Rebuilding New Orleans, Reinforcing Inequalities?

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as “humans do not act according to what is, but according to what they assume” ( .... One explanation for the uneven contribution of storm damages ... hurricane Katrina had a long-term effect on the city of New Orleans and should thereby be ... and design was oriented on the relatively calm period of the 1970s-1990s (cf.
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Rebuilding New Orleans, Reinforcing Inequalities? -Inequalities in New Orleans and how they have been exacerbated by Hurricane Katrina in different stages of the disaster-

Contact: Till Neuhaus, Pestalozziweg 3, 33818 Leopoldshöhe, Germany E-Mail: [email protected]

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Table of Contents 1.

Introduction ..............................................................................................................................1

2.

Katrina as a Phenomenon of Climate-Induced Migration .......................................................2 a.

Katrina as a Climate Phenomenon causing Migration ..............................................................3

b.

Victims, Damages, and Deaths caused by Katrina ....................................................................4

c.

The Changing Nature of Risk ..................................................................................................5

New Orleans’ Geography, Social Typology, and History.........................................................6

3. a.

New Orleans’ Geography of Danger ........................................................................................7

b.

The Changing Nature of Risk in New Orleans .........................................................................7

c.

New Orleans’ History of Inequality .........................................................................................8

Reinforced Inequalities by Katrina ..........................................................................................9

4. a.

Before the Storm .....................................................................................................................9

b.

After the Storm ..................................................................................................................... 12

c.

Long-term Effects on New Orleans ........................................................................................ 14

5.

Findings and Results ............................................................................................................... 17

6.

Outlook on further Research .................................................................................................. 18

7.

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 20

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1. Introduction “Emerging empirical research indicates that environmental changes, including climate change, currently play a role in migration” (Warner, et al. 2011: 188). Some scholars even go a step further and argue that “[c]limate change has become part of high politics” (Castles 2011: 415). The scientific community agrees that climate change is partly responsible for the increase of extreme weather phenomena (cf. Castles 2011: 423) even though climate change’s impact factor cannot be exactly determined. People all around the world are exposed to extreme weather conditions and it can generally be assumed that “[t]here will always be crisis, catastrophes and uncertainty” (Müller 1994: 372). People try to lessen the impact of natural hazards (cf. Aradau/van Munster 2011: 4/5) and while almost all communities and countries are statistically affected by those hazards, their responses differ massively. One strategy to lessen the impact of those “[r]are, if not unique, and as striking rarely and without warning” (Clark 2005: 6) phenomena is migration. “Environmental migration is not a new phenomenom. […] However, global climate change threatens to significantly increase human movement, both within states and across international borders” (McAdam 2010: 1). A lot of research has been dedicated to identifying and differentiating between mitigation and adaption strategies (cf. Castles 2010: 239-241), however, less attention has been invested into the resettlement of and in urban areas (cf. Hugo 2011: 270). Further, it should be noticed that due to the on-going trend of urbanization, the city as a matter of analysis of climate-induced migration will steadily gain importance (cf. Ruth/Kirshen/Coelho 2009: 132) and due to rising sea levels, coastal cities are more affected by climate change and thereby by climate-induced migration than the inland (cf. Ruth/Kirshen/Coelho 2009: 125). Even though numbers vary massively depending on the employed definitions concerning climate-induced migration (Dun/Gemenne 2008: 11), it can nonetheless be stated that “the populations of coastal megacities have skyrocketed” in the last couple decades (Donner/Rodríguez 2008: 1095) and, on the basis of those tendencies, it can be concluded that more people will consequently be affected by climate-related phenomena in the future. As mentioned before, impacts1 but also responses to natural hazards differ between countries, regions, and even within communities. The coping strategies depend on the perception and interpretation of risk while taking into account one’s own vulnerability (cf. Luig 2012: 6). However, those interpretations can differ as “humans do not act according to what is, but according to what they assume” (Haltermann 1

Ruth and Ibarrarán state that the coping capacity differs between countries but also among people in society (cf. 2009a: 3). They come to the conclusion that hazards impact poorer countries more than rich ones (cf. 2009b: 50). An observation, which can empirically be confirmed with the help of Malone and Brenkert’s Vulnerability-Resilience Indicator Model (VRIM) (cf. Malone/Brenkert 2009).

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2012: 64). While it is extremely difficult to access people’s decision-making processes in detail, it is feasible to measure people’s vulnerability with regard to their access to resources. Vulnerability “describes the degree to which a socio-economic system or physical assets are either susceptible or resilient to the impact of natural hazards” (Oliver-Smith 2011: 161). Oliver-Smith concludes that vulnerability is “related to inequalities, to gender relations, economic patterns and ethnic or racial divisions” (ibid.). Gemenne advocates the idea that Katrina unveiled inequalities not only during the evacuation but also during the resettlement and rebuilding phases (cf. 2010: 30). To include this temporal dimension of potential impacts on New Orleans and its inhabitants, this article will investigate the reinforcement of already existing inequalities in different phases of the 2005 hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. In order to pursue this aim, hurricane Katrina and its aftermath will be categorized according to climate migration theory. After having Katrina positioned theory-wise, New Orleans geographical situation and prior experience with extreme weather phenomena will be further investigated. As mentioned earlier, access to resources is a crucial variable for people’s responses to hazards; therefore New Orleans will also be looked at in terms of resource distribution alongside historical developments with a special focus on racial segregation. After having categorized the hurricane Katrina and having provided information on New Orleans’ geographical and social background, the reinforcement of uneven resource distribution in different phases of the storm will be discussed. This section will be split into three parts: The time before the hurricane, the time of re-migration, and New Orleans’ long-term developments triggered by the storm. The insights gained from this investigation will be summarized and, on the basis of the found implications, it will be tried to answer the following question: How did the storm affect different economic groups and how did those groups react to the disaster? Further, it will be investigated how the storm has widened the gap between the economically disadvantaged and the wealthier. 2. Katrina as a Phenomenon of Climate-Induced Migration “Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the US Gulf Coast as a category-three storm on the morning of August 29, 2005” (McIntosh 2008:1). The last time New Orleans was seriously affected by a hurricane was in 1965, when hurricane Betsy caused major damages and fatalities in New Orleans (cf. Rohland 2014: 215). And while “Hurricane Katrina came close to destroying all of New Orleans in August 2005” (Gotham/Greenberg 2014:1), multiple reasons were explored for the destructiveness of Katrina, ranging from urban restructuring (Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 13) to rising sea levels (Gotham/Greenberg 2014:3) and uneven

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urban developments, which reproduce racial and class-based inequalities and segregation (Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 14). In this section, the case of Katrina will first be categorized with the terminology of climate-migration theory. Secondly, the damages caused by Katrina will be described as well as ascribed to different neighborhood and regions in New Orleans. Lastly, the partially overlapping terminology from the field of climate-induced migration will be discussed hoping to gain further insights on the causes of natural hazards, finding an adequate definition for risk, and paint a coherent picture of the risk’s changing nature.

a. Katrina as a Climate Phenomenon causing Migration Generally, there is a lack of precise definitions and terminology to describe the phenomena adequately (cf. Warner, et al. 2011: 190). Besides Quarantelli’s artificial differentiation between catastrophes and emergencies/disasters (cf. Quarantelli 2006), most scholars divide disasters into two categories: A “long-term, slow on-set process” in contrast to “the sudden onset of cataclysmic events which destroy or rapidly change livelihood or displace population on a permanent or temporary basis […]” (Hugo 2011: 261). Katrina can obviously be ascribed to the latter of the two categories. In terms of destructiveness, Katrina also fulfills the requirements to be labeled a disaster. According to Ruth and Ibarrarán, a phenomenon can be classified as a disaster if more than 10 people die, more than 100 are affected, or it results in a call for international assistance or the declaration of the state of emergency (cf. 2009b: 49). Further it can be stated that those “sudden-onset disasters, […] can trigger large-scale displacements and incur huge economic costs. However, depending on the recovery efforts, the ensuing displacement need not be long-term, and return will remain possible in most cases” (Kälin 2010: 85). Concerning migratory movements, sudden-onset disasters cause huge displacement but the overwhelming majority remains within in their country, “which qualifies them to be labeled as internally displaced persons” (Kälin 2010: 86). Due to Katrina, more than a million people were evacuated from the three affected states Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi (cf. Rohland 2014: 215). All of the evacuees stayed in the U.S. Despite all efforts, 1,800 people died from direct effects of the storm (cf. ibid.). The displaced victims of rapid-onset phenomena often return to their prior homes and reconstruct them in the disaster zone (cf. Piguet/Pécoud/de Gucheteniere 2011: 6/7). This is often explained with a lack of resources which prevents the victims to move outside the disaster zone (cf. ibid.). Paradoxically, “[i]t is often assumed that such displaced person all wish to return but it has been the experience of recent disasters that significant numbers do not wish to return and settle elsewhere” (Hugo 2011: 263). This was also the case after Katrina as

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many displaced people chose not to return, although their former communities were reconstructed (cf. Sastry/Gregory 2009). Piguet, Pécoud, and de Guchteniere hint at the fact that “[…] a high frequency of disasters encourages people to move away from their town or country” (2011: 7), however, if the community is economically depend on the region or social factors contribute to the decision-making, people stay in the danger zone as it was the case with Katrina (cf. ibid.). A possible explanation why people, despite the omnipresent danger 2, stayed in New Orleans can be found in communal and personal evaluation of risks. It is assumed that awareness for disasters is held up for roughly a generation, ergo around 35 years. If a disaster does not repeat within that time span, the awareness level drastically decreases (cf. Rohland 2014: 215). This also explains why the protective measures, namely the levee systems, were still under construction when the storm hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005. With reference to Wechselgartner (2001: 35), one could argue that “limited awareness” had a higher impact on authorities and people than the potential “awfulness” of or “exposedness” to the potential disaster. b. Victims, Damages, and Deaths caused by Katrina As mentioned earlier, Katrina came close to destroy the city of New Orleans almost entirely. 70% of the approximately 452,000 inhabitants of New Orleans left the city before the hurricane arrived (cf. Fussell 2015:1232), 25% left during or after the storm, and 5% stayed (cf. Fussell 2015: 1237) . Katrina’s destructiveness hit large parts of the city and 71.5% of the 188,251 housing units were damaged, 55.9% having severe or major damage (cf. ibid.). While “floodwaters submerged 80% of the city” (Fussell/Sastry/VanLandingham 2010: 2), one could assume that almost all citizens were equally affected, however, victims of Katrina “were disproportionately poor, elderly, and African American” (Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 1). This observation manifests itself when analyzing the numbers of the casualties. In the city of New Orleans, 67% of all inhabitants were Afro-American. However, 76% of the deaths caused by Katrina can be accounted to the group of Afro-American (cf. Rohland 2014: 217). The white population of the city of New Orleans, which was 28% before the storm, represented 20% of the fatal casualties (cf. ibid.). But not only the death rate has an ethnical implication but also the flood damages. Gotham and Greenberg analyzed the metropolitan area and concluded that even though African Americans (and other minorities) made up 45% of the metropolitan population, they accounted for 58% of the residents who lived in flooded 2

Statistically, New Orleans is exposed to a tropical storm every two years (cf. Rohland 2014: 215). Those storms vary massively in their destructive potential. Zaninetti/Colten estimate that a disaster of the magnitude of Katrina happens once every 400 years (cf. 2012:692).

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neighborhoods (cf. 2014:61). One explanation for the uneven contribution of storm damages can be found when looking at the typography of the city. Generally, it can be said that the low-lying neighborhoods were also the ones where property value was lower and a higher amount of economically disadvantaged people lived3 (cf. Fussell 2015: 1238). Exceptions to this pattern mark the primarily White and wealthy Lakewood neighborhood, which also suffered massive flood damages (cf. ibid.). The post-Katrina remigration movements will be discussed later in this paper, however, it can already be stated that the reconstruction also favored the wealthier population of New Orleans as disaster tends to affect low-income and rental households more dramatically (cf. Fussell 2015: 1235). A strong division between wealthy and economically disadvantaged can be found in the different stages of the Katrina disaster but, at least for the case of New Orleans, the terms wealthy and poor also contain a racial tendency as African Americans and other minorities populated major parts of the economically disadvantaged and simultaneously most devastated neighborhoods, whereas Whites primarily lived in the wealthier and less affected parts of the city. This interconnection of race, resources, location of neighborhoods, and thereby affectedness led some scholars to the conclusion that most disasters unveil “deliberately discriminatory practices”, which “places minorities in precarious housing situations with few resources for disaster mitigation” (Ruth/Ibarrarán 2009b: 59). Even though it cannot be ultimately proven whether the inequalities were caused to due discriminatory practices, it can be stated that there is a correlation between class and ethnic group. Therefore, race is considered a relevant category for the question of this paper4. c. The Changing Nature of Risk As stated earlier in this paper, there is a lack of precise definitions to describe and demarcate the different phenomena from each other. Traditionally, the term disaster describes “natural phenomena such as earthquakes, storms, floods, or tsunamis” (Macamo/Neubert 2012: 82). What those phenomena have in common is that they are rare and strike without any kind of warning. Now some scholars tried to differentiate according to the necessary means to overcome those phenomena. Quarantelli suggests that catastrophes challenge existing technologies and procedures whereas emergencies and disasters situations can be solved and 3

Gemenne adds that the storm exposed and revealed the already existing vulnerability. Further he argues, vulnerability should not be reduced to poverty but also to medical condition, gender, race, and age (cf. Gemenne 2010: 29). 4 While many scholars see a correlation between class and ethnicity (i.e. Ettlinger 2007: 8), others argue that “[c]lass—as income, wealth, and access to material resources, including a safety net of social connections—was certainly a better predictor than race of who evacuated [New Orleans] before the hurricane, [and] who was able to survive the storm itself” (Elliot/Pais 2006: 299).

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negotiated with already existing procedure and technologies (cf. 2006). This however, does not provide any insights on the very nature of the phenomena. While most of those phenomena have their roots in natural processes, an emerging amount is caused by mankind itself. While Quarantelli sees technology as the variable which distinguishes a disaster from a catastrophe, Beck links the emerging industrialization and on-going modernization process to an emerging potential for risks (cf. 1992: 21). This insight may be very valuable for the climate change discourse as CO² emissions are widely considered as the primary reason for climate change (cf. Cramer et al. 2001). However, not only long-term effects on the environment are considered a threat for the environment but also “[…] accidents of a more technical nature are referred to as disasters” (Macamo/Neubert 2012: 82). As disasters were formerly exclusively a natural phenomenon, they now became a “complex intertwining of human interventions and environmental vulnerability” (Luig 2012: 4). Beck’s argument is even more radical when he states that “[r]isk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (1992: 21). What all those phenomena have, independently from their cause, in common is that they refer to something with a long-term effect (cf. Macamo/Neubert 2012: 82). This may be the central argument which classifies certain phenomena as a disaster and this paper will show that hurricane Katrina had a long-term effect on the city of New Orleans and should thereby be considered a disaster, even if the causes are a mixture of natural and man-made processes, which will be further discussed in the following section. 3. New Orleans’ Geography, Social Typology, and History New Orleans has a long history, which is linked to colonialism, multiculturalism, and various ethnicities, which found their way on the American continent. The city was first laid out in 1764 by the French (cf. Gitlin/Berglund/Arenson 2013: 1). New Orleans later belonged to the United States after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, in which France sold Louisiana and further territories to the U.S. (cf. Möllers 2008: 45/46). New Orleans is often considered an un-American city due to its multiple influences and racially diverse composition of society (cf. ibid.). While New Orleans has a rich tradition of ethnic influences, it also has a considerable amount of experiences concerning disaster as it was exposed to over 96 tropical storms and hurricanes between 1852 and 2007 (cf. Rohland 2014: 215). In the following section, New Orleans geographical traits as well as man-made developments, which made and still make the city more susceptible to disasters, will be discussed, before its social

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typography, including racial and economic segregation, will be further investigated and historically contextualized. a. New Orleans’ Geography of Danger As mentioned earlier, the coastline of Louisiana is very prone to storms and from “the early years of colonial settlement, cities located in the immediate vicinity of the Gulf of Mexico have been stricken repeatedly by hurricanes” (Zaninetti/Colten 2012: 675). Before Katrina, the Galveston Hurricane (1900) and Hurricane Betsy (1965) were considered the most devastating storms to hit the coastline. However, due to the fact that the wetlands inhabited dense populations and urbanization along the coastline, only few people were directly affected by the storms. Technically speaking, “New Orleans is the only sizable city in the state that must cope with coastal weather conditions” (Zaninetti/Colten 2012: 676), especially because 2 out of 3 inhabitants lived under the sea level line and are thereby even less protected from storms and floods (cf. ibid.). The situation of the New Orleans metropolitan area is further worsened as it is located next to Lake Pontchartrain and is constantly losing surrounding wetlands (cf. ibid.). This leads to the conclusion that New Orleans is more susceptible to hurricane disasters than any other American city (cf. Rohland 2014: 215).

b. The Changing Nature of Risk in New Orleans While New Orleans’ geographical traits already favor a hurricane or flood disasters, the development within the city, as well as other man-made factors, contributed to the disaster which many scholars have predicted (i.e. cf. Fischetti 2001). The first and arguably most severe man-made factor is climate change. Gotham and Greenberg state that “[…] changing climate, and sea level rise could dramatically intensify the destructiveness of urban disasters in the coming years” (2014: 3). Secondly, the gradual growth of urban population and the city itself exposed and still exposes more people to past and future disasters but also resulted in a destruction of mangroves, sand dunes, and trees, which used to serve as buffer zones (cf. Donner/Rodríguez 2008: 1090). The last man-made development, which worsened the crisis for large parts of the population, is urban restructuring under a neoliberal paradigm. In 2000, New Orleans was the 6th poorest out of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. (cf. Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 57). Further, Gotham and Greenberg argue that due to the financial inability of the city, among other factors, a “decades-long crisis-driven process of neoliberalization” took place (2014: 14). Due to their argumentation, this “crisis-driven

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urbanization” distributed risks unequally and ensured that, in the case of a hazard, the poor would suffer the most (cf. 2014: 61). Their argumentation is closely related to the vulnerability framework which suggests that the unequal distribution of resources results in vulnerability, which, in case of a natural hazard, results in a disaster (cf. Wisner et al. 2004: 52). Climate change, population growth, and a neoliberal urbanization process were completed by a misevaluation of the potential dangers as the levee system’s structure and design was oriented on the relatively calm period of the 1970s-1990s (cf. Rohland 2014: 217). After taking the various positions into account, one could come to the conclusion that initially Katrina was seen as a major natural disaster “but when the levees broke, condemnation of the American Government was precipitous and the nature of the catastrophe was seen, in different ways, as ‘man made’” (Keeble 2016: 168). c. New Orleans’ History of Inequality New Orleans and generally Louisiana consist of various ethnic groups ever since and arguably “[n]o other coastal delta in the world […] has been inhabited by as expansive a mix of migrants as those reaching south Louisiana” (Usner Jr. 2013: 29). Around 1818, the first years after the Louisiana Purchase, New Englanders were worried about the contact zone with the “decivilizing trifecta of Catholic religious culture, French and Spanish political culture, and multiracial contact culture” (Kastor 2014: 165). The, at that point in time, creolized society of Louisiana was confronted with the American vision of society, such as Protestantism and democracy (cf. Möllers 2008: 54). The most un-American city, sometimes also referred to as “Southern Babylon” (cf. Möllers 2008: 55), was integrated into the American nation and discursively negotiated its identity in relation to the rest of the United States. In terms of racial segregation, New Orleans was of course affected by slavery and later racial segregation. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, New Orleans was an ethnically relatively well mixed city (cf. Rohland 2014: 217). Contrary to this observation, Daniel Rosenberg comes to the conclusion that at the beginning of the twentieth century, “[r]ace relations had reached its lowest point” (1988: 12). For the hypothesis of an ethnically relatively well mixed city argues that, even though “White Supremacy prevailed in politics and labor […]” (ibid.), different laborer movements arose, which crossed the traditional color lines of Black and White (cf. ibid.). However, those instances should not distract from the given that from the 1920s onwards, New Orleans faced a slow process of racial segregation into primarily Black and White neighborhood, which lasted until 2005 (cf. Rohland 2014: 217). This spatial segregation has been, as this paper has already outlined, accompanied by a

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resource-based segregation as well as a segregation of risks 5. That argument can be underlined by the numbers of the Census Bureau, which state that the Black poverty rate was around 35% in New Orleans; the highest among all large cities in the U.S. (cf. U.S. Census Bureau 2000).

4. Reinforced Inequalities by Katrina New Orleans is a city of contradictions and features multiple interesting circumstances, such as unequal distribution of resources, ethnically shaped neighborhoods, or a very susceptible geographical location for floods and storms. As argued earlier, the amount and access to different resources “is decisive for the ability to adapt to natural hazards” (Haltermann 2012: 60). In the following section it will be illustrated how different adaption strategies were employed according to the individuals’ access to resources. Further, the upcoming section will provide insights on how inequalities between the rich and the poor were reinforced and widened by the storm. Those reinforcements of inequalities can be found in the pre-storm and re-migration phases as well as the long-term effects on the city. a. Before the Storm The pre-storm phase, in which citizens made their decision to either leave or stay, can be investigated by focusing on four different sub-topics. Firstly, the information and communication process must be understood in order to explain people’s reactions to the disaster warnings. After having looked at communicative scenarios and hurdles, the people’s geographical position in the city also influenced the impact of the disaster. Further, the physical resources to leave New Orleans must be evaluated to generate insights on people’s decision. Lastly, preventative measures, such as insurances, will be discussed in this section as they play a major role in the reduction and lessening of potential risks and partly explain remigration movements, which will be further investigated in the following section. One aspect which determines people’s responses to disasters is risk communication6. This vast area contains the aspects of receiving and understanding important information as well as assessing them accordingly. The assessment process is tightly linked to trust in 5

“The topography of New Orleans favors a racial divide: the lower, more dangerous ground has long been inhabited by the poor and mostly Black, while the safer, higher ground has been occupied by Whites” (Battistoli 2015: 3). 6 “Risk communication is an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk management” (NRC 1989: 21).

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authorities but also to experiences made in prior disaster scenarios. Those experiences can be seen as individual knowledge; however, in well-connected communities information exchange takes place more detailed, which usually results in better decision-making. The kind of resource which is discussed here is cultural capital and the possession of cultural capital influences the information receiving as well as the information processing part. Concerning the information receiving process, Donner and Rodríguez hint at “[d]eficits in ‘lingustic capital’”, which “may lead to misunderstanding of warnings […]” (2008: 1091). Linguistic barriers however, cannot explain why the majority of the 5% who did not leave the city were almost exclusively Black (cf. Battistoli 2015: 3). Information on the storm was given to New Orleans’ entire population and it can be assumed that the overarching majority has, on the information level, properly understood it as linguistics deficits cannot be observed in the Afro-American communities. However, the evaluation of risk differed immensely. One factor, which could explain those differing evaluations, might be trust in official announcements. Battistoli, among others, states that “[o]ver many decades, as hurricanes and floods approached New Orleans, officials directed, even ordered, Blacks in this region to act in ways that put their lives and property in harm’s way” (2015: 4). Those experiences, alongside the given that “changes in opinion are significantly related to the trustworthiness of the source used in the communication” (Hovland/Weiss 1951: 647), could explain why the AfroAmerican communities of New Orleans did not follow the official orders but remained skeptical towards those. Furthermore, it should be taken into consideration that minority groups are more likely to rely on and trust information provided by their social networks (cf. Morrow 1999: 8). This observation can be combined with yet another finding, namely the one of Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien, who found out that the quality of information differs according to socio-economic status. This ultimately leads to a “knowledge gap” (cf. 1970: 159). In the case of New Orleans, race and ethnicity and tightly linked to socio-economic status, thereby one could argue that especially minority groups have less access to quality information and are more depended on information provided by their social networks. Those hypotheses are partly refuted by Battistoli’s findings, when he comes to the conclusion that only socio-economic status and frequent use of risk communication sources are significant factors to explain this phenomenon. Also, the investigated groups, Whites as well as AfroAmericans, used mass media as their primary source of risk information (cf. 2008: 7), which thereby minimizes the impact of race on the information’s quality. What indeed is different however, is the processing of that information. According to Fussell, 49% of the evacuees, which were registered with the Red Cross, thought “that the hurricane would not be as bad as

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it was” (2015: 1237). After all, it can be argued that the differences in risk perception were not produced by the access to quality information but by the evaluation of it. The resources discussed in the second paragraph of this section are the physical and monetary resources. The positioning within the city will be investigated together with resources and opportunities to leave the city and insurances, as they are all linked to the financial situation of the affected people. As mentioned early, the more endangered neighbors in case of floods are also the neighborhood with lower property value and subsequently with lower rents. Multiple scholars stated that New Orleans experienced racial segregation from the late 1920s on, which is mostly due to socio-economic disenfranchisement and inequalities. As outlined earlier, race and socio-economic situation have strong linkages and thereby the economic disadvantaged neighborhoods mainly consist of minority groups. In the case of New Orleans, the most visible minority group, which is also one of the economically most disadvantaged groups, is the Afro-American community. In the prior section, it was stated that information on the storm made its way to almost all citizens and was understood by almost everybody. Further it can be argued that the poor Black neighborhoods were, at least partially, aware that their situation in case of floods is significantly worse than the situation of wealthier and higher located neighborhoods. Despite all risks, 30% stayed in the city until the hurricane hit the coast. One potential explanation for that behavior is that they were simply lacking the resources to leave. “The main reasons given by those who did not evacuate prior to the storm for not leaving were the lack of a car or another way to leave (34%), underestimating how bad the storm would be (28%) or being physically unable or caring for someone physically unable to leave (12%)” (Fussell 2015: 1237). While there was a significant amount of people who were lacking the means to evacuate, another economic factor should not be ignored: Inability to sustain oneself during long-term evacuation (cf. Donner/Rodríguez 2008: 1098). McIntosh’s analysis of Katrina’s impact on Houston’s labor market, hint at the fact that those who evacuated and decided to move out of the potential danger zone long-term were primarily female, highly educated, and non-minorities, who then entered the Houstonian labor market, whereas male, less educated, and Houstonian members of minority groups were not exposed to more competition on the labor market (cf. McIntosh 2008: 56). Lastly, the impact of preventive measures, such as insurances, should be investigated. Generally, it can be said that poorer members of society have less resources “for preventative and adaptive measures” (Ruth/Ibarrarán 2009b: 54). This could be of particular interest as uninsured people had to fear destruction of their property caused by plundering gangs or thugs (cf. Barbieri/Edwards

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2015: 1). The fear of losing one’s property without any compensation may have convinced some to stay. Further, the majority of economically disadvantaged people does not own property but rents it and is thereby depended on the housing-complex owner’s insurance status. In case of ‘projects’, the insurance situation is special as it is either the state or private investors, who is responsible for the housing complex. In both cases capital return rate is relatively low, which often results in neglect when rebuilding projects after disasters as other investments promise higher profits and return rates. Fussell, among others, states that “[d]isasters tend to disproportionately damage rental and low-income housing, which also tend to be rebuilt more slowly, if at all, while owner-occupied housing is typically repaired and rebuilt quickly” (2015: 1235). This homeowner bias can be explained by the more efficient monetary transfers from insurances and federal disaster assistance to owners of property (cf. ibid.). The inability to provide such preventative measures and the resulting lack of those measures create a scenario in which poorer communities are less supported by the state as well as from insurances. Together with the above illustrated risk and resource distribution in New Orleans, it can be remarked that poorer neighborhoods were more affect by Katrina as well as less assisted by private and federal institutions after the storm.

b. After the Storm In this section, remigration to New Orleans after the storm will be investigated. Particular interested will be dedicated to the speed of repopulation. Further, it will be investigated who had the chance to re-enter the city and when. Further it will be tried to explain how those different tempi came into being. After Hurricane Katrina almost destroyed New Orleans, ‘dewatering’ took six weeks and was prolonged by Hurricane Rita, which added rainwater to the floodwaters (cf. Fussell/Curtis/DeWaard 2014). Just taking total numbers into account, it can be said that “[a]fter residents were allowed to return, the city’s population recovered gradually, reaching only about half its pre-Katrina size by mid-year 2006 and about three-quarters by mid-year 2012” (ibid.). However, “population recovery […] was uneven in the years following Hurricane Katrina”, which could be explained by impediments, such as “extensive damage to residential and nonresidential property and structures, slow and inadequate dispersal of recovery funds, employment layoffs due to contractions in demand for goods and services, inadequate repairs and improvements to existing

levees,

and

debilitated

healthcare,

school

and

emergency

services“

(DeWaard/Curtis/Fussell 2016: 450). It can thereby be assumed that resourced also played a major role in determining who was able to repopulate the city at what point in time. In the

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following, this section will try to find out who could return when and what held certain groups back. As mentioned earlier, damages were distributed unequally within the city. The lowlying and often economically disadvantaged neighborhoods suffered more severe damages than the higher and wealthier neighborhoods. This unequal distribution of risk was accompanied by an unequal procedure in terms of post-disaster aid. Grants, insurances, and funds were distributed in different temporal episodes. The major difference which can be observed here is between private insurances and federal disaster assistance. “Homeowners with private insurance received payments relatively quickly and reliably and so they could confidently make decisions about rebuilding or relocating“(Fussell 2015: 1238). Not only did the federal disaster assistance held back payments multiple years but also paid less as “[t]he grant amounts for rebuilding depended on the lesser of two amounts: the cost of rebuilding the damaged home or the pre-storm value of the property” (Fussell 2015: 1239). Subsequently, people from low property value neighborhoods received less money. This, in contrast to people from wealthier neighborhoods, led to relatively higher potential costs for rebuilding and mitigating the storm damages. Even though it is widely considered that, due to more efficient payments of insurances and grants to homeowners, there is a homeowner bias in post-disaster situations; this bias is further amplified by risk and damage distribution. Generally, it was the case that high-value property was less affected by the storm, yet received higher and faster recovery payments than low-value property. Those tendencies are tightly linked to preventative measures, mainly private insurances, and governmental decisionmaking. Nonetheless, this example illustrates how pre-existing inequalities (i.e. the lack of financial resources to insure property) result in exacerbated inequality after the disaster. While inequalities are mirrored by different treatment according to property value, the same applies to rental housing. 50% of New Orleans’ housing units were rented in 2004 and there is a strong tendency that socially and economically disadvantaged, and thereby more vulnerable, people have a higher tendency to rent apartments and housing 7 (cf. Fussell 2015: 1239). Renters are highly depended on their landlords’ decisions, so if the landlord cannot repair the housing units in time, renters lose their home. Further, it should be stated that rental houses are often of lesser quality and suffer greater damage (cf. ibid) and housing damage can be considered one of the main factors of slowing down return migration, especially among Black 7

residents

and

residents

of

low

socio-economic

status

57% of African American householders rented, 81% of householders with below–poverty incomes rented, 62% of female-headed householders rented, and 87% of female-headed householders with below–poverty incomes rented (cf. U.S. Census Bureau 2005).

(cf.

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Fussell/Sastry/VanLandingham 2010: 11). Independent from rental or owning status, it can be said that uneven recovery patterns of neighborhoods are one of the most central reasons why return-migration took place at different times. As outlined earlier, those recovery patterns are tightly linked to the socio-economic status of the individual as well as the neighborhood. Further, neighborhood recovery corresponds to pre-storm inequalities, leaving the poorer and more affected neighborhoods under construction for longer than the less affected areas. Fussell, Sastry, and Van Landingham outline in detail that Afro-Americans needed more time to return to their neighborhoods (cf. 2010: 8-10). Lastly, it should be noted that some were not able to return at all. Responsible for those resettle movements were mainly the lack of affordable housing and a rise in rents. The about 97,000 people who were not able to return mainly moved into the suburb areas. The implication of that migratory movement as well as the racial composition of the non-returners will be taken up in the following section.

c. Long-term Effects on New Orleans This paper has so far investigated how resources changed the situations and responses of people before and shortly after the storm. New Orleans however, has almost been entirely destroyed by hurricane Katrina. Decision-makers and politicians were inevitably challenged to build back the city. But which measures were chosen and what kind of economical, social, and political implications did the chosen projects, measures, and procedures imply? This question is of particular interest as the ‘Culture of Response’ is shaped by political ecology, ethno-history, social, and economic factors (cf. Dyer/McGoodwin 1999: 214). Further, Dyer and McGoodwin suggest that “power relationships dictate access to disaster recovery resources” (1999: 214) “in ways that can determine when, where, and how much aid might be directed at a particular area, population, subculture, or minority group” (Dyer/McGoodwin 1999: 213). The impact of power relationship has already been observed by looking at return migration and the above mentioned ‘homeowner bias’. This time however, the bias for certain parts of society is manifested through city planning and urban restructuring. Ruth and Ibarrarán suggest that disaster result in “changing level and structure of public expenditure”, which “usually hurts the current level of public services and future public investments, and reduces transfers, particularly to the disenfranchised and poor” (2009b: 51). The harder impact of disasters on the “disenfranchised and poor” is often explained by the fact that “it is decision-making authorities that determines the impact of disaster on marginal communities” (McDyer/Goodwin 1999: 215) and that the networks of those marginalized people and communities “are less likely to contain connections to influential people, such as

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moneylenders or government officials” (Ruth/Ibarrarán 2009b: 54). The projects set up by the government and other decision-makers had two effects: “The city is whiter and wealthier than it was before the Katrina crisis” (Johnson 2015: 176). “97,000 African Americans have not returned” (ibid.) and were pushed in the suburban areas (cf. Zaninetti/Colten 2012: 689/690), which resulted in an increase in suburban poverty (cf. Johnson 2015: 176). Ironically, the tendency before the storm was the exact opposite and showed that, at least for certain groups, “extreme events may even act as a pull rather than a push factor” (Piguet/Pécoud/de Guchteniere 2011: 6/7). The change in ethnic composition can be explained by looking at the rent-price structure of New Orleans. Post-Katrina New Orleans has changed massively and became, especially for renters, “largely unaffordable” (Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 162) 8. Gentrification, alongside the tendency to build and rent houses above the sea-level line (cf. Zaninetti/Colten 2012: 692), led to a long-term increase of rents and property values, which pushed economically disadvantaged individuals and groups out of the city and mainly into the suburbs. Simultaneously, the city attracted wealthier individuals from other areas of the country. The process of rebuilding and restructuring the city can be explained by two effects, which describe the same process, yet with different implications: The Phoenix-Effect and the Matthew-Effect. According to Dyer, “[a]chieving a state of recovery that surpasses the original state and that creates new social, economic, and cultural capital beyond what existed before is here termed the ‘phoenix effect’” (Dyer 1999: 282). The Phoenix-Effect can be triggered by choosing the most efficient and impactful project which attract public and private partners. The disaster is seen as a trigger which forces authorities to plan more carefully and try “to maximize the benefits of invested recovery capital” (ibid.) and thereby “achieve results that might not have been achieved in pre-disaster climate” (Dyer 1999: 283). The PhoenixEffect and authorities’ decision-making can be depicted by taking a closer look at the income and salary developments of New Orleans’ inhabitants. “Although the hurricanes caused earnings losses in the short term, on average they led to earnings gains in the medium term and long term” (Groen/Kutzbach/Polivka 2016: 34). Although some of the changes might be caused by migratory movements and attracted businesses, the analysis of wages can hint at the industries which were sponsored the most after the storm. The conducted study comes to the conclusion that especially construction, manufacturing and agriculture benefitted the most, whereas fields, such as healthcare and education, were neglected, which resulted in smaller 8

60% of the renters paid more than 30% of their pretax income for rent and utilities in 2010, compared to 50% nationwide. Further, 31% spend more than half of their pretax income on housing, compared to 25% nationwide (cf. Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 162).

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growth rates and subsequently lower wages (cf. Groen/Kutzbach/Polivka 2016: 35). While the Phoenix-Effect is supposed to be a neutral observation, there are more critical voices which ascribe disasters the potential to cause gentrification and even triggering ethnical cleansing in post-disaster reconstruction times (cf. Johnson 2015: 175-177). As there were plans to shut down some of the predominantly Afro-American neighborhoods in New Orleans after Katrina and use them as a buffer zone (cf. ibid.), it has to be acknowledged that disasters of Katrina’s scope also have the potential to change cities and inhabitants permanently while widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The Matthew-Effect explains how disaster can reinforce already existing inequalities. The pre-assumption of the Matthew-Effect is that “[p]redisaster inequality is exacerbated by differentials in disaster impacts and institutional and social responses“ (Fussell 2015: 1234). However, “[t]he Matthew effect is also produced when disasters create attractive opportunities, especially for government planners and community members interested in ‘building back better’ and for business elites who seek to take advantage of redevelopment opportunities in devastated areas” (ibid.). The problem however, which ultimately creates further long-term inequalities, is that “the groups that experienced the greatest losses are those least well positioned to take advantage of emergent opportunities” (Fussell 2015: 1235). Even though New Orleans became one of the fastest growing cities after 2005, peaking at 17% growth rate between 2006 and 2007 (cf. Fussell 2015: 1233), this does not necessarily mean that the generated wealth is distributed among all inhabitants or tickles down as suggested in some branches of economic sciences. Also, it cannot be assumed that the post-disaster growth caused a general uplift of New Orleans’ society. Instead, it can be argued that “[t]he decline in the rate of family poverty for New Orleans, […], also reflects the fact that the poor and most vulnerable to flood damages are least likely to have access to the resources to return to the city after the deluge” (Gotham/Greenberg 2014: 165). While taking the already existing inequalities into account, the post-disaster programs launched by New Orleans have an almost cynical overtone. Gotham and Greenberg conclude that the “lowincome housing tax credits […] paled in comparison to the huge amount of tax-exempt bonds”, which were primarily designed to attract businesses (2014: 129). While some of the more radical voices from within the scientific community argue that “Louisiana policymakers engaged in legislative maneuverings that aimed to further mute the voices of African American community members“ (Henry Jr./Dixson 2016: 222), it can nonetheless be concluded that the poorest members of society were helped the least after the disaster and decision-makers launched, unconsciously or consciously, programs which triggered

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gentrification, while simultaneously reducing transfers and services which would have helped the economically disadvantaged.

5. Findings and Results This paper tried to answer the question how different groups within New Orleans were differently affected by Hurricane Katrina and how those groups responded to the disaster in relation to their available resources. It is notable that economic and social class is strongly intertwined with race in New Orleans. Furthermore, class and race can, to a certain extent, also serve as a determiner for storm-induced damages. This article was able to show that suffering from the storm closely corresponded to socio-economic class. This tendency was observable in all three investigated phases of the storm. In this regard, the hurricane disaster does not mark any difference to already existing theory. Further, the individual and collective responses of victims were also partly determined by their resources and thereby socioeconomic status. Therefore, some scholars come to the conclusion that community based struggles have intensified in post-Katrina times (cf. Perry 2015: 95) as Afro-American were on average more affected by the storm, received less support while and after the storm, and had and still have less resources to mitigate the disaster as well as the post-disaster stress they are exposed to. Secondly, this paper tried to unveil how the hurricane widened the gap between rich and the poor. This article was hopefully able to show that pre-disaster inequalities are very likely to be exacerbated by disasters as it was the case in New Orleans. The reasons why disasters tend to favor bottom-to-top redistribution are tightly linked to political decision-making as well as pre- and post-disaster opportunities. In the pre-disaster phase a significant difference in information processing and evaluation was found. Those differences are very likely to be explained by different prior experiences of ethnical communities. The different perception of risks resulted in different decisions, which ultimately resulted in a higher proportion of deaths from the storm for those communities. But not only information processing and risk evaluation are responsible for the found difference but also the inequalities in terms of resources to leave and sustain oneself in a safe place for the duration of the disaster. Alongside the riskier location of economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, those resourcerelated factors were mainly responsible for the higher degree of affectedness of poor and often Afro-American inhabitants. Further, the lack of resources resulted in a lack of preventative measures. This again results in lesser aid received after the disaster. Especially the difference

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between private insurances in contrast to federal disaster assistance can be considered immense. The example of preventive measures is a prime example how pre-disaster inequalities are reinforced and enlarged by an external catalyst, name the storm. Also this article has shown that inequalities affected disadvantaged people more drastically in all stages of a disaster. However, economically marginalized people are not only assisted less and affect more but also have a lesser chance of benefitting from the emerging post-disaster opportunities, which partly explains why inequalities are not only unveiled by disaster but often reinforced and enlarged. In those post-disaster scenarios the already rich seem to benefit more as they receive a larger share of public funding as well as private investment. That upward spiral often results in gentrification, which again affects the more vulnerable parts of society. As a closing remark, it can be stated that disasters have different effects and impacts on groups according to their opportunities, which are often, if not always, related to their socio-economic status, level of education, and social class. Those different impacts could be found before, during, and past the disaster and that their specific countermeasures and mitigation/adaption strategies result in very different outcomes, which often emerge already existing inequalities. 6. Outlook on further Research This paper has shown that race and economic status, among other factors, were major determiner for pre-, while, and post-disaster responses. The focus of this paper has been set on the Afro-American communities as they were excluded resource-wise before and after the disaster (cf. Usdin 2014: 162). Even though New Orleans partly reflects “[t]he complicated racial environment in the USA [caused by] regional history and influences“, the self-narrated image of New Orleans does no longer represent migratory reality as it neglects Hispanic and Asian migratory flows (Usdin 2014: 163). Usdin further argues that “[…] many of New Orleans’ lower-income and working-class African-Americans who had evacuated postKatrina and were trying to return, competed for jobs with the many Hispanics who came to the area for work or were brought in by contractors” (ibid.). Therefore, it might be insightful to investigate how those new migratory flows changed the city’s structure. As multiple scholars have argued, race is only one component which explains the risk and wealth distribution within the city of New Orleans. Therefore, it might be fruitful to investigate how those newly arriving ethnic groups integrate into the city, to what extent those groups are exposed to potential risks, and to further determine and, if possible, isolate the influence of race in contrast to class, education, and legal status. Especially the latter might be of particular

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interest as an emerging number of undocumented Latinos are finding their ways to New Orleans and try to “make a living in the storm-ravaged city” (Drever/Blue 2011: 89). According to already existing theory, undocumented working-class inhabitants are supposed to be affected the most by risk and disaster. It might be interesting to investigate whether this is also the case in New Orleans. Secondly, further research should be dedicated to adaption and mitigation strategies employed by the people of New Orleans. As Miller, Jonkman, and Van Ledden argue, “New Orleans’ risk of flooding will continue to increase in the future due to many factors, including regrowth of the population and economy as well as physical factors such as sea level rise and ground subsidence” (2015: 59). But also protective measures were improved and risk analysis further refined (cf. ibid.). The long-term question should thereby be how New Orleans evaluates and mitigates the future disasters. Yet, another interesting question for further research might be how the potential risk, which might be accelerate in the future, is evaluated by the citizens and to what extent those risks influence their decision of staying or moving. From the countless opportunities for further research, the question of risk evaluation combined with citizen participation in city planning (cf. Weil 2012) might be, especially in the case of New Orleans and its inequality problem, a very promising topic.

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k: Na u a

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