In Vietnam (Case 4.1) ..... Private airlines, state-owned airlines (flag carriers) and hybrid .... Part of the Vietnamese oil and gas group (Petrovietnam), overall.
Looking for the options: Hybrid governance, Analytical perspective Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
In press, to be published in August 2017 MA course in English, spring 2018, 3rd semester. University of Tampere, Faculty of Management
Private enterprises in charge of public duties: Public buildings, mines, supplies
for the army, grazing lands, and tax collection (’tax farming’).
First descriptions were related to the contracts for feeding of sacred hens in the
hill of Capitolium 390 BC.
Societas publicanorum: limited liability public service corporations, shares,
flexible organisation, division between administration and politics, in other private business limited liability through the joint slave ownership and ’slave CEO’.
Criticism for malpractice: fraudulent behaviour in transportation, detachment
from unprofitable public contracts, cruelty in mines, excessive tax collection.
In the imperial era the centralized civil service replaced the private companies
in administering public duties. The autocratic rule of the Emperors replaced the oligarchic rule of the Senate.
The written historical sources originate from the descriptions of the Senators
and followers of the Caesars who were in competitive position in relation to the publicani. Caesars followed their whips and whims, and the conduct of civil service was not always exemplary.
Follow Me!
I
a
b
c
II
III a
b IV
Shared ownership. Goal incongruence and
different institutional logics in the same organisation.
Variety in the sources of
financing.
Differentiated forms of
economic and social control.
Monstruous hybrid (mixing of syndromes)
Listen a story about Chimera
A cute little pet
Syndrome as a compatibility problem, not as a disease. Guardian syndrome is important for the integration. Commerce syndrome is important for survival. Consider two tribes: a tribe of fishermen and an agricultural tribe.
Separate community effort to fulfill goals and exchange with the other are equally important functions.
Hybrid organisations mix integration and exchange. Therefore, there
are risks involved.
Guardian Syndrome • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Shun trading Exert prowess Be obedient and disciplined Adhere to tradition Respect hierarchy Be loyal Take vengeance Deceive for the sake of the task Make rich use of leisure Be ostentatious Dispense largesse Be exclusive Show fortitude Be fatalistic Treasure honor
Commerce Syndrome • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Shun force Compete Be efficient Be open to inventiveness and novelty Use initiative and enterprise Come to voluntary agreements Respect contracts Dissent for the sake of the task Be industrious Be thrifty Invest for productive purposes Collaborate easily with strangers Promote comfort and convenience Be optimistic Be honest
Hybridihallinta ”Labradoodle” Crossbreed between a
labrador and a poodle.
Inflicts very little allergies.
May suffer from health
problems.
Has not been approved as a
pure dog breed.
Some say that it should not
have been created in the first place.
Labradoodle
Chimera
Greek mythology: a
combination of a lion, a goat and a snake (or scorpion or dragon)
It can breath fire Was considered as a bad
omen predicting disasters
Refers to things highly
imaginative or implausible
Questions
Answers
How should we understand
Micro,-meso ja macro.
the space in between public and private?
What kind of empirical
categorisations are used to classify hybridity?
How do hybrid
organisations legitimate their activities?
How are hybrid activities
valued in society?
Singular, Dyadic, and Triadic.
”Conceptual waste”,
”Muddling through”, ”Deviation from optimum”.
External – internal. Hybrids by design vs. by
default.
Impure goods, Combinations
of orders of worth.
Johanson & Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organisations. Exploring diversity of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge..
Global air travel (Case 3.4)
Cleantech –industry (3.2)
Publicani in the Roman Republic (Case 2.1)
European PPP pension Provision (Case 5.1)
Coxa- Hospital (Case 4.2)
PPP Road construction In China (Case 2.2)
Energy company In Vietnam (Case 4.1) National innovation system (Case 3.3) System of National Accounts (Case 3.5)
Health policy (Case 3.1)
Johanson & Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organisations. Exploring diversity of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge..
Innovation system as a catalyst of innovations Old: basic research, applied research, commercial applications. New: university, enterprise and government interaction as a source of innovation (triple helix). Specialisation into particular industries implies that industries differ from one
another. Usually there is no unified national innovation system. The significance of an innovation system is difficult to verify.
Forerunners: (Greece, Ireland) efficient production and commercialization. Laggards: Problems with both innovation production and commercialisation
(Netherlands, UK),
Problems with commercialisation: (Canada, Finland, Korea, New-Zealand) Problems with innovation production: (Italy, Norway, Mexico Portugal). If universities take a position in developing innovations, students and basic
research might suffer.
The wealth of industrialized countries is both antecedent and consequence of
innovations.
Looking for the options: Hybrid governance, Reasons for hybrids Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
Strategy: public organisation is capable of achieving change in
the environment of an organization. Private enterprises are geared to adaptation to the environment. Hybrids might be better equipped to influence their environment than private enterprises
Performance: Performance measurement is ambiguous also in
business and government organisations. The combination of profit-seeking and public policy goals in hybrids requires the simultaneous use of two different yardsticks.
Strategies as goal-oriented future actions
Performance as evaluation of past actions
Strategic design. Advancing
Principle of economy.
goals through programming
Strategic scanning.
Advancing goals through combining resources
Strategic governance.
Advancing goals through sharing work and connecting with others
Performance as parsimony. Minimum costs and efforts.
Principle of efficiency. The
best possible output with given resources
Principle of effectiveness.
The best possible value and outcome with given resources
The combination of public policy goals and for-profit activity.
Environmental sustainability as source of business opportunities rather than as a counterforce.
Interest of capital investors in new technologies. The concern of
citizens of the degradation of environment.
Changing environmental problems into business opportunities.
”doing well by doing good”. Conceptual battle and boundary concepts in the background:
”biotech”, ”infotech”, “cleantech”.
Continuous problem of demarcation: Is low-emission diesel
engine part of cleantech?
Adapted from Ostrom 1990
The categorisation into public and private goods is far from
clear
The categorisation is ambiguous, vulnerable to change, and it
depends upon the structure of the institutions in a given society
A straightforward interpretation is that hybrids would be
related to impure goods such as toll goods and common pool resources
In practice, hybrids are part of the production of public goods
as well. e.g. private enterprises in providing supply of weapons and personnel for the army or building a spacecraft
There were no highways in
mainland China in 1988, the length of highways was 104 400 kilometers in 2013.
Highway construction as public-
private partnership.
Highway companies: 19 stock
listed companies.
Road tolls provide revenue for
the companies as well as income for the local governments.
Road tolls as a device for
regulating road congestion.
The main features in the orders of worth Order of worth
Main features
Inspired world
Creativity, passion, emotion
Domestic world
Reputation, trustworthiness, authority
World of fame
Popularity, media, vogue, trends
Civic world
Collective welfare, equality, rules, and regulations
Market world
Price, competition, short-term
Industrial world
Technical efficiency, engineering, long-term
Green world
Environmental friendliness, sustainability, future generations
Project world
Connectivity, flexibility, social capital, networks
Adapted from Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, Thévenot et al. 2000, Boltanski et al. 2005.
(Table 2.1)
Orders of worth do not recognize public or private sectors. There are two possible worlds for the market activity: market
world and industrial world
For public sector the nearest equivalent would be the civic
world (and domestic world)
For strategic design the long term-orientation of the industrial
world is important point of reference
For strategic scanning, the inspired world is important point of
reference
For strategic governance, the project world and the domestic
word are important points of reference
Hybrids combine the practices of public and private sector, but
they combine also orders of worth
Hybrids do not have a conceptual position in existing
categories. Therefore, they are vulnerable to grievances
Examples: Why are public services provided by private enterprises (Market
world) if it endangers the equality of citizens (civic world)? Why to employ practices such as public-private partnerships even if they provide uncomfortable mixing of market and civic worlds? Why do societies intervene with market actions even if there are no conspicuous implications for social policy?
Vouchers. Instead of allocating public
Privatisation. At the macro level of
Contracting out. This is based on an
Public-private partnerships
budgets and funding to serviceproviding organisations, funds are allocated to the users of the service. The user is able to utilise her voice when making choices. This may contribute to higher levels of variation in terms of service volume and quality. assumption that public service provision is fundamentally a ‘make or buy’ decision (Williamson 1999). The buy decision may have implicated new types of internal quasi-markets (a purchaser-provider split) or externalised public service systems.
society, an extreme form of indirect control is privatisation, in which control is actually delegated to private economic agents. for example, energy, transportation, and telecommunications. It has not been able to evade the hybridity of parallel institutional logics. (PPPs). The impetus to mix governments with markets has created an industry of new forms of interaction between public and private sectors. Public-private partnerships may assume several different forms and thus create families of conceptual positions.
Looking for the options: Hybrid governance, Conceptualising hybrids Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
Animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a distance. (Borges 1966, 108)
Impure types, demarcation from the original species Forms of hybridity in public admistration context: Politics and administration Public administration and business activity -As a governance structure -As an entity -As a relationship
Markets Unprotected hazard
No specific features ccc
Hybrid contracting
No contractual safeguards
Firm
Market support
Regulation Private
Specific features Contractual safeguard
Administrative support Public
Williamson 1999
Public agency
Cooperatives, mutual companies and public enterprises and
non-profits illustrate entities which do not conform to the ownership perspective.
Rationale: the cost of ownership (Hansmann 1996). Those that
would suffer most for not owning, are the most likely owners
University as an example: Public ownership might help to sort
out possible grievances between students, academic oligarchy, private enterprises and public authorities.
Ambiguous organisations in terms of ownership, goals, resource
acquisition and control.
Education includes features of both public and private goods. In terms of
control, societies have always been eager to control university activities.
Academic oligarchy: in addition to public and private regulation, there is
the aspect of self-regulation.
Logics of performance measurement: multiple measurers (government,
business, and students), There is no one single yardstick. How universities serve for profit motives, education policies and willingness of citizens to invest in human capital?
e.g. Does university produce new knowledge? (academic oligarchy)? Does
the higher education conform to the requirements and is it comparable with other units (government). Can I get a good job by acquiring higher education? (student)
In what ever way you evaluate the performance, it cannot be done
satisfactorily in any one single way.
Public-private partnerships, (PPP) Long-lasting cooperation between public
and private actors in producing services and products by sharing risk, cost and resources (Koppenjan, Enserink 2009)
Forms: Public leverage, outsourcing,
licencing, joint venture, open strategic partnership (Schelcher 2005)
A step further: Any meaningful interaction
between public and private actors
Dimension
Public leverage
Outsourcing
Savings, quality, Significance for the Inciting private efficiency, improved public sector sector investments management
Lisencing
Public sector attention to the private sector
Joint venture
Open strategic partnership
Access to private Attachment of private resources, transfer of interest in public action risk to private partner
Mode of operation
Industrial subsidies Public service provision Private enteprise in private enterprises acquires right to produce public services
Agreement in which the private partner acquires capital and is resposible for the operational cost
Long-term unofficial cooperation
Financing
Public
public
User fees, Often public supporrt
Private, public reimbursement
Public, Private funding is possible
Example
Subsidies for declining industrial areas
Carbage disposal, Social services
Many public private pension schemes
Infrastrucuture projects
Civic engagement
Public-private arrangements have become more common in European
pension provision since the 1990’s (within private sector).
Three models: 1) public leverage, 2) licensing, 3) franchising. Accountability: 1) public leverage: defining private service as mandatory,
usually no specific accountability mechanism; 2) licensing: public authority requires private producers to comply with the stipulated requirements, accountability can be evaluated according to the requirements; 3) Franchising: public authority defines the product and grants production right to private enterprise, the forms of accountability vary.
Two basic forms of accountability: 1) accountability to the key
stakeholders (social partners, employers in particular). 2) mandatory private arrangements. The accountability is realised between service provider and public authority.
The freedom of choice has increased, but the voice of he beneficiary is
muffled. If accountability is defined, it is connected to the employers as financers of the schemes, not to employees as beneficiaries.
Johanson & Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organisations. Exploring diversity of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge..
Bilateral government agreements (ASA) over the routes between
two destinations. Overall there are more than 3000 agreements globally. Restrictions of foreign operators within national airspace. Private airlines, state-owned airlines (flag carriers) and hybrid airlines. Hybrid contracting in global alliances: Star Alliance, Oneworld, Skyteam. Landing rights to government -owned airports. Aircraft manufacturing: public subsides (army acquisitions) and direct government stakes, government guarantees for aircraft purchasing Main manufacturers: Bombardier (Canada), Embraer (Brasil), Boeing
(USA), Airbus (Europe). Wide-body aircrafts. Two manufacturers: Boeing and Airbus.
PERSPECTIVES Hybrid organisations
(organisation)
Global air travel (hybrid
industry)
Other National bilateral contracts in
establishing routes State influence on aircraft manufacturing Public airports and distribution of landing slots to aitlines
ACCORDING TO THE
NUMBER OF ACTORS
Singular
(public/private/hybrid)
Dyadic (Public –private
cooperation in global alliances)
Triadic (global alliances)
Taxonomy in biology: Scientific names of animals and hierarchical levels of taxonomy (According to Carl von Linné 1707-1778)
Organisations resemble living creatures in a sense that
they are born and they face institutional life and death
BUT Organisations do not reproduce sexually. They do
not possess DNA that would dictate their life and death
Organisations can inherit acquired characteristics For any classification it is noteworthy that
organisations may alter their actions due to the classifications
Organisations are social beings. Therefore, univocal
and exhaustive classification of organisations is very difficult
The system of national accounts aims at statistical classification of economic activity according to globally
accepted principles.
Background: the need for public intervention to combat the Depression in the 1930s, the increased role of
government in economy, the need to calculate the available resources for the war effort and recovery after the war.
The national accounts were designed to inform macroeconomic policy by supporting macroeconomic analysis and
providing a conceptual basis for the formation of long-term strategic development and reform (Ward 2006; Vanoli 2005).
By identifying the distinct roles of different institutions, national accounts give guidance on the mandates and incentive structures of corporations, households, governments, and nonprofit institutions
For the purposes of the SNA, institutional units that are resident in the economy are grouped together into five
mutually exclusive sectors (and many subunits) composed of the following types of units:
1)
Nonfinancial corporations
2)
Financial corporations
3)
Government units, including social security funds
4)
Nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISHs)
5)
Households
Level of analysis
Main distinction
The result of distinction
Level one All institutional units
No distinction between institutional units is possible (kingdom)
Totality of units
Level two Geographical location
Distinction between resident and foreign (rest of the world) institutional units (phylum)
Domestic, foreign
Level three Type of institutional unit
Distinction between types of households (class)
Level four Pricing
Distinction according to market principle (order)
Nonmarket producer, market producer
Distinction between the institutional nature of organisations (family)
Nonprofit institutions serving households, nonfinancial institutions, financial institutions, government
Distinction according to controlling entities of the unit (subarea of activity only) (genus)
Public, private, and foreign control of market producers
Level five Area of activity
Level six Control
Institutional households, households
Denial: Public – private partnership (PPP) PPP first appeared in classification in the latest 2008 edition PPP arrangements are categorized into either public or private
according to the distribution of risk
PPP is ”conceptual” waste and its independent existence is
denied
Restricted approval: Originally non-profit institutions were subjected to serving households
The initial categorisation could not grasp the variety of non-
profit activities
Solution: A more detailed classification outside the System of
National Accounts
Looking for the options: Strategies for different types of organisations Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
The young lieutenant of a small Hungarian detachment in the Alps sent a reconnaissance unit into the icy wilderness. It began to snow immediately, snowed for two days, and the unit did not return. The lieutenant suffered, fearing that he had sent his own people to death, but on the third day the unit came back. Where had they been? How had they made their way? “Yes, they said, we considered ourselves lost and waited for the end. Then one of us found a map in his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted the snowstorm, and then with the map we discovered our bearings. And here we are”.
The lieutenant borrowed this remarkable map and had a good look at it. He discovered to his astonishment that it was not a map of the Alps, but a map of the Pyrenees. (Weick 1995, 54)
Strategic design
Strategic scanning
Strategic governance
The strategy defines ways to expand and organise current actions (programming)
The strategy enables the mapping of novel ways to match resources to fulfil goals (combining)
The strategy defines the basis for sharing work with external partners (relating)
Disturbed-reactive
Turbulent fields
Turbulent fields
Primary type of capital
Financial
Human
Social
Managerial control
Budget
Division of labour
Contract
The role of strategy
Assumption about the environment
Johansonchallenges & Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organisations. Exploring diversityRigid of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge. Main Unanticipated situations resources, Contracting costs, misinterpretation of overwhelming external resources stakeholders
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STRATEGY OF HYBRID ORGANISATIONS (FIGURE 4.1)
How is it going to be?
Strenghts and weaknesses
What do we have?
Threats and opportunities
With whom are we going to be with?
Pv Power in Vietnam (Case 4.1) (Binh 2016) Part of the Vietnamese oil and gas group (Petrovietnam), overall
approximately 30% of GDP.
Pv Power: Securing energy production, management of power plants,
production of electricity.
Previously the use of domestic coal. Following the economic growth,
increased import.
Import restrictions: Only three companies can import coal. The approval of
prices by public authorities. Ambiguous rules in accepting prices.
In the evaluation of bids, there are two main criteria: the continuity of
supply and competitive pricing. Not all producers wish to take part in bidding and brokers sometimes make false promises.
Unclear rules result in difficulties in deciding on acceptable prices and
requirements for continuity. Negotiations between ministries and stateowned enterprises.
Public – private hospital (Coxa: Tampere, Finland). Previous
quality problems in hip and joint replacement surgery.
Systematic management training (TQM) within Pirkanmaa
health district.
Possibility to establish private hospital within public health
care system.
Coxa was a result from long-term negotiations among the
stakeholders.
Both public and private owners, representation of
stakeholders within the board.
The construction of the hospital as public- private
partnership.
The use of profits for use within one’s own organisation. The results of the care have been improving. The finances are
good.
Russia: SOEs control many important industries Mass media, military-industrial complex, infrastructure,
natural resources, financial services, public sector accounts for 40% of stock market capitalisation
Political elite controls foreign trade, economy is structured
around industry groups with holding company structure led by tycoons (oligarchs)
In industry groups, the success of subunits is dependent
upon the contacts to the oligarch. The success of an oligarch is dependent upon the contacts to the members of political elite
The result: parasitic politico-economic structures which
enables the influence of political elite on society as a whole
Patron-client structure: Public
authorities as patrons, oligarchs as clients
Client provides financial benefits
and acquires political support for patron. Patron gives political protection.
The most important patrons:
president, prime ministeri, the mayor of Moskow. The most important oligarchs are connected to these institutions
In practice, the same structure in
89 districts and cities
(Grosman & Leiponen)
Enterprise Owner
In the Putin era, some of the
oligarchs have been removed, but they have been replaced with others
Private enterprises
Public agencies
Strategic design
Strong position in lucrative industry
Strategic scanning
Inimitable and unique Command of valued combinations of internal expertise and information in resources the policy process
Strategic Exploitation of lack of governance contact between other firms.
Hybrid organisations
Ideal position in proximity to Beneficial position between power or the enlargement of private and public spheres bureaus
Privileged access to both public and private resources
Brokering in the policyExploitation of lack of making process, divide-and- contact between other rule through power and organisations, alliances brokering between government bodies and business enterprises
Looking for the options: Performance of organisations Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
Super-goals
Hybrids and supergoals
Relatively permanent
The dual goals of hybrids
The aim is to identify
Hybrids are different in
criteria for measurement purposes. optimality and deviance.
are vulnerable to changes of emphasis. comparison to others, but they do not constitute a homogeneous group.
Vulnerability of change may
induce adaptation.
State-owned Enterprises in China Over half of thet SOEs follow
hybrid governance as follows:
Politics: communist party section,
employee association, employee meeting.
Corporate governance:
shareholder’s meeting, the board and supervisory board.
Differentiated incentives:
ideological education for management to combat corruption, financial perks for employees to increase efficiency (Hua et al. 2006)
Social enterprises USA vs. Europe USA: ”big government” and increase in
non-profit activity in 1960’s and 1970’s.
USA: The decrease of government funding
in 1980’s did not change thet social mission of non-profits, but required additional resources from the market activities of non-profits.
Europe: The unemployment in 1980’s,
availability of public support for the reduction of unemployment.
Europe: The emphasis of non-profit activity
on employment and financing from the public sources (Defourny & Nyssens 2014).
For performance measurement
Implications for hybrids
Business enterprises, public
The rationality of
Measurement is a feature of
Measurement decreases
Organisations justify their
Measurement produces
agencies or hybrids do not have a single common goal successful organisation existence by being connected to other organisations
The action does not have
other easily manageable alternatives
measurement decreases insecurity impurity
comparability
Measurement helps to sort
out future direction
Performance measurement as a form of social action
Main features
(Figure 5.1)
Measurement is a product
of social action
Measurement is a medium
for human (inter-)action
Measurement both
constrains and enables
Measurement solves
problems, but also creates new ones
Measurement of economic performance (Figure 5.2)
Main features Measurer: who is the measurer? Measuree: the object of
measurement
Measurement system: The rule
system of calculation, according to which performance is quantified
Measurement result: The results
of measurements to be used for the decision-making of public policies, organisations, and relevant stakeholders
Measurer: Multiple possibilities 1) students and business, 2)
higher education authorities 3) academic oligarchy. Questions: whose value should be increased?
Measuree: 1) universities as service providers, 2) universties as
implementors of policy goals, 3) universities as academic tribes. Question: How should we understand universities as objects of
measurement?
Measurement system: 1) performance satisfying stakeholder
needs, 2) Performance in fulfilling goals of higher education policies, 3) performance measurement as device to verify the creation of new knowledge. Question: how to define the rules for measurement systems?
Measurement results: 1) legitimation for satisfaction, 2)
legitimation over fulfilling political goals or 3) legitimations over production of new knowledge. Question: Who needs to be convinced with the results?
Accountability over actions which one
has no say.
Compromises to number of directions. ‘Organizations trying to meet conflicting
expectations are likely to be dysfunctional, pleasing no one while trying to please everyone.’ (Koppell 2005, 95)
Measurement as a solution. As a
consequence, more performance measurements, which require more work, but do not solve the underlying contradictions.
Balancing between access to service, service quality and cost
containment.
US: organisation, financing, production and management
combines public and private features.
Financing: public private 50/50. Production predominantly
private.
The health expenditures as share of GDP (16,4 %) are higher
than in other OECD countries (8,9%), but the coverage is lower than in other countries
Cost containment is not equally important to all stakeholders. How to evaluate the inefficiency of hybrid governance?
Compared to what? Public, private, and other feasible arrangements.
Private enterprises
Economy, the principle of parsimony
Public agencies
Hybrid organisations
Minimising product costs in a competitive environment, minimising transaction costs
Minimising public expenditures and the financial burden to taxpayers
Minimising the cost of collaborative governance and joint production
Technical efficiencies, optimal input-output relationships, scale efficiencies emphasising the volume of production, economies of scope emphasising the benefits of joint production
Scale efficiencies emphasising the volume of production, allocative efficiencies ensuring the equal distribution of outputs and outcomes
Economies of scope beyond organisational boundaries, producing a complementary variety of services and goods
Effectiveness, the principle of value creation
Value for customers and shareholders (the profit motive and the concept of profitability)
Value for society, taxpayers, and the public
Motto
‘Doing good by doing well’
‘Doing good by doing good’
Efficiency, the principle of optimality
Value for society, taxpayers, and the public, value for customers and shareholders (the profit motive and the concept of profitability)
‘Doing well by doing good’
Defining the alternatives: Strategy and performance in hybrid setting Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
Principle of economy: how to organise processes; heuristics
and external interactions as simply and economically as possible in the presence of both public and private influence (financial sustainability).
Principle of efficiency: balancing goals, administering fruitful
doses of resources and evaluation of external interaction in two spheres to maximise outputs (equilibrium).
Principle of effectiveness: what are the long term concequences
of hybrids, how innovations within hybrids are evaluated, what is the role of hybrids in the social integration)? (value creation)
Strategic design: How to organise goals and division of labour to
maximise the future benefits? (legacy)
Strategic scanning: how to combine public and private modes of
operation, resources and innovations in such a way that the resulting whole is more than sum of its individual parts? (social welfare)
Strategic governance: How to combine dual directions of
external relationships in such a way that public and private stakeholders are present for fruitfull goal attainment and integration of society? (social capital)
Process integration: The use of same channel for multiple client
groups (public/private)
Balancing goals: The control of stakeholders Harvesting legitimacy: acceptance from multiple sources
Legacy: The well-being of future generations
Combining heuristics: e.g. Ideological education against
corruption, financial incentives for efficiency
Administering doses for synergy: The balancing of public and
private resources to avoid dependence
Creating innovations: The balance between public and private
innovations
Social welfare: The well-being in society in different economic
and social structures.
Establishing connecting positions: With minimal number of ties
maximal number of connections. The centralization and decentralisation of external relationship management
Weighing dual reciprocities: how beneficial the contacts are to
public and private partners. Paradox: community building most often requires reduction of contacts to other groups
Integrating communities: Brokering positions shorten the paths
that would otherwise be longer (horizontal and vertical integration, bottom-up and top-down)
Social capital: intertwined society
Defining the alternatives: New understanding of hybrid governance Source: Jan-Erik Johanson & Jarmo Vakkuri (2017) Governing hybrid organizations. Exploring variety of institutional life. Abingdon & New York, Routledge.
External: problems of regulation
Internal: operational possibilities
Ambiguous organization
Vitality in specific space
structures
Dual rule structures Problems of accountability
Institutional survival despite
contradictions
Hidden strenghts beyond
politics and business
The role and position of hybrids and hybridity in institutional life is
significantly determined by the extent to which their action and behaviour is perceived as rational
a system of hollow politics in which important strategic choices have
been made through somewhat obscure and nontransparent processes and mechanisms of decision-making system of lousy business practices in which, in terms of performance, bureaucratic red tape and the pursuit of a common good prevent the pursuit of sensible profit seeking We may give credit for no particular reason, and we may also assign
blame to hybrid organisations with insufficient causal reasoning and improper empirical evidence.
1) Conscious selection of accountability structures: As agents, hybrids are
not expected to demonstrate accountabilities in all directions or to be loyal to all principals. Some stakeholders and audiences are more permissive of the ambiguity of accountabilities, which encourages permissive accountability structures.
2) Choosing the modes of value to demonstrate. One important
characteristic of hybrid activities is that, despite high expectations, hybrids are not able to produce all kinds of value. Hybrids may have an option to disclose those forms of value they wish to hide.
3) Selecting the forums to be present. Hybrids may be able to benefit from
the problem of multiple decision-making heuristics and institutional logics. This may be an excuse for hybrids to justify their decision-making procedures in favourable forums.
Democracy
OECD -countries
The significance of hybrids varies according to context Hybrids and advanced industrial countries:hybrid activity as an
extension of market activity with a social twist. When considering the highly coordinated market economies in Nordic countries, hybridity easily appears to be a government-driven system with a market twist. In liberal societies hybrids appear as extension of markets with a social twist. Hybrids and state-centric societies: economic activity with the central influence of the government. In these settings, there is no need to see hybridity as a transitory phase. Instead, hybridity can be seen as a device to retain continuous top-down government control of market transactions. Hybrids and developing countries: Could be the only option to organise large-scale economic activity in the developing world. Hybridity is not an extension of the existing categories but instead an anchor point for organising economic structures and government activity in the future.