Proceedings of The 1st Australian Security and ...

   

Proceedings of The 1st Australian Security and Intelligence Conference 1st December 2008. Edith Cowan University Mount Lawley Campus Perth Western Australia Published By: SECAU - Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University Mount Lawley Campus Perth Western Australia Edited By: Associate Professor Craig Valli and Dr David Brooks SECAU Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University Perth, Western Australia Copyright 2008. All Rights Reserved ISBN 978-0-7298-0664-0 Proceedings of the 1st Security & Intelligence Conference ISBN 979-0-7298-0663-3 Proceedings of the 2008 SECAU Security Congress CRICOS Institution Provider Code 00279B

Conference Foreword Dear Delegate, The 1st Australian Security and Intelligence Conference has a number of high quality paper submissions from authors who represent a cross-section of international and Australian national perspectives in terms of security and intelligence. These papers reflect the emerging themes of CCTV, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Ethics and Intelligence analysis, and Psychometrics. All published papers were double blind peer-reviewed before acceptance into the conference for publication. There were a total of 28 papers submitted for review from which only 13 were accepted and presented. The 1st Australian Security and Intelligence Conference is one of four conferences that form the 2008 SECAU Security Congress. The congress reflects an overarching commitment to bringing together a broad spectrum of security topics under a single assembly in order to promote and develop a cross disciplinary approach to a continuum of security research. Conferences such as the 1st Australian Security and Intelligence Conference take a great deal of co-ordination, time and effort in order to bring together the right people in a common forum in order to advance the wider security understanding and to progress the various research directions. To that end, I express my thanks to the conference committee for their hard work and dedication to the conference cause. In particular, I would like to commend the various reviewers, editors and proposal submitters for their devotion and perseverance in the face of countless other duties and engagements. In concert with this gratitude is another vote of thanks to the administrative staff within the School of Computer and Information Science, as well the SECAU Security Research Centre, for their patience, good-humour, and professional approach to ensuring the successful running of the conference. Sincerely, David Cook SECAU – Security Research Centre 2008 SECAU Congress Co-ordinator Conference Committee Dr David Brooks (Chair and Editor) Associate Professor Craig Valli (Editor) Dr Geoff Swan Bill Bailey Jeff Corkill Roslyn Dinkgreve David Cook

Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee

Sponsors: Best Paper Award – Presented by the Secure Systems Limited SECAU – Security Research Centre

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Table of Contents 1. Organisational security: A propositional study to map expert knowledge……… p4 2. Psychometric risk perception: Why do some individuals elect not to act on risks?……………………………………………………………………

p12

3. Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry……………………………..

p17

4. Vigilance and the implications of using threat image projection (TIP) for CCTV surveillance operators ………………………………………………

p26

5. Critical infrastructure protection – Oil refining industry…………………….. p37 6. Aviation Infrastructure Protection: Threats, Contingency Plans and the Importance of Networks …………………………………………………..… p44 7. Modern Society as Risk Society: Implications of Modernity on Private Security ………………………………………………………………………. p56 8. Piracy in S/E Asia a possible new definition …………………………….

p61

9. The use of red teaming in the corporate environment: A study of security management, vulnerabilities and defence …………………………………..

p77

10. Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? …………………..………………………..

p84

11. Cerberus: The game of security analysis ……………………………………. p93 12. Covert Operative Management in 2020 – Nodal Delivery and a Collegiate Governance Model …………………………………….………………………………….. p102 13. Nuclear Radiation: Properties, Characteristics and Radiological Dispersal

Devices………………………………………………………………………p111

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Organisational security: A propositional study to map expert knowledge Adel Alruwaii [email protected] Saudi Aramco Affiliated [email protected] David J Brooks [email protected] Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University

Abstract Organisational security, as a profession, is at an early stage in terms of consensus by researchers on categorical concepts that sum its body of knowledge. In addition, scrutinising and mapping similarities of the security expert knowledge structure has not been undertaken by researchers on any significant scale. Nevertheless, a recent study (Brooks, 2006a) has investigated and critiqued 104 academic university level security courses and extracted common security concepts, resulting in a tabulated sum of 14 knowledge categories that represent the organisational security expert knowledge structure. Controversy in the security industry mandates specific knowledge structure research to help achieve a consensual agreement on the security body of knowledge. This paper aims to outline a research proposition to conduct similarity analysis on security knowledge categories through a multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique. The proposed research will validate the foresaid 14 knowledge categories representing the security expert knowledge structure by reviewing similar research conducted and adding knowledge categories if found necessary. The proposed research will provide a better understanding and relationships of security knowledge categories, and aid educational organisations in developing more concise and industry focused security curriculum. Furthermore, the proposed research will support education institutions in developing security professionals with proper knowledge and skills necessary to face challenges in the security industry. Keywords Organisational security, security expert, categories, security education, body of knowledge

INTRODUCTION Although private or organisational security has a clear function of protecting personnel, information and assets from harm, it is stated by Fischer and Green (2004, p. 37) that the private security definition has no universal agreement and cogent arguments have been made for substituting the term loss prevention for security. Furthermore, vigilant observation of organisational security education revealed that not much has been done to sum what constitutes the knowledge of organisational security (Nalla, 2001). As a result, second career law enforcement or military personnel - who may lack the business background - were always given priority when appointing organisational security managers, which lead to marginalising and alienating the security function (Gill, 2007). The dispersal of a consensual organisational security definition has mandated research to sum the knowledge categories that represent the organisational security expert knowledge. Security professional expertise has never been more needed as a true profession and consolidation of the term organisational security is crucial to the international community (Wakefield, 2007). It should be noted that the term security throughout this article referrers to the term organisational security, which will be used interchangeably in the content of this article.

BACKGROUND The security industry is one of Australia’s fastest growing sectors, generating revenues of approximately $4.5 billion per year and employing over 150,000 security personnel (Australian Security Industry Association, 2008). In addition, the security industry in the United States is a business worth some $100 billion a year and still growing (ASIS International, 2005). In contrast to other disciplines, such as medicine and engineering, organisational security still lacks a concise definition and an agreement on knowledge categories representing what constitutes its body of knowledge.

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In a study (Nalla, 2001) to explore the core components of an introductory course in organisational security, nine (9) security topics were ranked important (Table 1). Nalla’s (2001) study drew data from benchmarking security textbooks, security professional’s interviews and proceedings of the ASIS first academic/practitioner symposium. The study emphasised, to a lesser degree, the consensus on the conceptual and methodological components of security education such as fire safety, workplace violence and workplace drug use. Table 1 _________________________________________________________________ Components of an Introductory Survey Course in Organisational Security _________________________________________________________________ Components description Physical security and asset protection Emergency and incident management Personnel security Legal issues Computer security ___________________________________

Access control management Risk assessment and management Investigations Information security

(Nalla, 2001, p. 49)

Analysis by Brooks (2006a) has investigated and critiqued 104 undergraduate security courses and extracted 14 security categories, representing an organisational security expert knowledge structure and body of knowledge (Table 2). In addition, the study reverse-engineered the represented knowledge categories with other related body of knowledge studies (American Society for Industrial Security, 2002; Bazzina, 2006), which included proposed industrial security standards.

Table 2 ___________________________________________________________________ Security Knowledge Categories _________________________________________________________________ Security categories description Criminology Emergency/contingency Fire science planning Facility management Industrial security Information and computer Investigations Physical security Principles Risk management Safety Security law Security management Security technology _____________________ ___________________________ (Brooks, 2006a, p. 176) Table 2 It could be proposed that these 14 knowledge categories effectively represent organisational security more than other studies. For the purpose of this study these 14 knowledge categories will be the centreline of analysis, with other similar work used to review and validate the knowledge categories to determine if other categories should be added. Kooi and Hinduja (2008) provided a more recent article in which they summarised their experience of teaching security to criminal justice undergraduates. The article considered the wider understanding of the “art and science” of security, resulting in the recommendation of nineteen (19) topics (Table 3).

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Table 3 Experimental Security Course Components in the Context of a Criminal Justice Undergraduate Degree

The origins and development of security

Security Course Components Security education, training, certification, and regulation

The role of security

Proprietary vs. Contract security

Risk analysis and security survey

Perimeter and exterior security

Interior Security and Access Control

Transportation / Cargo Security

Computer and Information Security

Security and the Law

Internal and External Fraud

Personnel Policies and Human Relations

Workplace Violence

Retail Security

Casino Security

Olympic Security Continuity of Operations

Nuclear Security

Museum Security

(Kooi & Hinduja, 2008, p. 299) It could be argued that many of these topics, for example retail, casino, Olympic, nuclear and museum security, may be considered practising areas of security, not security knowledge categories. Brooks (2008) described such topic areas, proposing that practising areas should be classified within a knowledge category of Industrial Security. Industrial security would encompass industry specific aspects related to security, for example within aviation security, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) legislation would be incorporated within the knowledge content. Security education, from the perspective of criminal justice and social science academics, can be beneficial in further validating security categories and body of knowledge. However, such studies may also increase confusion as to what may constitute organisational security and, reduce the ability of achieving consensus in the near to medium term.

SIGNIFICANCE One of the most important things we have learned in the last 20 years of study into the practice of security is how little we actually know, namely that the discipline of security has not yet matured (Giever, 2007). The challenge for the future is for security research to find a way of improving security practice (Gill, 2007). To invoke true professional status in the security industry, scientific decision-making must be practiced by the majority of practitioners (Calder, 2007, p. 3). To gain such a harmony among organisational security practitioners requires consensus in a body of knowledge. However, there has been limited research in presenting an organisational security body of knowledge, with publications primarily by ASIS International (2003) and others (Brooks, 2006a; Hesse & Smith, 2001; The Interim Security Professionals Taskforce, 2008; Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). These limited publications are perhaps due to the diverse nature of security, which makes research activity diffuse and security research difficult (Sarre, 2005). Nevertheless, a single security body of knowledge has not been explicitly presented, although there is supporting literature to develop such a body in many of the security domains.

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PURPOSE The purpose of this study is to outline a research proposition to conduct similarity analysis on security knowledge categories through a psychometric multidimensional scaling (MDS) knowledge mapping technique. The proposed research will validate the 14 knowledge categories representing the security expert knowledge structure (Table 2) by reviewing similar conducted research and adding knowledge categories if found necessary. In addition, the research will present the psychometric MDS knowledge structure of organisational security, according to practicing subject matter experts.

UNDERLINE THEORY The underline theory of the study encompasses interpretative analysis, where past security body of knowledge studies are considered and expanded. In addition, psychometric multidimensional scaling knowledge mapping is incorporated, to present a spatial representation of the corporate security knowledge structure. Organisational Security Body of Knowledge The need for competent organisational security practitioners has mandated the development of an industry acceptable body of knowledge. This body of knowledge is possible by inviting interdisciplinary research to define their contribution and aid the definition of the elements of the organisational security knowledge categories (Calder, 2007). The term organisational security body of knowledge refers to a set of categories that inclusively sum the profession of organisational security. A consensual body of knowledge is important in defining security standards, competencies, qualifications, education, licensing and accreditation of organisational security practitioners (The Interim Security Professionals Taskforce, 2008). Knowledge may commence with object and pattern recognition, nevertheless this does not provide an appropriate explanation to define knowledge. It is stated by Clancey (1997, p. 285) that knowledge is “more than written scientific facts and theories”. Knowledge may be defined as “facts or experiences known by a person or group of people ... specific information about a subject” (Angus & Roberston, 1992, p. 557). Knowledge is constructed and, built on previous experience by, using and expanding existing ideas (Novak & Gowin, 1984). Therefore, it can be stated that; as new knowledge is gained, change in understanding the existing theories may be achieved. Knowledge is integral to memory structure, which is concerned with how the memory may organise, store and retrieve knowledge. As a person is exposed to information in his or her everyday life, concurrent knowledge has to be economised and abstracted into categories. These categories are developed and maintained within long-term memory; however, there is a cognitive balance between the number and effectiveness of such categories. Categories need to be informative, based to a degree on the natural world, economic and cohesive (Eysenck & Keane, 2002) and organised (Kellog, 2003). Similar objects are grouped together within a conceptual category and these groupings are generally a product of the learner’s environment. In addition, expert performance is considered different to that of novice or lay persons. Expertise may be defined as consistent performance on a domain specific representative task (Ericsson & Charness, 1997), although expertise cannot be so easily defined (LaFrance, 1997). Experts require a number of abilities that includes problem solving skills, conceptual understanding, domain knowledge and experience. A novice will, in general, group problems together based on similar surface features or schema. Whereas experts classify problems based on deeper knowledge structure and with hierarchical categories (Kellog, 2003). The proposed study will use the 14 knowledge categories presented by Brooks (2006a) as a schema baseline, conduct a literature review to validate these categories and spatially map expert understanding of these categories.

Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a method that represents the pattern of proximities among pairs of objects (Borg & Groenen, 2005, p. 3). The psychometric MDS knowledge structure technique, as demonstrated by Brooks (2006b), will provide a visual representation of similarities and dissimilarities among the organisational security knowledge categories. The organisational security knowledge categories will be graphically displayed through MDS to enable a visual representation of expert knowledge structure. MDS analysis would result in a spatial representation of knowledge concept clusters (Trochim, Cook, & Setze, 1994) and allow an analysis of judgements between variables to define dimensionality between such variables 7

(Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2002), within the proposed study, these variables will be knowledge categories. MDS is a statistical technique within the area of multivariate data analysis, “attracting worldwide interest” (Cohen, et al, 2002, p. 369) and has been used in many other similar studies (Cox & Cox, 2000). Such studies have included knowledge structure in the form of concept mapping (Brooks, 2006b; Cheng, 2004; MartinezTorres, Garcia, Marin & Vazquez, 2005; Trochim, 2006; Turner, 2002). MDS reduces complex dimensional data and provides a spatial representation, allowing hidden data structure formation. MDS commences with a set of objects, which are paired and their dissimilarities measured. Configurations of points are sought in dimensional space, with each point representing an object. MDS calculates a dimensional space configuration where the points match, as close as possible, the paired dissimilarities. Dimensional representation demonstrates object proximity, with proximity being how similar or dissimilar objects actually are or perceived to be (Cox & Cox, 2000; Kruskal & Wish, 1978). The variation in matching defines the different algorithms of MDS (Cox & Cox, 2000), with the study using ALSCAL (Alternative Least squares SCALing).

STUDY EXPECTATIONS This article reports on the study’s proposition, where the expected outcomes of the study are still not clear or able to be validated. However, the study is expected to provide at least three significant outcomes. First, the study will further validate the 14 organisational security knowledge categories representing the security expert knowledge structure tabulated by Brooks (2006a), subtracting or adding to these knowledge categories. Second, the study will present a psychometric multidimensional scaling (MDS) similarity analysis map of the participating experts’ organisational security knowledge structure. Third, the study results could lead to cluster formation within the psychometric MDS map, indicating organisational security expert knowledge groupings. In the study’s proposition, it has been put forward that organisational security and security management could be the focal point of the centre cluster and that the study may validate this assumed spatial locality. In addition and based on such expected close spatial similarity, security and security management could perhaps be found to be an interchangeable category. Furthermore, it could be suggested that investigations and fire science may be closely related to criminology and facility management respectively, representing two (2) separate category clusters. Finally, risk management and business continuity management (BCM) could be similar enough and cluster together. Talbot and Jakeman (2008) stated that the knowledge category Information and computer should be divided into two discrete categories, namely information security and information communications technology (ICT). The study is expected to test the significance, according to the participating experts, on such a division of categories. For illustration purposes, Figure 1 provides a speculative view of the proposed organisational security knowledge categories spatial structure. It should be noted that the security principles category was omitted from Figure 1 and further psychometric measurements as it was believed that this category may be embedded throughout the other categories, depending on the considered theory, principle or model. To include such a diverse category would reduce the reliability and validity of the final psychometric knowledge map. The proposed research will provide a better understanding of organisational or private security knowledge category’s relationships, aiding educational organisations in developing more concise and industry focused security curriculum. Cluster formation, if achieved, could result in providing separate educational paths, for example two or three fields of study or majors within the organisational security domain. Organisational security is a multidiscipline field and the identification of education paths could help specialisation that raises the profession. In turn, this would aid the development of practising organisational security professionals, equipped with proper knowledge and skills necessary to face challenges in the security industry.

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CONCLUSIONS This paper highlighted a propositional study to map expert knowledge categories representing organisational security expert knowledge structure and body of knowledge. The proposition suggested utilising the 14 knowledge categories tabulated by Brooks (2006a) as a baseline for the study and validating these categories through a literature review. For example, it was expected that information and computer could be divided into two discrete categories of ICT and information security, and that the study might validate this category division. The outcome of the literature review representing the organizational security knowledge categories could then be analysed, based on industry subject matter experts and presented as a psychometric multidimensional scaling map. The importance of the proposed study considers the need to present a practical and industry focused organisational security consensual body of knowledge. It could be proposed that the study outcomes would improve organisational security categories comprehension; aiding educational institutions to better offer and deliver organisational security curriculum and support the advancement of the security profession. Nevertheless, the diversity of organisational security mandates interdisciplinary studies to sum competencies under each knowledge category.

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Ford, & R. R. Hoffman, Expertise in context: Human and machine (pp. 247-291). Menlo Park, CA: The MIT Press. Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2002). Research methods in education. London: Routledge Falmer. Cox, T. F., & Cox, M. A. (2000). Multidimensional scaling: Monographs on statistics and applied probability. Coca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC. Ericsson, K. A., & Charness, N. (1997). Cognitive and developmental factors in expert performance. In P. J. Feltovich, K. M. Ford, & R. R. Hoffman, Expertise in context: Human and machine (pp. 4-41). Menlo Park: The MIT Press. Eysenck, M. W., & Keane, M. T. (2002). Cognitive psychology: a student's handbook. New York: Psychology Press Ltd. Fischer, R. J., & Green, G. (2004). Introduction to security (7th ed.). Boston: Butterworth Heinemann. Giever, D. (2007). Security education - Past, present and the future. Security Journal, 20, 23-25. Gill, M. (2007). The challenges for the security sector: Thinking about security research. Security Journal, 20, 27-29. Hesse, L., & Smith, C. L. (2001). Core curriculum in security science. Proceedings of the 5th Australian Security Research Symposium (pp. 87-104). Perth, Western Australia: Edith Cowan University. Kellog, R. T. (2003). Cognitive psychology. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Kooi, B., & Hinduja, S. (2008). Teaching security courses experientially. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 19(2), 290-307. Kruskal, J. B., & Wish, M. (1978). Multidimensional scaling. London: Sage Publications. LaFrance, M. (1997). Metaphors for expertise: How knowledge engineers picture human expertise. In P. J. Feltovich, K. M. Ford, & R. R. Hoffman, Expertise in context: Human and machine (pp. 163-180). Menlo Park: The MIT Press. Martinez-Torres, M. R., Garcia, F. J., Marin, S. L., & Vazquez, S. G. (2005). A digital signal processing teaching methodology using concept-mapping techniques. IEEE Transactions on Education, 48(3), 422-429. Nalla, M. K. (2001). Designing an introductory survey course in private security. Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 12(1), 35-52. Novak, J. D., & Gowin, D. B. (1984). Learning how to learn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sarre, R. (2005). Researching private policing: Challenges and agendas for researchers. Security Journal, 18(3), 57-70. Talbot, J., & Jakeman, M. (2008). Security risk management body of knowledge. Melbourne, Australia: Risk Management Institution of Australasia. The Interim Security Professionals Taskforce. (2008). Advancing security professionals: A discussion paper to identify the key actions required to advance security. Melbourne: The Australian Government AttorneyGeneral. Trochim, W. M. (2006). Concept mapping. Retrieved September 13, 2008, from Research Methods Knowledge Base: http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/conmap.htm Trochim, W. M., Cook, J. A., & Setze, R. J. (1994). Using concept mapping to develop a conceptual framework 10

of staff's views of a supported employment program for individuals with severe mental illness. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62(4), 766-775. Turner, P. (2002). Multidimensional scaling analysis of techniques used by physiotherapists in Southeast Australia: A cross-national replication. Australian Journal of Physiotherapy , 48, 123-130. Wakefield, A. (2007). The study and practice of security: Today and tomorrow. Security Journal, 20, 13-14.

COPYRIGHT Adel Alruwaii & David J Brooks ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Psychometric risk perception: why some individuals elect not to act on risks? Jaber Alsuhaimi School of Engineering Edith Cowan University David Brooks School of Engineering Edith Cowan University

Abstract Each year natural disasters cause significant economic loss around the globe, despite the efforts exerted by local governments to reduce the impact of such disasters. One major factor in these efforts is the interaction of local residents to take precautionary action in order to mitigate negative implications. Some studies have indicated that with the help of local people, financial damages can be reduced by up to 80%. However, many people located in areas of natural disasters choose not to take any actions despite warnings from their local governments. The purpose of this paper was to investigate why people make certain decisions and provide an explanation of the phenomenon. The concept of psychometric risk perception has been used for the past 30 years to consider, in part, why people may make decisions based on the perceived risk. Within the paper, psychometric risk perception was used to explain how people interpret warning messages and how this may affect their decisions - whether to take precautionary actions or not. Studies conducted in Taiwan, Germany and New Zealand were also utilised to support the study’s outcomes. Results considered the differences between expert and lay persons, cultural and social factors, visceral level of risk and the importance of trust. Finally, that for risk communication to lead to precautionary action requires a heuristics approach; however, further research is still required in order to gain a better understanding as psychometric risk cannot provide an appropriate explanation. Keywords Risk perception, psychometric risk, risk management, risk communication, natural disasters

INTRODUCTION We are surrounded with risks in everyday life. Our activities and even decisions we take, can invite potential risks and threats. However, people tend to have different perceptions of risk and therefore their decisions differ accordingly. What is perceived as being risky to someone might be acceptable to other individuals. This difference between risk perceptions among individuals also applies to different cultures around the world (Breakwell, 2007). Moreover, people seem to accept risks associated with voluntary acts as opposed to risks resulting from activities or technologies imposed on them by others, such as their employers or governments (Starr cited in Sjöberg, 1999). In contemporary risk management, risk depends on two aspects, namely probability and consequence. Risk level is directly proportional to the probability of negative events and the severity of consequences (Sjöberg, 1999). It seems logical that disastrous outcomes would immediately grab the attention of potential victims to take the necessary actions in order to deal with risks. However, people sometimes neglect acting on risks even if the consequences are significant. A good example in this case would be the kind of reactions people take in response to risks posed by natural disasters. Apparently, one would expect that people facing the risk of natural disasters such as floods or volcanoes would immediately act to avoid negative impacts. Nevertheless, the reality is that many victims choose to take only minimal precautions or sometimes no precautions at all. Natural disasters occur in different places around the globe each year, with some causing devastating consequences. Governments have been trying to reduce the impact of such disasters by promoting the preparedness of local residents to take precautionary actions. As per the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, long-term precautions taken by local people and organisations can reduce financial damages by up to 80% (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). Although this figure can be seen as very optimistic, it still provides a good indication that private efforts can have a significant impact on risk mitigation. However, many people located in areas of natural disasters choose not to take any actions, despite warnings from their local governments. For instance, in spite of earthquake hazards warning to 97% of the population of Wellington, New Zealand, only 11% had emergency plans and 9% purchased first aid kits (Paton et al., 2000). This approach does not appear to make sense, as you would expect people living and working in such natural disaster areas would take preventive measures to ensure the safety of their lives and belongings.

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The purpose of this paper was to investigate why people make certain decisions and provide an explanation of the phenomenon, posing the following research question; why do some individuals elect not to act on natural disasters risks?. Within the paper, psychometric risk perception was used to try to explain how people interpret warning messages and how this may affect their decisions on taking precautionary measures. Risk reactions of local residents in areas prone to natural disasters in Germany, Taiwan and New Zealand were used to support the study’s outcomes.

PSYCHOMETRIC RISK Although the word risk is commonly used, the definition of risk is not trivial as it differs from one perspective to another. Risk is not a definite term and can have different meanings to different people. This variance depends on how people perceive the risk based on various factors. The term risk perception can be defined as “the subjective assessment of the probability of a specified type of accident happening and how concerned we are with the consequences” (Sjöberg et al., 2004), indicating that the level of perceived risk may affect our actions. A number of techniques have been widely researched to explain risk perception. For the purpose of this paper the psychometric risk approach was used, as it provides more quantitative tools to understand risk perception. The concept of psychometric risk has been used for the past 30 years to consider why people may make decisions based on the perceived risk. The concept also explains, to some degree, why lay people perceive hazards in different ways to experts (Siegrist et al., 2005) and that emotions play a role in the decision-making process (Slovic & Weber, 2002). The psychometric risk paradigm uses techniques such as multidimensional scaling to quantify risk perception of activities. A two-dimensional representation was developed by Slovic to spatially map perception of various risks. The first axis, labelled dread risk, indicated the level of fear from the subject risk and the second axis, labelled unknown risk, represented how familiar or unfamiliar the risk was to individuals (Slovic & Weber, 2002). Using this map, different risks can be spatially represented in a twodimensional map. Risk perception research, using the psychometric paradigm, focused on the difference between experts and the general public in perceiving certain risks in activities or technologies. It has been found that this variance is mainly due to the mismatch in assessing the impact of risk among the two groups (Slovic, 1987). Experts tend to base their judgments on numbers and physical measures. On the other hand, lay people tend to relate risk impact to different factors such as past experience, emotions, and vulnerability. Nevertheless, it has been found that the general public subjective estimation of risk fatalities were comparable to that of statistics, demonstrating that the public are reasonable good at self estimation of such risks. However, there are degrees of distortion within such public risk estimations (Breakwell, 2007). Therefore, why is there restricted alignment between what the experts attempt to communicate in regard to risks associated with natural disasters to the precautionary actions taken by the public?

NATURAL DISASTERS PREPAREDNESS To try to understand this misalignment between warning messages and private preventive measures, studies from Germany, Taiwan and New Zealand are presented, along with their outcomes. All three studies focused on the research question of why some people do not make necessary actions to be prepared for natural disasters. Floods in Germany A study has been conducted by Grothmann and Reusswig (2006) to evaluate precautions taken by residents in the potential flood areas of Cologne, Germany. The last major flood hit the city, located on the Rhine River, in 1995 when water levels reached 10 metres. The study included 157 households prone to flooding risk along the Rhine River. A questionnaire was designed to assess factors including past flood experience, perceived threat, precautionary actions and dependence on government protective actions. In the questionnaire, 39% of respondents owned the residence they lived in and 41% had past experience with floods (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). The study showed that 48% of the interviewed individuals had carried out self education about private protective measures. However, only 31% and 38% had bought protective equipment and installed structural barriers respectively. Providing a straight forward explanation of the research problem was not possible as people make decisions based on many varying factors. Previous flood experience, risk of future floods, reliability of government protection measures, cost of personal measures, perceived ability to perform precautionary measures, and wishful thinking were found to be factors affecting decisions of the potential victims (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). The study concluded that risk perception might not be enough to encourage people to take precautionary measures. It was also proposed that more thought needs to be given to 13

risk messages communicated to the public. Risk communication should include not only the flood risk but also how effective private measures can be to risk mitigation. Factors negatively affecting precautionary actions such as denial and wishful thinking should also be taken into account when addressing the public (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). Taiwan Floods and Landslides In Taiwan, floods and landslides cause many casualties and significant financial losses each year during the rainy season between May and November. In 2004, two typhoons accompanied with heavy rain caused devastating landslides and floods in the period between the months of July and September. One month later, the National Science and Technology Centre for Disaster Reduction conducted a National Risk Perception Survey of Flood and Landslide. The survey included two separate questionnaires for floods and landslides victims. A total of 1340 participants including 250 victims were interviewed for the flood questionnaire. The landslide questionnaire was conducted on 1574 participants including 501 victims. Survey participants were chosen from five towns that suffered from landslides and seven towns impacted with floods during the same period (Lin et al., 2008). Based on this survey, a study was initiated to understand the relation between risk perception and risk mitigation adoption. Moreover, the study tried to understand why the general public were more willing to take precautionary measures than the victims of floods and landslides. By analysing the 2004 survey data, this study found out that victims of floods and landslides were more concerned with hazard warnings than the public; however, they were more hesitant to apply protective measures. Most victims appreciated the threat, but claimed to lack resources to deal with it. On the other hand, it had been noted that physiological factors such as risk perception were stronger predictors than education and income (Lin et al., 2008). The study used the following measures in order to map the participants’ responses: impact, control, powerless, helpless and trust. It was concluded that risk perception measures being impact and control are predictors for positive action. Powerless and helpless measures were found to be negative predictors. Although victims had high perception of the impact of floods and landslides, they also had high sense of powerlessness compared to the general public. Given that the powerless factor is stronger than the impact factor, the victims did not take enough precautionary measures (Lin et al., 2008).

Preparedness to Volcanic Hazards in New Zealand In September 1995, the volcano of Ruapehu in New Zealand erupted causing ash fall on nearby areas. Approximately six months earlier, a survey was carried out to evaluate population knowledge and perception of volcanic risk in Hastings and Whakatane, which both suffered from volcanic eruptions in the past. In November 1995, the survey was repeated in order to study the change in risk perception and preparedness to volcanic hazards. Hastings is a small city approximately 110 km southeast of the volcano and Whakatane is a smaller town situated 190 northeast of Ruapehu. During the 1995 eruption, Hastings suffered from ash fall due to the eruption, but Whakatane did not. The results from both surveys were compared to understand the effect of 1995 Ruapehu eruption on risk perception and preparedness of the population (Johnston et al., 1999). The study concluded that Hastings experienced an increased perception of volcanic hazards as a result of the eruption. However, this increase was accompanied by a decrease in public preparedness, which may be explained by the mild impact of the volcanic eruption on the population. It was also found that despite past experience of volcanic hazards, limited actions had been taken by local people to mitigate the associated impact. This approach may, in partial, be due to the perception of low vulnerability and high level of control than average (Paton et al., 2000).

DISCUSSION The psychometric risk model aims to explain the difference in risk perception between experts and the public. This model might be used to explain why people do not act when they are told they are facing higher natural risks. If the warning message is coming from an expert and the audience are mostly lay people, then the message has to be tailored to address the difference in risk perception. However, the diversity and interwoven aspect of risk perception, risk decision-making and some form of action led to what may constitute a need to consider this not only with psychometrics, but within heuristics. A number of points, underpinned with psychometric risk, have been put forward in the following discussion in an attempt to address the posed question. The process of measuring risk perception is not quite straight forward. Knowledge, beliefs and past experience are all factors affecting risk perception. The ways in which knowledge and beliefs were gained including direct experience, media, government agencies publications, can also affect our perception of various risks (Paton et al. 2000). When trying to predict how people react to natural disaster, it is important to understand the risk perception and 14

past experience of the public to such risks. According to the psychometric paradigm, it can be assumed that risk perception of natural hazards victims may be, in general, represented with higher familiarity and mid to higher dread levels. A higher level of familiarity or known risk could contribute to the missing action to mitigate these risks. Paton et al. (2000) finding support this discussion as they proposed that direct experience tends to increase awareness, but not necessarily preparedness. The visceral level of risk exposure can lead to either risk amplification or attenuation, demonstrated with such models as the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). The extent, type and consequence of media communication may alter a person view on such events (Kasperson et al. cited in Slovic & Weber, 2002). Some people may believe that if they are exposed to the risk at one point in time that it is less likely that they will be exposed again. If a person’s experience with a natural disaster is low, it is likely that his or her perception of the risk becomes lower and that they do not take further action. Some people might not act because they do not have past experience with the threat and therefore, they tend to under estimate the magnitude of impact. The opposite may also be true; people without past experience can over estimate the impact and therefore act even if the risk does not require any action. Considering the issue from another perspective, people get affected by the general risk perception in the society where they live. Natural disaster risks might be socially accepted risks, contributing to decision-making. Outside the domain of psychometric risk, additional cultural issues may reinforce such risk views. Johnston et al. (1999) stated that “we need to consider risk assessment within a wider societal context to more objectively assess prevailing attitudes to natural hazards”. The problem of not acting upon risks might not be an individual problem, rather a problem that is common among most of the society’s members. People might not act because they believe that measures put forward by local authorities can do little to mitigate potential natural disaster risks. This belief highlights the importance of trust in promoting public precautionary actions. If the local people do not trust the intent of their local government and the content of warning messages, then it is more likely that they will not act. Therefore, it could be argued that it is important to develop trust and understand how individuals estimate their own options along with efficiency and cost of these options. This issue becomes beneficial in understanding how people would react in response to threats (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). There are problems with risk communication and such research has been extensive, although risk messages will depend on other elements within broader social risk (Breakwell, 2007). Risk communication should highlight not only the need to take protective measures, moreover the effectiveness of these measures and the risk warning messages (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). However such simplistic advice, without trust, may be difficult to achieve within the broader domain of social risk. In some cases, public awareness programs about natural hazards may reduce perceived risk and therefore, reduce level of preparedness. This approach “can result in their overestimating their perceived preparedness and/or underestimating the risk” (Paton et al., 2000). There may be restricted causal linkage between risk perception, making a decision and acting on such a decision in regard to such natural disasters. As Breakwell stated, “there is a very real need for studies that follow the decision-making process from risk estimation ... to risk-taking” (2007, p. 269). In addition, the many aspects that make up our views of risks have to be considered, perhaps resulting in the need to consider such problems within the broader heuristics risk approach.

CONCLUSION Extensive research has been conducted to understand the relation between risk perception and the decisions taken. Nevertheless, it appears difficult to understand why some people elect not to take precautions against risk. The studies presented earlier were chosen from different parts of the world. Results from each study varied depending on the nature of risks, research methods, analysis and participants. However, all three studies presented in this paper provided a consensus that there was a problem of not taking risk warning seriously by potential victims. For the purpose of this paper, psychometric risk was used in an attempt to consider the factors causing of such decisions. However, it was clear that the research question could not be explained using the psychometric paradigm alone, as other factors contributed to the problem such as cultural and social factors. These factors are mainly due to the complex relation between risk perception and decision-making. The process of predicting risk response is very complex, as risk perception varies from one culture to another. Within the same cultural group, risks are often perceived by different people in varying ways. Moreover, the same person can have different perception of the same risk at different times depending on the situation. An important factor in promoting protective actions by local people is improving risk communication messages. In addition to the main purpose for these messages to highlight potential risks, it is also important to highlight what needs to be done by the public and how effective protective measures can be in mitigating negative impacts. It is also important to improve trust between people and their local governments in order to provide more positive interaction to risk communication messages. 15

REFERENCES Breakwell, G. M. (2007). The psychology of risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grothmann, T., & Reusswig, F. (2006, May). People at risk of flooding: Why some residents take precautionary action while others do not. Natural Hazards, 38(1-2), pp. 101-120. Johnston, D., Bebbington, S., Lai, C., Houghton, B., & Paton, D. (1999). Volcanic hazard perceptions: comparative shifts in knowledge and risk. Disaster Prevention and Management, 8(2), pp. 118-126. Lin, S., Shaw, D., & Ho, M. (2008, February). Why are flood and landslide victims less willing to take mitigation measures than the public? Natural Hazards, 44(2), pp. 305-314. Paton, D., Smith, L., & Johnston, D. (2000, December). Volcanic hazards: Risk perception and preparedness. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 29(2), pp. 86-91. Siegrist, M., Keller, C., & Kiers, H. (2005). A new look at the psychometric paradigm of perception of hazards. Risk Analysis, 25(1), pp. 211-222. Sjöberg, L. (1999). Consequences of perceived risk: Demand for mitigation. Journal of Risk Research, 2(2), pp. 129 - 149. Sjöberg, L., Moen, B., & Rundmo, T. (2004). Explaining risk perception. An evaluation of the psychometric paradigm in risk perception research. Rotunde Publications. Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. Science, 236, pp. 280-285. Slovic, P., & Weber, E. (2002). Perception of risk posed by extreme events. Paper presented at the Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World. New York.

COPYRIGHT Jaber Alsuhaimi and David Brooks ©2008. The author/s assign SECAU & Edith Cowan University a nonexclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to SECAU & ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry Jeff Corkill SECAU [email protected]

Abstract The intelligence analyst plays a critical role in the decision processes effecting national security and law enforcement. The purpose of this research proposal is to provide sufficient evidence to support the undertaking of a study into the hypothetical construct of Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry (PIJA). PIJA has been proposed as a possible model through which the various internal and external influences on intelligence analyst decision making may be mapped and understood. The complexity of real world intelligence operations is such that a positivist approach to this problem is unlikely to generate useful outcomes it is therefore proposed to utilise a hermeneutic methodology in line with the interpretative requirement of the research problem. Keywords Intelligence, judgement artistry, security, law enforcement, ethics, decision making, research

INTRODUCTION Intelligence by its very nature has been a secret business, arcane and steeped in mystery, a profession long hidden away and rarely credited for policy or military success yet often blamed when poor policy or operational decisions result in public humiliation. The American response to Pearl Harbour during the 2nd World War is a case in point. More recently the controversy over the invasion of Iraq and the missing weapons of mass destruction is an example. The politicisation of intelligence gives rise to a debate on the ethics of intelligence in terms of collection, analysis and the subsequent application of intelligence products. The use of intelligence is not limited to national security and defence domains. Intelligence plays a significant role in the compliance and enforcement structures of governments. Intelligence is recognised as a key function of modern law enforcement as it enhances law enforcement effort. The perceived value of intelligence in law enforcement is demonstrated in the common use of the term ‘intelligence led policing’ in various parts of the world (Ratcliffe, 2004 p.5; Grieve, 2004 p.25; Cope, 2004). In the last 30 years the intelligence community and profession has been opened up to academic scrutiny (Gill & Phythian, 2006). The previously opaque barriers to understanding have become if not transparent then, at least, translucent. Subsequently, the domain has become a legitimate subject for scholarly study. A rich body of knowledge has emerged as scholars from within and external to the profession have sought to define what intelligence is and what it is that intelligence analysts do (George, 2004; Heuer, 1999; Lefebvre, 2004; Cooper, 2005; Marrin & Clemente, 2005; Russell, 2004). Whilst the popular media characterizes intelligence as consisting of such things as spies and secret collection technology, the critical element of successful intelligence production is, and remains the intelligence analyst. Demonstrated by the fact that it is the analyst who initiates collection of information, and who processes, integrates and interprets that information. It is the analyst who creates and disseminates intelligence products, generates context and provides insights all necessary for optimal decision making (Cooper, 2005; Lefebvre, 2004; Rieber, 2004). Therefore it may be argued that in order to improve intelligence it is necessary to understand what it is that intelligence analysts actually do. Paterson (2003) developed the construct of Professional Practice Judgment Artistry as means of understanding the complexity of judgement and practice as it pertains to the domain of occupational therapy. “Judgement artistry refers to the capacity of professional artist practitioners to make highly skilled micro-, macro-, and meta- judgements that are optimal for the given circumstances of the client and the context. It utilizes the unique knowledge base, frame of reference and reasoning capacity of individual practitioners in the task of processing and unravelling highly complex problems which arise 17

in professional practice including: demanding, moral and ethical issues; questions of value, belief, and assumptions; the intricacies of health issues as they impact on people’s lives.” (Paterson, 2003. p. V) The issue is wether intelligence analysts practice judgment artistry. Professional intelligence analysts are required to make complex judgments at the micro, macro and meta-levels that optimise decision making on the part of the client (decision maker) for particular circumstances and within a specific context in a similar way to Paterson’s occupational therapists. In a similar manner, intelligence analysts process complex problems including moral and ethical issues, which may question values, beliefs and assumptions; the outcomes of which may impact on the individual through to national security levels.

RESEARCH STRATEGY A relatively rich body of literature has evolved as the intelligence community sought to understand why intelligence fails, what constitutes good analysis, the relationship between analysts, agencies and decision makers and what represents analytical best practice (Swenson, 2003; Cooper, 2005; Lefebvre, 2004; Marin & Clemente, 2005; Moore, Kirzan & Moore, 2005). For the most part though, this literature is focused on national security with limited analysis of the law enforcement intelligence domain. This paper represents the start of a research study that will build on that knowledge base and extend into an examination of ethical analytical decision-making by analysts within a law enforcement environment. The construct Professional Intelligence Judgment Artistry (PIJA) - an adaptation of the construct Professional Practice Judgment Artistry as identified by Patterson will be used in order to create understanding of the complex judgement exercised by intelligence analysts in the dynamic and uncertain environment in which they operate. The purpose of this research is to examine the (professional practice) decision-making of intelligence analysts using the framework of Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry. How is PIJA demonstrated? What frameworks do they use to make decisions? What role does ethics play in this decision making process? In the first instance this study of intelligence analysis will be limited to the domain of law enforcement intelligence in order to create a coherent context for the examination of analytical decision-making. It is proposed that a qualitative research strategy will be utilised to conduct this research. Hermeneutics has been proposed as an appropriate qualitative research methodology that is both credible and rigorous and suited to the analysis of the professional environment (Paterson & Higgs, 2005; Kosmala, 2006; Ehigie & Ehigie, 2005). The desired result of this research will be an analysis of the PIJA decision-making framework used by intelligence analysts. Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry will be examined in a different context to that in which Patterson developed her construct of Professional Practice Judgment Artistry not only will this contribute to a better understanding of analytical decision-making in general, it will contribute to the ongoing development of the intelligence profession. Through definition and understanding of PIJA, the intelligence profession will more clearly articulate its status as a profession. Furthermore, an increased understanding of intelligence decision-making will create opportunities to develop enhanced training regimes and methodologies for intelligence analysts. Do intelligence analysts operating within the law enforcement context exercise Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry (PIJA) with regard to analytical decision making? How is PIJA demonstrated? 

What is PIJA in this context?

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How is PIJA developed in individual intelligence analysts?

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What is the value of PIJA in this context?

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Does PIJA contribute to ethical analysis?

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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE A substantive body of knowledge in relation to intelligence and intelligence analysis has emerged over the last twenty years more so in the aftermath of the events of 9 September 2001. From that body of knowledge a number of key themes have emerged: Intelligence is a fundamental process with application in the national security, foreign policy, law enforcement, business domains and the broader governance and compliance areas. It is a critical element in effective decision making. It is generally agreed that intelligence is both a product and a process. Gill & Phythian (2006, p2) define intelligence as follows: “Intelligence is the umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination – conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventative policy or strategy, including, where desirable, covert activities.” This contrasts somewhat with the definition of the Australian Army which is: “The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces, areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity”. (Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare Part Two, Corps Doctrine, Vol 1 pamphlet 1 Intelligence, 1996.) Grieve (2004, p25) suggests that within the law enforcement context intelligence may be described as “information designed for action”. These first two definitions limit us to considering intelligence in what may be described as an essentially national security role. However, the use and conduct of intelligence extend far beyond that domain. In the contemporary world intelligence units or functions are found in organisations as diverse as the Australian Tax Office, State Fisheries Departments, Environmental Departments and all of the Australian law enforcement agencies. Furthermore dedicated intelligence functions can also be found in many corporations providing both business intelligence and security intelligence functions. At the RAND workshop “Toward a Theory of Intelligence” (Treverton, Jones, Boraz & Lipscy, 2006, p2) Warner argued that there were two common usage definitions for intelligence one being “information for decision makers” the other being “secret state activity designed to understand or influence foreign entities.” Warner argued that three key themes emerge from this second definition: 

A working definition of intelligence for states must include a consideration of secrecy.

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Intelligence for states can mean life or death.

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Intelligence includes clandestine activity as well as information.

It may be argued however that the realm of criminal intelligence is also defined by Warner’s (2006) key themes. There is a need to keep information relating to criminals secret, as failure to do so could result in the death of persons. Finally clandestine activity may be undertaken in order to disrupt or prevent criminal activity. Lefebvre (2004) describes the process of intelligence analysis as being one of evaluation and transformation of data into a product for the use of policy consumers who may more broadly be defined as being decision makers. Critically it involves “assessing the reliability and credibility of the data, and comparing it with the knowledge base available to the analyst, to separate fact from error and uncover deception” (Lefebvre, 2004 p.236). Gill and Phythian (2006) suggest that analysis is a process of seeking knowledge and assigning certainty sufficient to allow decision makers to act on the intelligence provided. More generally analysis is recognised as being an intellectual process focused on identifying truths, making appropriate judgements and explaining the evidentiary basis of such (Herbert, 2006; Heuer, 1999; Atran, 2006; George, 2004). Moore, et al (2005) suggest that in order to understand intelligence analysis though the analysts themselves need to be understood. If it is broadly accepted that analysis in its simplest form focuses on acquiring certainty from complex and uncertain information in order that effective decisions may be made, then it is critical that how analysts evaluate the information they acquire and are exposed to is understood. 19

Sandow-Quirk (2002) in her analysis of why intelligence fails identified a variety of factors including failures of evaluation, failures of source selection, and failures of target identification. Atran (2006) would add to that failure of imagination. It may be argued though, that it is the failure of evaluation that is most damaging to the production of intelligence as poorly evaluated information given undue certainty has a multiplier effect through to dissemination and action. The universe of information available to analysts is rapidly increasing both in terms of volume and in complexity whilst the multiplicity of sources that may be utilised to access that information is also increasing. This volume of information is uncertain, ambiguous and often contradictory. Analysts are overwhelmed and unable to adequately assess the volumes and complexity therefore they are required to reduce and simplify the information that they work with (Rodgers, 2006). One method of doing so which has been identified is the creation of mental models and subsequent evaluating and processing new information through those models (Heuer, 1999; Rodgers, 2006; George, 2004). The trouble with mental models is they have potential to sustain bias, the potential to encourage rejection of information at variance to the norm and also have the potential to reinforce current perceptions. It is clear from the literature that analysis is a difficult task and that the human mind, whilst adapted to cope with complexity and volume, is not necessarily well adapted to identifying deception, reliability or determining certainty. The natural mechanism by which the mind copes with this complexity and quantity is to reduce volume by exclusion, to simplify the complex, and evaluate the new via existing mental models. This process will likely ensure that analysts will continue to be surprised by the actions of adversaries as they successfully gather and integrate evidence whilst failing to make sense of it. The teaching of analysis varies significantly, more so than that of evaluation; it tends to be more situational and agency specific. Experienced analysts tend to be in agreement that good analysts posses certain qualities regardless of the domain they operate in (Heur, 1999; Gazit, 1980; various personal communications with senior analysts). Those qualities include demonstrated intellectual capacity, curiosity, a degree of scepticism, and attention to detail. Information systems literacy has developed into a core skill for analysts and along with it the concept of the analyst as a technologist. This has led to, in some environments, the term analyst, referring to someone whom is simply competent with particular software tools (Personal communications with senior analysts). Intelligence will be used by decision makers in many cases to make significant decisions that will affect people’s lives and futures of nations. Yet it is most likely this intelligence will be derived from uncertain evidence. The dilemma for the analyst then, becomes how to speak the truth, without compromise due to that inherent uncertainty. Weiss (2008) quite rightly argues that this dilemma is not unique to the intelligence profession but is very much the same as that which faces the medical profession and for that matter, scientists. It may be argued that it is this mix of uncertainty, truth, action and outcome and the impact of such, that it requires the issue of ethics to be addressed in relation to intelligence analysis. It may also be argued that intelligence analysis has much in common with social research and therefore a useful starting point from which to consider the role of ethics in intelligence analysis my be as it understood in the social sciences (Ratcliffe, 2006). Whilst much of the ethical debate in relation to social research is perceived as being that relating to the protection of rights it is also very much focused on methodology and practice. Ethical research or analysis does not preclude action that may have a harmful impact on an individual if it may be argued that the social or community benefit outweighs the potential harm. It may be argued that this concept of beneficence is in fact the ethical principle most likely to be abused within the intelligence domain. Anything is fine as long as it is in the interest of public security/protection. Whilst much of the ethical discussion on social research is focused on the protection of subjects (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2006; Habibis, 2006) Sarantakos (1993) identifies a number of issues which whilst focused on the realm of the social researcher it may also be argued are valuable as a means by which ethical analysis may be determined. Those issues are: 

Ethical collection and processing require a commitment to accuracy on the part of the analyst.

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Analytical methodology should be selected for its relevance and suitability to the analytical objective.

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Interpretation of data should be done in full and in accordance with methodological standards.

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Reporting should be accurate and known errors, distortions and bias clearly stated.

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Fabrication of data is not ethical.

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Falsification of data is not ethical.

Those simple objectives identified by Sarantakos (1993) may in the first instance constitute a good ethical model on which to assess the analytical judgments of the intelligence community.

A FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTIGATION This research will utilise a qualitative research framework to both define and refine the construct PIJA. This approach allows the research to be conducted in the real world, examining the construct of PIJA in its full context (Krausse, 2005; Bowen, 2005; Ehigie & Ehigie, 2005). In the case of the PIJA construct, it is argued that its complexity necessitates the extraction of meaning for the purpose of understanding rather than proving. Moreover this research will fit the ‘naturalistic’ ontology as described by Bowen (2005) in that it will be conducted in the natural setting, utilise qualitative methods, purposive sampling and inductive analysis. This approach is considered appropriate in the case of this research as it is exploratory research into the phenomenon of PIJA about which there is very little known and the need for detailed and in-depth understanding is required. Paterson and Higgs (2003) first proposed a construct of ‘professional practice judgement artistry’ as a means to explore the complexity of professional practice decision making in the domain of occupational therapy. Utilising a Hermeneutic research strategy Paterson (2003) subsequently developed a model of ‘professional practice judgement artistry’. Hermeneutics in this work was identified as an appropriate qualitative research methodology that was both credible and rigorous and suited to the analysis of the professional practice environment (Paterson & Higgs, 2005). Kosmala (2006) has also used a hermeneutic research paradigm in order to generate understanding of structural power in professional service firms. In this case the professionals under analysis are auditing accountants. Kosmala (2006) has utilised a hermeneutic research paradigm to consider how structure and professional best practice may limit autonomous judgement. It is proposed that this approach will also serve as an appropriate methodology to determine if PIJA is an appropriate construct through which to assess professionalism of intelligence analysts and identify and assess the various inputs which influence their decision making. There are significant differences between domains examined in previous research, Occupational Therapists are tertiary trained and recognised as professionals whom it may be argued have a common foundation in terms of understanding professional outcomes within their field. Furthermore they are regulated by governing bodies, require certification and represented by professional bodies. A similar case it may be argued exists in the accounting domain. Intelligence analysts however do not have to undertake formal education to prepare them for employment, there is significant variation in the employment of intelligence analysts and whilst there is some common foundation in terms of professional capability or understanding, there are quite significant variations across the profession. However it has been argued by Rodgers (2006) and Marrin and Clemente (2005) that there are striking similarities between the profession of intelligence and that of medical and mental health practitioners in terms of the approach to diagnosis and analytical prediction. On this basis the adoption of the Paterson and Higgs (2003) construct of ‘professional practice judgement artistry’ is likely an appropriate start point from which to construct an initial concept of Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry. Paterson & Higgs (2005) identified three critical philosophical assumptions that shape the research strategy and contribute to creation of a ‘hermeneutic spiral’. 

The achievement of shared understanding by all participants is achieved via language. That is different interpretations of the phenomenon are fused through dialogue to create shared understanding.

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Knowledge is constructed through dialogue and meaning emerges via hermeneutic conversation between the text and the inquirer.

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Movement between the parts and whole of the construct is circular with the researcher becoming an integral part of the circle. 21

Integration of the three metaphors creates the hermeneutic spiral and the hermeneutic spiral maps the research path (Paterson & Higgs, 2005; Kosmala, 2006). Paterson & Higgs (2005) state that in order to enter your hermeneutic spiral pre judgements of the phenomenon being considered for analysis need to be clarified. In this case that phenomenon is PIJA. The review of the literature is then undertaken in order to elucidate what PIJA may mean and how it may be experienced. It is achieved through seeking understanding of how authors interpret those key concepts that have been identified as relating to PIJA and is broadly consistent with Bowen (2005) who argues that extensive reading is essential. Reading of the literature and interpreting key concepts should enable key questions to emerge that can become the means by which the various horizons between the text voices and those of the researcher may be fused (Paterson & Higgs, 2005; Bowen, 2005). Concepts identified are tested on the reference group for validity and subsequent inclusion in the texts. The research is to be completed in four phases: 

Phase 1 – review of and immersion in the literature

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Phase 2 – engagement with focus groups

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Phase 3 – in depth interviews

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Phase 4 – write up the study

The first phase of the study will involve a broader and deeper review of the literature beyond that specific to intelligence analysis and methodological aspects of the research. The literature review will include the following concepts; ethics, decision making, judgement, situation awareness, training, aptitude, intelligence, information use, organisational structure, and motivation. In accordance with interpretative nature of hermeneutic research the literature will be returned to and expanded as concepts are clarified throughout the life of the project. Initial texts will be referred to the focus groups for validation and interpretation. The second phase of the study will require engagement with the focus groups. Focus groups will be drawn from the Australian law enforcement intelligence community at both junior and senior levels together with intelligence academics/educators. The value of focus groups is that they provide access to a abroad range of information rich participants. Furthermore the dynamics of group interaction provides an opportunity to explore knowledge and experience that may not be forthcoming in an individual interview scenario (Paterson, 2003; Kitzinger, 1995; Kidd & Parshall, 2000). Recruitment of participants will be facilitated by the investigator’s personal links to the wider intelligence community and key intelligence managers in the various state police services. In order to broaden the recruitment process the author will utilise the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) forum to reach those areas where there is no current personal access. The third phase of the study will involve in depth interviews with law enforcement intelligence analysts and intelligence academics who will be identified for selection during focus group sessions. Paterson (2003) used the focus groups to identify those potential participants whom might provide greater depth and insight into the phenomena being investigated. Participant recruitment will as in phase 2 make us eof the investigator’s personal and professional links to the target intelligence community. Whilst there are no specific rules as to sample size in naturalistic inquiry there is inherent assumption data saturation is the final determinant. There is however no apparent agreement on just how to determine how many participants are needed to achieve this. It may be argued that data saturation is achieved when no new data emerges from any singe participant (DePoy & Gitlin, 2005; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). For the purpose of this study the interview sample will consist of no less than ten and no more than 20 participants. Attention to quality and credibility in qualitative research has been identified as an essential element of any research undertaken. Bowen (2005) argues that the interpretative paradigm requires greater emphasis on the concept of trustworthiness rather than the positivistic criteria of reliability and objectivity. Demonstrating intellectual rigour in any research is vital even more so when utilising interpretative methodologies. The means by which this may be achieved includes:

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

Demonstrating the authenticity of ideas, and authenticity of understanding of the research subject’s ideas



Demonstrating the fit of data with the subsequent outcomes of research



Demonstrating the actual trustworthiness or otherwise of the research



Demonstrating that ethical issues have been considered and addressed at all stages of the research

All of the above may be achieved and demonstrated effectively by ensuring transparency of research is maintained, a sufficient breadth of literature is reviewed and appropriate research subjects are chosen (Paterson & Higgs, 2005; Bowen, 2005; Kosmala, 2006). Paterson & Higgs (2005) also cite the use of a research journal as an aid to both providing transparency and as a means to capturing external contextual data. Process and procedure that will enhance the intellectual rigour of the project will include: 

Prolonged engagement



Triangulation

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Peer debriefing and support

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Member checking

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Negative case analysis



Auditing (Padgett, 1998 in Bowen, 2005)

These various strategies will all be integrated into this research. Bowen (2005) placed emphasis on triangulation which will also be utilised as a primary means of demonstrating rigour in this project. Throughout the study a reflective journal will be maintained by the researcher which will in essence provide an audit trail. Rolfe (2006) and Paterson (2003) both argue that the audit trail provided by an appropriate reflective journal contributes significantly to the validity of a qualitative research project an argument also supported by Whitehead (2004). CONCLUSION According to DePoy and Gitlin (2005) the nature of naturalistic inquiry means that the analytical process may vary quite considerably, will be selected according to the nature of the inquiry and may change or be different at various stages during the inquiry process. For the purpose of this study analysis will commence at the initial immersion into the literature as assumptions are tested and concepts initially categorised for testing in later focus groups. Throughout the study as information is collected it will be integrated into research notes from which from which categories of information will emerge. Categories of information will be coded for ease of management, to identify key themes and from this primary concepts will emerge. These primary concepts will be reintegrated with the initial texts and form the basis of subsequent questions for reflection of participants during in depth interviews. Transcripts from the in depth interviews will be read and reflected on for the purpose of extracting both meaning and categories of information which again will be integrated with the initial texts. This process of extraction of meaning, reflection and reintegration of information will continue until no new concepts or categories of information emerge (Sandberg, 2000; Paterson, 2003; Willis, 2006). This research has significant potential to advance our understanding of how intelligence analysts undertake the process of analysis and just what influences their analytical decision making processes. It will determine if professional artistry is relevant to the intelligence profession and if so how Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry can be developed in individual intelligence analysts. Furthermore it should provide an insight into what intelligence analysts perceive to be ethical analysis and if Professional Intelligence Judgement Artistry contributes to ethical behaviour of intelligence analysts. Most importantly though this study may lead to the development of a more professional and capable body of law enforcement intelligence analysts.  

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REFERENCES: Blaxter, L.; Hughes, C. & Tight, M. (2006). How to Research, 3rd ed. Berkshire: Open University Press Bowen, G (2005) Preparing a qualitative research-based dissertation: lessons learned. The Qualitative Report, 10/2, pp. 208-222. Retrieved 31 Aug 06, from http://www.nova.edu.ssss/QR/QR10-2/bowen.pdf Cooper, J. R. (2005). Curing Analytical Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. Washington, USA: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence. DePoy, E & Gitlin, L (2005) Introduction to Research understanding and Aplying Multiple Strategies, ed3. Philadelphia: Elsevier Mosby Doyle, T. & Hammond, J. (2006). Net cred: evaluating the internet as a research source. Reference Services Review, 34:1, 56-70 Ehigie, B & Ehigie, R (2005) Applying qualitative methods in organisations: a note for industrial/organisational psychologists. The Qualitative Report, 10/3, pp. 621-638. Retrieved 31 Aug 06, from http://www.nova.edu.ssss/QR/QR10-3/ehigie.pdf Gazit, S. (1980). Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work. International Security, 4:4, 36-56 George, R. (2004). Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17: 385–404, 2004 Gill, P. & Phythian, M. (2006). Intelligence in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity Press Grieve, J (2006). Developments in UK Criminal Intelligence, in Ratcliffe, J (ed) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Analysis. Sydney: The Federation Press Guest, G; Bunce, A & Johnson, L (2006) How many interviews are enough?: An experiment with data saturation and variability. Field Methods, 18:1, pp. 59-82 Harris, G. (1989). Evaluating Intelligence Evidence. In R. Garst (Ed.), A Handbook of Intelligence Analysis (2nd ed., pp. 33-47). Washington: The Defense Intelligence College. Heath, C, Luff, P & Svensson, M (2002) Overseeing organizations: configuring action and its environment. British Journal of Sociology, 53/2, pp. 181-201. Herbert, M. (2006). The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 19:4, 666 – 684 Heuer, R. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Washington, USA: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence. Hulnick, A. (2006). What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence & National Security, 21:6, 959 – 979 Kidd, P & Parshall, M (2000) Getting the focus and the group: Enhancing analytical rigor in focus group research. Qualitative Health research, 10:3, pp. 293-308 Kitzinger, J (1995) Introducing focus groups. BMJ, 311, pp. 299-302 Kosmala, K (2006) Insights from Ricoeur’s hermeneutics on best practice in professional service firms: on perpetual myth creation? Qualitative Sociology Review, 1/1, pp. 31-50. Krauss, S (2005) Research paradigms and meaning making: a primer. The Qualitative Report, 10/4, pp. 758770. Retrieved 31 Aug 06, from http://www.nova.edu.ssss/QR/QR10-4/krauss.pdf Lefebvre, S. (2004). A Look at Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17:2, 231 – 264 Manual of Land Warfare. (1996). Part 2, Corps Doctrine, Volume 1, Pamphlet 1, Intelligence. Canberra: AGPS.

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Marrin, S. & Clemente, J. (2005). Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18:4, 707 – 729 Moore, D. Krizan, L. & Moore, E. (2005). Evaluating Intelligence: A Competency-Based Model. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18:2, 204 – 220 Morrissey, G & Higgs, J (2006) Phenomenological research and adolescent female sexuality: discoveries and applications. The Qualitative Report, 11/1, pp. 161-181. Retrieved 31 Aug 06, from http://www.nova.edu.ssss/QR/QR11-1/morrissey.pdf Paterson, M (2003) Professional Practice Judgement Artistry in Occupational Therapy. Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Sydney. Paterson, M & Higgs, J (2005) Using hermeneutics as a qualitative research approach in professional practice. The Qualitative Report, 10/2, pp. 339-357. Retrieved 31 Aug 06, from http://www.nova.edu.ssss/QR/QR10-2/paterson.pdf Ratcliffe, J (2006). Intelligence Research, in Ratcliffe, J (ed) Strategic Thinking in Criminal Analysis. Sydney: The Federation Press Richardson, J (1999) The concepts and methods of phenomenographic research. Review of Educational Research, 69/1, pp. 53-82 Rolfe, G (2006). Validity, trustworthiness and rigour: quality and the idea of qualitative research. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 53 (3), 304 - 310 Price, P. & Stone, E. (2004). Intuitive Evaluation of Likelihood Judgment Producers: Evidence for a Confidence Heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 39-57. Rodgers, S. (2006). Improving Analysis: Dealing with Information Processing Errors. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 19:4, 622 – 641 Sandow-Quirk, M. (2002). A Failure of Intelligence. Prometheus, 20:2, 131 – 142 Sandberg, J (2000) Understanding human competence at work: An interpretive approach. The Academy of Management Journal, 43:1, pp. 9-25 Sarantakos, S. (1993). Social Research. Melbourne: MacMillan Education. Warner, M. (2006) in Treverton, G. Jones, S. Boraz, S. & Lipscy, P. (Eds) Toward a Theory of Intelligence Workshop Report, Santa Monica, RAND National Security Research Division. Walter, M. (ed). (2006). Social research methods an Australian perspective. Melbourne: Oxford university Press. Weiss, C (2008). Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and Other Professions. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 21, 57-85 Whitehead, L (2004). Enhancing the quality of hermeneutic research: decision trail. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 45 (5), 512-518 Willis, K (2006) Analysing qualitative data, in Walter, M (ed) Social Research Methods an Australian Perspective, South Melbourne: Oxford University Press

COPYRIGHT Jeff Corkill ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Vigilance and the implications of using threat image projection (TIP) for CCTV surveillance operators. Fiona M. Donald University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Craig Donald Leaderware cc Email: [email protected]  Abstract Closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance operators are responsible for protecting people and property in a range of settings, including critical infrastructure (e.g., airports, ports and government buildings) and public spaces (e.g., shopping malls, streets). The effectiveness of CCTV surveillance is related to operator performance. Several authors have indicated that CCTV surveillance operator (hereafter referred to merely as ‘operator’) performance is sub-optimal. CCTV surveillance is vigilance intensive and vigilance tasks in themselves are demanding. Further, a vigilance decrement may occur over time. Therefore an intervention to enhance operator performance is recommended. Threat image projection (TIP) has been used successfully with X-ray baggage screeners in aviation and involves the electronic insertion of a threat image into the X-ray image, to which screeners are required to respond. TIP, or IGOs, could be applied to CCTV to heighten vigilance and enhance the detection of potential threats and security incidents. Given the differences between X-ray screening and CCTV, however, careful consideration needs to be given to the nature of TIP images or IGOs so that they do not distract operators from real incidents. This paper discusses how TIP could improve vigilance performance, how it could be used to assist operators in visually engaging with the displays they monitor, and design considerations for TIP images.

Keywords closed circuit television, CCTV, threat image projection, TIP, critical infrastructure protection, vigilance, IGO, detection performance, operators.

INTRODUCTION  Closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance operators are responsible for protecting people and property in a range of settings, including critical infrastructure (e.g., airports, ports and government buildings) and public spaces (e.g., shopping malls, streets). Despite large investments in the technological systems involved in CCTV and a more recent focus on automated analysis, its effectiveness has been questioned (Gill & Spriggs, 2005; Smith, 2004). Most research into CCTV has focused on technological effectiveness (such as image quality) and social aspects such as the impact of CCTV surveillance systems on crime rates and public perceptions of security systems. The human side of CCTV systems has largely been ignored (Keval & Sasse 2006; Neil, Thomas, & Baker, 2007). Research that has been done on operator performance tends to focus on aspects such as pay and management issues (for example, Gill & Spriggs, 2005). Limitations in the development of technological solutions focused on improving operator performance can lead to a major shortfall in the realisation of the potential for CCTV system service delivery. At the same time, aligning human performance and the technological potential of CCTV systems represents a major design and implementation challenge (Keval, 2006).

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The operational effectiveness of CCTV operators is influenced by a number of factors relating to the ergonomics of the working environment, social issues, management effectiveness and viewing strategies, and the selection, training, and performance management of operators. A key environmental factor related to operator performance is the design of the operator’s job, such as how many monitors and cameras they monitor (Neil et al., 2007), shift lengths, breaks, and other tasks that remove attention from the displays (Donald, 2008). Many of these factors are already being addressed by organisations, such as ensuring that there are sufficient breaks and rotating operators to other tasks in order to improve performance. The social environment in control rooms also impacts on performance as it may distract operators from their monitoring task, but at the same time may reduce monotony (Smith, 2004). Organisational policies and procedures regarding selection, training and performance management, and supervisory skills, are likely to influence performance. In addition, broader industry and socio-economic factors and legislation regarding the use of CCTV, individual privacy and the use of CCTV are likely to impact on performance. Many of the social, organisational, and technical environmental conditions come together to impact on the level of vigilance, and consequently, detection capabilities of the operators. Vigilance is therefore a key factor in the performance of CCTV surveillance operators (referred to as ‘operators’) who are required to sustain attention for long periods of time and maintain high levels of concentration, in order to detect incident conditions or deviations from standards. Vigilance is defined in a number of ways, but for the purposes of this research is defined as ‘a capacity for sustained effective attention when monitoring a situation or display for critical signals, conditions or events to which the observer must respond. Incorporated into this perspective on vigilance is the ability to identify, recognise and interpret the information that is being monitored’ (Donald, 2001, p 36). Detection rates of operators who are required to be vigilant over long periods of time are frequently less than optimal (Donald & Andrew, 2003; Edkins & Pollock, 1997; Keval & Sasse, 2006; Wells, Allard, & Wilson, 2006). Despite extensive research into vigilance over many decades, the development of vigilance theories and the identification of numerous factors related to performance, relatively few methods of enhancing vigilance have been proposed (Mackie, 1987). More recently, however, an intervention called ‘threat image projection’ (TIP) has been developed and applied to X-ray baggage screeners (referred to as ‘screeners’) in the aviation industry (Berrick, 2004; Catchpole, Fletcher, McClumpha, Miles & Zar, 2001; Neiderman & Fobes, 2005). The use of TIP in X-ray screening provides a valuable foundation for the use of similar concepts in CCTV viewing and there is potential for a similar system to be developed and applied to CCTV. This paper discusses some of the issues involved. Only two other studies on TIP for CCTV have been found. These are Andrew, Landgrebe and Donald (2003) and Neil, Thomas and Baker (2007). Both indicated that the technology has potential, but major adjustments are required for the system to be effective. The current study places a greater emphasis on how TIP needs to be adapted for the CCTV context and the implications for the design of the images. TIP images for screeners and CCTV may share certain similarities, but would also differ in many respects. TIP images are realistic representations of threat objects or “contraband” (Catchpole et al., 2001; Neiderman & Fobes, 2005). Conversely, the type of objects displayed as TIP type CCTV stimuli may vary between synthetic shapes (such as circles or squares), images of real objects or people (some of which may have threat characteristics), representations of behaviours associated with incident conditions, or inserts of video showing actual behavior or suspect targets. In addition the stimuli used for CCTV can vary widely, such as still, animated, moving objects or simulated or real video inserts (Andrew et al., 2003; Donald et al., 2007). Given the range and formats of stimuli that could be used for CCTV, the term inserted graphic object (IGO) is used instead of the narrower term, TIP. The term ‘incident’ refers to events that operators are required to detect. While TIP for X-ray screening and CCTV surveillance would share some similarities, they would differ in some crucial respects. Therefore careful consideration is needed regarding how TIP for CCTV would be implemented, including the types of images used. The aim of this paper is to discuss key issues in the design of TIP images for CCTV. In the next section, factors

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related to operator performance are discussed. Thereafter, TIP is explained in more detail, followed by a comparison of X-ray and CCTV detection tasks and the implications for an intervention for CCTV. Possible objectives of TIP for CCTV are then covered, emphasising the importance of IGOs facilitating incident detection, rather than being an end in themselves. The focus then moves to a discussion of attentional processes and how these underpin detection. This leads into the need to align IGOs (or TIP images) with real incidents or targets, and suggestions regarding how this could be done, based on attention and visual search research. Next, the potential for IGOs to distract operators from their primary task of detecting real incidents and ways of dealing with this are covered. The paper concludes with a summary of key considerations and recommendations. 

There are two aspects of vigilance that have major implications for CCTV viewing. Parasuraman (1984) has described these as the overall level of vigilance and the vigilance decrement. Operators bring an overall level of vigilance to the task and some individuals may have a higher overall vigilance level than others. On the other hand, the vigilance decrement occurs when performance deteriorates over time (Koelega, 1996). Vigilance tasks typically impose high attentional, information processing and working memory demands on people (Parasuraman, 1979). Further, the mere requirement of continually observing a display seems to be demanding in itself and appears to cause a vigilance decrement (Dember & Warm, 1979). The conditions mentioned above are likely to apply to CCTV surveillance operators who observe multiple visually complex monitors for lengthy periods (Donald, 2001; Donald, 2008). One available empirical study that measured CCTV operator incident detection over time reported that there was in fact a vigilance decrement (Donald, Andrew & Landgrebe, 2007). Vigilance performance is affected by numerous factors related to the task, individual characteristics and the environment (Mackie, 1987). Task related factors include incident characteristics such as foreknowledge, frequency, complexity, regularity, conspicuity, spatial and temporal uncertainty, redundant versus orthogonal discrimination and whether the background is static or dynamic (Balakrishnan, 1998; Koelega, 1996; Mackie, 1987; See, Howe, Warm, & Dember, 1995). With CCTV, characteristics of incidents are seldom known before they occur, incidents often occur infrequently, irregularly, in locations and at times that are not specified beforehand, and against a dynamic background. Incidents vary in the degree to which they are difficult to detect. For example, a brawl outside a pub is easier to detect than a small object being removed from a desk. However, regardless of the difficulty level, the degree of visual complexity is almost always high. Situation awareness is often required to detect incidents as this provides clues as to what to look for and how to interpret actions seen on displays (Donald, 2008). All these aspects affect the demands the task makes on operators. Individual factors affecting vigilance performance include motivation, mood, morale, health, drug use and smoking, work/rest patterns, circadian rhythms, search strategy (Mackie, 1987; See et.al., 1995), stress and fatigue (Sawin & Scerbo, 1995; Szalma, Warm, Matthews, Dember, Weiler, Meier, & Eggemeier, 2004), personality characteristics such as boredom proneness (Sawin &Scerbo, 1995) and observational skills (Donald, 2001). It is important to select people who are most suited to the role and to develop relevant skills, mental models and expectancies. These factors are likely to apply to operators.

Attentional processes are an additional individual factor that affects performance. Where surveillance is conducted in real time, the success of the CCTV system depends, to a large extent, on the assumption that operators are actively observing the displays. However, operators tend to cope with the monotony of their jobs by embarking on activities that remove their gaze and attention from the displays, such as making tea, thinking about other matters, talking to colleagues, reading newspapers and taking toilet breaks (Smith, 2004). Therefore an intervention that assists operators in attending to the displays is needed. About fifteen years ago Craig (1984) noted that few interventions aimed at improving vigilance performance have attempted to address attentional processes, and a review of literature in the area suggests that this comment still applies today.

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Given the large number of factors that affect vigilance performance, it is unlikely that any single intervention will solve all performance issues. However, TIP systems address the frequency of targets requiring a response and therefore operator expectancies regarding incident frequency. This in turn is likely to affect operators’ response criterion, or tendency to decide that an incident or target has occurred or not (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). If implemented appropriately, TIP could increase operator awareness of incident characteristics, as elaborated upon later.

TIP and its objectives

TIP refers to the electronic projection of images of objects that pose a threat, such as weapons and explosives, into real time X-ray images of actual bags and requires screeners to detect them (Neiderman & Forbes, 2005). TIP is based on research conducted in the 1960’s referred to as ‘artificial signal injection’ (ASI) (for example, Baker, 1960; Wilkinson, 1964). ASI was mostly used for inspection in manufacturing. Faulty items were placed amongst other items for inspection in order to measure how many faults were noticed, how many were missed and how many false positives or false alarms occurred. Inspectors had to respond to both artificial and real faults, and could not distinguish between them. Early ASI studies obtained mixed results but found improved detection rates for sonar signals when combined with feedback (Mackie, Wylie & Smith, 1994). Thus feedback is an important component in the effectiveness of ASI systems. ASI and TIP manipulate signal or target frequency and related expectancies – both important factors in vigilance performance (Balakrishnan, 1998; Koelega, 1996; Mackie, 1987; See et al., 1995).

Expectancies regarding the frequency of events which require a response will impact on observation and vigilance performance (Loeb & Alluisi, 1984). In signal detection theory terms, alterations in expectancies lead to a change in the observer’s response criterion. The response criterion refers to observers’ tendencies to bias their decisions regarding the presence of targets or signals based on their expectations (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). An alternative explanation is that operators who expect incidents or IGOs to appear more often, are more likely to direct their gaze and attention at the displays and in turn, to detect more incidents and IGOs. IGOs inserted into displays towards the end of shifts may assist in reducing monotony and fatigue, provided that they do not impose too large a mental workload. This is in line with learning and neurological theories of vigilance (Loeb & Alluisi, 1984; Parasuraman, 1984).

IGOs may be used to evaluate and manage performance, provide feedback, and maintain motivation and alertness (Andrew et al., 2003). Such targets are thought to increase vigilance by manipulating the frequency of signals to which operators should respond (Baker, 1960). This is based on arousal, expectancy, learning and neurological theories of vigilance (Loeb & Alluisi, 1984) and signal detection theory (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). Arousal theories explain performance improvements through the maintenance of appropriate arousal levels during the watch (Matthews & Davies, 1998).

A less obvious objective is to use IGOs to not only heighten vigilance, but to enhance the process of recognising and detecting potential threats and security incidents (Andrew et al., 2003). Using IGOs to enhance incident detection is a significant departure from traditional ASI and TIP studies and practice and goes beyond manipulating signal frequency and expectancies. This objective uses IGOs to assist operators in visually engaging with the displays and deploying attentional resources to them. To achieve these objectives, a relationship between the detection of IGOs and incidents should be established. Without this relationship, operators may become skilled at detecting IGOs without detecting real incidents, especially if IGOs are very

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different from incidents and performance reviews are based solely on IGO detection. Where a relationship exists, IGO detection rates can be used to measure and predict performance regarding incident detection.

The nature of the detection task differs for operators and X-ray screeners although similar visual analysis processes seem to underpin both jobs. Both positions require job incumbents to form mental pictures of what is happening and to draw upon situation awareness in the process. However, operators do this in a dynamic context where detection occurs in real time. Although some incidents take a while for perpetrators to set up and implement, others occur in a split second. Operators who apply accurate mental models and situational awareness to recognise the behaviours involved in either of these situations are likely to be more successful in detecting incidents (Donald, 2008). An understanding of behaviours assists in anticipating events and recognising them as they unfold (Donald, 2004). Therefore operators need to observe objects, behaviours and patterns, while screeners focus only on objects. The range of behaviours and events that suggest an incident is taking place implies that IGOs could take on a variety of forms to reflect these behaviours and events. IGOs need not only reflect objects, as with TIP for screeners.

The context of X-rays provides a clear indication of the type of images used as TIP objects, such as weapons or parts of weapons. For CCTV, the type of systems most appropriate for IGOs is less clear. In view of the complexity of CCTV displays and the vast array of scenes recorded, a wide range of images could potentially be used. Given the differences between X-ray screening and CCTV surveillance there are likely to be different types of TIP images or IGOs for the two contexts. It would be difficult to achieve equivalent degrees of realism for TIP images and CCTV IGOs. TIP images ‘blend’ into the display and characteristics, such as colour, size and visual angle can be used in a realistic manner. This high degree of realism and the inability to distinguish visually between TIP images and real threat objects would be difficult to replicate in CCTV due to the dynamic properties of CCTV displays, depth of field, the operator’s ability to control cameras, changing viewing conditions, the use of multiple displays and the time taken for incidents to unfold. In addition, IGOs should not be located in places where they obscure incidents (Andrew et al., 2003).

A range of objects could be used for CCTV, from simple shapes, to items related to incidents (such as valuable objects or weapons), to symbols and humourous items. However, the decision regarding the nature of the images used should be based on the objective of the IGO system. IGOs consisting of real or enacted footage is most likely to ‘blend’ into displays in a realistic manner, especially if placed in displays depicting the context usually covered in that display. However, such footage is likely to suffer certain drawbacks. It may be large and could obscure certain camera views, preventing operators from detecting any actual incidents that may occur in that space while the inserted footage is displayed. Alternatively it would need to be inserted in a section of the display where the context is appropriate and aspects such as perspective, size and colours would need to be suited to the particular display where it is inserted.

Where real footage is used, operators are likely to know about incidents that have occurred, (even if they did not detect the incidents themselves) because incidents may be discussed amongst surveillance staff and are sometimes used in training sessions. This would make the detection of these IGOs very easy, especially if used repeatedly. Therefore a large pool of such footage would need to be developed. Further, operators need to be aware of other types of incidents that could occur, and reinforcing mental models for a (presumably) small set of incidents may narrow the range of incidents they expect and therefore detect.

CCTV IGOs could also be used to influence operators’ expectations regarding incident frequency and have the potential to assist in maintaining stable performance over time and reducing the vigilance decrement. This is particularly relevant to CCTV where real incidents occur very infrequently in some situations – as much as

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days, months or years apart (Donald, 2001). Given the complexity of CCTV displays, the question is raised as to how IGOs should be designed and implemented for CCTV.

This increase in image monitoring that comes with TIP will impact on operators’ mental workload, attention resource allocation, situation awareness and search strategy and scanpaths (Donald, 2008). Monitoring multiple displays is likely to influence the detection of both incidents and IGOs (Neil et al., 2007). Therefore designers of IGO systems for CCTV clearly need to consider the number of monitors and cameras monitored per operator. In addition, consideration needs to be given to where IGOs are placed – which camera views or displays and their locations within these. It is proposed that the extent to which TIP achieves it objectives will therefore depend significantly on the design of IGOs and an appropriate implementation strategy. This is explored initially below in terms of theories of attention and how these provide pointers to how such a strategy could be achieved.

Attention processes and IGO characteristics.

Operators are required to ‘pay attention’ to displays, therefore it is not surprising that attentional processes can guide the design of IGOs in a CCTV environment. Attention is no longer viewed as a unitary process, but is made up of multiple processes (Parasuraman, 1998). Five types of attention are acknowledged in the resarch – focused, selective, divided, switched and sustained (Wickens & McCarley, 2008). All these types of attention are relevant to operators. Thus operators select specific objects or areas of displays on which to focus. At other times they divide attention between objects, camera views or displays. Similarly, they may switch attention from one area or object to another and back again. This is sustained over a period of time.

Two key processes are involved in influencing which objects or events are selected for attention (Serences, Shomstein, Leber, Golay, Egeth, & Yantis, 2005). These are referred to as goal directed or endogenous processing, and stimulus-driven or exogenous processing. Goal-directed processing occurs when goals, mental models, expectations, attentional sets, beliefs and task goals influence the deployment of attention to visual stimuli (Yantis, 1993). It is voluntary, intentional and controlled by the observer. Thus operators decide where to direct their gaze and which regions and stimuli deserve scrutiny. By contrast, stimulus-driven processing takes place when properties of a stimulus ‘grab’ or draw attention involuntarily, even though the stimulus is not related to the observer’s goals (Leblanc & Jolicoeur, 2005). Thus operators may find that they notice a large bright object even though they were not searching for one.

Both processes are involved in incident detection. Operators have mental models regarding incidents which assist goal-directed attentional control. For example, operators have expectations regarding what form an incident may take, areas where incidents are likely to occur and types of people who may be involved. These aspects form part of their attentional set or mental model of incidents and influence where they look and how carefully they examine various display regions. Operators’ attention may also be drawn by certain objects or events such as a new person entering a scene, which may attract attention.

It seems prudent to use the same mental model for incident and IGO characteristics where possible. If the nature of the IGOs is such that they require a different mental model from incidents, it is argued that IGOs could slow or even prevent the detection of incidents. This has not been tested empirically, but visual search literature on singletons supports the reasoning involved.

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Singletons are visual stimuli that differ on one dimension from surrounding stimuli. They are detected extremely efficiently, regardless of the number of surrounding stimuli or distractors (Duncan, 1984). This contrasts with conjunctions (stimuli defined by two features that share a feature with distractors). This was attributed to singleton detection mode, whereby observers adopted an attentional set for singletons (ibid.). Thus observers applied their attention set for singletons and searched specifically for singletons, disregarding surrounding stimuli. This implies that separate attention sets were used for singletons and surrounding stimuli.

A similar process could develop with IGOs, where operators develop and apply an attention set for IGOs and ‘ignore’ other objects and events that form incidents. It is proposed that this situation be prevented by aligning the mental sets required for IGOs and real incidents. To do this, IGOs should reflect characteristics found in incidents. It may not be practical for IGOs and real incidents to be identical and therefore to share all aspects of mental models and search processes. However, at the minimum, the attentional set for IGOs should reinforce that for actual incidents.

It is argued that IGOs depicting content that is completely unrelated to incidents should be avoided as their detection will involve a different attention set from incidents. Although IGOs that are unrelated to incidents may be easy to detect, their detection is not likely to be related to incident detection. Therefore they may not be effective in performance management and feedback. Further, unrelated IGOs are not likely to enhance incident detection and may even cause a deterioration in incident detection if the mental model for incidents is not invoked. Without a shared mental model, search may favour either incidents or IGOs, depending on a number of factors such expectancies, rewards and pay-offs. In situations where incidents occur very seldom, operators may focus on IGOs rather than incidents.

Stimulus characteristics play an important role in detection performance. Key characteristics include novelty, visual salience or conspicuity (Brockmole & Henderson, 2005; Itti & Koch, 2000; Irwin Colcombe, Kramer, & Hahn, 2000) and certain types of motion (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). Stimuli with these properties tend to draw attention quickly. Therefore IGOs reflecting these characteristics are likely to be noticed easily and quickly, without searching the display carefully. Therefore they have the potential to distract operators from other areas of the display which may contain potential incidents.

IGOs that attract attention on a largely stimulus-driven basis may function in a similar way to singleton detection mode. If this occurs, operators would search specifically for them and ignore other aspects of the display that may contain incidents. In order to reduce the likelihood of singleton detection mode and distraction, it is proposed that IGOs that draw attention be aligned with attention sets for incidents. Given their presumed ease of detection, these IGOs may be useful in maintaining alertness rather than facilitating visual engagement – this deserves research in the future. However, they should probably be used with caution and possibly in conjunction with other IGOs that are more difficult to detect. Thus the mix of IGOs needs to be considered as part of an implementation strategy. The types of mental models and attention sets that operators develop for IGOs that function on a largely stimulus-driven basis is also recommended as an area for future research. In view of the potential of stimuli with these properties to distract operators, they should be used with caution.

Goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention processes have been separated for the purpose of discussion, but do not function in isolation. They interact and are both present in all instances of perception (Hitch, 2005; Serences et al., 2005). Observers exercise a degree of control over which stimuli receive attention and only a few stimuli attract attention on a purely involuntary basis (Serences, et al., 2005). With the majority of stimuli, the attentional set modulates stimulus-driven capture and vice versa (Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1992, 1993). Other factors involved in modulating these attentional processes include the similarity between the target and other stimuli (Proulx & Egeth, 2006), the nature of the task (Bravo & Nakayama, 1992), availability of attention 32

resources (Boot, Brockmole & Simons, 2005), representations of similar tasks in long-term memory (Wickens & McCarley, 2008) and various perceptual processes such as grouping and working memory representations (Yantis, 2000). Thus the allocation of attention to different types of IGOs and incidents involves numerous factors and complex processes.

When there is foreknowledge of the target characteristics, goal-driven attention processes tend to be dominant (Wickens & McCarley, 2008). Conversely, when the target is not specified, stimulus-driven processes tend to be given more weight (ibid.). With CCTV surveillance, incident characteristics are generally not known before they occur and stimulus driven characteristics may therefore be given substantial weight in deploying attentional resources. Operators have expectancies and mental models regarding incidents, but presumably these need to be well developed if they are to guide attention appropriately. This highlights the importance of training to generate situational awareness and a knowledge of incident characteristics and behaviours.

CONCLUSION Numerous factors affect vigilance performance and detection rates achieved by operators. Therefore no single intervention is likely to address all problems regarding operator performance. However, IGOs seem have the potential to increase performance based on the increased frequency of events and altered expectancies. Aligning the attentional sets required for detecting IGOs and incidents is seen as a key factor in designing IGOs that assist operators in visually engaging with displays and enhancing incident detection. IGOs reflecting the defining properties of incidents are likely to have the advantage of reinforcing the mental models required for incidents by serving as ‘reminders’ of what to search for in incidents. IGOs depicting content that is not related to incidents may be detrimental to performance as they may distract operators from other areas of the display. More importantly, when the pool of IGOs consists only of highly salient images, operators may search only for them and ignore incidents.

Goal-directed and stimulus-driven attentional processes are both relevant to IGO and incident detection. Goaldirected processes assist in guiding attention, while stimulus-driven processes alert operators to new and different stimuli. Both types of process should be considered when designing IGOs. However, the mental models used in guiding attention need to be accurate and developed through training. Stimulus-driven processes have the potential to distract operators, but may be useful in maintaining alertness. An implementation strategy needs to consider a mix of IGOs using goal-directed and stimulus-driven processes.

IGO systems for CCTV could be designed in many different ways. However, empirical research is needed to establish which IGOs are most effective and how they should be implemented. This implementation will vary with the objectives of the system. Therefore it is important that organisations consider the objectives of the system before implementing IGOs. This paper proposes that inserted targets be adjusted to the nature of the environment and infrastructure being implemented. For example, the implementation of TPP for Government institutions may focus on terrorist TIP images to increase the sensitivity to those kinds of events. Key point protection around gas and oil installations will incorporate elements in the risk profile for the CCTV TIP for those industries to ensure that attentional sets of operators are in line with those kinds of risk. A city council is likely to have a very different set of CCTV TIP images to facilitate the recognition and detection of crime type activities.

The authors are currently conducting research into the characteristics of IGOs. It is recommended that future research also be conducted on the types of mental models used for IGO and incident detection, whether highly salient IGOs assist in maintaining alertness and reducing a vigilance decrement, the distraction effects of various 33

types of IGOs, and the implications of IGOs for mental workloads. In conclusion, IGOs are likely to be useful for CCTV, but given the huge number of forms IGOs could take, the way in which they are designed will be crucial to their success.

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Neiderman, E. C., & Fobes, J. L. (2005). Threat image projection system. United States Patent 6899540. www.freepatentsonline.com . Parasuraman, R. (1979). Memory load and event rate control sensitivity decrements in sustained attention, Science, 205, 924-927. From Noyes and Bransby. Parasuraman, R. (1984). Sustained attention, in Parasuraman, R., & Davies, D. R. (Eds.), Varieties of attention, Orlando: Academic Press, Inc. Parasuraman, R. (1998). The attentive brain: Issues and prospects. In R. Parasuraman (Ed.)., The attentive brain, (pp. 3-15). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Proulx, M. J., & Egeth, H. E. (2006). Target-nontarget similarity modulates stimulus-driven control in visual search. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 13(3), 524-530. Sawin, D. A., & Scerbo, M. W. (1995). Effects of instruction type and boredom proneness in vigilance: implications for boredom and workload, Human Factors, 37(4), 752-765. See, J. E., Howe, S. R., Warm, J.S., & Dember, W. N. (1995). Meta-analysis of the sensitivity decrement in vigilance, Psychological Bulletin, 117, 230-249. Serences, J. T., Shomstein, S., Leber, A. B., Golay, X., Egeth, H. E., & Yantis, S. (2005). Coordination of voluntary and stimulus-driven attentional control in human cortex. Psychological Science, 16(2), 114122. Smith, G. J. D. (2004). Behind the screens: Examining constructions of deviance and informal practices among CCTV control room operators in the UK. Surveillance and Society, 2(2/3), 376-395. Szalma, J. L., Warm, J. S., Matthews, G., Dember, W. N., Weiler, E. M., Meier, A., & Eggemeier, F. T. (2004). Effects of sensory modality and task duration on performance, workload, and stress in sustained attention, Human Factors, 46(2), 219-233. Wells, H., Allard, T., & Wilson, P. (2006). Crime and CCTV in Australia: Understanding the Relationship. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Bond University, Australia. Wickens, C. D., & McCarley, J. D. (2008). Applied attention theory. London: CRC Press. Wilkinson, R. T. (1964). Artificial ‘signals’ as an aid to an inspection task. Ergonomics, 7, 63-72. Yantis, S. (1993). Stimulus driven attentional capture and attentional control settings, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19, 676-681. Yantis, S. (2000). Goal directed and stimulus driven determinants of attentional control. In S. Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.), Attention and Performance (Vol 18). Cambridge: MIT Press.

COPYRIGHT Fiona Donald and Craig Donald ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Australia’s Oil Refining Industry- Importance, Threats, and Emergency Response Amanda East School of Engineering Security Science Edith Cowan University Bill Bailey SECAU Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University

Abstract

Australia’s Oil Refining Industry- Importance, Threats, and Emergency Response. Australia is heavily reliant on down-stream, or refined oil products for daily life and industrial purposes. The industry faces a range of threats and risk factors all of which have the capability to inflict significant damage. A major disruption to Australia’s oil refining industry would have major consequences not only for the industry but on society and the economy as a whole. By assessing Australia’s reliance on oil products, as well as considering the impact of major disruption to oil refining capabilities internationally, this paper seeks to assess the impact that such an event would have on Australian society, public and private industry and the economy. In the Australian context the industry is not adequately prepared to respond to, or recover from major disaster or disruption. There are a range of international strategies and policies which will be assessed in order to further prepare the Australian industry for a range of potential disasters. This paper uses the Kwinana oil refinery in Western Australia as a case study for considering potential threats, consequences and recovery strategies related to a major oil refinery disruption or disaster.

AUSTRALIA’S OIL REFINING INDUSTRY-IMPORTANCE, THREATS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE The Australian oil refining industry is very important to the social and industrial stability of the nation. In terms of size and production the Australian refining industry is relatively small. This being said the local oil refining industry is critical in supplying and maintaining national social and industrial activities. The majority of refinery output is used to supply the transport sector, however the agricultural industry, heavy industries, and general household activities are also reliant on locally produced oil products. If an Australian oil refinery were rendered unavailable for an extended period of time it would have significant consequences for the regional, and perhaps even national social and economic stability. Subsequently the industry needs to be prepared for the range of human and natural threats that it faces. Terrorists, insiders, criminals and natural disasters are all sources of threats which have the capacity to severely disrupt any, or all of the Australian oil refining facilities. There are a number of governmental and industrial measures in place to prevent and respond to any possible threats and risks. Thus far the Australian industry has avoided any major disaster, however must remain vigilant in securing against every form of threat.

AUSTRALIA’S OIL REFINING INDUSTRY The Australian oil refining industry is made of seven privately owned refineries. Located in five states and owned by four major companies, these refineries provide Australia with 796 000 barrels of refined oil product each day (EIA, 2005). Two refineries, Kwinana (WA) and Bulwer (QLD) are owned by BP; Lytton (QLD) and Kurnell (NSW) are owned by Caltex; Shell runs two refineries, Geelong (VIC) and Clyde (NSW), while the Altona refinery in Melbourne (VIC) is owned by Mobil (AIP, 2005, p.5). The Kwinana refinery is the biggest with an output capacity of 138 000 barrel per day (bpd) (EIA, 2005). The Liquid Fuel Emergency Act (LFE Act, 1984) identifies the following as ‘refined liquid petroleum products (S3.1)’: 37

Petroleum products make up 46% of Australian refinery output, diesel 29%, and jet fuel 14% (AIP, p.6). Seventy five percent of Australian demand for petroleum products is supplied by local refineries, any disruption within the Australian industry would have significant social, and economic consequences. Only 30% of refinery feedstock is local crude oil (AIP, 2008, p.2), Australian crude oil is unsuitable for conversion into the primary refined product, petrol. Subsequently the majority of crude oil used in Australian refineries is imported from the Asian and the Middle Eastern refineries (AIP, 2008, p.2). As previously stated Australia is heavily reliant on the local oil refining industry, a range of social and industrial services rely on the stability and supply of the Australian oil refining sector.

AUSTRALIAN RELIANCE ON OIL PRODUCTS Australian society relies heavily on oil products to provide and supply a range of essential social and industrial services. Oil is relied on for transportation, agricultural as well as industrial, and household purposes. The Australian Institute of Petroleum states that petroleum products are responsible for 52% of final energy consumed in Australia (n.d., p.1). Based on this data it can be assumed that the consequence of a major disruption to the refining industry would be significant. Without oil a significant number of vital social requirements, and industries would not be able to function at full capacity, or at all Transport is the sector of Australian society which is most reliant on petroleum products. The oil refining industry is geared toward petroleum production to supply the nations transport requirements. All forms of transport, passenger cars, trucks, cargo transport- truck and rail, as well as air transport are reliant on petroleum products to fuel them. Of these, passenger cars or personal transport is responsible for the highest level of consumption. In Australia road transport accounts for nearly 80% of liquid petroleum use (Robinson, Fleay & Mayo, n.d., p.1; Taylor, n.d., p.10), two thirds of which can be attributed to passenger vehicles (Taylor, p.10). Considering that there are 13.2 million registered motor vehicles (passenger cars, commercial vehicles and trucks)in Australia (Robinson etal, p.1; ABARE, 2004, p.47) each averaging 15 300 kilometers (Robinson etal, p.1) per year it is understandable that Australia consumes 38 billion litres of fuel annually for road and off road vehicles (Green Car Congress, 2008). These numbers indicate that Australia has a very strong, but probably unrealised, reliance on the oil refining industry. Transport is relied on not only to transport people, but for the transportation of food, goods and services. If the oil refining industry were to suffer a serious disruption the social, and eventually economic consequences would be enormous. The agricultural industry also has a strong direct, as well as indirect reliance on oil products. In Western Australia livestock and crop farmers, predominantly wheat, are responsible for 80% of petroleum product purchases by broadacre agriculture (Kingswell, p.2). The majority of the fuel and oil purchases are used in establishing and harvesting a range of grain crops (Kingswell, p.2). The dairy industry has a strong, but indirect reliance on oil products for the transportation of dairy products from farms to processing plants. As previously stated transportation is the sector most reliant on oil products, and agriculture relies on the transportation industry to maintain and ensure the success of their operations. Expenditure of grain and sheep dominant agricultural sectors on transport is 55.6 and 35.5 percent respectively (Kingwell, p.3), while expenditure on petroleum products by the grain dominant sector is 37.0 %, and 20.5 % for the sheep dominant sector (Kingwell, p.3). The export earnings for Australian agricultural commodities made up approximately 2.9% of annual GDP (ABS, 2005). Taking into account drought and other conditions the Australian agricultural industry has not been as successful recently as in previous years, even so the sector is very important to Australian society and economy, and would be significantly effected in the event of a major disruption to local oil supply. The industrial sector, including mining and quarrying, iron and steel and construction accounts for 21% of Australian oil use (IEA, 2000, p.44). Within this sector, the mining industry is major consumer of diesel fuel (IEA, 2000, p.44). About 35 percent of energy needs within the mining sectors are met by electricity followed by fuel oil which accounts for 32 percent. Energy requirements in exploration and site preparation are reliant on transportation and drilling, which both require fuel oil (ITP, p.18). As the world's largest exporter of coal iron 38

ore, lead, diamonds, rutile, zinc and zirconium, and the second largest exporter of gold and uranium the mining industry contributes a significant amount to Australian’s GDP. Since the mid 1980s the mining industry has contributed $ 43 Billion to the Australian economy, that is 5% of annual GDP (ABS, 2005). Although the sector is not entirely reliant on oil products it could not function effectively without it, resulting in consequences for Australian exports and the economy.

Petroleum fuels (liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and heating oil) accounted for 4.6% of household energy consumption in 1995. It is possible that this number has been reduced since due to the connection to natural gas, and upgrades in heating and cooling technology (G.Wilkenfeld, 1998, p.5). Of the petroleum fuels used in general household activities approximately 83.7% was used for heating, 13.3% for water heating and 3.0% for cooking (G.Wilkenfeld, 1998, p.9). Household consumption of oil is not particularly significant, however plays an important role in providing the services and luxuries that we have come to expect.

THREAT SOURCES The oil industry has always faced a wide range of threats from a number of sources. In the current international security environment terrorism is the main security concern, however every industry must remain vigilant in defending against other sources, and types of threats. As Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute states,

“it was Katrina not Al-Qaeda that devastated the platforms and refineries along the U.S. Gulf coast in August 2005; it was a short circuit not a well-placed bomb that caused the massive blackout in Moscow in May 2005; and it was not a shoot-out but a labor strike that stopped the pipeline construction in Azerbaijan in November 2005 (Baev, 2006, p.33).”

As well as terrorism, the threat from environmental terrorism, insiders, cyber attacks, and natural disasters must be considered in protecting and defending all forms of major infrastructure.

The major threat to the oil and gas infrastructure is from highly motivated terrorists (Bajpai & Gupta, 2004, p.176). In 2006 there were 344 significant attacks against oil and gas targets compared with 265 in 2005 (Oil and Gas Industry-Terrorism Monitor(OGI-TM), 2007). These attacks resulted in significant loss of life and tens of billions of dollars in lost production as well as physical and reputational damage to many companies (OGITM, 2007). The oil and gas industry is not a new target for terrorism, however in recent years Al-Qaeda has vowed more strongly to cut the ‘economic lifelines’ of industrialised societies (Peck & Lord, p.4), the economic lifelines being oil infrastructure. In light of this and the fact that a number of significant terrorist organisations exist in the region surrounding Australia all forms of oil infrastructure, including refineries need to be prepared for and consider the consequences of a possible terrorist attack. Agricultural, forest, mineral, petroleum and ecosystem sites and water resources have been identified as being particularly vulnerable targets for environmental terrorism (O’Lear, 2003, p.140). Although not the most significant threat to oil refineries activists are capable of causing disruption and disturbance to oil refinery staff and operations. During times of peace, aspects of the environment, including human manipulated landscapes, could be targets of intentional acts of destruction intended to communicate a particular message (O’Lear, 2003, p.140). Environmental terrorists are not of major concern to the Australian oil refining sector. However oil refineries do have the potential to cause significant environmental damage, and petroleum sites are targets for environmental terrorism. The Australian sector must be wary of the threat that environmental terrorists and activists pose.

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Insiders, employees of a particular company or organisation, are also a major threat to the security and productivity of their company. The threat they pose may be maliciously motivated, or purely accidental. As has been previously stated terrorism is a major threat to the oil industry. It is possible that in some cases terrorists may be working in collusion with internal disgruntled employees (Bajpai & Gupta, 2007, p.176) to achieve their objective. That being said disgruntled employees can cause serious disruption of their own accord through fraudulent activity, sale of corporate information, or cyber attacks (Stoneburner, Goguer & Feringa, 2002, p.14). However the major threat posed by employees working in oil refineries is accidents. Around the world, plant and refinery employees are injured or killed on the job almost every day, many of the accidents take place as a result of the negligence of other employees, employers, or third parties (Nelson, 2007). In facilities that process hazardous materials, and performs such a vital social function, there must be a significant emphasis placed on preventing malicious or accidental incidents from within. The increased reliance computers and networks to control and maintain oil refineries and their functions has led to the development of another, major threat source. The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) provide the critical service of monitoring and controlling the functions and delivery of the essential services of most critical infrastructure. These systems are used within refineries and to control pipelines, however they were developed purely for functional purposes with no security concerns considered, as a result they are vulnerable to cyber threats. These vulnerabilities leave oil companies, and their facilities susceptible to exploitation, attack and theft of proprietary information (Sevounts, 2006, p.79). Oil facilities have always been targets of malicious attack, and now that many of them are reliant on systems that are vulnerable to cyber threats there is an increased priority placed on securing systems, and defending against the cyber threat (Sevounts, 2006, p.79). Natural disasters are a major cause of damage and disruption to oil refinery operations. Of all the threats listed, the threat from natural sources is potentially the most damaging. Measures can be implemented to reduce the effects of natural disaster, however they can still cause extensive damage and nothing can be done to prevent their occurrence. Australia is susceptible to a range of natural disasters, all of which can create significant damage and disruption.

PREPAREDNESS The government has developed a range of strategies and initiatives by which to further enhance the security of critical infrastructure. The majority of government strategies are targeted at ‘critical infrastructure’ as a whole, rather than each individual sector. This being said the security of oil refineries is covered by a range of energy sector legislation, and critical infrastructure initiatives. The Liquid Fuel Emergency Act is the legislation developed in order control the production and release of fuel in times of a national fuel crisis. Unless there is a national crisis oil companies are responsible for their own activities and security issues. The Act enables the government to control the output and use of oil products in periods of major emergency. The Act states that, “The Minister may... direct a relevant fuel industry corporation: (a) to maintain at all times after a specified day, at specified places in Australia, specified quantities of reserve supplies of a specified kind of liquid fuel; or (b) to accumulate, by a specified day, specified quantities of reserve supplies of a specified kind of liquid fuel and to maintain, at all times after that day, such quantities of reserve supplies of liquid fuel of that kind at specified places in Australia (S12:1a, b).” The legislation can only be considered in extreme situations where rationing across multiple jurisdictions would be necessary for an extended period and be beyond the capability of the industry to manage on its own (AIP, 2008, p.14). Enacted in 1984 the legislation has never been required to be introduced. Although the Act is not directly related to oil refineries it is the only legislation which Australia can introduce in a time of severe disruption to any part of the oil industry. 40

The Australian government has implemented a number of initiatives and measures to assist in development and enhancement Australia’s critical infrastructure security. These measures are relevant to, and aimed at all industries classified as critical infrastructure. The government strategies intend to increase communication between the government and private sectors on matters of security threats and improvements. The Business Liaison Unit (BLU), a part of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), was developed in order to provide a forum by which Australian businesses could interface with the Australian intelligence community (ASIO). The BLU aims to ensure that owners and operators of critical infrastructure can access ASIO information on security issues which affects their assets, operations and personnel (ASIO). The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) is another government program aimed at increasing the security of critical infrastructure through increased communication. The TISN brings business and government together with the purpose of sharing ideas and expertise to develop solutions to common, as well as complex, security concerns and problems. The Computer Network Vulnerability Assessment (CNVA) Program is part of the TISN. It is a government grants scheme developed to help secure critical infrastructure. Through the program funding is provided to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify the vulnerabilities of their information and communication systems (CNVA, 2008). It also allows for the examination of security implications of IT infrastructure changes, and assesses potential and existing physical and personnel security issues (CNVA, 2008). The Australian industry has a number of strategies it can implement in times of supply emergency. In times of extreme emergency they can be introduced in combination with government strategies. The mechanisms which the industry uses to adjust supply include purchase and ship product from a refinery in another state which may take several days to arrive, or from Singapore the shortest time frame is about three weeks (AIP, n.d., p.7). In times of long term disruption product can be purchased and shipped from other overseas sources, delivery of which is likely to take several weeks (AIP, p.7). When there is a significant disruption or reduction to supply and production companies may restrain or limit supplies to industrial and local consumers (AIP, p.7).

RECOVERY STRATEGIES In terms of maintaining supply of refined oil products the only existing options are to import from other national refineries, increase the capacity of existing refineries, or import products from overseas. The best recovery strategy for the Australian oil refining industry is found in the physical layout of the industry. Australian refineries are not located in close proximity, or owned by the same companies, subsequently it is highly unlikely that the entire industry can be affected by a single disaster or disruption. No natural disaster has the capability to disrupt every refinery, unlike in America where over 40% of national refining capacity is found in two states which are vulnerable to severe weather conditions (Parformak, 2007, p.4). The Australian refineries are owned by different companies, with no communication or cyber connection, making it impossible to shut down the entire system via a single cyber attack. Perhaps the only event that has the capability to impact the nation by disrupting oil refinery production is a highly organised and coordinated terrorist group with the ability to infiltrate the physical and personnel security procedures of the Australian refineries. The production capacity of the Australian refineries is equal, no refinery is far superior in terms of production. If one or two refineries where to be disrupted it is probable that other refineries could supply the effected region for a short period of time without being severely effected themselves. This being the case the most useful and immediately available measures for recovering, or dealing with an oil related emergency are market-driven, voluntary and compulsory demand restraint (IEA, 2000, p.39). In the Australian context the implementation of measures to reduce industrial and general consumption of oil products is the most effective means by which to recover from a major disruption, while still maintaining social and economic stability.

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In terms of size and production the Australian oil refining industry is relatively small, however extremely important in supplying the country with oil products. The majority of locally refined oil products are used domestically, meaning that Australian society and industries are reliant on the local oil refining sector. Australian refineries produce a full range of oil products, the majority of which are used to supply the transportation industry, as well as the agricultural and mining sector. Thus far the industry has been free of malicious, or extremely damaging events, however it does face a range of potentially disastrous threats. Terrorists, insiders, cyber criminals, activists and natural disasters are all sources that threaten the security of the oil refining industry. The consequences of a major disruption would be significant. There are a range of governmental strategies in place to develop and enhance the security of Australia’s critical infrastructure, and the industry itself has plans by which it intends to continue in spite of a major disruption. Although the Australian industry has not yet faced any serious disasters it must continue to develop measures to secure, and ensure the continuity of the industry in the event of a major disaster, otherwise there will be major consequences to Australian society, industry and economy.

REFERENCES Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics. (2004). Energy in Australia. Retrieved from Australian Government: http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/drs/pubs/562/set/hs31energy-in-australia2004.pdf ASIO. (n.d.). Business Liaison Unit. Retrieved from Australian Government: http://blu.asio.gov.au/

  Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2005). Year Book Australia 2005: 100 years of change in Australian industry. Retrieved from http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/[email protected]/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article212005?opendocu ment&tabname=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2005&num=&view=

  Australian Institute of Petroleum. (n.d.). Supply Security. Retrieved from http://www.aip.com.au/pdf/supply.pdf Australian Institute of Petroleum. (2005). Downstream Petroleum. Retrieved from http://www.aip.com.au/pdf/Downstream_Petroleum_2005_Report.pdf Australian Institute of Petroleum. (2008, April). Maintaining Supply Reliabililty in Australia. Australian Institute of Petroleum. www.aip.com.au/pdf/AIP%20Paper%20-%20Maintaining%20Supply%20Reliability.pdf Baev, P. (2006). Re-evaluating the Risks of Terrorist Attacks Against Energy Infrastructure in Eurasia. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly , 4:2, p.33-38. Bajpai, S. & Gupta, J. (2007). Securing oil and gas infrastructure. Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering , 55, 174-186. Bajpai, S. & Gupta, J. (2004). Site Security for Process Plants. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries , 18:4-6, 301-309. CNVA. (2008). Fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(930C12A9101F61D43493D44C70E84EAA)~CNVA+F act+Sheet+June+2008.PDF/$file/CNVA+Fact+Sheet+June+2008.PDF Energy Information Administration. (2005). Output of Refined Petroleum Products: All Countries, Year 2004 for the International Energy Annual 2005. Retrieved from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilproduction.html

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G Wilkenfeld and Associates. (1998). Household Energy Use in Australia: End Uses, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Energy Efficiency Program Coverage. Retrieved from http://www.energyrating.gov.au/library/pubs/hhenergy1998.pdf Green Car Congress. (2008). Jamieson Report Calls for Fastracking Development of Electric Vehicles in Australia. Retrieved from http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/07/jamison-report.html International Energy Agency. (2000). Oil Supply Security: The Emergency Response Potential of IEA Countries 2000. Retrieved from International Energy Agency: http://www.iea.org/dbtwwpd/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/oilsecu2001.pdf ITP Mining. (n.d.). Energy and Environmental Profile of the US Mining Industry. Retrieved from www1.eere.energy.gov/industry/mining/pdfs/overview.pdf Kingwell, R. (n.d.). Oil and Agriculture: Now and in the Future. Retrieved From: www.aspo-australia.org.au/References/Kingwell-Oil-in-Agriculture-2003.pdf Liquid Fuel Emergency Act. (1984). Retrieved from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/lfea1984213/s3.html Nelson, S. (2007). Plant/Refinery Accidents. Retrieved from Law Office of Scott. A. Nelson: http://www.oceanlawusa.com/html/plant-refinery.html Oil and Gas Industry- Terrorism Monitor (OGI- TM). (2007). Retrieved from http://www.ogitm.com/ogi_latest_threats.php O'Lear, S. (2003). Environmental Terrorism: A Critique. Geopolitics. 8:3, 127-150 Parfomak, P. (2007). CRS Report for Congress: Vulnerability of Concentrated Critical Infrastructure: Background and Policy Options. Peck, B. & Lord, A. (n.d.). The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Needed Changes to Counter Today's Threats to Energy Security. Retrieved from Strategic Studies Institute: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil456.pdf Robinson, B., Fleay, B., & Mayo, S. (n.d.). The Impact of Oil Depletion on Australia. Retrieved from http://www.aspo-australia.org.au/References/Abstract_Lisbon_Robinson.pdf Sevounts, G. (2006). Addressing Cyber Security in the Oil and Gas Industry. Pipeline and Gas Journal , 233:3, 79-80. Stoneburner, G., Goguer, A., Feringa, A. (2002). Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems. Retrieved from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30/sp800-30.pdf Taylor, M. (2004). Australia's approach to managing an oil emergency. Retrieved from International Energy Agency: http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2004/cambodia/bj_session4.3-Australian%20paper.pdf

William Bailey and Amanda East, Edith Cowan University © 2008. The author/s assign Edith CowanUniversity a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Aviation Infrastructure Protection: Threats, Contingency Plans and the Importance of Networks Mel Griffiths Edith Cowan University [email protected]

Abstract Much literature has been published on the vastly disproportionate repercussions that disruptions to critical infrastructure have the potential to create. The security of critical infrastructure requires careful planning as well as rapid response and recovery strategies. The protection of Australia’s airports as sites of critical infrastructure raises many issues common to infrastructure protection. There are legal, cultural and procedural barriers to the sharing of information, as well as a lack of integration within security networks and between the government and owner/operators of infrastructure. These issues must be taken into account to enable effective crisis management at airports. This paper examines the process of planning, incident, and recovery for airports taking into consideration the difficulties associated with critical infrastructure protection. The concepts are illustrated using threat assessment, business continuity, crisis management, and business recovery strategies based on the AS/NZS4360 model for risk management as well as an incident scenario based on credible scenario development. The effective protection of airports must take into account the problems associated with security networks and the interdependent nature of critical infrastructure, as failure to do so invites the potential of a cascading collapse of Australia’s critical aviation infrastructure.

INTRODUCTION The protection of critical infrastructure poses some of the most significant challenges to nation-states today (Dupont, 2004, p. 78). Although the complexities of protection impact all types of critical infrastructure, it is the example of airports that best illustrates the issues (Rothery, 2005). Australia's aviation infrastructure forms a complex web of interconnectedness and interdependence that is fundamental to the functioning of air services. Australia's large landmass, distance between capital cities and limited viable transport alternatives means that aviation infrastructure is all the more critical. In addition, transport infrastructure is likely to continue to be a favoured target of terrorism. Such areas are easily penetrated relative to other critical infrastructure, have a high density of people, and are constantly beset by problems of security versus functionality (Fleckner, 2005). This fundamental interdependence that allows aviation infrastructure to function may also be an additional source of risk. Variations in security standards and practice between airports, airlines and other associated industries, creates variations in the expected risk exposure within the infrastructure network. For example, lack of passenger screening at a regional airport creates an increased risk for all associated airports. Security issues associated with infrastructure interdependence may also be complicated by difficulties with government and private sector collaboration. The effectiveness of information-sharing and security consultancy networks composed of government and private sector participants can be compromised as many problems are magnified at the public/private nexus (Rothery, 2005, p. 6). This creates a range of security considerations that are largely unique to critical infrastructure and specifically transport infrastructure.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT Since 2003, the Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 and its amendments have legislated the risk management responsibilities of 'essential services infrastructure' owners and operators, a move referred to as 'responsibilisation'. This legislation stipulates that infrastructure operators must “comply with any prescribed standard” (Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2006 (Cth) s.11 (12)(1)) in developing their risk management program. The standard currently prescribed by the Australian Government is the AS/NZS4360:2004 Risk Management Standard which provides a robust framework for managing risk (Terrorism (Community Protection) (Prescribed Standards) Regulations 2007 (Cth) s.3(a)). Given the interdependent nature of infrastructure networks, it follows that the consequences of risks that threaten infrastructure continuity must be given serious consideration, as disruption is not simply a matter of economics. Business Continuity 44

Management guarantees the “availability of processes and resources in order to ensure the continued achievement of critical objectives” (Standards Australia, 2004, p. 2), which clearly is a necessary requirement for all forms of critical infrastructure. This involves the specification of roles and responsibilities (Rosenthal and Pijnenburg, 1991), the allocation of resources (‘t Hart, 1997), and the testing of established plans (Boin, Kofman and Overdijk, 2004). According to the Australian Government, “the current security environment makes business continuity planning important” (Attorney General’s Department, 2008). Managing business continuity “provides practical strategies to follow in a crisis, eg fire, flood, storm, explosion, adverse market or financial circumstances, computer viruses or power outages” (Attorney General’s Department, 2008). However, the ‘current security environment’ reinforces the need for up to date business continuity and recovery plans in order to face the heightened threat of malicious actions. For example, because of meticulous planning for business continuity and disaster recovery, Scotland’s Glasgow airport was able to resume operations and reopen a damaged terminal 23 hours and 59 minutes after an attempted car bomb attack on June 30, 2007 (Crichton, 2007, p. 19). Business Continuity Management forms an integral part of the risk management process and identifies the organisation's critical objectives, potential disruptions, and mitigation strategies. Business continuity is essentially the process of ensuring the uninterrupted availability of the primary business resources that are required in order to sustain crucial business activities. Confusion can arise regarding the relationship between business continuity and risk management. Essentially business continuity management is the use of risk management to mitigate a particular type of risk, that of disruption to business continuity. Ensuring an airport meets its legislative risk management obligations and establishes strategies for continuance during disruption requires that appropriate tools be provided by Government. Given the significance of risk and business continuity management to ensuring the continuity of essential public services, consideration must be given to how the larger challenges specific to infrastructure network interdependence and public/private integration may affect the development of effective business continuity and recovery strategies in Australian Airports.

INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS AND OWNERSHIP Despite playing a vital role in the running of the state (Dupont, 2004, p. 78), around 90 per cent of Australia’s critical infrastructure is privately owned (Trusted Information Sharing Network, 2004). As a result the protection of critical infrastructure has become a “shared responsibility of business and the Australian Government” (Attorney General’s Department, 2005, p. 3.6). However, according to the ‘Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing’ conducted for the Australian Government in 2005 (Wheeler, 2005), the task of ‘enabling’ the private sector at sites of critical infrastructure, such as airports, is (and remains) a considerable challenge. Difficulties associated with information sharing, communication, coordination, and dynamics within networks are common to all organisations, but “are magnified as the site of intervention moves from state-owned to privately-owned entities” (Rothery, 2005, p. 6). In the event of a disruption to infrastructure, government and business will have differing priorities. According to Yates (2003), an infrastructure owner's first priority is its commercial survival which may or may not encompass the government's priority of “minimising the social, economic and political impact by returning the infrastructure to service as soon as possible”(p. 3). Although the priorities of business and government may not be in full agreement, ultimately both parties are primarily interested in the continuity of the infrastructure, which provides a common starting point for the establishment of security networks.

SECURITY NETWORKS Ideally, security networks facilitate the coordination of government and industry and are intended to “coordinate... activities and share responsibilities, resources, information and/or knowledge... more efficiently and effectively than vertical or hierarchical structures” (Whelan & Palmer. 2006, p. 4). There is an increasing

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awareness that the privatised nature of much of Australia’s critical infrastructure calls for a broader and more robust integration of public and private elements in security networks. In November 2002, the Commonwealth Government announced the creation of the Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (TISN). This network of advisory groups was created in response to the need for critical infrastructure owners and operators to have access to informational resources. According to Yates (2003), these resources include information on: business continuity, consequence management, information system attacks and vulnerabilities, ecrime, protection of key sites from attack or sabotage, chemical, biological and radiological threats to water and food supplies, and the identification and protection of offshore and maritime assets (p. 43). This overarching security network is an essential tool in securing critical infrastructure, however the size of the network and the complexity of the task mean that coordination, trust, and partnership can be difficult to foster. Security networks can operate on local levels involving local organisations, as well as on the regional or national levels as illustrated by the Trusted Information Sharing Network. The challenge of coordination, trust, and partnership is more difficult to foster in larger security networks. Therefore, aspects of continuity and recovery that are more reliant on trust and partnership, such as consultation, mock exercises, and coordination with local authorities, are best served by local security networks. Regardless of the specific elements of a security network, there are some common key elements to successfully achieving the stated objectives. Interdepartmental cooperation, clear responsibilities, and trust are essential factors for success. Smaller, more local security networks which focus on specific elements of an infrastructure sector may effectively mitigate issues of trust, information sharing, communication, coordination, and dynamics at the local level of infrastructure protection. For example, fostering trust and cooperation with local emergency services and police can aid an airport’s business continuity process immeasurably. However, effectively integrating public and private agencies into security networks of any size still “faces considerable organisational, cultural, and legal barriers” (Whelan & Palmer, 2006, p. 1). Examples of barriers to integration include legal issues associated with the sharing of classified information, organisational cultures perpetuating a lack of interdepartmental trust and cooperation, and issues of conflicting responsibility and jurisdiction. These issues may lead one to conclude that the private sector has a limited interest in participating in and maintaining security networks. However, it is not uncommon for the private sector to actively seek out a greater participation in security networks (Whelan & Palmer, 2006, p. 9). This involvement gives the private sector the benefit of enhanced information and greater planning roles in securing infrastructure, although these benefits can be somewhat offset by the private sector seeking to limit their financial burdens associated with security.

UNIQUE BARRIERS The private sector/government nexus in infrastructure protection poses some unique challenges in terms of economics and interdependence. Essentially this interdependence means that the risks faced by “any individual, firm, region or country depends not only on its own choices but also on those of others” (Heal, Kearns, Kleindorfer, & Kunreuther, 2008, p. 258). This represents a meeting of the “politics and economics of risk management” (Whelan & Palmer, 2006, p. 9). For example, decisions regarding an airport’s security may take into consideration the security flaws in another airport when determining how effective a particular countermeasure will be, and how security resources are subsequently allocated. To what extent then can one airport be expected to invest in security when it is “connected to and dependent on others whose failures may compromise its own operations?” (Heal, et al., 2008, p. 259). With interdependence, each part of the aviation network “has less incentive to invest in protective measures if the others have not taken similar action” (Heal, et al., 2008, p. 259). It is worth noting however, that a small group within a network may also be able to “tip the entire industry from a starting equilibrium in which no one invests in security, to a new equilibrium that improves security and increases expected profits” (Kearns & Ortiz, 2004). Agreement and cooperation on security measures among a small part of the infrastructure network can change the tide of opinion and the general security outlook among aviation infrastructure owners and operators. 46

This further reinforces the importance and utility of security networks that promote cooperation and consistency across the infrastructure network.

RESPONSIBILISATION Effective security networks provide much of the toolkit that enables the private sector to be responsible for legislative standards. This ‘responsibilisation’, whereby government strategies are used encourage the private sector to be responsible for their own risk management, is heavily reliant on the effectiveness of networks (O'Malley & Palmer 1996). The importance of security networks to the risk management of critical infrastructure was recognized early by Australian water supply authorities who, shortly after the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, created the Australian Water Industry Critical Infrastructure Protection Group (Yates, 2003, p. 83). Recognising the implications to critical infrastructure protection that the new security paradigm presented, the group's objectives included improving industry understanding of the threat as well as information and strategy exchange. A key element of these objectives is the identification of best practices in business continuity and emergency response planning, which according to Yates (2003), “has been critical following a number of threats and chemical thefts since September 11 2001” (p. 83). The speed with which private industry recognised the needs of critical infrastructure sectors so early after the establishment of what has become known as 'the new security environment', reaffirms that private industry can and does take the risk management initiative. However, ensuring infrastructure security networks are established and working well cannot be left to industry alone, and is a responsibility that according to Whelan and Palmer (2006), rests firmly with the government; “it is not simply enough to make the private sector responsible for owning and managing risk; the government must give them the appropriate tools to do so” (p. 4). According to the US Department of Homeland Security's National Infrastructure Protection Plan, by taking an active role in cooperating with the private sector, governments can “add value to industry’s ability to assess its own risk and refine its business continuity and security plans” (Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 10).

CONTINUITY AND RECOVERY STRATEGIES The question of how the afore-mentioned larger issues of critical infrastructure interdependence and networks may influence the planning and development of airport continuity and recovery plans is one that deserves consideration. For example, an airport operator may ask whether any of their security measures are affected by other operators in the infrastructure network, and if so, how? Do aspects of security need to be modified? Do new measures need to be introduced as a result? They may also ask if their planning is based on relevant and timely information gained through well established, cooperative, and trustworthy channels. This process falls under the method described by the Australian Standards Business Continuity Management handbook as risk and vulnerability analysis, where the “vulnerability of business processes and interdependencies” (Standards Australia, 2004, p. 15) is considered. Intelligent consideration of problems of interdependence reveal that if the Australian Government can encourage industry to “go beyond efforts already justified by their corporate business needs” (Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 9) in regards to business continuity and recovery planning, infrastructure sectors may tip “from a starting equilibrium in which no one invests in security, to a new equilibrium that improves security and increases expected profits” (Kearns & Ortiz, 2004).

THREATS AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT An examination of the stages of continuity and recovery planning reveals the way infrastructure interdependence and poor security networks can adversely impact the process. Understanding an airport’s operational environment and determining the threats that could cause major disruption to operations is the first stage of business continuity and recovery planning. Should interdependence issues and security network efficiency not be considered at this stage, the net result is an increase in risk to the individual airport, and therefore aviation infrastructure as a whole. Airport owners need to consider not only how their security is affected by deficiencies in other areas of the infrastructure network, but also how their security impacts the overall protection of the infrastructure. This daunting task can be simplified by considering these issues as ‘interdependence risk’. Should this stage of establishing the context in business continuity management in the 47

aviation industry fail to consider the unique issues of infrastructure protection, there is the potential for misallocation of resources, skewed threat assessments, and gaps in airport security. The importance of a comprehensive approach to continuity and recovery planning cannot be stressed enough given the social, economic and political consequences of infrastructure failure, and the consistent tendency of terrorism to shift its focus to ‘overlooked’ vulnerabilities. In order to determine and assess the nature, source, and extent of threats to the airport’s physical infrastructure and operations, a threat assessment is employed. This process has particular significance to security networks and the issues of information sharing. Having an established, trusted, and relatively local security network that functions in tandem with bodies such as the Trusted Information Sharing Network, greatly benefits this process by ensuring the use of relevant information from a variety of trusted sources. This part of business continuity management is very much akin to the initial stages of the Australian Government prescribed AS/NZS4360:2004 Australian Standard for Risk Management, and similarly relies heavily on communication and consultation. A broad-based threat assessment that, in addition to natural and technical risks, assesses “the intentions of people who could pose a hazard to a resource or function, how they might cause harm and their ability to carry out their intentions” (Yates, 2003, p. 146) must be appropriately informed to be effective.

CRITICALITY The second stage of the continuity and recovery planning process involves the identification of operations that are critical for both short and long term operational capability. This kind of forethought can be seen in the case of the attempted car bombing at Glasgow airport in 2007, where the airport’s integrated continuity and emergency plans initiated such critical continuity mechanisms as calling in off-duty support staff, establishing a business recovery team within two hours of the incident, and establishing a separate check-in area after the short-term loss of terminal 2 (Crichton, 2007, p. 20). Establishing what is critical to operations must be informed by the policy and procedures of all other airports in the infrastructure network. This aspect of interdependence must be considered if continuity and recovery plans are to ‘gel’ with the contingency plans of surrounding airports, should flights need to be diverted and other support deemed necessary. Unlike other forms of critical infrastructure where public access is not a fundamental security issue, the aviation industry is one that deals with the public in a very physical sense with a need for efficiency and relative openness of movement. Singling out the “purposeful agents acting out of complex motivations to do harm” (Heal, et al., 2008, p. 273) that may be present among the millions of people that pass through Australia’s airports every year is a fundamental security issue. This vulnerability combined with the heightened risks of the new security environment means that an emphasis on the risk of malicious actions is reasonable within an allhazards approach.

CONSEQUENCE AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENTS Assessing the impact of the identified threats on an airport’s critical functions, as well as identifying the required resources to ensure continuity and rapid recovery, form the third stage of the continuity planning process (Standards Australia, 2004, p. 6). To assess the impact of a threat, the likelihood must also be determined to give an overall level of risk which must be appropriately informed by relevant information from sources such as the Trusted Information Sharing Network and Aviation Risk Context Statements. The US’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Department of Homeland Security, 2006) states that the challenges of the new security environment “requires new approaches focused on intelligence-driven analysis, information sharing, and the private sector” (p. 10). Security networks provide the resources to realise this ‘new approach’. In addition to threat assessment, business continuity and recovery plans also need resources to function. A key role of business continuity is to ensure preparedness for disruption, which requires that the responsibilities and resource aspects of the plans are in place. The critical nature of infrastructure means that the consequences may well be entirely disproportionate to an actual attack, should the harm imagined by ‘purposeful agents’ successfully disrupt critical infrastructure.

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Cyber Attack Malicious disruption need not be a physical attack as demonstrated by a hacker who disabled an airport control tower computer system in Worcester, UK in 1997 (Chantler & Broadhurst, 2006, p. 7). However, the term ‘cyber attack’ tends to conjure visions of Dr Who’s Cyber-men, which makes the concept feel fanciful and farfetched. Unfortunately a cyber attack on an airport’s information systems is not a fanciful scenario but an increasingly apparent reality. Due to the complex and interdependent nature of critical infrastructure and their IT systems, cyber terrorism may achieve its political goals by being used to “discredit governments by negatively impacting on critical infrastructure through incapacitation, exploitation or attempts at destroying or disruption of essential services” (Cyber Security Journal, 2006). The prevention of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure is an “intimate requirement in critical information infrastructure protection” (Chantler & Broadhurst, 2006, p. 27) and the threat should not be disregarded. This kind of threat to airport security has the potential to be directly affected by the lack of incentive to invest that is often generated by the industry's security equilibrium and the infrastructure's interdependence. If the trend in the industry is not to invest in IT security, then risk management decisions based on return of investment will tend to reflect this. However, if the risk management decisions are based on ensuring business continuity (whether for reasons of economics or politics) the potential is for the industry equilibrium to eventually tip in favour of more robust critical infrastructure security trends. Explosives A threat that is taken very seriously in the protection of airports is screening for explosives. Since 2004, the Australian Government has established Checked Baggage Screening (CBS) with explosive trace detection capable x-ray equipment in each of Australia's international and, more recently, domestic airports; further plans to include all regional airports were announced in the May 2007 budget (Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, 2008). These measures are designed to prevent explosives from getting on board a passenger aircraft, or on the airside of the facility. This also closes come of the security gaps relating to different screening procedures between regional and other airports. However, threat scenarios that examine these types of vulnerablilities, such a bomb planted by an insider (such as a baggage handler) or a cargo bomb planted on an aircraft, must also be considered as they may relate to infrastructure interdependence and the differing security strategies between airports. Unfortunately there are many other scenarios that are quite credible in which other vulnerabilities are exploited. Stevens et al., (2006) lists several possible bombing scenarios for an airport environment, including; a luggage bomb of around 50 pounds which could cause mass casualties in a screening line; a curbside car bomb of up to 500 pounds detonated at gathering areas; and a tower/utility plant or large truck bomb in excess of 1000 pounds of explosive (p. iix-ix). These forms of attack are somewhat more 'conventional' with numerous examples available, from the US embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998 to the more recent 2008 bombing of the Marriot hotel in Islamabad. The devastating consequences and limited number of mitigation strategies for these types of attacks makes effective security network consultation and cooperation essential. More imaginative attacks must also be anticipated, as a series of failed mortar attacks by the IRA on Heathrow Airport in 1994 illustrates (Stevens et al., 2006, p. iix-ix). But this must be carefully balanced with the credibility and likelihood of the threat. The new security environment has added to the list of explosive threats and it is now generally accepted that “hydrogen peroxide based liquid explosives (HPOM) pose a terrorist threat to civil aviation” (De Ruiter & Lemmens, 2008, p. 205). Decisions of where and how much to invest in protection from these types of threats can be influenced by the ‘security investment trend’ across the infrastructure network. Therefore communication and consultation with larger security networks (such as the Trusted Information Sharing Network), the airport's local security network, and regional networks involving many airports should be undertaken to ensure all aspects of each identified threat have been considered in the critical infrastructure context. Firearms Stevens et al. (2006) also propose several scenarios involving firearms which may be used to conduct a public area attack. According to Stevens, et al. (2006), between 3 and ten terrorists “with body armor and automatic weapons could kill a large number of people before being stopped” (p. ix). Although a less likely scenario given Australia's strict automatic weapons laws, careful consideration that is appropriately informed by security networks support can dramatically limit the damage caused by such situations. Practical exercises coordinated

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with local law enforcement and emergency services will not only fine tune the response and recovery strategies, but also foster a good working relationship within the security network. These principles apply to any severe disruption that stretches continuity and recovery plans, and were shown to be very effective in the response to the Glasgow airport attack in 2007 (Crichton, 2007, p. 20). CBR Threats The new security environment has also brought with it fears of terrorists using biological, chemical and radiological weapons against critical infrastructure targets. Smith and Runyon (2003) assert that bio-terrorism is a credible threat, especially given that “numerous biological agents can be used as weapons” (p. 5). According to Audi, Belson, Patel, Osterloh, and Schier (2005) in their comprehensive review of the biologic toxin ricin, “threats of ricin release and procurement of ricin as a terrorist weapon highlight the need… to be vigilant for illness suggestive of ricin exposure” (p. 2342). Ricin is one of the most easily produced and lethal biologic toxins known, particularly when inhaled. Strategies for dealing with an outbreak of biological agents are reliant on many factors including training, policy, monitoring, response capacity, laboratories, and secure information and communications systems (Smith & Runyon, 2003, p. 2). Fostering a cooperative relationship of trust with the local emergency services and healthcare facilities through joint exercises is essential to ensuring that such an incident is handled effectively. Security networks can be used to coordinate such exercises regularly, and to promote cooperation and trust within these areas of infrastructure protection. Chemical weapons including nerve, blister and choking agents (Smith & Runyon, 2003, p. 8) as well as radiological devices, or ‘dirty bombs’ utilising conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material require similar considerations in terms of medical assistance and mock exercises. Less likely than more conventional attacks due to the difficulties in procurement, storage, transport and handling, these types of attacks are also largely without precedent and views range widely as to their impact. For example, Smith and Runyon (2003) state that: a radiological attack would involve low-level radioactive material... the number of people who would be sickened by such an attack and the amount of territory that could be contaminated would depend upon the type of material and the amount of conventional explosive used to spread it. (p. 9). With so many variables affecting the impact of a biological, chemical or radiological attack, it is difficult to know if mitigation and continuity strategies are going to be effective. Security networks help critical infrastructure owners to understand the realities and relevance of threats and therefore develop more credible and accurate scenarios.

THE BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLAN AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS The fourth stage of the continuity planning process is essentially one of documentation of the identified infrastructure and resources that are necessary to ensure operational continuity. Within this documentation, specific actions are set forth that deal with various contingencies or scenarios. The relevance and accuracy of these scenarios directly affects the relevance and effectiveness of the documented response actions. According to Schwartz (2003), the formulation of credible scenarios is essential to explain and test the interdependencies of critical infrastructure. According to Elias (2008), this may be done through “specific actions set forth in a series of supporting plans for operational security, surveillance and intelligence, threat response, system recovery, and coordination” (p. i). Specific actions set forth in the continuity and recovery plans that are based on inaccurate or fanciful scenarios may severely impact the effectiveness of those plans. Protecting critical infrastructure from incidents that could potentially bring the nation-state’s essential functions to a halt should be given due attention and as much detail as is practically necessary. Boin and McConnell (2007) argue that “many worst-case scenarios fail to convince and invite ridicule on the part of practitioners” (p. 57). Credible and realistic scenarios are necessary if the question of how to best allocate resources for the protection of sites of critical infrastructure is to be adequately addressed (Jenkins, 2002).  

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Working Smart Throwing the most resources at the worst case scenarios imaginable does not necessarily provide the best protection for critical infrastructure. In a review of security at Los Angeles International Airport, Stevens, et al (2006) found that security solutions tended to fall into one of four categories: 1.

Low-cost options that greatly reduced the risk of terrorism;

2.

High-cost options that greatly reduced the risk of terrorism;

3.

Low-cost options that modestly reduced the risk of terrorism, and;

4.

Expensive solutions to modest problems. (p. iix-ix).

The study also found that dramatic improvements could be made by implementing just two of the category 1 options (Stevens, et al, 2008, p. xiii). This type of approach satisfies the cost/benefit analysis of business as well as the Government's need to maintain service continuity. This partially bridges the public/private divide and indicates that the protection of critical infrastructure can be achieved in effective and cost effective ways.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES The fifth stage of continuity management involves promoting awareness and training in the Business Continuity Plan and associated emergency responses. This stage is intricately linked with local and regional security networks, and according to Waugh (2004), “investment in planning and exercising [are essential] to assure that those security networks are adequate” (p. 312). Elements of infrastructure interdependence that were considered earlier in the continuity planning process will directly impact how training and exercising is conducted, the level of investment in training, and eventually the level of coordination and cooperation during a disruption. Airport operators may ask if another airport’s contingency plans take into account a particular disruption of their network node (airport). If not, what adjustments need to be made to continuity plans to compensate? Of course, the ideal situation would involve a resounding ‘yes’ to the first question from all areas of the infrastructure network. If security networks can be effective on every level, this will help the industry ‘tip’ toward a more cooperative and integrated security culture, creating a greater incentive to invest in security. Eventually this may lead to a resounding ‘yes’ emanating from a unified infrastructure network.

RECOVERY AND ASSESSMENT The final stage of the continuity planning process is to ensure that the applied processes remain up to date and appropriate to the security environment. This is a continual process of review and improvement. The review process is integrally linked to the recovery phase of a disruption, and is essential in order to establish potential areas of improvement. The recovery stage of emergency crisis management involves the re-establishment of critical airport functions in the least time possible. Enoma and Allen (2007) identify key aspects of recovery as: 

Availability of backup or alternative for the facility;



The ease of repair or replacement;



The experience and expertise available;



The strength of the workforce;



The speed at which the security authority takes control of the situation;



The way and manner the airport officials handle the situation;



The early arrival of help from ambulances and medical crew;



Creation of support and canceling areas for those involved;



Clear communication to everybody on the situation at hand through the public address system;



Clear signage to the nearest assembly point; and



An unobstructed route to the nearest assembly point. (p. 311).

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Recovery also involves assessing the performance of the planning, preparation and response. The process of assessment can be problematical given the difficulty in determining where and how improvement has occurred, and where it is needed. Here, the importance of regional security networks that involve many airports becomes apparent, as details of recovery assessment for different airports may be compared in order to aid evaluation. Enoma and Allen (2007, p. 296) state that the use of key performance indicators for airport safety and security may provide a frame of reference for post incident assessment. They argue that key performance indicators can “aid comparison like for like so it will be possible to compare the operations of different airports” (p. 301). Rigorous benchmarks, key performance indicators as well as measurement and performance targets are tools that can assist the speed of recovery and limit the loss of lives, assets and money (Enoma & Allen, 2007, p. 313). However, no amount of planning and preparedness is adequate to prevent all extreme risks from eventuating (Wildavsky, 1988). Much literature has been published on both the requirement and the impossibility of knowing the sources and dynamics of threats well enough to avoid them all (Turner, 1978; Reason 1990, 1997; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Anheier, 1999; Gauld & Goldfinch, 2006). But given the critical nature of infrastructure, it is the responsibility of the private sector to ensure all available tools are utilised to ensure continuity and that due consideration is given to the risks and benefits of the fundamental interdependence of infrastructure. It follows that the Government must take responsibility for providing the appropriate tools for the private sector to apply, and to provide essential support through its departments and the Trusted Information Sharing Network.  

CONCLUSION The protection of critical infrastructure poses some of the most significant challenges to nation-states today. This paper examined the process of planning, incident, and recovery for Australian airports taking into consideration the problems associated with security networks and the interdependent nature of critical infrastructure. It was found that the fundamental interdependence that allows aviation infrastructure to function may be an additional source of risk which creates variations in the expected risk exposure within the infrastructure network. Mitigation strategies at one airport may be rendered ineffective or redundant by the security arrangements of another airport within the network. There is also an increasing awareness that the privatised nature of much of Australia’s critical infrastructure calls for a broader and more robust integration of public and private elements in security networks. However, the aviation infrastructure’s fundamental interdependence may also yield great benefits in creating an integrated security solution. Agreement and cooperation on security measures among a small part of the infrastructure network can change the tide of opinion and the general security outlook among aviation infrastructure owners and operators. Measures employed to increase the integration of public and private elements in security networks will assist these networks to be effective on every level. This has the potential to help the industry ‘tip’ toward a more cooperative and integrated security culture, creating a more robust security environment for Australia’s critical aviation infrastructure.

REFERENCES Anheier, H.K. (Ed.). (1999). When things go wrong: organizational failures and breakdowns. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA. Attorney General’s Department. (2005). National Counter-Terrorism Plan (2nd ed.). Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

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Attorney General’s Department. (2008). Information for business: Business continuity planning. Retrieved August 20, 2008, from http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/Information_For_BusinessBusiness_Continuit y Audi, J., Belson, M., Patel, M., Osterloh, J., & Schier, J. (2005). Ricin poisoning: a comprehensive review. Journal of the American Medical Association, 294(18), 2342-2351. Boin, A., & McConnell, A. (2007). Preparing for critical infrastructure breakdowns: the limits of crisis management and the need for resilience. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 15(1), 50-59. Boin, R.A., Kofman-Bos, C., & Overdijk, W.I.E. (2004). Crisis simulations: exploring tomorrow’s vulnerabilities and threats. Simulation and Gaming: An International Journal of Theory, Practice and Research,35(3), 378-393. Chantler, A.N., & Broadhurst, R. (2006). Critical information infrastructure protection. Technical report for the Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved August 10, 2008, from http://eprints.qut.edu.au Crichton, G. (2007). The Glasgow airport attack from a business continuity and crisis management point of view. Business and Continuity Journal, 2(3), 18-24. Cyber Security Journal. (2006). Cyber threats to the critical infrastructure of the nation. Retrieved August 14, 2008, from http://www.cybersecurityjournal.com/category/cyber-crime/ Department of Homeland Security. (2006). National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Washington. DHS. Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government. (2008). Aviation Security Measures for Carry-on Baggage at International Airports. Retrieved August 4, 2008, from http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/aviation/LAG/index.aspx De Ruiter, C.J., & Lemmens, O.M.E.J. (2008). Liquid explosives – the threat to civil aviation and the European response. In H. Schubert and A. Kuznetsov (Eds.), Detection of liquid explosives and flammable agents in connection with terrorism. Springer Science. Dupont, B. (2004). Security in the age of networks. Policing & Society, 14(1), 76-91. Elias, B. (2008). National aviation security policy, strategy, and mode-specific plans: background and considerations for congress. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from http://www.fas.org Enoma, A., & Allen, S. (2007). Developing key performance indicators for airport safety and security. Facilities, 25(7/8), 296 -315. Fleckner, A. (2005). Developing a comprehensive approach by transport operators to the terrorist threat. Proceedings of the Australian Urban Transit Security Conference. Melbourne: AHSRC.

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Gauld, R., & Goldfinch, S. (2006) Dangerous enthusiasms: E-government, computer failure and information system development. Otago University Press: Otago. Heal, G., Kearns, M., Kleindorfer, P., & Kunreuther, H. (2008). Interdependent security in interconnected networks. Proceedings of the International Public-Private Preparedness Summit, 2008. Florence. NYU. Jenkins, B.M. (2002). Get used to it: our airports are vulnerable to terrorism. Retrieved August 12, 2008, from http://www.rand.org/commentary/2002/07/25/LAT.html Kearns, M., & Ortiz, L.E. (2004). Algorithms for interdependent security games.University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved August 20, 2008, from http://books.nips.cc/papers/files/nips16/preproc/NIPS2003_AA71.pdf O'Malley, P. & Palmer, D. (1996). Post-Keynesian policing. Economy and Society, 25(2), 137-155. Pauchant, T.C., & Mitroff, I.I. (1992). Transforming the crisis-prone organization: preventing individual, organizational and environmental tragedies. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate: Aldershot. Rosenthal, U. & Pijnenberg, B. (Eds) (1991). Crisis management and decision making: simulation oriented scenarios. Kluwer: Dordrecht. Rothery, M. (2005) Critical infrastructure protection and the role of emergency services. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 20(2), 45-50. Schwartz, P. (2003). Inevitable surprises: Thinking ahead in a time of turbulence. Gotham Books: New York. Smith, J.A.D., & Runyon, L.C. (2003). Terrorism preparedness and response. Washington: National Conference of State Legislatures. Standards Australia. (2004). HB 221 Business Continuity Management. Sydney: Standards Australia. Stevens, D., et al. (2006). Implementing security improvement options at Los Angeles international airport. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved August 15, 2008, from http://www.fas.org ‘t Hart, P. (1997). Preparing policy makers for crisis management: the role of simulations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5(4), 207-215 Trusted Information Sharing Network. (2004). Critical Infrastructure Protection National Strategy. Version 2.1. Canberra. Commonwealth of Australia.

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Turner, B.A. (1978) Man-made Disasters. Wykeham: London. Waugh, W.L. Jr. (2004). Securing mass transit: a challenge for homeland security. TheReview of Policy Research, 21(3), 307-317. Wheeler, J. (2005). An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Whelan, C., & Palmer, D. (2006). Responding to terrorism through networks at sites of critical infrastructure: a case study of Australian airport security networks. Proceedings Social Change in the 21st Century Conference 2006 (pp. 1-13).Brisbane. QUT Carseldine. Wildavsky, A. (1988), Searching for Safety. Transaction: New Brunswick. Yates, A. (2003). Engineering a safer Australia: Securing critical infrastructure and the built environment. Australia: Institution of Engineers.

COPYRIGHT Melvyn Griffiths and William. J. Bailey, Edith Cowan University © 2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CDROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Modern Society as Risk Society: Implications of Modernity on Private Security David Jurcic Edith Cowan University [email protected] Abstract German sociologist Ulrich Beck has devised an exclusive theory of risk and reflexive modernisation, impacting considerably on contemporary sociological thinking (Elliott, 2002). One of the core tenants of Becks argument is that modernisation is ‘dissolving’ industrial society and in its place, leaving behind a new ‘modernity’ (Shearing & Stenning, 1981). Beck refers to this new modernity as ‘risk society’, a type of society where the notion of ‘risk’ becomes the new lens through which individual and institutional thinking is guided in contemporary societies (Hall, 2002). Drawing on the work of Beck and other scholars, this paper examines the growing concerns with security/protection, by placing the analysis within the context of the late modern or risk society. The paper attempts to demonstrate how security is likely to be impacted by present society’s growing focus towards the control and management of uncertainty and risk. Keywords Ulrich Beck; modernity; risk society; reflexive modernisation; risk management; ontological security; risk society thesis; protection. INTRODUCTION Simple Modernity to Post Industrial Era According to Ferguson (1997), simple modernity ran from a period between the 1920’s to the 1970’s. Western societies during this particular period have been described as pre-modern societies, as it was a period during which the concept of uncertainty was understood as danger or hazard over which people had little or no control (Hall, 2002). It has been suggested that the idea that people could in some way control uncertainty, was not part of the lexis at that time and in the event of some misfortune, outcomes were attributed to fate, chance or even God’s will (Hall, 2002). Hence threats were viewed as a given, but an outcome over which people or even society had little or no control (Hall, 2002). According to Shrivastava (1995), “…the logic of wealth production dominated the logic of risk production: …risks [in this era] were [viewed] as minor, and they could be treated as a latent side effects or externalities of production” (p.120). The move from classical industrial society (simple modernity) to the post industrial (modernity) era has resulted in a shift in the way society and individuals think about threats and hazards. Hall (2002) says that modernity has brought on a condition in which the logic of risk has emerged as a dominant preoccupation, whereby “Instead of viewing most threats as givens, people increasingly understand risk as products of human activities, and as a phenomena over which humans exercise control and responsibility” (p.175). Hence, “…thinking in terms of risk has become central to the way in which human agents and modern institutions organise the social world…risk managing and risk monitoring increasingly influence both the constitution and calculation of social action” (Elliott, 2002, p. 299). Risk – A New Way of Thinking Risk based ways of thinking may be observed in business, government and professional practice where individuals and institutions are persistently ordering reality into a calculable form. Furedi (2005) describes risk based thinking as the application of ‘rational management principles’ that is symptomatic of contemporary cultural attitudes towards threatening and dangerous phenomena. It seems apparent that human agents in the

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modern world are attempting to control an unpredictable future through mechanisms that aim to control risk (Elliott, 2002; Loader, 1999). Today, it is common practice for human agents within developed democracies to proactively manage risk and uncertainty, by anticipating undesirable outcomes before as apposed to retrospectively dealing with the effects as they arise (Shearing, 2001). Classical risk oriented approaches to decision making involves a temporal shift to pro-actively anticipate and forestall events that have yet to occur, but paradoxically may not actually ever occur, by changing the language of misfortune or uncertainty into a calculable probability (Hollway & Jefferson, 1997; Zedner, 2007). Through the use of methodologies and practices that attempt to order the future into calculable constructs, human agents have discovered the rationale behind the improvements and gains that are achievable during decision making, especially when risky judgements and decision need to be made. According to Beck (1992) present-day awareness of hazards or threats has become future orientated; “The centre of risk consciousness lies not in the present, but in the future…We become active today in order to prevent, alleviate or take precautions against the problems and crises of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow” (p.34). There is a growing tendency by human agents to understand what the outcomes (consequences) are likely to be, before engaging in activities that might be considered as risky (Furedi, 2005). This is supported by Los (2002) in which she states that within the new order, people have begun to “…assess potentially hazardous situations and choose how to approach them” (p.171). Reflexive Modernization - Responding to Dangers Risk society commentators like Beck, Giddens and others support the view that present day preoccupations with risk management, security (protection/loss prevention) and safety is linked to societies heightened fears of threats and hazards brought on by a climate of insecurity (Hughes, 2003). This insecurity may be due to the process of reflexive modernization which, according to Beck is at the core of risk society (Ferguson, 1997). Reiterating, since around the 1970’s, western societies have entered a new social order, an era of modernity or risk society. Within such an era, there appears to have been significant changes to the way people and the greater society perceive and then responded to hazards and dangers. Many authors discuss the new risk consciousness that exists, which essentially concerned with undesirable risk events and its management. Following on from the argument above concerning the climate of insecurity, such insecurity is then said to be linked to reflexive modernization. Insecurity may increase because of the reflex or responsive behaviours that people may have towards information about hazards and dangers. Essentially, people react and organise their behaviours and activities in manner that reflects an increased awareness of the potential harms that are out there somewhere in the world of which they form apart. People thus have a conscious recognition that potential downsides to risk do exist and that the outcome of a risk can be harmful. However, there is also an awareness of the gaps in knowledge about the possibility of future events that cannot be predicted with absolute certainty (Ferguson, 1997). Reflexive modernity may mean that individuals and institutions perceive and respond to control the possibility of unfortunate events, even with the awareness of the existence of inadvertent or unknown consequences (Ferguson, 1997). It is possible to observe links between societies concern with threats and hazards, brought on by insecurity and the corresponding reflexive application of precautionary techniques to better manage the negative consequences that have been brought on by modernisation (Hutchinson & O'Connor, 2005; O'Reilly & Ellison, 2005). For example, according to Loader (1999), “The purchase of policing services or security hardware enables…people to feel they have acted responsibly in the face of crime, reducing their levels of risk and bringing themselves some peace of mind” (p.382). There are likely to be more complex structural linkages that explain the desire for modern agents to take preemptive action to secure themselves. Many authors suggests that modern societies desire for certainty over uncertainty, precipitated by conditions of anxiety, is likely to play a substantial part in attracting human agents to courses of action that offers the ability to provide order and control to an otherwise uncertain or unpredictable future (Hollway & Jefferson, 1997). Hutchinson & O'Connor (2005) suggest that the growth of protection systems is part of the surge towards risk based thinking, which paradoxically, has become central to the practice of asset protection. The Search For Certainty Giddens as cited by Rasmussen (2002) mentions the term ‘ontological security’, a condition that is desired by at risk societies. The term implies “…the firm knowledge of what one might expect…” (p.331). Modern society is an actuarial society, where many aspects of social life are transformed from a state of unknowability, invisibility or even uncertainty, to a ‘social’ that is informed, visible, knowable and manageable (Ferguson, 1997;

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Hutchinson & O'Connor, 2005). Society’s desire for ontological security requires knowledge. The insatiable demand for knowledge is increasingly a “…function [that] is linked to the generic task of providing information for risk analysis” (Johnston, 1999, p.189). Ontological security flows from the knowledge provided by the systematic generation of information gained during the analysis of risks (Hall, 2002). There is evidence to suggest that the contemporary security discourse has adapted an actuarial frame of reference that “presumes” that security risk events are predictable and therefore calculable and manageable (Ferguson, 1997). According to Fisher & Green (1998) “Security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without [the] fear of disturbance or injury” (p.3). Security as defined here implies the creation of conditions of stability and predictability against harm and injury, which not surprisingly, is symptomatic of an at risk society. The definition seems to imply that security risk events are visible, knowable and therefore predictable. The Insatiable Demand For Protection According to Ericson, Barry, & Doyle (2000), security is at the core of modernity. Many authors support the view that there is an ‘insatiable’ demand for security due to heightened perceptions of risk (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006). Accordingly, human agents will be attracted to security as it provides a veneer of control over the fear of threats or for some, a means to control their susceptibility to victimisation (Loader, 1999). Giddens as cited by Loader (1999) describes how it is now common to see individuals, businesses and communities building protective cocoons around themselves. This apparent shift in consciousness to anticipate and forestall undesirable outcomes is exemplified by the modern approach to the provision of security, where risk based (predictive, actuarial and event based) methodologies have for many years, been a principle characteristic (O'Reilly & Ellison, 2005). Lustgarten as cited by O'Reilly & Ellison (2005) suggests that security institutions have long been in the business of providing risk management solutions, even before the onset of modernity. It is important, at least in this context, to highlight the difference between preventive methodologies in a generic sense and risk based solutions in particular. To suggest, as Lustgarten does that security intuitions have long used risk based modes of operation, would not be entirely accurate. Early security programs were not pre-emptive in a true sense as would be understood by contemporary risk discourses. Applications of preventive security measures prior to the 1970’s were driven by an enforcement mentality that required adherence to rules and the application of physical hardware that were implemented after a security breach had been realised. Hence, security measures were implemented to counter a security breach after the fact, to prevent reoccurrence, which is a reactive approach. Real applications of risk management methodologies require forward planning and proactiveness to anticipate events before they manifest into tangible loss and disruption. Such forward thinking within a security context is a modern realisation. This is supported by Shearing (2001) where he mentions that risk focused modes of governing is emerging within security. Shearing’s commentary also contradicts Johnston’s (1999) argument that the principles of risk management have been central to commercial security for more than a century. Shifting Crime Discourse According to Loader (1999), taking precautions against crime ‘risk’ within modern society is becoming the norm rather than the exception for individuals and organisations. Coleman & Sim (1998) make note of the official discourse on crime that is increasing being viewed as a risk to be managed, rather then an issue that needs to be explained. According to Shearing (2001), traditional or pre-modern modes of thought that centred on justice are being eroded by a new morality, one that is based on the logic of risk. This risk logic or ‘new penology’ as Coleman & Sim (1998) point out is focused upon an instrumentalist approach that is central to risk based thinking. It is possible to observe how traditional notions of crime control are changing due to modernity. Order maintenance, upholding social norms and making criminals accountable for past wrongs, traditionally central to criminal justice systems is according to Shearing (2001) slowly fading. The move towards modernity has changed the way society views crimes and criminals. Crime is now less attributed to economic and social conditions or demography and instead seen as a given, a normal condition of modernisation that needs to be examined in the context of probability and consequences, and measures implemented to reduce loss or prevent disruption (Zedner, 2003). “Criminality is no longer presented as a deviation from the norm but rather as continuous with normal social interaction and motivated by the same urge to utility maximisation” (Zedner, 2003, p.158). Reflexive societies have begun to deviate away from correcting past wrongs and tyring to rehabilitate offenders, to a mode of thinking that is emphasizing a conscious shift towards understanding the costs of wrongs or crimes and what can be done to prevent the likelihood of future reoccurrence. Accordingly, risk management “…is managerial, not corrective or punitive. It does not focus on problems or causes, wrongdoing or the morality of erring individuals, but on reducing risks and avoiding harm…” (Heng, 2002, p. 234).

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Risk Society and Security – A Harmonious Existence Risk societies, though it would seem, appear to be obsessed with the search for security (Johnston, 1999). Security can survive strongly within a cultural sphere that is dominated by risk based thought and action (Johnston, 1999). As society changes, security has also transformed to accommodate and feed the growing expectations of a risk society. As society exhibits a growing tendency towards risk based ways of thinking, the working practices of security have adapted to ensure that its principle mode of functioning caters for the challenges presented by contemporary risk society. Modern security has adapted the philosophy of risk management which is now firmly embedded within contemporary discourses. The working practices of security emphasise a rational, pragmatic approach to decision making. The aim is to reduce or prevent loss and therefore protect the interests of populations that are at risk of future security violations (Lippert & O'Connor, 2006). Security achieves its objectives by identifying, assessing, evaluating and quantifying risks and then providing cost effective options to reduce the probability and or consequences. This contemporary discourse ensures that security accentuates a temporal shift in its own consciousness that will motivate thought and action towards anticipation, forward planning and proactiveness. As modernity has brought with it a consciousness of risk, which according to Heng (2002) “…is bound up with attempts to control and colonize the future” (p.232) Present day security discourses have moved towards controlling and anticipating the future via proactive, calculated, risk based actions. CONCLUSION This paper introduces the risk society thesis developed by Ulrich Beck. The discussions have attempted to show how the growing concerns with risk and its management is driven by Western society’s heightened perceptions of hazards and dangers that are driven by a process of reflexive modernization. Growing concerns with threats and hazards, brought on by insecurity, causes a corresponding reflexive application of precautionary techniques. As individual and institutional thinking is being continuously guided and framed by a risk logic, we thus observe an actuarial society at work where most aspects of social life are transformed from a state of unknowability, invisibility or even uncertainty, to a society that is informed, visible, knowable, calculable and manageable. It was also shown that as society has entered a post industrial state, the working practices of security have adapted the philosophy of risk management to ensure that its principle mode of functioning caters for the challenges presented by contemporary risk society. It would appear that there is an ‘insatiable’ demand for security due to heightened perceptions of risk in the post industrial era. Human agents will be attracted to security as it provides control over the fear of threats or in some instances, will be the sole means by which these agents can reduce their levels of victimisation. Hence security enables people to feel they have some control over the wrongs or dangers that seem to be prevalent within the consciousness of the post industrial era, bringing stability and predictability. The paper also discusses how reflexive societies have begun to deviate away from correcting past wrongs and tyring to rehabilitate criminals, to a mode of thinking that is beginning to emphasize an understanding of the costs of crimes and what can be done to prevent the likelihood of future reoccurrence, consistent with a risk logic. The move towards modernity has changed the way society views crimes and criminals; crime is now less attributed to economic and social conditions and instead seen as a given, a normal condition of the late modern era that needs to be ‘dealt’ with by a risk frame of reference. It appears that security will continue to be in strong demand by a risk society. As long as insecurity prevails, and there is strong desire by human agents to pre-empt undesirable outcomes, and to bring a sense of stability and predictability to an otherwise dangerous and unpredictable world. Security will continue to exist to provide the type of protection that is tailored and which reflects the consciousness of risk society. REFERENCES Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. C. (2006). Security sector reform: bringing the private in. Conflict, Security & Development, 6(1), 1-23. Coleman, R., & Sim, J. (1998). From the Dockyards to the Disney Store: Surveillance, Risk and Security in Liverpool City Centre. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 12(1), 27-45. Elliott, A. (2002). Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment. Sociology, 36, 293-315.

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Ericson, R., Barry, D., & Doyle, A. (2000). The moral hazards of neo-liberalism: lessons from the private insurance industry. Economy and Society, 29(4), 532-558. Ferguson, H. (1997). Protecting children in new times: child protection and the risk society. Child and Family Work 2, 221-234. Fisher, R. J., & Green, G. (1998). Introduction to Security (Sixth ed.). Woburn, WA: Butterworth-Heinemann. Furedi, F. (2005). Culture of Fear: risk taking and the morality of low expectation (Revised ed.). London. New York: Continuum. Hall, D. R. (2002). Risk Society and The Second Demographic Transition. Canadian Studies in Population, 29(2), 173-193. Heng, Y. K. (2002). Unravelling the war on terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing? Security Dialogue, 33, 227-242. Hughes, G. (2003). Understanding crime prevention; Social control, risk and late modernity. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill House. Hutchinson, S., & O'Connor, D. (2005). Policing the New Commons: Corporate Security Governance on a Mass Private Property in Canada. Policing and Society, 15(2), 125-144. Jefferson, W. H. T. (1997). The Risk Society in an Age of Anxiety: Situating Fear of Crime. The British Journal of Sociology, 48(2), 255-266. Johnston, L. (1999). Private Policing in Context. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 7, 175196. Lippert, R., & O'Connor, D. (2006). Security Intelligence Networks and the Transformation of Contract Private Security. Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, 16(1), 50-66. Loader, I. (1999). Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security. Sociology, 33, 373392. Los, M. (2002). Post-communist fear of crime and the commercialization of security. Theoretical Criminology, 6, 165-188. O'Reilly, C., & Ellison, G. (2005). Eye Spy Private High. British Journal of Criminology, 46, 641-660. Rasmussen, M. V. (2002). 'A Parallel Globalization of Terror': 9-11, Security and Globalization. Cooperation and Conflict, 37, 323-349. Shearing, C. (2001). Punishment and the Changing Face of the Governance. Punishment & Society, 3, 203-220. Shearing, C. D., & Stenning, P. C. (1981). Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications. Crime and Justice, 3, 193-245. Shrivastava, P. (1995). Ecocentric Management for a Risk Society. The Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 118-137. Zedner, L. (2003). Too much security? International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31, 155-184. Zedner, L. (2007). Pre-crime and post-criminology? Theoretical Criminology, 11(2), 261-281.

COPYRIGHT David Jurcic©2007. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

       

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A new definition of Piracy in South East Asia required? P. Kevans School of Engineering Security Science Edith Cowan University Bill Bailey SECAU – Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University Abstract Many experts consider that Piracy is a serious problem in South East Asia region and that this impacts on both world trade and the economy generally. However, there is another school of thought that indicates because of the way ‘piracy’ is defined it includes what are in fact incidents that should be classified as crimes by another name. The issue appears to be the definition of what is ‘piracy’? Furthermore, the reluctance of some countries to take part in international initiatives or allow external powers to be involved in the process is also in question. They consider it to be an infringement of their national sovereignty; therefore they deem it to have greater geopolitical ends rather than a way to control the problem of piracy. These waters also have serious social and economical constraints that limit their involvement to effectively mitigate the issue.\ The response to reducing piracy incidents is neither insular nor simple; the social constructs need to be considered in providing a greater understanding of what piracy actually means in the wider context. This will allow the actual problem of ‘real piracy’ to be dealt with effectively and not to waste resources on what could be classified as ‘petty’ crime. This paper recommends that a new definition of ‘piracy is required in order to establish a new direction for combating piracy.

Keywords Piracy, Government, Legislation, Root Causes, Geopolitical, Aid, SLOC, ASEAN, UNCLOS, ReCAAP.

INTRODUCTION The subject of Piracy is one that has become very prominent on the news today with a substantial increase in the number of incidents this year. Although Somalia is currently the area of interest this paper will focus on the issue of Piracy in S.E. Asia, principally the regions of Malacca, Indonesia, Singapore Straits and the littoral states that border them. The paper will review what measures have been used to try and reduce the problem as well as the barriers associated to agreement of some of the proposed regional and international initiatives that are being proposed. The process will review the definitions of piracy in a legal context, to ascertain if the legal designations realistically reflect it broadly enough to allow effective application in perceived mitigating mechanisms. Conversely consider whether the definitions themselves are acting as a barrier to ratification of security initiatives and protocols. The overall premise of research should allow for a more effective understanding of the crime threat while considering the influential nodes that may alter the threat level. This in turn should assist the Security function, both State and private shipping operators in the application of security policies and strategies that could prevent or mitigate crimes at sea? Objectives and Aims The principal aim of the paper is to identify the level of piracy threat to the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and Shippers in South East Asia (S.E.Asia). Establish some of the root causes of piracy on a local and regional level including social economical aspects of the crime and identify any risk transfer nodes that may be established when these influences are established. Based upon these aspects a redefinition of ‘Piracy’ will be suggested as a method to focus resources at the actual problem and not petty crime side issues. 61

Overall the premise is to emphasise that the issue of piracy is not a simple issue that can be adequately prevented just by heightened frequency of marine patrols. It is offered that the threat of piracy remains where an ineffective policing strategy is assigned. Especially if it fails to consider the inductive functions of the crime nodes and mechanisms, as well as the barriers to achieve or maintain an accepted mitigating construct. Significance The principal purpose of this paper is to identify whether Piracy in South East Asia (S.E.Asia) is resulting in a significant impact to global shipping as some regional and international governments perceive it be and why they are pressuring coastal states to effectively address the problem. This pressure is centred on the assignment of enforcing agencies and ratification of both regional and international protocols. It can be offered that the international focus is based on the protection of shipping routes or Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) which carry critical infrastructure commodities which are of global economic significance. On this basis a high monetary significance could be assigned. The annual Asia global marine market is estimated to be worth US$ 254 Bn (Parsons, Westwood, Rowley, 2002) as figure 1 below indicates, with some 45% (Barrios 2004, P1) of the worlds shipping passing through the S.E.Asia region as such many countries relying on the trade links then any significant threat requires mitigating for.

Figure1. Geographic Segmentation of the US$747Bn. Westwood Associates UK (2002) Global Ocean Markets Although as stated by Maritime International Secretariat Services (MARISEC) website (The Round Table of International Shipping Associations, 2004, P.1) it is difficult to quantify the value of world seaborne trade in monetary terms. Douglas Westwood associates from the UK in a later paper (2005, p.24) give reference to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) who hazard an estimate, that the operation of merchant ships contributes about US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5% of total world trade. On this basis and that the segmentation provided in figure 1 remains applicable this indicates that Asia merchant shipping is valued at an approximate 129bn USD. Also in considering critical infrastructure commodities, Zubir M (2005, p.6) suggests that oil and gas shipments passing through the Malacca straits alone are estimated to be somewhere in the region of 11 million barrels a day, in example this route services some 80% of Japans Oil import requirements. This being the case and on recent barrel values reaching $USD 130 (BBC News, 2008) then any threat to the safe transit of this highly sensitive priced commodity could potentially result in a global economy downturn, stifling Asia growth and possibly resulting in a return to the economic levels of 1998 Asia market crash.

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Currently there continues to be healthy expansion in the shipping industry as indicated in figure 2, which identifies nearly a doubling in growth in dry weight tonnage (dwt) over 300 gross tonnes.

Figure2. Total world merchant fleet by national and foreign registries as of January 1st, 1995 – 2007 (dwt index 1995 = 100) Heideloff, (2007) This growth is further compounded by a reduction in the number of vessels being scrapped; figure 3, which potentially indicates that the SLOC are in the short term likely becoming more congested as older vessels remain in service, thus posing a safety risk, while also offering more opportunity to pirates.

Figure 3. World tonnage additions and reductions 1994-2006 dwt, Heideloff, (2007) Due to these global economic values then why are countries being assigned a responsibility to act by the International community, not ratifying regional agreements or United Nations International codes? Firstly the premise of this paper is to identify; 

What are the legal definitions of piracy and

 Identify whether piracy in S.E. Asia actually poses a serious threat to regional and even international global trade as may be suggested by experts and authors. While doing so:  Ascertain if piracy in international waters or armed robbery, in states territorial waters, International Maritime Bureau [IMB definition] should be re classified to correctly define the crimes that are being committed. It is proposed that these influences must be considered as both barriers and risk reduction concepts that will subsequently enable international, regional power nations with a vested interest in the region as well as the 63

Shippers themselves to better consider strategies, while reducing the threat and the influences of marine based crime.

Research Premise The fundamental research premise is based on the general threat of piracy in the region and in such the principal focus will be made towards the regional and geopolitical responses by governments and industry alike. To achieve this effectively it is necessary to identify and provide examples of the threats and response in relation to comment, theory or definition as that may be proffered by a research paper author, book or assigned legislative function or marine standards as well as industry and government issued piracy data. Where interviews are undertaken the research function is based on that as suggested by Cohen, Manion (2000, p.27), Research Methods in Education. Background The focus of many papers points to Indonesia waters as some of the most active and dangerous waters in the world, Beckman, 2002, p.317. Beckman further highlights that from 1999 to 2000 resulted in a 56% increase in incidents and this was a fourfold increase compared to 1991. The author however does not indicate any potential external influences to this increase in his example. Asia suffered financial crises in 1998, which started after a devaluation of the Thai Baht in 1997, and this resulted in massive regional unemployment and overall economic downturn bringing some countries to the virtual brink of collapse. Emmer, 2007, in a working paper on piracy offers that; “The rise in Piracy has resulted from social economic difficulties face after the 1997 [not felt until 1998] Asia crash. Poverty and unemployment resulted in piracy, an attractive income for coastal communities.” (Emmers 2007, p.9) Southeast Asia specifically Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore noted the following step changes in reported piracy incidents: 

Indonesian Waters 1998, 60 incidents to 2000 119 incidents



Singapore Waters (Straits) 1998, 1 to 14 in 2000



Malaysia 1998, 10 to 21 in 2000

 Malacca Straits running between Malaysia, Indonesia and at its south, sitting Singapore went from 1 in 1998 to 75 in 2000 Figure 4 provides a trend of piracy and armed attack incidents collated from IMB reports 1991 to first quarterly reports 2008. This provides a clear indication of incident uplift 1994 to 2000 and subsequent decline thereafter to 2008.

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Total Attempted & Actual Piracy Incidents 380 360 340 320 300 280 260 240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Indian & Sub-continent

S.E.A Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore

)

07 (M a

rc h

20 08

06 20

05 20

04 20

03 20

02

20

Year

20

01 20

00 20

99 19

98 19

97 19

96 19

95 19

94 19

93 19

92

S.E.A & India Subcontinent

19

19

91

N u m ber

(IMB Reports 2001 - 2007 - S.E.A, India, Far East, India, Sub-Continent)

Figure 4. International Marine Bureau (IMB), 2001 - 2007 Piracy Reports,

Although since 2000 there has been a steady overall decline in piracy incidents in S.E. Asia although there was an upward turn in 2003, the trend has dropped by some 69% from 2000 to 2007 with incidents reported in the region running on par with 1991 piracy reports of 102 and 109 in 2007, this is also comparable to the incident levels pre-Asian Crash. However positive, this suggests that even in good time’s piracy remains and this may be attributed to a function of community acceptance as well as a marginalization of coastal communities. This is not to assign all the improvements in incident frequency to one facet as other constructs need to be discussed and addressed. Although on initial data trending the link between economic stability is potentially a principal influential factor. The downward trend in statistics has been attributed to the littoral states enforcement initiatives (IMB, 2005 p.22) however this has been sporadic at best since being introduced between Singapore and Indonesian navies through the Indonesian Singapore Coordinated Patrols (ISCP) patrols which commenced in 1992, see figure 5 below:

65

Total Attempted & Actual Piracy Incidents - Key Events

US Threatens to send Troops to Malacca region

(IMB Reports 2001 - 2007 - S.E.A - Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore) Oil Prices drop to a 12 year low at $10/ barrel OPEC fails to cut d ti

220 200 180 160

Indonesia reduces poverty through Industrial Employment 60% in 1970 to 14% in 1994, Sai S.W. Latt (2007. P.62)

Num ber

140 120 100

First The Indo-Sin Coordinated Patrols (ISCP)

Oil Price increases by 17%

SARS affects Toursim

Indonesia: 20 Million Unemployed 79.4 M in Poverty

US/ UK Aftganistan Bombings Aceh peace agreement / Indoensia elections

80 60 On 1/12/98 mandatory ship reporting system & AIS Malacca & Singapore Straits & new TSS

20 0 Year 1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Anti-corruption Initiative Indonesia

Oil $45 /b

Thai Bhat Depreciated

40

IMO introduced Alarms on Vessels >500 gt

Allie War on Iraq

9/11 Terrorist attacks USA

Asia Financial Crash / USD dollar tumbles

1998

Indonesia: 20 Million Unemployed 140 Million in Poverty / President Suharto Loses election

1999

2000

Indonesia 26% rise in Fuel, 30% Rise in Basic Foods Oil $130/b. Riots in Countries, Protests Indonesia. Fuel Subsidies being reduced Malay & Indo

US puts pressure on Indonesia - elections & maintains arms embargo

Oil $30 /b

240

2001

Oil $50 /b

Tsunami & Aceh Ceasfire

Insurance War Rating start/ stop

Littoral State 'coordinated' patrols Malacca Littoral States increase Patrols. TNI/ Malay Navies praised for apprehending pirates by IMB (EIS)

2002

2003

2004

Littoral State 'joint' patrols

US Indonesian military restrictions lifted

2005

2006

2007

Oil Facts & figures: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GE26Dj02.html / Asia Crises Information http://www.asiasociety.org/publications/update_crisis_ching.html / Shipping Info: http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=476&doc_id=1339 / http://www.mindef.gov.sg/cyberpioneer/backissuesoctnews.htm

Figure 5: Plotted ‘Key Events’ against IMB Piracy Reports 1991 – 2008 (1st Quarterly Report), Appendices 7, and p.134

Through further review of these nodes it is proposed that the investigation process may allow for the redefinition of either piracy or armed robbery as assigned under legal function. This is especially apt were it is established that some of the nodes are acting as a barrier to the effective application of security functions.

Piracy what is it and what are the definitions?

What is Piracy? Hitts (2000, p.6) suggests that Piracy in S.E.Asia was re-ignited in the 70’s and 80’s when S.E.Asia fishermen grew desperate from economic problems as their once ‘stable livelihoods’ became entwined with the ‘boombust’ global economy and also when there was an influx of Vietnamese boat people escaping from the Vietnam conflict who became easy pickings while stories emerged of horrific vessel boarding’s involving robbing, raping and killings. Internationally it was recognised as an issue in 1958 when the Geneva Convention of the High Seas was adopted by the international community. This was followed in 1982 when through the U.N’s International Marine Organisation (IMO) the U.N Convention of Law at Sea (UNCLOS, 1998) and the issue of piracy was established under article 101. Piracy is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, Article 101 as follows; “Piracy” consists of any of the following acts: (a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

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2008 (March)

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b). ”2 “Armed robbery against ships” is defined in the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (resolution A.922 [22], Annex, paragraph 2.2), as follows: “Armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.” IMO (2008 p.2), Piracy Acts November Report, issued 11th January 2008 This definition does have an impact on how incidents are reported, and is especially relevant when considering acts of boarding, violence and attack in international waters or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) which are categorised as piracy while incidents in states territorial waters such as Indonesia and Malaysia are categorised as ‘armed robbery’. Under Article 101 of the UN Convention of Law at Sea [UNCLOS] piracy is defined as an ‘international crime’. The problem with the definition is that certain littoral states are reluctant to agree to the application of international law in their sovereign waters and the inclusion of Armed Robbery which groups all marine crime. (Beckman, 2002 p.320), in short it is their waters, therefore their problem, under their law. It can be said that the law definition of armed robbery itself fails to adequately define incidents that occur in territorial waters of a country and in turn this may be acting as a barrier to user and regional state initiatives. In fact in considering that the types of incidents occurring in the main are not as IMO defined ‘armed robbery’ in its full context and this is a principal barrier to agreement. Dillon (2005, p.1) suggests that current definitions also overlook corruption among port authorities and classify maritime terrorism together with reports of dockworkers stealing cans of paint. A more recent protocol offered, is the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 2005 this further clouds the issue of definition between terrorism and unlawful acts which in turn amplifies the concerns of non-ratifying states. Beckman (2002 p.330) suggests the ratification by all countries and application of the SUA Convention could be an; ‘’important tool for combating major criminal hijacks in Southeast Asia…. If all the states in Southeast Asia were parties to the convention’, and many are not, those persons who undertake actions in international waters would be categorized as “international criminals”. This may be true however both Indonesia and Malaysia have ratified UNCLOS they have not ratified the SUA Convention 1998 or its update of 2005. As Barrios (2004. p.1) highlights pursuit of pirates is requirement of all ratifying states under UNCLOS however once the pirates enter a third parties or their own waters they then fall outside the jurisdiction of the pursing party and the pursuit has to stop this is why joint initiatives are being pressed for in allowing agreement to continue to pursue in to neighbouring waters. This function though is potentially superseded by the 2005 SUA convention, in effect removing sovereignty rights and allowing entry under the premise of terrorist prevention (Hughes, 2004 p.8).

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In reality the UNCLOS convention stills remains un-ratified by 37 of the world countries including the USA. Also there are ‘gaps’ in the law which would benefit from further qualification such as terrorism, kidnapping and other broadly termed unlawful acts under SUA as well as that assigned to marine ‘armed robbery’ itself. In confirmation of codes and protocols narrowness of armed robbery definition, in 2005, IMB director Pottengal Mukundan stated that ‘the vast majority of attacks on ships in waterways [state] were opportunist, low-level crimes’ (MIMA News Flash, p.11). Are these really armed robbery under the definition of the IMB? If an act of violence occurs it could be termed armed robbery however most perpetrators are carrying tools for the purpose of ‘breaking and entry’ into the ships store or for cutting away a ships equipment such as a life raft.

Are these types of thefts were the perpetrator is armed with tools such as a crow bar or knife for the purpose of ‘breaking and entry’ or ‘burglary’ not the same? Why doesn’t the UK Home office report such incidents separately, it can be assumed that their classification is termed as ‘theft’ if not ‘petty theft’ under the terms of UK law. In this respect and if the same premise is assigned by non-ratifying states a similar opinion can be drawn in that most of the incidents reported are petty in nature and therefore the definition overall is ineffective in considering all the functions of crime that are played out. Figure 6 provides an indication of the some of the barriers associated to full state ratification by S.E.ASIA states Sovereignty Issues in  cross border pursuits

Detention of vessels and  reverted cost risk to state and  accusation of ‘state’ piracy 

SUA 2005 in essence allows a  ratifying state to board a  vessel suspected of unlawful  acts potentially in other state  waters (does not apply to non‐

of international law.State

SUA 2005 Protocol  Ratification    

Barrier

Broaden IMO  / SUA  Definition to include  th i i

Ratification 

Most incidences of Piracy  [armed robbery] are low level  pilfering incidents carried out 

SUA Ratification 

State 

Only encompasses Piracy does not  cover other more damaging marine  i h ill l fi hi

Joint State Initiatives

Broaden IMO / SUA  Definition to recognise  the low level crime 

Broaden IMO / SUA  Definition to include  other marine crimes &  terms of detention

Unlikely to be ratified as the  definition of terrorist or  unlawful act is not well  defined. In essence allows  countries such as the USA  unimpeded access to other  States waters.  Furthermore  h USA h if

Treatment

Outcome

Figure 6: Barriers to the ratification of SUA 1998 / 2005

So what are the real threats to Shipping? 68

In comparing the volume of marine traffic using the Malacca straits and the number of incidents this establishes a less worrying representation than one might expect, the attack rate is less than one percent. That is for every 62,000, approximate vessels sailing through the Malacca straits the vessel would have 0.01% of being attacked even if this was equated to the high number of incidents noted in late 1990’s it is still less than 1%. If we also consider that the rate of traffic is predicted to increase and if the rates of attack remain the same the risk reduces even further. A general representation of risk value based upon IMB Piracy reports over 17 years is provided in figure 9 below:

0.011% 0

0.018%

0.045%

0.019%

0.003%

0.002%

0.000%

0.005%

0.003%

0.020%

0.005%

0.040%

0.008%

0.060%

0.011%

%

0.080%

0.052%

0.100%

0.026%

0.120%

0.027%

0.121%

0.140%

0.061%

Percentage Piracy Incidents based on 62000 Vessels Traversing Malacca Straits

19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 20 08 0 (M 7 ar ch )

0.000%

Figure 9: Malacca traits ‘actual and attempted’ Piracy attacks IMB Piracy Reports 1991 – 2008 (Quarter 1 report) . In considering that a high volume of incidents, 70%, were carried out when the vessel was not steaming and the value assigned to most of the incidents could be termed as small, highlighted later, then to a large extent the majority could be termed ‘opportune pilfering incidents’. Out of the 245 attacks reported between January 1st 2005 and March 31st 2008 in the Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia regions 193 incidents when actual boarding’s. 57% [110] of the reports indicated perpetrators were armed, ninety nine of these reports actually detailed the types of arms used the majority of cases, knives were the prominent weapon. Piracy Research Definition On basis of research and identification of interrelated nodes a general definition of Piracy and Armed Robbery is offered in specific regard to South East Asia, and consideration of the barriers to acceptance in its present form: 

Piracy:

“Piracy” is defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101) is in the main adequate and should remain.

(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers or ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

69

(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b). The premise of pursuit by state into other countries territorial waters should continue to be made by previous formal memorandum of understanding or ratification of agreement between the two states or groups. In doing so this maintains the sovereign rights of the states in which its jurisdiction is held. Armed Robbery is influenced by a number of nodes and therefore the IMO and IMB definition needs to be expanded. 

Armed Robbery

Armed Robbery undertaken in a States waters whether the vessel is steaming, moored or berthed remains the responsibility of the State in which its jurisdiction falls and should be prosecuted as per laws of that state in which the unlawful acts occur. On this premise the following terms are provided as guidance to the states in which the attack occurs. In any case in the event the vessel leaves states waters and enters international waters the terms of Piracy are engaged and in doing so it is elevated to an International Crime.  Serious Crime; The perpetrator(s) who may be a member of the crew or passenger, or other persons who have externally boarded the vessel unless otherwise indicated. a) Vessel Hijack is the taking control of a vessel and moves the said vessel through either operation by the perpetrator(s) or by a crew or member of the public or state officer by means of threat of, or actual violence whether the perpetrator is armed, or not in the pursuit of stored or transited goods, equipment, monies or other financial gain including the theft of the vessel itself. b) Armed Robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or actual threat of violence against a member of the crew, public or state officer in the pursuit of stored or transited goods, equipment or monies or other financial gain on a vessel which is berthed, steaming or moored in a states territorial waters by the perpetrator(s). In the event of physical assault then the indictments should therefore be viewed in respect of these additional events. c) Kidnap against persons on ships whether they is berthed, steaming or moored in a states territorial waters by the perpetrator(s). The perpetrator(s) may be a member of the crew or passenger, or other persons who have externally boarded the vessel. Definition is provided in reference to Archbold 19-331 to 19348, under the UK Crown Prosecution Service, the general premise is provided in example only;

There are two elements to the offence: 

removal of person(s) by another by force or threat of force



without the consent of the person so taken or carried away; lawful excuse.

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The law further indicates that kidnapping will include or be followed by the commission of assault sexual or aggravated or murder or attempted murder and the indictments should therefore be taken in review of these additional events. (CPS UK, Archbold 19-331 to 19-348) d) Unlawful or False Imprisonment against persons on ships by the perpetrator(s). Definition is provided in reference to Archbold 19-331 to 19-348, under the UK Crown Prosecution Service, the general premise is provided in example only;-

‘False imprisonment …. involving the unlawful and intentional or reckless detention of the victim. An act of false imprisonment may amount in itself to an assault. If the detention was for the purpose of committing another indictable offence, and such an offence was committed, a count for the substantive offence will usually be enough’ (CPS UK)

o Lesser Crime: The perpetrator(s) who may be a member of the crew or passenger, or other persons who have externally boarded the vessel unless otherwise indicated. a. Breaking and Entry by unlawful means by perpetrator(s) in the pursuit and actual retention of stored or transited goods, equipment or monies or other financial gain without threat of violence or actual harm to persons on a vessel which is berthed, steaming or moored in a states territorial waters b. Trespass with intent by unlawful means by perpetrator(s) who are persons who have externally boarded a vessel which is berthed, steaming or moored in states territorial waters, in the pursuit and attempted retention of stored or transited goods, equipment or monies or other financial gain without actual threat of violence or harm to persons on. These definitions would allow more constructive assessment of crime types in regard to a States law compared to those presently being assigned by both the IMO and IMB. This in turn may improve the reporting of ‘serious’ incidents by shippers and states, which currently deems the function of ‘armed robbery’ as too broad in that it encompasses all facets of the crimes being carried out. Further to this the basis of redefinition and expansion of armed robbery will better support security functions as defined under ISPS in quantification of the threat level and in doing so assign more effective mitigating controls. In regard to the 2005 SUA convention in which the premise of entry to states waters on the basis of preventing a terrorist act or were the vessel or persons on board is believed to be involved in such activities. Ratification remains unlikely as it supersedes the UNCLOS statement of pursuit approval into territorial waters undermining the states jurisdiction. The definition of terrorism or unlawful acts is not provided and this is cause for concern as the premise of boarding or stopping a vessel is essentially made by the pursuing party. Additional functions should also be applied in consideration of other marine crimes such as smuggling of states goods, natural resources including fish, as well as people. To emphasize some of the disparity of the laws attributed to piracy, the UK abolished corporal punishment was abolished through the ratification of the European Union’s Human Rights Convention. [hanging] in 1965, (Wildash, 2008 p.1) however it wasn’t until 1998 that hanging for pirates At present no regulation or suggestion on criminal penalties is provided under UNCLOS for piracy or armed robbery, however UNCLOS does deter custodial sentence for illegal fishing and therefore any deterrence is limited. This provides further clarification that the law of piracy and armed robbery should be adequately defined but so should, smuggling, Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported fishing (IUU) and people trafficking under the international community protocols which would clearly benefit from an overhaul. This would address some 71

of the barriers to ratification while provide recognition of the problems faced by some of the less developed countries face. In turn terrorism the ‘de rigeur’ word of recent age, must be defined without a clear definition it has far reaching security, political and social consequences that could do more harm than good. The ship in the water on the basis of statistics review is at much less risk of serious incident to what it has been over the last eight years. In regards to low level incidents underreporting has been brought about by the actions of the Lloyds war rating and the focus of external functions such as ASEAN, ReCAAP and IMB. Although on the surface they can be seen as positive mitigating mechanism the focus and application has likely further distanced Indonesia and Malaysia from ‘open reporting’ in what are in the main low cost incidents that do not warrant a grouping under a ‘piracy’ premise. Countries like the UK do not differentiate between onshore and offshore crime, yet littoral states are expected to. This is perceived by Littoral States to be an unfair application of law that that does warrant the international interest that it receives. A positive move would be the development of a more encompassing maritime crime protocol which recognises other facets of marine crime, which are impacting on SLOC bordering States. If the perceptions of non-user SLOC states in regard to marine crime are not considered in future protocols and codes then any proposal is unlikely to receive effective ratification. In conclusion, the concept of piracy under UNCLOS is the most useful in terms of legality however there are clear weaknesses in regard both the modes and severity of attack required in providing assignment as an ‘international crime’ and even grouped under a terrorist banner as SUA does especially for state based water incidents. When the majority can be termed ‘petty’ at best, even ‘breaking and entry’ and in some cases only trespass with intent to steal. Therefore it is necessary to provide a more encompassing definition of marine crime, which may remove barriers of ratification, however before this can be accomplished additional influences and a clearer understanding of the threats need to be reviewed. This paper has suggested on area that could be reformed with little difficulty.

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COPYRIGHT Bill Bailey and P. Kevans ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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The use of red teaming in the corporate environment: A study of security management, vulnerabilities and defence Greg Lane GHD Pty Ltd David Brooks SECAU Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University Abstract This study explored the use of red teaming within the Western Australian mining sector. Red teaming is the formation of a team of experts with the goal of attacking a company’s infrastructure, with permission to find flaws and weaknesses in their security. A series of interviews were conducted with security professionals within the mining sector to gauge the level of red teaming knowledge and to investigate the current security red teaming practices. The study interviews demonstrated a lack of security testing within the mining industry. However, the interviews indicated that companies would find value in using red teaming exercises to evaluate the level of security in their current systems, in particular, security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the intention of this study was to provide foundation information regarding red teaming. This approach allowed the development of a proposition to focus on the introduction and use of the red teaming methodologies within the corporate security environment. Such a proposition allows an interpretive inquiry to develop, test and measure a corporate red teaming model. Keywords Red teaming, vulnerability assessment, security audit, war gaming

INTRODUCTION The Western Australian resource sector is currently booming, with millions of dollars invested into the sector for new exploration projects and mine sites to capitalise on the valuable minerals beneath the surface. It is vital for the security considerations of both new and existing sites to be taken seriously, not only to protect the valuable assets but also to ensure the safety of the personnel onsite. Red teaming methodologies provide a way to assess the effectiveness of the current security measures and identify potential weak points that expose possible avenues of attack. “The concept of red teaming is far from new. It has been used (under that name or others) in government, military, and civilian circles in a variety of contexts” and “in the business world, red teaming usually means a peer review of a concept or proposal. In government circles it is normally associated with assessing vulnerabilities of systems or structures, especially within the informationwarfare arena” (Malone, & Schaupp, 2002). As Malone and Schaupp describe, the use of red teaming has a long history in the military and ultra high security government applications. A view supported by White and Conklin, who stated that “emergency service organisations and the military frequently use exercises to test how their personnel will react to specific situations” (2004). Red teaming is also used in the military, as “the US Department of Defence (DoD) typically use red teams in force on force exercises, in which attackers (red team) go toe-to-toe with defenders (blue team)” (White & Conklin, 2004). However, there is a growing trend for companies to use red teaming as a part of an extensive risk management process. Many authors “believe that red teaming, which is the practice of attacking systems to better understand how to defend them is a necessary practice” (Ray, Vemuri & Kantubhukta, 2005). Red teams allows a company to gain a greater understanding of exposure to vulnerabilities and how critical known threats may assessed. This approach to risk mitigation allows internal processes to be developed to deal with such security incidents. The American Defence Science Board Task Force stated that “Red Teaming deepens understanding of options available to adaptive adversaries and both complements and informs intelligence collection and analysis” (Defence Science Board Task Force, 2003).

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BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY In 2005-06 the value of Western Australia’s Mineral and Petroleum industry reached $43.2 billion. In this period the Department of Industry and Resources reported that Western Australia hosted 560 commercial mineral projects, which had a total of 1222 operating mine sites (Department of Industryand Resources, 2006). Due to the remote nature of the mining operations, the security within this sector can sometimes be overlooked. This study investigated the use and knowledge of red teaming methodologies, and if they have a place in the security planning and auditing process within the Western Australian resource sector. Structured interviews of practising mining or allied industry security managers were used to respond to prescribed research questions. Interviews allowed richer data to be gathered, gaining a greater insight into the use and understanding of red teaming.

RED TEAMING Red teaming is not a new concept; it has been used in many forms over the years, typically in high security applications such as the military. “By definition and purpose, the Red Team takes an attacker like approach to testing security” (Peake, 2003). The United States military has been using red teaming for security testing and auditing for some time. Military testing has used red teaming methodologies to evaluate the security for various high security installations, such as nuclear power plants and other key infrastructure sites. Generally red teaming exercises include a red team who play the attackers, and a blue team who take the role of the defenders. These teams will participate in an exercise which attempts to simulate an actual attack (White & Conklin, 2004). However in the business world, red teaming usually refers to a peer review of a concept or proposal, and in government circles it is generally associated with the investigation of vulnerabilities of systems of structures, especially in the IT arena. (Malone & Schaupp, 2002, p. 2). In some larger international corporations with critical national infrastructure, red teams are used to emulate the methods and procedures of enemy hostile intelligence or rival competitive intelligence services. These teams utilise a mock program to test their companies internal security systems (Helms, Ettkin, & Morris, 2000, p. 129). The Seattle Police Department has bee utilising red teaming exercises in both small and large scenarios for a number of years, including exercises such as the 2003 TOPOFF2, 2005 Marine Terrorism Response Exercise and the 2005 TOPOFF3 full scale exercise in Connecticut. They have stated that employing ‘red team’ techniques is a major initiative in the intelligence and warning mission area (Meehan, 2007). Meehan separates red teaming activities into two major categories, analytical red teaming (passive) and physical red teaming (active). The following eleven steps combine to form the basic structure of the red teaming process: • Determine the objectives of desired results • Communicate with government and private partners • Determine the scale and type of exercise, the type of scenario, the method of evaluation, and the documentation plan • Develop the scenario • Identify and train the appropriate participants • Conduct and evaluate the exercise • Prepare thorough documentation • Evaluate the performance • Develop the improvement plan • Make the required and desired improvements • Exercise again (Meehan, 2007) 78

However, in recent years the information technology sector has been increasingly employing the use of red teaming methodologies to test the security of IT systems, computer servers and their Internet presence. Often called penetration testing, a company can use internal staff or employ an external entity to attempt to break into their systems. The importance of penetration testing in a networked environment is explained further by Budiarto, et al, “the best way of ensuring that the system is secure is to attempt penetration testing. This would be the most effective way to find exploits and to proof whether a system is vulnerable” (Budiarto, Ramadass, Samsudin, & Noor, 2004, p. 563).This vulnerability evaluation helps expose flaws and oversights, in an effort to increase the overall system security. Risk and risk management have always been an important consideration in a company’s planning process, both in terms of normal operations and security. Moreover, there has been a growing trend in the use of professional risk management planning and tools with standards, such as the risk management standard AS/NZS4360:2004. This standard defines a risk management process and considers, in depth, how it can be employed in the company’s own internal risk processes. The risk management process assists the company to identify the risks that it may be exposed too and attempts to define a process that can mitigate these risks, usually through security measures to protect the company and its interests. Duncan suggests that "The risk management audit is a primary method used to review the effectiveness of the company’s risk management functions.” (Duncan, 1991, p.48). Red teaming offers a process that can be used to audit a company’s security process and in addition, report on the effectiveness of the risk management procedures that are currently in place. The use of red teaming within the corporate environment has been difficult to gauge due to the very limited literature on the subject. However there is now appears to be a growing trend for companies to use red teaming as a part of an extensive risk management process. This study set out to discover if red teaming was currently being used within the Western Australian resource sector and investigates the level of knowledge that security professionals have on this topic.

FINDINGS When the research topic was first proposed, several research questions were put forward in regard to red teaming within the Western Australian mining sector. These research questions considered the level of red teaming knowledge within the sample group, the application and acceptance of red teaming within the West Australian mining sector and whether the industry could benefit from such a security approach. Through the use of structured interviews with security professionals, the research questions were addressed, standardised semistructured interviews determine the exact wording and sequence of the questions in advanced and all interviewees are asked the same basic questions (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 353). The results of these interviews show a wide variance in the level of knowledge relating to red teaming methodologies and vulnerability assessments. Additionally the research showed a general lack of post installation security testing within the industry in general. This is further supported by Furnell and Papadaki, who state that “Testing readiness is a standard practice in other contexts (e.g. fire safety drills, military defence exercises), as it is recognised that one cannot wait for an incident to occur in order to determine the level of preparedness.” (Furnell & Papadaki, 2008, p. 11). Understanding red teaming The level of knowledge of red teaming that the security professionals in the resource sector had was generally very limited. While most had some academic knowledge of red teaming, this had rarely been applied and their knowledge appears to have a close similarity to prominent articles available in popular journals. Their knowledge tended to be generally focused on red teaming in terms of defence and penetration testing in an information technology environment. Due to the academic levels of the people interviewed, it may be possible that the red teaming knowledge was gained through academic pursuits and therefore would be limited by the available literature. The literature on red teaming is generally lacking and tended to be focused on activities by the United States Defence Force in testing security to key high security government assets. While these articles do contain important information on the structure of a red teaming exercise, have the benefit of being refined over decades of use and studied by the people who are directly involved with their execution, they do not directly relate to the use of red teaming in a corporate environment. Only one of the people interviewed had any direct knowledge of red teaming within a corporate environment and specifically within the resource sector.

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While this knowledge related directly to one of the research questions, its value was somewhat diminished as no particular model was used. When questioned further regarding this, it was discovered that for each exercise a plan was developed according to the scope of the project being undertaken. While this may prove beneficial, when a security professional is performing the exercise – who has a good depth of experience upon which they can draw to develop a red teaming methodology to suit – there is a potential for introduced flaws that may cause a bias in the results and generally reduce the quality of the exercise. These biases may take the form of the security professional’s opinions, previous experiences in similar situations or their own unique evaluation of the issues being dealt with. The support of upper management was expressed as a key concern in all interviews. It was discussed that the red teaming exercise needs their support so that security staff and managers who may have implemented security measures in the past do not affect the results. Eckert has investigated the reluctance of upper management to perform these tests and stated “businesses are reluctant to discuss security gaps they discover in their systems, fearing it may expose them to liability” (Eckert, 2002).

The concern was raised that a red teaming exercise may show dramatic weaknesses in the security currently in use. If staff who are responsible for this security are directly involved, they may attempt to control the red team process especially in the case of dramatic failures in security. This concern is also raised by Lodal and Shinn, they recognise that this can sometimes be a difficult process. They suggest that “The real challenge for the Red Team is not architecture or technology, however. It is getting political leadership to break the bureaucratic rules and move fast in order to plug the security threat” (2002, p. 6). Several of the interviews with security professionals who had academic knowledge of red teaming, described it as a structured methodology with a combination of management planning, design and technology, as well as a specialised technical form of brain storming. From these descriptions it is apparent that they consider red teaming primarily as a desktop activity focusing on a study of facilities or assets, and proposing possible angles of attack with a physical exercise either excluded completely or forming only a small component of the project. While this may be a valid methodology in assessing the security of a facility or asset, it appears to be very similar to a typical vulnerability or risk assessment with the possible inclusion of a small demonstration upon the conclusion of the project. It lacks the ability to test the actual implementation of the security hardware, policies and procedures, as well as testing the response to a possible breach. Application of red teaming The use of red teaming within the Western Australian mining sector appears to be minimal to nonexistent, with only one of the interviewees having any knowledge of red teaming ever being used. The security professional interviewed that did have knowledge of red teaming being used in the sector, advised that its use was minimal and typically was only being used on assets with very high monetary values. It was also noted that the use of red teaming was highly dependent on the attitudes of management and the experience of the security professional. Exploring this further, it appeared that even when red teaming was employed, it took the form of a desktop study with some practical demonstrations upon completion to allow the client to visualise the weaknesses. While this may be effective, it does tend to have more in common with a typical vulnerability assessment then a strict red teaming exercise. To explore the level that vulnerability assessments are used and to help gauge the level of security testing that is currently in place, the security professionals interviewed were queried on their experiences performing vulnerability assessments within the mining sector. Vulnerability assessments were considered of high importance by all security professionals interviewed, with an emphasis placed on the physical and procedural aspects of security as the key areas in which they are used. Other areas that were considered important included personnel and, health and safety, as they were considered closely linked with the security function. All of the security professionals expressed the opinion that testing of security in place was, in general, rare in typical operations and was only brought about as part of an audit process. If an incident occurred or there was a redevelopment that could directly effect the level of security or the security functions in place. This view did divert from the topic of red teaming to some extent, nevertheless, it was important to note the general lack of security testing within the industry. While the comments of the security professionals may be affected by self marketing, it does express the importance of testing a security solution once it had been implemented.

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Acceptance of red teaming The next phase of the research was to attempt to ascertain the level of acceptance that a company operating within this mining sector would have to the inclusion of red teaming as part of their security process. As part of this process, each interviewee was shown a copy of the Sandia National Laboratories Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDART) methodology for red teaming. They were asked their opinion on both the functionality of the IDART model and if they believed that it could be employed within the industry. It was noted that the model has similarities to the intelligence cycle known to most intelligence professionals and that it broke down the discovery of vulnerabilities into logical steps. While it did have some weaknesses and omissions, the consensus was that it did have a place within the industry, however perhaps not in its current form. This view was due to some reservations on the flexibility of the model to adapt to some situations and it appeared to focus on security within the information technology industry. It was suggested that it may have some issues adapting to the testing of a physical security solution. These opinions appeared to be held by the security professionals with a high level of experience in actually performing testing within the industry. Some of the security professionals interviewed with less general experience or less direct experience within the industry tended to be more receptive to the Sandia model and held a greater regard for its usefulness. While there were some reservations, it was generally believed that the industry would be receptive to a red teaming model to test security initially for high monetary value assets. It appeared that with the appropriate model, marketing and pricing structure, it could be expanded to include assets of a high value that may not necessarily have a high monetary cost. This approach would allow smaller operations to have the benefit of testing the quality of their security without the high costs normally associated with doing so. Benefits of red teaming The final question posed was if security professionals could benefit from a red teaming approach. It was accepted by all of the professionals interviewed that red teaming could be of great value to the industry if it was presented correctly and within the right context. It was noted by all participants that security was generally not tested once implemented, with the possible exception of a walkthrough test on an electronic intruder detection system. In addition, that the true level of security afforded by the system is based solely on the experience and assessment of the security specialist implementing it. This approach presented some danger to the company implementing the solution, who in general relied on outside contractors and security specialists to recommend security solutions based on known threats. Any weaknesses left in the company’s security by these security specialists will likely not be discovered until they are defeated or possibly where other security specialists are brought in and identify them. It is important to note that other than the Sandia model no other red teaming methodologies were presented to the security consultants and their responses regarding the proposed model were only based on a short reading during the interview. However, there was a clear opinion by all security professionals that value would be found in further exploring the red teaming model and refining it to provide a baseline methodology that could apply to the Western Australian resources sector.

PROPOSITION The study has raised the need for further research to consider the use of red teaming within a corporate security environment. The industry security professionals interviewed during this study expressed an interest to further develop a corporate red teaming model. The proposed study seeks to further investigate the prevalence of red teaming within the corporate environment and will endeavour, with the assistance of industry professionals, to develop a peer reviewed red teaming model specifically designed for the corporate environment. Case studies will then be performed to test such a model in real world situations. These case studies will be analysed and reviewed, with the assistance of industry security professionals, to measure the effectiveness of the proposed model. From where the model will be further developed and refined for general use by corporate security managers and staff.

CONCLUSION The study has shown a low level knowledge and use of red teaming amongst the security professionals interviewed. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a high level of interest in the possibilities that red teaming represents. This lack of knowledge appears to have come about due to a general lack of security testing within 81

the industry, illustrating a potentially vulnerability. Such vulnerability is an important consideration, as organisations are relying on security solutions implemented by their security professionals. While the security professionals are relying on their experience and perhaps past incident reports in recommending and implementing security solutions, there remains the possibility that previously unknown vulnerabilities may be exposed, negating other security measures. In using a red teaming exercise it was agreed that security solutions could be analysed in greater depth, allowing for a better understanding of the security implemented, the processes involved and the multiple levels of security employed. This in turn would allow for the vulnerabilities to be brainstormed and tested as per the red teaming processes. While it was found that red teaming is not currently used within the mining sector to a great extent, it was agreed that red teaming has a place, given correct marketing to ensure that it is properly understood. While there is some concern over the perceived high costs involved in performing a red teaming exercise, the repetition within the same environment over several years could dramatically reduce such costs. One of the primary concerns in the development of a red teaming methodology is that it needs to be broad enough to be able to adapt to different situations, while still providing a process that can be used by the project manager to clearly define the stages of the red teaming exercise. With this in mind, it is important to note that one of the key challenges of red teaming may not be the process itself, but convincing upper management of the value in using this technique to test their risk mitigation strategies.

REFERENCES AS/NZS 4360:2004. Risk management. Sydney: Standards Australia. Budiarto, R., Ramadass, S., Samsudin, A., & Noor, S. (2004). Development of penetration testing model for increasing network security. Paper presented at the International Conference on Information and Communication: From Theory to Applications, Syria. Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2007). Research Methods in Education. New York: Routledge. Defence Science Board Task Force. (2003). The role and status of DoD red teaming activities. Washington: DSB. Department of Industry and Resources. (2006). Western Australian mineral and petroleum statistics digest. Perth: AGPS. Duncan, C. (1991). Risk Management Audits set Directors’ Minds at Ease. Risk Management, 38(8), 48-51. Eckert, T. (2002). U.S. ‘red teams’ think like terrorists to test security. Copley News Service, Retrieved October 14, 2007 from http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20020820- 9999_1n20redteam.html Furnell, S., Papadaki, M. (2008). Testing our defences of defending our tests: the obstacles to performing security assessment references. Computer Fraud & Security, 2008, (5), 8-12. Helms, M., Ettkin, L., & Morris, D. (2000). Shielding your company against information compromise. Information Management & Computer Security, 8(3), 117-130. Lodal, J., & Shinn, J. (2002). Red-teaming the data gap. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved October 14, 2007 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/8668/redteaming_the_data_gap_a_cfr_paper.html Malone, T., & Schaupp, R. (2002). The “Red Team” forging a well conceived contingency plan. Aerospace Power Journal, 16(2), 22-33. 82

Meehan, M. (2007). Red teaming for law enforcement. The Police Chief, 74(2). Peake, C. (2003). Red teaming: The art of ethical hacking. SANS Institute. Retrieved October 14, 2007 from http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/auditing/1272.php Ray, H., Vemuri, R., & Kantubhukta, H. (2005). Towards an automated attack model for red teams. IEEE Security & Privacy, 3(4), 18-25. White, G., & Conklin, A. (2004). The appropriate use of force-on-force cyberexercises. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(4), 33-37.

COPYRIGHT Greg Lane and David Brooks ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Title: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists by another name? William Bailey SECAU Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University Adam McGill School of Engineering Security Science Edith Cowan University Abstract The term “terrorism” has been over-used in recent history. This has led to the term losing some of value as its meaning has been altered. This essay will refute the statement that freedom fighters are but terrorists of a different name. It will be argued that there are certain actions and practices that separate the two. Performing these behaviors will cause a group to fall under either one heading or the other. Defining Terrorism has been a challenge in recent history. Early usage of word stems from the writings of Russian Revolutionaries, modern day definitions have changed somewhat from these early beginnings. The term freedom fighters first emerged in British controlled Palestine with creation of the group “Freedom Fighters for Israel”. Differentiating between freedom fighters and terrorists involves the identification of a number of issues including; who has the right to label activist groups, the requirement of popular support, freedom as a primary goal, their targets and areas of operation. Included within this paper will be an examination of the IRA which aims to isolate and identify changes in behaviours that lead to a group shifting its focus from freedom fighting to terrorism. It is certainly possible to evaluate a group by its actions and goals and categorize it as either a terrorist group or freedom fighters.

The term “terrorism” has been over-used in recent history. Its definition has been stretched, moulded and shaped by the political context. This has led to the term losing its value and meaning. In effect it has become a ‘catchall’ word used for purposes beyond a descriptor for a particular type of behaviour. This paper will refute the statement that freedom-fighters are but terrorists of a different name, and will also argue that there are certain actions and practices that separate the two and will cause a group to fall under either one or the other heading. To construct this argument a clear definition of terrorism must be identified along with a clear definition of a freedom-fighter. Factors which influence whether a group is labelled as a terrorist or freedom fighter will be explored. Finally a case study and its participants will be examined and, through a discussion of their actions, be categorized as either terrorists or freedom fighters.

DEFINITIONS Terrorism Defining terrorism has been a challenge in recent history. Early usage of word stems from the writings of Russian Revolutionaries and Anarchists at the end of the 19th century. Bakunin includes terrorism, along with Revolution and banditry as methods of challenging the superiority of the state. In fact Bakunin states that in the course of revolution, opponents will cast them as ‘terrorists’ in order to denigrate their cause (Bakunin, 1869). Morozov, another Russian writer, would describe the tactics of the day as a new form of revolution namely ‘Terroristic Revolution’ Morozov included acts of violence against the state, including political assassination, as terrorism. (Morozov, 1880). What is considered terrorism in the modern day has changed somewhat from these early beginnings. Recent writings have described terrorism as;

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“serious, violent, criminal act[s] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury that occur outside an armed conflict for a political, ideological, religious, or ethnic purpose and that are intended to create extreme fear with the goal of intimidating a population” or unduly compelling a government” (Saul, 2006, p. xxxiii)

Wilkinson (cited in Barnaby 2007, pp. 207-208) describes terrorism as “coercive intimidation. It is the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction, in order to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorists’ political demands”. Current Australian legislation describes terrorism as; an action or threat of action made with the intention of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause and, the action or threat of action is done with the intention of coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth including state and territories or foreign country or, intimidating the public or section of the public. Included in the definition of an action are such things as causing serious harm, injury, death, endangerment, serious risk to healthy and safety, disruption of electronic and financial systems, damage to property (Australia, 2002). This becomes a ‘catch all’ definition that may well prove to be too general for it to achieve the desired aim; successful application in the courtroom. There are subtle differences between the above definitions. The inclusion of the statement in Saul’s definition regarding “outside of armed conflict” is notable as this would be outside an open declaration of war. According to this definition one could immediately discount insurgencies during times of war and occupation as nonterrorist activities. Likewise the inclusion of “destruction of property” in Government legislation is also interesting as this adheres to the general principals of a developed society where property is the driving force behind the economy. Failure to protect this negates the concept of ownership upon which wealth can be developed. The Wilkinson definition fails to mention damage to property, stating only serious, violent criminal acts. The word “terror” has been defined as; an intense, overpowering fear (FARLEX, 2008). This brings us to the difference between “fear” and “terror”. It is possible to argue that controlled demolition of an adversary’s facilities, without loss, or risk to, human life does not create the intense overpowering fear that possible loss of life or serious injury does. The better definitions include the compelling or coercion of government as a goal of terrorist groups. While this is legitimate, a true definition of terrorism must include the goal of intimidating a population in order to force or coerce the government into some form of action. Violent actions directed solely at a government and not at the civilian population is one of the areas where this essay will differentiate between terrorists and freedom-fighters. The definition of terrorism which will be taken for the purpose of this essay is “Extreme political or ideologically motivated violence with the intention of causing overwhelming fear in the civilian population, in order to coerce the existing powers into a pre-determined course of action.”

Freedom Fighters The term ‘freedom fighters’ first emerged with creation of the group “Lohamei Herut Israel” Or “Freedom Fighters for Israel; this group operated in British controlled Palestine and later became known as the “Stern Gang” (Westrate, 1997). The international acceptance of the idea that they were ‘freedom-fighters’ lies very much with the general guilt felt by many at the abject failure to prevent the holocaust committed by the Nazi regime. The term ‘freedom fighter’ was also used to describe members of groups such as the Front de liberation national (FLN), who fought to liberate Algeria from French occupation. While no clear academic definition for freedom- fighter was identified, several dictionary based definitions were discovered. The best of these was; “Freedom fighter - noun - a person involved in armed conflict against an oppressive government etc; an insurgent, rebel or insurrectionist (Allwords, 2008). The key point identified in this definition is not that they are in involved in armed conflict, but in armed conflict against an oppressive government. This is the definition which will be taken for the purposes of this essay.

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LABELING AND LEGITIMACY In terms of differentiating between freedom-fighters and terrorists an issue which must be addressed is who has the right to label the different groups. A common statement concludes that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom-fighter." This is not necessarily the case. Who has the right to suggest that one group is either one or the other? What may be viewed as a legitimate act by one group may not be viewed in the same light by another. Correctly identifying the difference must be based on the history of a group as it is possible for one person to say that an act was terrorism and another to say that it was a legitimate act of war (Newman, 2002). Another complicating factor is the way in which terrorists construe abhorrent acts of violence as admirable acts of courage (Jackson, 2004). Given these factors it is impossible for a burgeoning activist group to legitimately label itself as freedom-fighters. That label can only be given based on examination of established behaviours and actions. It is also common for a political power to label a group as terrorists for solely political purposes. Sceptics argue that some criminal acts become terrorist activities in order to secure political mileage (Barnaby, 2007, pp. 207208). Any label given to a group by a state or nation it is in conflict with must therefore be viewed with suspicion. Arguably, none of the directly involved groups may issue any legitimate labels due to the various biases and agendas they may have. The decision of whether a group are freedom fighters or terrorists must come from outside of the conflict, namely, the international community.

POPULAR SUPPORT The definition of freedom fighter states that they are involved in conflict with an oppressive government. Therefore in order to be classed as freedom-fighters they must not be involved in actions against a democratically elected and supported government. Wilkinson argues that in a “true democracy” there can be no group that does not have representation (Wilkinson, 1977, p. 257). Therefore it is possible to say that any internal group that initiates violent actions against a democratic state cannot be labelled as freedom fighters. In a democracy, citizens have the right to protest against government decisions, and many aim to cause political change through non-violent means (marches, petitions, demonstrations, rallies).

FREEDOM AS A PRIMARY GOAL United Nations Article 1514 (XV) makes the statement that “all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and integrity of their national territory.” Also included in the Article is the following statement; “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.“ (UN, 1960). In the eyes of the international community groups acting against governments which deny these rights to their people may be classed as freedom-fighters, as the internationally recognized rights of freedom are what they are fighting for. In order to support this classification they must retain the support of majority of their population. Losing popular support may mean they are in fact acting against the people’s “right to self determination”.

The emergence of the term ‘freedom fighter’ can be traced back to a period of history during which global society was experiencing a wave of ‘anti-colonial terrorism’ as described by Rapport (2002), Complications arise in securing this definition of political action because a freedom-fighter, as defined above, refers to those who struggle against oppression. This is seen in some corners as an acceptable form of action as it is directed towards a legitimate cause. Even the United Nations has stated that people under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and that any definition or ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ should not include them (High Panel Report, 2004). What differs between the two is not the ultimate goal or even the initial causes, but the method of operation. Freedom-fighters do not target civilians and non86

combatants. They do engage in violence, but this violence should be against government or military bodies and is often referred to as ‘guerrilla warfare’, which is the deliberate use of violence against military and security personnel (Ganor, 2002). Inevitably some civilians do get caught in the crossfire but they are not the principle targets. A terrorist act, on the other hand, does deliberately target an area that is frequented by civilians, such as train station, hotel or office building in order to inflict as much physical and psychological damage on the population as a whole as possible. The objective for terrorist violence is to inflict terror!

TARGETS One of the best ways to differentiate between freedom fighters and terrorists lies in the targets at which they strike. Freedom-fighters aim to make their primary targets military or state based. While civilian casualties may occur, they are not the intended target (Goldie, 1987). Freedom-fighters will make every effort possible to avoid and reduce civilian casualties in order to retain their public support. In contrast, terrorists intend to harm noncombatants in order to coerce a third party (Goldie, 1987). In many cases of terrorism the perpetrators are heedless of the fact that the victims are complete strangers with no individual strategic value. They are treated as a symbolic target for the separate purpose of instilling overwhelming fear in the hearts of the target population (Goldie, 1987).

AREA OF OPERATIONS Given the restrictions on popular support discussed in regards to freedom being the primary goal, freedom fighters operations are restricted to within their own areas. Against an oppressive government or illegal occupying force their actions have a degree of legitimacy, however, once the group begins to strike at targets beyond its area of popular support, perception of the group will change. Striking at targets outside the area of conflict , for example at foreign nationals in neighbouring countries, is viewed as a direct attempt at coercing public opinion and falls under Wilkinson’s definition of terrorism (Wilkinson, 1977, p. 376)

IRA: Terrorists or freedom fighters?

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SUPPORT An example of how a political group may exist as both freedom fighters and terrorists is that of the IRA and Provisional IRA operating in Northern Ireland in the early 1970’s through to the late 1990’s. For republicans in some areas of Northern Ireland this conflict was merely a manifestation of rebellion dating back centuries (Harnden, 2000, p. 95). In certain areas, for example urban ghettos and smaller towns such as Crossmaglen in South Armagh (Coogan, 2000, p. 377), the Provisional IRA enjoyed considerable public support albeit often in a passive sense (bed for the night, hospitals not reporting treatment for gun-shot wounds, etc. )(Coogan, 2000, p. 376).

FREEDOM It has been said that at its broadest the IRA struggle in Northern Ireland came under the heading of a means of national self determination (Cowell, 2005). This brand of struggle was accepted and legitimized by the United Nations Article 1514 (xv) as discussed previously.

TARGETS In the early 1970’s the main IRA tactics consisted of blockades, stone throwing and petrol bombings, along with some political aspirations. However later years saw the rise of a concentrated campaign of economic warfare. It was in fact IRA policy that a Protestant was never to be targeted on account of his religion. In fact the only time civilians were deliberately targeted was during the campaign on the British mainland (Coogan, 2000, p. 380). The IRA also issued statements advising that warnings were issued to authorities before detonations of explosives in order to prevent unnecessary casualties (the same statements also add that the warnings were deliberately held back by the British as counter-tactic in order to maximize negative publicity for the IRA) (PIRA, 1973). These actions, along with targeting RUC and British Army forces, and along with activism and hunger-strikes may all be considered the actions of freedom fighters. The annual cost of holding the North for the British was £1 billion annually during the 1970’s (Coogan, 2000, p. 376). The strategy of economic warfare was inflicting a heavy economic as opposed to civilian toll.

AREA OF OPERATIONS Later events would alter the perception of the international community towards the IRA. In the early 1980’s a number of bombs were detonated on the British mainland, the purpose being to “export the terror and destruction of the Northern conflict”. The reasoning behind this was simply that targeting soldiers in Northern Ireland was not getting enough attention and that bombing England would keep the issue on the political agenda (Harnden, 2000, p. 318). It had now become a terror campaign. By moving the area of operations to a sector with no strategic value beyond causing casualties among non-combatants and sowing terror, the IRA lost their legitimacy as freedom-fighters. The change in tactics led to a shift in public and international perception of the group.

MANDELA; TERRORIST OR FREEDOM FIGHTER? One figure in global politics provides an insight in the difference between freedom fighter and terrorist. Nelson Mandela is seen by global opinion as ‘larger than life’. He is a figure who embodies struggle, his own struggle for change lasting fifty years (Newswire, 2008). What is not often discussed however are his links to the organization known as “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (MK) or “Spear of the nation”. MK was the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC). It was formed in 1961 with the intention of using it to pursue an agenda of change through the use of violence. Immediately after its conception MK commenced a sabotage campaign against strategic facilities in South Africa. There were strict rules in their mandate with Tambo, the leader of the ANC, telling the Guardian newspaper “The strict rule was that sabotage should involve no injury to life “(Ngculu, 2003).

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From a military perspective these attacks were amateurish but effective. Homemade explosives were the weapon of choice with much of the expertise coming in the form of World War II veterans within the ranks of MK. Sabotage operations continued for over a year after the creation of MK. Targets were chosen strictly and in accordance to the demands of the given definition of freedom fighters. Targets selected included pass offices, power pylons, and police stations and military facilities. Most MK personnel lacked real training with the result that these attacks did not always go according to plan. Large numbers of saboteurs were imprisoned as a result (Williams, 2006). As activities continued the MK organisation sent selected senior commanders out of the country in order to prepare external infrastructure and receive advanced military training. Nelson Mandela was one such officer. He featured prominently in these efforts and received training in both Algeria and Ethiopia (Williams, 2006). On his return to South Africa Mandela again became involved in the struggle and, after a period of evasion, was captured and tried for sabotage. At his trial he was quoted as saying; “I did not plan it [sabotage] in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen from many years of tyranny, exploitation and oppression of my people by the whites.” (Ngculu, 2003) In 1969 the charter for MK was formally recognized and a modern approach to the theory of political and military liberation struggle was adopted. The Morogoro Conference of 1969 lead to the creation of the Strategy and Tactics Document which outlined the objective factors for guerrilla operations and being dependant on; The existence of political leadership capable of gaining the organized support and allegiance of the people, or in terms of this paper, popular support. Readiness to respond to the strategy of armed struggle with all the enormous sacrifices which this involves Extending and consolidating the machinery of the underground operations. Military struggle is only part of, and is guided by, broad political strategy MK recognizes the primacy of the political leadership as unchallenged and all revolutionary formations, armed or otherwise, are subordinate to it (Ngculu, 2003). Operations by MK continued throughout the decades of Mandela’s imprisonment with limited success. 1983 saw a shift in tactics. In May of that year a car bomb was exploded outside the South African Air Force and Military Intelligence Headquarters in Pretoria. Extensive structural damage was caused to both buildings, a number of military personnel were killed but the attack also claimed the lives of a number of civilians. This operation demonstrated that MK was willing to operate both deep inside urban areas and also in a fashion not restricted by symbolically ‘military’ targets. Further to this the ANC released a statement announcing that it could no longer guarantee the safety of civilians in the this struggle (Williams, 2006). This was a calculated statement designed to increase the pressure for change by increasing the element of fear experienced by a population. The MK, and ANC by extension, had begun to use terror as a political tool. Mandela’s release and the eventual demise of Apartheid led to the inclusion of the MK into the South African armed forces thereby giving the group a legitimate standing in the armed forces. Mandela himself became the first black president of South Africa. However under the current definition of terrorism accepted by Australia, Mandela is still a member of a terrorist organization. Civilians were targeted and fear was used as a political weapon. Mandela was in fact the essence of a freedom fighter; he knew and accepted the necessity of armed struggle against oppression but abided by the conventions to prevent this violence from descending into terrorism. Mandela’s vision for Africa continued throughout his presidency eventually establishing the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund to strive to change the way society treats its children (Newswire, 2008). At no time has Mandela ever renounced the use of violence as a method of achieving political change against an oppressive government and as such it is only in recent history that the United States has finally removed Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress from a three decade old immigration watch list for possible terrorists (ABCNews, 2008). 89

CONCLUSION This essay has discussed what attributes categorize an activist group as either a terrorist or freedom fighter. It has cast doubt on involved parties’ abilities to label themselves and has shown that there are certain actions that, when taken, will shift a group between the two headings. It has been shown that the main differences between terrorists and freedom fighters are; public support, goals, and the targets they choose, as well as the areas in which they operate. While both groups may be formed with the same intentions, how they go about achieving them determines which heading they fall under. It is certainly possible to evaluate a group by its actions and goals and categorize it as either a terrorist group or freedom fighters. In all the examples discussed above, the terrorism has been committed against what were considered as oppressive systems of government. This type of terrorism is referred to as ‘anti-colonial terrorism’, which ended in the 1960’s (with a few exceptions). The form of terrorism that the world is facing today has been coined as the ‘religious wave’ (Rapport, 2002). The religious wave has brought new groups into the fold and has given rise to new justifications for terrorist acts (Rapport, 2002). Specifically, Islam has played a major role in this form of terrorism although this is definitely not to say that all people of the Islamic faith are terrorists, or even support the idea of it. In fact, the majority of Muslims have condemned the actions of al-Qaeda and the like outright (Stempel, 2005). However, it is thought that Islamic societies have become less capable of dealing with the modern world, and increased frustration, hatred for the West and all it stands for has turned into Islamic radicalism, resulting in a growing number of movements (Stempel, 2005). This religious wave was also the first to use a human body as the preferred delivery method for an explosive attack (Rapport, 2002). It would be hard to argue that killing those who do not adhere to your faith is in some way and act of ‘freedom’. Therefore religious terrorists cannot claim under any definition that they are ‘freedom fighters’ for their brand of idealism any more than the Baader- Meinhof gang( 1966- 1977) could claim they were liberating the working classes when they murdered for their ‘revolutionary socialist cause’ One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter in title only. Freedom fighters want political power in their own country. They want to take part in the decision making process of their own country and they want the dominating authority to leave them in peace. The IRA, FLN and the ANC, despite many claims to the contrary, all qualify as terrorist organizations because they have killed civilians even though they began by targeting only the symbols of colonialism, occupation or suppression. The terrorists of today have even less of a claim to ‘freedom fighters’ as attacks on civilians increase in number and severity, and there is no doubt that more attacks will occur in the future. The term ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist’ is not only inaccurate but intentionally misleading. It pollutes the issue and makes things (such as definitions of terrorism) impossible to decide or define. Terror is a word that has a definition and a meaning. If one supports terrorism then, in order to communicate effectively, it would be better to say that one supports this particular form of terror. If the misuse of this phrase does not stop, then the counter-terrorism efforts of the international community will neither achieve their goals nor gain wide acceptance. The need is to stop the sponsorship of terrorism and terrorism itself in all its guises. The use of terror to achieve political goals is morally wrong, but what is at stake for many is freedom itself. The dilemma will always be what is acceptable in the pursuit of freedom? Furthermore, does violence ever become tolerable if it can be shown to be in pursuit of a so called ‘noble cause’ and therefore becomes what t can be classified as a ‘legitimate’ ?

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REFERENCES ABCNews. (2008, 2nd July 2008). US drops Mandela from terrorist list. Retrieved 20th November, 2008, from http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/07/02/2291630.htm Allwords. (2008). Dictionary definitions for "freedom fighter". Retrieved 29th March, 2008, from http://www.allwords.com/word-freedom+fighter.html Australia. (2002). TERRORISM (COMMONWEALTH POWERS) ACT 2002. Retrieved. from. Bakunin, M. (1869). Neskolko slov k molodym bratyam v Rosii (Revolution, Terrorism, Banditry). Geneva. Bin Hassan, M.H. (2007). Imam Samudra's Justification for Bali Bombing. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30(12), 1033-1056. Barnaby, F. (2007). The Future of Terror. London: Granta Books. Coogan, T. P. (2000). The I.R.A. London: Harper-Collins. Cowell, A. (2005). Two Faces of Terrorism: Is One More Evil Than the Other? New York Times, 44. FARLEX. (2008). Definition of terror. Retrieved 28th March, 2008, from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/terror Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter? Police Practice and Research 3(4), 287-304 Goldie, L. F. E. (1987). Profile Of A Terrorist: Distinguishing Freedom Fighters From Terrorists. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 14(2), 125. Harnden, T. (2000). Bandit Country: The IRA & South Armagh. London: Coronet Lir. Jackson, L. (2004). Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions. Canadian Psychology, 45(3), 245. LoBaido, A.C. (2001). Behind The Third Boer War. Retrieved March 24th 2008, from http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=22477 Morozov, N. (1880). Terroristicheskaya Borba (The Terrorist Struggle). Geneva. Newman, B. (2002). Terrorism is in eye of beholder. Denver Post, A.05. Newswire. (2008). Nelson Mandela's 90th Birthday Celebration. PR Newswire. Ngculu, J. (2003). The role of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the creation of a democratic civil-military relations tradition. Retrieved 20th November, 2008, from http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/OURSELVESNGCULU2.PDF?lin k_id=32&slink_id=1760&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 PIRA. (1973). Freedom Struggle by the Provisional IRA. pres. Dublin. Rapoport, D.C. (2002). The four waves of rebel terror and September 11. Anthropoetics – The Journal of Generative Anthropolgy, (8)1. Saul, B. (2006). Defining Terrorism in International Law. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Stempel, D. (2005). The impact of religion on intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (18)2, 280-295. 91

Terrorist Watch. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14th, 2008, from http://www.netcomuk.uk/sringbk/enemy.htm UN. (1960). Article 1514 (XV). Retrieved 30th March, 2008, from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm United Nations High Level Panel. (2004). Report to the General Assembly on the Threats, Challenges and Change. Retrieved March 2nd 2008, from http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%highlevel%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm Westrate, B. (1997). The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949. The American Historical Review, 102(3), 1. Williams, R. (2006). The Impact of Guerrilla Armies on the Creation of South Africa's Armed Forces. Institute for Security Studies, 127. Wilkinson, P. (1977). Terrorism and the liberal state. London: Macmillan Press.

 

COPYRIGHT Bill Bailey and Adam McGill ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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CERBERUS: THE GAME OF SECURITY ANALYSIS Stuart Porter Department of Computing Curtin University of Technology [email protected] Tele Tan Department of Computing Curtin University of Technology [email protected] Kok Wai Wong School of Information Technology Murdoch University [email protected]

Abstract Physical security assessment for critical infrastructure is an integral part of security system design and maintenance. It is designed to sieve out security gaps and loopholes that if left unattended may result in disastrous consequences. The dynamic nature of modern day security threats as well as the ever-changing situations in the secure environment remains a challenge to security managers since conventional security audits are inadequate in such circumstances. We propose here a computational security dynamic system which is aim to provide security managers with the ability to detect and respond to emerging threats and changing environmental conditions. We will address the requirements and design considerations for this simulation system using serious games concepts as well as a progressive development plan to achieve the objective. It is planned that the proposed system will also provide useful opportunities for research and development in the fields of security and behavioural modelling.

Keywords Static Security Analysis, Dynamic Security Analysis, Intelligent Agent, Simulation, Serious Game, Cerberus

INTRODUCTION Physical security involves measures undertaken to protect personnel, equipment and property against threats of all forms. It includes both passive and active measures. Passive measures include the effective use of architecture, landscaping and lighting to achieve improved security by deterring, disrupting or mitigating potential threats. Active measures include the use of proven systems and technologies designed to deter, detect, disseminate and respond against threats. Another emerging trend of improving the security is by analyzing different possible threats using computer simulation. The modern computer, whose ancestors were originally developed to “simulate” shell trajectories in WW2 and crack un-crackable codes by simulating the encoding machine, have evolved to allow us to simulate the world we live in. Computers are now being used to simulate and train people for various disasters, from mine cave-ins to toxic spills (Straw 2007). There are even projects looking to integrate many varied simulators of specialised design to allow for the simulation of larger disasters, such as earthquakes (Takeuchi, Kakumoto & Goto 2003). The power of these simulations comes from the computer’s ability to quickly analyse data given to it and create an output based on complex formulas. The speed and suitability for computers to perform these sorts of calculations allows for simulations to be interactive, to alter the environment that is being simulated in real time and receive real-time representation of the ramifications of that change. This power grants a two-fold benefit, removing the need for costly human calculation of variables and allowing for the modeling of difficult or impossible to simulate real world events. It is the goal of this project to exploit these capabilities in the field of physical security.

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This paper gives details on the requirements specification and design background of the Cerberus system which is an active simulation software system targeting the physical security industry. The concept was to allow for a user to run virtual “Red Team” activities against personnel, assets and infrastructure, to gauge the overall facility’s resistance to varied attack scenarios and the dollar cost of those attacks. Operationally, Cerberus can be used as a system in a loop deployment, in between regular security assessments, to provide up-to-date security threat assessment and timely responses to these threats. The Cerberus software is based upon the Serious Games software development principles. The concept of a Serious Game is to use video game technology and/or design methodologies to produce software with a focus on simulation, training or evaluation (Gallego et al. 2006). While we hope to explore numerous concepts through the development of Cerberus, it is being developed with the aim of producing software that could quickly be taken up by security experts and put to use. It is intended that the completed Cerberus system would allow for a fast and accessible way for users to assess the security of a facility. For example, after inputting a facility (3.1), a user can use Cerberus to generate a visual security guide to their facility (3.2) allowing them to visually assess the security of their assets. The user will then be able to make changes, such as adding or moving security elements and then assess the impact these changes have had on their overall security.

BACKGROUND Many modern facilities need to undergo regular security audits, from airports to banks to mine sites. With Security Consultants costing upwards of $300 an hour, human inspection quickly becomes prohibitively expensive. Due to this cost, security audits are only performed at intervals, which can result in security problems when the approved security plan changes. An example case involved a terror suspect who escaped from a Singapore detention centre in 2008 (Mydans 2008). The suspect took advantage of a window left unprotected due to ongoing renovations. Being a prison, we assume the facility would have at least undergone an audit before the renovations. But, due to a dispute between the contractor and prison, the accepted security plan was altered and the impact of this alteration was not detected. It is for this problem area we have designed Cerberus. Terrorism/Security In this modern world, it is not uncommon to use fear mongering to help push an agenda. It is not our goal to feed on this fear, but rather to try and reduce it. The Cerberus system is intended to allow a user to assess their security and confirm it achieves a level of security they are comfortable with. The system is intended to allow a user to perform objective assessment of their security and to allow them to make necessary alterations. We believe, based on data available (Figure 1), that there is room for and perhaps even a need for new security simulation software. It should be noted that this data has been abstracted for the reasons of illustration. Terrorism goes through dips and rises but the data available suggests it is on an upward trend.

Figure 1 - Terrorism Incidents 1976 - 2006 (Based on data from (LaFree & Dugan 2007, p. 181)) 94

Serious Games Serious games are becoming a well recognized and funded answer to problems ranging from AI Research (Gallego et al. 2006) to Disaster control and training. At least one such project, Hazmat: Hotzone, which began as a research project at Carnegie-Mellon University’s Entertainment Technology Center has spawned a spin off company, dedicated to the productions and extension of the system.

CERBERUS GOALS The goals of Cerberus are to, firstly, allow the simple input and setup of a facility (3.1). Secondly, a user should be able to perform an analysis of the security at a facility under given circumstances (3.2). Thirdly, it is of interest to allow a user to run virtual Red Team events against a facility by use of Intelligent Agents (3.3), a exercise supported by the final goal of Distributed Computing (3.4). Facility Input It is envisioned that facility input process will accept either a CAD representation of a building or possibly even simple blueprints of the building. The input step is of particular importance because from an end user point of view, if the software is difficult or frustrating to use, uptake and use will be reduced. It is envisioned that the software will be laid out to assist in facility input. So, in the case of input from a flat floor plan, a user may be required to help clarify which lines represent walls. Once a user has selected a wall, the software will attempt to intelligently apply this knowledge and present the user with a click and drag style interface of making corrections. As part of facility input, it will be necessary for a user to define the security elements (5.1). This will involve a streamlined interface to allow a user to select items such as walls and define their security characteristics. It is envisioned that a user will simply be able to click and drag elements such as security personnel and security devices into place with default settings, and once placed they may view and alter the settings of the elements to suit their scenario. Static Security Analysis Once a facility has been input a user may perform static security analysis. It is most likely that a user will be required to set several variables before they perform their analysis, such as weather conditions which can impact the performance of sensors and responders and also the time to help simulate the typical state change between security during the day and security at night. The system is then expected to produce a “heat map”(5.4), allowing a user to see visually the security levels of the facility. See Figure 2 for mock up. Based on this information a user can then assess the risk to their assets and any changes that need to be made. As a part of Cerberus we will also explore Computer Aided Security Design, where the Cerberus System itself will be able to suggest optimisations to the system. CASD will remain a lower priority unless Cerberus can be demonstrated to be capable of acting as an expert system to the satisfaction of security personnel.

Figure 2 - Static Analysis Heatmap Mockup

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Dynamic Security Analysis It is felt that Dynamic Analysis through Simulation could prove to be one of the more valuable elements of Cerberus, allowing for the low cost simulation of varied attacks and evacuations procedures on a large scale, such as an Olympic stadium. Indeed, several other research projects already seek to simulate security procedures (Koch 2007; Guru & Savory 2004), facilities (Tarr 1992; Tarr 1994; Tarr & Peaty 1995) and even model behaviour in a large scale emergency (Takeuchi, Kakumoto & Goto 2003). It is felt that the Dynamic System we propose, detailed below, is novel enough to validate our research. However, given the cost and effort required with building and proving behavioural models, this goal is currently considered secondary to the more easily applied Static Analysis. The intention of simulation within Cerberus is to allow a user to input all personnel within a system as Agents (5.2) and to attempt to simulate their movements within a facility and their reactions to stimuli. We classify stimuli in this instance as events such as alarms or points of interest such as computer terminals and other agents. As part of the simulation, a user could add Attacker Agents who will attempt to bypass the other agents and facility security to gain access to assets. A concept we would like to explore is “branch points” for simulations. The concept runs that with a single Attacker Agent the world state could be saved each time the Attacker makes a choice. These branch points could then be processed separately, allowing the exploration of all possible attacks and the collection of statistics. For instance, after all branch points have been simulated to success or failure for the attacker the system could offer a summary such as; “In 30% of simulations the attacker escaped with assets. 90% of these simulations branch from an entry through window 4 on the second floor.” Using this information the user could add extra alarms or sensors to the second floor and run the simulations again, perhaps specifying a second floor entrance for expedience. This ability to simulate various scenarios and test solutions could obviously prove useful. However, once you start to try and simulate multiple attackers or a large facility, the processing demands increase quickly. To solve this problem, we propose to use distributed computing. Distributed Computing During design of the Cerberus system, a goal of computational distribution has been kept in mind. This has influenced the selection of tools (Section 4) and required that a design goal of modularity be considered. A proposed client/server infrastructure will be illustrated later (Section 5.3). It is planned that a cross-platform client would be produced, allowing users to potentially farm their simulations or complex static analysis out to multiple Windows desktops and/or a dedicated Linux cluster. An average workplace computer runs with a great deal of its processing power unused. It is planned that Cerberus could take advantage of this untapped computing power, as many existing compilers and graphics rendering systems do, to allow a user to quickly process a large job with minimal impact on their co-workers. However, due to the development environment selected which will be discussed in Section 4.2 an interesting possibility is opened up. It is proposed that the Cerberus system could farm processing out to Xbox 360’s. Game Consoles are sold typically on the razorblade model. This system of marketing entails selling one component, the console, at a loss with the intention of making money later on other components, software and peripherals. This far into it’s life cycle it is most likely the Xbox 360 console is no longer sold at a loss, but game consoles still represent an exploitable resource for cheap, dedicated hardware. A single Xbox 360 console contains 3, 3.2Ghz Power PC Processors and 512MB of GDDR3 RAM clocked at 700Mhz. This gives the console a vector processing power of 9 million dot product operations per second and an overall processing power of 1 Teraflop of Floating Point calculations per second. With a 20GB HDD included, a second hand Xbox 360 will cost you roughly $320 with the added benefit of grabbing student attention.

TOOLS As part of the design and research of Cerberus, several different tool sets were examined. Initially, a high importance was placed on a cross platform development environment (4.1). As the project has progressed however, our criteria have changed somewhat, resulting in our current selection (4.2), detailed below.

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Delta 3D Delta 3D is a fully funded, open source cross platform development tool set for serious games. It has an active community, full time development team and many desirable features such as built in network and physics systems. It’s designed to encapsulate existing open source systems and to build tools to link them together, creating an easy to use development environment. However, working on the Delta 3D environment was less than positive. Attempts to install the system under OS X were met with various fatal problems. Messages to the Delta 3D forum asking for help often sat for days or went completely unanswered. While a large portion of the problems resulted from OS X being a lesser used development platform for Delta 3D, it was still disappointing and resulted in further exploration of other tool set. XNA XNA is in many ways the opposite of Delta 3D. It is not a cross platform development environment or open source. It is a toolset released and supported by Microsoft to encourage development of games on their Xbox 360 system and on the Windows Operating System. Due to this, it is actually very simple to cross compile, opening up the possibility of using Xbox 360 as a processing client. XNA is built upon the successful Visual Studio system with 2.0 running under Visual Studio 2005. It is felt that with most businesses using Windows for their desktops, the transition to a Windows centric development should cause minimal harm to the end product. There are also cross-platform tools available for compiling C# code, Mono, which with the current client/server design is sufficient. The limited experience so far with XNA has also been excellent, with strong, active community support, numerous pages offering coding tips and samples and the official Microsoft site providing various games with complete source.

DESIGN It has been our focus in creating the preliminary design to make the system as modular and adaptable as possible. We believe our preliminary design, detailed here, will prove applicable to the Cerberus problem area but accept that there is an imperative in research to adapt. The following sections should prove a good overview of the design. Security Elements We have proposed a system for Security Elements based on inheritance and Object Oriented design (See Figure 3). The intention with the system is to make it as easy as possible for a user to add or customise an element. So, for instance, a user wanting to create a reinforced concrete wall could create a concrete wall, then go into the Material properties and alter them appropriately, saving the new material for use later. It is envisioned that a simple drag and drop interface will present elements to the user for placement with elements such as drop down boxes allowing for the selection of items.

Figure 3 - Proposed Security Element Model

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Intelligent Agents The agents we have designed for use in the Dynamic Security Analysis present a problem. There is a desire to create realistic, intelligent behaviour but also to allow for up scaling to potentially tens of thousands of agents. The system we propose separates agents into three types based on behaviour, similar to at least one other known design (Smith et al. 1999). Beyond that we also specify complexity based on the importance of the agent to the simulation, as detailed below. The most simple agent, referred to as the Bystander Agent, would also be the most common. Intended to model civilians and non-security staff, a Bystander Agent would perform a simple “coin toss” or “dice roll” decision upon encountering various elements within the environment, including other agents. It is proposed that typically choices will be made between a high probability option and a low probability option. For example, on perceiving another Bystander Agent there is a high probability that the Bystander will do nothing with a low probability that they will engage the other Bystander in conversation. Building upon this, we have planned a “Point of Interest” concept, which tracks stimuli and ranks them based on priority. So, if a Bystander Agent has heard a fire alarm, evacuating will have a higher priority than talking to another Bystander Agent, providing context limited action choices. We believe this system could provide an efficient simulation of behaviour in a work place and help represent various real world scenarios such as a agent not detecting an attacker because they are engaged in a conversation. The second agent type we wish to model is the Defender Agent. The Defender Agent will incorporate and extend the behaviours of the Bystander Agent and is intended to model security personnel. To simulate the training and skills of the field, the Defender Agent will have a higher level of perception as well as type specific behaviours such as patrolling a specified route. Defender Agents will be fewer in number than Bystander Agents in most scenarios and it is intended that they would use a somewhat more complex decision process, more akin to fuzzy logic than a coin flip. Our agent design includes a framework for modeling complex communication. For instance, should a Bystander Agent hear a noise and become suspicious, they will seek to contact a Defender Agent and report the location. This information would then be added to the Defender Agent’s Point Of Interest list and acted upon appropriately. We intend to incorporate the capacity for false alarms into this behaviour as well as the potential for loss of accuracy from word of mouth. This brings us to the third and final agent type, Attacker Agents. Due to the nature of a simulated Red Team, the attacker agents will require the most work. They will need and justify a more complex intelligence model and higher processing, an attacker needing to respond accurately to an environment to make the simulation worth while. While some base behaviours such as search or wander may be useful to an Attacker Agent, for the most part their behaviours will be unique. It is planned that given the small number of attackers likely to be operating in comparison to Bystanders and Defenders, it is justifiable for the Attackers to use considerably more resources in the pursuit of realism.

Figure 4 - Proposed Agent Modelling System

Client/Server The client/server design (See Figure 5) is relatively simple and will be covered here briefly. A single system may run a simulation or analysis, but with larger simulations such as the earlier stadium example, it would quickly become an arduous process. The proposed system is that a server system would maintain the Facility Model or World Model. Each connected client would be assigned Agents as needed, with a weighting based on the type of agents. So, for instance, one machine may run 10 Bystanders or 3 Defenders or a single Attacker.

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For each agent, the client looks at the environment, updates the Agents Point of Interest listing and calculates an appropriate action and updates it’s Agents appropriately. It communicates movements to the server, similar to a network game, which updates the World State and then updates all clients. We believe this model would allow for excellent scalability.

Figure 5 - Proposed Client/Server Model Security For the purpose of determining security we break a facility down into a collection of zones. A zone is an arbitrary area with some common bounding condition. The most common example would be a room, where the walls, windows and doors act to bound the zone. Zones act as the basic blocks for security analysis. For the purpose of determining a zone’s security, we look at it’s effort distance from the outer zone. The outer zone acts as a security free container, representing the uncontrolled public domain beyond a facility. Zones then link to each other from this outer zone in a logical manner. This makes determining the security of a zone a graph domain problem similar to those encountered in computer communications. We use Dijkstra’s algorithm (Cormen et al. 2002, p. 595) to find the least effort distance required to reach a zone (node) and use this effort distance (edge) as our security metric, on the basis that an attacker will logically seek the least secure zone or path for attack. The wall between them determines the effort distance or graph edge between two zones. A wall may act as a container for doors and walls all with their own material types and security ratings. The security of a wall will be determined primarily by the weakest part, so for a concrete wall with a steel door and a glass window, the wall’s security will be equivalent to the window. This seems appropriate for many cases but probably over simple and we will investigate weighting a walls security and more complex security determinants as Cerberus evolves. As part of the calculation of Dijkstra’s algorithm, we also generate and store information on which zone would most likely be used to access a given zone. This will allow compelling visual information to be displayed to users on why a zone has the security rating it does, enabling users to make informed decisions on how best to tweak their security. Being able to visually trace multiple attack paths to a single weak zone will help users to experiment with adding security to that zone or those before it, increasing the overall security of their facility.

DISCUSSION In the preceding sections we have provided an overview of the design for the Cerberus System. The next stage will be to incorporate our data model, based upon the work by Zachary J. Alach (Alach 2007), and begin testing. The testing will involve static analysis of an example facility with consultation from security industry professionals. We shall seek feedback on both the prototype interface and the analysis performed by the software. It is hoped that Cerberus may also provide the basis for future research opportunities. One concept proposed for future work is a form of “hybrid reality” security. In this concept, models of people could be used in conjunction with security elements to predict and track movement through a facility. This sort of system could prove invaluable in helping staff to locate and evacuate everyone during, for instance, a fire alarm. The security benefits of being able to flag unusual behaviour are also interesting to consider. Cerberus also offers interesting training possibilities. An altered version of the system might allow training consultants to test their assessment skills against a proven system, Cerberus acting as a type of expert system. An interesting concept is to extend the system, taking on more game components to allow security personnel to take on the role of an Attacker or Defender Agent and use the simulated environment for training. You could

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even make a sort of Splinter Cell-esque multiplayer, where one player must setup the security elements and try to detect and capture a friend before they escape with assets. A fully realized Cerberus System opens up many interesting possibilities for security testing, training and research. We hope that some of these possibilities may be explored in future projects.

CONCLUSION We hope to achieve many things through the use of the Cerberus System. It is hoped that we could produce a commercially viable product, which would help fund research into expansions, such as Agent Modelling and the Hybrid system. We also believe that the process of researching and building the system may well lead to valuable community knowledge and discussions including exploration of intelligent, non-invasive security systems. We believe that the knowledge gained through the development of the system will also prove valuable and hope it will result in the release of useful source code and knowledge related to the area of security and the development environment of XNA. We further believe the knowledge and artifacts created as a part of the Cerberus system could easily be applied to other projects within the wider research community to help boost productivity through the use of modeling and simulation technologies. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Professor G. West for his feedback and assistance towards this project. We would also like to thank Mr Z. Alach, whose work has formed the basis of our own.

REFERENCES Alach, Z. 2007 “Mapping the elements of physical security towards the creation of a holistic physical security model”, Masters Thesis, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia Cormen, T. Leiseson, C. Rivest, R. & Stein, C. 2002 Introduction to Algorithms, 2nd Ed. USA: MIT Press, pp 595 – 601 Gallego, F. Bernabeu, A. Reverte, J. Rosana, S. & Llorens, F. 2006, “A Computer-Games-Based AI research environment” in Proceedings of the Fifth Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence Guru, A. & Savory, P. 2004, “A Template-Based Conceptual Modeling Infrastructure For Simulation Of Physical Security Systems” in Proceedings of the 2004 Winter Simulation Conference, pp 866 – 873 Koch, D. B. 2007, “Portsim – A Port Security Simulation and Visualization Tool” in Proceedings of the 41st Annual IEEE Carnahan Conference, pp109-116 LaFree, G. & Dugan, L. 2007, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database”, Terrorism and Political Violence, pp 181 – 204 Mydans, S. 2008, “Terror Suspect Fled Prison Through Window, Singapore Says”, New York Times 22 April Smith, J. Peters, B. Jordan, S. & Snell, M. 1999 “Distributed Real-time Simulation for Intruder Detection System Analysis” in Proceedings of the 31st conference on Winter Simulation: simulation – a bridge to the future – Volume 2, pp 1168 – 1173 Straw, J. 2007, "Games Aid Emergency Management”, Security Management December Takeuchi, I. Kakumoto, S. & Goto, Y. 2003, “Towards an Integrated Earthquake Disaster Simulation System” in Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Synthetic Simulation and Robotics to Mitigate Earthquake Disasters

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Tarr, C. 1992 “Clasp: A Computerised Aid To Cost Effective Perimeter Security” in Proceedings of the 1992 International Carnahan Conference, pp 164 – 168 Tarr, C. 1994 “Cost Effective Perimeter Security” in Proceedings of the 28th Annual 1994 International Carnahan Conference, pp 60 – 65 Tarr, C. & Peaty, S. 1995 “Using CLASP To Assess Perimeter Security” in Proceedings of the 29th Annual 1995 International Carnahan Conference, pp 311 – 316  

COPYRIGHT Stuart Porter, Tele Tan and Kok Wai Wong ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a nonexclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Covert Operative Management in 2020 – Nodal Delivery and a Collegiate Governance Model

Wayne Snell Australian Federal Police College Edith Cowan University

Abstract The management of covert operatives is an essential part of the operational capacity of a number of agencies in Australia. This paper will explore a model where a new organisation is created to manage all of the functions which are currently undertaken by each of the agencies in Australia who maintain a covert operative capability . The model will draw upon the current literature, the management theory of managerialism and collegialism and risk management theory. This issue has been identified because of the ongoing difficulties with the recruitment, training, retention, well being and security of personnel engaged in this type of deployment in the current operating environment. The paper will focus on a national leadership approach for the formation of an independent organization whose primary task will be the servicing of covert human resources to law enforcement and related agencies. An overview of the predicted operating environment will be undertaken and a rationale to support such a move formulated.

Keywords Covert, Governance, Risk management. The management of covert operatives is an essential part of the operational capacity of a number of agencies in Australia. This paper will explore a model where a new organisation is created to manage all of the functions which are currently undertaken by each of the agencies in Australia who maintain a covert operative capability. The model will draw upon the current literature, the management theory of managerialism and collegialism and risk management theory. This issue has been identified because of the ongoing difficulties with the recruitment, training, retention, well being and security of personnel engaged in this type of deployment in the current operating environment. The paper will focus on a national leadership approach for the formation of an independent organization whose primary task will be the servicing of covert human resources to law enforcement and related agencies. An overview of the predicted operating environment will be undertaken and a rationale to support such a move formulated. The organisation and governance of covert operatives is challenging for organisations whose primary function and mission is not the management of covert operatives. This is due to the nature of the work to be undertaken, the risks to the individuals being deployed, risks to the organisation and the significant resource implications in maintaining the capability. The management of this asset has been identified as a high risk area in a number of studies and in some international police jurisdictions has been regarded as too difficult and dangerous and the practice has been discontinued1. In Australia, individual agencies are required to recruit, train and develop, deploy, maintain, debrief and reintegrate their own operatives. Whilst cooperation exists across a number of agencies, it is difficult to utilise a covert operative asset in another agency due to the legislative and authority constraints as well as the inherent cultural and operational attributes which are developed in organisational isolation.

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Although there is a limited academic and industry body of knowledge regarding this very compelling area of operations, a number of authors have espoused models of management which have contributed to the discourse on this issue. Burton and O’Connor support the separatist approach of individual agencies whilst Mawby supports a wider vision. The development and management of a covert operative capability in the individual agencies is a manifestation of the Managerialism theory in which public organisations are best managed when the power is exercised hierarchically by managers who are distinct from the service providers. The managers are however able to dispose of the organisations resources as they see fit. As a result the organisational power (and individual power) is based in the allotted position within the hierarchy and the ability to control its activities through resource allocation. As a result decision making processes are based around the narrow power base of the individual managers and the departments within which they operate. This facilitates and perpetuates the isolationist style of development and management of current covert operative management model. This also exposes the individual operative, discreet operations and department responsible for the management of covert operatives to the individual decisions of managers higher in the hierarchical structure who are dislocated from the actual provision of the service. The already high risk activity of the management of covert operatives is then exposed to the flowing tide of organisational priorities and individual nuances. Whilst this issue is consistent for all organisational units, the management of covert operatives due to its unique risk environment becomes more vulnerable. The proposal for the development of a specific agency or node to manage covert operatives is based on a move from organisational focus to a whole of government service. The application of this strategy is consistent with the management theory of Collegialism where the service is provided through an organisational structure and vision which is based on cooperative agreement across the organisation or in this case across government. Collegialism is particularly associated with the professions and is therefore consistent with the strategic policy direction of professionalising policing (the main user of this type of operational strategy). The development of a quasi commercial model of a node of delivery of covert operative services is in line with the commercialisation policy being implemented across all sectors of government. The creation of this type of agency would see a service delivery model based on partial cost recovery for actual operational deployment with the redundant capability and capacity requirements being met in a single centrally funded governance model. The management of the risk’s in this instant is informed by Australian Standard 4360 which provides the key guiding principles for managing risk in Australia and has been adopted by the Commonwealth. Risk can be defined as the threat of a negative outcome or harmful event as a result of an activity. Generally, risk is measured in terms of consequence, being the extent of the harm and probability being the likelihood of the negative outcome. Risk is generally managed by undertaking actions which avoid the risk; reduce the risk; spread the risk; transfer the risk; accept the risk; or a combination of these strategies. In the single entity model for covert operative management the risk management strategy is the transfer some of the risk from the individual agencies to the new one, reduce the risk to the individual agencies, spread the risk by setting Commonwealth standards and accepting that some of the risk is residual within the agencies who will continue to require the operational capability being delivered by the service provider.

Meta Operational Theatre In order to develop a strategy for the provision of covert operative services in 2020, it is essential to form a picture of the operational theatre which may exist at that time, based on the analysis of current trends,

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forecasting by futurists and formation of cogent picture which will assist in formulating the ontological issues to be considered2. The first issue is the national security and policing environment. The predicted position is that the move towards a higher level of sophistication in criminal enterprise facilitated by a more highly educated population in generation X, Y and Z. As a result the response from government in dealing with these entities and individuals will require a more coordinated structure as vulnerability exploitation is likely to be key strategy of criminals. The current economic down turn being experienced across the globe will continue which engender the development of fraud and other offences involving a breach of trust. The separation of enforcement in the community or street crime environments and organised national and international threats will continue facilitating a expansion of the role in the commonwealth in dealing with these issues in the national interest. The global economic position and the institutionalised economic rationalist vision in the commonwealth government will see a continuation of the reduction in real terms of the funds available to policing and national security organisations in Australia. This will be achieved through efficiency dividends, selective appropriations and a continuation of the burgeoning welfare crisis precipitated by the global economic position. As a result specialist activities are likely to be restricted in order to facilitate essential services and specific government initiatives. The government will also attempt to relieve some of the burden on facilitating publically funded services by continuation of the commercialisation or quasi commercialisation of government services. This will include the need for government agencies to pay for services provided by other agencies to minimise waste and focus on actual service requirements rather than projections. Geopolitical tensions are likely to continue to increase, particularly in the resource rich - population poor pacific and Australian/New Zealand Region. This will fuel organised crime and perhaps state sponsored insurgency in an effort to secure the highly valued resource, environmental, water and economic commodities which will have elevated value in an evolving black market. Environmental changes will also start to increase the amount of population migration to counties which are developed in order to support traditional and economic refugee displacement. This will increase boarder security issues including people smuggling, criminal slavery and criminal operative insertion. There will also likely continue to be a decline in the influence and regard for the United States as its economy and internal morality are identified as significant contributors to the state of global health and prosperity. As a result other developed nations will be required to fill the void left by soured relationships with the United States. This will include the continued development of government infrastructure and crime fighting capability. Australia will need to take a lead role in our region in this endeavour.

Ontological Issues to be Considered The management of the provision of covert operatives across agencies by a single agency will seek to address the managerial risk and superior service provision to the community. There is an incompatibility of general police recruitment requirements and the identification and recruitment of potential covert operatives. This is due to the nature of the activity in deception, misrepresentation, lying and manipulation. These abilities are incompatible with general recruitment standards across all Australian police jurisdictions and make the redeployment of covert operatives more challenging after an extended period of time deployed in covert environments. This challenge is faced by the individual operative as well as the agency. The introduction of the separate agency for covert operatives removes the requirements to recruit against ‘patrol constable’ police standards and allows specialist criteria to be developed to recruit operatives who possess superior skills for the covert environment as well as resilience to the risks of such environments. This should

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provide a higher level of skills, knowledge and abilities for utilisation by the various agencies. A dedicated agency would have more scope to recruit and retain operatives from community identifiable cultural groups as these operatives are being recruited to perform specific specialist functions not general law enforcement with its inherent entry requirements. This strategy also removes the need to redeploy the operative to general policing operations.3 The dedicated agency would be able to develop a whole of operational life management strategy which would include a three stream recruitment strategy of operations, specialist and technical and management. This strategy would include developing the specific recruitment requirements, screening and assessment, induction and orientation, initial training and doctrine, tradecraft development, specialist training, pre deployment orientation, deployment monitoring, post deployment reflection, reinvigoration and development, (back to redeployment for length of service), deoperationalisation process, separation or management development programme4. There are significant ongoing security implications for the maintenance of a capability in this field considering the increased sophistication of counter intelligence, insurgency and surveillance of organized crime groups. As a result a dedicated agency could develop highly specialised management strategies to manage this risk again without the security implications of redeployment and without the internal security issues of infiltration by corrupt elements and previous relationships/associations with colleagues5. This strategy also removes the nepotism issues related to promotion and development opportunities from so called, elite squads. The significant risk management issues associated with actual deployments and the impacts of those deployments on operatives would be able to be researched and new strategies developed. This would be facilitated by the dedicated nature of the agency and the vision and mission such an agency would engender. As a result a body of knowledge built on reliable research would be available to other international agencies and also be able to be extrapolated to other high risk activities in the sector such as human source a management.6 investigations staff of specialists. This strategy is to provide partitions during the investigation phase to eliminate a number of negative connotations and inferences such as group think, narrow focus, corruption opportunity and undue influence on specialists. The creation of a separate agency would significantly reduce these risks by providing the opportunity to formulate a well founded and highly focused integrity regime which is consistent and cognisant of the types of deployment environments. The development of specialist managerial and leadership capability for this specialty would be significantly enhanced by the creation of a dedicated agency. This outcome would be achieved by the reduction in the rotation of managers through key positions with limited knowledge or experience in covert operations, remove the need to train managers for the role based on that rotation and provide development opportunities which are designed to facilitate professional covert operations managers. This would also provide the individual managers with the professional and personal opportunity to develop exceptional skills, knowledge and abilities. As a dedicated agency the new agency would be better able to cope with government efficiency requirements which limit the ability of individual agencies to effectively maintain a capability in this specialty. This is achieved because the primary mission of the agency would be developing and providing the covert operative capability. As a result the internal competition for resources would continue to be dedicated towards that mission rather than to achieving other organisational objectives. As a result decisions which effect resourcing can be viewed holistically across the covert operation spectre without having to take into account other organisational imperatives which may increase the risk in the covert environment.

                                                              

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The strategy of a whole of government response is consistent with the increased multi agency presence in serious and organized crime investigations. The respective agencies develop and maintain a general and specialist capability which creates redundancy and duplication. There is a need for consistency in training and deployment capability, specialised knowledge development and transfer, infrastructure and support services, management policy and protocols and fiscal responsibilities. The creation of a dedicated agency would remove the need for duplication and provide a much more focused efficient service to government without significant impact on budgetary requirements. This is the model with significant support in comparable jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom where the Home Office has sought to develop agencies which eliminate duplication and support a clearer mission and mandate. Interestingly this has included significant amalgamations of functions. There have been increased demands to maintain covert operative intelligence and counter intelligence capabilities where evidentiary investigations capability only has been the norm. This is particularly relevant in the counter terrorism sector. As a result duplication in the development of doctrine, training and operational deployment controls has occurred. The development of a dedicated agency would allow sub discipline specialists to be developed with a resource capacity which would be cable to meeting surge capacity requirements and specialised deployment requirements such as language, culture or crime type/issue type knowledge. This would provide operational agility to all of the client agencies. The opportunity to develop and deliver highly specialized training and development opportunities as a core function without having to compete with priorities or other areas of organizations and indeed other organizations. Efficiencies in the administration would be realised from the centralization of a management and support structure from a number of agencies into one. This strategy would remove the need to continually redevelop operational exigencies based on internal organisational influence and systems development or adoption. The development of national standards and policy in relation to covert operations and deployments would be facilitated by the body of knowledge held centrally rather than fragmented through agencies who may or may not wish to contribute to the development of such policy. The new agency would also be able to identify and service its own administrative needs based on its mission and vision. The launch of the new agency would also facilitate the development of legislation to enhance the management of covert operations across jurisdictional boundaries and other enabling measures thus removing some of the current encumbrances. This would provide a central point for expert political and policy advice for government and agencies. It would provide the depth of knowledge required to coordinate influence and furnish information when lobbying for change. The agency, through its research capability would be able to prepare and present argument which did not contain sensitive operational material whilst drawing on a wide range of operational scenarios and case studies. The ability to review capability, deployment patterns, operational outcomes and monitor emerging risks would be enhanced by having a central repository of post activity assessment. This information would be available for managers and researchers to assist in decision making.

Implication Analysis Clearly there are a number of implications to be considered in the establishment of the new covert operations agency. The principle issues surround how the agency would be established; interact with the recipient organisations, how the agency would be funded, how the transition would be managed and the implications of change management including intellectual property management and the quantification of projected service requirements in the future. The establishment of the organisation as a government enterprise which was operating in a covert environment with the ability to generate income from its service delivery and also by block operating grant from Treasury. The establishment of this type of organisation would require legislation to ensure appropriate government and community scrutiny of its mission and objectives and also to provide the mandate for cost recovery processes from client organisations. The establishment legislation could also contain the governance, structural model, accountability framework and enabling provisions as the core guidance for the successful operation of the 106

agency. This legislation may also be the appropriate vehicle to provide critical authorities and powers which would transcend the jurisdictional challenges faced when deploying personnel across state boarders, into specialised agencies and in seeking authorise to engage in covert operations. This legislation could also provide consistent indemnity provisions for operatives in controlled operations and criminality engagement. A risk management strategy will need to be developed to assist in combating the opportunity for the development of a meritocracy within law enforcement by the development of this type of highly specialised agency which may be seen as elite. As a result the governance structure should include a Board of Management and an oversight mechanism such as the Inspector General of Intelligence. A comprehensive change management strategy as outlined by Hayes which entails a plan which identifies the risks, graduated strategies, responsible officers and communications strategies needs to be developed to facilitate the movement of the function and any personnel. As part of this process a conflict resolution strategy needs to be developed in line with Tillet which will provide the tools for the resolution of interagency or individual conflict should they arise. As the agencies involved are likely to be engaged in an on going relationship the collaborative approach espoused appears to be the appropriate. As part of the change strategy a significant component should be a marketing strategy which highlights the altruistic nature of supporting the establishment of the organisation for the effected agencies and individuals. This process should also highlight their respective contributions and their future engagement in the development of the capability. The development of a comprehensive implementation strategy which includes a well communicated time line and provides contingency arrangements for the time lag from establishment to commissioning and commissioning to fully operational capability will be critical to implementation plan and to ensure that that a relatively disruption free change over occurs.. As this organisation is a human services organisation and one of the key drivers for undertaking this strategy is to more effectively mange the human resources engaged in covert policing operations, a comprehensive human resources strategy needs to be developed prior to the employment of any operational staff. The development of this strategy should set the benchmark for human resources engaged in this and similar types of operational roles. A robust costing model which identifies the operational or deployments and may form the basis for service level agreements with the client agencies will need to be developed. A significant aspect of this model should be to highlight the cost savings for the agency in moving towards this centralised agency and the opportunity for them to actually facilitate more covert operations by redirecting the infrastructure savings to operations.

CONCLUSION The development of a centralised service provider whose role is dedicated to the provision of covert operatives to police and similar agencies is a responsible management strategy designed to facilitate the meeting of community expectations in the areas of policing, law enforcement and national security. The development of such an agency would alleviate the difficulties with financial constraints, legislative and jurisdictional impediments to operational deployments, human resource management and risk management. This strategy would also provide a central node of delivery which would demonstrate best practice through leading edge research into the area of covert operations. The development of this agency would also meet government objectives in relation to efficiencies and reduction of duplication. The agency would also be able to provide a more diverse range of operatives, skill sets and covert solutions at a reduced cost.

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REFERENCES Aldag, R.J. & Stears, A. (1992) Managing organizational change. In Management (pp.386-410). Cincinnati: South-Western. Amir, M. (2003) Criminal Undercover Agents or “Bad People” Doing “Good Things”. In: Substance Use & Misuse, Volume 38, Issue 10 January 2003 , pages 1425 – 1431. Ansley, B. (1995) Stoned on duty. Hodder Headline Group: Auckland. Arter, M.L. (2007) Supervising the Undercover Function. In Ruiz, J., Ruiz, D. & Hummer, D.C. (ed’s) Handbook of Police Administration (Ch 17). CRC Press: Washington. Australian Federal Police (2008) Guide to the sworn recruitment process. Australasian policing directions – Police Ministers Conference, 2007. Avery, J. (1981). Police - Force or Service? Butterworths: Sydney. Barlow, H. (1993) Introduction to criminology (6th Ed) Harper Collins College Publishers: New York. Bayley, D.H. (1989). Community Policing in Australia: an Appraisal. In Chappell, D & Wilson, P (Eds)., Australian policing Contemporary Issues (1st Edition) (pp.63-82). Sydney: Butterworths. ISBN 0 409 49489 5 Brandl, S.G. (2008) Criminal Investigation. Pearson: New Jersey. Brown, K., Ryan, N. & Parker, R. (2000) New modes of service delivery in the public sector. In The international journal of public sector management. Vol.13. No.3. Burton, T.M. (1995) Undercover Officer Safety. In Proceedings of the National Executive Institutes Associates, Major City chiefs Association and Major Counties Sheriffs Association, October, USA, 2005. Corkill, J. & Snell, W. (2006). Intelligence migration – a place in time commentary. Proceedings of the Conference of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers, Brisbane, 2006. DeGraff, J. & Lawrence, K. (2002) Creativity at work. Bossey Bass: Danvers. Dunford, R.W. (1992). Organisational behaviour: An organisational analysis perspective. (pp.297-327) Sydney: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. ISBN 0 201 50041 8 Edwards, C. (2005) Changing police theories. Federation: Sydney. Gill, P. & Phythion, M. (2006) Intelligence in an insecure world. Polity: Cambridge. Edwards, C.J.. (1999). Drugs – The Cause of Street Crime, or a Health and Social Issue . Unpublished paper given at the Australian Crime Prevention Council Biennial Conference, Melbourne, October 1999. Edwards, C.J. (2005). Changing Police theories for 21st century Societies Sydney: Federation Press. Evans, D.R. & MacMillan, C.S. (2003). Ethical Reasoning in Policing, Corrections and Security. Edmond Montgomery: Toronto. Freckelton, I. & Selby, I. (Eds). (1998) Police in Our Society. Sydney, Butterworths Gauvin, R.. (2005). Ethics, A Practical Framework for Decision-Making. Unpublished paper given at OPC Train the Trainer Conference, Ontario, October 2005. Gilbert, J.N. (2007) Criminal Investigations. Pearson: New Jersey. Gill, P. & Phythian, M. (2006). Intelligence in an insecure world. Polity: Cambridge.

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Grieve, J. (2004) Developments in UK criminal intelligence. In Strategic thinking in criminal intelligence. Federation Press: Annandale NSW. Gross, H. (1934) Criminal Investigation. Sweet and Maxwell: London. Hayes, J. (2006) The theory and practice of change management. Palgrave: New York. Home Office – United Kingdom (2001) Policing for the 21st century. A speech by the Home Secretary to the Police Superintendents Conference 11th September, 2001. Hoogenboom, J., Meiboom, D., Schoneveld, H. & Stoop (Eds) (1997) Policing the Future. Amsterdam: Kluwer Hunt,D. (1995). Strategic Management in Policing including the Future Role of Police. In Etter, B & Palmer, M (eds) Police Leadership in Australasia (pp. 40 -74). Sydney: Federation Press. Landy, F.J. (1989). Psychology of Work Behaviour. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks-Cole. Mawby, R.I. (1998) Policing across the world. Issues for the 21st century. Routelage: New York. McCulloch, L. (2001) The street. Confessions of and undercover cop. Floradale Productions and Sly Ink: Sydney. Merriam-Webster’s (2003) Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed). Merriam-Webster’s: U.S.A. Michigan Department of State Police (1990-1) The ultimate role conflict: Managing the undercover officer. Part I & II. Nancoo, S.E. (Ed)(2004). Contemporary Issues in Canadian Policing. Canadian Educators Press: Ontario New South Wales Police (2008) Recruitment Process. Accessed on 14/10/08. http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/recruitment/related_information/application_process. O’Connor, T. (n.d.) Police undercover work. Lecture Notes – Missouri State University. Pogrebin, M.R. & Poole, E.D. (1993) Vice isn’t nice. A look at the effects of working undercover. In Journal of criminal justice. Vol 21 pages 383-394. Prenzler, T. & Ransley, J. (Eds) (2002) Police Reform – Building Integrity. Federation Press: Sydney. Pritchett, P. (n.d.) The Ethics of Excellence. Pritchett Associates:Dallas, Texas. Royal Commission into whether has been corrupt or criminal conduct by any Western Australian Police Officer. (2004) Final Report - Royal Commission into whether has been corrupt or criminal conduct by any Western Australian Police Officer. Scrivener, E. (2001) Hiring in the spirit of service. Innovations in police recruitment and hiring. United States Department of Justice. Standards Australia (2006) Australian Standard 4360 – Risk Management. Sykes, J.B. (1983) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English. University Press: Oxford. Tillett, G. (2001) Resolving conflict. A practical approach. Oxford University Press. Tony, T. & Morris, I (Eds) (1992). Modern Policing. Chicago: University of Chicago Vilgoen, J. & Dann, S. (2000) Strategic management. Pearson: Sydney. White, M.D. (2007) Current Issues and Controversies in Policing. Pearson: New Jersey.

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Whitehead, A. (1954) Dialogues. Wing, I. (2004) Maintaining security and justice: The intelligence versus evidence dilemma. The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers. 13:1 ISSN 10391525

 

COPYRIGHT Wayne Snell ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

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Nuclear Radiation: Properties, Characteristics and Radiological Dispersal Devices Geoff I Swan Security Research Centre Edith Cowan University

  Abstract Highly radioactive sources are widespread with numerous applications in medicine and industry. There is a risk that terrorists might succeed in acquiring radioactive material for a radiological dispersal device. In this paper, the general properties and characteristics of nuclear radiation are summarised and the radioactive isotopes of most concern reviewed.   Keywords Decay Modes, Dispersal, Exposure, Radioactivity.

INTRODUCTION Nuclear radiation has been enormously beneficial to humankind with numerous applications in medicine and industry in Australia and around the world (ANSTO, 2008; NEI, 2007; UIC, 2008; UIC, 2006). Sources that contain the radioactive isotopes that produce this nuclear radiation are widely distributed and subjected to regulation for safety and security reasons. Since the attacks on the world trade center and the pentagon on the 11th September, 2001, there has been heightened concern about the possibility of nuclear terrorism and safeguards to prevent it. With nuclear weapons (nuclear fission explosives) extremely difficult to produce or acquire, some attention has been drawn towards the easier task of producing a “dirty bomb” where chemical explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. This is an example of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the science of nuclear radiation is reviewed and summarised with the focus of giving security professionals a general understanding of the properties and characteristics of nuclear radiation. In the second part the radioactive isotopes of most concern for an RDD are identified and characterised. Aspects of dispersion, response to radiological incidents, and security of sources are also discussed. Nuclear radiation The science of nuclear radiation at an intermediate level can be found in most general university physics textbooks (Halliday, Resnick and Walker, 2008; Serway and Jewett, 2008). A simpler and non-mathematical treatment can be found in Hewitt (2006). A more advanced treatment (which includes an atomic mass table with decay modes and half lives for isotopes in appendix 8) can be found in Thornton and Rex (2006). The critical properties and characteristics pertinent to radioactivity are summarised and presented here. Atoms and isotopes Matter is made up of microscopic particles called atoms, which consist of a tiny dense nucleus surrounded by negatively charged electrons. The nucleus consists of positively charged protons and uncharged neutrons. Atoms have the same number of protons and electrons and are therefore electrically neutral.   It is the number of protons in the nucleus, known as the atomic number (Z), which uniquely determines the type of atom and hence the element. For example, atoms with atomic numbers of 1, 8 and 92 are known as hydrogen, oxygen and uranium respectively. The periodic table lists all the known elements in groups according to similar chemical properties. It should be noted that although uranium has the highest atomic number of any naturally

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occurring substance on Earth, other elements with higher atomic numbers can be created using particle accelerators or nuclear reactors. Although the number of protons (and electrons) is fixed for an atom of any particular element, the number of neutrons can vary. Typically atoms have similar numbers of protons and neutrons, but for heavier atoms the number of neutrons is always more than the number of protons. Atoms with the same atomic number but different numbers of neutrons are called isotopes. The number of nucleons (protons plus neutrons) is known as the mass number (A). Some isotopes are radioactive. In radioactive isotopes, the nucleus is unstable and emits radiation in the form of a particle or a photon to increase stability. This is known as radioactive decay and this paper will focus on explaining the different types of radioactive decay and the properties and characteristics of the emitted radiation before turning attention towards the applications of these isotopes in the modern world and nuclear terrorism. Decay modes There are three modes of radioactive decay: alpha, beta and gamma. Each decay mode will be explained and an example nuclear reaction given. In these examples please note that the each isotope can be represented by a symbol that gives the element, and its mass number. For example, 76% of naturally occurring chlorine on earth is Cl-35 (or 35Cl). As chlorine by definition has 17 protons, this isotope must have 18 neutrons if the mass number is 35. In all reactions given, both the mass number and net charge do not change and are said to be conserved. In alpha decay, an unstable nucleus emits an alpha (4) particle. An alpha particle is consists of two protons plus two neutrons and is also sometimes referred to as a He-4 (4He) nucleus. In the example below, radium-226 alpha decays to radon-222 Alpha Decay:

226

Ra 222 Rn 4

Note that in alpha decay the daughter nucleus (radon) always has 2 less protons and 2 less neutrons than parent nucleus (radium). The alpha particle (4) is a charged particle and emitted with high kinetic energy. Alpha particles are not very penetrating and a few sheets of paper is usually sufficient to stop them. In beta decay, an unstable nucleus emits a beta () particle. A beta particle can be an electron (-) or a positron (+). A positron is basically the same as an electron except it is positively charged. In the example below, nitrogen-12 beta decays to carbon-12. Beta Decay:

12

N 12 C     

The end symbol refers to a neutrino which interacts very weakly with matter and for our purposes can be ignored. Note that although the daughter nucleus (carbon) has the same mass number as the parent nucleus (nitrogen), the atomic number always changes by one. Like alpha particles, beta particles (- and +) are charged and emitted with high kinetic energy. They are more penetrating than alpha particles but still only able to pass through a few mm of Aluminium on average.      

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After alpha or beta decay, the daughter nucleus is often in an excited state (*). In gamma decay, an excited nucleus releases this excess energy through the emission of a photon (γ). This is demonstrated in the example below, where boron-12 beta decays to carbon-12 which then gamma decays. 12

B 12 C *      followed by

12

C * 12 C   (Gamma Decay)

Note that in gamma decay the mass number and atomic number of the parent nucleus does not change. Gamma rays are high energy photons and are not charged. They are more penetrating than beta and alpha particles and are able to penetrate a few cm of lead on average. Half life and activity Radioactive decay is a spontaneous process and it is not possible to know exactly when a given radioactive isotope will decay. However, it is possible to know the probability that a given radioactive isotope will decay in a given time and this is represented by the decay constant (). A sample with a large number of a particular isotope, say N, decays with time (t) a predictably exponential fashion at a rate (R) according to the first equation below. Decay

Rate : R  N  N 0 e t

Half Life : t 1  2

ln 2





0.693



The half life (t½) of a radioactive isotope is the time taken for half of a given number of radioactive nuclei to decay, and is related to the decay constant () by the second equation above. After two half lives, the number of radioactive nuclei remaining is half times half or one quarter of the original number. The decay rate (R) is also known as the activity. The standard unit is the becquerel (Bq), but the curie (Ci), which is based on the activity of 1 gram of radium, is a commonly used unit. Both units are defined below. Activity: 1 becquerel = 1 decay per second , 1 curie = 3.7x1010 Bq The curie is a large unit and activities are often measured in millicuries and microcuries. For example, the activity of Am-241 found in household smoke detectors is typically about one microcurie. Absorbed dose and dose equivalent Exposure to alpha, beta, and gamma radiation will ionise matter and cause damage to cells. Radiation can leave a trail of altered and broken molecules, produce new chemicals and create free radicals within living tissue. Although for small doses cells can often repair the damage, other cells die and may or may not be replaced. Damage to DNA produces cell mutation and if this occurs in the gonads then mutations can become hereditary. The amount of damage done to living tissue depends on the dosage received. The absorbed dose measures the energy absorbed per kilogram of material. Although the standard unit is the Gray (Gy), an older unit known as the “rad” is also in use. Both these units are defined below Absorbed Dose: 1 Gray = 1 Joule per kilogram = 100 rad The Roentgen is another older absorbed dose unit. Also note that energy is sometimes measured in mega electronvolts (MeV).        113

The damage done to biological tissue depends not only on the energy absorbed, but also on the type of radiation responsible. Each type of radiation has an RBE (Relative Biological Effectiveness) value which when multiplied by the absorbed dose gives the “dose equivalent”. This is a much better measure of the damage done to biological tissue. The RBE for alpha particles, beta particles and gamma rays are 10-20, 1.0-1.7 and 1.0 respectively. The standard unit for absorbed dose is the Sievert (Sv), and the older unit is known as the “rem”. Both units are defined below. Dose Equivalent: 1 Sievert = RBE x Absorbed Dose in Grays = 100 rem Exposure to other ionising particles and photons, that may or may not be nuclear in origin, also contribute to the dose received. The RBE for X-rays, thermal neutrons, fast neutrons and protons, and heavy ions are 1.0, 4-5, 10, and 20 respectively. It should also be noted that a third unit known as “effective dose” is sometimes used where the dose equivalent is weighted according to the type of tissue (ARPANSA, 2008). The sievert is a large unit and dosages are usually expressed in millisieverts (mSv). Radiation exposure Radioactivity is a natural part of our environment. Indeed the thermal energy that heats the interior of the earth, which has a different chemical composition to that of the crust, comes from the decay of radioisotopes. Human exposure to radiation is represented in Figure 1. Natural background radiation, food and water account for 83% of exposure. Although the medical and diagnostics exposure is mostly due to X-rays, the increasing use of nuclear medicine is likely to increase average exposures. Most rocks have traces of radioactive isotopes which can end up in building materials. For example, every ton of granite contains about 20 grams of thorium and 9 grams of uranium. Radon-222, which is part of the uranium-238 decay series, is responsible for much external radiation exposure for humans. It is a heavy gas that can accumulate in buildings which are not well ventilated. Human bodies are themselves radioactive with potassium-40 and carbon-14 isotopes contributing approximately 5000 and 3000 beta decays respectively between every heartbeat (Hewitt, 2006). 

Figure 1. Origins of radiation exposure for an average individual in the United States (Hewitt, 2006)       

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In Australia, the average dose equivalent is about 2 millisieverts (mSv) per year from natural background radiation (ARPANSA, 2008). Exposure in medical procedures and some occupations may be significantly greater than this and it has been recommended that individuals should not receive a dose equivalent of more than about 5 mSv in any one year. The effects of humans as the dosage increases depends on a range of factors so, with qualifications, some generalisations are made here for dosages received over a short period of time. For low doses (0 to 100 mSv), it is generally assumed that the probability of radiation induced cancer during ones lifetime increases linearly with a risk of 1 in 10,000 per mSv. Very high doses (1 to 10 Sv) result in acute health effects with death likely within weeks from extreme doses (above 10 Sv). Radioactive isotopes are artificially produced in nuclear reactors, cyclotrons and accelerators for use in medicine, industry and research. Australian facilities at Lucas Heights (near Sydney) are operated by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and detailed information on these facilities, the radioactive isotopes produced, and their uses in medicine, industry and research in an Australian context can be found through the ANSTO website (ANSTO, 2008). Radioactive isotopes are used in all sorts of beneficial ways. In table 1, Peterson, et al. (2007) present some examples of commonly used radioactive isotopes (radionuclides) in medicine, industry, and scientific research. 

Table 1. Examples of commonly used radioactive isotopes from Peterson, et al. (2007).       Radiological Dispersal Devices

Radiological Dispersal Devices and Dirty Bombs

Since the attacks on the world trade centre and the pentagon on 11th September, 2001, there have been increased fears of a nuclear terrorist attack using a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). Peterson, et al. (2007) defines an RDD as “any method used to deliberately disperse radioactive material to create terror or harm”. Although this would include methods like spraying or spreading by hand, a bigger concern is the use of chemical

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explosives (like dynamite) to disperse highly radioactive materials. This type of RDD is known as a “dirty bomb”  Dirty bombs have been described as “Weapons of Mass Disruption” rather than “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (NRC, 2003; Peterson, 2007). Deaths at the blast scene are much more likely to be from the conventional bomb blast (and any associated panic) rather than any acute radiation poisoning. However the economic and psychological damage could be substantial. In addition, small radioactive particles that might be produced from an RDD could be inhaled or ingested. A large number of people could therefore eventually receive a high dosage due to internal exposure over a long period of time. The probability of cancers and other radiation related ailments over the longer term would be considerably increased. Zimmerman and Loeb (2004) proposed that planning for an RDD attack be based on this longer term scenario. High Risk Radioisotopes While many radioactive isotopes would be effective ingredients in an RDD, only a small number have been identified as being high risk. The risk depends on a number of factors. The energy and type of radiation (including radioactive daughter nuclei) will determine the penetration and damage done to cells. The half life and amount will affect the magnitude of the activity and time taken for decontamination. The availability, portability, concentration, chemical form (eg solid powder) and shielding of containers are also factors in efficiency and effectiveness in acquiring, transporting and dispersing a radioactive isotope using an RDD. A Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) interagency working group on radiological dispersal devices (DOE/NRC, 2003), as one of its briefs and with input from Sandia National Laboratories, identified radioactive materials of greatest concern. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (n.d.) and Peterson, et al. (2007) have also identified high risk radioactive isotopes for RDD’s. With minor differences, the identified high risk isotopes are the same, and the individual properties of these isotopes are given in table 2 (Peterson et al., 2007). Note that the specific activity listed in this table (in curies per gram) allows us to quickly compare the activities of the same amount of different isotopes.

Table 2. High risk radioactive isotopes (radionuclides) for RDD’s from Peterson, et al. (2007). 

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To give a better insight into how some factors influence the effectiveness of an RDD, consider the effect of half life. Notice that the half lives of the high risk radioactive isotopes (table 2) are intermediate in value. A life time which is too short would not give time for a terrorist to acquire and transport the source, make the RDD and then set it off in a location before the radioactive isotopes have mostly decayed. In addition, natural decontamination of the site would occur quickly as the remaining isotopes decay. At the other extreme, consider that the alpha particle emitter uranium-238 (U-238), of which Australia has plenty, has an extremely long half life of 4.5 billion years and a correspondingly low specific activity of 0.00000034. Much U-238 would be required to pose a moderate health risk in an RDD. Now let’s consider the high risk isotopes in table 2 by type of decay. The main risk from the alpha emitters: Am-241, Cf-252, Pu-238, Po-210 and Ra-226, is if they are ingested or inhaled due to the very low penetration ability of alpha particles. Americium, californium and plutonium are probably the easiest to disperse as they can exist as oxides in powder form. Am-241 can also be combined with beryllium to produce a neutron source which also poses an external threat due to the greater penetration of neutrons. Note that the small amounts of Am-241 found in domestic smoke detector sources and Ra-226 mixed with phosphorus on some old watches and gauges (to glow in the dark) are not considered high risk sources. The high energy gamma emitters: Cs-137, Co-60 and Ir-192 are particularly dangerous due to the high penetration of the gamma radiation and the very high activities (of up to 10,000 curies) found in commercial sources. The high level of this radiation can be used to kill cancerous cells, sterilise food and equipment, and non-invasively check critical welds. The mobile nature of some industrial equipment is a cause for concern. Also, Cs-137 is often found in a caesium chloride powder which can dissolve and be dispersed in water. Strontium-90 emits beta particles and is most dangerous if ingested or inhaled. They are high activity sources that were most widespread in the former USSR as the energy source for portable radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG’s) in remote locations. RTG’s powered by Sr-90 or Pu-238 are also used in interplanetary spacecraft. Further details on these high risk radioactive isotopes can be found in several sources (DOE/NRC, 2003; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007; Peterson, et al., 2007). Security and Response In the current environment it has been recognised that improving security of these high risk radioactive isotopes is desirable. The DOE/NRC Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices (2003) investigated the relative hazards of radioactive materials, national tracking systems for sources, tagging and monitoring of sources, and how to deal with unsecured, excess and unwanted sources. They believed that achieving a higher level of assurance for the control and security of radioactive materials would be beneficial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also outlined a comprehensive programme to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism (IAEA, 2007). An illuminating example of damage that can be done with unsecured radioactive material is provided by the Goiania incident in Brazil which occurred over a few months in 1987 and 1988. It started when scrap metal scavengers broke into an abandoned radiotherapy clinic and removed a 1375 Curie cesium-137 source from its protective housing. Five days later, the source was punctured (allowing the powder to leak out) and a series of events saw the cesium-137 being widely distributed. The human (and economic) toll was enormous with 5 people dead, 249 found to be contaminated by cesium-137, and 112,000 people monitored for radiation exposure and sickness. Zimmerman and Loeb (2004) give a detailed account of this incident in the context of the aftermath of an RDD attack. Natural disasters can also generate unsecured radioactive material and safely recovering radioactive sources was one of the many areas of concern following the devastating earthquake in Sichuan Province, China earlier this year (Swan, 2008).   

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Responses to an RDD attack have also been investigated and Peterson, et al. (2007) suggested that a response would involve three phases. The first phase would be immediate treatment of victims and evacuation of areas base on radiation levels. To reduce exposure from radioactive airborne dust individuals would need to move at least several blocks away, and if facilities were available, remove (and bag) clothes and have a shower (NRC, 2003). Some radioisotopes can be purged from the body with appropriate medication. Evaluation of the extent of the contamination and steps to limit further contamination or human exposure would constitute the second phase. This could be difficult to accomplish given the desire to treat and evacuate victims from the areas quickly. The final stage would involve cleaning up the contaminated area. It is worth noting that “there is no existing Australian guidance on criteria for the implementation of clean-up or remediation of an area affected by radiological or nuclear emergencies”, although there is developing international guidance (Radiation Health Committee, 2007). The need for the remediation would depend on the likely dose for a person in the area. As some guidance, it has been recommended that above 100 mSv per year would almost always justify remediation whereas less than 1 mSv would rarely be necessary.

CONCLUSION In this paper, the science of nuclear radiation and its uses in the modern world have been summarised. The nature of radioactive isotopes that are considered high risk for a radiological dispersal device (RDD) have been identified and discussed. An RDD attack could be a “Weapon of Mass Disruption” with few or no deaths from radiation exposure and little clean-up required. However a different scenario could be well organised terrorists with knowledge and resources able to create an RDD with high dispersion of highly radioactive material to large numbers of people. In either case we need to be prepared, and there is scope and need for further research in this field.

REFERENCES ANSTO (2008). Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO). Retrieved August, 2008 from: www.ansto.gov.au ARPANSA (2008). Units for Measuring Radiation. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.arpansa.gov.au/radiationprotection/basics/units.cfm DOE/NRC Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices. (2003). Radiological Dispersal Devices: An initial study to identify radioactive materials of greatest concern and approaches to their tracking, tagging and disposition. Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy. Retrieved April, 2007 from: http://www.energy.gov/media/RDDRPTF14MAYa.pdf Halliday, D., Resnick, R., & Walker, J. (2008). Fundamentals of physics extended (8th ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Hewitt, P.G. (2006). Conceptual Physics. (10th ed.). San Francisco: Pearson Addison Wesley. IAEA (2007). Promoting Nuclear Security: What the IAEA is doing. Retrieved August, 2008 from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/nuclsecurity.pdf National Threat Initiative. (n.d.). Radiological Terrorism Tutorial. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/ NEI (2007). Beneficial uses and production of radioisotopes. Nuclear Energy Institute. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.nei.org/filefolder/beneficial_uses_of_radiation_01-07.pdf 

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NRC (2003). Dirty bombs fact sheet. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.pdf Peterson, J., MacDonell, M., Haroun, L., Monnete, F., Hilderbrand, R. D., & Taboas, A. (2007). Radiological and Chemical Fact Sheets to Support Health Risk Analyses for Contaminated Areas. Argonne National Laboratory Environmental Science Division and U.S. Department of Energy. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.ead.anl.gov/pub/doc/ANL_ContaminantFactSheets_All_070418.pdf Note: The fact sheets within this document that are relevant to this paper are all dated 2005 apart from a fact sheet on Strontium which is dated 2006. Radiation Health Committee. (2007). Statement of Clean-up Criteria following a Radiological Incident. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.arpansa.gov.au/pubs/rhc/cleanup_stat.pdf Serway, R.A., & Jewett, J.W. (2008). Physics for scientists and engineers with modern physics (7th ed.). Belmont USA: Brooks/Cole-Thomson Learning. Swan, G.I. (2008). Nuclear security case study: earthquake in Sichuan Province, China. Australian Security Magazine, September/October 2008, Sydney: Yaffa Publishing Group. Thornton, S.T., & Rex, A. (2006). Modern physics for scientists and engineers. (3rd ed.). Belmont USA: Brooks/Cole-Thompson Learning. UIC (2008). Radioisotopes in Medicine. Uranium Information Centre (UIC). Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.uic.com.au/nip26.htm UIC (2006). Radioisotopes in Industry. Uranium Information Centre (UIC). Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.uic.com.au/nip27.htm Zimmerman, P. D. & Loeb, C. (2004). Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited. Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University. Retrieved August, 2008 from: http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/defense_horizons/DH38.pdf

COPYRIGHT Geoff Swan ©2008. The author/s assign Edith Cowan University a non-exclusive license to use this document for personal use provided that the article is used in full and this copyright statement is reproduced. Such documents may be published on the World Wide Web, CD-ROM, in printed form, and on mirror sites on the World Wide Web. The authors also grant a non-exclusive license to ECU to publish this document in full in the Conference Proceedings. Any other usage is prohibited without the express permission of the authors.

 

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