Regionalist Party Mobilisation on Immigration

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The Bavarian CSU and Lega Nord both appear to be more concerned with protecting the ..... and traditions in schools. The CSU does not, however, support the.
Regionalist Party Mobilisation on Immigration A Comparison of the Scottish National Party, the Bavarian Christian Social Union, the Italian Northern League and the Catalan Convergence and Union Party

Eve Hepburn University of Edinburgh ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the different ways in which regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe approach the issue of immigration. It explores the extent to which parties respond to European pressures to become more international in outlook, and to adopt principles common to the EU, such as multiculturalism and diversity, in order to be perceived as credible. Drawing on the experience of the Italian Northern League, the Scottish National Party, the Catalan Convergence and Union and the Bavarian Christian Social Union, this paper compares how regionalist parties incorporate these themes into their ‘constructions’ of the nation, and how issues of diversity and immigration inform their policy goals. It will be shown that regional political mobilisation on these issues varies from country to country. Whilst regionalist parties in Scotland and Catalonia have welcomed the ‘Europeanisation’ of the nation and have encouraged immigration as a way of expanding and diversifying national membership and bolstering the labour market, the story is rather different in the Alpine region. The Bavarian CSU and Lega Nord both appear to be more concerned with protecting the labour market and the nation from dilution by foreigners, which they claim is being hastened by Europe’s openness to immigration. Their attitudes towards European integration, though certainly not static, have become increasingly more sceptical. This paper seeks to uncover the different motivations for pursuing a pro- or anti-immigration approach. Moreover, it aims to address the broader questions of how regionalist parties advance a homogenous or heterogeneous vision of the nation, how this is linked to their socioeconomic goals, and how they view European integration as an opportunity or a threat to their territorial projects. WORK IN PROGRESS. PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION. COMMENTS GRATEFULLY RECEIVED.

ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow Department of Politics University of Edinburgh Chisholm House, High School Yards Edinburgh EH1 1YZ Email: [email protected] 57th UK Political Studies Association (PSA) Annual Conference, University of Bath, 11-13 April 2007

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Introduction Immigration has become one of the most divisive issues in West European politics. Despite the arguments of demographic experts that immigration is the only way to mitigate Europe’s pending demographic (and economic) crisis, caused by falling birthrates and an ageing population, many parties are fearful that increasing diversity will result in social conflict, weaken traditional cultures and threaten national identities. Nowhere is this debate more focused than in the discourse of minority nationalist and regionalist parties, who have sought to valorise their cultures and identities in the face of increasing globalisation and European integration. The aim of this paper is to explore how these parties have approached the issue of immigration. It considers the extent to which parties have responded to European pressures to de-ethnicise their nation-building projects in order to be perceived as legitimate. Drawing on the experiences of regionalist parties in Italy (the Northern League), the UK (Scottish National Party), Spain (the Catalan Convergence and Union Party) and Germany (the Bavarian Christian Social Union), this paper compares how regionalist and nationalist parties incorporate themes of diversity and multiculturalism into their ‘images’ of the nation, and how these themes inform their immigration policy goals. The first section begins with a discussion of the ethnic and civic characteristics of nationalism. It then offers an overview of nationalist and regionalist party responses to Europe, exploring how they have adapted to Europe. The middle section unpacks the party constructions of the minority nation in the four cases, and examined how these are linked to the parties’ economic and immigration policies. The final part seeks to uncover the different motivations for pursuing a pro- or anti-immigration approach, and identifies several factors influencing immigration policy. The paper concludes by considering how parties view European integration as an opportunity or a threat to their territorial projects. Two Faces of Minority Nationalism and Regionalism The emergence, or re-emergence, of minority nationalist and regionalist movements in the 1960s and 1970s was met with a mixture of concern and interest by social scientists. Contrary to modernisation theories, which posited that the standardization and diffusion of politics and norms across territories would lead to the assimilation of particularist identities and the smoothing over of territorial differences, increasing globalization appeared to encourage a (re)assertion of territorial demands for self-determination. Some scholars of nationalism, such as Eric Hobsbawm (1990), argued that such movements were a throwback to the past, based on pre-modern and closed visions of society. Others, such as Michael Keating (2006), contended that such movements can be equally forward-looking and progressive, seeking new forms of collective organization amid the rescaling of political authority brought about by supranational integration. Debates about whether or not nationalism is a good or a bad thing have since abounded in the field. Yet those taking a negative view of their subject may have a difficult time reconciling their theories with the reality of contemporary minority nationalism. Instead of seeking to banish the ‘other’, regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe, such as Plaid Cymru-Party of Wales, the Catalan Republican Left, the Sardinian Party of Action and the Union for Democratic Brittany, have exhibited a self-consciously liberal and democratic brand of nationalism. These parties have argued for recognition of the diversity of the ‘peoples’ of the European Union, rather than perceiving Europe as a threat to their nation-building projects. Such a position defies the anachronistic image of all nationalists as separatist and isolationist, though some parties do exhibit these characteristics. This means we cannot assume the nationalist and regionalist ‘party family’ to be a homogenous group. Instead we must account for variation in types of present-day nationalism, and the possibility that parties may exhibit different cultural, economic and political markers are different times. Despite this, it has become commonplace in nationalism studies to speak of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ variants of nationalism. As Keating points out, these ideal types can be juxtaposed in different contexts – the continental and the liberal, the voluntarist and the organicist, the Eastern and the Western, and the cultural and political. ‘They differ,’ says Keating ‘on the question of who constitutes the nation and on the basis for legitimacy of nationalist demands.’ (Keating 1996a: 3). 2 Copyright PSA 2007

More generally, these distinctions aim to explain why nationalism is used to either legitimate governments on bases of inclusion, or to violently destabilise governments and society on bases of exclusion. To begin with ‘civic’ or political-democratic nationalism, criteria for membership of the national community is associative. This means that the individual can voluntarily consider herself to be part of a greater collectivity. Nation-building begins with the individual and her rights and interests, rather than the nation determining the individual’s rights and duties from common nationality. The national community of which one is a part is based on a common identity derived from shared value systems and institutions, and social and political interactions within a territorially-defined community. This type of national community is often associated with tolerance, openness and democracy. For instance, Miller (1995) believes that this type of common nationality must exist in a democracy to promote a shared social trust and foster a tolerant society. The link between civic nationalism and democracy is the concept of ‘citizenship’. Charles Taylor (1998: 144) alludes to this when he states that ‘a nation can only ensure the stability of its legitimacy if its members are strongly committed to one another by means of a common allegiance to the political community’. However, Brubaker (1992: 21) is perturbed that ‘although citizenship is internally inclusive, it is externally exclusive. There is a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners.’ Nationalism, even of the ‘civic’ type, needs to define itself in terms of the ‘other’. Mann (1999), for instance, argues that an organic perception of the people, founded on democratic principles, has created a backlash of authoritarian statism that often involves ethnic and political cleansing. In colonial contexts, popular sovereignty became the basis of an ‘us versus them’ mentality, leading to homogenising policies. Mann’s conception of the ‘organic people’ comes close to resembling the ‘ethnic’ breed of nationalism. This may be defined as a form of ascriptive identity, often marked by religious or linguistic differentiation, based on shared social boundaries and patterns of behaviour. Often, this ideal type is associated with exclusiveness, intolerance, and fear of, or superiority over, ‘the other’. But instead of identifying what type of nationalism exists where, this paper contends that the focus should be on whether different strands of nationalism could be identified in each. Contemporary minority nationalism is often characterised by a mix of political, cultural and economic markers. These facets are mobilised differently according to the changing constellations of power at state and supranational levels. So whilst scholars understand nations to be of a ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ nature – associating one with progressive, associative membership of a nation, and the other with irrational, ascriptive criteria, in practice most minority nationalist movements tend to encompass elements of both (Keating 1997). A cursory glance at the goals and activities of contemporary nationalist parties in Europe indicates that there is a huge variation both across and within nationalist movements. Regionalist and Nationalist Parties in Europe There is a growing body of literature on the increasingly pro-European attitudes of ethnoregionalist parties (Lynch 1996; Keating 2001; De Winter and Gomez-Reino 2006). These have been defined as ‘geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity’ (Muller-Rommel 1998). They are also known as minority nationalist and regionalist parties, the terms we use in this discussion to avoid the ‘ethno’ categorisation. Although these parties do not only or always seek cultural recognition, it is important to note that their defining characteristic is the demand for self-government. This need not be secession – which is in fact a minority preference amongst these parties – but includes demands for devolution and federalism. Regionalist and nationalist parties have reoriented their autonomy goals to include the European level. They are now able, indeed obligated, to frame their interests and demands at levels of authority beneath and beyond the state. Indeed, the assumption that nationalists universally seek independent statehood is misplaced. With the exception of the Scottish National Party, most minority nationalist parties have long pursued less ‘radical’ forms of constitutional change. Political autonomy is granted in response to territorial demands within state structures, representing the 3 Copyright PSA 2007

motivation of central governments to ‘territorially manage’ potentially separatist movements. Nationalist and regionalist parties do not equate the political expression of nationhood with independent statehood, but are interpreting the principle of national self-determination to mean different degrees of autonomy. These include a place within a Europe of the Regions, Peoples or Small States (Keating 2001; Hepburn 2004). Moreover, European integration offers these parties a number of opportunities for political engagement, such as networking and lobbying opportunities, election to the European Parliament, and participation in transnational party groupings on the European level, such as the European Free Alliance (De Winter and Gomez-Reino 2002). Whereas it could be argued that autonomy goals once focused exclusively on state structures, they are now prone to lobbying at trans-national levels to advance their nation-building projects. Nationalist parties have been perceived as parochial and backward, with tendencies toward a ‘closed’ vision of a politically and culturally homogenous nation (Hobsbawm 1990). This is perhaps a reaction to the imposition of a ‘closed’ vision of a politically and culturally homogenous state. However, scholars have argued that the European dimension has caused territorial movements to ‘internationalise’ their appeals and demands (Lynch 1996). This has occurred for ideological and practical reasons. On one hand, minority nationalist and regionalist parties must play the European ideological ‘game’ to be perceived as credible, thus emphasising themes intrinsic to the shared value framework of Europe such as democracy, diversity and human rights. On the other, parties have welcomed Europe into their projects in order to receive structural funds, to access decisionmaking at the European level and to participate in Europe-wide political lobbying associations. In the next part of the discussion, we consider whether, as Keating (2006) argues, European integration has led to a ‘de-ethnicisation’ of nationalist movements and an increased emphasis on territory as the criterion of inclusion in the national community. Introducing the Cases The main factor guiding this case selection is the emergence of regionalist and nationalist parties in Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia and Northern Italy that have advanced immigration strategies as part of their nation-building projects. Yet this paper is interested in variation in party mobilisation on immigration issues, and these cases were also selected for their differences. The cases thus include left-wing and right-wing parties, pro-European and anti-European parties, parties in government and in opposition, and diverse constitutional goals ranging from independence to devolution. Moreover, the context in which these parties operate varies considerably – such as constitutional constraints, local party competition, and economic resources. The consideration of dissimilar cases allows us to compare the uneven effects of ‘Europe’ on parties’ immigration policies. To begin with, the Scottish National Party was formed in 1934, and remains to this day the leading nationalist party in Scotland. The SNP was a marginal force in Scottish politics in the first few decades of its existence. The real breakthrough for the SNP occurred in 1974 when the party polled 30% of the Scottish vote at the general election. Although the SNP’s electoral fortunes slid following the first referendum on devolution in 1979, it made a come-back in the 1990s, supporting the 1998 referendum on devolution, and now forms the main opposition in the Scottish Parliament. The SNP adopted a policy of Independence in Europe in 1988, arguing that the European context would provide economic and security safeguards, and reassure voters of ‘going it alone’. Our second party, the Christian Social Union was formed in 1945 as the sister party to the Christian Democratic Union. The CSU has governed Bavaria near continuously since 1946 and proclaims to be the party of the Bavarian people and defender of the Heimat (nation). It was instrumental in shoring up Bavarian identity following the cultural homogenising practices of the Nazis, and has to guarantee Bavarian rights within the German federal state and to defend Bavarian autonomy within Europe. The CSU is an avid supporter of integration but has also been reviled as Eurosceptical because of its desire to protect Lander competences from European encroachments. Moving on, the Convergence and Union Party (CiU) won the first Catalan regional elections in 1980, following Franco’s death in 1975 and the adoption of a democratic constitution for Spain 4 Copyright PSA 2007

in 1978. Catalonia was granted the status of ‘autonomous community’ and the CiU, under the leadership of Jordi Pujol from 1980 to 2003, was instrumental in sustaining this sense of national identity through various nation-building policies. Since being elected in 1980, the CiU – a federation of conservative, liberal and Christian Democratic parties – has remained the dominant party in Catalan politics. The party is an avid supporter of a Europe of the Regions, and believes European integration supports the development of Catalanism. Finally, the Lega Nord was created in 1991 as a confederation of regionalist ‘league’ parties that evolved into a single centralised party. The Lega’s aims was the radical restructuring of the Italian state, a policy first envisaged as obtaining special status for the remaining ‘ordinary’ regions of the north-east, which then evolved to federalism and devolution, and finally the goal of secession of the North (‘Padania’) from Italy. The LN was instrumental in pressing for ‘devolution’ and forcing other parties on the left and right to make concessions to these proposals. Whilst initially seeing Europe as a support structure for this goal of Italian regionalism in the late 1980s, the LN has since turned its back on Europe, strongly rejecting EMU, deeper integration and enlargement. Party Constructions of the Nation The nation is a social construction, continuously re-constituted and reinterpreted by social and political actors as a key unit of shared identity. As Benedict Anderson (1991) argues, it is set of ideas, or an aspiration, to be made and remade. Nationalist elites have sought to sustain the nation as a key unit of shared identity and have constructed or re-appropriated cultural meanings of the nation in line with their political, socio-economic and constitutional goals for the territory. In the following discussion, we will examine how minority nationalist and regionalist parties construct the ‘nation’. We are interested in the way they use cultural, economic and territorial markers of membership, whether they advance a homogenous or heterogeneous vision of the nation, and how this is linked to their political and socioeconomic goals. Scottish National Party For the SNP, the Scottish nation is considered a political community that requires sovereign statehood in order to make it a ‘normal nation’ and to give it the self-respect that comes with being independent. So long as Scotland is considered a ‘region’ of the UK. Instead, according to the SNP, Scotland is a rich country with abundant natural resources and a skilled population that could easily overturn its sluggish economic growth and low self-confidence by choosing independence. Moreover, the SNP has brought a social-democratic discourse into its nationalist ideology, arguing that independence is the only means of establishing a distinct social policy in accordance with Scottish values. The SNP argues that it is crucial for Scotland to be viewed in political and economic terms as separate from the UK, and not just a cultural entity within it. Yet this is easier said than done. As McCrone (1992: 31) suggests, ‘the party’s problem for long enough was that it could find no way of changing the idea of ‘Scotland’ into one of a politically independent nation. ‘Scotland’ remained associated with the music hall, tourism and cultural organisations.’ Scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the overtly ‘civic’ character of the SNP. For instance, Hamilton (1999) argues that Scottish political nationalism is a model of associative identity-politics in Europe, whilst Nairn (2000) believes that the SNP has recaptured the democratic voice of Scotland. The nation is characterised territorially, and thus anyone can consider herself to form that nation by living in it and sharing in its institutions and society. This inclusiveness means that the ‘tariff’ for being a nationalist is quite low, and allows the SNP to appeal to the widest voting electorate. The SNP has chosen not to construct a cultural meaning of Scottish nationhood, or sought to stimulate collective action on this basis, as it is assumed that this ‘nation’ already exists. Rather, the emphasis has been on how to obtain status and resources for the territorial collectivity.

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Bavarian Christian Social Union In contrast to the SNP, the CSU has continuously constructed the Bavarian nation an ‘imagined community’ with strong emotional and symbolic content. The CSU’s notion of the Bavarian nation is derived from an historical myth of statehood, territorial continuity and shared culture and traditions that sits with, but ultimately supersedes, the identity and traditions of Bavaria’s diverse regions. The CSU is adept at mobilising certain elements in Bavaria’s history that glorify the Land and its independent spirit, whilst ignoring other less palatable incidents, such as the establishment of first Socialist Republic in 1919. The CSU creates a ‘reusable past’, and a crucial aspect of Bavarian nationhood is its long history of legislative and administrative autonomy. In 1990, former Minister President Max Streibl said that: ‘Bavarian sovereignty is the political protector of the Bavarian way of life. Bavaria, the oldest German state and one of the oldest states in Europe, should never be allowed to sink to the level of a mere administrative province’ (cited in Sutherland 2000: n10). At the same time, the CSU’s construction of Bavaria is also based upon the post-war modernisation of the Land, with the CSU at the helm. This vision of ‘modern’ Bavaria brimming with high-tech industries is complemented by safeguarding traditional economic communities, such as craftsmen and farmers, which are associated with Bavaria’s history, culture and social values. To underline Bavaria’s territorial integrity, the CSU has sought to develop a singular political culture in which the ‘sub-cultural’ regional traditions of Swabia, Franconia and Old Bavaria are integrated into an overall vision of the Bavarian nation. To forge a sense of common purpose and belonging, the CSU has been instrumental in developing cultural and education policies that assert Bavaria’s unique identity, such as holding annual traditional festivals and cultural events, and teaching Bavarian history, literature and traditions in schools. The CSU does not, however, support the development of a multicultural Bavaria. Instead, it seeks to preserve and protect the Bavarian Heimat from foreign cultures and peoples, especially those from outside the EU. Catalan Convergence and Union In the aftermath of the Franco regime, Jordi Pujol’s party sought to rebuild the Catalan nation around a common identity, based on a shared history, culture and language, and mobilised towards the goal of economic progress. In its struggles with the Italian state to obtain more autonomy and recognition, it has insisted on the hecho diferencial, or specificity, of the Catalan nation. The CiU constructs the nation in line with its own ideological beliefs, emphasising tradition and the Catholic social doctrine, for instance. Yet the CiU also views the Catalan nation as adaptable to modern conditions and, importantly, highly democratic. To that end, the CiU and other Catalan nationalist parties have strenuously promoted a ‘civic’ nation-building project. Pujol’s assertion that ‘everyone who lives and works in Catalonia and has a wish to be so and feels tied to this land, is Catalan’ has become official party, and government, policy (Keating 1996a). Thus, membership of the nation is based on territorial and linguistic markers, rather than race or descent. But the CiU does not believe that Catalonia must be independent to be self-determining. Instead, it frames Catalan nationalism within the Spanish and European contexts, emphasising the linkages and interdependencies that Catalan can take advantage of by operating in multiple spheres of influence. The CiU believes that Catalan nationalism has prospered with its integration into Europe. It argues that Catalans are more European than their Spanish counterparts, thus invoking a ‘usable past’ of Catalonia’s status as an important trading nation in the Europe in the Middle Ages (Keating 2001). The Lega Nord Unique out of all the main minority nationalist parties in Europe, the Lega Nord has sought to create an imagined community of ‘Padania’ that has no historical basis. ‘Padania’, which is the Latin term for the basin of the River Po, is loosely based on the geographical boundaries of Northern (later extended to Central) Italy. Faced with these difficulties, the LN has sought to invent a historical and cultural narrative for Padania, for instance referring to the glorious battles of its Celtic predecessors, and emphasising the local languages and dialects of Northern Italy. The supposedly ‘authentic’ 6 Copyright PSA 2007

Celtic origin of Padania is meanwhile contrasted with the ‘artefact’ of the Italian nation-state. Padania is proclaimed as a linguistic, ethnic and territorial community – unlike the heterogeneous, multilingual and multicultural place that is Italy. Padania’s links with Northern and Western Europe have been emphasised, to contrast with Mediterranean or African influences on Southern Italy. The LN found its strength in the sub-alpine regions of Lombardy and the Veneto, where clusters of industrial districts were common. Indeed, the League presented itself as the party of the northern industrial periphery. It has also linked the cultural values of small-scale industry in the North-East communities with the concept of a Lombard people, extended to the remainder of the people of North and Central Italy (Biorcio 1991: 53). The nation is built around the ‘traditional’ ways of life in Northern Italy, Catholic values, and a special work ethic described as ‘neo-Calvinist’ based on the virtues of hard work, honesty and cooperation. Small-scale industrialization was crucial to building a northern grass-roots community because these type of enterprises allegedly embodied such virtues. So although culture was important to the LN’s appeal, the underlying principles upon which the LN argued for the unification of a ‘Northern’ people were socioeconomic. As Umberto Bossi, Leader of the Lega Nord stated, ‘we moved from an ethnic-cultural discourse to a socio-economic one. The Padania is a people and has a similar socio-economic fabric’ (cited in Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002:101). Thus, the socio-economic ‘fabric’ of the small business community was the cultural basis upon which the Lega has sought to build the nation. Nationalist and Regionalist Responses to Changing Demographics There are few issues that have aroused the fear and panic of the West European electorate like the prospect of rapid demographic change, resulting from a rapidly aging population, falling birth rates, the increased mobility of workers and growing asylum and immigration. Political parties have had to tread carefully around these issues, and according to some scholars, their immigration policies may be categorised by their ideological profile. For instance, Jupp (2003) argues that the parties of the Left have historically favoured liberal, multicultural or cosmopolitan policies, whilst right-wing parties are seen to be more prone to anti-immigrant stances. But as we shall see, parties rarely fit into such neat categories. This section will examine how the parties’ construction of nation aligns with their immigration and socioeconomic policies, to ascertain how ‘Europeanised’ their discourse on nation-building and national membership has become. Scottish National Party As mentioned previously, the SNP has asserted an incontrovertible ‘civic’ kind of nationalism. Its criteria for national membership is based on territory, not blood or descent. The ‘nation’ thus includes non-native born or blood-descent Scots, which is underlined by the SNP’s affiliated organisations, Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for Independence. The SNP advocates opening up Scotland’s doors to further immigration to attract vital skilled workers, and has supported a devolved immigration policy for Scotland to achieve this goal. The SNP supports this policy on economic grounds whilst at the same time advocating principles of diversity and freedom. On the first matter, the SNP believes that Scotland faces grave demographic challenges. Its birthrate is one of the lowest in Europe, and the economy is reliant on the skills and labour of new workers. The SNP wishes to increase immigration so that Scotland has a ‘stable population’ and immigrant families can contribute to high-quality public services for future generations. As SNP Shadow Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill argued, ‘Our economic needs and social wants are different and distinct to the rest of the UK. As a nation of emigrants we wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland dealt with kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression’ (Holyrood, 29 October 2006). MacAskill was referring to the treatment of asylum seekers in Scotland, an issue over which the Scottish Parliament has no authority as it is reserved to Westminster. The SNP argues that ‘the Labour government’s immigration policy is not only terrorising children and families in Scotland, but will also lead to long term economic stability’ (SNP Press Release, 19 October 2005). Aside from the pending ‘depopulation crisis’ in Scotland and the economic crisis that it will bring, the 7 Copyright PSA 2007

SNP supports increased immigration as part of its promotion of a multicultural Scotland free from racism and intolerance. The SNP’s criteria of ‘national belonging’ based on residence alone usefully deflects criticism that the party is exclusionary. The party fears that any emphasis on birth, tradition or Scottish culture will arouse accusations of narrow ‘ethnic’ nationalism, which would discredit the party and undermine its appeal to broad sections of Scottish society. Bavarian Christian Social Union Leader of the CSU and Minister President Edmund Stoiber advocates a drastic reduction in the ‘uncontrolled level of immigration’ and the number of asylum seekers that Germany accepts, a policy that has prompted critics to label him, and the CSU, xenophobic. In 1998, Bavaria demanded an opt-out from EU immigration rules, so that the CSU-led government could demand proof from immigrants that they had a job and health insurance in Bavaria. In the federal election that year Stoiber also lambasted Gerhard Schröder for saying that he would work hard in the interest of Germans and people living in Germany; the CSU leader took issue with the fact that Schröder pledged to work on behalf of ‘non-citizens’. In 2000 it introduced a restrictive ‘Blue Card’ that tied the granting of a residence permit to a particular employment contract. And in 2002 it opposed the immigration law put forward by the SPD-Greens federal government which laid out a number of measures designed to make foreigners fit into German society. ‘We can’t afford to expand immigration, when in terms of integration, we can’t cope with existing immigration’ said Stoiber during the parliamentary debates (BBC, 22 March 2002). The party argues that immigration cannot be increased whilst unemployment in Germany is so high, as it places too great a strain on public services. Moreover, the party opposes the idea of multiculturalism. CSU Leader Edmund Stoiber once said that ‘talk of a multicultural society tears up the very roots of our national and cultural identity, developed over centuries’ (Die Welt, 25 February 1989). The CSU uses strong antiforeigner rhetoric, and one of the CSU’s posters in the 1998 federal elections even urged people not to vote for them if they accepted more foreigners in Bavaria. The CSU’s cultural policy appears to be keeping immigrants out of Bavaria, who are considered to threaten and dilute the purity of the Bavarian nation. More broadly, the CSU seeks to maintain traditional societal structures in Europe, and argues that Europe’s Christian roots must be protected. Although it supports the regionalisation of Europe, then, the CSU strictly opposes the Europeanisation of Bavaria, if that means Bavaria must open its society up to foreigners of different backgrounds, faiths and ethnicities. Catalan Convergence and Union Catalonia is one of the wealthiest regions in Spain, and has had an open immigration policy since its economic expansion in the 1960s, attracting at first Southern Spanish immigrants – mainly from Andalucia – and later from Northern Africa and South America. The large proportion of migrants living in Catalonia – which has hovered between 30-40% of the population since the 1960s (Keating 1996a: 166) – has prompted some to dub Catalonia a ‘county of immigrants’. This has had significant effects on Catalan’s social structure as well as the definition of Catalan identity. But instead of seeing immigrants as a threat to Catalan culture, immigration is perceived as good for the economy and good for the Catalan nation. In 2001, the CiU-led Catalan government drafted an immigration policy that went ‘against the grain of standard migration policy and differs greatly from the Immigration Law approved by the Spanish parliament’ due to its flexibility, openness, and emphasis on social rights and citizenship (Sedura i Mas 2001). The CiU has forged an inclusive ‘civic’ Catalan identity, where language is marker of identity, but has also been used as a tool for assimilation. Linguistic ‘normalization’ is key to the CiU’s project of nation-building in Catalonia. A number of laws have established Catalan as the language of public administration, the media and education. Yet instead of alienating newcomers, this policy is supported by immigrants and Southern Spanish settlers in Catalonia, as much as native-born Catalans (CIS 1994). Immigrants are offered free Catalan language immersion courses (the alternative is for them to pay for Spanish lessons) and in 2003 the government launched a 8 Copyright PSA 2007

campaign to encourage immigrants to speak Catalan. As a result, the ability to speak Catalan is seen as a ‘badge of achieved status’ (Keating 1997) rather than a marker of ethnic exclusion. The policy here is to assimilate Southern Spanish and foreign immigrants into the Catalan community, and to avoid ethnic distinction. As the government’s head of linguistics said, ‘the language debate is not a sign of a hostile anti-immigrant sentiment but rather part of a determined effort to remain culturally distinct from the rest of Spain’ (Adler BBC 2003). Thus, far from seeing immigration as a threat, the CIU makes the case that integrated newcomers in Catalonia help strengthen their identity. Assimilation through language allows incomers to share the common history and culture of Catalonia, thus strengthening the (scale of) demands for autonomy. The Lega Nord The LN has been lambasted by EU politicians and scholars alike for its xenophobic and racist views with regard to immigration. It associates immigration with fear, crime, and a threat to its way of life. The Celtic, Christian, and Calvinist identity of Padania is supposedly threatened by an Italian immigration policy decided in Rome (Wagemann and Caramani 2005: 85). The homogeneity of this ethnic community must be preserved by a stricter control of immigration and asylum claims. As well as using legislative means to achieve this goal – for instance supporting the Berlusconi’s government’s recent immigration law that tightened repressive measures against illegal immigrants – the Lega has been engaged in populist rabble-rousing and demonstrations. For instance it coorganised a campaign in 1999, which gathered 700,000 signatures, to petition for a referendum to repeal the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law that regulates immigration and the status of foreigners (Ivarsflaten). According to the LN Provincial Secretary of Varese, ‘The immigration of terroni and more recently extracomunitari 1 is changing the social structure of Varese and other areas of the North of Italy. The influx of extracomunitari has caused more problems, such as theft, the use and sale of drugs and general petty crime. The ‘black economy’ gets bigger every day and the social cohesion of Varese and other towns in disintegrating. The LN wants to protect and maintain the traditional values, dialects and culture of these areas’ (cited in Giordano 1999: 223). Immigrants are thus seen as a threat to the economy as well as the perceived homogenous identity, culture and values of Northern Italy. Whereas in the first decade of its existence, the ‘other’ was perceived to be Southern Italians, since 9/11 the immigrant ‘other’ has been those of the Islamic faith (McDonnell 2006). But this requires us to deconstruct who the ‘we’ is in the Padanian nation. During the period of the LN’s electoral rise, the small business communities of Northern Italy were facing a number of ‘threats’ which Allum and Diamanti (1996: 152-153) list as: inefficient and wasteful public intervention, degeneration of the political party system and uncontrolled immigration. The Lega’s immigration policy was oriented towards the interests of the small business community. Surveys reveal that Southern Italians and immigrants are considered as outsiders in these communities, whilst ‘employees were often the ex-workmates, the kin, the political co-militants or the co-religioists of their employees (sic)’ within the community (Piore and Sabel 1984: 229). The Lega Nord was able to successfully link the small business frustration with immigration and central government misrule to demands for regional autonomy. It insists that Padania would be one of the richest regions in Europe, if it became independent, as then it would not have to subsidise Southern Italy, and it could close its doors to immigration so that foreigners could not steal local jobs and there would this be full employment. The only deviation from this anti-immigrant policy is to allow South Americans of Italian heritage to return to Northern Italy, which serves to underline the Lega’s criteria of ethnic descent as the basis of national membership. Homogenous and Heterogeneous Nations-Building: Explaining Sources of Variation From the previous discussion, we can see that there are two very different discourses emerging in Europe on the composition of the region or minority nation in response to European integration: ethnic homogeneity versus multiculturalism. What are the motivations that underlie these positions? We can identify three separate, but overlapping issues that motivate regionalist and nationalist 9 Copyright PSA 2007

parties’ immigration policies: (1) a concern with cultural reproduction and; (2) the economy and labour market – both of which are linked to demographic change; and finally (3) a desire to be perceived as ‘civic’ and credible, requiring parties to play European ideological game. Cultural reproduction Nationalist and regionalist parties are generally concerned with the need to protect local cultures to secure their survival and longevity in the face of globalisation. Nation-building projects may thus be motivated by concerns for linguistic protection and cultural reproduction. In the latter case, parties may demand the creation of barriers to halt the inflow of immigrants into national communities, which are perceived as the source of ‘dilution’ of traditional cultures. This has been the case with the Lega Nord and the Bavarian CSU. However, it has not been the case in Catalonia or Scotland, who believe immigration and multiculturalism can benefit the nationalist project – through strengthening the size and number of people claiming identification with the nation. Also, by learning Catalan, immigrants can share in the Catalan culture and identity. On the second issue, a major concern for many minority nations is securing the survival of their language in an age when English has become the lingua franca. But again we will find here that nationalist and regionalist responses to this problem have been quite diverse. Whilst the Lega Nord seeks to use language (or rather, the many indigenous dialects of Northern Italy) as a mark of ethnic distinction, the CiU has sought to normalise the Catalan language in order to assimilate immigrants into the nation. Caramani and Wagemann (2006) argue that the tendency towards differentiation rather than assimilation of foreigners is indigenous to the Alpine region as a whole. Alpine populist parties believe that Americanisation and immigration from Islamic countries and Asia poses a cultural threat that challenges the Christian heritage of Europe. Anti-immigration policies are thus more likely to appeal to those who subscribe to ‘traditional’, meaning closed, views of the nation. Economy and the Labour Market An important aspect of nation-building strategies is socioeconomic policy. Regionalist and nationalist parties have sought various ways to boost their economies to face the threats posed by depopulation, competition from foreign cultures and the opening of markets. Some regions are better positioned to face these challenges than others. Bavaria, Catalonia and Northern Italy are three of the wealthiest regions in Europe, but their responses to securing economic prosperity have varied. Whilst the LN and CSU have accused immigrants of stealing local jobs and sponging off the welfare state, the CiU has sought to provide fairer social security and housing benefits for newcomers. Furthermore, the charge that the working class must compete with immigrant groups for scarce resources has been treated differently by parties. The SNP argues that skilled immigrant workers are necessary for the well-functioning of the economy, and are important for cross-cultural learning, innovation and creativity, whilst the LN has sought to evict immigrant competitors from Padania’s borders. Regionalist parties also seek different solutions to demographic change. Whilst the CiU and SNP view immigration as the only way to sustain their economies and public services and have encouraged newcomers to settle their families in Scotland and Catalonia, the CSU has an extremely selective immigration policy (high-tech skilled workers on temporary contracts only), whilst the Lega argues that Italy should encourage the return of those of Italian descent in South America, who have ‘common cultural, historical and religious roots’ (McDonnell 2006). Indeed, cultural issues are closely linked to economic resources. A major concern for Catalan parties is how to secure the survival of their language in Europe. Catalan is used in public administration, the communication media, and education, but ‘in the world of business and the professions, Catalan remains rather weak’ (Keating 1996a: 170). Businesses tend to conduct external relations in Castillian and other languages – often English. The Catalan government has been pressing for the acceptance of Catalan as an official EU language, rather than a just a ‘regional’ language, but as yet to no success despite the fact that millions of people in three member states speak it (Guibernau 2006). On the other hand, to impose Catalan on businesses’ foreign 10 Copyright PSA 2007

relations, or to make Catalonia a monolingual society would not have made any economic sense. Thus, the CiU encourages the use of Catalan in everyday life and business, and is especially keen to encourage immigrants to use Catalan as their first language (and for their part, speaking Catalan is an incentive for immigrants to rise socially). Encouraging newcomers to speak Catalan is all the more necessary for linguistic survival, given that Catalonia – like other parts of Western Europe – is facing demographic challenges. Through its linguistic assimilation policies Catalonia has created policies a new generation of Catalan-speakers to struggle for recognition of their distinctiveness. Playing the European ideological game European institutions, networks and lobbying organisations have provided an opportunity structure in which territorial actors are able to develop a new political voice. This voice has been shaped by political dialogue at the EU level, whereby it has become important for territorial parties to ‘play’ the European ideological ‘game’. It has been argued that ‘the European political arena has been open to nationalist and regionalist movements that have emphasised territorial and inclusive nationalism and democracy, and not to those that cleave to ethnic exclusiveness or racism’ (Keating 2006 intro). To that end, Europe has encouraged regionalist and nationalist parties to adopt civic and inclusive criteria for territorial membership (Lynch 1996). But whilst Europe may have been closed to the ethnic-exclusive Lega Nord – which was thrown out of the European Free Alliance for its racist and xenophobic policies – the CSU has avoided the need to ‘de-ethnicise’ its appeal. This is because the CSU has not based its nation-building project on ‘nationalism’ but on Christian conservatism. It has therefore not had to legitimate itself in present-day Europe, or to emphasise territory as the criterion of inclusion, because it categorises itself as a conservative party. It has also been argued that regionalist and nationalist parties are likely to advocate principles and themes common to those of the EU – such as support for free trade, diversity and a pro-integration outlook to be perceived as credible. Again, whilst the CiU and SNP seek to present themselves as avid Europeans, and have adopted the principles of tolerance and democracy, the Lega Nord – in rejecting diversity and the ‘Europeanisation’ of Padania, has been excluded from European channels and networks. Yet the CSU, which officially supports ‘unity in diversity’ and the principles of European integration, exhibits a strongly ethnic brand of nationalism and as well as the vision of a pure Bavarian nation, advocates a vision of a Christian Europe untainted by other faiths. The CSU uses and interprets concepts and issues at the European level according to its own policies and nation-building project – such as a Europe of the Regions (keeping Europe out of the regions) and diversity (rather, this implies Protestantism and Catholicism for the CSU). The reason the CSU’s ethnically-exclusive and anti-immigration stance has gone unnoticed by scholars of nationalism is because it has not made a claim to nationhood (instead it uses the term Heimat to convey a sense of attachment and belonging to the Bavarian Land and people). Europe as a Threat or Opportunity for National Projects? The way in which regionalist and nationalists parties mobilise on the issue of immigration, and link this to their nation-building projects, varies significantly from country to country. Whilst some parties have welcomed immigration as a way of boosting their economies and expanding and diversifying national membership, other parties have rejected immigration as a threat to the labour market, and argue that it will undermine and fragment the national community. Unlike some approaches that assume that Europeanisation is a blanket top-down process, this discussion has sought to emphasise the variation in parties’ mobilisation on immigration issues to explain why some actors have become more Europeanised than others, and why some actors are involved in European discourses, whilst others have withdrawn into the image of an ideal, pure ‘nation’. As we have seen, regionalist and minority nationalists parties’ immigration strategies have been largely informed by their socioeconomic goals and constructions of the nation. The CiU and SNP both view immigration as necessary to support the economy, whilst the CSU and LN are more concerned with protecting the labour market, and moreover the nation from dilution by foreigners, 11 Copyright PSA 2007

which they claim is being hastened by Europe’s openness to immigration. Moreover, the SNP and CiU have pursued largely pro-European positions, happily succumbing to European pressures to become more international in outlook, and to advance policy agendas based on multiculturalism and pro-diversity in order to be perceived as credible. For the CSU, it does not feel the need to legitimate its approach to immigrants to be perceived as credible as it stakes its position on the basis of its conservatism rather than its nationalism. Meanwhile, the LN seems to have foregone any desire to satisfy European expectations, and has turned to criticising Europe from afar. Thus, whilst all of the parties under analysis have, at various times, supported Europe as an outlet for nationalist aspirations, the goal of a Europe of the Regions or Peoples has been interpreted differently: for some parties it has represented cultural and ethnic diversity in Europe, whilst for others it has meant keeping Europe out of the nation. The heterogeneity in attitudes to Europe, and to Europeanising the nation, indicates that we are far from realising the ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ that Guibernau (2006) argues for, which includes the ‘right of any foreigner… to be treated without hostility in the country of arrival’ which should go hand-in-hand with the eradication of ‘the discrimination, repression and attempted annihilation suffered by some nations and ethnic groups’. So far, this goal remains a dream. Whilst some parties like the CiU and SNP have embraced multiculturalism as part of their constructions of the nation, the CSU and Lega Nord continue to espouse narrow, exclusive and ethnically-based visions of the nation, and in turn reject Europeanisation and diversity as a threat to their traditional cultures. For these parties, an unresolved tension remains: having pursued autonomy strategies that argued for recognition of the diverse nations and peoples in Europe, these parties unashamedly continue to oppose diversity within their own national boundaries. References Allum, P. and I. Diamanti (1996), ‘The Autonomous Leagues in the Veneto’, in C. Levy (ed.), Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics, (Oxford: Berg). Anderson, B. (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London and New York: Verso). Biorcio, R. (1991), ‘The Rebirth of Populism in France and Italy’, Telos, 90. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, (Cambridge-Mass.: Harvard University Press). CIS (1994) Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, La consciencia national y regional en la Espana de las automias (Madrid: CIS). De Winter, L. (2001), ‘The Impact of European Integration on Ethnoregionalist Parties’, Working Paper 195, Institut de Ciènces Polítiques I Socials, Barcelona. De Winter, L. and Gomez-Reino (2002) ‘European Integration and Ethnoregionalist Parties’, Party Politics, 8(4). Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell). Giordano, B. (1999) ‘A Place called Padania? The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern Italy’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 6(3). Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. (2002), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics – Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the northern question, (Aldershot: Ashgate). Guibernau, M. (2006) ‘Nations without States in the EU: The Catalan Case’ in J. McGarry and M. Keating (eds) European Integration and the Nationalities Question (London: Routledge). Hamilton, P. (1999) ‘The Scottish National Paradox. The Scottish National Party’s Lack of Ethnic Character,’ Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 26. Hepburn, E. (2004) ‘Territorial Autonomy in the European Context’, in Francesca Astengo and Nanette Neuwahl (eds) (2004) A Constitution for Europe? Governance and Policy-making in the European Union (Montreal: University of Montreal). Hobsbawm, E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: CUP). Jolly, S. (2007) ‘The Europhile Fringe? Regionalist Party Support for European integration’, 12 Copyright PSA 2007

European Union Politics, 8(1). Keating, M. (1996a), Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, (London: Macmillan). _________ (1996b), ‘The Invention of Regions. Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe’, Arena, 8/96. _________ (1997) ‘Stateless Nation-building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the changing state system’, Nations and Nationalism, 3(4). _________ (2001) Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). _________ (2006) ‘Introduction’ in J. McGarry and M. Keating (eds) European Integration and the Nationalities Question (London: Routledge). Lynch, P. (1996), Minority Nationalism and European Integration, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press). McCrone, D. (1992), Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation, (London and New York: Routledge). McDonnell, D. (2006) ‘A Weekend in Padania. Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord’, Politics, 26(2). Mann, M. (1999) ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing,’ New Left Review, May 1999. Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Muller-Rommel, F. (1998) ‘Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe’ in De Winter, L. and H. Tursan (1998) Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, (London and NY: Routledge). Nairn, T. (2000), After Britain. New Labour and the Return of Scotland, (London: Granta). Piore, M. and Sabel, C. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, (New York: Basic Books Inc.). Sedura i Mas, A. (2001) ‘From multiculturalism to interculturalism’, Avui, 20 March. SNP (2003) Speech by Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Scottish Parliament Debate on Europe, 12 June 2003, Press Release (Edinburgh: SNP). Sutherland, C. (2001) ‘Nation, Heimat, Vaterland; The Reinvention of Concepts by the Bavarian CSU Party’, German Politics, 10(3). Taylor, C. (1998) ‘The Dynamics of Democratic Exclusion,’ Journal of Democracy, 9, October. Wagemann, C. and D. Caramani (2005) ‘A Transnational Political Culture? The Alpine Region and its Relationship with Europe’, German Politics, 14(1). 1

Terroni is the derogative term to describe Southern Italians, meaning peasants, whilst extracomunitari refer to those people who comes from outside the EU.

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