husband (Rebecca’s husband) and of robbing Amelia’s husband. Amelia is sick, thus, she imagines Rebecca comes and takes Amelia’s husband. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (14): 14. Ch. XXXV, p.344: “The child was asleep”, “annoyed perhaps at the creaking of the Major’s boots”. Interpretation: Amelia’s child was asleep. The Major, William Dobbin, visits them and brings a lot of games for the child. His boots made a voice that disturbs Amelia, thus, she says ‘hush’. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular (child), Implicit 3rd person singular (the Major), Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (15): 15. Ch. XXXV, p.345: “Hush! Don’t wake Georgy!”, she added, as William Dobbin went to the door with heavy steps. Interpretation: William Dobbin, the Major, wants to leave Amelia with her child, he wants to send the letters to the agents. He produces noise with his heavy steps while he is leaning. Therefore, Amelia says ‘hush’ since her child is asleep. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (16): 16. Ch. XXXVIII, p.370: “I will not have badly poisoned, mamma!”, cried Emmy, rocking the infant about violently with both her arms round him, and turning with flashing eyes at her mother. Interpretation: Amelia implicitly accuses her mother of killing him, Amelia’s son, by giving him a medicine called Doffy’s Elixir (which Amelia thinks, it is a poison). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit.
٩٠ Text (17): 17. Ch. XXXVIII, p.371: “Poisoned, Amelia!”, said the old lady; “This language to me?”. Interpretation: Amelia found her son in her mother’s arms drinking it a bottle of Doffy’s Elixir. Amelia thinks that this drug is a poison. This disturbs her mother who is indirectly complaining from her daughter. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (18): 18. Ch. XXXIX, p.388: “Give up your keys, you hardened hussy!”. Interpretation: Mrs. Bute accuses Hester of robbing Sir Pitt. Hester does not accept Bute’s accusations stating that though she is poor, she is an honest woman she uses a bad language with Mrs. Bute making her (Mrs. Bute) complaining. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (19): 19. Ch. XL, p.390: They smooth pillows, and make arrowroot; they get up at night, they bear complaints and quarrelousness.. Interpretation: Miss Hester, a nurse who took care of the Baronet, Mr. Crawley’s father, she as all nurses ought to bear the patients’ complaints, she should get up at nights, and tried to lessen Crawley’s complaint but she did not do that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person plural, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (20) 20. Ch. XLIII, p. 420: Everything annoyed him that day. Interpretation: Amelia’s letter annoys her husband because it reminds him of his past love. He is forced (by his father’s will) to leave her. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (21): 21. Ch. XLIII, p.421: And the colonel, pulling his pipe and listening to those complaints would suggest that Glory should have some black frocks out. Interpretation:
٩١ Glorvina is complaining from the Major since he does not pay attention to her. She complains to her sister- in- law that everything is the same for him. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person plural, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (22): 22. Ch. XLVI, p.448: “I’ve sold everything I had, the India shawl from my back, every down to the very spoons”. Interpretation: Mrs. Sedley is complaining from her daughter, Amelia, since the latter buys books for her son while they suffer from poverty. Mrs. Sedley sells everything she can to have bread. Thus, she is annoyed from her daughter’s behaviour, i.e., buying books at Christmas for her son. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (23): 23. Ch. XLVII, p.452: “Pooh! I tell you there are secret reasons”. Interpretation: Tom Eaves, who knew all the great folks in London and the stories and mysteries of each family, expresses his annoyance from how the man’s poor situation is compared with that of the great. He provides us with the example of the Marchioness of Steyne, the Maughtiest woman in England. Despite of her haughtiest nature, she would bend down to her husband so submissive. She will not be so submissive unless her husband has some sword to hold over her. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (24): 24. Ch. XLVII, p.453: Pooh! And it stands to reason that every great man, having experienced this feeling towards his father, must be aware that his son entertains it towards himself; and so they let but be suspicious and hostile. Interpretation: Tom continues his annoyance from the society he lives at by giving another example, for how the poor men’s situation is compared to that of the great. This example is of the father and his son. The fathers and elder sons of all great families hate each other. The Grown prince is always in opposition to the crown, or hankering after it. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit.
٩٢ Text (25): 25. Ch. XLVII, p.453: “Pooh! Sir, they know the world!”. Interpretation: Tom again describes the state of England by giving another example of the feeling of the elders towards youngest sons, i.e., George Mac Turk, Lord Bajazet’s eldest son. If, when he comes to the title, had his will, he would do what the sultans do. He would clear the estate by chopping off all his younger brothers’ heads at once and in turn, with them all. So it is another example which shows how the state of England is influenced by the great man (even between the brothers). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (26): 26. Ch. LIII, p.516: “You lie, you dog!”, said Rawdon. Interpretation: Rawdon expresses his annoyance when he saw Steyne kissed Rebecca’s hand (Rawdon’s wife). Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (27): 27. Ch. LIII, p.517: “Ah, how dreary it seemed, how miserable, lonely, and profitless!”. Interpretation: Rebecca is annoyed since she remembered her past life before she met Rawdon. This life was full of dreary incidents. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (28): 28. Ch. LU, p.537: “You have no right to insult Mr. Wenham with this sort of language; and dammy”. Interpretation: A champion in Captain Ma Cmurdo blames Rawdon since the latter uses bad language to Mr. Wenham. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (29):
٩٣ 29. Ch. LV, p.537: “I don’t believe one word of the whole story”, said Rawdon grinding his teeth. “I believe it ad-lie, and that you’re in it, Mr. Wenham”. Interpretation: The cause of Macmurdo’s blame of Rawdon is because of the fact that Mr. Wenham tells Rawdon a story about Steyne, he (Wenham), does not directly tell him about Steyne’s intention, i.e., carrying a letter of challenge to Crawley. Hence, Rawdon indirectly accuses Wenham of being a liar. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (30): 30. Ch. LXIII, p.600: “What a heavenly day!”, Emmy said; “I hope we shall have a calm passage”. Interpretation: Amelia is very sad because of her husband’s death. She wishes that her husband is with her in the tour. Since her husband is not with her, she feels alone and the day passes heavenly. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (31): 31. Ch. LXUI, p.646: “For shame, Major Dobbin”, Emmy said (who looks the Major almost fiercely in the face). Interpretation: Rebecca stays at Amelia’s house. This leads to the Major’s suggestion that Rebecca should no longer stay at Amelia’s house. Therefore, Amelia expresses her annoyance towards the Major. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (32): 32. Ch. LXVI, p.648: “Hush! You little sly creature”, Beckey said taking up his hand and kissing it. Interpretation: Amelia’s son, George, has seen Jos (his uncle) and Rebecca together in the mask at the Rouge et Noir. This annoys Rebecca; therefore, she demands from the child to stop talking about this subject. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (33):
٩٤ 33. Ch. LXVI, p.650: “Pooh! Damn! Don’t let us have this sort of thing!” Jos cried out, alarmed, and anxious to get rid of a scene. Interpretation: Dobbin comes back to Amelia to remind her of what he had suggested before, i.e., do not let Rebecca to live with you. Jos loves Rebecca and he goes out with her secretly (without his sister’s knowledge). Therefore, he does not want Dobbin to speak about her again. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (34): 34. Ch. LXVI, p.653: “What a noble heart that man has”, she thought, “and how shamefully that woman plays with it!”. Interpretation: Rebecca is annoyed because Amelia does not accept Dobbin as a husband. Rebecca wishes to have a husband like Dobbin despite his large feet. Amelia is not a type of woman that plays with others’ feelings but she cannot easily forget her husband and the tradition of society. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit. Text (35): 35. Ch. XI, p.93: “And you ask this villain into your house!”, continued the exasperated Rector. “you, the mother of a young family, the wife of a clergyman of the church of England. By Jove!” Interpretation: The rector expresses his annoyance towards Mrs. Bute since she accepts the presence of her husband, Sir Pitt, is a wicked man who does so many evils, however, his wife is an aware of that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Implicit.
3.4 Findings and Discussion: Complaining as mentioned in the literature (see 3.1) falls within the class of expressives, since the S expresses his/her feelings and emotions (negative ones) towards the H rather than beliefs and intentions. The preceding analysis (see 3.3) has a main focus, that is, it is an application of the suggested model to the data to provide a pragmatic analysis of complaining in the novels under discussion. The researcher presented the results of the preceding analysis (see 3.3) of each novel separately. The first novel is Wuthering Heights. The agent was explicit 1st person singular in (9) instances (33.3%), explicit 3rd person form in (9) instances (33.3%) and explicit 2nd singular form and explicit 1st plural in
٩٥ (1) instance (3.7%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (7) case (25.9%). It was found that explicit type of complaining occurred in (18) instances (66.6%), of which (10) instances (37%) are involved in the direct use of the performative verb complain. Implicit type of the speech act of complaining, however, occurred in (9) instances (33.4%). The nonperformative verb, consequently occurs in (17) instances (62.9%). Considering the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (25) out of (27) instances (92.5) were in the active voice, whereas (2) out of (27) instances (7.4%) were in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was in (13) instances (48.1%), explicit 1st person singular; in (9) other cases (33.3%) was explicit 3rd person singular, in (2) cases (7.4%), was the 2nd person singular form and in (1) case (3.7%) was explicit 3rd person plural. Whereas it was implicit 2nd person singular in (2) cases (7.4%) and implicit 3rd person singular in (1) case (3.7%). With regard to tense in the propositional clauses, the present simple tense was used only in (12) cases (44.4%) and the simple past (15) instances (55.5%). As far as the mood is concerned, it was found that (24) cases (88.8%) out of (27) cases were indicative and only (3) cases (11.1%) out of (27) cases were imperative. The second novel is Jane Eyre. The agent was explicit 3rd person singular in (3) cases (9.3%), (10) cases (31.2%), explicit 2nd person singular in (6) cases (18.7%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (3.1%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (13) cases (40.6%). It was found that the explicit type of complaining occurred in (7) cases (21.8%), of which only (3) cases (9.3%) involves the use of the performative verb complain. Implicit type of the speech act of ‘complaining’, however, occurs in (25) cases (78.1%). Therefore, non- performative verb occurs in (29) instances (90.6%). Concerning the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (29) out of (32) cases (90.6%) were in the active voice, whereas (3) out of (32) instances (9.3%) were in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was in (10) cases (31.2%), explicit 1st person singular, in (9) cases (28.1%) explicit 2nd person singular, (9) cases (28.1%) explicit 3rd person singular form and in (2) cases (6.2%) explicit 3rd person plural, while it was implicit 3rd person singular in (3) cases (9.3%) and implicit 1st person singular in (1) case (3.1%). Concerning tense in the propositional clauses, the present simple tense was used in (22) cases (68.7%) and the simple past tense in (9) cases (28.1%). It was verbless in (1) case (3.1%). As far as mood is concerned, it was found that (29) cases (90.6%) out of (32) cases were indicative, whereas (3) cases (9.3%) were imperative. The third novel is Hard Times. The agent was explicit 3rd person singular in (6) cases (46.1%), explicit 1rt person singular in (2) cases (15.3%), explicit 3rd person plural in (2) cases (15.3%) and explicit 2nd person singular form in (1) case (7.6%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (2) cases (15.3%).
٩٦ Explicit type of complaining occurred in (8) cases (61.5%), of which (7) cases (53.8%) involved direct use of the performative verb complain. Implicit type of complaining speech act, moreover, occurred in (5) cases (38.4%). Therefore, non-performative verb occurs in (6) cases (46.1%). Considering the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (13) cases (100%) out of (13) cases were in the active voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was explicit 3rd person singular in (5) cases (38.4%), explicit 1rt person singular form in (4) cases (30.7%) and explicit 2nd person singular and explicit 3rd person plural form in (2) instances (15.3%). With regard to tense in the propositional clauses, the simple past tense was used in (4) cases (30.7%), whereas the present simple tense was used in (9) cases (69.2%). The mood was indicative in all of the cases (13) cases (100%). The fourth novel is Vanity Fair. The agent was explicit 3rd person singular in (7) cases (16.2%), explicit 1st person singular in (8) cases (18.6%) and explicit 3rd person plural form in (2) cases (4.6%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (26) cases (60.4%) and implicit 3rd person plural in (2) cases (4.6%). Explicit type of the speech act of complaining was used in (13) cases (30.2%), of which (6) cases (13.9%) involved the performative verb complain. Implicit type, however, of the speech act of complaining occurred in (30) cases (69.7%). Therefore, non-performative verbs occur in (37) cases (86%). As far as the structure of the propositional clause is concerned, the subject was 3rd person singular in (18) cases (41.8%), 1st person singular in (7) cases (16.2%), 2nd person singular form in (7) cases (16.2%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (3) cases (6.9%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (4) cases (9.3%), implicit 2nd person singular form in (2) cases (4.6%) and implicit 3rd person plural and implicit 2nd person plural in (1) case (2.3%). With regard to tense, the simple past tense occurred in (10) cases (23.2%), whereas the simples present tense occurred in (33) cases (76.7%). It was found that the active voice was used in (41) instances (95.3%), whereas the passive voice was used in (2) cases (4.6%). Finally, the mood was indicative in (37) instances (86%), imperative in (5) instances (11.6%) and subjunctive in (1) case (2.3%).
٩٧ Notes to Chapter Three: (1)
There are two other conditions which are not taken into consideration in the analysis: the first is the Contact Code Condition which is applied to all speech acts since it involves the fact that both S and H know the language, can understand each other, are aware of what they are doing and don’t have serious handicaps. The second condition is called the Wrap-up-Condition (see Al-Sulaimaan, 1997:69). (2) All examples have been tested by our adopted FCs and have been considered as genuine speech acts. For the sake of brevity, we will ignore this step and give the text analysis only. (3) This text is analyzed in terms of the utterance meaning (implicit level) since there is no complaining in terms of the sentence meaning (explicit level).
٩٨ Chapter Four The Speech Act of Apologizing 4.1 The Concept of the Speech Act of Apologizing: The adjective or noun ‘sorry’ is one of the explicit uses of the speech act of apologizing. Apologizing is an expressive illocutionary act which has the effect of “paying off a debt thus compensating victim for the action done by the offence” (Searle, 1969: 39). Consequently, it is used to “heal a cut in the social interchange between interactants day-to-day interaction”. (Matti, 1999 : 2). From what has been shown, it is left for the reader to induce that apologizing involves two participants: An apologizer and a recipient of the apologizing. The apologizer (or offender) needs to apologize when he/she has performed an act (action or utterance), which has offended another person (apologizee), or for which she/he (apologizer) is responsible (Trosborg, 1994: 327). For Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 20), the act of apologizing requires; therefore, an action or an utterance which is held to “set things right”. Concerning the relationship between the apologizer and the apologizee, Leech (1983: 125), remarks that if the apologizer owes apologizing for the apologizee, apologizing is considered as an expiation of the offence. In this sense, apologizing is similar to thanking since it can be regarded as an acknowledgement of an imbalance in the relationship between S and H, and to some extent, is an attempt to restore the equilibrium. One may ask: when and why does apologizing occur? Olshtain and Cohen (1983) state that apologizing occurs when a social norm is violated whether the offence is real or potential. It occurs to show the apologizer’s intention to “adhere to conventional rules and social expressions”. Thus, Goffman (1971: 145) states that from a societal point of view, apologizing is a social convention that has the function of regulating the daily encounters through obeying the social rules and values. The apologizer, in other words, needs to apologize to be free from guilt, avoid changes to express removes and specifically to alleviate the offended pasty. Consequently, Goffman (1971: 145) concludes that, from the apologizer’s point of view, apologizing functions as remedial behaviour used to “down play the negative repercussions of the offence at hand”. Apologizing is a speech act addressed to B’s face – needs and intends to remedy an offence for which A takes responsibility, and thus to restore equilibrium between A and B (where A is the apologizer, and B is the person offended) (Holmes, 1989) (1). In addition to a remedial function, apologizing is identified as a ritual act and in particular a negative ritual act. Durkhaim (1951) (cited in Trosborg, 1994: 25) distinguishes between positive and negative rites. Goffman (1971) distinguishes between positive and negative ritual acts. The former means supportive interchanges, which arise out of a need for mutual support, whereas the latter occurs when infractions have been made. The former involves an offer, which should be received with a show of gratitude. The latter, on the other hand, demands from the offender that he/she should provide remedial accounts and assurances, and thus a remedial interchange occurs. Thus, apologizing is distinguished from other
٩٩ convivial acts such as thanking and congratulating, by their remedial functions (Trosborg, 1995 : 373 - 374) It has been discussed before (see 3.1) that complaining has a conflictive function since its goal conflicts with the social goal. The S expresses negative feelings and reactions towards H. Unlike complaining, apologizing in the terminology of Leech (1983: 104 – 105), is a convivial speech act. This is due to the fact that the goal of apologizing is to coincide with the social goal of maintaining harmony between S and H. Since expressive acts such as pardoning, thanking, congratulating, etc. involve positive psychological attitudes, they are intrinsically polite. Therefore, polite speech acts largely correspond to Leech’s category of convivial functions. Now, the question that can be raised is: Is apologizing a face-threatening act? Previously, it is discussed that complaining speech acts are offensive in nature since they are highly threatening to the social relationship between S and H; therefore, they are characterized as ‘an abusive act’ (see 3.1, p. 91). Apologizing, is similar to complaining in that it involves a threat to the S. when the offender lets the offended person know that he/she (apologizer) is sorry for what has she/he done (therefore this act is highly hearer-supportive and often self demanding). However, it is, unlike complaining, possible to be identified as a face-saving act by explaining the reason for his/her failure. An element of face-saving involves (1) with regard to a protective orientation towards saving the interlocutor’s face and (2) a defensive orientation towards one’s own face (see Goffman, 1971: 325). Throughout the previous discussion, the researcher tries to draw the reader’s attention to fewpoints concerning apologizing and other speech acts such as congratulating, complaining, etc. and in more particular complaining. To continue this discussion, the researcher tries to discuss the claim that “although the acts complaint / apology resemble an adjacent pair, one may occur without the other”. The discussion starts from the apologizer’s responses. The apologizer’s response has a two- fold aim (see Edmondson – House, 1981 cited in Trosborg, 1994: 374375): “He must placate the complainer to restore social harmony and he/she must restore his/her own social status”. Therefore, complaining is not always followed by apologizing. What’s about the recipient of apologizing? The apologizee, in turn, may or may not have been complaining. If a S feels he/she has given an offence and / or anticipates negative reactions he/she may try to “soften his/her interlocutor’s feelings” by “ getting it first”. Olshtain – Cohen, (1983) state that age, familiarity and social status of the two participants are of the same influential factors that influence the apologizer’s behaviour. Other factors are the apologizer’s own perception of the degree of the severity of the offence (which is often decisive), the recipient’s point of view, his/her perception of the degree of the offence, etc. (Trosborg, 1994: 375). The question that can be raised is: Is the speech act of apologizing a universal one ? Some of the recent authors such as Fraser (1981) claims that: Every language makes available to the user the same basic set of speech acts, such as requesting, apologizing, declaring and promising, with the exception of certain culture-specific ritualized acts such as baptising, doubting bridge, and excommunication. Underlying this claim is the assumption that when language
١٠٠ permits an act such as requesting, every other language will (for further detail, see Wierzbicka, 1991: 152). In Wierzbicka’s (1991: 152) view, it would be difficult to base one’s research on a less justified assumption. Despite in many cultures, it is possible to apologize on behalf of someone or something else, e.g., for someone close to you or for whom you have responsibility, etc., there is considerable cross-cultural variation in perception of responsibility. A Japanese friend reports being very upset by an incident which occurs in Australia, when the parents of a fellow student who had damaged her car, offered no apologizing whatever for the incident. Presumably, the Australian parents felt that their daughter was entirely responsible for her own actions. In German, one can be held legally and morally responsible, if his/her cat digs up his/her neighbour’s garden (Wierzbicka, 1991: 100). Before Wierzbicka, Coulmas (1981) elaborates on the uniqueness of apologizing as follows: Apologizing and thanking are western words, however , their applicability to other cultures should not be taken for granted. “We should not assume”, he states, “that names of speech acts of individual languages define universal types of speech acts”. In Iraq, for instance, if one buys something and later on discovers that it is damaged and intends to replace it, the seller is neither responsible for this dilemma nor ready to compensate the customer. The seller behaves in this way because Iraqis tend to regard it as the customer’s fault for not checking the goods. The idea of responsibility in Iraq is incompatible with the Japanese idea that “customers are good”. Tanaka (1991 : 37) emphasizes this idea stating that “the seller would apologize profusely in such a situation to create a harmonious atmosphere”. Hence, apologizing is universal as far as its expressions, formulas and its functions are concerned. To close off this discussion, one can say that there is little empirical evidence, as the critics argue, for the claim that the speech act categories such as requesting, apologizing, promising have universal functions. The fact that these activities which are found in different languages, in no way prove that their functions in politeness are universal. Now the questions that can be raised are: How does one approach apologizing? Are there direct or indirect strategies? Apologizing can be approached directly or indirectly depending on a number of approaches. The first approach is that of Fraser’s (1981). He proposes nine semantic strategies each of which, meets a particular semantic and pragmatic criterion. The first four strategies, which are semantically oriented, are direct, whereas the other five, which are pragmatically oriented are indirect: Strategy 1: Announcing that you are apologizing, e.g.: 1. “I (hereby) apologize for…” Strategy 2: Stating one’s obligation to apologize, e.g.: 2. “I must apologize for…” 3. “I hereby offer my apology for…” Strategy 3: Offering to apologize, e.g.: 4. “I (hereby) offer my apology for…” Strategy 4: Requesting the hearer to accept an apology, e.g.: 5. “Please accept my apology for…”
١٠١
a. b. c.
Strategy 5: Expressing regret for the offence, e.g.: 6. “I’m (truly /very/ so/ terribly) sorry for…” Strategy 6: Requesting forgiveness for the offence, e.g.: 7. “Please excuse me for…” Strategy 7: Acknowledging responsibility for the offending act, e.g.: 8. “That was my fault”. Strategy 8: promising forbearance from a similar offending act, e.g.: 9. “I promise you that this will never happen again” Strategy 9: Offering regret, e.g.: 10. “Please let me pay for the damage I’ve done” Then, he presents a number of contextual and sociological factors to investigate whether they play any role in the choice of apologizing strategies. These are: The nature of the offence, the situation of the interaction, the familiarity of the individual involved, and the sex of the individuals (Fraser, 1981: 259-262). Another approach which is more elaborative one than Fraser’s (1981) is that of Olshtain and Cohen’s (1983: 20-25). They assume that each speech act has a set of semantic formulas of apologizing depending on whether the offender admits responsibility or denies it. When the offender recognizes the need of expressing an apology, five semantic formulas emerge: 1. An expression of an apology. An expression of regret, e.g.: ‘I’m sorry’. An offer of apology, e.g.: ‘I apologize’. A request for forgiveness, e.g.: ‘Excuse me, pardon’. 2. An acknowledgement of the responsibility: (a) accept my blame, e.g.: ‘It is my fault’. (b) expressing self deficiency, e.g.: ‘I was confused’. (c) recognizing the other person as deserving apology, e.g.: ‘You are right’. (d) expressing acts of intent, e.g.: ‘I did not mean to’. 3. An explanation of the situation, e.g.: ‘The bus was delayed’. 4. An offer of repair, e.g.: ‘I’ll pay for the broken vase’. 5. A promise of forbearance, e.g.: ‘It won’t happen again’. When the offender denies responsibility for the offence, however, his/her verbal reaction would be represented as follows: 1. A denial at the need to apologize, e.g.: ‘There was no need for you to get insulted’. 2. A denial of responsibility: a. not accepting the blame, e.g.: ‘It was not my fault’. b. blaming the other participant for bringing the offence upon himself, e.g.: ‘It is your own fault’. Trosborg’s (1994: 378-383) approach is a much more elaborated one than Fraser’s and Olshtain and Cohen’s. Below is a brief account of her strategies: 1. Opting out cat. O (the complianee does not take on responsibility): The complainee either denies that the complainable has occurred or he / she denies that he / she / himself / herself can be hold responsible. This is done by either justifying his/ her behaviour or by blaming someone else. This category is divided into the following : (a) explicit denial of responsibility, e.g.: ‘I know nothing about it’, ‘I
١٠٢
a. b. c.
a. b. c. d. e. f.
a. b. c.
can assure you’. (b) implicit denial of responsibility (c) justification (d) blaming someone else (e) attacking the complainer. 2. Evasive strategies – Cat I (Minimizing the degree of offence). This strategy is to some extent closely related to the strategies in which the complainee fails to be taken on responsibility. The difference lies in the fact that the complainee seeks to minimize the degree of offence either by arguing that the supposed offence is of minor importance, or by queering the preconditions on which the complaint is grounded. This category involves the following subcategories : Minimizing, e.g.: ‘Oh what does that matter, that’s nothing’. Quering precondition, e.g.: ‘well, everybody does that’. Blaming someone else. 3. Indirect strategies – a. Cat II (Acknowledgement of responsibility) when a complianee decides to take on responsibility, he / she can do so implicitly or explicitly with varying degrees of self-blame. This category includes the following sub-categories which are all hence supporting and self demeaning: Implicit acknowledgement, e.g.: ‘I can see your point’. Explicit acknowledgement, e.g.: ‘I’ll admit I forgot to do it’. Expression of lack of intent, e.g.: ‘I didn’t mean to’. Expression of self-deficiency, e.g.: ‘I was confused’. Expression of embarrassment, e.g.: ‘I feel so bad about it’. Explicit acceptance of the blame, e.g.: ‘It was entirely my fault’. b. Explanation or account – Cat III. A complainee may try to mitigate his/her guilt by giving an explanator or account of the situation. This category involves: a. Implicit explanation, e.g.: ‘Such things are bound to happen, you know’. b. Explicit explanation, e.g.: ‘Sorry I’m late, but my car broke down’. 4. Direct apologies – Cat IV (Expression of apology). An apologizer may express his/her apology explicitely throughout using verbs such as apologize, sorry, … etc. This category includes : expression of regret, e.g.: ‘Sorry about that’. offer of apology, e.g.: ‘I (hereby) apologize for….’. Request for forgiveness, e.g.: ‘Excuse me’. 5. Remedial support: If in apology situations, the gravity of the offence is a sever one, a verbal expression of apology is hardly enough. Thus, explanations and justifications may be needed. Furthermore, additional support may be offered either in the premises with relation to future behaviour and/or remedy of the offence or in the form of verbal expressions of concern. This category involves: 1. Expressing concern for H (St.5) 2. Promise of forbearance – (St. 6), e.g.: ‘It won’t happen again, I promise’. 3. Offer of repair (St. 7) (a) repair, e.g.: ‘I’ll pay for the clearing’ (b) compensation, e.g.: ‘You can borrow my pen instead’.
١٠٣ Matti (1999) criticizes Trosborg’s approach for a number of reasons, one of them is that her distinction between indirect and direct apologies is based on superficial feature. Trosborg claims that apologizing is direct if it contains one of the apologizing verbs such as ‘feeling sorry’, ‘pardon’, etc. otherwise, it is indirect. In Matti’s (1999) work, he does not consider apologizing verbs as direct means of expressing apology, he depends on how effective the apology is since, for example, (Str. 7) would be more effective and; therefore, more indirect than an expression of apologizing in case of material damage. Moreover; such verbs are considered as conventionalized means of expressing apologizing among speakers of one community (for more criticism, see Matti, 1999: 33-35). Trosborg, moreover, distinguishes between downgrades (minimize the guilt) which include : 1. Dowtoners 2. Understaters 3. Hedges. 4. Subjectivizers and Upgraders (maximize the apology). Another model is Coulmas’(2) (1981). His model is a comprehensive study which conflates ‘thanking’ and apologizing to “manifest structural, typological and pragmatic properties shared by these two highly routinized communicative act”. Theoretically, Coulmas’ work is enrooted in contrastive pragmatics since it depends on “what the Japanese and Europeans utilize in situations eliciting thanks and apologies”. (see Matti, 1999: 6). Coulmas (1981: 75-76) presents an indefinitive taxonomy of thanking and apologizing depending on different types of gratitude and regret. Kinds of apology co-vary with a wide range of objects of regret, e.g.: Apologies ex ante: Apologies ex post The formers are employed when the initiator knows that his/her action is undesired by his/her interlocutor, e.g.: asking for direction. On the other hand, ex post apologies are described as unpredictable intervention since the offender’s negative action is not preplanned such as stepping on ones toe in a crowded place (Matti, 1999 : 38). Apologies for Material damage: (car accident, broken vase,… etc.). Apologies for immaterial damage (annoyance, inconvenience, etc. ). This dichotomy comprises two different kinds of objects of regret. They, in turn, affect apologizer’s choice of apologizing strategies and responder’s reaction, e.g.: 10. Situation : Ali’s car runs into Ahmed’s new car. Ali : I’m sorry. Ahmed : Never mind. 11. Situation : Ali steps on Maha’s toe. Ali : I am really terribly sorry. Maha : Never mind. In example (10), ‘never mind’ seems an inappropriate response when the damage is grave. Example (11) shows how an intensified strategy sounds strange and may be interpreted as “a sarcastic device if the damage is not serious”. III- Apologies that are indebting:
١٠٤ Apologies that are not indebting The last dichotomy is devoted to showing the difference between object of ‘regret’ that are indebting and those which are not. If the apologizer is responsible for the offensive action, the object of regret is indebting, but if the apologizer makes apologizing without being responsible for the negative action at hand, the object of regret is not indebting. In addition to what has been said above, Coulmas (1981: 77) distinguishes between two types of responders:
Responders
Recognizing or acknowledging the existence of object of gratitude or regret and relieving the participant of its burden, for instance: ‘You are welcome’, etc.
Denying or minimizing the existence of such an object, for example: ‘Not at all’,…etc
Fig. (3): Responders to Thanks and Apologies Coulmas’ work is extensive and elaborative for it tackles apologizing and thanking with their responders with no strategies. Trosborg’s work, however, lacks thanking as well as responsive strategies. To fill this gap, Matti (1999: 46) adopts a revised model which applies Trosborg’s (1994: 378-383) approach to discover: First apologizing and thanking strategies employed by Iraqi speakers and second explore responsive strategies to thanking and apologizing and then applies Coulmas’ model successfully. This model is as follows :
١٠٥
Apology Strategies Disavow Responsibility
Take on responsipility
St.1: Choosing an IFID
St.3: Promise
St.2: An offer to make Amends
a. Direct Recompense
St.5: Humiliaty St.
St.4: Evasive start.
St.1: Blaming a third party
St.2: Blaming H
St.6: Explaination or Account
b.Indirect
a. With first person
Recompense
a. Take on responsibility for a Third Part
b. Without first person
b. Auto Resp. a. Explicit b. Implicit Self-Blame Self-Blame
a. Act innocently
b. Query precondition An expression of embarrassment
Justify H
Justify S a. Expressing Regret
c. Requesting Forgiveness for the b. An offer d. Requesting offence acceptance of of Apology an apology
Fig. (4): A Revised Model
After this panoramic presentation of various approaches to apologizing, it has been found that Trosborg’s model is the most suitable one to the researcher’s work. It is singled out, in comparison with the most significant approach, i.e.,
١٠٦ Coulmas’ because it provides us with an extensive taxonomy of apologizing strategies only. Unlike Trosborg, Coulmas provides us only with responsive strategies of apologizing and thanking with no taxonomy of their strategies (despite the fact that they are incomplete etc, i.e., worth dwelling upon cf. Matti, 1999: 41).
4.2 The Structure of the Speech Act of Apologizing: After presenting the properties of the speech act of ‘apologizing’, we should make the way clear for the structure (grammatical, semantic and philosophical) under which this speech act may be correctly performed. It has been mentioned before that expressive speech acts require nominalizations transformation whether gerundive or not, but they should not generate ‘infinitive phrases’ or ‘that clauses’, e.g.: 1. I apologize for behaving badly. 2. I apologize for my bad behaviour . *3.I apologize that I stepped on your toe . *4. I apologize to step on your toe. For further comment on sentences such as example (1), Martinich (1985: 143) states that “there is a noun-sharing between the S of the contained sentence and either the direct object (as with the verb thank) or the subject (as with apologize) of the performative”. However, the contained sentence does not have a modal verb, but a verb usually in the past. As far as the verb phrase of the contained sentence is concerned, it is brought in by means of a preposition such as ‘for’, ‘upon’, or ‘against’. These prepositions subdivide the verbs: The favourable verbs such as praise, thank or command and the unfavourable verbs such as apologize, censure and pardon. The syntactical symbolization of expressives is as follows : E(P) (S/H + property). To apply this formula to apologizing, the result will be: The illocutionary point of apologizing is to express apology, there is no direction of fit between the words and world, a person who apologizes for H because of his/her action, expresses regret and this property is specified in the utterance by an apologizer towards an apologizee (for further information concerning syntactic frames of the expressive category, see Searle, 1975b: 357 and Searle, 1979 : 23). As far as the philosophical structure is concerned, the act of apologizing is not among the types of IAs for which the FCs have been explicitly formulated by Searle. However, by generalizing the acts that Searle (1969 : 66-67) does deal with, one can formulate other conditions for other types of speech acts. The importance of these FCs lies as mentioned before in: First, performing successfully the speech act in question and; therefore, distinguish one speech act of a certain category from another act of the same speech act. Norrick (1978: 279-282), suggests three of conditions which distinguish between members of expressives depending on FCs which also determine their social functions. These conditions are as follows: 1. The Factive Condition:
١٠٧ It is associated with the speaker’s presupposition of the proposition expressed. A person, who uses a sentence such as (5) to perform an act of apologizing must believe that he/she in fact kicked the addressee’s dog: 5. I apologize for kicking your dog. The verb apologize is factive in that “it requires a complement which expresses a proposition presupposed true (at least by the S)”. Norrick (1978: 282) shows that in cases where no complement as such occurs, semantic and pragmatic considerations, permit reconstructions of the presupposed proposition. If one believes that the state of affairs does not obtain, in this case, apologizing is viewed as insincere, i.e., the apologizer accepts as factual the state of affairs for which he/she apologizes. 2. The Value Judgement Condition: It is concerned with the fact that the S makes a value judgement with respect to the effect of the recognized state of affairs on the patient, i.e., the affected person. In the case of apologizing, the S must feel that the state has affected someone adversely before being ready to apologize. This requires a value judgement on his/her part. If, to set ‘a bizarre example’: ‘I step on the foot of a masachist’ who enjoys the pain I have inflicted upon him and who even thanks me before I get a chance to apologize, then I will judge the situation to be inadequate for apologizing (Norrick, 1978 : 283). 3. The Role Identification Conditions: Norrick (1978: 283) defines it as “the speaker identify [Sic] the roles of agent (the person responsible for the student), patient and in some cases, observer”. In apologizing, the S must identify himself/herself as the agent and someone else as the patient. Failure to identify the patient leave the S ignorant of who to apologize. If I hear, for example, one of two people behind me complain that his/her foot has been stepped on, I have grasped the base situation as specified in the factive condition, it remains to recognize that I do the stepping and to turn around to which of the two is the plaintiff. Failure to recognize responsibility for the state leaves me with no reason to apologize at all. Norrick (1978 : 283) proposes the following schema : Agent : S, value : negative, patient : addressee In other words, the role of agent is filled by the apologizer, whereas the role of a patient is filled by the apologizee, and the value is negative (offensive action) . In some cases, the agent and the patient refer to the same person or there is no patient, but an observer. To modify this formula according to our data analysis, it will be as follows: Agent (S): apologyizer, Value: offiensive action, patient (H): apologyizee. Norrick (1978: 280) further elaborates the social functions of the speech act of ‘apologizing’ in more particular the apologizer since illocutionary acts are initiated by speakers (agent). Since the social function of an illocutionary includes its perlocutinary effect (either as means to achieve it or may go beyond it, thus the social function of apologizer is to make the apologizee believes that the apologizer
١٠٨
1.
2. 3.
1.
2.
3. 4.
1.
2.
3.
is contrite (wants to be forgiven or the addressee will dismiss the matter). However, the social function, may be to “evince good manners, to assuage the addressee’s wrath, or simply to get off hook and be on one’s way”. Owen (1983 cited in Trosborg, 1994: 375-76) has constructed the set of rules SRs for the use of the appropriate IFID as follows(3) : Preparatory Rules: (a) The act A specified in the propositional content is an offence against the addressee H. (b) H would have preferred S’s not doing A to S’s doing A and S believes H would have preferred S’s not doing A to his/her doing A. (c) A does not benefit H and S believes A does not benefit H. Sincerity Rule: S regrets (is sorry for) having done A. Essential Rule: Counts as an expression of regret by S for having done A. Regarding the preparatory rules, Owen emphasizes the necessity of having a rule that indicates that one does not apologize for acts that are not interpretable as offences. When formulating the sincerity rule, Owen relies on Searle’s later work of (1975a-b). Finally, Owen derives the description of the essntial rule from the validity of the sincerity rule. After presenting Searle’s (1969) general framework of FCs, Norrick’s (1978) proposal and Owen’s (1983) SRs, the researcher may sum up the results of such survey and make certain modifications in order to produce a relatively simpler and more economical model. The Propositional Content Condition: S expresses his/her apologizing for the offensive action that he/she does either in his/her utterance(4) or behaviour in the hope that H will forgive him/her or dismiss the matter. The Preparatory Conditions: a. An offensive action is done by S which offends H(5) . b. H views S responsible for A. Thus, H prefers S not doing it and S believes that H does not prefer S’s A (since A does not benefit H). S knows that through previous utterance or behaviour of H. The Sincerity Condition: S feels sorry for doing A (offensive action). The Essential Condition: S’s utterance or behaviour is considered as an expression of apologizing to make H recognize that S is contrite and H recognizes (S) that by S’s utterance and / behaviour. From the above mentioned set of FCs, some SRs for the use of the IFID can be derived: The Propositional Content Rule: Apologizing should be uttered only in the context of a sentence or behaviour, the utterance and/or behaviour of which undertake responsibility. The Preparatory Rules: a. The act A specified in the propositional content is an offence against the addressee H. b. H would have preferred S is not doing A and S believes H would have preferred S’s not doing A. The Sincerity Rule: Apologizing is uttered only if S feels sorry for A.
١٠٩ 4.
The Essential Rule: The proposition of apologizing is to be uttered only if S’s utterance counts as an expression of regret to make H recognize that S is contrite. The ground has now been prepared for a full dress analysis of the speech act of apologizing. The data to be presented in the following sections will be analysed by using our FCs as a model for establishing the status of apologizing in four English novels of 19th C.: Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, Hard Times and Vanity Fair.
4.3 The Analysis of the Speech Act of Apologizing: In this section, our modified model of the FCs for the speech act of apologizing is going to be applied to different examples taken from Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, Hard Times and Vanity Fair in order to identify the speech act of apologizing.
4.3.1 Wuthering Heights:
1.
2.
3. 4.
Text (1): 1. Ch. II, P.25, “I beg your pardon !” I hastened to reply Interpretation: Mr. Lockwood tries to help Mrs. Heathcliff to get the canisters which are out of her reach, but she refuses. She considers his action as an offensive action. Therefore, he apologizes. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: The Propositional Content Condition: Mr. Lockwood expresses his apologizing for the action which is considered by Mrs. Heathcliff as an offensive action in the hope that she will forgive him. The Preparatory Conditions: a. An offensive action is done by Mr. Lockwood, that is of helping Mrs. Heathcliff to get the canister. b. Mrs. Heathcliff views Mr. Lockwood responsible for her annoyance. Thus, she prefers Mr. Lockwood not doing that from the beginning. She knows that by her previous utterance “I don’t want your help, I can get them for myself”. The Sincerity Condition: Mr. Lockwood feels sorry for his trial to help Mrs. Heathcliff. The Essential Condition: His utterance ‘I beg your pardon’ is considered as an expression of apologizing to make Mrs. Heathcliff recognize that Mr. Lockwood is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. VII, p.60 “But, if you be ashamed of your touchiness, you must ask pardon, mind, when she comes in”. Interpretation:
١١٠
1.
2.
3. 4.
Catherine accuses Heathcliff of being dirty. She fears that her hands become dirty from their contact with Heathcliff’s. Thus, Heathcliff becomes angry and speaks with her rudely. His words make Catherine sad and lead her to cry. Neally, therefore, demands from Heathcliff to apologize. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: The Propositional Content Condition: Neally ask Heathcliff to express his apologizing in her utterance ‘You must ask pardon’ in the hope that Cathy will forgive him The Preparatory Conditions: a. Heathcliff speaks badly with Catherine. b. Neally views Heathcliff responsible for making Catherine leaves the place. Thus, Neally prefers him not doing that through her utterance “you have grieved Catherine: she’s sorry she ever came home, I dare say!”. The sincerity Condition: Heathcliff should feel sorry for hurting Catherine. The Essential Conditions: Neally’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing that Heathcliff should do to make Catherine recognize that he is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 2nd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
Text (3): 3. Ch. VII, p.65: “Excuse me”, I responded. Interpretation: Mrs. Neally tells Earnshaw the life of Wuthering Heights. It is ten o’clock, she stops telling him anything else since he should sleep early and wake early in the morning. However, he insists on the necessity to continue her story. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mr. Earnshaw expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘excuse me’ in the hope that Mrs. Neally will forgive him in the future and continue her story. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Earnshaw insists on listening to Neally’s story despite the fact that time is late. b. Mrs. Neally views Earnshaw responsible for making her continue telling the story. Thus, She prefers that Earnshaw stops asking her to continue the story through her utterance “A person who has not done one half of his day’s work by ten o’clock runs a chance of leaving the other half ?”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Earnshaw feels sorry for insisting on Neally’s continuous story. 4. The Essential Condition: Earnshaw’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Neally recognize that he is contrite. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
١١١ Text (4): 4. Ch. IX, p.77: “Is she sorry for her shameful conduct?”, I asked myself. Interpretation: Catherine treats Heathcliff badly in comparison with Edgar. The former is dirty, knows nothing about anything. Therefore, Cathy does not want to accompany him. The latter, on the other hand, speaks in a low manner and he is a handsome man. But, Cathy loves Heathcliff and this is what she wants to inform Neally. She wants to apologize for Heathcliff. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1.
The Propositional Content Condition: Cathy expresses her apologizing for the offensive action that she does in her utterance “where’s Heathcliff?”, this utterance is preceded by her disturbance and anxiety and followed by another pause, during which Neally notices a drop or two from Catherine’s cheek to the flags in the hope that Heathcliff will forgive her. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. An offensive action is done by Cathy which offends Heathcliff. b. The observer (Neally) and consequently Heathcliff view Cathy responsible for the action. Thus, Neally (and consequently Heathcliff) prefer Cathy not doing this action and she knows that through Heathcliff’s utterance “well, I cried last night and I had more reason to cry than she” and Neally’s utterance “that she may be shameful from her action” and (through her perception of a drop from Cathy’s cheek to the flags). 3. The Sincerity Condition: Cathy feels sorry for her offensive action (accusing Heathcliff of being dirty and knowing nothing about anything. 4. The Essential Condition: Cathy’s behaviour is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Neally and consequently Heathcliff recognize that Cathy is contrite and this is clear through Neally’s utterance “she may come to the point as she will – I shan’t help her ! No; she felt small trouble regarding any subject save her own concerns”. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. XI, p.93: “You were really sorry for me, were you ?”. Interpretation: Cathy treated Heathcliff badly since he is not handsome and clean as Edgar. Heathcliff heared Cathy’s opinion secretly. This speech hurts Heathcliff and leads to Heathcliff’s departure. Heathcliff comes back and wants to see Cathy. He is sure that Cathy feels sorry for Heathcliff and wants to apologize for him. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Catherine expresses the proposition of apologizing throughout Heathcliff’s utterance ‘You were sorry for me’ in the hope that he will forgive her in the future.
١١٢ 2.
The Preparatory Conditions: a. Cathy treats Heathcliff badly and speaks badly about him. b. Heathcliff views Catherine responsible for his departure. Thus, he prefers not doing that through his utterances: “a little more than you have thought of me, but be ware of meeting me with another aspect next time!” and “nay, You’ll not drive me off again”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Catherine feels sorry for forcing Heathcliff to leave. 4. The Essential Condition: Heathcliff’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing that Catherine should do to make him recognize that she is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 2nd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. X, p. 93: “I cannot rest, Ellen”, she said, by way of apology. Interpretation: Cathy is happy for meeting Heathcliff again after three years. She cannot sleep; therefore, she awakens Neally since the latter is awakened, Cathy apologizes . Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Cathy indirectly expresses her apologizing in her utterance ‘I cannot rest’ in the hope that Neally will forgive her. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. An offensive action is done by Cathy which offends Neally (that is of awakening her). b. Neally views Cathy responsible for this action. Thus, Neally prefers Cathy not awakening her and Cathy knows that through her utterance “I want some living creature to keep me company in my happiness !”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Cathy indirectly feels sorry for awakening Neally from her sleep. 4. The Essential Condition: Cathy’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Neally recognize that she is contrite and she (Neally) recognizes that by her utterance “she said it by way of apology”. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. XIII, p.124: It appeared dry and cold; but at the bottom was dotted in with pencil an obscure apology. Interpretation: Isabella marries Heathcliff despite Catherine and Edgar’s warning. She marries him and runs away from her brother. After six weeks, Isabella sends a letter to her
١١٣ brother which is dry and cold. It is as an apology to her brother from what she has done. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Isabella expresses her apologizing in her letter ‘at the bottom was dotted in with pencil as obscure apology’ in the hope that Edgar will forgive her in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Isabella does an offensive action, i.e., marrying Heathcliff without her brother’s acceptance. b. Edgar (explicitly) and Neally (implicitly) consider Isabella responsible for her bad state (action). Thus, they prefer Isabella not doing action from the beginning and Isabella knows that her father (in more particular) does not prefer that through her utterance “… and my brother is either too angry or too distressed to answer what I sent him.” 3. The Sincerity Condition: Isabella feels sorry for marrying Heathcliff and leaving her brother. 4. The Essential Condition: Isabella’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Edgar and (consequently Neally) recognize that she is contrite and both of them recognize that through Neally and Edgar’s utterances: ‘… I got along letter which I considered odd, coming from the pen of a bride just out of the honeymoon’ and ‘I am not angry, but I’m sorry to have lost her, especially as I can never think she’ll be happy’. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past , Type of SA: Explicit. Text (8): 8. Ch. XVII, p.150: “Excuse me !”, answered a familiar voice. Interpretations: Isabella is treated very badly from Heathcliff, therefore, she runs away from Wuthering Heights. Neally does not accept her presence at the Grange, since her master does not agree on that. Thus, Isabella apologizes. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Isabella expresses her apologizing in her utterance ‘excuse me’ in the hope that Neally will forgive her in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Isabella comes to the Grange despite Edgar’s refusal. b. Neally views Isabella responsible for doing such an action (offensive). Thus, Neally prefers Isabella not coming to the Grange and Isabella knows that through Neally’s utterance “how dare you show your giddiness here? What would Mr. Linton say if he heard you”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Isabella feels sorry for arriving at the Grange. 4. The Essential Condition: Isabella’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Neally recognize that Isabella is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis:
١١٤ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (9): 9. Ch. XXIII, p. 204: “I’m sorry I hurt you?”, she said at length, racked beyond endurance. Interpretation: Cathy makes Linton very angry by denying his story about her mother with his father. Moreover, she causes him to fall against one arm of the chair. This leads Linton to a suffocating cough. Thus, she apologizes. Text Analysis: Mood: indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (10) 10. Ch. XXIV, p.215: “And believe that your kindness has made me love you deeper than if I deserved your love : and though I couldn’t and cannot help showing my nature to you, I regret it and repent it ; and shall regret and repeat it till I die !” Interpretation: Linton loves Cathy, Edgar’s daughter, and she loves him. However, whenever they meet each other, they quarrel. The main reason for their quarrel is Linton. He is sick and cannot bear Cathy’s long speech. and argument. Therefore, he apologizes for making Cathy angry. He confesses his loves towards her. Text Analysis: (1) Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. (2) Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject : Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
4.3.2 Jane Eyre: Text (1): 1. Ch. 2, p.19: “Forgive me”. Interpretation: John Reed asked Jane to come to him. Jane speaks with him in a bad temper, this makes John to strike her. Therefore, she uttered the utterances “wicked and cruel boy” and “you are like a murderer” . These utterances make John angry, thus, he grasps his hair and shoulder. Consequently, Mrs. Reed orders servants to take her to the red-room which is a very gloomy room to the extent that she imagines a ghost comes out of it. Therefore, she apologizes. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses the proposition of apologizing in her utterance ‘forgive me’ in the hope that her aunt will forgive her in the future.
١١٥ 2.
The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane makes an offensive action that is of speaking badly with John Reed. b. Her aunt views Jane responsible for doing this offensive action. Thus, John Reed and consequently his mother, Mrs. Reed, prefer Jane not doing so and she knows that through Mrs. Reed’s utterance “You will now stay here an hour longer, and it is only on condition of perfect submission and stillness that I shall liberate you then”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane feels sorry for her an offensive behaviour with John. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mrs. Reed recognize that Jane is contrite and she recognizes that through her apologizing. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2) 2. Ch. 14, p.132: “Sir I was too plain, I beg your pardon”. Interpretation: Mr. Rochester asks Jane about her real opinion of him. She informs him that he is not handsome. This disturbs Mr. Rochester. Therefore, she apologizes. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses the proposition of apologizing in her utterance ‘I beg your pardon’ in the hope that Mr. Rochester will forgive her. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Jane does an offensive action, i.e., telling Mr. Rochester the truth. b. Mr. Rochester views Jane responsible for the offensive action. Thus, he prefers Jane not telling him the truth and Jane knows that through his utterance “Ah! By my word! there is something singular about you…” and when “one asks you a question, or makes a remark to which you are obliged to reply, you rapport a round rejoinder, which, if not blunt, is at least brusque”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane feels sorry for the offensive action she does, i.e., telling Mr. Rochester that he is not handsome. 4. The Essential condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mr. Rochester recognizes that Jane is contrite and he recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. 1, p.201: “Do you forgive me, Jane?”. Interpretation:
١١٦ Mr. Rochester makes himself a fortunteller trying to make Jane speaks about her love towards Rochester. Thus, Rochester apologizes for acting this role. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rochester expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘do you forgive me, Jane?’ in the hope that Jane will forgive him. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rochester does an offensive action, i.e., that is of acting the role of a woman who tries to make Jane speak about Rochester. b. Jane views Rochester responsible for the offensive action that he does. Thus, she prefers Rochester not doing that and Rochester knows that through her utterance “In short I believe you have been trying to draw me out-or in; you have been talking nonsense to make me talk nonsense. It is scarcely fair, sir”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mr. Rochester feels sorry for doing his offensive action. 4. The Essential Condition: Rochester’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Jane recognize that he is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4) 4. Ch. 19, P.201: “I shall try to forgive you”. Interpretation: The same interpretation as in text No.3, moreover, Jane accepts Rochester’s apologizing. Its FCs are the same as in text No.3. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. 21, p.237: “Forgive me for my passionate language”. Interpretation: Jane comes back to see Mrs. Reed. They talked of the past life when Mrs. Reed treated Jane badly. This leads Mrs. Reed to cough severely. Therefore, Jane apologizes for the passionate language she used to use with Mrs. Reed. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses the proposition of apologizing in her utterance ‘forgive me’ in the hope that Mrs. Reed will forgive her. 2. The Preporatory Conditions: a. Jane used to speak frankly with Mrs. Reed. b. Mrs. Reed views Jane responsible for making Mrs. Reed behave nervously. Thus, Mrs. Reed prefers Jane not doing that offensive action and Jane knows that through Mrs. Reed’s utterance “I could not forget
١١٧ your conduct to me, Jane”. The fury with which you once turned on me; the tone in which you declared you abhorred me the worst of anybody in the world”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane feels sorry for the passionate language she used to use with her aunt. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mrs. Reed recognize that Jane is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. 21, p.237: “If you could be persuaded to think no more of it, aunt, and to regard me with kindness and forgiveness”. Interpretation: Mrs. Reed insists on hating her. Jane repeats her apologizing for the passionate language that she uses. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: The same FCs that are applied to the text (No.5), are applied to this text. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. 23, p.284: “I am sorry, Janet, but I believe indeed you must”. Interpretation: Mr. Rochester decides to marry, this means that Jane should leave Thornfield. Therefore, he apologizes. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rochester expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘I am sorry’ in the hope that Jane will forgive him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rochester obliges Jane to leave his house. b. Jane views Rochester responsible for making Jane leaves the place. Thus, Jane prefers Rochester not doing that and Rochester leaves that through Jane’s utterance “must I move on, Sir ? Must I leave Thornfield?” 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rochester feels with regret for obliging Jane to leave Thornfield. 4. The Essential Condition: Rochester’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Jane recognize that he is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
١١٨ Text (8): 8. Ch. 28, p.333: “Do with me and for me as you like ; but excuse me from much discourse – my breath is short…”. Interpretation: When Jane leaves Thonfield, she does not know where to go. After walling far along time, she falls down. At that time, it is raining. Therefore, she walks unconsciously towards St. John’s house. she excuse, them from answering any question since she is very tired. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her proposition of apologizing in her utterance ‘excuse me’ in the hope that they will forgive her in the future. 2. The Preparatory conditions: a. Jane is silent whenever Diana or Mary asked her. b. They view Jane responsible for keeping silent whatever they ask her. Thus, they prefer that Jane will speak throughout different utterances “can we send for any one you know? What account can you give of yourself?” 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane feels sorry for keeping silent and not being able to speak with them. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make them recognize that Jane is contrite and they recognize that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (9): 9. Ch. 35, p.408: “But that it is the duty of man to forgive his fellow until seventyand-seven times”. Interpretation: St. John wants to marry Jane and take her to India with him, but she does not accept (since she loves Rochester). She thinks that if she will marry St. John, she will kill him. He thinks that her words are inexcusable, but the duty of man is to forgive them. Text Analysis: Mood: indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular (fellow), Implicit 3rd person singular (Jane), Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
4.3.3 Hard Times: Text (1): 1. Ch.1, p.11: “I’m sorry to hear it. I am very sorry indeed to hear it”. Interpretation: Louisa’s father used to bring up their sons and daughters in a scientific way and anything behind science is silly (such as watching a circus) Thus, Louisa implicitly blames him for his way of treatment.
١١٩ Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Louisa’s father expresses his proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘I’m sorry’ in the hope that his daughter will forgive him. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Louisa’s father does an offensive action, that is, of considering science as the most important thing in life and anything behind it is silly. b. Louisa views him responsible for treating them in such away. Thus, Louisa prefers her father to pay attention to other things (that they are children and want to play and watch things in the same way as other children) throughout the narrator’s utterance of describing her state “there was an air of jaded sullenness in them both, and particularly in the girl; yet, struggling through the dissatisfaction of her face?”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Louisa’s father is very sorry for hearing that he is responsible for Thomas, i.e., Louia’s brother, state. 4. The Essential Condition: Louisa’s father’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Louisa recognize that he is centrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: (1) Mood: Indicative, Voice : Active , Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present , Type of SA: Explicit. (2) Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present , Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. 9, p. 46: Then he beats the days and I was frightened, and said, “Father, father! Pray don’t hurt the creature who is so fond of you! O heaven forgive you, father, stop!”. Interpretation: Sissy tells Louisa how her father is kind. The only night in which he is stiff is with his dog. He asks it to jump up on the back of the two chairs and stand across them. Since the dog refuses, her father beats it severly. Therefore, Sissy is asking the Heaven to forgive her father. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Sissy expresses the proposition of apologizing for her father’s offensive action he does with his dog throughout her utterance ‘O heaven forgive you, father, stop !’ in the hope that her father will not do it again. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Sissy’s father does an offensive action, that is, of beating the dog. b. Sissy views her father responsible for beating the dog. Thus, she prefers her father not doing so and asks heaven to forgive him ‘O heaven forgive you’. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Sissy expresses her own sorry for the offensive action that her father does.
١٢٠ 4. The Essential Condition: Sissy’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make her father recognize that he should feel sorry for and she recognizes that through her utterance ‘O heaven forgive you, father, stop’ and he stops. Text Analysis: Mood: Subjunctive , Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. 16, p. 83: “I hope I may be excused”. Interpretation: On a wedding day of Louisa and Mr. Bounderby, Mr. Bounderby expresses his happiness to have Louisa as a wife. He is worthy of her and she is worthy of him . However, he apologizes for all ladies and gentlemen (on the explicit level) and for Louisa (on the implicit level) for being a ragged-street boy in the past, i.e., he was unclean. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Josiah’s expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘I hope I may be excused’ in the hope that ladies and gentleman (on the explicit level) and his wife (on the implicit level) will forgive him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Josiah has done an offensive action, that is, of being a ragged street boy, who never washes his face. b. Louisa (on the implicit level) and guests (on the explicit level) view Mr. Bounderby as responsible for his ragged state. Thus, in particular prefers Mr. Bounderby to be another person and does not want to marry him. This is clear in her response to her father’s question of whether to marry him by saying “No, father, I do not”. 3. The Sincerity Conditions: Mr. Bounderby feels sorry for his previous state. 4. The Essential Condition: Bounderby’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make others (on the explicit level) and Louisa (on the implicit level) recognize that he is contrite and they recognize. Text Analysis: Mood: indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Implicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch.1, p. 92: “Beg your pardon, really !”. Interpretation: A stranger wants to see Mrs. Sparsit. When he tries to know certain things from her, she tells him that her husband is a powler. He is surprised , therefore, he tries to apologize when he wants her to repeat what she says. Establishing the Status of Apologizing:
١٢١ 1. The Propositional Content Condition: The stranger expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘beg your pardon’ in the hope that Mrs. Sparist will forgive him in the future (and hence will repeat what she says). 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. The stranger asks Mrs Sparist to repeat what she says concerning the work of her husband as a powler. b. Mrs. Sparsit views the stranger responsible for making Mrs. Sparsit speak about her life (without questioning her directly) especially about her husband. Thus, she prefers him not to ask more questions throughout her utterance “It was once good or ill fortune, as it may be before I became a widow-to move in a very different sphere. My husband was a powler”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: The stranger feels sorry for making Mrs. Sparist repeat what she says concerning her husband’s work. 4. The Essential Condition: The stranger’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mrs. Sparsit recognize that he is apologizing for making her repeat what she says about her husband’s work and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch.2, P. 174: “I beg your pardon, sir”. Interpretation: While Mr. Harthouse is sitting in the restaurant trying to read a newspaper, the waiter breaks this silence by trying to inform him that he is wanted. Before he informs him, he apologizes for breaking up his silence. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: The waiter expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘I beg your pardon, sir’ (he says it apologetically) in the hope that Mr. Harthouse will forgive him. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. The waiter breaks up the silence of Mr. Harthous, thus he apologizes. b. Mr. Harthouse views the waiter responsible for breaking up his silence and indifference of what is going on around him. Thus, he prefers the waiter not to do this action through the narrator’s utterance of describing him “still true to his conviction that indifference was the genuine highbreeding (the only conviction he had)”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: The waiter feels sorry for interrupting Mr. Harthous; therefore, he apologizes. 4. The Essential Condition: The waiter’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mr. Harthouse recognize that he is contrite and Mr. Harthouse recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative , Voice : Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
١٢٢ Text (6): 6. Ch.2, P. 174: She begged pardon, she meant to say Miss Bounderby – she hoped to be excused. Interpretation: Mr. Bounderby demands from Mrs. Sparsit to take charge of the teapot. He does so because Louisa is late and he wants his breakfast to the moment. When Mrs. Sparist tries to do so, Mrs. Bounderby is appeared. When she tries to explain the reasons behind her presence with Mr. Bounderby, she says Miss. Bounderby instead of Mrs. Bounderby. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mrs. Sparist expresses the proposition of apologizing through the narrator’s utterances ‘she begged pardon’ and ‘she hoped to be excused’ in the hope that Louisa will forgive her in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mrs. Sparist names Louisa as Miss Bounderby not as Mrs. Bounderby. b. Mrs. Sparist views herself responsible for possibly making Mrs. Bounderby angry. Thus, she prefers not naming her as Miss Bounderby throughout her utterance “I really cannot call her Mrs. Bounderby ; it’s very absurd of me as youthful as I described her . 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mrs. Sparist feels sorry or regret for doing the job that Louisa must do. 4. The Essential Condition: Mrs. Sparist’s begging is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mrs. Bounderby recognize that Mrs. Sparist is contrite and she recognizes that. Text Analysis: (1) Mood: Indicative, Voice : Active , Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past , Type of SA: Explicit. (2) Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular (Mrs Sparist), Implicit 3rd person singular (Mrs Bounderby), Tense: Past , Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch.3, P.181: “We shall be happy to hear any little apology you may think proper to offer …”. Interpretation: Mrs. Sparsit informs Tom that his sister at Mr. Bounderby’s; therefore, Tom comes and wants to see his sister. Tom insists on her presence. Thus, Mr. Bounderby becomes angry and forces (indirectly) Mrs. Sparsit to apologize and then leave his house. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mr. Bounderby expresses the necessity of Mrs. Sparsit’s apologizing in his utterance ‘we shall be happy to hear any little apology you may think to offer’ in the hope that he will forgive her in the future.
١٢٣ 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mrs. Sparsit does an offensive action that is, of telling Tom about Louisa’s place. b. Mr. Bounderby views Mrs. Sparsit responsible for informing Tom about her place. Thus, he refers that she does not do that throughout his utterances: ‘ Now, Ma’am we shall be happy to hear any little apology you may think proper to offer’. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mrs. Sparsit should feel sorry for the offensive action that she does. 4. The Essential Condition: Bounderby’s utterance is counted as apologizing (in reality, his force to make Mrs. Sparsit apologizes) to make Mr. Bounderby recognize that she is contrite (in reality, his utterance is made to make her recognize that she is guilty. Text Analysis: Mood: indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 2nd person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person plural, Tense : Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
4.3.4 Vanity Fair: Text (1): 1. Ch. 2, p. 14 : And she looked back to the freedom and the beggary of the old study in Soho with so much regret that everybody, herself included, fancied she was consumed with grief for her father. Interpretation: Rebecca longs for the past life when she lived with her father. She felt very happy with him her presence at the Chiswick when she missed all these beautiful things. On the explicit level, she accuses circumstances and (on the implicit level) her father of feeling sorry. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rebecca expresses the proposition of apologizing in the way the narrator describes her with so much regret in the hope that she will forgive her father (implicitly) and fate (explicitly) on the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rebecca leaves her father and goes to the Chiswick to be under Miss Pinkerton’s protections. b. Rebecca views her father (implicit) and fate (explicit) for sending her to this place. Thus, she prefers not leaving her father throughout the narrator’s utterance concerning her “the catastrophe came and she was brought to the Mall as to her home” and “she looked back to the freedom and the beggary of the old studio in Soho”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rebecca feels sorry for being at the Chiswick. 4. The Essential Condition: Rebecca’s state through the narrator’s description is counted as an expression of apologizing to make the readers (on the explicit level) and her father (on the implicit level) recognize that and they recognize. Text Analysis:
١٢٤ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active , Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past , Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. IV, p.23: She persisted in calling Sambo “Sir”, and “Mr. Sambo”, to the delight of that attendant, and she apologized to the lady’s-maid. Interpretation: Miss Sharp does not only find favour with Amelia’s family, she finds interest with others’ things. One of these things is to venture with the lady’s maid in ringing the bell. Thus, she apologizes. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Miss Sharp expresses the proposition of apologizing through the narrator’s utterance ‘she apologized to the lady’s-maid’. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Miss Sharp rings the bell instead of the lady’s maid. b. Rebecca views herself responsible for an offensive action, that is of, ringing the bell instead of lady’s maid. Thus, she prefers not troubling the lady’s-maid throughout her humiliations and the interests she makes with all the servants. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Miss Sharp feels sorry for ringing the bell instead of the lady’s maid. 4. The Essential Condition: The narrator’s utterance is counted as a description of Miss Sharp’s expression of apologizing to make the lady’s maid recognize that Miss Sharp is contrite and she recognizes. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active , Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past , Type of SA: Explicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. XXII, p.202: “Do forgive me !”. Interpretation: Rebecca demands from Captain Osborne to forgive her since she accuses him of being careless with his wife, Amelia. Establishing the status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rebecca expresses the proposition of apologizing in her utterance ‘Do forgive me’ in the hope that Osborne will forgive her in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rebecca accuses Osborne of being careless with her dearest friend, Amelia. b. Osborne views Rebecca responsible for that offensive action, accusing him of being careless. Thus, he prefers her not doing that through his anger and shameful running away from Rebecca to close off this subject. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rebecca feels sorry for the bad action that she has already done.
١٢٥ 4. The Essential Condition: Rebecca’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Osborne recognize that she is contrite and he recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Implicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch. XXX, p.276: Knowing how useless regrets are Interpretation: Rebecca remembered her past days when she got married from Captain Rawdon. With these memories, she discovered that her regretts are useless. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rebecca indirectly expresses her regret in the narrator’s utterance of describing her regrets ‘how useless regrets are’ in the hope that she will forgive her husband in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rawdon Crawley leaves her wife, Rebecca. b. Rebecca views Crawley responsible for devorsing her and making her feel with regret. Thus, Rebecca prefers her husband not doing that through her suffering and rememberance 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rebecca feels sorry for leaving her husband. 4. The Essential Condition: Rebecca’s regrets are counted as an expression of apologizing to make readers (on the explicit level) and her husband (on the implicit level) recognize that she is contrite and they (and he) recognize that. Text Analysis: Mood: indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. IV, p.537: “You deserve an apology”. Interpretation: Mr. Wenham tells a story about Lord Steyne who wrote a letter of challenge to Crawley. Crawley, however, does not believe him and accuses him of being a liar. Mr. Macmurdo insults Crawley and he apologizes to Mr. Wenham instead of Crawley. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Macmurdo expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘you deserve an apology’ in the hope that Mr. Wellham will forgive him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Crawley makes an offensive action, accusing Mr. Wenham of being a liar. b. Mr. Wenham views Crawley as responsible for doing such an offensive action. Thus, he prefers that Crawley not doing that through his behaviour
١٢٦ “turning deadly pale at Crawley’s savage interruption and looking towards the door”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Crawley (implicitly), but Macmurdo (explicitly) feels sorry for accusing Mr. Wenham. 4. The Essential Condition: Macmurdo’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mr. Wenham recognize that he is contrite. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject : Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. IV, p.536: “How I regret that Mrs. Wenham and myself had not accepted Mrs. Crawley’s invitations to sup with her”. Interpretation: Mr. Wenham mentions Mrs. Crawley’s invitation to avoid Mr. Crawley’s insult of Wenham’s story (about Lord Steyne). He feels sorry for refusing her invitation (he feels sorry because if he accepts it, he will neither receive any insult from Crawley nor speak about Lord Steyne at all. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Wenham expresses the proposition of apologizing in his utterance ‘how I regret that Mrs. Wenham and myself had not accepted Mrs. Crawley’s invitation’ in the hope that Mrs. Crawley will forgive him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Crawley insults Mr. Wenham. This leads to Mr. Wenham’s regret for refusing Crawley’s invitation. b. Mr. Wenham views himself responsible for receiving Crawley’s insult (on the implicit level). Thus, (on the implicit level) he prefers not receiving Crawley’s insult through her utterance “I tried my utmost to calm Lord Steyne”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: He feels sorry for refusing Crawley’s invitation. 4. The Essential Condition: Mr. Wenham’s utterance is counted as an expression of apologizing to make Mr. Crawley recognize that he is contrite and he recognizes that. Text Analysis: Mood: indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. XIV, p.140: Having devoted only the proper portion of regret to it. Interpretation: Rebecca longs for the past time, to Amelia and her family especially Tom Sedley (the man whom she loves). Therefore, she feels sorry for that past and happy life. However, she must look forward and forget the past life. Establishing the Status of Apologizing:
١٢٧ 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rebecca expresses the proposition of apologizing in the narrator’s utterance of describing Rebecca’s state ‘having devoted the portion of regret to it’ in the hope that she will forgive Amelia’s family in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Sedleys’ family send Rebecca away from their house. b. Rebecca views Sedleys’ family responsible for leaving the house and its happiness. Thus, she prefers the family not doing that through her utterance to Amelia “Oh, what a change between to-day and yesterday ! Now I am friendless and alone, yesterday I was at home, in the sweet company of a sister, whom I shall ever, ever cherish !”. 3. The Sincerity Condition: She feels sorry for leaving her past life at Sedleys’ house. 4. The Essential Condition: The narrator’s utterance concerning Rebecca’s state is counted as an expression of apologizing to make the readers (implicitly) and Rebecca (explicitly) recognize that she is contrite and they (readers and she) recognize that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (8): 8. Ch. XXIX, p.274: Hope, remorse, ambition, tenderness, and selfish regret filled his heart. Interpretation: George remembered his father’s speed that he should not marry Amelia. When Dobbin told him that their departure is engaged and that they should march in three hours, he thought of his wife, child and the future that waited for them. Therefore, he feels sorry for marrying Amelia. Establishing the Status of Apologizing: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: George expresses the proposition of apologizing in his thought over his brief married life: “Why had he married her? She was not fit for marriage. Why had he disobeyed his father, who had been always so generous to him” in the hope that his father will forgive him in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. George did not listen to his father when the latter advised him not to do so. b. George views himself responsible for the bad future that waits for his wife and child (since he does not obey his father). Thus, he prefers that he does not marry Amelia and this is clear in his utterances “why had he married her”, “how unworthy he was of her” and “why had he disobeyed his father?” 3. The Sincerity Condition: George feels sorry for marrying Amelia and not obeying his father.
١٢٨ 4. The Essential Condition: George’s thoughts are counted as an expression of apologizing to make the readers (explicitly) and his father (implicitly) recognize that he is contrite and they (readers and the father) recognize that. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative , Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Past , Type of SA: Explicit.
4.4 Findings and Discussion: As it is mentioned in the literature (see 4.1), apologizing is one of the expressive speech acts which is used to mend a cut in a day-to-day interaction between interlocutors. Thus, it is compensating to the victim (usually the apologizer). Moreover, the speech act of apologizing, is similar to the speech act of complaining, is not among the types that have been explicitly formulated by Searle (see 4.2). However, by generalizing from the acts that Searle (1969) does deal with, in addition to the FCs that are formulated for the successful performance of expressives (Norrick, 1978) and the SRs that are constructed for the appropriate use of IFID concerned with the speech act of apologizing, it is possible to construct the set of FCs and the SRs for the successful performance of the speech act of apologizing. The preceding analysis (see 4.3) has a main focus : It is an application of the suggested model to the data to provide a pragmatic analysis of apologizing in the four English novels. The researcher presented the results of the preceding analysis (see 4.3) of each novel separately. The first novel is Wuthering Heights. The agent was explicit 1st person singular and explicit 3rd person singular in (26) instances (44%), explicit 3rd person singular form in (15) instances (25.4%), explicit 2nd person singular in (11) cases (18.6%) and explicit 1st person plural in (2) cases (3.3%). Whereas, it was implicit 3rd person singular in (4) cases (6.7%) and implicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (1.6%). It was found that explicit type of apologizing occurred in (59) instances (100%), of which (3) instances (5%) involved the direct use of the performative verb apologize. Implicit type of apologizing, however, occurred in (zero) instances (zero%). The non-performative verb, consequently occurred in (56) cases (94.9%). As for the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (58) out of (59) instances (98.3%) were in the active voice, whereas (1) out of (59) instances (1.6%) were in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was in (28) cases (47.4%) explicit 1st person singular, in (13) cases (22%) explicit 3rd person singular, and explicit 2nd person singular and in (2) cases (3.3%) explicit 1st person plural. However, it was implicit 3rd person singular in (2) cases (3.3%) and explicit 1st person singular in (1) case (1.6%). With regard to tense in the propositional clauses, the present simple tense was only used in (42) cases (71.1%), whereas the past simple tense occurred in (16) cases (27.1%). It was verbless in (1) case (1.6%). Regarding the mood, it was found that (58) cases (98.3%) out of (59) cases were indicative and (1) case (1.6%) was imperative.
١٢٩ The second novel is Jane Eyre. The agent was explicit 3rd person singular in (21) cases (35.5%), explicit 1st person singular in (22) cases (37.2%), explicit 2nd person singular form in (8) cases (13.5%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (3) cases (5%). Whereas, it was implicit 3rd person singular in (7) cases (11.8%) and implicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (1.6%). It was found that explicit type of apologizing occurred in (59) instances (100%), of which (1) case (1.7%) involved the use of the performative verb apologize implicit type of the speech act of apologizing, however, occurred in (zero) case (zero%). Therefore, non-performative verb occurred in (58) cases (98.3%). Concerning the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (58) out of (59) cases (98.3%) were in the active voice, whereas (1) case out of (59) cases (1.6%) was in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was used in (24) cases (40.6%) explicit 1st person singular, in (18) cases (30.5%) explicit 3rd person singular and in (13) case (22%) explicit 2nd person singular. Regarding tense in the propositional clauses, the simple past tense was used in (19) cases (32.2%), whereas the simple present was used in (40) cases (67.7%). As far as the mood is concerned, it was found that (58) cases (98.3%) out of (59) were indicative, whereas (1) case out of (59) cases (1.6%) was imperative. The third novel is Hard Times. The agent was explicit 1st person singular in (21) cases (45.6%), explicit 3rd person singular in (18) cases (39.1%) and explicit 2nd person singular form in (6) case (13%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular and 3rd person plural in (1) case (2.1%). Explicit type of apologizing occurred in (46) instances (100%), of which only (3) cases (6.8%) involved the use of the performative verb apologize. Implicit type of the speech act of apologizing, however, occurred in (zero) cases (zero %). Therefore, non-performative verb occurred in (43) cases (93.4%). Concerning the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (43) out of (46) cases (95.6%) were in the active, whereas (2) out of (46) cases (4.3%) were in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was explicit 1st person singular, in (22) cases (47.8%), explicit 3rd person singular in (17) cases (36.9%), explicit 2nd person singular in (6) cases (13%) and explicit 1st person plural in (1) case (2.1%). Whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (1) instance (2.1%). With regard to tense in the propositional clauses, the simple present tense was used in (39) cases (84,7%), whereas the simple past tense was used in (7) cases (15.2%). The mood was indicative in (43) cases (93.4 %), whereas it was subjunctive in (3) cases (6.5%). The fourth novel is Vanity Fair. The agent was explicit 3rd person singular in (39) cases (62.9%) and explicit 1st person singular, explicit 3rd person plural in (10) cases (16.6%) and it was explicit 2nd person singular in (1) case (1.6%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (10) cases (16.1%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (1.6%). Explicit type of the speech act of apologizing was used in (62) cases (100%) of which (8) cases (12.9%) involved the performative verb apologize. Implicit type, however, of the speech act of apologizing occurred in (zero) case (zero%). Therefore, non-performative verb occurred in (54) cases (87%).
١٣٠ As far as the structure of the propositional clause was concerned, the subject was explicit 3rd person singular in (43) cases (69.3%), explicit 2nd person singular in (10) cases (16.1%), explicit 2nd person singular in (3) cases (4.8%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (4) cases (16.4%), whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (3) cases (4.8%) and implicit 2nd person singular in (1) case (1.6%). With regard to tense, the simple past tense was used in (27) cases (43.5%), whereas the simple present tense was used in (35) cases (56.4%). It was found that the active voice was used in (60) instances (96.7%), whereas the passive voice was used in (2) cases (3.2%). Finally, the mood was indicative in (58) cases (93.5%), whereas imperative and subjective in (2) cases (3.2%).
١٣١ Notes of Chapter Four 1. 2.
3.
4.
5.
Holmes defines apologizing with reference to hearer-supportive strategy. This definition concentrates on apologizing as an expressive action of the H. Coulmas’ work is the only available one, in the literature, that tackles both thanks and apologies (for a detailed discussion of this model, see Matti, 1999 : 36-46). Owen (1983 cited in Trosborg, 1995 : 510) presents these rules of use which have an effect on the interpretation of the speech act of apologizing. He presents these rules since the FCs of apologizing are seldomly referred to in the literature. In certain instances of the four novels, S does not express his/her apologizing directly in his/her utterance or behaviour. His/her apologizing, however, can be treated through another person, an observer, who is in most cases the narrator. This case can be applied to the all FCs that the researcher has put in her pragmatic analysis of the four English novels. For instance, Vanity Fair, Ch. XXX, p. 276. Since A has offended H, thus, A does not benefit H. Therefore, it is not directly mentioned as a separate preparatory condition.
١٣٢ Chapter Five The Speech Act of Thanking 5.1 The Concept of the Speech Act of Thanking: The term thanking is defined differently according to different uses of it. The literal meaning of this term is “to express gratitude to Sb, for Sth” (Hornby, 1985: 1043). The religious meaning of this term, however, refers to the National Holiday in the U.S.A., which was celebrated in (1621) by the Ploymouth Colony. He appoints a day for ‘thanksgiving’ after their first harvest and soon a celebration of this day of thanking become general. (Hamerton, undated: 8032). The form ‘thank you’, however, is the accepted way of showing appreciation in the United States and “may convey respect for a listener who has contributed to, assisted in, or alleviated a condition for the speaker” (Becker and Smenner, 1982: 538). The speech act of thanking, however, is not concerned solely with showing appreciation in the USA. Trosborg (1994: 15) provides us with a more general definition of thanking as “the speaker expresses gratitude for the hearer’s participation in a prior action which was beneficial to the speaker”. Thanking is generally considered as the most formulaic and least heartfelt of expressive IAs. This is due to the fact that children are drilled to say ‘thank you’ in all possible situations; it is part of good breading(1) (Norrick, 1978: 285). Norrick’s view leads to Matti’s (1999: 1) conclusion that is: On the one hand, thanking in comparison to apologizing, has less functional value since the absence of the former does not “aggravate the situation”. On the other hand, failure to express gratitude may lead to the negative intense relationship between participants (if it is successfully performed, feelings of warmth and solidarity evolve) (see Eisenstsein and Bodman, 1986: 167). This is because of the fact that thanking is similar to any other expressive speech act. Expressives such as apologizing, play an important role in the daily interaction of every society (for further information concerning the differences between apologizing and ‘thanking’ with reference to their social and functional values, see Trosborg, 1994:15). The above mentioned discussion concerning the values of thanking leads to the following question: What is the social function of thanking? Norrick (1978: 285) asserts a general social function of thanking, i.e., one person benefits from the action of another one. ‘Thanking’ may have another social function, in expressing ‘gratitude’ for previous acts of the addressee, for example, ‘thanking’ may have the intention of a compliment or flattery in the hope of receiving future favours. In some cases, thanking someone in advance has the social function of either assuring the addresees of future gratitude and / or “of making him feel guilty if he does not perform the favour required”. Thanking in this sense, is considered as a defective expressive IA since the truth of its propositional content cannot be presupposed. The social function or goal of any speech act should not be different from that of its illocutionary goal. In other words, the illocutionary goal of a speech act should go hand by hand with its social function to reach to the final station, that is
١٣٣ to communicate successfully. Therefore, Leech (1983: 105-106) presents four categories of illocutionary goals of establishing and maintaining the community. Hence, thanking is one of the expressive speech acts that have convivial function which means “expressing, or making, the speaker’s psychological attitude towards a state of affairs which the illocution presupposes”. It is; therefore, intrinsically polite (similar to apologizing but different from complaining, see 3.1 and 4.1 above). Trosborg (1994) provides us with the illocutionary, perlocutionary effect and social functions of thanking. His view will be illustrated by the following table: Thanking
Illocutionary Effect S expresses Gratitude
Perlocutionary Effect S is grateful
Social Function Positive Appreciation of H’s action + politeness
Table (1): Illocutionary, Perlocutionary Effect and Social Function of Thanking Brown and Levinson (1987: 68) assume that thanking is a FTA in the sense that it threatens the thanker’s negative face because it involves accepting a debt and sacrificing his/her own face. Matti (1999: 27) provides us, however, with the following figure:
Thanks
FTA
FSA
Thanker’s negative face
Thanker’s positive face
Fig. (5): Positive/ Negative Face with Reference to Thanks
١٣٤ Matti’s (1999: 28) analysis of FTAs and FCs take the reverse position with reference to the responders in relation to thanks and thanker. He claims that despite the fact that the thanker’s negative face is threatened; yet, the thanker’s positive face is saved as stated above in the figure. Moreover, with reference to the responders of thanking, the thankee may have the feeling of constraint to lessen thanker’s debt. In other words, thankee’s negative face is threatened at the superficial level, yet, his/her reactive action aims to lessen the debt. Therefore, the thanker’s positive face is saved. The following figure illustrates this point:
Responders
FTA
FSA
Thanks
Thanks
Thankee’s negative face
Thanker’s positive face
Fig. (6): Positive/ Negative Face with Reference to Responders
In addition to Matti, Kasper (1990: 197) presents Edmondson’s (1981) agreement against Brown and Levinson’s. Kasper believes that thanking, apologizing and complaining are considered as FTA, however, they have the nature of hearer-supportive, i.e., they are beneficial to the H. To conclude the notion of ‘politeness’ in relation to thanking, it is the turn to see the verbal approaches of politeness with reference to thanking. Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model pays less attention to thanking, despite of its significant social and psychological effect on interlocutors’ relations in daily interactions. Meier (1995: 384) refers to the reason behind Brown and Levinsosn’s (1987) shortage of strategies for expressing thanking. Meier believes that even if they introduce these strategies for expressing thanking, they would be reduced because the strategies of ‘apologizing’ in Brown and Levinson’s model have already catered little consistent guidance for various studies on apologizing. “In essence, these taxonomies effect drastic inconsistencies and contradictions, because they are not based on solid ground and hence pragmatic results across studies will be gravely affected”. Because of such criticism, it is advisable to adopt other complementary models.
١٣٥ It has been mentioned before (see 4.1) that Coulmas’ (1981) approach is the only model which conflates thanking and apologizing which Coulmas’ (1981: 7778) classification of thanking is depending on different kinds of objects of gratitude: I - Thanks ex ante (for a promise, offer, invitation). Thanks ex post (for a favour, invitation (afterwards). II- Thanks for material damage (gifts, services). Thanks for immaterial goods (wishes,compliments, congratulations, information). III- Thanks for some action initiated by the benefactor. Thanks for some action resulting from a request, wish and orders by the beneficiary. IV- Thanks that imply indebtedness. Thanks that do not imply indebtedness. The first dichotomy shows temporal features of gratitude. The ex ante differs from the ex post thanks in the sense that the former is an advanced thanks directed towards having the intention to do something for the benefit of someone else. The latter, however, occurs afterwards (after receiving the gift). Each one of these kinds has its own responses which should not be overlapped with the latter, e.g.: 1. You are welcome, is inappropriate to ex ante thanks since when utilized, the benefactor admits the existence of the object of gratitude which has not been received yet. The second dichotomy is between material and immaterial goods which involve different kinds of strategies and responders. Again, ‘you are welcome’ is inappropriate to immaterial objects of gratitude such as wishes, compliments, e.g.: 2. Situation: I compliment Layla for being good in exam. Layla: Thank you *Me: You are welcome The third dichotomy shows how objects of gratitude are different with reference to whether the beneficial action is requested or not Furthermore, Coulmas elaborates this dichotomy by stating that “an object of gratitude is not indebting if it is being paid for”. The responders in this case, are unlikely as the following example illustrates: 3. Situation: Maha finishes buying the groceries and gives the cashier the money. Maha: Thank you * Cashier: Pleasure As illustrated above, some responsive formulas are mutually exclusive; others are mutually comparable. Coulmas (1981: 77); therefore, presents the figure for the responders to thanks and apologies (see 4.1, p. 174).
١٣٦ Norrick (1978: 285) also presents different types of ‘thanking’, but they are not comprehensive and detailed well-organized as in the case of Coulmas (1981). However, the researcher finds the necessity to present them and she does so by numerating them: ‘Thank you’ is uttered to show that: (1) The S can do the rest of his/her work alone, e.g.: ‘Someone who offers help for him/her on their wearing the coat’. (2) The S has finished his/her work, e.g.: ‘Someone tries to help you in drying the dishes and you are about to finish’. (3) Polite way of responding to the greeting can be question, e.g.: ‘How are you?’ Similar to complaining and apologizing, thanking has certain expressions to express this speech act of thanking. Direct uses of this act involves the use of the performative verb thank or expressions such as gratitude (see 3.1 and 4.1on the definition of direct or explicit use of the speech acts of complaining and apologizing). Norrick (1978: 285) states that thanks and ‘thank you’ are the only common forms of expressing thanking, although both occur with a wide range of intensifiers. Moreover, in situations where one wants to express truly felt gratitude, it is likely to use lengthier and less formulaic phrases such as: 4. I am truly grateful or 5. I would like to express my gratitude. Thanking, similar to all other expressive IAs, depend on their total effect on “the manner in which they are spoken on accompanying gestures and exhibited emotions”. After presenting kinds of thanking according to Coulmas (1981) and Norrick (1978), it is clear that most if not all expressions of thanking are direct and this conclusion will be verified in (5.3) below. To close off this section, a question may be raised: Is thanking a universal speech act or not? It has been mentioned before (4.1) that apologizing is a universal phenomenon as far as its functions are concerned. The same thing is applied to thanking. It is a universal speech act as far as its functions are concerned. The universal function of thanking is to express gratitude. However, it is unique as far as the culture is concerned. Each culture uses different expressions, formulas, situations and even responses to express thanking from another culture. In Iraq, the community uses the expression ‘ ukran ’ ﺷـ ارto express thanking. In English, the expression ‘thank you’ is used. In French, the expression ‘merci’ is used while in German, the expression “Danke Schön’ is used. The responses to these expressions, are also different from one culture to another. They are as follows: Iraq: ‘ / laa ∫ukra ؟ala waad3ib / ’ﻻ ﺷ ر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟواﺟب English: ‘That is quite all right’. French: ‘Pas De rien’.
١٣٧ German: ‘Bitte Schön’. Another example is provided by Jaworski (1994: 199) regarding the use of the formulaic expressions of thanking. The English ‘thank you’ is used as a sign of accepting an offer or invitation, whereas in Poland, the equivalent expression of gratitude is used to reject an offer or invitation. Iraqis are similar to Poles, they may employ a gratitude expression to reject an invitation, however, this expression ‘thank you’ is accompanied by some signals or gestures to reinforce the rejection, e.g., if an Englishman offers an Iraqiman something, the latter will say ‘thank you’ which may be considered as both rejection and acceptance, but it is the former or the latter if ‘thank you’ is followed by ‘no’ or ‘yes’. Another example is the following: 6. Situation: A friend is offering you a pen. He: / tafaddal / ‘Have one, please ’ﺗﻔﺿﻞ, i.e., here you are You: / ∫ukran / ‘Thank you ‘ ﺷ را, i.e., no, thank you. Uniqueness is not only specified with different cultures, but also with different people in the same culture. Beker and Smenner (1982: 539-544) present an article in which they indicate the fact that the spontaneous use of ‘thank you’ that is uttered by preschoolers is determined by sex, socio-economic status and listener’s status, taking into consideration other researchers that are found in the literature in presenting their own results, Greif and Gleason (1980) (cited in Beker and smenner, 1982: 539-540), for example, suggest that middle income families may be more permissive and concern themselves less with pragmatic routines. Middle class parents, for instance, may emphasize politeness routines to “allow their children to become socially effective communications and develop beneficial affiliations; they emphasize social achievement” Low class parents on the other hand, stress politeness routines to issue conformity and gratify needs as proposed as possible (Hess, 1970 cited in Beker and Smenner, 1982: 450).
5.2 The Structure of the Speech Act of Thanking: After presenting the properties of the speech act of thanking, it is time to shed some light on the structure (grammatical, semantic, and philosophical) under which this speech act is formulated or structured. It has been previously mentioned (see 3.2 and 4.2) above that expressives have the syntactic structure which requires a gerund nominalization transformation or other nominals, but not ‘that clause’. Therefore, it is not possible to say: 1. * I thank you that you paid me the money. But the following sentence is grammatical 2. I thank you for paying me the money (thanks for paying me the money) These syntactic facts are the consequences of the fact that there is in general no direction of fit in expressives. Moreover, the truth of the proposition expressed in an expressive is presupposed. Therefore, the symbolization is as follows: E (P) (S/H + Property),
١٣٨ where E refers to the illocutionary point common to all expressives, is the null symbol indicating no direction of fit, (P) is a variable ranging over the different possible psychological states expressed in the performance of the IAs and the propositional content ascribes some property to S or H. 3. I thank you for doing me a favour, paying me the money,.. etc. Therefore, the property specified in the propositional content of an expressive must, however, be related to S or H (Searle, 1975b: 357). The deep structure analysis of the performative sentences that contain the verb ‘thank’ are roughly paralleled to what Leech (1983: 206) later on observes. Leech assumes that expressive verbs normally occur in the construction ‘S verb (prep) (O) (Prep) Xn’, where (Prep) is an optional preposition and ‘Xn’ is an abstract NP or a gerundive phrase, e.g.: 4. I tried to thank the driver. As far as the semantic analysis of the speech act of ‘thanking’ Leech (1983: 217-218) presents a table for the categories of the speech acts with reference to a number of semantic properties. Thanking has the following properties:
Expressives: Thanking
(a)
1. 2. 3. 4.
[X is the event described in Does X follow the the speech act? propositional content] Thanking No (e) What attitude is implicated? Gratitude for X
(b) Is S or h involved in X? (h)
(c)
(d)
If X follows the Is X speech act, is it S , S, conditional or h, or h? unconditional? S S
Table (2): The Speech Act of Thanking with Reference to Its Semantic Properties As for the philosophical structure, Searle (1969: 67) explicitly formulates four SRs for the successful performance of thanking. These are as follows: Propositional Content Rule: past Act A done by H Preparatory Rules: A benefits S and S believes A benefits S. Sincerity Rule: S feels grateful or appreciative for A. Essential Rule: Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation. Searle then comments that rules (3 and 4) overlap. Moreover, thanking has the only social function of expressing gratitude. It has been mentioned before (see 3.2 and 4.2) that Norrick (1978): 279282) presents conditions on the successful performarce of expressives. Factive condition equals Searle’s sincerity condition. It means “the speaker’s presupposition of the proposition expressed”. In other words, in order to fulfil this condition, one should be sincere in performing his/her act. If I say, 5. Thank you for paying me money.
١٣٩ In order to be factive, I should be sincere in uttering it. It is accompanied by emotions. Gans (1993: 79-80) agrees with the fact that expressives, in particular, and other speech acts in general, can hardly be insincere. One feels thankful as a result of being able to say ‘thank you’ rather than the other way round. The possibility of such feeling in any explicit sense is “the product of the proposition-existing speech acts that provide them with their vocabulary”. However, Norrick (1978: 279) believes that one cannot consider the factive condition (or sincerity condition) as a determining factor because, thanking is performed whether the thanker feels sincerely with the feeling of thanking or not. Norrick, following Searle (1969) propounds that expressives do not backfire when sincerity condition is not met. What is occupied with the sincerity condition is emotion which is varied from one person to another and from one situation to another. What further strengthens the unimportance of the presence of this condition is sometimes the thanker uses the expression ‘thank you’ for ironical effect (or to use Austin’s (1962) term, parasitic). Norrick (1978: 281) provides us with the following example: If I wish to call Ali’s attention that he has neglected a promise he made, I may ironically thank him. “It is the expression of gratitude he knows cannot be felt which is intended to make him realize that I have nothing to be grateful to him for”. Therefore, he has failed to keep his promise. Neverthless, the speech act of thanking is performed even when this ironical sense is felt. Similarly, Mey (1993: 138-142) indirectly agrees with Searle (1969) and Norrick (1978) that thanking occurs even when sincerity condition is not met. For the reasons cited, Norrick (1978: 280) prefers to depend on the preparatory conditions (using Searle’s (1969) term) for the expressives. In other words, “the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and hearer”. (It is Searle’s sixth parameter) (for Searle’s classification, see Searle (1975b: 5)). Norrick concentrates on the social function of expressives, i.e., “the kinds of effects which a speaker intends to cause by performing such acts” (the social functions of thanking have been already referred to previously, see 5.1 above). Searle’s ‘preparatory conditions’ are Norrick’s role identification and value judgement conditions. The role identification condition is explained by Norrick (1978: 283-284) as there should be a S who is responsible for the state, patient (who gets affected by the state) and, in some cases, observer (a person cognizant of the state besides the patient) with himself/herself qua S or with the adressee. The role of the agent is naturally paired with the adressee, while the patient is done with that of the S. The adressee’s state must be perceived as beneficial to the speaker. Thus, the following pairings of thanking is shown as follows: Agent : adressee, value : positive, patient : speaker. According to our data ananlysis, the above formula will be modified as follows: Agent (S): Thanker, Value: Positive, Patient (H): Thankee. Sometimes the agent and the patient refer to the same person, e.g.: When one thanks himself / herself. For example, in Hard Times, Ch. 13, p. 68. In other cases, the thanker does not want to thank, but the observer wants the thanker to do
١٤٠
(i) (ii)
(iii)
that as in Wuthering Height, Ch. XXI, p. 120. In such cases and other similar cases, the analysis is done on two levels: the explicit level and the implicit level, in (text No. 3), the implicit level expresses the agent’s ‘gratitude’ (though these cases are discussed in the findings, the researcher finds it necessary to mention them). When the agent is not identified, when the agent is not identified, Norrick (1978: 283) states that the thanker is left ignorant of who deserves the expected thanking. Moreover, failure to recognize the benefit of the state leaves thanker with no reason to express his/her gratitude. Value judgement condition means “the requirement that the speaker make [Sic] a value judgement with regard to the effect of the recognized state of affairs, person, or patient”. In thanking, S must feel that the state has affected him positively before expressing his/her thanking. This requires a value judgement on the part of the thanker. The researcher’s point of view concerning this last condition is similar to that of the sincerity condition. In other words, sometimes the state of affairs has affected the agent negatively; therefore, she/he utters ‘thank you’ in the case of irony or blaming as in Wuthering Heights, Ch. X p. 100. In such cases, thanking has positive value on the explicit level, but negative on the implicit level. In such cases, two levels are taking into consideration to analyze the speech act of thanking. Edmondson (1981: 42-43) presents a new term when he discusses spoken discourse, that is of sequential relevance. It is “the constraints on what I can say or do, given what you have said and done, are social constraints”. In answering a question, one is responding to a person, and not an utterance. Since this notion ‘sequential relevance’ is intersectional, Edmondson finds the necessity to note the effect of what has been said or done on others. Therefore, he discusses the semantic features of perlocutionary verbs in English. By perlocutionary verbs, Edmondson (1981: 42) means, verbs which “denote the effect on a hearer of a verbal communication”. For the sake of analyzing a conversation, it is relevant to observe that perlocutionary verbs can be properly used to refer to a S’s activity, regardless whether or not the S intends to produce that perloutionary effect. If for example, “you are amused by my screaming, crying, cursing, complaining, or whatever, I have amused you in behaving in these various ways”. Therefore, he presents the semantic features of most of the perlocutionary verbs and thanking is one of them: S wishes H to believe that S is in favour of an act A, performed by H as in the interest of S. S in thanking may be held to believe that H did A knowingly and that benefits S consequent to A, were known by H to be involved at the time of his doing A. Thanks are clearly H-supportive, and the verbal means of performing this IA are explicit. Edmondson (1981) considers these features as semantic. He does not label them as FCs on the performance of thanking. The first and the second semantic features are Searle’s preparatory conditions. The last condition may be considered as Searle’s propositional content condition.
١٤١ Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 179-180) use the formal apparatus of illocutionary logic to analyse over a hundred English illocutionary verbs; therefore, their analysis is also considered a semantic one since those verbs imply an illocutionary point as part of their meaning. Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 212) state that the point of thanking is to express gratitude. Its preparatory conditions are that the thing in question benefits or is good for the S and that the H is responsible for it. The propositional content need not necessarily represent an action provided that the H is responsible. Therefore, thanking takes the following form: [ ] [ E ] where (i,p) where (i , p) = { gratitude (p)} and (i,p) = { p, the proposition that bi is responsible for the state of affairs that p at time ti, the state of affairs is good for the speaker ai} where: = sincerity condition, [ E ] = preparatory conditions, i = utterance, ti = time, ai = speaker , bi = hearer. It is important to note that one thanks the H in each case for something about him/her and his/her relation to the state of affairs is specified in the propositional content. Allan (1986: 191-192) classifies the speech acts into two major categories, namely interpersonal acts and declaratory acts. But, he bases his classification on the different classes of speech acts. Acknowledgements which are one division of interpersonal acts that are corresponding to Searle’s (1975b) expressives, have appropriacy values. Because the function of acknowledgements is to maintain both S and H’s face, they have two sincerity conditions instead of one. Generally, these are as follows: [ 1a ] = S feels a certain way toward H. [ 1b ] = S believes it is polite to express a certain feeling toward H. It is the turn now to reveal Allan’s (1986: 198) FCs of thanking as follows: 1. [propositional] : H, or someone or something in his charge, does D with the apparent intention of benefiting S (directly or indirectly). 2. [sincerity] : Either [ Sa] : S is grateful for D. [ Sb] : there is a social expectation that one should express gratitude for D. 3. [Essential] : [ I ] : S reflexively – intends H to recognize that U expressed his/her gratitude. After presenting Searle’s (1969) SRs for the successful performance of thanking, Norrick’s (1978) proposal, Searle and Vanderveken’s (1985) and Allan’s (1986), we sum up the results of such survey and make certain modifications in order to produce a relatively simpler and more economical model of conditions and rules: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: S expresses his/her thanking in his/ her utterance and/or behaviour for the past action (A) which was done by the H. A is done in the hope that the S will benefit directly or indirectly from A. 2. The Preparatory Conditions:
١٤٢ a. H did past A since he/she believes it will benefit the S. b. S views H responsible for doing A that will benefit S in future. c. (b) case leads to ( c ) case that S wishes H to believe that A is in the interest of S. The H believes in this. 3. The Sincerity Condition: This condition requires that S must feel with sincere thanking for past A done by patient. 4. The Essential Condition: The S reflexively wants the H, by counting or considering his/her utterance and/or behaviour as an expression of thanking, to recognize that the S is grateful.
1. 2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
From the above mentioned set of FCs, some SRs can be determined for the IFID: The Propositional Content Rule: Past act (A) done by H which makes S expresses thanking in his/her utterance and/or behaviour. The Preparatory Rules: The past action (A) specified in the propositional content benefits the S and the H believes in that. The S believes in that, the H’s A benefits S. (b) case leads to (c) case that the S wishes to H believe in (a). The Sincerity Rule: Thanking is uttened only if S feels with thanking for A. The Essential Rule: The proposition of thanking is uttered only if the S’s utterance and/or behaviour is counted / as an expression of thanking to make H recognizes his/her S’s thanking. The ground has now been prepared for a comprehensive analysis of thanking. The data to be presented in the following sections will be analyzed by using our FCs as a model for establishing the status of thanking in the novels under discussion: Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, Hard Times and Vanity Fair.
5.3 The Analysis of the Speech Act of Thanking: In this section, our modified model of the FCs for the Speech act of thanking is going to be applied to different examples taken from Wuthering Heights, Jane Eyre, Hard Times and Vanity Fair in order to identify the speech act of ‘thanking’.
5.3.1 Wuthering Heights: Text (1): 1. Ch. X, P. 100: “I’d thank you to adhere to the truth and not slander me, even in joke!”. Interpretation: Isabella loves Heathchiff and the latter tries to deceive her to take the fortune of Edgar, Isabella’s brother. Cathy tries to tell Isabella the truth of Heathcliff. Isabella; therefore, expresses her thanks to Cathy. Her thanks are considered on the deep level (implicit) as ironical ones. This is due to the fact that Isabella knows the real reason behind Cathy’s intention of telling her the truth of Heathcliff (since Cathy loves Heathcliff).
١٤٣ Establishing the Status of Thanking: The Propositional Content Condition: On the implicit level, Isabella expresses ironical thanking because she knows quite well that Cathy loves Heathcliff. On the explicit level, Isabella expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘I’d thank you…’ for Cathy’s telling her the truth. Cathy tells Isabella that in the hope that Isabella will benefit from such information directly. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: On the implicit level, a. Cathy informs Isabella of Heathcliff’s real intention behind his marriage to Isabella, to leave him because Cathy is in love with Heathcliff. Thus, Cathy’s information in reality will benefit Cathy not Isabella. b. (b) case leads to (c) that Isabella wishes Cathy not telling her the truth. On the explicit level, 1.
a. Cathy informs Isabella of Heathcliff’s real intention since Cathy believes that this will make Isabella thank her and consequently not marry Heathcliff. The Sincerity Condition: On the implicit level, this condition is not met since Isabella is not sincerely thanking Cathy. On the explicit level, Isabella feels with sincere gratitude for what Cathy has already done (telling Isabella the truth of Heathcliff). 4. The Essential Condition: Isabella reflexively wants, by counting her utterance as an expression of thanking to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: 3.
Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. XII, P. 113: “And Edgar standing solemnly by to see it over; then offering prayers of thanks to God for restoring peace to his house”. Interpretation: Edgar knows quite well that, what Cathy is trying to do is only to make him feel in sympathy with her. He, therefore, thanks God because God provides Edgar’s house with peace. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1.
2. a. b. c. 3.
The Propositional Content Condition: Edgar expresses his thanking in his prayers for what God has provided Edgar’s family. God does so in the hope that Edgar’s family will benefit from God’s gift of peace. The Preparatory Conditions: God has provided Edgar’s family with peace since peace will benefit his family. Edgar views God is responsible for making his family live in peace. This case (b) leads to case (c) that Edgar wishes God to believe that His gift of providing peace is in the interest of Edgar. The Sincerity Condition: Edgar feels sincerely with thanking for what God has provided.
١٤٤ 4.
The Essential Condition: Edgar reflexively wants God, by considering his prayers, as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Edgar is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. XXI, P. 129: “Compare the present occasion with such affliction as that, and be thankful for the friends you have, instead of coveting more”. Interpretation: This text has two interpretations on two levels: On the explicit level, there is no thanking at all. On the implicit level, the real thanker is Neally, Neally thanks God for having the friends that Miss Catherine has. In other words, when Neally and Miss Catherine’s father will die, they will sleep in peace since Catherine has friend (she does not feel in loneliness). Therefore, Neally orders Catherine to be thankful instead of her crying. Therefore, FCs are going to be interpreted on the implicit level. Establishing the Status of Thanking:
1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
The Propositional Content Condition: Neally and Edgar express their thanking and in more particular Neally in her utterance: ‘Compare the present occasion with such an affliction as that, and be thankful for the friends you have instead of coveting more’, for what God has done. God’s gift is made in the hope that Catherine will not be left alone . The Preparatory Conditions: God provides Miss Catherine with more friends than anyone may have and this will not make her feel lonely. Neally, in particular views God responsible for providing her (Catherine) with friends who will not leave her alone. (b) case leads to (c) case that Neally wishes God to believe that providing friends for Catherine will not make her feeling in loneliness. The Sincerity Condition: Neally (in particular) and Edgar (in general) feel sincerely with gratitude for God who provides Miss Catherine with friends. The Essential Condition: Neally reflexively wants God (implicitly Miss Catherine who is not the main source of providing friends for herself; therefore, she is not the thankee), by considering her utterance as an expression of thanking to recognize that Neally is grateful for God. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative , Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 2nd person singular, Subject: Explicit 2nd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch. XXVI, P. 222: His nephew’s offering of thanks was duly delivered. Interpretation:
١٤٥ Linton tells Catherine to give his thanks to Edgar because the latter gives his permission to Miss Catherine to see Linton. Therefore, Catherine does what Linton asks her to do. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
The propositional Content Condition: Linton expresses his thanking in his previous utterance “and give him my thanks for permitting you to come” for Edgar’s permission of letting Catherine to see him. Edgar does so hoping that Linton (and in more particular Catherine and she is not the thanker) will feel well when he sees Catherine. The Preparatory Conditions: Edgar lets Catherine to go and see Linton since Edgar believes that this action will benefit Linton and Catherine. Linton views Edgar responsible for letting Catherine to come and see her. This (b) case leads to (c) case that Linton wishes Edgar to believe that letting Catherine to see Linton is in the interest of Linton. The Sincerity Condition: Linton sincerely feels with thanking for what Edgar has already done. The Essential Condition: Linton reflexively wants Edgar, by considering his utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Linton is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular , Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. XXVII, P. 230: “There’s law in the land; thank God there is”. Interpretation: Heathcliff forces Catherine to marry Linton, Catherin is ready to marry him because she loves him. Neally thanks God because He provides law in the land and therefore, no one has the right to force Catherine to marry Linton. Establishing the Status of Thanking:
1.
2. a. b. c. 3.
The Propositional Content Condition: Neally expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘thank God’ for God’s gift of law in the land. God does hope that people in general will benefit from God’s law. The Preparatory Conditions: God provides humanity with justice and law since he believes they will benefit humanity in general and Catherine in particular. Neally views God responsible for making Catherine marry who wants to marry (by providing humanity with law and justice). Case (b) leads to case (c) that humanity in general and Neally in particular wish God to believe that providing law makes humanity live in peace. The Sincerity Condition: Neally sincerely feels with thanking for God’s gift of law.
١٤٦ 4.
The Essential Condition: Neally (one of human beings) reflexively wants God, by counting her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Neally is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. XXVIII, P. 237: “God be thanked, you are safe with us again”. Interpretation: At last Catherine can run away from Heathcliff and see her father again (before his death). Therefore, Neally thanks God that Catherine comes back and she is well. Establishing the Status of Thanking:
1.
2. a. b. c.
3. 4.
The Propositional Content Condition: Neally expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘God be thanked’ for what God does with Catherine (he helps her to come back to her family and she is in a good state). God helps her to do so hoping that Cathy will come back safely to her family. The Preparatory Conditions: God helps Catherine to run away from Heathcliff and comes back to her family (feeling with a good health). Neally views God responsible for helping Catherine. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Neally wishes God to believe that helping people (who are in trouble) is in the interest of Neally (in particular) and people (in general). The Sincerity Condition: Neally sincerely feels with thanking for what God does with Catherine. The Essential Condition: Neally reflexively wants God, by considering her utterance, as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Neally is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive , Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular (God); Implicit 3rd person singular (Neally), Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. XXXII, P. 261: “But now I thank you”. Interpretation: Earnshaw loves Catherine very much and tries to help her despite her hatered. He, more than once, tries to take her part despite Heathcliff’s anger. Catherine does not pay attention to him because he is illiterate (uneducated). However, at last Catherine knows Earnshaw’s intention, she thanks him. Establishing the Status of Thanking:
1.
The Propositional Content Condition: Catherine expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘but now I thank you’ for what Earnshaw has made (he always tries to help her). He does so to make Catherine feel in love with him.
١٤٧ 2. a.
b. c. 3. 4.
The Preparatory Conditions: Earnshaw takes Catherine’s part more than once because he loves her. He does so since this will benefit her (to be prevented or avoided from Heathcliff’s anger) Catherine views Earnshaw responsible for taking her part. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Catherine wishes (though implicitly) Earnshaw to believe that taking her part is in the interest of Catherine. The Sincerity Condition: Catherine sincerely feels with thanking for what Earnshaw has made. The Essential Condition: Catherine reflexively wants Earnshaw, by counting her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Catherine is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
5.3.2 Jane Eyre: Text (1): 1. Ch. 20, P. 215: “Thank you sir.” Interpretation: Mr. Rochester loves Jane and she does the same with him. While they are walking, he asks her if she wants a flower and before her answer, he gathers a half-blown rose. Jane likes flowers, therefore, she thanks him. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘thank you’ for Rochester’s action, offering her a flower. He does that in the hope that Jane will benefit from this action, i. e, she will become happy. The Preparatory Conditions: Rochester offered Jane a flower since he believes that this will benefit Jane. Jane views Rochester for having a half-blown rose and this action will make Jane happy in the future (Rochester’s past action will benefit Jane). Case (b) leads to case (c) that Jane wishes Rochester to believe that offering a half-blown rose is in the interest of Jane. The Sincerity Condition: Jane sincerely feels with thanking for Rochester’s action. The Essential Condition: Jane reflexively wants Rochester, by considering her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Jane is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active , Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. P. 48: “ Just as I cherished Mrs. Fairfax a thankfulness for her kindness” Interpretation:
١٤٨ Mrs. Fairfax welcomed Jane. She behaves very kindly with Jane. Therefore, Jane thanks her very much. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1.
2. a. b. c. 3. 4.
The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘I cherished towards Mrs. Fairfax’s kindness’ for Mrs. Fairfax kindness with Jane. Fairfax’s kindness is made in the hope that Jane will be happy at Thornfield and will stay forever at it. The Preparatory Conditions: Mrs. Fairfax treats Jane very kindly since she believes such treatment will benefit Jane making her happy at Thornfield. Jane views Mrs. Fairfax responsible for making Jane happy at Thornfield by her (Mrs. Fairfax) kindness. Case (b) leads to Jane wishes Fairfax to believe that treating her kindly is in the interest of Jane. The Sincerity Condition: Jane sincerely feels with thanking for Fairfax’s kindness. The Essential Condition: Jane reflexively wants Mrs. Fairfax, by considering Jane’s utterance and behaviour as an expression of thanking, to recognize that Jane is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. 32, P. 363: “At this period of my life, my heart for offender swelled with thankfulness than sank with dejection”. Interpretation: Jane tries to be beneficial for pupils of the village. She encourages them to be educated. Therefore, they love her. On the surface level, Jane thanks them since they treat her kindly and with respect. On the implicit level, they are grateful for her since she helps them in learning. The condition will be interpreted on the surface level. Establishing the Status of Thanking:
1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘At this period of my life, my heart for Jane is swelled with thankfulness than with dejection’ for what people of the village (in general) and pupils of it (in particular) treat her with respect and kindness. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. People treat Jane very kindly and with respect since this will make Jane happy and do her best to make them educated people. b. Jane views the people of the village responsible for treating her kindly and this will make Jane does her best to educate them.
١٤٩ c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Jane wishes people to believe that treating her with respect and kindness is in the interest of Jane. The Sincerity Condition: Jane sincerely feels with thanking for what the pupils of the village do towards her. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane reflexively wants the people and the pupils of the village, by considering Jane’s utterance, behaviour and feeling, as an expression of thanking, or recognize that Jane is grateful. Text Analysis: 3.
Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active , Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular , Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch. 30, P. 351: “ I thank you for the proposal, Mr. Rivers.” Interpretation: Jane after her departure from Thornfield, went and lived with St. John’s family. She loves his sisters, Diana and Mary. However, both of them work at different houses to take care of those families and St. John wants to leave Moor House and goes to Morton accompanied by Hannah. Therefore, this house where John’s family live in, is going to be closed. These new circumstances force Jane to think of a new place to work at and live in. St. John suggests to work as a teacher in Morton’s school. Because she was a respectable and good teacher and had no will to do another thing, she accepted the suggestion and thanked him. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘I thank you for the proposal, Mr. Rivers’ for what Mr. Rivers suggests in finding her a job as a teacher. He does so since that will make Jane happy and do her past work again (being a teacher). This is on the surface level (explicit level). On the implicit level, Mr. River’s intention is to make Jane near him because he loves her (since he is also going to Morton). 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mr. Rivers finds a job for Jane since this will make her work and get money (and implicitly near him). b. Jane views Mr. Rivers responsible for finding her a job which will make her happy and get money to live well (implicitly to be near her since they will be in the same place, Morton). c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Jane wishes Mr. Rivers to believe that finding her a job (especially a teacher not a person who takes care of others at the strangers’ houses) is in the interest of Jane. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane sincerely feels with thanking for Mr. River’s suggestion. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane reflexively wants Mr. Rivers, by counting her utterance an expression of thanking to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis:
١٥٠ Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular , Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. 5, P. 48: Thanks having been returned for what we had not got. Interpretation: Jane studies at Lowood. In this school, girls (pupils) are treated badly. They (workers at this school) offer them bad food (burnt porridge is almost as bad as rotten potatoes). No girl tastes it or tries to swallow it. However, they thank God. On the explicit level, the girls forced to thank God for providing food. FCs are going to be established on the surface level which express the ironical social function of thanking. The real irony is not made towards God, but teachers of Lowood. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: The girls (pupils) express their thanking in their praying, thanking God and this thanking is expressed through Jane’s utterance ‘thanks have been returned’ for what God has given them, being pupils at this school provided by teachers and food. God provides them with this place (supposing it should be the best place for pupils) to help them in their living and education in the future. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. God provides the pupils at this school with teachers who should treat kindly the pupils and offer them with good and tasty food since God believes that being at a school is to make pupils happy in their education and living. b. The pupils at Lowood (and especially Jane) views God responsible for making them at this place which is supposed to be good for them in learning and living. c. Case (b) leads to (c) that the pupils wish God to give them the chance to be at this place since it is in their interest. 3. The Sincerity Condition: The pupils feel with some thanking for what God has given them. 4. The Essential Condition: The pupils (and Jane in particular) reflexively want God (explicitly who provide them with the best place for learning and living) and (implicitly) teachers of Lowood, by counting their praying (expressed through Jane’s utterance) as an expression of thanking, to recognize that the pupils are grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Passive, Agent: Implicit 3rd person plural, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Implicit 3rd person plural (pupils), Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. 16, P. 161: Thanks to it, I was able to meet subsequent. Interpretation: Jane starts loving Mr. Rochester but if she compares herself with Miss Ingram, Mr. Rochester will choose the latter. Therefore, she decides to control herself and not to
١٥١ be foolish to imagine things which are unreal. Finally, she thanks her wholesome discipline that forces her feelings to submit. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Jane expresses her thanking in her utterance “Ere long, I had reason to congratulate myself on the course of wholesome discipline to which I had thus forced my feelings to submit: thanks to it” for her own control (wholesome discipline) since it will help Jane in forgetting Mr. Rochester and in living peacefully at Thornfield. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. She forces herself to have this control since this will help her to continue her living at Thornfield. b. Jane views herself responsible for controlling her feelings towards her since such a thing will be helpful for her to forget Mr. Rochester and live peacefully with him. c. Case (b) leads to (c), that Jane wishes herself to believe that controlling her feelings will help her in forgetting Mr. Rochester. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Jane sincerely feels with thanking for her wholesome discipline. 4. The Essential Condition: Jane reflexively wants herself (and may be the readers implicitly), by counting her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Verbless, Type of SA: Explicit.
5.3.3 Hard Times: Text (1): 1. Ch. 13, P. 68: “I am thankful I stayed”. Interpretation: Stephen’s wife is very sick. Rachael is her close friend. Thus, she prefers to stay with her and she asks her husband, Stephen, to sleep. Stephen’s wife tries to kill herself by taking the bottle that had certain deaths in it. At this moment, Stephen and Rachael are sleeping. However, Rachael wakes up at last and takes this bottle from Stephen wife’s hand and saves her life. Stephen, then, walks up and is terrified that his wife takes a draught from that bottle. Yet, Rachael assures him that his wife is good and she thanks herself that she is beside her to save her. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rachael expresses her thanking in her utterance: ‘I am thankful I stayed’. Her staying benefits Stephen’s wife, i.e., saving her life. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Rachael insists on to stay beside Stephen’s wife (they are friends) since this will benefit Stephen’s wife (saving her life).
١٥٢ b. Rachael views herself responsible for staying beside Stephen’s wife since this will save her life. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Rachael wishes herself to believe that staying beside her friend is in the interest of Rachael herself. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rachael sincerely feels with thanking for her staying beside Stephen’s wife. 4. The Essential Condition: Rachael reflexively wants herself, by considering her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. 10, P. 50: she laid her hand lightly on his arm a moment as if to thank him for it. Interpretation: Stephen loves Rachael to the extent he wishes to be with her all the time. She does not accept that since he has a wife and Rachael is a good woman and does not want people to talk badly about her. All these things are taken into Rachael’s consideration when she walks with Stephen. Despite of Stephen’s disappointment (that Rachael cannot decieve his wife), he looks at her with respect. Therefore, Rachael thanks him for such respect. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rachael expresses her thanking in her behaviour “laying his hand as if to thank him” for what he shows (by using the facial expression) of respect and patient towards her. Stephen does so since he loves her and does not want to miss her. Moreover, she is right of whoever she does (since she is a respectable girl). 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Stephen understands Rachael’s attitude towards their relation. Therefore, he expresses his respect since she is right and he does not want to lose her. b. Rachael views Stephen responsible for expressing his respect towards her and accepting what she has done with him since his expression will make their relation to go on forever and protect her reputation among people. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Rachael wishes Stephen to believe that his expression of respect (which means that he agrees with what Rachael directly or indirectly states) is in the interest of Rachael. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rachael sincerely feels with thanking for what Stephen expresses (by using facial expression) his respect towards her. 4. The Essential Condition: Rachael reflexively wants Stephen, by counting her behaviour as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular , Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular , Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit.
١٥٣ Text (3): 3. Ch. 12, P. 60: “Thank you”, said the old woman, with infinite content. Interpretation: An old woman raises many questions to Stephen about Mr. Bounderby and Stephen answers her questions sincerely. Stephen, however, thinks that this lady is similar to a lady whom Stephen knows her (and she is a bad lady). Therefore, he answers her (on the explicit level) to help her since she is an old woman. Yet, (on the implicit level), he answers her to get rid of her. In both cases (or levels), this lady is grateful for Stephen. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: The old woman expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘thank you’ which is uttered twice by her for Stephen’s responses. Stephen does this since his answers will help her (in assuring that he is the same man she looks for) to meet the man she looks for (on the explicit level) and will help him to get rid of her (on the implicit level) since she is a bad woman. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Stephen answers her questions honestly since such a kind action will help her to meet Mr. Bounderby (the man whom the lady looks for). This interpretation is held on the explicit level, on the implicit level, he answers her honestly to get rid of her quickly (because he thinks her as the same old and bad woman he knows). b. The old lady views Stephen responsible for helping her to meet Mr. Bounderby quickly since he answers honestly all her questions. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that the old woman wishes Stephen to believe that answering all her questions honestly, quickly and directly is in the interest of her. 3. The Sincerity Condition: The old lady sincerely feels with her thanking for Stephen’s kind treatment towards her (answering her questions honestly). 4. The Essential Condition: The old woman reflexively wants Stephen, by counting his utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch. 1, P. 93: “Thousand thanks”, said the stranger. Interpretation: A stranger comes from Mr. Gradgrind holding a letter to Mr. Bounderby. He comes to Mrs. Sparsit to ask her questions about Mr. Bounderby and his wife (Louisa). The way he asks Mr. Sparsit is a gentle way that makes her answering him honestly and quickly. Explicitly, to help him in sending the letter to her boss (Mr. Bounderby whom Mrs. Sparist works with) quickly. Implicitly, the stranger is a handsome man and Mrs. Sparist is a widow so she may have him as a husband. This intention is
١٥٤ strengthened when a stronger describes her as “a lady of a very superior and agreeable appearance”. Whatever the reason is, the stranger thanks her. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: A stranger expresses his thanking in his utterance ‘Thousand thanks’ for Mrs. Sparist’s kind and honest way of giving him the adress of Mr. Bounderby’s bank and she wants the stranger to go quickly to him giving him letter from Mr. Gradgrind. However, implicitly, she helps him since he is a handsome man and she is a widow, so he can marry her and be a rich man since her family is a powler one. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mrs. Sparist gives the stranger the address of Mr. Bounderby honestly and with no hesitation since this will help the stranger to go quickly to him giving him Mr. Gradgrind’s letter. This is on the explicit level, on the implicit level, Mrs. Sparist helps him to marry her and will become a rich man since she belongs to the powler’s family. b. A stranger views Mrs. Sparist responsible for helping him by giving him Mr. Bounderby’s address quickly and honestly. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that the stranger wishes Mrs. Sparist to believe that giving him Mr. Bounderby’s address quickly and honestly is in the interest of the stranger. 3. The Sincerity Condition: A stranger sincerely feels with thanking for Mrs. Sparist’s kindness (giving him the address of Mr. Bounderby). 4. The Essential Condition: The stranger reflexively wants Mrs. Sparist, by counting his utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that he is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Verbless, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5): 5. Ch. 1, P. 170: “If any harmony has been awakened in her young breast that was mute in mine until it turned to discord, let her thank heaven for it”. Interpretation: Mr. Gradgrind loves and worships science as if the only thing in life irrespect with feeling. He does not pay attention to his children and how they live. The most important thing to him is science. Louisa is his victim. Now (often Louisa’s bad life), the father makes this change with another daughter. Therefore, Louisa asks her father to let his daughter to thank heaven for this change. Explicitly, Louisa demands his sister thank heaven herself. Implicitly, Louisa herself thanks heaven for the change that takes place a round her house, daughter and father. FCs are going to be applied on the implicit level since the thanker (Louisa) feels sincerely with thanking and since one does not have the clear voice of Louisa’s sister who feels with gratitude for what heaven provides her. Establishing the Status of Thanking:
١٥٥ 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Louisa expresses her thanking in her utterance ‘let her thank heaven for it’ for what God provides her sister (Jane) and her father with changes. God (or heaven) does so since this will make the father take care of his daughters and live peacefully with them. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. God provides Mr. Gradgrind’s family with changes that will make the father take care of his daughters, live with them peacefully and is to be near to their feelings. b. Louisa views God responsible for changing his father’s attitude and consequently her family since this will benefit all members of her family to live in peace and love each other. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Louisa wishes God to believe that doing such changes, is in the interest of Louisa. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Louisa sincerely feels with thanking for what God has provided her family and especially her father. 4. The Essential Condition: Louisa reflexively wants God, by counting her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. 7, P. 214: Louisa, with many thanks and with a lightened loond, detained Mr. Sleary. Interpretation: Louisa’s brother steals the bank. Sissy suggests a place where Louisa’s brother can hide. The place is at Sissy’s father’s circus. There, Mr. Sleary can take care of him. When both of Louisa and Sissy go there, Mr. Sleary helps them to see Tom, Louisa’s brother (he is disguised so that no one can know him). Therefore, Louisa thanks Mr. Sleary. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Louisa expresses her thanking which is expressed throughout the narrator’s utterance ‘Louisa, with many thanks’ for what Mr. Sleary does. Mr. Sleary hides Tom by wearing the clothes of a black waiter. He does so since this will make Tom away from the police and will make Mr. Gradgrind happy (Mr. Gradgind helps Sissy and Sissy is the daughter of Mr. Sleary’s old friend, therefore, Mr. Sleary helps Mr. Gradgrind’s son). 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mr. Sleary helps Tom to be away from the police by hiding him in his circus since this will make Mr. Gradgrind happy and may in return, help Mr. Sleary (by giving him money, for example). b. Louisa views Mr. Sleary responsible for helping Mr. Gradgrind’s son, Tom to be away from the police since this will make Louisa and her father happy.
١٥٦ c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Louisa wishes Mr. Sleary to believe that helping her brother is in the interest of Louisa. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Louisa sincerely feels with thanking for what Mr. Sleary does. 4. The Essential Condition: Louisa reflexively wants Mr. Sleary, by considering her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (7): 7. Ch. 1, P. 170: “Louisa, I have a misgiving that some change may have been slowly working about me in this house, by mere love and gratitude”. Interpretation: Mr. Gradgrind has undergone a change that mind is not everything, the heart can do what the mind alone cannot. He feels that such change is occurred at his house. Explicitly, changes have undergone at his house by love and gratitude. Implicitly, he himself thanks God for this change to take place at his house. Therefore, he is happy with such a change, FCs are going to be applied on the implicit level. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Mr. Gradgrind expresses indirectly his thanking in his utterance “I have a misgiving that some change may have been slowly waking about me in this house by mere love and gratitude” for what God has provided of change to his heart and consequently to his house. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. God has provided a change inside Mr. Gradgrind’s house, that is heart is as important as mind, this is done since this will benefit Mr. Gradgrind by making him near his children and taking care of them. b. Mr. Gradgrind views God responsible for changing his life, attitude and consequently his house. Such a change will help him in being near his children. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Mr. Gradgrind wants God to believe that changing his attitudes and house into a better way is in the interest of Mr. Gradgrind. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Mr. Gradgrind sincerely feels with thanking towards God who is responsible for this change. 4. The Essential Condition: Mr. Gradgrind reflexively wants God, by counting his utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that he is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person singular (Louisa’s father), Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit.
١٥٧ 5.3.4 Vanity Fair: Text (1): 1. Ch. 3, P. 16: “Thank you for the beautiful shawls, brother”, said Amelia to the fire-poker. Interpretation: Joseph, Amelia’s brother leaves the house and goes to India when Amelia is five years old. Amelia thinks that her brother does not care whether she loves him or not. But when she sees the two Cashmere shawls that he brings them to her, she became happy and thanks him. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Amelia expresses her thanking in her utterance “thank you for the beautiful shawls, brother” for what he brings. Joseph brings her two shawls because he knows that she will became happy. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Joseph brings Amelia these two shawls because he knows that Amelia will become happy. b. Amelia views Joseph responsible for making her happy (by giving her two shawls). c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Amelia wishes Joseph to believe that bringing her shawls is in the interest of Amelia (since this means that he thinks of her and wants to make her happy). 3. The Sincerity Condition: Amelia sincerely feels with thanking for her brother’s present. 4. The Essential Condition: Amelia reflexively wants Joseph, by counting her utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative , Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (2): 2. Ch. IV, P. 22: She was all respectful gratitude to Mrs. Sedley. Interpretation: Amelia takes Rebecca with her to live in he house. Mrs. Sedley, Amelia’s mother, treats Rebecca kindly as if she is her daughter. She takes her to the Bazaars and to the theatre. Therefore, she feels with gratitude towards Mrs. Sedley. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Rebecca expresses her thanking in her behaviour and throughout the narrator’s utterance (describing Rebecca’s gratitude) ‘she was all respectful gratitude to Mrs. Sedley’ for what Mrs. Sedley does. Mrs. Sedley treats her kindly by taking her to the theatre and the Bazaars since seeing these place will make Rebecca happy and feel that she lives with her real family. 2.
The Preparatory Conditions:
١٥٨ a. Mrs. Sedley takes Rebecca to these places since treating her kindly and considering her as a member of the Sedley will make her happy and will not leave her alone. b. Rebecca views Sedley’s family and especially Mrs. Sedley responsible for making her happy and making her have the feeling of one member of the family (this feeling is clearly shown when Mrs. Sedley takes her to these places). c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Rebecca wishes Mrs. Sedley to believe that going with Mrs. Sedley to these places is in the interest of Rebecca. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Rebecca sincerely feels with thanking for Mrs. Sedley’s kind treatment (going with her to the theatre and the Bazaars). 4. The Essential Condition: Mrs. Sedley, by counting the narrator’s utterance is, as an expression of thanking, to recognize that she is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative , Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person singular, Subject: Explicit 3rd person singular, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (3): 3. Ch. XXI, P. 193: “I thank everybody who loves Amelia” Interpretation: George Osborne loves Amelia too much and she does the same with him. However, her family become poor and disgrace themselves. Therefore, George’s family do not want George to love her or even to mention her name. Her friend, Miss Swartz, loves her and tries to be beside her. Hence, George thanks her. This utterance is analysed on two levels: on the explicit level, he thanks anybody who loves Amelia and Miss Swartz is one of them. On the implicit level, he wants his sisters to be kind with her and therefore, he will thank them, because the one who loves Amelia or treats her kindly means loves George himself. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: George expresses his thanking to Miss Swartz (especially) and to everyone (generally) because the former loves Amelia and wants to ask about her. George’s gratitude is expressed throughout his utterance ‘I thank everybody who loves Amelia’ and his previous utterance to Miss Swartz “Thank you”. Miss Swartz does so because she loves her and loving her will make him happy. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Miss Swartz loves Amelia too much since they are close friends. Loving and treating her kindly, will make George happy. b. George views Miss Swartz responsible for making George happy since she loves Amelia very much. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that George wishes Miss Swartz to believe that treating Amelia kindly and loving her, will make George happy and feel with thanking. 3. The Sincerity Condition: George sincerely feels with thanking for what Miss Swartz does (treating Amelia kindly and this makes George happy).
١٥٩ 4.
The Essential Condition: George reflexively wants Miss Swartz, by counting his utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that he is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person singular, Subject: Explicit 1st person singular, Tense: Present, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (4): 4. Ch. XXIX, P. 267: And both Amelia and William Dobbin thanked her for this timely observation. Interpretation: Rebecca’s husband is a general. They, i.e., Rebecca and her husband want to go to Amelia. Amelia and George become poor. Thus, when George asks Amelia: Why does not she have a bouquet?, Mrs. O’Dowd answers him that he is the reason behind this (since he is a poor man who cannot buy a bouquet for his wife unlike Rebecca) (who was poor in the past; yet, her husband is rich and can buy her a bouquet). For this observation, Amelia and Dobbin thank Mrs. O’Dowd (as a kind of blaming towards George instead of the latter’s blame to Amelia). Establishing the Status of Thanking:
1. The Propositional Content Condition: Amelia and Dobbin express their thanking throughout the narrator’s utterance describing their gratitude ‘both Amelia and William Dobbin thanked her’ for what Mrs. O’Dowd’s observation says to make Amelia happy (instead of blaming her) and to blame George that he is responsible for Amelia’s bad state. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Mrs. O’Dowd says that why George didn’t buy a bouquet for his wife since this will not blame Amelia but George (since he is responsible for his wife’s state). b. Amelia and Dobbin view Mrs. O’Dowd responsible for making Amelia happy (instead of blaming her) and blaming George for not buying a bouquet for his wife and consequently making her handsome as Rebecca. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that Dobbin and especially Amelia wish Mrs, O’Dowd to believe that saying so is in the interest that they are grateful. 3. The Sincerity Condition: William Dobbin and Amelia sincerely feel with thanking for what Mrs. O’Dowd says. 4. The Essential Condition: Amelia and William Dobbin reflexively wants Mrs. O’Dowd, by counting their utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that they are grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 3rd person plural, Subject: Explicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. Text (5):
١٦٠ 5. Ch. IV, P. 24: Only let us be thankful that the darlings are like the beasts of the field, and don’t know their own power. Interpretation: The narrator describes the state of woman that has no father or mother to give a chance for them to marry. Thus, they depend on themselves to marry. To do so, women use their talents for doing so. Men do not know their own power otherwise they will overcome women. Therefore, women thank themselves. Rebecca is one of those women that wants to create a chance for herself to marry Joe, Amelia’s brother. This text could have two levels: The explicit level that women, in general thank themselves for having the chance to have husbands. On the implicit level, Rebecca is one of those women who is orphan and depends on herself to marry Joe FCs are going to be applied on the explicit level. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: Women express their thanking in the utterance ‘only let us be thankful that the darlings are like the beasts of the field’ for what they do. They depend on themselves to have chance to marry good men since this will make them live in peace and happy. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. Women depend on themselves to marry good men since they will live in peace and happiness. b. Women view themselves for marrying good men so that they live happily and peacefully. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that women wish themselves to believe that depending on themselves to marry good men is in the interest of them. 3. The Sincerity Condition: Women who don’t have someone to depend on, sincerely feel with thanking for what they have (power) to marry. 4. The Essential Condition: Women reflexively want themselves, by counting the narrator’s utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that they are grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Imperative, Voice: Active, Agent: Implicit 3rd person plural (women), Subject: Implicit 3rd person plural, Tense: Present, Type of SA : Explicit. Text (6): 6. Ch. LXII, P. 602: And that the pleasure to be, has in listening to fine music, as in looking at the stars in the sky, or at a beautiful landscape or picture, was a benefit for which we might thank Heaven as sincerely as for any other wordly blessing. Interpretation: The Major is one of those people who should thank Heaven for giving human beings the stars, beautiful landscapes or pictures to look at. Establishing the Status of Thanking: 1. The Propositional Content Condition: The Major expresses his thanking in his utterance ‘we might thank Heaven’ for what Heaven does. God or Heaven
١٦١ provides people with beautiful pictures and stars to look at since this will make people feel happy and enjoy their time. 2. The Preparatory Conditions: a. God provides us with the stars and beautiful pictures since these will make us happy and enjoy our time (the Major is one of us). b. The Major views God responsible for enjoying our time by having the stars and beautiful pictures. c. Case (b) leads to case (c) that the Major wishes God to believe that having these things is in the interest of the human beings and the Major is one of those. 3. The Sincerity Condition: The Major sincerely feels with thanking for what God provides us with beautiful pictures and stars. 4. The Essential Condition: The Major reflexively wants God, by counting his utterance as an expression of thanking, to recognize that he is grateful. Text Analysis: Mood: Indicative, Voice: Active, Agent: Explicit 1st person plural, Subject: Explicit 1st person plural, Tense: Past, Type of SA: Explicit. 5.4 Findings and Discussion: Thanking as mentioned in the literature (see 5.1) falls within the class of expressives since the S expresses his / her thanking for the H’s participation in a previous action which was beneficial to the S. Moreover, it has been stated before (see 5.2) that the speech act of thanking is unlike the speech acts of complaining and apologizing, in the sense that its rules of use have been explicitly formulated by Searle (1969). Therefore, by depending on these rules that Searle (1969) does deal with, in addition to the FCs that are either formulated for the successful performance of expressives (see Norrick, 1978) or for the successful performance of thanking speech act (see Edmondson, 1981; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985 and Allan, 1986), the researcher can construct a set of FCs and derive some SRs for the use of the appropriate IFID that are responsible for the successful performance of thanking speech act. The preceding analysis (see 5.3) has a main focus, that is, it is an application of the suggested model to the data to provide a pragmatic analysis of thanking in the novels under discussion. The researcher presents the results of the preceding analysis (see 5.3) of each novel separately, the first novel is Wuthering Heights. The agent was explicit 1st person singular in (12) instances (63.1%), 3rd person singular in (3) cases (15.7%) and explicit 2nd person singular in (3) instances (15.7%). Whereas, the agent was implicit 3rd person plural in (1) instance (5.2%). It was found that explicit type of thanking was found in (19) instances (100%), of which all of them (19) instances (100%) involved the direct use of the performative verb thank. Implicit type of the speech act of thanking, however, occurred in (zero) case (zero%). The non-performative verb consequently, occurred in (zero) instances (zero%).
١٦٢ Considering the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (18) cases out of (19) cases (94.7%) were in the active voice, whereas (1) case out of (19) cases (5.2%) were in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was used in (12) instances (63.1%), explicit 1st person singular, explicit 3rd person singular in (4) cases (21%) and explicit 2nd person singular in (3) cases (15.7%). However, the subject was implicit 3rd person singular in (1) case (5.2%). With regard to tense in the propositional clauses, the simple present was used in (13) cases (68.4%), whereas the simple past tense occurred in (4) cases (21%). It was, however, verbless in (2) cases (10.5%). As far as the mood is concerned, it was found that (16) instances (84.2%) were indicative and (3) instances (15.7%) were imperative. The second novel is Jane Eyre. The agent was explicit 1st person singular in (30) instances (90.9%). Whereas, it was implicit 3rd person singular in (2) cases (6%) and implicit 1st person plural in (1) case (3%). Explicit type of thanking occurred in (33) cases (100%), of which all of them (33) cases (100%) involved the direct use of the performative verb thank. Implicit type of thanking occurred in (zero) case (zero%). The non-performative verb, thus, occurred in (zero) case (zero%). Concerning the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (32) out of (33) cases (96%) were in the active voice, whereas, (1) out of (33) cases (3%) were in the passive voice. The subject in the propositional clauses was explicit 1st person singular in (30) cases (90.9%), 3rd person singular in (2) cases (6%) and 3rd person plural in (1) case (3%). However, it was only implicit 3rd person plural in (2) cases (6%). With regard to tense in the propositional clauses, the simple present tense was used in (26) cases (78.7%), while the simple past tense was used in (6) cases (18.1%). It was, however, verbless in (1) case (3%). As far as the mood is concerned, it was found that (33) cases (100%) out of (33) cases were indicative. The third novel is Hard Times. The agent was explicit 1st person singular in (27) cases (84.3%) and explicit 3rd person singular in (3) cases (9.3%). Whereas it was implicit 3rd person singular in (2) cases (6.2%). Explicit type of thanking occurred in (32) cases (100%), of which (31) cases (96.8%) involved the direct use of the performative verb thank. Implicit type of the speech act of thanking, however, occurred in (zero) case (zero%). Consequently, the non-performative verb occurred in (1) case (3.1%). Considering the structure of the propositional clauses, it was found that (32) cases (100%) out of (32) cases were in the active voice. The passive voice occurred consequently in (zero) case (zero %). The subject in the propositional clauses was explicit 1st person singular in (27) cases (81.8%), explicit 3rd person singular in (4) cases (12.5%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (3.1%). With regard to tense, the simple present tense was used in (29) instances (90.6%) while the simple past tense occurred in (2) cases (6.2%). It was however, verbless in (1) case (3.1%). Regarding the mood, it was indicative in (31) cases (96.8%), whereas imperative in (1) case (3.1%). The fourth novel is Vanity Fair. The agent was explicit 1st person singular in (28) cases (60.8%), explicit 3rd person singular in (15) instances (32.6%) and
١٦٣ explicit 1st person plural in (2) cases (4.3%). Whereas is was implicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (2.1%). It was found that explicit type of thanking occurred in (46) cases (100%), of which (44) cases (95.6%) involved the direct use of the performative verb thank. Implicit type of thanking occurred in (zero) case (zero%). The non-performative verb, consequently, occurred in (2) cases (4.3%). As far as the structure of the propositional clauses was concerned, the subject was explicit 1st person singular in (28) instances (60.8%), 3rd person singular in (14) cases (30.4%), explicit 3rd person plural in (2) cases (4.3%) and explicit 3rd person plural in (1) case (2.1%). It was, however, implicit 3rd person plural in (1) instance (2.1%). With regard to voice, it was found that (46) cases (100%) out of (46) cases (100%) were in the active voice. The passive voice, thus, occurs in (zero) case (zero%). With regard to tense, the simple present tense was used in (29) cases (63%) simple past tense which was used in (17) cases (36.9%). Concerning the mood, indicative was used in (46) cases (100%).
١٦٤ Notes to Chapter Five (1)
Becker and Smenner (1982) “The spontaneous Use of ‘Thank You’ by Preschoolers as a Function of Sex, Socioeconomic Status, and Listener Status” in Journal of language and Society (Vol. 15, No. 4) in which children are affected by number of factors such as sex, socioeconomic status and listener status in order to produce the expression ‘thank you’.
١٦٥ Chapter Six: Conclusions, Recommendations and Suggestions 6.1 Conclusions: From our discussion throughout the present study, the following conclusions have been drawn: 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
abc-
d-
e6.
Our findings confirm the applicability of SAT to literary works, particularly novels of the 19th C., which can be analysed in terms of FCs and SRs suggested in the literature for the successful performance of complaining, apologizing, and thanking (see chapters 3,4 and 5) Having applied the FCs and SRs to the speech acts under discussion, it has been found that there are (115) speech acts of complaining, (226) speech acts of apologizing and (130) speech acts of thanking. This validates our first, second and third hypotheses. The language of the nineteenth century novelists is characterized by using explicit performatives (direct speech acts) more than implicit performatives (indirect speech acts). The percentages of our data analysis reveal this fact since most cases of the speech acts in question were used explicitly (85.3%), whereas (14.7%) of our data were used implicitly. This confirms our fourth hypothesis. The percentages of our data analysis show that the speech acts of complaining were used both explicitly (40%) and implicitly (60%), whereas the speech acts of apologizing and thanking were used only explicitly (100%). Thus, our sixth hypothesis has been validated. The percentages of our data analysis substantiate the view that the grammatical structures of literary speech acts run parallel with those of natural conversational acts. These percentages validate our fifth hypothesis. They are as follows: Most of the examples were used in the indicative mood (94%) versus (4.6%) and (1.4%) for imperative and subjunctive mood. As far as voice is concermed, it was found that most of the examples were used in the active voice (96.8%) versus (3.2%) for passive voice. Regarding the agent, the percentages of our data analysis show that the explicit 1st person singular was used in (205) cases (63.5%), explicit 3rd person singular was used in (139) cases (29.5%). While explicit 2nd person singular was used in (37) cases (7%). As for the subject, it was found that explicit 1st person singular was used in (215) cases (55.5%), explicit 3rd person singular in (156) cases (33%) and explicit 2nd person singular was used in278 (58) cases (11.5%). With regard to tense, it was found that most of the speech acts in question were used in present tense (69.8%), whereas (30.2%) were used in past tense. Our data analysis confirms our literature review concerning these three acts in the sense that thanking involves a convivial function which coincides with the social goal of revealing explicitly S’s appreciation and respect for a listener’s participation in a prior action which was beneficial to S.
١٦٦
a-
b-
c-
d-
e-
f-
Similarly, apologizing, has the same function which coincides with the social goal of restoring explicitly or implicitly the equilibrium between S and H since S has to apologize for H for an action he / she has offended the H. Complaining on the other hand, has a conflictive function of conflicting with the social goal since it is designed by nature to cause offence (it expresses negative feelings and emotions). Therefore, its categories, strategies and structures are agentless passives and constructions with neutral agents such as ‘someone’ in which the undesired state of affairs has been the focus of attention. To substantiate what we have already mentioned in point 6, the following percentages are significant: With regard to mood, it was found that the highest percentages of indicative mood was found in the act of apologizing (96%) followed by thanking (94.6%) and complaining (89.5%). The active voice was overwhelmingly used in the three acts with some variations from one act to another. The highest percentages of active voice was found in the act of thanking (98.4%) followed by apologizing (97.3%) and complaining (93.9%). The agent in the act of thanking was expressed more explicitly (94.6%) than the agent in apologizing (83.1%) and complaining (59.1%). The agent in the act of complaining, however, was expressed more implicitly (41%) followed by apologizing (16.9%) and thanking (5.4%). The subject was found to vary in the three acts. The 1st person was used most in the act of thanking (76.1%), (74.6%) in the 1st person singular and (1.5%) in the 1st person plural followed by the act of apologizing (38.9%), (37.6%) in the 1st person singular and (1.3%) in the 1st person plural and then complaining (30.4%), (30.4%) in the 1st person singular, but no 1st person plural form. The 2nd person form was most used with complaining. (21.7%), (20.9%) in the 2nd person singular form and (0.8%) in the 2nd plural form followed by apologizing (15.9%), (15.9%) in the 2nd person singular, but no 2nd person plural form and least used with thanking (2.3%), (2.3%) in the 2nd person singular form, but no 2nd person plural form. As far as the 3rd person is concerned, it was most used with complaining (50.4%), (42.6%) was in the 3rd person singular and (7.8%) in the 3rd person plural followed by apologizing (46.9%), (43.8%) was in the 3rd person singular, and (3.1%) in the 3rd person plural and least used with thanking (23.8%), (19.2%) in the 3rd person singular, and (4.6%) in the 3rd person plural. With regard to the category of tense, it was found that the simple present tense was most used with thanking (74.6%) followed by apologizing (69%) and least used with complaining (66%). The simple past tense, however, was highest in the case of complaining (33%) followed by apologizing (30.5%) and least used in thanking (22.3%). Our study reveals the fact that the highest percentages of using performative verbs were used with thanking (97.6%) followed by complaining (22.6%) and least used with apologizing (6.6%).
١٦٧ 6.2 Recommendations for Pedagogical Implications: 1.
The areas of SAT require more attention on the part of all those who are interested in teaching. The expressive speech acts in general and apologizing, thanking and complaining in particular, their functions, uses, strategies, structure, FCs and SRs need to be more extensively dealt with. Thus, it seems that Iraqi learners need to have more training in the utilization of clues for the above mentioned points concerning the expressive speech acts. 2. Although teaching Iraqi students is directed in the first five years of the learner’s study of English towards the points of similarities and differences between the two languages, it seems that this is not enough at least in the area concerning English expressive speech acts (with particular reference to apologizing, thanking and complaining or any other speech acts) and their counterparts in Arabic. Therefore, more attention should be paid to this area in the later stages by text-book designers and teachers. In other words, Iraqi learners of English should be trained to rely less on the Arabic counterpart of this area because this leads to depend on their mother tongue, i.e., Arabic and neglect the content in which such expressive speech acts (with their functions, strategies, uses, etc.) in particular and other expressive speech acts and / or other speech acts in general are used. This may be achieved in the present course, through intensive drilling which will eventually lead to the induction of the use of the mother tongue on the part of the subjects.
6.3 Suggestions for Further Research: 1.
Further research can be carried out with regard to the application of these expressive acts to other literary genres (such as poetry, drama, short story, etc) at different periods 18th C., 19th C. and 20th C. 2. Although this thesis has studied the applicability of the SAT to the 19th C. novels, research is also required in the applicability of this theory to 18th C. novels and 20th C. novels. This comparative study may provide complementary insights and findings that may agree with the ones given in these periods with their different narrative texts and different styles of the novelists. Such a work would make the application of the SAT to the narrative text more comprehensive. 3. Further research can also be carried out with regard to the application of SAT (with particular reference to these three expressives) to other pragmatic aspects, namely, Grice’s non-natural meaning, his CP, politeness maxims of Leech (1983) and the concept of implicatures to 19th C. novels, 19th C. and / or 20th C. novels. 4. Further research can also be carried out with regard to the application of SAT (with particular reference to these three expressives) to other fields such as applied linguistics . The latter involves the use of these speech acts in a form of diagnostic tests (which include recognition and production tests) and / or
١٦٨ achievement tests to the Iraqi learners of English at different levels and at different colleges.
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١٧٨ Ventola, E. (ed.) (1991): Approaches to the Analysis of Literary Discourse, Obo: Obo Academic University Press. Verdonk, P. (ed.) (1993): Twentieth – Century Poetry: From Text to Context, London and New York: Routledge. Verschueren, J. (1984): “A Review Article of Principles of Pragmatics”. In: Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 21, pp. 450-470. ____________ (1987): Pragmatics as a Theory of Linguistic Adaptation, IPrA Papers in Pragmatics, Working Document 1, Belgium: International Pragmatic Association. ____________ (1992): “The Conceptual Basis of Performativity”, pp. 1-29. (Personal communication). Warnock, G. (1973): “Some Types of Performative Utterance”. In: Berlin, S., Forguson, L., Pears, D., Pitcher, G., Searle, J., Strawson, P. and Warnock, G. (eds.), Essays on J.L. Austin, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 69-89. Watts, R. (1981): The Psycholinguistic Analysis of Narrative Cooperation in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times, Tubingen: Gunter Narr Verlag. Watts, R. Ide, S. and Ehlich, K. (1992): “An Introduction”. In: Watts, R. Ids, and Ehlich, K., (eds.), Politeness in Language: Studies in its History: Theory and Practice, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyer, pp. 1-21. Wierzbicka, A. (1991): Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Wiggins, D. (1971): “On Sentence Sense, Word Sense and Difference of WordSense. Towards a Philosophical Theory of Dictionaries”. In: Steinberg, D., and Jakobovits, L. (eds.), Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1434. Wittgenstein, L. (1953): Philosophical Investigations, (trans. by Anscombe, G.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
١٧٩ The Analysed Texts: Brontë, C. (1847): Jane Eyre, London: Cox and Wyman Ltd. (Edited by Bell, C., 1994: Second Edition). Brontë, E. (1847): Wuthering Heights, London: Richard Clay and Company, Ltd. (Edited by Bell, C., 1946: Second Edition). Dickens, C. (1854): Hard Times, New York: W.W. Norton Co., Inc. (Edited by Ford, G. and Monod, S., 1966: Second Edition). Thackery, W. (1847): Vanity Fair, London: Mackays of Chatham Plc, Chatham, Kent. (Edited by Wordsworth, W. 1998).
١٨٠ Appendix ( I ): The Speech Act of Complaining 1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
1. 2. 3.
4.
5. 6.
a. Wuthering Heights: Neally to Mr. Lockwood: “I am annoyed how I should dream of chattering on at such a rate” (Ch. VII, P. 64). Mr. Lockwood states that: “But, alas! How could I offered a man who was charitable enough to sit at my beside a good hour, and talk on some other subject than pills and draughts, blisters and leeches?” (Ch. X, p. 88). Neally to the reader: And as he had been in the habit of accusing Catherine Earnshaw (Ch. XVIII, p. 171). Ellen states that: “But few have slighter reasons for complaint then I had” (Ch. XXIII, p. 207). Neally to Cathy and Hareton: “It will annoy Mr. Heathcliff” (Ch. XXXIII, p. 363). b. Jane Eyre: Jane to Miss. Temple: “Because I have been wrongly occused; and you, ma’am, and everybody else will now think me wicked” (Ch. 8, p. 72). Jane Eyre says: “who blames me? Many, no doubt” (Ch. 12, p. 111). Jane Eyre to Miss Ingram: “Go! Your folly sickens me. And you have derived pleasure from occasional tokens of preference – equivocal tokens shown by a gentleman of family and a man of the world to a dependant and a novice. Poor stupid dupe? Could not even self – interest make you wiser? Cover your face and be ashamed! (Ch. 16, p. 160). Miss Ingram to Jane Eyre: “What! You revert to Mr. Rochester as a model order! No snivel! – no sentiment! No regret! I will endure only sense and resolution” (Ch. 16, p. 161). Miss Ingram says: “Oh, I am so sick of the young men of the present day!”, exclaimed she, rattling away at the instrument (Ch. 171, p. 178). Miss Ingram to her daughter: “Then no more need be said: change the subject” (Ch. 17: p. 177).
c. Hard Times: 1. The writer states that: The seizers of the station with a fit of trembling, gradually deepening to a complaint of the heart, announced the train (Ch. 11, p. 163). 2. Mrs. Pegler to Mr. Gradgrind: “O for shame, to accuse me of being a bad mother” (Ch. 5, p. 199). 3. The writer states: For, now, the rope came in, tightened and strained to its utmost as it appeared, and the men turned heavily, and the windlass complained (Ch. 6, p. 206).
292
d. Vanity Fair: 1. The Writer to the reader: ….. and woe betide those who came last (Ch. XXXII, p. 301).
١٨١ 2. 3. 4.
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Amelia’s mother to Amelia: “Ah, Mrs. Osborne! May you never nourish a viper in your bossom” (Ch. XXXVXXX, p. 371). The writer says: “O ladies, ladies! There are some of you who are neither handsome nor wise” (Ch. XXXVIII, p. 375). The writer states: Dobbin at this lost all patience, and if his accuser had not been so old and so broken, a quarrel might have ensued between them at the Slaughter’s Coffee – House (Ch. XXXVIII, p. 377). Hester said: ‘Low, Betsy, how could you go for to tell such a wicked story’ (Ch. XXXIX, p. 388). The writer to the reader: Everything annoyed him that day (Ch. XLIII, p. 420). Mr. Veal to gentlemen: “I will lay any wager, to complain of their repast” (Ch. LVI, p. 546). Max to Fritz: “Bah!,” said the other (Ch. LXVI, p. 643). Jos to Dobbin: “Pooh” said Jos (Ch. LXVI, p. 646).
١٨٢ Appendix ( II ): The Speech Act of Apologizing 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6. 7.
8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19. 20.
21. 22.
a. Wuthering Heights: Mr. Lockwood states: “you must excuse me for troubling you” (Ch. I, p. 20). Mr. Lockwood states: “I should be sorry to ask you to cross the threshold” (Ch. I, p. 29). Mr. Lockwood describes the situation as follows: He told Zillah to give me a glass of brandy, and then passed on to the inner room; while she condoled with me on my sorry predicament (Ch. II, p. 31). Mr. Lockwood states: “I beg pardon for asking” (Ch. IV. p. 43). Neally to Heathcliff: “you have grieved Catherine. She’s sorry she ever come home, I dare say” (Ch. VII, p. 60). Neally answers Heathcliff: “It is for God to punish wicked people, we should learn to forgive” (Ch. VII, p. 64). Neally describes her relation to Heathcliff (while she is speaking with Lockwood): “I had not the heart to leave my charge; and beside, you know I had been his foster – sister, and excused his behaviour more readily than a stranger would” (Ch. VIII, p. 67). Neally to Catherine: “I’m sure Mr. Edgar will excuse me” (Ch. VIII, p. 71). Neally to Catherine: “I’m sorry for it, Miss Catherine” (Ch. VIII, p. 71). Hindley to Neally: “I beg your pardon, Nell” (Ch. IX, p. 74). Heathcliff to Catherine: “And you must forgive me for I struggled only for you” (Ch. X, p. 93). Neally describes Catherine to the readers: we excused her, to a certain extent, on the plea of ill – health (Ch. X, p. 96). Catherine to Heathcliff: “I should be sorry to think so” (Ch. X, p. 101). Neally to Catherine: “I wonder will he have the art to find a plausible excuse for making love to Miss….” (Ch. XI, p. 104). Heathcliff to Mr. Linton: “Mr. Linton, I’m mortally sorry that you are not worth knocking down!” (Ch. XI, p. 107). Catherine to Mr. Linton: “If you have not courage to attach him, make an apology, or allow yourself to be beaten” (Ch. XI, p. 107). Neally describes Catherine’s states: I guessed, with a continual vague expectation that Catherine, repenting her conduct, would come of her own accord to ask pardon (Ch. XII, p. 111). Kenneth to Neally: “Mr. Linton will be sorry?” (Ch. XII, p. 120). Neally to Kenneth: “Sorry? He’ll break his heart should anything happen!” (Ch. XII, p. 120). Neally to Mr. Linton: “And her ardent desire to see him, with a wish that he would transmit to her, as easily as possible, some token of forgiveness by me” (Ch. XIV, p. 132). Linton to Neally: “Forgiveness!”, “I have nothing to forgive her” (Ch. XIV, p. 132). Linton to Neally: “I am not angry, but I’m sorry to have lost her” (Ch. XIV, p. 132).
١٨٣ 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.
1. 2.
Neally to Isabella: “He sends his love, ma’am, and his wishes for your happiness, and his pardon for the grief you have occasioned” (Ch. XIV, p. 133). Catherine to Neally: “you are sorry for me – very soon that will be altered. I shall be sorry for you” (Ch. XV, p. 143). Catherine to Heathcliff: “I forgive you. Forgive me!”(Ch.XV, p. 144). Heathcliff to Catherine: “It is hard to forgive”. Then he says: “I forgive what you have done to me” (Ch. XV, p. 144). Catherine to Ellen: “On only one condition can I hope to forgive him” (Ch. XVII, p. 158). Catherine to Ellen: “As he was the first to injure, make him the first to implore pardon” (Ch. XVII, p. 158). Ellen to Catherine: “I beg your pardon” (Ch. XVII, p. 159). Neally to the reader: And how sorry he would be to find she had been there (Ch. XVIII, p. 172). Heathcliff to Neally: “I do regret, however, that he so little deserves the trouble” (Ch. XX, p. 180). Neally to the reader: I began to dislike, more than to compassionate Linton, and to excuse his father, in some measure (Ch. XXI, p. 190). Mr. Linton to his daughter, Catherine: “I meant to explain this some time as you grew older, and I’m sorry I delayed it” (Ch. XXI, p. 191). Cathy to Neally: “And I felt I must forgive him and, though he should quarrel the next moment, I must forgive him again” (Ch. XXIV, p. 215). Cathy to the reader: “Yet, I was sorry Linton had that distored nature” (Ch. XXIV, p. 215). Cathy to Linton: “I’m sorry he’s so much less pleasant, and so much less affectionate to me” (Ch. XXVI, p. 222). Neally to the reader: Before we reached home, Catherine’s displeasure softened into a perplexed sensation of pity and regret (Ch. XXVI, p. 222). Cathy to Heathcliff: “You can’t help being sorry and pitying me” (Ch. XXVII, P.231). Cathy to Heathcliff: “But I’m glad I’ve a better, to forgive it” (Ch. XXIX, p. 240). Neally to the reader (describes Cathy): I saw she was sorry for his persevering sulkiness and indolence (Ch. XXXII, p. 250). Cathy to Earnshaw: “But now I thank you, and beg you to forgive me” (Ch. XXXII, p. 261). Cathy to Earnshaw: “Say you forgive me, Hareton, do!” (Ch. XXXII, p. 262). Neally to Earnshaw: “And what excuse have you to offer for taking such liberties with the garden” (Ch. XXXIII, p. 263). b. Jane Eyre: Jane to the reader: She regretted to be under the necessity of keeping me at a distance (Ch. 1, p. 9). Abbot to Bessie: “And what a scream if she had been in great pain, one would have excused it, but she only wanted to bring us all here” (Ch. 2, p. 19).
١٨٤ 3. 4. 5.
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
Jane to Abbot: “Not at all, Bessie; indeed; just now I am rather sorry” (Ch. 4, p. 42). Jane Eyre to the reader: I can so sincerely forgive the first while I abhor the last (Ch. 6, p. 61). Jane to the reader: For nothing could soften in my recollection the span of agony which clutched my heart when Mrs. Reed spurned my wild supplication for pardon (Ch. 8, p. 73). Jane to the reader: I imagined myself only to be regretting my loss (Ch. 10, p. 86). Jane to the reader: I sometimes regretted that I was not handsomer (Ch. 11, p. 100). Jane to the reader: Oh, romantic readers, forgive me for telling the plain truth (Ch. 12, p. 111). Jane to the reader: “Excuse my tone of command” (Ch. 13, p. 125). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “Miss Eyre, I beg your pardon” (Ch. 14, p. 134). Jane Eyre to the reader: He had designed as explanation; almost an apology (Ch. 14, p. 135). Rochester to Jane: “I sat down and took a cigar – I will have one, now, if you will excuse me” (Ch. 15, p.142). Jane Eyre to Miss Ingram: “Pardon me, madam” (Ch. 17, p. 179). Jane Eyre to the reader: Pardon the pardox (Ch. 18, p. 185). Jane Eyre to the reader: God pardon me (Ch. 19, p. 199). Robert to Jane: I am sorry I can’t give you better news of them, Miss” (Ch. 21, p. 220). Jane Eyre to the reader: There the toilet table, the arm-chair, and the foot stool, at which I had a hundred times been sentenced to kneel, to ask pardon for offences by me uncommitted (Ch. 21, p. 228). Jane Eyre to the reader: And a strong yearning to forget and forgive all in jumes – to be reconciled and clasp hands in amity (Ch. 21, p. 229). Mrs. Reed to Jane Eyre: “I said I was sorry for his disappointment” (Ch. 21, p. 237). Jane Eyre to Mrs. Reed: “You have my full and free forgiveness: ask now for God’s and be at peace” (Ch. 21, p. 238). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “And would be sorry to part with them?” (Ch. 23, P. 248). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “I believe you must, Jane – I am sorry, Jane (Ch. 23, p. 248). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “I’m sorry to give ….” (Ch. 23, p. 249). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “It along way to Ireland Janet, and I am sorry to send my little friend on such weary travels” (Ch. 23, p. 250). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “Because you are sorry to leave it?” (Ch. 23, p. 250). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “you will excuse the idea; it was involuntary” (Ch. 24, p. 259). Jane Eyre to the reader: “I had green eyes, reader, but you must excuse the mistake” (Ch. 24, p. 257).
١٨٥ 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
The widow to Jane Eyre: “I am sorry to grieve you” (Ch. 24, p. 263). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “Indeed begging your pardon, sir” (Ch. 24, p, 268). Jane Eyre to the reader: “Would I forgive him for the selfish idea, and prove my pardon by a reconciling kiss? (Ch. 24, p. 271). Jane Eyre to the reader: “No, I would rather be excused” (Ch. 24, p. 271). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “I continued also the wish to be with you, and experienced a strange, regretful consciousness of some barrier dividing us” (Ch. 25, p. 279). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “your uncle, I’m sorry to say is now on a sick-bed” (Ch. 26, p. 292). Jane Eyre to the reader: Reader, I forgave him at the moment and on the spot. I forgave him all (Ch. 27, p. 296). Jane Eyre to the reader: she Shook her head, “she was sorry she could give me no information” (Ch. 28, p. 323). Jane Eyre to Diana: “But excuse me from much discourse” (Ch. 28, p. 333). Diana to Jane Eyre: “But there is so many cheats goes about, you mun forgie me” (Ch. 29, p. 338). Jane Eyre to Diana: “That will do – I forgive you now” (Ch. 29, p. 339). Miss Oliver to Jane Eyre: “Do excuse me” (Ch. 31, p. 361). St. John to Jane Eyre: “But you must excuse me for once” (Ch. 33, p. 373). St. John to Jane Eyre: “Jane, I excuse you for the present” (Ch. 34, p. 386). Jane Eyre to St. John: “Forgive me the words, St. John” (Ch. 34, p. 404). Jane Eyre thinks: He had forgiven me for saying I scorned him and his love (Ch. 35, p. 406). Jane Eyre to Diana: “You must forgive by being such a spy” (Ch. 35, p.410). Jane Eyre states: And now I believed he had forgiven me once more (Ch. 35, p. 412). The host to Jane Eyre: “It is excusable, for she had a hard life of it” (Ch. 36, p. 422). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “I beg your pardon” (Ch. 37, p. 437). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “My seared vision! My crippled strength”, he murmured regrettably (Ch. 37, p. 439). Amelia to Dobbin: “I have to beg your pardon” (Ch. LXI, p. 578). c. Hard Times: Mrs. Gradgrind to her husband: “I declare you’re enough to make one regret ever having had a family at all” (Ch. 4, p. 13). Mr. Bounderby to Mr. Gradgrind: “I should ask Mrs. Gradgrind’s pardon for strong expressions” (Ch. 4, p. 15). Bounderby to Mr. E. W. B. Childers: “Do I excuse her for it? No. Have I ever excused her for it?” (Ch. 6, p. 25). Louisa to Tom: “Though I do know better, Tom, and am very sorry for it” (Ch. 8, p. 40). Sissy to Mr. Gradgrind: “I beg you pardon” (Ch. 9, p. 47).
١٨٦ 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32.
33. 34.
An old woman to Stephen: “You’ll excuse an old woman’s curiosity – have you seen the gentleman?” (Ch. 12, p. 59). Sissy to Mr. Gradgrind: “I am sorry, sir” (Ch. 14, p. 70). Mrs. Sparsit to Bounderby: “I beg your pardon, Sir” (Ch. 16, p. 81). Bitzer to Mrs. Sparsit: “I beg your pardon, ma’am” (Ch. 1, p. 88). The writer describes Bitzer to the reader: Bitzer knuckled his forhead again, and again begged pardon (Ch. 1, p. 89). Mrs. Sparsit to Bitzer: “You must excuse me” (Ch. 1, p.89). A visitor to Mrs. Sparsit: “I beg your pardon” (Ch. 1, p. 91). Mr. Bounderby to Mis. Sparist: “Which accordingly venture, with all suitable apologies, to do” (Ch. 1, p.92). Mrs. Sparsit to the visitor: “Excuse me: you are not a native, I think?” (Ch. 1, p. 92). The visitor to Mrs. Sparsit: “Excuse my impertinent curiosity” (Ch. 1, p. 93). Jem to Louisa: “Pardon me” (Ch. 2, p. 99). Stephen to Bounderby: “Wi’ yor pardon, Sir” (Ch. 5, p. 112). Harthouse to Louisa: “Pardon me” (Ch. 7, p. 130). Harthouse to Louisa: “Pardon me again” (Ch. 7, p. 130). The writer describes Mrs. Sparsit to the reader: One idiosyncrasy for which she often apologized, she found it excessively difficult to conquer (Ch. 8, p. 143). Louisa to her father: “What I have learned has left me doubting, misbelieving, despising, regretting, what I have not learned” (Ch. 1, p. 166). Louisa to her father: “I don’t know that I’m sorry” (Ch. 1, p. 167). Louisa to Sissy: “Forgive me, pity me, help me” (Ch. 1, p. 172). A waiter to Mr. Harthouse: “Beg your pardon, Sir” (Ch. 2, p. 174). Hanthouse to Sissy: “Pardon my curiosity at parting” (Ch. 2, p. 179). Bounderby to Mr. Gradgrind: “Now, you’ll excuse me” (Ch. 3, p. 182). Bounderby to Gradgrind: “Although I am sorry to see Tom Gradgrind reduced to his present position, I should be doubly sorry to see him brought so law as that” (Ch. 3, p. 184). Louisa to Rachael: “I am very, very sorry” (Ch. 4, p. 190). Rachael to Louisa: “O, I hope you may be sorry” (Ch. 4, p. 190). Rachael to Louisa: “I ask your pardon for having done you an injury” (Ch. 4, p. 192). Mrs. Pegler to Mr. Gradgrind: “Now, Lord forgive you, Sir” (Ch. 5, p. 198). The writer describes Stephen’s situation to the reader: The star had shown him where to find the God of the poor; and through humility, and sorrow, and forgiveness (Ch. 7, p. 208). Mr. Gradgrind to Tom: “Give me your hand, my poor boy, and may God forgive you as I do!” (Ch. 8, p. 217). Bitzer to Mr. Gradgrind: “I beg your pardon for interrupting you, Sir” (Ch. 8, p. 218).
١٨٧ 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6. 7.
8.
9. 10.
11.
12. 13. 14.
15. 16. 17.
18. 19.
d. Vanity Fair: Osborne to Mrs. Sedley: “And that Mrs. Sedley had forgiven his breaking the punch – boul of the child’s porty” (Ch. V, p. 42). Jos Sedley to Amelia: “Pray excuse me, … and entreat her to pardon” (Ch. VI, p. 54). The writer to the reader: and she fell to thinking of her Russell Square friends with that very same philosophical bitterness with which, in a certain apologue, the fox is represented (Ch. VII, p. 58). Rebecca to Amelia: “Sir Pitt applauded my resolution highly; he would be sorry to lose his little secretary” (Ch. X, p. 88). Miss Maria to George: “And yet she said she was like, an artless forgiving creature” (Ch. XI, p. 99). George to Dobbin: “No, hang it, William, I beg your pardon” (Ch. XIII, p. 107). Miss Sharp to Osborne: “But oh, Mr. Osborne, what a difference eighteen months’ experience makes! Eighteen months spent, pardon me for saying so, with gentlemen” (Ch. XIV, p. 120). The writer to the reader: Rebecca gave way to some very sincere and touching regrets that a piece of marvelous good fortune should have been so near her (Ch. XV, p. 139). The writer to the reader: She is so fond of him, Rebecca thought, that she will forgive him anything (Ch. XV, p. 140). The writer to the reader: The pair might have gone down on their knees before the old spinster, avowed all and been forgiven in a twinkling (Ch. XVI, p. 144). The writer to the reader: Adventures which could never have occurred to them if they had been housed and she sheltered under the comparable uninteresting forgiveness of Miss Crawley (Ch, XVI, p. 144). Rebecca to Miss Briggs: “The kindest heart in the world as yours is, will pity and sympathize with me and excuse me” (Ch. XVI, p. 145). Rebecca to Miss Briggs: “Even he forgave me” (Ch. XVI, p. 146). The writer to the reader: the Vanity – Fairion, as to witnesses this sordid part of the obsequies of a depart friend, can’t but feel some sympathies and regret (Ch. XVII, p. 150). Rebecca to Mr. Sedley: “I’m really sorry he’s gone wrong” (Ch. XVII, p. 157). The writer to the reader: if they were short or selfish, what excuse she found for the writer! (Ch. XVIII, p. 163). The writer to the reader: and he gave up at least ten seconds of his valuable time to regretting the misfortune which had befallen that unlucky young woman (Ch. XXI, p. 189). Rebecca to Osborne: “Do Forgive me!” (Ch. XXII, p. 202). The writer to the reader: I knew once a gentleman and very wortly practitioner in Vanity Fair, who used to do little wrongs to his neighbors on purpose, and in order to apologize for them in an open and manly way afterwards (Ch. XXII, p. 202).
١٨٨ 20.
21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.
30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
35. 36.
37. 38. 39. 40.
41.
Miss Osborn to Captain Dobbin: “…And dear Rhoda, who went away from her in sad, sad anger, I know will forgive him. Woman forgives but too readily, Captain” (Ch. XXIII, p. 207). Captain Dobbin to Miss Osborn: “Could his own conscience ever forgive him if he deserted her?” (Ch. XXIII, p. 208). Mr. Bullock to Jane: “Eels will be sorry he cried off” (Ch. XXIII, p. 209). Mr. Osborne to William: “I say, forget and forgive” (Ch. XXIV, p. 212). Amelia to Gorge: “He must forgive you, my dearest, kindest husband” (Ch. XXV, p. 229). The writer to the reader: she was naturally of a kindly and forgiving disposition (Ch. XXV, p. 232). The writer to the reader: yet was not her fault a natural and excusable one? (Ch. XXV, p. 234). Gorge to Grawley: “Sorry I hadn’t seen you three days ago” (Ch. XXIX, p. 263). Captain Rawdan to Rebecca: “Gold tops and bottles, indeed! Damrmy, I’m sorry I didn’t take more now” (Ch. XXX, p. 276). The writer to the reader: Jos succeeded in plunging into the coat, and came forward blushing and stuttering out excuses to his fair visitor (Ch. XXXI, p. 288). The writer to the reader: He would drink the regiment’s health; or indeed, take any other excuse to indulge in a glass of champagne (Ch. XXXI, p. 294). Mrs. O’Dowd to Mr. Sedley: “God forgive me, Mr. Sedley” (Ch. XXXII, p. 308). Bowls to young James: “I beg your pardon” (Ch. XXXIV, p. 326). The writer to the reader: Miss Crawley bids me say she regrets that she is too unwell to see you before you go (Ch. XXXIV, p. 332). The writer to the reader: that his son should have gone out of the reach of his forgiveness, or that the apology which his own pride expected should have escaped him (Ch. XXXIV, p. 336). Mr. Osborne to Captain Dobbin: “I beg your pardon” (Ch. XXXV, p. 342). The writer to the reader: Osborne broke out into a rhapsody of self – praise and imprecations – by the first, excusing himself to his own conscience for his conduct (Ch. XXXV, p. 342). Mrs. Sedley to Amelia: “And may he forgive you as I do!” (Ch. XXXVIII, p. 371). The writer to the reader: What folly will not a pair of bright eyes make pardonable? (Ch. XXXVIII, p. 375). The Major to Osborn: “Will you forgive the child for poor Gorge’s sake?” (Ch. XXXVIII, p.342). Sir Pitt to lady Southdown: “And however much I may regert any circumstance which may lead to your Ladyship quitting this house” (Ch. XL, p. 392). The writer to the reader: Sick and sorry felt poor William, more than ever wretched and lonely (Ch. XLIII, p. 420).
١٨٩ 42. 43. 44.
45.
46. 47. 48.
49.
50. 51.
The writer to the reader Rawdan muttered some excuses about an engagement (Ch. LIV, p. 512) The writer to the reader: Little Southdown was sorry; so you may be sour was his sister Lady Jane, very sorry (Ch. LI, P. 539). The writer to the reader: English youth have been so educated time out of mind, and we have hundreds of thousands of apologists and admirers of injustice (Ch. LVI, p. 543). The same morning brought Major Dobbin a letter to the Slaughters’ Coffee – House from his friend at Southampton, begging dear Dob to excuse Jos for being in rage when awakened the day before (Ch. LIX, p. 574). Amelia to Major Dobbin: “I have to beg your pardon for something” (Ch. LIX, p. 578). Dobbin to Amelia “It is for me to ask your pardon for being a fool for a moment” (Ch. LIX, p. 579). The writer to the reader: Becky called the waiters ‘Monsieur’, and paid the chambermaids in politeness and apologies what for more than compensated for a little niggardliness in point of money (Ch. LXIV, p. 623). The writer to the reader: If she begged pardon of all her servants for troubling them to answer the bell; if she apologized to a shop boy who showed her a piece of silk (Ch. LXV, p. 637). Amelia to herself: “If I had forgiven it, ought he to have spoken?” (Ch. LXVI, p. 646). Emmy to herself: “Oh, I will, I will, if he will but let me and forgive me” (Ch. LXVII, p. 664).
١٩٠ Appendix ( III ): The Speech Act of Thanking a. Wuthering Heights: 1. Lockwood to Heathcilff: “No, thank you” (Ch. I, p. 23). 2. Lockwood to Heathcilff: “No, thank you” (Ch. 1, p. 23). 3. Mr. Lockwood to the reader: And thanked my stars that, at length, I had lighted on a spot (Ch. IV, p. 42). 4. Joseph to Mr. Lockwood: “Thank Hivin for all!” (Ch. IX, p. 84). 5. Heathcliff to Catherine: “Meantime, thank you for telling me your sister – in law’s secret” (Ch. XI, p. 105). 6. Neally to the reader: Thanks to his fearless nature, which offered no temptation to that course of oppression (Ch. XVIII, p. 171). 7. Neally to Catherine: “be thankful it is nothing worse” (Ch. XXII, p. 197). 8. Linton to Catherine: “And give him my thanks for permitting you to come – my best thanks, Catherine” (Ch. XXVI, p. 221). 9. Heathcliff to Neally: “I’d thank his uncle to be quick” (Ch. XIII, p. 225). 10. Joseph to Heathcliff: “Thank God” (Ch. XXXIII, p. 265).
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.
b. Jane Eyre: Jane Eyre to Bessie: “No, thank you” (Ch. 3, p. 22). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “Thank you” (Ch. 12, p. 115). Mrs. Fairfax to Rochester: “I have to thank her for this sprain” (Ch. 13, p. 124). Mrs. Dent to her daughter: “I thank Heaven I have now done with them” (Ch. 17, p. 176). Jane to Rochester: “Thank you, sir” (Ch. 20, p. 215). Robert to Jane Eyre: “Yes, miss: my wife is very hearty, thank you” (Ch. 21, p. 220). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “Thank you, Mr. Rochester, for your great kindness” (Ch. 2, p. 244). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “Thank you, sir” (Ch. 23, p. 249). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “Thank God it is no wase” (Ch. 24, p. 261). Jane Eyre to Rochester: “No, thank you, sir” (Ch. 24, p. 268). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “No, thank you” (Ch. 24, p. 268). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “Thank God” (Ch. 25, p. 283). Grace to Rochester: “We’re tolerable, sir, I thank you” (Ch. 26, p. 291). Rochester to Jane Eyre: “I am thankful I was not, too late” (Ch. 26, p. 292). Jane Eyre to the reader: I turned my prayer to thanksgiving (Ch. 28., p. 321). Jane Eyre to the reader: I thank His providence for the guidance! (Ch. 31, p. 356). Jane Eyre to herself: “All I see had made me thankful, not dependent” (Ch. 31, p. 357). St. John to Jane: “I thank God for it!” (Ch, 34, p. 392). St. John to Jane: “Thank you, Jane” (Ch. 35, p. 413). Jane Eyre to the reader: I rose from the thanksgiving (Ch. 35, p. 415).
١٩١ 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Rochester to Jane: “But I am only too thankful to hear and feel you” (Ch. 37, p. 431). Rochester to Jane: “Now, I thank God”. “yes, I thank God” (Ch. 37, p. 442). Rochester to Jane: “I thank my Maker” (Ch. 37, p. 442). Jane to John: “Thank you, John” (Ch. 38, p. 444). Rochester to Jane: “I thank Providence who watched over you” (Ch. 27, p. 307). Jane to the reader: I thanked God (Ch. 28, p. 334). c. Hard Times: Mr. Gradgrind to Mr. Sleary: “I thank you” (Ch. 6, p. 28). Stephen to Bounderby: “Thank you, Sir, I wish you good day” (Ch. 12, p. 59). Sissy to Mr. Gradgrind: “Thank you, Sir” (Ch. 14, p. 70). Sissy to Mr. Gradgrind: “Thank you, Sir, very much” (Ch. 14, p. 70). Mrs. Sparsit to Mr. Bounderby: “Thank you, Sir,” (Ch. 16, p. 80). Bounderby to ladies and gentlemen: “So, I thank you, on both our parts, for the good-will you have shown towards us” (Ch. 16, p. 83). Mrs. Sparsit to Bitzer: “Thank you, Bitzer” (Ch. 1, p. 87). Bitzer to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thank you, ma’am” (Ch. 1, p. 87). Bitzer to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thank you, ma’am” (Ch. 1, p. 89). Bitzer to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thank you, ma’am” (Ch. 1, p. 90). Bitzer to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thank you, ma’ma” (Ch. 1, p. 90). Bitzer to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thank you. Allow me” (Ch. 1, p. 91). The stranger to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thank you” (Ch. 1, p. 92). Mr. Harthouse to Mrs. Bounderby: “Thank you” (Ch. 7, p. 130). Tom to Harthouse: “Thank you” (Ch. 8, p. 136). Bounderby to James: “Thankee” (Ch. 8, p. 138). Bounderby to Harthouse: “No, thank you” (Ch. 8, p. 140). Mrs. Sparsit to Mr. Bounderby and his wife: “Thank you very much, Sir” (Ch. 8, p. 142). Mrs. Sparsit to Mr. Bounderby: “Sir, I am thankful to find” (Ch. 8, p. 143). Mrs. Sparsit to Mr. Bounderby: “Thank you, Sir” (Ch. 8, p. 144). Tom to Loo: “Thank you, my dear Loo” (Ch. 8, p. 146). Tom to Mrs. Sparsit: “Thankee, Mrs. Sparsit” (Ch. 11, p. 158). Mr. Bounderby to Rachael: “Thank you, ma’am” (Ch. 4, p. 190). Bitzer to Mr. Gradgrind: “Thank you, Sir” (Ch. 8, p. 218). Mrs. Sparsit to Mr. Bounderby: “Thank you, Sir,” (Ch. 9, p. 224). d. Vanity Fair: Miss Sharp to herself: “So much for the Dixonary; and, thank God, I’m out of Chiswich” (Ch. II, p. 7). Amelia to Joseph: “Thank you, dear Joseph” (Ch. IV, p. 33). Rebecca to herself: “How thankful I am to him” (Ch. VI, p. 55). Rebecca to Mr. Crawley: “Oh, thank you, sir” (Ch. X, p. 80).
١٩٢ 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
15. 16. 17. 18.
19. 20.
21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
26. 27. 28. 29.
George to the old gentleman: “Thank you, sir” (Ch. XIII, p. 114). Rebecca to Mrs. Firkin: “Thank you, Mrs. Firkin” (Ch. XIV, p. 119). Rebecca to Mrs. Firkin: “Thank you, Mrs. Firkin, that will quite do I will ring when anything is wanted. Thank you” (Ch. XIV, p. 119). Crawley to George: “Thank you, my boy” (Ch. XIV, p. 130). The writer to the reader: All were filed with hope and ambition and patriotic fury; and thanked the French Emperor as for a personal kindness in coming to disturb the peace of Europe (Ch. XVIII, p. 165). The writer to the reader: But he was content, so that he saw her happy; and thankful to have been the means of making her so (Ch. XX, p. 187). Old Osborne to Dobbin: “Thank you for nothing, Captain” (Ch. XXIV, p. 213). Young Stubble to Dobbin: “Thank you, Dobbin” (Ch. XXIV, p. 221). The writer to the reader: She was thankful, truly thankful (Ch. XXV, p. 234). Rawdon to Rebecca: “on which he replied, that he would do exactly as he liked, and would just thank her to keep a civil tongue in her head” (Ch. XXV, p. 238). Mrs. Bute to Briggs: “And thank him for coming to Brighten and so forth” (Ch. XXV, p. 239). The Major’s lady to Jos: “I’ll thank you to tell me what they mean” (Ch. XXVIII, p. 258). George to himself: “Thank Heaven that is over” (Ch. XXX, p. 282). Rebecca to Miss Crawley: “And thanked her in the name of France for all your benevolence towards our unfortunates during their exile!” (Ch. XXXIV, p. 333). The writer to the reader: Osborne’s son thanked his father for his former generous conduct (Ch. XXXV, p. 337). The writer to the reader: Amelia thanked him (George) for a thousand thousand kind offices and proofs of steadfast friendship to her in her affection (Ch. XLII, p. 414). The writer describes Becky’s state to the reader: Becky seized Pitt’s hand in a transport and gratitude when he agreed to come (Ch. XLIV, p. 424). Becky to Pitt: “Thank you” (Ch. XLIV, p. 424). Rebecca to Sir Pitt: “…. And I am often thankful that Miss Crawley’s memory…” (Ch. LXI, p. 463). Becky to Lord Steyne: “Thank you, Monseigneur” (Ch. XLVIII, p. 464). One lady in a party to another concerning Becky: “What airs of independence she assumes, where she ought to sit still and be thankful if anybody speaks to her!” (Ch. LI, p. 487). Rawdon to his sister: Rawdon thanked his sister a hundred times, and with ardour of gratitude (Ch. LIII, p. 514). Rawdan to Sir Pitt: “Thank you, brother” (Ch. LIV, p. 520). Amelia to Dobbin: “Thank you, William” (Ch. LIX, p. 578). The writer describes the state of the rich man and / or woman after death to the reader: “I am very rich; I am tolerably well known; I have lived all my life
١٩٣ 30. 31.
32. 33. 34.
35. 36.
in the best society, and, thank Heaven, come of a most respectable family” (Ch. XLI, p. 588). George’s father to himself: “I here thank him heartily for his love and regard for them” (Ch. LXI, p. 593). The writer to the reader: We took off our hats to our acquaintances of the table d’hôte, and the lady, in return, presented us with a little smile and a curtsy, for which everybody might be thankful (Ch. LXII, p. 607). A woman to George: “Thank you”, said she, pulling the money towards her; “thank you” (Ch. LXI, p. 616). Emmy to Becky: “How thankful, how thankful I ought to be!” (Ch. LXVI, p. 641-642). The writer to the reader: Though I doubt whether that practice of piety inculcated upon by our womankind in early youth – namely to be thankful because we are better off than somebody (Ch. LXVI, p. 642). Amelia to Becky: “Thank you” (Ch. LXVII, p. 663). The writer to the reader: She would have liked to kneel down and say her prayers of thanks there (Ch. LXVII, p. 666).
