Reason and Faith

1 (3) 2018

DOI: 10.26319/3919

Mieszko Tałasiewicz Institute of Philosophy University of Warsaw

Reason and Faith Abstract: The claim of this paper is that theism and atheism as beliefs about the nature of the universe are equally distant from any sort of proper justification by reasoning, but that faith cannot be reduced to any sort of belief (although it induces beliefs). This claim is illustrated by a survey of several case-studies, including the case of moral sense (Marc Hauser), the so-called “God gene” (Dean Hammer) and discoveries of Benjamin Libet on “free” movement. The illustrations attempt to show that only some imagerial associations connected with these cases, and respectively with religious beliefs, would make an impression of incoherence, not their actual content. The conclusion of the paper would echo the statements of Cardinal John Henry Newman, who said in his Oxford University Sermons: “Faith is an instrument of knowledge and action, unknown to the world before, a principle sui generis, distinct from those which nature supplies, and independent of what is commonly understood by Reason”. Some implications of this conclusion, such as the notion of the rationality of faith, an account of the relation between science and theology, or the problem of agnosticism, are discussed, too.

Keywords: theism, atheism, agnosticism, rationality, science and religion, John Henry Newman This paper originates in a talk I gave in Oxford entitled “Imagery in Science and Religion.” The title of my talk was too narrow, though. The analyses of mental images evoked by certain scientific or religious considerations would serve just as illustrations or case studies for the purposes of discussing something more general and 1) The talk took place on March 2, 2016, at Blackfriars Hall. The talk was a part of the Humane Philosophy Project, run by University of Oxford, University of Warsaw, and the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion.

87

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 1 (3) 2018

deeper, namely, the relation of Reason and Faith. There is a grand tradition to discuss this topic in Oxford, let me mention just one prominent example: Oxford University Sermons, given by Cardinal John Henry Newman some eighteen decades ago. I agree with Newman in many respects, so that my paper could perhaps be regarded as a kind of a supplement to those Sermons. However, what immediately triggered my engagement with that subject was a somewhat more recent debate between Oxford scholars: Alister McGrath and Richard Dawkins. It is a common understanding in contemporary discussions that faith is a certain belief about the universe. Theists and atheists – such as McGrath on one side and Dawkins on the other – would share this understanding, diverging in their judgment about whether this belief is held according to sufficient evidence given by Reason, or rather without such evidence, or even against substantial evidence to the contrary. McGrath would proceed to say that “this is ... a matter of intellectual integrity, in which all sides to the debate – whether atheist, theist or Christian – seek to offer the ‘best explanation’ of the available evidence. This is basic philosophy of science...” From my point of view theism – as well as atheism – cannot be regarded as the best explanation of the available evidence, if the evidence is understood as anything close to what “basic philosophy of science” would consider as evidence. As a matter of fact, it cannot be regarded as any sort of explanation, better or worse, because there is no required connection between natural phenomena that could serve the purpose of evidence and the principles of faith. Not only logical connections are missing, but any relevant connections whatsoever. For while it is widely accepted that there is no logical proof or disproof of the existence of God on the grounds of natural science, the view that natural phenomena would in some indirect way, weaker than logical, but nevertheless very strong, speak for or against the thesis, is still quite popular. But it is not true – or so I would argue. The notion of explanation of facts by theories in philosophy of science is grounded in a connection (often a logical or at least probabilistic one) between theories and facts. Theories predict certain states of affairs and if these states are facts, the theories get corroborated. If the predicted states turn out to be counter-factual, the theories get falsified. Empirical underdetermination of theories – to which McGrath alludes – means that different theories might be connected to the same known facts and be therefore equally corroborated by them. Scientists may take sides on the grounds of their expectations as to which of the competing theories are more likely to gain new evidence in the future, but they usually agree on what would speak for and what against the theories in question. It is not so, it is dramatically not so in the case of theism. Science does not resolve the problem of theism because the body of natural evidence is in an equilibrium between pros and cons (in the sense that some facts speak for and some other facts speak against the probability of the existence of God and they are pretty much balanced). Science cannot resolve this problem because no single natural fact can be consid-

2) Alister E. McGrath, Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 605, Kindle. 3) Timothy Williamson calls this idea E v i d e n c e N e u t r a l i t y : “a community of inquirers can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to whether any given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry” (The Philosophy of Philosophy, The Blackwell/ Brown lectures in philosophy, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing 2007, 210). Williamson claims that Evidence Neutrality is false when it comes to philosophy and doubts that it goes faultless in respect of any human belief (ibid., 212). Such a claim undermines the role of evidence as a neutral arbiter, yet Williamson acknowledges that reliability of our theories can be saved if “the failures of Evidence Neutrality are limited enough”. Thus the regulative role of some sort of weakened principle would hold, especially in science, if not in philosophy. Let us call it Weak Evidence Neutrality and attempt a following formulation: a c o m m u n i t y o f inquirers ca n usua l ly achieve common belief as to whet her some cr ucia l proposit ions wou ld corroborate g iven hy pot heses rat her t ha n fa lsi f y t hem.

88

Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Reason and Faith

ered as corroborating or falsifying theism. Participants in the debate often think that this or that natural phenomenon would support or undermine faith, but what is really compared belongs more to the realm of some imagery evoked by science and religion than to actual content of faith or scientific theories. It is very striking that both sides would often point to the very same facts in order to provide an account in favor of and, respectively, against theism. I will give several illustrations of this. The first two are traditional in this debate, while the next three are more recent. The first is the Copernican Revolution, as discussed, for instance, by Bertrand Russell in his Religion and Science. While Russell himself soberly admits that “there is nothing in the Copernican astronomy to p r o v e that we are less important than we naturally suppose ourselves to be,” it has become a cliché that Copernican astronomy suggests unimportance of Man in the universe. While it was thought that the sun and moon, the planets and the fixed stars, revolved once a day about the earth, it was easy to suppose that they existed for our benefit, and that we were of special interest to the Creator. But when Copernicus and his successors persuaded the world that it is we who rotate while the stars take no notice of our earth; when it appeared further that our earth is small compared to several of the planets, and that they are small compared to the sun; when calculation and the telescope revealed the vastness of the solar system, of our galaxy, and finally of the universe of innumerable galaxies – it became increasingly difficult to believe that such a remote and parochial retreat could have the importance to be expected of the home of Man, if Man had the cosmic significance assigned to him in traditional theology. The image of our insignificance, of our contingency as part of the physical universe would, in the eyes of many people, suggest that God does not exist. It might be replied, however, that it is exactly our contingency that suggests the existence of God. We need to take into consideration Earth’s uniqueness, with its abundant and complicated forms of life, compared to the sterile emptiness of the observable part of the universe. Only some blind cosmic necessity could replace God as an explanation of that fact, if such status of the Earth were inevitably following from the laws of the universe. Cosmic contingency cannot be comprehended without God, who is able to impose such unique features on such a remote and parochial planet as the Earth, of no special status in the light of the laws. The second of the aforementioned traditional illustrations is biological evolution. Atheists would say that it is completely irrational to think that God, being absolutely good and almighty, could possibly have chosen such a method of creation: full of pain, of fear, of imperfections. This image can be countered, though. It might be observed that pain and fear are, in fact, p o s i t i v e adaptations; that an animal feeling no fear and no pain would be a dead animal. The inability to feel pain is a serious disease, not an advantage. On the other hand – according to the Revelation – the Earth is far from being the kingdom of heaven and the title of the Prince of This World is not an honorable one, therefore we should not expect any sort of perfection here on Earth. The Earth is heading to its end in rather apocalyptic circumstances. God offers us salvation, not abolition of natural difficulties. The main counter-image, however, Evolution offers an intuitive – at least for some people – solution to a problem, which resembles a medieval paradox of omnipotence: can God create a stone so heavy that He 4) Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 24. 5) Ibid.

89


cannot lift it? We can ask, namely, how could God, whose will is able to force every planet and each of elementary particles alike to change their trajectories, ask for human obedience and love as a free gift that man can give – or refuse to give – to his Creator? How could God make man so free that He could not force him to obey? In search for an answer to such questions we may conclude that in the act of creation God must have placed a screen between man and Himself that He must have grounded man’s personality in some axiologically neutral medium which exceeds man’s abilities of comprehension. The world of nature, with its rich structure and lack of values, which provides a setting for the evolution of man as an animal, is functioning exactly as such neutral medium. Evolution, as a means of creation of a highly complex material world, need not be an unsolved puzzle, but can be taken as the basis of man’s independent existence and his freedom. Evolution here must be understood as something p r e v e n t i n g u s from seeing God’s actions. Intelligent design, attempting to s h ow God’s industry in the machinery of the natural world, apart from its failure as a scientific theory, simply will not do in this t h e o l o g i c a l role. The cases of Copernican or Darwinian revolutions in scientific pictures of the world may seem a bit outdated today. Yet the distrust felt towards scientific discoveries has not disappeared from theology and the crusade against religious beliefs has not disappeared from the agenda of many scientists, either. We regularly witness scientists advertising their research as undermining the claims of religion (a notorious example is Richard Dawkins), as well as theologians condemning new discoveries of science. Let us consider three cases which have been in the focus of debate in the last few years. First, it is the case of the so called “God gene.” Dean Hamer discovered, or so he claimed, that there is a correlation between a certain form of gene (VMAT2) and susceptibility to religious belief, measured by the subject’s openness to believe things taken as not literally provable. Hamer’s work has run into serious criticism from other scientists, and it is unclear whether the mechanism described by this author really exists. Additionally, Hamer’s idea has attracted a strong opposition from many theologians, including John Polkinghorne, who, in response to an interview question, said that the idea of a God gene went against all his personal theological convictions. Polkinghorne’s response suggests that there is something thoroughly ungodly in accepting that some people are naturally more predisposed to believe in God than others. Everybody is the same distance away from God, he would say. However, the idea that the predisposition towards religious belief varies in degree, and that this variability is somehow congenitally determined does not seem absurd to me. More than that, the claim that everyone is the same distance away from God is, to my way of thinking, patently false. People differ as to their education, environment, health, cultural, social and religious background. It is a common-sense platitude that such differences may be reflected in the availability of religious attitude; that some people, so to speak, are closer to God than others in sociological, cultural, or biological terms. God’s justice does not consist in everyone being the same distance from Him, but in God’s knowing different distances and always meeting us at the right point. He needs only to take a step forward to meet some of us, while with others He will have to carry them off. Jesus just said to Saint Peter: “Come with me,” and Saint Peter followed Him. Doubting, Thomas the Apostle would not be satisfied until Jesus showed him His hands and side. Saint Paul had to be struck blind in the desert before he could see the truth. Thus, regardless of whether Hamer’s work is indeed as scientifically sound as proclaimed to be, it does not go against the real content of religious beliefs. It does not speak in favor of them, but it does not speak against them, either. 6) Dean Hamer, The God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired into Our Genes (New York: Doubleday, 2004). 7) Elizabeth Day, “‘God gene’ discovered by scientist behind gay DNA theory”, The Daily Telegraph, 14 November 2004.

90


Another example is furnished by the still hotly-debated discoveries of Benjamin Libet from the 1970s and ’80s. Libet demonstrated that the so-called “readiness potential” in the part of the brain controlling the motor functions preceded the point which the subjects indicated as the time at which they had made the decision by about 500 milliseconds. Many commentators and followers (including, for example, Daniel Wegner) hold that Libet’s research suggests that human agency is an illusion, and that man has no free will. These commentators take it for granted that free will means acting upon a desire, so if the action precedes the desire, free will is no longer possible. But free will is not acting upon a desire. Quite to the contrary – free will is meant to control our desires. For ages various moralists have argued that acting upon desires is not an example of free will; it is rather a case of enslavement, of being caught into a net of causal connections trying to determine our behavior. If I feel a sudden desire for chocolate and I eat it, it is not a paradigmatic example of free will, but an example of following blind impulses, and the sense of control that might accompany it may well be an illusion. Analogously, a situation in which, after a certain interval, I am to press a button upon some internal impulse is precisely a paradigmatic example of giving in to the i l l u s i o n of free will. Free will would rather exhibit itself in cases of realization of some long-term scheme, established in advance and executed exactly as planned, not as momentary impulses might dictate. A good example is the case of a lent-and-feast liturgical calendar, demanding to refrain from certain kinds of food in certain times. A good measure of freedom is whether a person is able to meet such a demand, against strong instincts of hunger. For we need to distinguish w i l l from w i s h . To be truly free does not at all mean doing everything that pleases me, or doing what I want to do. ...To be truly free means to use one’s own freedom for what is a true good.10 Man’s dignity therefore requires him to act out of conscious and free choice, ...and not by blind impulses in himself or by mere external constraint.11 When I do what I wish, I am not truly free; I am a slave to my desires. I am free only when I do what I ought to do. Again, there is nothing in favor of atheism that might not also be read in favor of theism in Libet’s research. It has been regarded as putting a question mark over free will only because the image of freedom has been distorted. Some people would say that we are free if we do not know what we are just about to do (although this can be known to a researcher examining our brain waves). However, true free will is precisely the opposite: when I follow my will I know what I am going to do not in 500 milliseconds but in 5 months – something the researcher looking into my brain would never know. The third illustration (a topic introduced to actual debates by Marc Hauser)12 is the claim that humans possess an innate, universal moral sense that has evolved over time; and thanks to which, we feel doing person-

8) A resume of his findings was published as: Benjamin Libet, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 9) Daniel Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 10) John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Dilecti Amici to the Youth of the World (1985), https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1985/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_31031985_dilecti-amici.html 11) Catechism of the Catholic Church, (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1993), article 2339. 12) Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed a Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (New York: Ecco Press 2006).

91


ally physical harm to another person to be evil. Many commentators, with joy or regret, depending on the side in the debate, take it for granted that such mechanism would deprive religion from one of its crucial role of telling people what is good and what is wrong. Such beliefs are groundless, though. In fact, the discovery of innate moral sense reaffirms an age-old piece of moral teaching: humans have an innate sense of morality that imbues them with the notions of good and evil (as distinct from profitable/unprofitable, pleasant/unpleasant and so on): For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves. Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts (St Paul, Rom. 2, 14-15) At the same time innate moral sense is not enough to produce a fully developed morality. You have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you… For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans do the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? Do not even the publicans so? (Matt. 5, 43-47) Jesus’s teachings do not invoke natural law. On the contrary, they are explicitly opposed to natural law. It is natural to love our friends, but Jesus wants us to love our enemies as well. It is natural to reciprocate kindness with kindness (reciprocal altruism), but Jesus wants us to reciprocate evil with good. It is natural to pay for the work done, but Jesus proposes to pay the same wages to a worker who has worked barely an hour as to the one who has worked an entire day. This is far from being natural. Natural moral sense is necessary for u n d e r s t a n d i n g morality, for the ability to have the c o n c e p t of good and evil. But it is not itself a morality. In summary, these illustrations are supposed to show that scientific discoveries are not likely to pose a threat to theism. At the same time, scientific discoveries will not be likely to provide evidence for theism, to say nothing of the revealed Faith. As Cardinal Newman put it, “It is indeed a great question whether Atheism is not as philosophically consistent with the phenomena of the physical world, taken by themselves, as the doctrine of a creative and governing Power.”13 We cannot seek in science a reason for believing if we do not also want to potentially find a reason for not believing. It is a psychologically proven fact that people think of rejecting some evidence in favor of a theory as the evidence in favor of the negation of this theory. This is a logical fallacy, yet still a very common one. People are fond of using this mechanism against their opponents; they show, for instance, weaknesses in pseudo-scientific apologias (such as Intelligent Design), and announce triumphantly that they have proven religion to be false. Quoting Cardinal Newman again: “From a wish to make religion acceptable to the world in general ... we betray it to its enemies.”14 Until now, we have approached, from a certain angle, the problem of the rationality of faith. Is faith irrational? Does this line of inquiry lead inevitably to agnosticism as the only rational view? What about the old schemata of fides quaerens intellectum and intellectus quaerens fidem? First of all, we must claim that faith is not the same as theism. Faith is not a belief at all, at least not in the first place. Of course, there are beliefs that follow from faith, and the belief that there is God is, of course, not the 13) John Henry Newman, Oxford University Sermons, Newman Reader, accessed 2 January 2018, http://newmanreader.org/works/ oxford/index.html , Sermon 10, 39. 14) Ibid., Sermon 4, 25.

92


least one among them. However, at its core, faith is not a belief. “While the intellect is not to be neglected, faith is very much more than knowledge. It is not mere belief in a thought, or conception, or idea. It is the expression of the whole nature of man in response to God’s approach in Christ.”15 Faith is a grace of God and a virtue of man. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it, “Believing is an act of ... assenting to the divine truth by command of the will moved by God through grace. …Before this faith can be exercised, man must have the grace of God to move and assist him; he must have the interior helps of the Holy Spirit, who moves the heart and converts it to God.”16 No theologian, no philosopher, much less a scientist could claim they have resources to persuade anyone to believe. “It is as absurd to argue men, as to torture them, into believing.”17 We must not forget, as we often do, that faith is not a propositional attitude: it is not a relation between a man and a proposition, but an interpersonal relation between man and God. Faith is something we may – and we shall say – pray for: “And the apostles said unto the Lord: ‘Increase our faith!’” (Luke 17,5). We would rather not pray “Lord, increase our theory!” or “Increase our explanation!” Once we take that faith, in its beginnings, is an act rather than anything else, we can see that agnosticism is not an option.18 We can refrain from holding a belief and from holding its negation at the same time. We can assert none of them. But we cannot refrain from doing something and from not-doing in the same time. We must pick just one option. Either we do, or we do not. According to faith, we cannot be agnostic; we must choose. Of course, there is a kind of mental state, perhaps identifiable by empirical psychology, of being uncertain about what to do. Decision-making is a process, rather than a point in time. But this uncertainty is far from any sort of stable and safe position that is comfortably occupied for long, as it is often treated. It is rather a difficult, unstable position, such that we would like to change as soon as possible. We cannot keep saying for years that we have not decided yet. If we do not believe, we do not believe. Decision is made, whatever are the declarations. And now we are in the position to reconsider the notion of the rationality of faith. The point is that there are completely different notions of rationality: the one that is applicable to beliefs or propositions, and the one applicable to decisions. If the reasons to hold a belief are in balance with reasons to reject it, it is rational to refrain from judgment, and it might be not rational to pick one of the options. However, if there is a decision to be made, an act to perform, we cannot assume that the rational decision is a priori to pick the negatively characterized option, that not to believe is somehow more rational than to believe. The formula intellectus quaerens fidem stands for precisely this: the eradication of anti-religious superstitions. As Cardinal Newman noticed: “So numerous and so serious have been the errors of theorists on religious subjects ... that the correction of those errors has required the most vigorous and subtle exercise of the Reason.”19 These are the preambula fidei: realizing that we have as much intellectual right to believe as to not believe, that our reason is free to give assent to faith, an assent that is considered the entrance condition of faith: “If there is no assent, there is no faith.”20

15) William Henry Griffith-Thomas, The Principles of Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers 2005), xxi 16) Catechism of the Catholic Church, article 155, 153. 17) John Henry Newman, Oxford University Sermons, Sermon 4, 10. 18) Of course, we are not talking here about an act of accepting certain beliefs. We are talking about an act of behaving in a certain way, a decision to perform actions required by the Revelation as the right things to do: to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to visit the sick, to bury the dead, etc. 19) John Henry Newman, Oxford University Sermons, Sermon 4, 11. 20) John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, (Vatican 1998), accessed 2 January 2018, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/ documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html , par. 79.

93


When we clear the path, the Holy Spirit shall approach us, and then the all things start to make sense in a completely different way. On assumption of faith, in the light of faith, the world might indeed picture itself as a divine beauty. “It is antecedent probability that gives meaning to those arguments from facts which are commonly called the Evidence of Revelation.”21 Where Newman says “antecedent probability” in this quote, I would rather have “antecedent act of faith”. Of course, on assumption of atheism, the picture would be quite different. But what is important is that it is the antecedent act of faith or rejection that determines the picture of the world. However, we shall not allow the picture to determine the act, because – if our arguments hold – this picture will have no such legitimate powers. Symmetrically, the figure of fides quaerens intellectum stands, inter alia, for the eradication of anti-scientific bias, a bias that is carried by many religious people. It is well acknowledged that there are internal employments of science within theology, as when theologians consider the ways of clarifying and systematizing theses of their discipline and that there are subsidiary uses of particular sciences as tools for ministration, improving the methodology of religious teaching (psychology, sociology, biology, etc.).22 But what is often missed, despite its necessity as a very important role of reasoning within religion, is that there is a need for proper understanding of the relation between science and faith. Religious people must understand that reason gives us additional, compared to Revelation, but not disjunctive, insight into God’s making of the world. If we believe that God created the world, we ought not to worry that the world would turn out to be incompatible with faith. Whatever science discovers, there always is a way to understand such a discovery in the light of faith, for, in the perspective of faith, “the marvelous book of nature” must be recognized as a part of divine Revelation.23 Our illustrations of the apparent clash between science and religion show how to approach such issues. Accordingly, we ought not to worry that too much becomes scientifically explainable. Sometimes such a worry can be felt on the side of the faithful, as if God were just the Lord of the Gaps in scientific explanation. We do not need God to fill the gaps, just as Laplace did not, and God does not need the gaps to exercise His power upon the world. We believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible, the things covered in mystery and those scientifically explainable. For it does not follow that if something is explained by a scientific theory, it has not been created by God.

21) John Henry Newman, Oxford University Sermons, Sermon 10, 44. 22) Perhaps even sociobiology, although this paradigm became somewhat outmoded within science itself. Yet it may still serve well in reminding us that, from a certain angle and after all, we are social apes equipped with biological instincts, and from this fact may follow certain difficulties in observing moral principles. 23) John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, par. 19.

94


Bibliography: Catechism of the Catholic Church. Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993. Griffith-Thomas, William Henry. The Principles of Theology. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2005. Hamer, Dean. The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired into Our Genes. New York: Doubleday, 2004. Hauser, Marc. Moral Minds: How Nature Designed a Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. New York: Harper Collins/Ecco, 2006. John Paul II. Apostolic Letter Dilecti Amici to the Youth of the World, 1985. John Paul II. Fides et Ratio. (http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_ 14091998_fides-et-ratio.html), 1998. Libet, Benjamin. Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. McGrath, Alister E.. Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2005. Newman, John Henry. Oxford University Sermons. (http://newmanreader.org/works/oxford/index.html), 1871. Russell, Bertrand. Religion and Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Tałasiewicz, Mieszko. “Science as Theology.” In Logic in Theology, edited by Bartosz Brożek, Adam Olszewski, and Mateusz Hohol, 257-291. Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2013. Wegner, Daniel. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. Williamson, Timothy. The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing 2007.

95