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Asia Eur J (2012) 10:1–20 DOI 10.1007/s10308-012-0320-8 O R I G I N A L PA P E R

Region-building and critical juncture: Europe and Northeast Asia in comparative perspective Sam-Sang Jo

Received: 11 October 2011 / Revised: 4 March 2012 / Accepted: 9 March 2012 / Published online: 28 March 2012 # Springer-Verlag 2012

Abstract China, Japan, and Korea have begun to engage one another vigorously since the 1997 crisis. As intraregional economic ties have further deepened and broadened, interconnectedness in cultural and political aspects has risen rapidly in a variety of forms. Decision-makers and intellectuals in China, Japan, and Korea have been floating ideas and interests for establishing various types of Northeast Asian community formation. New security dialogues and co-operation frameworks also emerge. Accordingly, the rapidly growing Northeast Asia is likely to emerge as an identifiable regional community. With the incipient emergence of regional community in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asian region-building becomes a salient issue of major academic and policy debates. Yet, in spite of the recent mushrooming of research in and attention to the region-building, the questions regarding within what surrounding and under what situation regional community can be built, as well as what motivates people to choose region-building, and when and how state system can be transformed into a regional community remains only partly resolved. In order to solve this puzzle, this paper will compare the current Northeast Asian region-building with the early stage of European region-building, arguing that while there are important differences in evolution, format, and kind of region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia, critical juncture is influential in region-building.

Introduction Since in the mid-1970s when Ernst Haas declared the “obsolescence of regional integration theory”, the study of region-building had occupied a small, if not S.-S. Jo Institute of Korean Studies, Pusan National University, Jangjun-dong Kumjung-ku, Busan 609-735, South Korea S.-S. Jo (*) School of Information and Communication, Meiji University, 1-1, Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

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insignificant, place in international relations. Yet, while “globalization” has once been the mantra of international relations in describing the emerging world order, “regionalization,” “regional integration,” “regional institution-building,” or “region-building” is the today’s buzzword. It is because not only have regions acquired substantial autonomy from the system-level interactions of the global powers but they have also grown steadily more interdependent, interconnected, and cohesive in socioeconomic terms, becoming substantially more important sites of cooperation than in the past (Hettne et al. 1999; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Hettne and Söderbaum 2002). Northeast Asia, for example, had once conspicuously lacked region-building. Yet, since the 1990s it has become a substantially more consolidated, assimilated, and interconnected region. Northeast Asia is not substantial only in geoeconomic terms, but it also is increasingly becoming an identifiable economic, political, and social region—a globally significant yet little recognized, new development. There are two positive developments for region-building among Northeast Asian states. Firstly, the virtual end of the Cold War in Northeast Asia has opened up vital opportunities for region-building. The traditional triangular alliance between China, North Korea, and Russia versus Japan, South Korea, and the USA has been obviously fading out. This brought a more favorable situation for region-building because of the absence of confrontation due to ideological differences. Secondly, and more significantly, the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis led to the increasing interconnections among the Northeast Asian countries. Since then, region-building has been quietly proceeding, in spite of the existence of serious territorial, historical, or sovereignty issues which have still not been resolved. There has been the emergence of a greater willingness on the part of regional leaders and elites to collectively manage affairs at a regional level. This is an important sign of one of the long-term consequences on Northeast Asian community formation. Furthermore, China, Japan, and Korea have begun to interconnect one another vigorously in political, cultural, and economic aspects. Ideas and interests for establishing various types of Northeast Asian community formations are afloat. New security dialogues and co-operation frameworks, such as the trilateral summit meeting and ministerial dialogues, also emerged. As a consequence, suffice it to say that a new regional community is gradually springing up in Northeast Asia. With the increase of region-ness in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asian regionbuilding becomes a salient issue of major and continuous academic and policy debates (Rozman 2008; Aggarwal and Koo 2008; Kim 2009; Calder and Ye 2010) which now contrast with scholarly interest in region-building that has long been focused on Southeast Asia, with its comparatively advanced institutional structures of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yet, in spite of the recent mushrooming of research in and attention to the region-building, the questions regarding within what surrounding and under what situation regional community can be built, as well as what motivates people to choose region-building, and when and how state system can be transformed into a regional community remains only partly resolved. In order to solve this puzzle, I will compare the current Northeast Asian region-building with the early stage of European region-building. This article is structured in four sections. The article begins with a description of region-building processes and types. I draw the outlines of my subject from Karl Deutsch and Donald

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Puchala’s region-building approach: regional community formation and regional political amalgamation. The penultimate section provides a concept of critical juncture. This is followed by a discussion of region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia. It is argued that while there are important differences in the evolution, format, and kind of region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia, critical juncture is influential in region-building. The final section offers some reflections on some of the conspicuous remarks of region-building for the future of Northeast Asia.

Types and sine qua non of region-building Although the study of region-building, paying attention to a rise in regional institutions all over the world in response to the challenges of globalization, emerged in Northeast Asia in the late twentieth century, theoretical analyses of region-building originally began in about 1950 with the works of Viner (1950), Byé (1958) and Giersch (1949) (admittedly all economists) and Haas (1958), and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) (all international relations scholars). They provided substantial literature on region-building among nations—exploring what it is and how it is formed. Leading figures among them in the development of scholarly perspectives concerning region-building, both empirically and normatively, are Deutsch et al. (1957), and one of his students, Puchala (1970). Deutsch’s work on region-building, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, and Puchala’s several works including “International Transactions and Regional Integration” were motivated by their belief that violent conflict could be eliminated from international relations through region-building if its conditions were understood and nurtured rather than conventional practices such as balance of power, collective security, or military deterrence. According to them (Deutsch et al. 1957, 5–8; Puchala 1981: 155), region-building has at least two major dimensions: (1) regional community formation: the loose interconnection of governments as well as the interconnection of peoples through economic interaction, information exchange, policy coordination, bonds of mutual trust, identification, and social assimilation and (2) regional political amalgamation: the intimate interconnection of governments through supranational institutions and policymaking processes. Specifically speaking, community formation includes a strongly increasing economic integration; the disappearance of intraregional communication barriers; the voluntary collective actions among states to tackle specific common problems in an open-ended and less complex manner; the heightening of mutual awareness, attentiveness and responsiveness at all societal levels; and the growth of “we-feelings” and mutual deference and esteem between peoples. Political amalgamation means the complex and deep commitments by the states in a given region to pursue the resolution of common problems with measures that affect the states’ sovereignty; the emergence and expansion of supranational institutions interconnecting governments; the emergence and increasing efficacy of political interest articulation and aggregation in a supranational arena; and increasing frequency, ease, and efficacy in intergovernmental accommodation in a “consensus finding” or “conflict resolving” process. As Table 1 shows, “community formation” and “amalgamation” may occur separately to produce either “regional community” or “empire,” respectively. Or the two processes may occur together to produce “region-state”. In

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Table 1 Region-building processes and types Amalgamation

Non-amalgamation

Community formation

Region-state

Regional community

Non-community formation

Empire

State system

other words, from their classification, four entities can be defined: (1) state system (non-community formation and non-amalgamation), (2) regional community (community formation but non-amalgamation), (3) empire (non-community formation but amalgamation), and (4) region-state (community formation and amalgamation). In a state system, a region is firmly rooted in territorial space: a group of people living in a geographically bounded community, and united through a certain set of cultural values and nationalism. Regional community refers to the entity whereby the region increasingly turns into a community with a distinct identity and interconnection of institutionalized or un-institutionalized actors, in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society, transcending the old state borders. Empire indicates a geographically extensive group of states and peoples amalgamated and ruled by an emperor or empress—for example, the Roman Empire, the British Empire, and the Mongol Empire etc. Empire’s rule, authority, and policymaking processes are centralized and maintained by either direct conquest and control with force or indirect conquest and control with power. Region-state constitutes a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign nation states into a new form of political entity, where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all, and which is radically more democratic than other international polities (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002: 37–45). European and Northeast Asian region-buildings, as Table 2 demonstrates, are organized along different lines. Europe would be an example of an intermediate entity between a regional community and region-state, pursuing regional political amalgamation (although political amalgamation has been from time to time resisted in Europe), while Northeast Asia is between a state system and regional community, experiencing the incipient emergence of regional community formation. European region-building emerged since the state system was blamed for a major catastrophic war, while Northeast Asian region-building is shaped at a time when the main concern of regional actors is to preserve the state system as a last resort of wellTable 2 Region-building processes and types

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being and security. European region-building is distinguished by the complex and deep commitments to political amalgamation to resolve common problems, while Northeast Asian region-building is distinguished by the summit level intergovernmental cooperation—where heads of state and government have talked and negotiated cooperative initiatives—as well as the voluntary collective actions and intensive people-to-people interconnections which lead to community formation. Europe illustrates with particular clarity the formal, legalistic, political, and sovereignty pooling aspects of region-building; Northeast Asia, the informal, non-legalistic, economic, and sovereignty comforting aspects. Europe seems to be determined to construct a greater European unity, that is region-state, by further surrendering or pooling of national sovereignty, making common fiscal policy and promoting regional political amalgamation. Northeast Asia appears to support a gradual strengthening of regional community formation through interconnectedness, voluntary collective actions, and policy coordination. But, within what environment and under what condition did Europe opt for political amalgamation and why does Northeast Asia choose regional community formation? Critical juncture can account for the environment and condition of the region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia. A critical juncture is a crucial historical point at which there are appealing alternative paths to the future. In other words, the periods surrounding a major crisis are described as the critical juncture, when long-established patterns in a region are suddenly called into question, and new, unusually enduring relationships are forged (Calder and Ye 2010: 45–48, 160–161). In years of turbulence such as the Second World War in Europe and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997—that is, periods when old relationships crumble and new ones are forged—long-standing and often routinized institutions and systems in the regions are recast. The new institutions and policy patterns fashioned during the critical juncture often persist long after the original pressures that forged them have died away. Ironically, region-building requires a crisis or other critical event as a catalyst to implement the regionalist ideas, to dramatize national interests to be converged, and to inspire cross-regional collective action. Critical juncture is important in helping decision-makers mobilize domestic support within their respective countries for broader region-building. Decision-makers sacrifice the goods only when crises convince them that they can survive in office only by promoting regionbuilding. Crisis typically weakens that resistance by generating urgency about change.

Regional political amalgamation and critical juncture in Europe The origin of the European region-building aiming towards regional political amalgamation can be drawn to the occurrence of a noteworthy series of “critical junctures.” The European political amalgamation is the invention of traumatic shared experiences, which sprung from the critical juncture of the Second World War. “Desire for peace and fear of war” were at the heart of the European political amalgamation which is a means to achieve a guarantee of peace and security. The desire for peace and the fear of war have always been present during the whole European history but have dominated the twentieth century.

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Millions of Europeans had experienced their continent’s rapid decline and tragedy. The inability of the nation states to provide peace and security within their own borders was obvious during the critical juncture. The ghostly presence of the total war’s dead had completely shattered the ideal of the nation state and had confirmed the view that the European nations, outclassed in military technology, economically impoverished, and dwarfed by the new superpowers, were bound to unite. Only if they combined and united could the nations of Europe have a future. Europeans who had suffered tragedy and total collapse as a result of the war saw no hope for their countries other than in the regional political amalgamation. Europeans were convinced that the war as critical juncture marked a fundamental historical discontinuity in which the values and attitudes of the nineteenth century were utterly destroyed (Jo 2007: 41–42). Once the latest, most destructive, and most tragic war as critical juncture of the nation-states was finally over, disillusioned individuals voiced their anger—some united in pressure groups, like the European Movement—and sought to establish a new, integrated Europe, inhabited not by French, Germans, or Britons, but by Europeans. Many people viewed nationalism and the nation-state as the main causes of the disasters that were again sweeping over Europe, proving to be a catastrophic creed. A New Europe had to be created in which the nation-states would merge for their common good. Feelings of European-ness had to be stimulated; loyalties had to be shifted from the smaller nation-states to a greater common European unity, that is to say region-state. Europeans intended “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” and called “upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts” (European Economic Community 1957). France: Europe invented by free men and independent states France was destabilized by the national trauma created by wartime collaboration and the structural weaknesses of the government of the Fourth Republic, and was to suffer blows to its national pride with the Hitler’s occupation. Three times in less than a century she had gone to war with Germany, and three times had suffered substantial losses; there was no certainty that the defeat of Nazism meant the removal of the German threat. Even after the Second World War, the degree of French distrust towards Germany was still astounding (Klein 1996: 31–32). Therefore, France’s concerns about her own security and fears about the revival of German political and economic power were wholly understandable, given that they had failed to control Germany after the First World War. France recognized that although the divided post-war Germany was not an immediate security threat, German destiny was at the heart of Europe’s future. Indeed, France was determined not to fail again after the Second World War, believing that it was their vital concern to secure lasting peace in Europe by constraining Germany within the European amalgamation framework. As a consequence, France, haunted by the trauma, held the active position among the six participating states in the early stage of European political amalgamation. As a matter of fact, until he was well over 50, the French president Charles de Gaulle did not seem to have had any idea about “Europe” except as a geographical expression (Gladwyn 1969: 32–33). However, the Second World War changed de Gaulle’s ideas on Europe, even though they differed markedly from those held by the founders of the European Communities, most noticeably Jean Monnet. De Gaulle

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found old-fashioned national patriotism reactionary. Instead, nationalism was blamed for Europe’s decline. It was Hitler’s nationalism that had plunged Europe into ruinous war. Thus, even for de Gaulle, the prospect of a purely national renewal seemed unimaginable. He had more support for the European political amalgamation than ever before, convinced that the European political amalgamation was an ineluctable consequence of the general evolution of affairs. His troubles with the Anglo-Saxon allies led him to the European political amalgamation led by France: “a sort of Western grouping” which would constitute a major world center for production, trade, and security (Calleo 1965: 82–83). When in 1947 de Gaulle launched his new political party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, the European political amalgamation was a major element in its platform. In a series of speeches and press conferences he elaborated on the European political amalgamation for a “Europe made up of free men and independent states, organized into a whole capable of containing all possible pretension to hegemony and establishing between the two rival masses the element of equilibrium without which peace will never come about” (Calleo 1965: 84). Therefore, his policy aimed at the European political amalgamation whose solidarity would increase as they developed links of all kinds that led Europeans to put into effect the Economic Community of the Six and to organize political cooperation among them. Germany: Political Amalgamation as a Healing Force After the First World War, Europe failed to restrain Germany within a regional framework, in particular supranational institution. Rather, Germany had again engaged in destructive nationalist rivalries and repeated war. Following the Second World War, to prevent another war and create a lasting peace, Konrad Adenauer, the leader of a western German state, had his eye firmly fixed on the Federal Republic’s amalgamation with Europe rather than on the reunification of Germany. Adenauer believed that European political amalgamation was necessary in order for Germany to become a player that would be taken seriously in European politics. Adenauer wanted to amalgamate West Germany politically and psychologically with the West (Osterheld 1996: 20). Adenauer considered the Germans to be an ailing people. The last generations had been forced to go through too much: two lost wars involving incredible adversity, millions dead; totally disparate forms of government; and the most contradictory value systems—all of this, Adenauer believed, would have proved too much for any German and European. He felt it was important that the people have a chance to rest, that healing forces be allowed to develop so that the Germans could recover from within (Klein 1996: 66). Thus, one of Adenauer’s most important ideas was that the European political amalgamation could prevent another war and create a lasting peace. Above all, he wanted to end permanently the deadly rivalry between Germany and France and was willing to sacrifice a great deal to gain his objective, including economic concessions. Meanwhile, Germany’s motivations to European political amalgamation can be seen in two major concessions that accompanied its apology for the past. The first was in 1950 when the French suggested that the steel and coal operations become a joint effort between Germany, France, Italy, and Benelux to form the European Coal and Steel Community, to which Germany agreed. If Germany was not a defeated

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nation, this joint effort might have been more difficult to be carried out. The second compliance was Germany’s agreement to the French proposal for Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), even though it did not benefit Germany. The policy allowed for more French agricultural products to be exported especially to Germany without tariff barriers. The subsidies from the CAP were also most beneficial to farmers in France (Kim 2009: 300–301). In sum, the reasons for Germany’s concessions were because the war trauma dampened any German selfish interests and Germany considered the burden of its substantial contribution to the European Union (EU) budget as a kind of war reparation as the defeated nation in the Second World War. Britain: the building of the United States of Europe Britain, one of the Big Three of today’s EU, did not participate in the founding stages of European political amalgamation process. Britain initially had been compelled by geography, history, and tradition to be something different from Europe. Indeed, Britain distanced herself from the European continent, not only on political, economic and strategic grounds, but also on the basis of a complex of British difference, which meant Britain’s political, and one might add, “moral”, superiority, based on the following factors: a sound and healthy political system, an “Imperial” density, and a great power role confirmed by her wartime experience (Varsori 1998: 138, 145). Continental Europe was, during the 1940s and 1950s, mainly regarded by both British decision-makers and public opinion as a source of trouble and the symbol of uncertainty and political crisis. Therefore, Britain would support European political amalgamation, in particular a rapprochement between France and Germany, but would itself definitely stay outside as a benevolent sponsor, along with the USA and the Soviet Union. Britain might have helped the Western Europeans solve their problems, but owing to her different character she had been careful to avoid any involvement (Deighton 2002: 155–169). Despite the myth of Britain’s “difference”, no leaders and activists raised a strong voice in favor of European political amalgamation until Winston Churchill, the distinguished wartime prime minister of Britain, spoke in Zurich on September 1946. Churchill postponed participation into the European political amalgamation because the UK was already a member of British Commonwealth as a powerful global organization, Nevertheless, Churchill overwhelmingly influenced the postwar European political amalgamation by arguing that Europeans should unite before war again demolishes Europe, its glorious civilization, and perhaps much of the rest of the world and that Europe’s reconstruction would be possible only after the reconciliation of France and Germany. For Churchill, battles had ceased but risks still prevailed, and peace should be promoted through the European political amalgamation in the construction of the United States of Europe by countries capable of doing so. Churchill also stated that although Britain would itself definitely stay outside as a benevolent sponsor, the continent absolutely had to achieve the political amalgamation through extended nationalism and a common citizenship. He called for Europe to pursue the European political amalgamation to guide its future. Such efforts by Churchill ultimately led to the Hague Congress of May 1948 and to the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949. Both actions remain landmarks in the European political amalgamation (James 1974).

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Movement towards an ever closer Europe Jean Monnet, as a pragmatic government official and a founding-father of European political amalgamation, established the High Authority that integrated and amalgamated Europe. The particular set of problems facing France in 1949 and 1950 offered Monnet a unique opportunity for the regional political amalgamation. What emerged was a supranational High Authority, the institutional depository of shared national sovereignty over the coal and steel sectors. Indeed, the proposal was revolutionary in the sense that Europe was offering to sacrifice a measure of national sovereignty in the interest of building a new supranational authority through regional political amalgamation that might end an old rivalry and help build a new European peace (McCormick 1999: 66–67). The High Authority would be responsible for formulating a common market in coal and steel and for supervising such related issues as pricing, wages, investment, and competition. The road to the European region-building would follow the unglamorous path of functional amalgamation. Close cooperation between countries in specific economic sectors held the key to overcoming national sovereignty and ultimately achieving the European political amalgamation (Dinan 1994: 13–14). Buoyed by Monnet’s initiation, Dean Acheson’s endorsement, and Adenauer’s approval, French Foreign Minister Schuman had little difficulty convincing his cabinet colleagues to support the scheme. On 9th May 1950, Schuman delivered a declaration that aimed to eliminate all possibilities of war between France and Germany by creating a single authority regulating two relevant industrial fields: coal and steel. He claimed that Europe underwent war because it failed to achieve the regional political amalgamation. Accordingly, by having a single authority managing the coal and steel that had been materials for weapons and munitions, Europe could recover its peaceful status without further war. Schuman foresaw that the European region-building could be achieved not by a unilateral plan, but by amalgamation. With efforts of Schuman and Monnet, the two carriers of the Schuman declaration, six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) made an agreement leading to the European region-building, that is to say the foundation of the European Steel and Coal Community, the very foundation of the EU. An institutionalized process of political amalgamation has been progressed. The Rome Treaty, establishing the European Community was signed in 1958. Single European Act, ratified in 1986–1987, set the goal of a single European market for goods, labor, and capital by 1992. It also streamlined collective decision-making by allowing for a qualified majority to pass some EC legislation, without the previously required consensus. From November 1993, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community into a tighter EU, while strengthening cooperation on foreign and security affairs, justice, and police matters. It also broadened the reach of the European Commission in industrial policy, consumer affairs, health, and education. Furthermore, supranational institutions have had a profound effect on the Europeanization of European state identity. Even in spite of today’s global economic recession and the crisis of Euro zone, Europe is not reverting to Hobbesian anarchy. Rather more and more, they seem to be determined to construct a greater European unity, that is region-state, by further surrendering or pooling of national sovereignty, promoting regional political amalgamation, and making common fiscal policy.

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Regional Community formation and critical juncture in Northeast Asia The movement towards Northeast Asian community formation was born from the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis, as the European political amalgamation stemmed from the critical juncture of the Second World War. A highly contagious financial crisis swept through the economies in East Asia in 1997, resulting in a free fall of their respective currency values and causing serious damage to the economies of East Asia. The crisis subsequently led to bulging unemployment rates and a general economic downturn. Even though the recovery was quite swift and robust, this shock of the crisis was profound for the region. The depth and consequences of the 1997 crisis shattered confidence and alarmed many people in the governments and the business sector and the academia who had touted the remarkable success of the East Asian economies as the “Asian miracle” (World Bank 1993). Northeast Asia was a weak region in that it underdeveloped political and social cohesion. Lingering suspicion and animosity have disturbed the development of trustworthy relationships between Japan, China, and Korea. However, the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis ultimately moved the Northeast Asian to act against their suspicion and distrust. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 as a critical juncture, during which the dearth of regional cooperative mechanisms both exacerbated a serious regional crisis and impeded its resolution, galvanized intellectuals and national government into action for regional community formation. The 1997 crisis “has taught a harsh lesson to all believers in weak, voluntary and informal cooperation” (Murray 2005: 208–209) provoking a dramatic change in thinking among both political and business leaders as well as intellectuals and people in general across Northeast Asia. The crisis cleared the way for much clearer thinking about regionbuilding. Awareness that crisis can no longer be tackled by any country on an individual basis increased. The old concept of one country’s independent solutions thus no longer was satisfactory, which spurred a growing realization of the need for Northeast Asian community formation to deal with similar crises in the future, so as to help sustain the economic growth of Asia as a whole (Cai 2001: 11). The crisis provided, in short, a catalyst for major change in the Northeast Asian region. Only through crisis at a critical juncture were the Northeast Asian countries able to achieve the cohesion to stabilize their region in the face of financial hurricanes gusting across the globe. And crisis, in particular, drew long-suspicious neighbors in Northeast Asia together seriously for the first time. The movement towards the regional community formation in the aftermath of the crisis was ubiquitous throughout Northeast Asia. During the critical juncture, the Northeast Asian community formation drew attention because it seemed to provide better economic prosperity. Northeast Asia’s community of leaders and intellectuals found expression in the upsurge of regional community formation, which aimed to create an institutional structure intending to prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis. China: “Kaifang de hezuo” (inclusive regionalism) Since the revolution of 1949, Beijing had lacked the capability to lead any multilateral initiatives in the Northeast Asian region, and had been wary of any potential

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infringement on its own sovereignty by intergovernmental or supranational institutions. It was unable to trade with its neighbors for years, after its bitter confrontation with the USA during the Korean War. Then, when China finally established diplomatic ties with Japan and the USA during the 1970s, it conveniently adopted a “huband-spokes” bilateral structure centering on Washington, remarkably similar to those in Tokyo and Seoul. Yet, China, although less directly touched by the 1997 crisis than its neighbors, felt the need to insulate regional economies from global forces through regional community formation, whereas Northeast Asian economies increasingly gravitated towards rising China. Accordingly, China began to transform itself from a passive participant into a proactive actor, both in East Asia generally and within Northeast Asia in particular. The 1997 Asian financial crisis marked a critical juncture for China’s regional policies. China’s shift to support for community formation in Northeast Asia was historic and influenced heavily by both its perception of the 1997 crisis and substantive changes in Beijing’s regional role that the crisis provoked. For the first time, China initiated several important regional frameworks on its own (Calder and Ye 2010: 90, 164), but in the regional community formation process, China guarded carefully its own national interests: an imperative to develop the national economy and strategic calculation to maintain regional stability, particularly in Hu Jintao’s peaceful rise strategy. Since the 1997 crisis, China’s embrace of regional community formation has been evident in its involvement in ASEAN Plus Three (APT). China has gradually played an important role in advancing Northeast Asian regional community under APT framework. When Japan proposed the creation of the Asian Monetary Fund in September 1997, China took the same stance as the USA to break down the proposal. Afterwards, however, Beijing became willing to promote regional community formation. In November 1999, for instance, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji had an informal breakfast meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Korean President Kim Dae-jung on the sidelines of the APT summit meeting in Manila. This was the first meeting between the heads of the three countries in modern times. Zhu Rongji agreed to undertake joint research in ten fields including trade, tariffs and the environment, while the three leaders consented to cooperate in helping China’s accession to the World Trade Organization at the earliest possible date. The summit has since gradually changed into a more formal and substantial event. China’s substantial commitment to regional community building was also seen in a critical initiative for closer economic cooperation. In 2002, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji proposed to establish a China–Japan–Korea free-trade area. It was not easy to start formal talks on the Northeast Asia FTA. However, the Chinese government believed that the preconditions to establish a regional community formation were fully developed (Li 2005: 153–154). In addition, at the first East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on December 2005, Wen Jiabao, recognizing that it is the rise of China that causes neighboring countries’ anxiety and fear as well as that provides opportunities for the Northeast Asian community formation, emphasized that China supports Northeast Asian community formation and that China advocates a “touming” (transparent) and “kaifang de hezuo (inclusive regionalism),” while opposing a closed, exclusive one. Wen Jiabao proposed the idea of three principles of “inclusive cooperation”: only inclusive cooperation can help promote the regional

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community formation; only inclusive cooperation can make an equal distribution of regional benefits; the method to form regional community in this century is not exclusive but inclusive one (Tang 2011: 143–144). Meanwhile, at the summit of Northeast Asian local governments in September 2006, China played a key role in developing ideas for a unified economic community in Northeast Asia. At the second Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation Forum, also in September 2006, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi highlighted the importance of Northeast Asian economic ties and urged deepening cooperation in infrastructure, trade and investment and proposed three suggestions for Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation. In 2007, China’s State Council affirmed the China’s commitment to a high-level Northeast Asian Economic-Trade Cooperative Forum. In 2008, when the Trilateral Summit was held in Fukuoka, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao underlined the importance to the Chinese of trilateral ties with Japan and Korea, putting forward concrete proposals for enhancing them. “China, Japan, and South Korea are countries of major influence in East Asia,” said Wen, adding, “Developing peaceful and friendly relations is not only a common wish of the three nations, but a condition for realizing regional stability and prosperity” (BBC 2008). Japan: “Re-Asianization” While Germany has been determined to play a key role in European political amalgamation, Japanhas been reluctant to be deeply entangled with Northeast Asian community formation (Katzenstein 2005: 103). For Japan, the dominant national interest for over a century has been to “escape Asia and enter Europe”—to borrow the nineteenth-century Enlightenment thinker Fukuzawa’s imagery. Japan has distanced itself from Northeast Asian community formation, identifying with the economically advanced countries of the West (Jo 2011: 20–21). The relationship between Japan and the rest of Asia remains uneasy. After the war’s end, a chastened Japan, mindful of the bitter historical heritage, was reticent about promoting Northeast Asian community formation and structurally handicapped by its domestic political fragmentation to do so. As a matter of fact, from the 1950s through the early 1990s, Japan focused on developing deep politicaleconomic ties, predominantly with the USA and Southeast Asia. Yet, Japan suffered economically from the macroeconomic downturn that followed the 1997 crisis, while becoming more active in promoting the Northeast Asian community formation (Asahi Shimbun Sha 2002: 93). Even though its proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund was rejected by American financial officials, Japan had enthusiastically contributed to promote Northeast Asian community formation at times. Since the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis, Japan’s traditional ties have been steadily shifting towards Northeast Asia, reinforced by economic tectonics. Japan has experienced a dramatic rising economic interdependence with the Northeast quadrant of the continent. Japan’s exports to China rose sharply from 6.3 % of overall totals in 2000 to 16.0 % in 2008. China’s share of total Japanese imports conversely rose from 14.5 % in 2000 to 18.8 % in 2008. By 2006, almost the same amount of Japanese exports were flowing to Korea and China alone as to the entire USA (IMF 2007). And in 2007 the total volume of Japanese trade with China surpassed that with the USA. As trade interdependence within the Northeast quadrant of the continent is rising,

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increasingly elaborate transnational production networks are being fused among Mainland China, Korea, and Japan. Financial coordination and intellectual exchange are also intensifying. Powerful winds on the continent of Northeast Asia, blowing outward from China, are driving Japan to find her national interests, especially economic gains, in a more interdependent and coherent Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro strove for regional community formation that, under the name of “East Asian Community”, aims to create a valuebased community with distinctive membership in 2002. Even though his policy was considered to counter the rapidly increasing Chinese influence, to reassert Japan’s leadership role in regionalism, and to reassure the USA that a regional community formation will not undermine core US interest in the region, Koizumi included the creation of a “community that acts together and advances together”, pursuing a functional approach in the areas of trade, finance, energy, the environment and human security (Koizumi 2002). After the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009, Hatoyama improved the previous regime’s (the Liberal Democratic Party) policy on the regional community formation. Hatoyama highlighted his policy to assuage sensitivities over Tokyo’s history of invasion and occupation in the region before and during the Second World War, emphasizing democracy strengthened by fraternal spirit (yuaiminshushugi). Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of Northeast Asian community formation, calling for an East Asian Community, while describing China, Japan and Korea as its collective core and the USA as its equal partner. “Until now, we have tended to be too reliant on the USA … The Japan–USA alliance remains important, but as a member of Asia, I would like to develop policies that focus more on Asia,” he said after a trilateral summit meeting in 2008 (New York Times 2009). China, Japan, and South Korea would form the core of the envisioned community, he said. Hatoyama’s emphasis of regional community formation was not only his personal preferences, but also reflected powerful sectors in Japan’s political and economic elites. Therefore, despite his resignation in June 2010 and Noda Yoshihiko’s inauguration as Prime Minister in 2011, who stresses importance of Japan-US relationship, Northeast Asian community formation based on a China– Japan–Korea partnership is likely to stay relevant for Japan (Funabashi 2011). Korea: a bona fide regional community Once known as the “hermit kingdom”, the Koreans traversed the twentieth century in the unappealing, brutalized roles of “colony,” “battlefield,” and “divided state frozen in time.” After the liberation of Japanese occupation in 1945, Korean leaders and elites have had consistent tendency to rely on the USA, which insisted on using its unparalleled global power to shape relations in Northeast Asia. Since the 1997 crisis, however, Korea has become an increasingly enthusiastic and effective advocate of Northeast Asian community formation. The critical juncture of the 1997 crisis had an incalculable shock impact on Korea, which deepened Korean consciousness of the necessity for community formation. Among Northeast Asian countries, Korea was one of the hardest hit by the crisis. Surging in abruptly, like a sudden, uninvited hurricane, the political-economic tumult shattered sanguine regional expectations of both growth and prosperity, giving birth to a new and unsettling sentiment: distrust of global institutions. The International Monetary Fund was roundly condemned within

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Korea, as the bogeyman that had savaged Korean prosperity and unjustly opened the country to scavengers from abroad (Kirk 2000). Many Koreans consequently began to believe more strongly than before in Northeast Asian community formation, as a buffer against the shocks conveyed by global institutions. The crisis showed Korea’s Northeast Asian neighbors to be more empathetic than their Western counterparts. Both psychologically, in the form of ambivalence towards US policy and gradual reconciliation with Japan, and economically, in the shape of rising interdependence on China, Korea was increasingly encouraged to support—and indeed in many ways to lead—the Northeast Asian community formation. Most importantly, because President Kim Dae-jung was aware that East Asia was unable to mount an effective collective response when the 1997 crisis devastated several economies, at the APT Hanoi Summit of November 1998, he raised the need for an East Asian Community and proposed the establishment of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) to discuss long-term community formation within the broad Asian region. The EAVG met five times from second half of 1999 to May 2001 and, eventually, in 2002 produced a set of the most important visions: “establishing an East Asian Free Trade Area; holding East Asia Summits, bringing together leaders in the region; working towards monetary integration; setting up a regional cooperative organization; and establishing the ultimate goal of building an East Asian Community” (ASEAN+3 Summit 2002). President Kim Dae-jung, striving to enhance Northeast Asia’s role without alienating the Southeast Asians, suggested that the existing APT organization be transformed into an “East Asian Summit.” The East Asian Summit, Kim Dae-jung contended, could evolve into a viable and increasingly integrated regional community, leading ultimately to a coherent East Asian unity (Kim 2006: 10–11). President Rho Moo-hyun and Lee Myung Bak saw that the Northeast Asian community formation could ultimately become the vehicle for, on the one hand, producing much needed reconciliation at the fractious Northeastern core of the region by resolving the nuclear threat from the North Korea and, on the other hand, protecting and promoting their national interests by expanding Korea’s positive relations with China and managing its long-standing economic and security relations with Japan. In particular, Roh Moo-hyun, while maintaining the USA–Korea alliance, shifted the main focus of his foreign policy from the US to Northeast Asia, demonstrating his willingness to form the Northeast Asian community along with China and Japan. To Roh Moo-hyun, who believed Korea should be a balancer between two regional leaders, the regional community formation was essential in promoting Korea’s peace and prosperity. In 2003, Roh Moo-hyun launched its “peace and prosperity policy” as the new government’s major policy goal, which aimed to promote peace and mutual prosperity on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia through “trust, cooperation, and mutual gains.” The Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, reporting directly to President Roh, put particular emphasis on the idea of enhancing Korea’s role as a logistical and financial hub for the Northeast Asian community. In order to boost its idea, it defined Korea’s role as catalytic in three levels: “as a ‘bridge nation’, linking continental and maritime powers: as a ‘hub nation’, emerging as a center of ideas to ensure peace and prosperity in the region and for interregional networks; and as a ‘cooperative nation’, serving as a catalyst to build a peaceful regional community” (Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative 2004).

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Efforts towards building a Northeast Asian community In Northeast Asia, historical legacies, a lack of common identity and great-power politics impeded political cooperation and economic integration. However, although they have not reached the stage of integration under thick institutions, China, Japan, and Korea have exhibited a growing interest in regional community formation since the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis, developing various initiatives and programs. Initially, the APT mechanism provided the Northeast Asian countries with valuable opportunities to develop their own institutions. The epoch-making event for regional community formation between China, Japan, and Korea was the holding of a trilateral “side summit” meeting in November 1997 by taking advantage of the APT framework. In the meantime, while Northeast Asian countries participated in the APT, East Asian Summit and the Chiang Mai Initiative, they themselves had not been able to fashion one for their own regional community formation. In this context, one should pay considerable attention to the annual trilateral summit meetings between China, Japan, and Korea since 2008 (Kesavan 2011). Indeed, December 2008 saw a watershed occasion, when the first Northeast Asian summit was held. The leaders agreed to hold such meetings annually and signed an action plan for promoting regional community formation. Although unlike the 1997 crisis, the 2008–2009 global economic crisis, triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, did not reinforce the leaders’ movement towards regional community formation as strongly as regional integrationists hoped, their trilateral summit meeting which intended to overcome political animosities focused on a joint Asian response to the global economic crisis (Fackler 2008). Since then, four summits of the trio have taken place. In 2010 at their third meeting three leaders adopted a blueprint for future economic cooperation, environmental protection, and expansion of personnel and cultural exchanges, showing their willingness to develop East Asian community formation (Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit 2010). They also agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in South Korea, which finally launched in Seoul in September 2011. Last year’s summit was held against the backdrop of the terrible earthquake-tsunami-nuclear reactor crisis of 11 March in Japan. Recognizing the need to help each other in times of disaster and adversity, they promised to work towards building a comprehensive regional framework to prevent the recurrence of a similar nuclear disaster (Kesavan 2011). It is clear that trilateral summit offers an easy and natural opportunity for the gathering of the three leaders. It also mitigates the skepticism of extra-regional countries about new initiatives among the three influential states in East Asia. Three countries that were hostile, distrustful and recriminated towards each other show their willingness to enter into relatively intimate and institutionalized regional community (Pempel 2008: 244). Parallel to top-down initiations such as the summit meetings, bottom-up interconnections have proceeded rapidly since the 1997 crisis. Korean and Japanese pop culture is avidly consumed throughout the region. Millions of Chinese, Koreans and Japanese visit each other’s countries as students, tourists, and business professionals. Economic and industrial linkages between China, Japan, and South Korea have gradually deepened since the 1997 crisis. Japanese and Korean firms have shown a growing interest in China as a production base with cheap labor and enormous markets for their products. Commercial transactions between China, Japan, and

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Korea increased rapidly with China’s economic expansion. China surpassed the USA as Korea’s primary trade partner in 2004, and became Japan’s primary trade partner in 2006. In 2004, Korea became the top investor in China after Hong Kong. In addition, networks of think-tanks including the Network of East Asia Think-thank, which was set up with a website in Beijing after its first meeting there in 2003, deepens between governmental agencies. Transnational networking forums like Boao, Jeju, and Nikkei, together with defense-related exchanges, are proliferating. Less constrained by politics and the shadows of history than their national counterparts, local governments are also increasingly involved in social, cultural, and economic cooperative projects involving Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cooperation (De Prado 2008: 319–320).

Conclusion It may be appropriate to conclude this article with a few over-all considerations bearing on region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia. Let me set forth some of the salient points suggested in this article: Firstly, many elites and scholars appear to deal with political, cultural, strategic, and economic aspects of the Northeast Asian region-building with a bit of skepticism, claiming that community formation in Northeast Asia is neither possible nor desirable because of its hegemonic regional order, incompatible antagonistic nationalism, and territorial disputes surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. According to them, exclusive national identities, mutual mistrust, and lack of a regional idea are militating against the emergence of regional community. Northeast Asian region-building, however, is now at a critical transition point. Northeast Asia is becoming more deeply interconnected, integrated and more closed, after the 1997 crisis. Northeast Asia has been evolving in an incipient regional community. A study of the US American Congressional Research Service in 2005 concluded, “While the economic, political, and military relations in northeast Asia occur largely on separate tracks, the sheer magnitude of the economic flow is affecting relations at other strata of interaction. Already, economic interest has included more cooperation on political disputes between China and Japan and South Korea” (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2005: 29–30). Although the region-building in Northeast Asia has had a late start compared with Europe, Northeast Asia is gradually witnessing the emergence of a regional community with a multilateral architecture. Secondly, as Jean Monnet (1978: 286) mentions, “People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize necessity when a crisis is upon them.” Only great crisis, as he believed, moves men to act against their cautious political instincts. Indeed, the EU has formulated its political amalgamation agenda in response to the total collapse as critical juncture, while the momentum of community formation in Northeast Asia has accelerated as a result of the 1997 crisis. In other words, in the aftermath of the crisis, there had been certain preoccupations with region-building since appropriate region-building was considered a key element of successful regional stability and well-being. The crisis pushed European and Northeast Asian countries to think about how best to build a region. However, different kinds and scopes of critical juncture can result in different outcomes of regionbuilding. In contrast to the entire European continent, which had suffered the total

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collapse and tragedy due to the two world wars, in Northeast Asia Korea experienced a severely unexpected suffering during the 1997 crisis, while recovering from it sooner or later, and Japan and China were less directly affected by the crisis. Owing to the extent of dreadful devastation and suffering, Europe has become reflective and cooperative, facing their dark and traumatic past. The critical juncture in Europe led them to be deeply aware that the nation-states were not able to offer peace and security. They had high hopes of making regional political amalgamation. On the contrary, given the scope of hardship and shock, the critical juncture in Northeast Asia did not lead to fundamental change in their inward-looking, narrow and irrational nationalistic attitudes and identities. Regional community formation never challenges the state system. Rather, Northeast Asian nation-states are the driving forces for regional community formation. Thirdly, and more importantly, in spite of current positive developments in Northeast Asia, the movement towards a deeper community formation of Northeast Asia is not likely to take place easily and smoothly. While European political amalgamation shows equal participation in the process and reciprocal respect for balanced relations based on a multilateral tradition, the process of regional community formation in Northeast Asia is likely to be faltering and unpredictable, because of their asymmetric strength and, in particular, China’s status as a big country and big power. As a matter of fact, China’s past idea in Northeast Asia, such as Sino-centrism, is still an essential point to bear in mind when considering Northeast Asian community formation. Today, the ancient notion of China being the center of the world appears to be reemerging. The philosopher Zhao (2005) wrote a popular book, Tianxia tixi (The Tianxia system), which fascinated China’s scholars. The historical East Asian regional order centering on China, Zhao contended, provides an almost perfect model for the future world and regional order because traditional Chinese thought, by virtue of its emphasis on peace and harmony, is superior to Western thought. This kind of Chinese nationalist discourse is likely to give little room for genuine regional community formation; rather, regional community formation is more likely to be used as a tool to build the Chinese sphere of interest. As a consequence, China, in initiating regional community formation, needs to draw the appropriate lessons from Japan’s past imperialistic experiences. A century ago, Pan-Asianism was appealing to many in Northeast Asia. Yet, China and Korea were so volatile that they could not build a genuinely equal and peaceful region with Japan. Accordingly, the idea of regional community formation was confiscated by the Japanese military group. Massive backlash on the Northeast Asian continent against Japan’s so-called Greater Northeast Asian Co-prosperity Sphere provides lessons for China that the current regional community formation has to be based on equality and mutual respect. Either Japan or Korea alone could not balance China. In order to reduce neighbor’s fears, as Germany had done during the unification period in 1989, China must commit that China’s own leadership in Northeast Asia will happen within a regional framework. In addition, it is necessary for China to recognize the role of bridge countries. The most important bridge is ASEAN, which can serve as a kind of Benelux bridging the gap between France and Germany, allowing the Northeast Asian countries to make progress towards regional community formation. Another bridge is the USA, who must be the supporter in regional community formation, as she had been the promoter to European political amalgamation.

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Fourthly, Germany and Japan’s routes and roles in region-building are different. Because of the scope of devastation and the guilt and remorse over its aggressions to neighbors, Germany had become inward-looking. Germany searched for the rebuilding of cooperative relations with the other European states. In doing so, Germany embraced modestly her destiny as a defeated state while not avoiding facing its embarrassing past. Contrary to Germany, the Japanese relied on an image of self as victim. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which dominated Japanese politics from 1955 to 1993, appropriated the rhetoric of Japanese war victimhood so that they could position themselves apart from the militarist period and evade discussion of Japanese war responsibility. In addition, the low level of regional interdependence and the authoritarian character for much of the Cold War in Northeast Asia provided governments little leverage to pursue the history issue with Japan. Although the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the 53 system in Japan, the rise of a democratic regime in Korea, and the intensification of economic interconnections in this region could help contain frictions over historical issues, Northeast Asia is still disturbed by the often-cited “history problem.” Political authorities in Japan, China, and Korea have attempted to invent the official historical narratives that legitimize their existence and mobilize historical resources to serve their interests. This causes a deep and lasting gulf between the ways in which the Japanese and their neighbors understand the history. Therefore, addressing this issue, which will in the end, nurture the building of trust among them, must be the key task for the future of community formation in Northeast Asia. Lastly, a genuine “historical learning process” and a continuous public deliberation about the past are embedded in a new political culture of the Europe. A new political culture in Europe is based on a sharp break with the past, due to traumatic experiences, painful memories and disastrous policy failures, from which the appropriate lessons have been drawn. The events of the Second World War as critical juncture represented a seminal episode that profoundly changed European traditional political culture and opened a window of opportunity. In keeping with the general abhorrence of hostility and aggression in the wider culture, a new culture of cooperation becomes firmly ensconced both in the European psyche and in its policy-making process. In contrast to Europe, the movement towards community formation is still plagued by mutual mistrust, prejudice, ignorance, and nationalism. Indeed, Northeast Asia has not so much had the opportunities of accumulating a culture of friendship, mutual trust, and responsiveness. Region-building has been purely tactical in nature, aimed at providing short-term solutions to specific problems, usually economic in nature. Therefore, the ‘region-ness’ such as the interconnection of governments and peoples through information exchange, policy coordination, bonds of mutual trust, identification, and social assimilation is still low in Northeast Asia. As a consequence, it is highly imperative to construct a new political culture. Before doing anything else, Northeast Asia must put forth an effort to learn and understand each other’s interpretations of history, society, politics, economics, and culture and each other’s purposes and intentions. If this “learning and understanding” is increasingly shared and disseminated across national borders, a new political culture will be laid for a deeper and genuine regional community formation.

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Acknowledgments This work was supported by Center for Korean Studies, Fudan University, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, the East–West Center, Hawaii, and the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government (KRF-2009-327-B00050). I would like to express my gratitude to Donald Puchala, Geoffrey Edwards, Hongguang Luo, Denny Roy, Inoguchi Takashi, Clark Scott, Liping Shi, the editor-in-chief, and two anonymous reviewers for their keen comments and supports.

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