Regulating Religion

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CRITICAL ISSUES IN SOCIAL JUSTICE Series Editor:

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Melvin Lerner, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

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6 The German Enquete Commission on Sects Political Conflicts and Compromises* Hubert Seiwert

INTRODUCTION

An English translation has been published under the title Final Report of the Enquete Commission on So called Sects and Psychogroups (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a). It is to be expected that this report will influence the ongoing public debate on "sects" and "cults" not only in Germany, but also in other European states, and it is therefore useful to throw some light on the working of the commission and the political controversies influencing its deliberations. Because I was a member of the commission myself, I should make it clear that I was and to a certain degree still am a participant in these controversies. I do not agree with many of the interpretations and particularly the political conclusions drawn by the majority of the commission. My own interpretations were presented in the final report as a minority opinion, which was also supported by commission member Dr. Angelika Koster-LoBack, M.P. Dr. Koster-LoBack was the only representative of the Green Party (Bilndnis 90/Die Griinen) in the commission, which had nominated me as an expert member (although I am not a member of that party).

In May 1996, the German Bundestag established an Enquete Commission on "Socalled Sects and Psychogroups." Despite the somewhat puzzling title, it was generally understood that the commission would deal with new religious movements, and above all with the Church of Scientology, which in 1996 was a perceived as a major threat to the State and society by the German public. Accordingly, in the media and in common language the commission was simply called Sektenkommission (sect commission). Unlike a similar commission of the French National Assembly, which presented its report in January 1996, 6 months after its installation and after only 21 hours of deliberations (Assemblee Nationale, 1996), the German sect commission had 49 sessions in 2 years. In June 1998, it presented its final report (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998b), which was later published as a book of nearly 500 pages (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998c). * Updated, revised, and reprinted from Social Justice Research, 12 (4), 1999.

85

86 Although active participation in the work of the commission on the one hand allows me to present more detailed information on its procedures and internal discussions than would otherwise be the case, it is, on the other hand, a factor that adds rather subjective perceptions to this paper. I cannot avoid making some critical remarks on the Final Report of the commission. However, this paper is not intended as a criticism of the majority opinion of the final report, which I have done elsewhere (Seiwert, 1999), but to explain the work of the commission and the political processes that restricted it.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND The installation of the Enquete Commission on sects marked the culmination of a public debate in Germany that goes back to the early 1970s. At that time, a number of new religious movements was introduced into Germany, among them the Unification Church, Scientology, ISKCON, the Children of God, and the Divine Light Mission. These five movements became generally known as youth religions, a term coined by the late Rev. Friedrich-Wilhelm Haack, who was the first and most influential critic of new religions in Germany (Haack, 1978). As in other countries, these new religious movements were highly controversial and became the target of a small but influential group of anti-cult activists. Most active among the critics were some "sect experts" (Sektenbeauftragte) of the Protestant Churches who also promoted the formation of many private "initiatives of parents and concerned persons" (Eltern und Betroffeneninitiativen ). Some of these initiatives gradually developed into private centers of counseling and information that inform the public and the media about the alleged dangerous influence of sects. New religious movements received attention periodically in the media, partic-

Hubert Seiwert

ularly after the mass suicide by members of the People's Temple in 1978. Although controversial religions remained a marginal phenomenon in quantitative terms, they were generally perceived as harmful and dangerous. Public opinion almost exclusively relied on information provided by the sect experts of the major churches and the private counseling centers. For a number of reasons, academic research on new religious movements was not promoted, and the few studies that did exist were ignored in public discussion (Baumann, 1998). In the early 1990s, the public debate on new religious movements gained new momentum after the unification of the two German states. Some sect experts argued that the collapse of the socialist system in East Germany had left an ideologic vacuum that provided a fertile ground for the invasion of sects. Although it soon became obvious that the expected "invasion" did not take place or at least was not successful, dangers caused by sects became a regular theme in the media. The continuing apprehension of· new religious movements was fostered by awful events abroad (e.g., the Waco incident, 1993; the murder and suicide of Solar Temple followers in Canada and Switzerland, 1994; the criminal activities of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, 1995). These events, which surpassed even the most atrocious stories about the baleful activities of sects, contributed to the increasing public concern. By early 1996, public apprehension of sects had taken forms that were properly described as hysteria even by observers who are wholly unsuspected of playing down the dangers caused by new religious movements (Niichtem, 1997, 1998; Fincke, 1998). For reasons that deserve further sociological investigation, the main focus of this hysteria became the Church of Scientology. Although Scientology had been severely criticized and accused of illegal activities in other countries as well, it was in Germany that the fight against Scientology became a major political issue. It is difficult to imagine

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The German Enquete Commission on Sects

today the frenzy prevailing in 1995 and 1996. Scientology was perceived as a serious political danger that not only threatened to tum individuals into will-less zombies, but was also conspiring to overthrow the democratic constitution of the state. For the first time, the public campaign against a "sect" was launched by senior politicians, including some federal and state ministers. The "Great Scientology Scare" had a tremendous impact on the public perception of new religious movements. Regarding Scientology as a public enemy became a matter of political correctness, and being suspected of having any relations with it-let alone of being a member-led to ostracism. Because Scientology was generally labeled a "sect," the Scientology fear was easily transferred to other "sects"-that is, new religious movements and other social phenomena to which the same label was applied. The strong negative cooootations that the term sect had acquired in public language were thus further enhanced. At the same time, it was used almost indiscriminately for religious minorities of any kind, putting the "youth religions" side by side with Jehovah's Witnesses and Evangelical communities, while demonstrating the perilous nature of sects with reference to the unquestioned atrocity of Scientology. It was this climate of sect hysteria that provided the background for the Enquete Commission of the Bundestag. Public opinion demanded political action. It seemed obvious to anyone that sects were a serious societal problem and a possible danger. Accordingly, the decision to establish the commission left no doubts about this. The commission was charged to "identify dangers emanating from these organizations for the individual, the State, and society" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996b). Thus, right at the outset it was taken for granted that "these organizations" cause dangers, a mindset that strongly shaped the aims and methods of inquiry. It was never asked whether the public apprehension of new religious movements was possibly a

result of distorted information, not to mention the question of whether "these orga- · nizations" might possibly have other than harmful effects on the society. Although it became clear during the proceedings of the commission that no criminal or other unlawful activities could be substantiated for any new religious movement in Germanythe only exception being Scientology (which the commission did not regard as a religious movement)· --the propositions that had led to its installation were never questioned by the commission. The majority of the commission avoided stating clearly that the public perception of new religious movements as dangerous or even criminal organizations was unfounded. Instead, it extended the range of social phenomena included into the inquiry far beyond "sects" in the common sense of the word (i.e., minority religions), treating such diverse things as direct marketing and pyramid schemes (chapter 3.3.4), occultism and Satanism (chapter3.4), alternative therapies and life-counseling (chapter 3.5.2), and ritual child abuse (chapter 5.2.6). Jn this way, "so-called sects and psychogroups" became a catch-all for anything that might be perceived as eerie and threatening. Because new religious movements were presented as in some way associated with these sinister phenomena, the prevailing apprehension was corroborated.

POLITICAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE COMMISSION To understand better the self-imposed limitations of the commission's work, it is useful to have a glimpse at the political setting surrounding it. As has been mentioned, during the years preceding its installation, public fear of sects had increased. Although new and unconventional forms of religion, sects and cults were publicly and even by some government representatives suspected of various harmful and illegal activities.

88 However, there was an almost complete lack of evidence supporting these accusations. As there was no evidence of unlawful activities by new religious movements, no public prosecution occurred and government policy paid little attention to the problem. This situation contrasted sharply with warnings of sects experts promulgated by media reports that alerted the public to the perilous influence of "sects." Political pressure on the federal government to take some action increased, although the existing laws did not allow doing more than had already been done. Because the constitution protects the .freedom of religious belief and free exercise of religion, the authorities could not interfere with the activities of sects, as there was no evidence for violations of the law. What the federal and state governments did, however, was to issue leaflets and public statements warning against individual sects and sects in general. The list of federal and state government publications on new religious movements is too long to be cited here. The first publications appeared in 1979 (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz). I could trace only three that appeared during the 1980s (1983, Nordrhein-Westfalen; 1983, Federal Government; 1988, BadenWiirtemberg) and three in 1994 and 1995 (Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, MecklenburgVorpommern). Between 1996 and 1998, government publications on new religious movements mushroomed, with a considerable proportion dealing with Scientology. The courts had approved such warnings, arguing that they did not interfere with the free exercise of religion but responded to the government responsibility of informing the public (Federal Court of Administration, 1989; Federal Constitutional. Court, 1989). Earlier, the federal government and other administrations had also financially supported private anti-cult organizations, but this had been outlawed by the Federal Court of Administration because such public funding had no legal basis (Federal Court of Administration, 1992). Efforts aimed at creating

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proper legal authorization for the provision of public funds to private information and counseling centers failed because of substantial constitutional doubts within the administration (Deutscher Bundestag 1998a, p. 275). Thus, the federal administration could not respond to the political pressure for further action against the harmful influence of sects because its options were restricted by the existing laws. It was against this background that the Social Democratic Party's (SPD) parliamentary group in February 1996 tabled a motion to establish an Enquete Commission of the Bundestag on "so-called sects and psychogroups" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996c). The motion was discussed in the parliament on 14 March and referred to the Committee for Scrutinity of Elections, Immunity and Rules of Procedure, which submitted a recommendation for a decision on 9 May 1996 (Deutscher Bundestag 1996a, pp. 8488-8500). Although the SPD as opposition party did not command a parliamentary majority, the Enquete Commission was established (Deutscher Bundestag, l 996b) with the support of the government coalition parties, even though their speakers had uttered some reservations during the session on 14 March. The speaker of the Liberals, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, doubted that the establishment of an enquete commission was the right way to deal with the subject (Deutscher Bundestag 1996a, p. 8494). She was not nominated by her party as a member of the commission. The commission consisted of 12 members of parliament and an equal number of external experts. The government coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) had five members, the Liberals (PDP) had one member. The SPD had four members, and the Green Party (Bilndnis 90/Die Grtinen) and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) had one member each. The same number of external experts was nominated by each party. The member of parliament who had initiated the motion was Renate Rennebach, a


back-bencher of the Social Democrats who for several years had made herself a political spokeswoman of the anti-cult network. In her speech, she described the dangers caused by sects with the whole spectrum of anti-cult stereotypes: We are confronted with the situation that people are driven into psychic and financial dependency, that children are forced to meditate for many hours and with silicon plugs in their ears, that the most severe frights are stirred up and people are exposed to the most atrocious practices of psychic indoctrination, which induces, for instance, their prostitution or even makes children available to sexual perversities. We are confronted with a situation, that people are refused medical help,. that families are destroyed, that whole branches of the economy are infiltrated and firms are bankrupted. (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996a, p. 8488)

She made also clear that of the assumed 600 sects and psychogroups it was not just Scientology that had to be scrutinized, but also "the 599 other groups" and the problems caused by 1J1em (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996a, p. 8494). Thus, the target of Mrs. Rennebach, who once called the enquete commission her "baby" (Leipziger Volkszeitung, 1996) and invested considerable passion into it, was obviously the whole range of sects and cults. It was probably this zeal serving all popular prejudices that made it difficult for the government parties to block the motion of the opposition party. Instead, they supported it and attempted to direct the work of the commission with their majority to a more moderate path. The different approaches of the government parties and the Social Democrats had some influence on the selection of external experts. At least three of the four SPD experts were known for their anti-cult commitment. One is a sect expert of the Protestant Parish Service for Wiirtemberg, one is the head of the Scientology Task Force of the State of Hamburg, and one is a judge and former

89 officer of the same task force. The fourth is a professor of religious studies. However, the coalition parties relied more on academic professionals. There were two social scientists, one psychologist, one officer of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, one lawyer and professor of law, and one officer of the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior. The last two were known for their engagement in the anti-cult struggle, particularly against Scientology. That both factions did not agree in aims and methods first became evident to the public after the summer. At the first hearing of the commission on 14 November, when officers of the internal intelligence service (Verfassungsschutz, i.e., Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) were questioned, one of the SPD experts, Mrs. Caberta, refused to answer asked questions because the vice president of the Bundestag, Antje Vollmer, was present. Ursuala Caberta y Diaz is head of the Scientology Task Force, Ministry of the Interior, Hamburg. She is one of the best-known and most active champions of the anti-cult campaign. She argued that Mrs. Vollmer, a member of the Green Party, had personal contacts with Gottfried Helnwein, a renowned painter, who is supposed to be a member of Scientology. Because of these contacts, Mrs. Caberta suspected the vice president of the parliament might possibly reveal secret information to Mr. Helnwein and in this way to the Scientology organization. As could be expected, the Green Party reacted sharply to this insinuation against one of its senior politicians. The conflict was further fueled when a few days later the expert who had been nominated by the Green Party (the author) was publicly accused by Mrs. Rennebach and Mrs. Caberta to be in some way connected with Scientology, or even to be a member. They demanded that the Green Party withdraw my nomination. Because I am personally involved, I do not want to go into the details of this campaign. 1 What can be safely stated, however, is that the zeal of the two

90 SPD members did not find the support of the other factions in the commission. The spokesman of the Christian Democrats attested to Mrs. Caberta's "hysterical traits," and the spokesman of the Liberals even suggested that she should be recalled as a member of the commission (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1996). These episodes illustrate the internal tensions that affected the work of the commission from the very beginning. There was a steady conflict between the Social Democrats, who followed a plain anti-cult policy, and the two members of the Green Party's faction (the author was not a member of the Green Party), whose position was more liberal and influenced by the results of academic research on new religious movements. The government majority took a position in between these two poles. Although the government faction controlled the majority of votes, it had a strong interest in an unanimous report. One may only guess that they wanted to keep the theme out of the coming election campaign, lest the Social Democrats would present themselves as the sole fighters against the sect danger. As we shall see, this strategy was largely successful.

PROCEDURES OF THE COMMISSION With the exception of some public hearings, all meetings of the commission were confidential. The aura of secrecy surrounding the commission contributed to a deep mistrust on the part of new religious movements, many of which sharply criticized the existence of the commission. For them, it seemed to be an institution of inquisition. Nobody knew which sects or cults were being investigated or what evidence was used by the commission. In fact, the commission itself was quite uncertain about how to define the object of its investigation. With the exception of Scientology, which was a constant

Hubert Seiwert

point of reference in most discussions, there was no clear delimitation of the field of inquiry. As has been noted, it finally included even economic phenomena like direct marketing and pyramid schemes. In the beginning, however, the focus was more concentrated on religious and spiritual groups. In January 1997, 15 "so-called sects" were invited for confidential hearings, including Rosecrucians (AMORC), a charismatic Christian church (Gemeinde auf dem Weg, Berlin), Mormons, ISKCON, Jehovah's Witnesses, Soka Gakkai, and Scientology. The identity of the 15 groups invited was revealed only in the Final Report (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998, p. 24). However, the discussions of the commission never systematically investigated the communities invited or other groups. To be sure, the members of the commission were covered with loads of papers dealing with the most diverse religious communities and other phenomena. These papers-newspaper reports, extracts of anti-cult literature, court decisions, government statements, and occasionally even · scientific reports-arrived in a rather random way. They were rarely discussed, let alone systematically evaluated. This is certainly one of the shortcomings of the commission's work, due partly to the lack of time and partly to a lack of methodology. Although the secretariat of the commission, which was staffed by several social scientists, did its best to structure the proceedings, the discussions were mostly exchanges or confrontations of political opinions rather than attempts at rational analysis. This impression is one of an academic professional who is used to other forms of discussions, of course. However, one may ask whether parliaments are well advised to leave enquiries into subjects that arouse high emotions to commissions not committed to any juridical or scientific rules. One of the results of the free-hand methodological approach was a certain nonchalance in dealing with the information available. Especially in the first year, there


was a tendency to take all information critical of sects and cults at face value, while at the same time information provided by the religious groups themselves was usually regarded as unreliable apologetics. As an illustration of this procedure, I quote from the intennediary report: The range of activities [of so-called sects and psychogroups] is multifarious and engenders various potentials of dangers. It ranges from economic exploitation and dangers to the physical health of individuals to the induction of criminal acts by the members of problem groups or by providers of services in enterprises of the new industry of consciousness and their clients. Likewise, the ideological and economic approaches, which extend as far as the claim to world domination, are diverse. It is, therefore, necessary to uncover the dangers to people directly or indirectly concerned, i.e., to their rights protected by the constitution like physical or psychic health, the freedom of action, of will, and of thought (beliefs), as well as to the free and democratic society and its institutions. (Deutscher Bundestag, 1997, p. 78; my translation)

The majority of the commission did not regard it as necessary to add any evidence to these and other allegations, and in fact there was no evidence supporting them available to the commission, except the well-known anti-cult literature. This tendency to utter general insinuations without verification was fostered by a decision that at first sight seemed quite reasonable. The commission had agreed not to make a list of sects or to criticize specific sects in order to avoid stigmatizing them. Instead, the problems connected with sects and cults should be treaied in a more general way. However, this approach allowed the collection of a variety of allegations from different realms and the accumulation of them to build a horrific picture of sects and cults without any specification. This procedure was sharply criticized in a minority vote to the intermediary

91 report by the two members of the Green faction (Deutscher Bundestag, 1997, pp. 3942). We also criticized that the majority had recommended an observation of Scientology by the domestic intelligence services because the commission had never discussed the pros and cons of such an observation. At that time (May 1997), the Scientology hysteria was still on its climax, and the ministers for the interior of the federal states were preparing a decision allowing an observation, which was taken in June. Supporting this policy was an act of political correctness, and the authors of the minority vote were accordingly severely attacked, both by the spokespersons of the other factions and by critics in the media. The second year of the commission's work was in several ways different from the first. The preparation of the final report demanded more concentration on certain topics and the drafting of the report. These drafts were often discussed controversially, but with a remarkable willingness to reach a compromise. The most important single factor contributing to a more rational procedure, however, was the submission of several research papers that had been requested by the commission. The major research project is an empirical study of individual biographies of members and former members of sects and cults (Fuchs-Heinritz, Scholl, Streib, & Vester, 1998). Another one is a review of quantitative studies on the psychological effects of membership (Murken, 1998). Other research reports deal with the "psychomarket,"-that is, suppliers of alternative therapies and life counseling, and practical experiences in counseling connected with new religious movements (cf. Deutscher Bundestag, 1998e). Although the incoming research reports had different themes and methods, they had one thing in common: None of them supported the allegations against new religious movements that prevailed in public opinion and were taken for granted by the majority of the commission.

92 In particular, there was no evidence that conversion to new religious movements and commitment to them was caused by weird "psycho-techniques," which deprived the "victims" of their capacity to act freely. It also became clear that conversion and membership depend in the first place on the "fit" between the individual's needs and the specific features offered by the respective community, and that individuals are active in the formation of this relationship. The researchers had found no indication that membership presented hazards to individuals that cannot also be found in other social contexts. A convenient summary of the results of the research projects can be found in the minority opinion to the Final Report presented by Angelika Koster-LoBack, MP, and myself (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, pp. 311-352). Although these findings were hardly a big surprise for anyone roughly familiar with former social scientific research on new religious movements, they contradicted obviously the fundamental assumptions that had led to the establishment of the commission. Likewise, other allegations as to the infiltration of economic and political institutions by sects were difficult to uphold in the light of the evidence available. Thus, it seemed that the commission had finally found a commonly accepted base of facts on which to build the final report. However, the majority of the commission was not prepared to accept the sole conclusions that could reasonably be drawn from the research results. This would have been to inform the parliament and the public unambiguously that new religious movements and religious minorities in general do not present a particular danger to individuals, the state, and society at large; that certain dangers and risks do exist, but are not specific to new religious movements and occur in other social contexts as well. Such a clear statement, however, would run against the political interests and expectations connected with the establishment of the commission, because one of

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the major aims of some on the commission was to clear the path for new laws to allow more effective measures against "so-called sects and psychogroups."

REDEFINITIONS In view of an almost complete lack of reliable evidence for dangers caused by new religious movements, the commission shifted its line of reasoning. Instead of "dangers," the final report concentrates on conflicts allegedly caused by "so-called sects and psychogroups." Thus, the commission's field of study was redefined as "not [only] the groups themselves but [also] clearly defined social actions and conflict-triggering actions by individuals-or more precisely, individual members of groups-most of which claim to have, or are ascribed, a religious or ideological status" (Deutscher Bundestag, l 998a, p. 37; words in brackets are not in the original German, but are in the official English translation). This definition states correctly that the commission did not systematically investigate particular groups. However, it wrongly suggests that the report goes on to produce evidence of individual actions that can be regarded as conflict triggering. Rather, the report confines itself to the discussion of "potential conflicts" (Konfiiktpotentiale ), which removes the obligation to deliver any evidence. The long list of potential conflicts, which is provided in chapter 3.3.5 of the Final Report, is an example for the attempt to conceal the lack of evidence and to obscure the actual findings of the research results. Far from dealing with "conflict-triggering actions" by individual members of groups, it accumulates accusations against "religious and ideological communities and psychogroups" that have been brought forward during the past decades. The list is presented as a "typology" of potential conflicts and therefore remains open to what degree these possible conflicts are actual


conflicts and to which "religious and ideological communities and psychogroups" they apply. The last point deserves particular attention because it reveals a fundamental methodological weakness of the report. The commission had great difficulties in demarcating the range of its inquiry. Although the decision of the Bundestag defined "socalled sects and psychogroups" as "new religious and world-view movements," 2 the commission extended its understanding of "psychogroups" to suppliers and clients of "alternative, non-orthodox educational, psychological and psycho-therapeutic methods" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 33). Actually, however, the report goes even further, including certain commercial practices such as pyramid schemes and multilevel marketing systems. These are labeled "commercial cults" that might attain "quasi-religious characteristics." "Employees are[then] exposed to a greater risk of exploitation and even psychological breakdown. [In such cases J a distinction between these and the 'psychogroups' (psycho-sects, psycho-firms) can no longer be made" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998, p. 196; insertions in brackets were in the original German). This line of reasoning not only justifies the inclusion of "commercial cults" into the discussion, but at the same time suggests that the risk of exploitation and psychological breakdown are characteristics of psychogroups. Incidentally, the research report on the "psycho-market," which had been submitted to the commission and is summarized in the final report, did not sustain any of these allegations (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, pp. 90-102; cf. Hellmeister & Fuchs, 1998). The inclusion of phenomena that are not new religious and worldview movements into the definition of "new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups" has significant methodological consequences because it obfuscates what exactly the report is talking about.

93 One has to admit that the problem to define "so-called sects" is a difficult one. It is also one with considerable political and juridical implications. The commission allotted many hours to the problem of definition and the issue proved to be highly controversial. Several conflicting arguments and interests were involved. In the intermediary report, the majority of the commission had agreed to a definition that included practically all religious communities except those that were established churches in Germany before 1919 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1997, p. 44 ). During the drafting of the final report, it was argued that in public usage, the term sect has too many negative connotations to be used as a descriptive term. The suggestion to replace it by the more neutral and scientifically common term new religious movements was at first sharply opposed by the majority. One can only guess about the reasons for this surprising resistance. One member argued that the definitions should not be too precise to allow the inclusion of a wide range of phenomena. Another reason might have been the attempt to bypass the adjective "religious" with its constitutional implications. It was argued that a "sect" was not defined by its religious nature but by its detrimental social effects and potential of conflicts. After long discussions, however, the majority decided to drop the term sect and replace it with new religious and ideological communities. In the decision to establish the commission "so-called sects and psychogroups" is explained by "new religious and worldview movements" (neuere religiose und weltanschauliche Bewegungen). It should be noted that the commission changed this definition in two ways: First, it takes "new religious and ideological communities" as an equivalent to "so called sects," making "psychogroups" an additional (and rather indistinct) category. Second, it replaced weltanschaulich (referring to world views) with ideologisch (ideological). Incidentally, weltanschauliche Gemeinschaften (world view communities) have the same

94 constitutional rights as religious communities, which is not the case with ideologische Gemeinschaften. Although the final report discusses the problems of terminology extensively (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, pp. 27-37), it does not arrive at a definition of the term new religious and ideological communities. The conclusion of the chapter summarizes instead the conflicts that are caused by "new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups," thereby conveying the impression that causing conflicts is indeed their most important characteristic (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 36).

COMPROMISE AND CONFLICTS It is not a difficult task to criticize internal contradictions in the commission's report. However, to do justice to it one must bear in mind that the text is the result of political compromises. Roughly speaking, there were "radical" and "moderate" factions. The former's background was the experience of actual conflicts that many of its members had with new religious and ideological movements, be it as Church sect expert, lawyer, officer, or anti-cult lobbyist. These experiences largely conditioned their perception of new religious movements. They had a strong interest in drawing a picture that transmitted their own experiences and evaluations to the public. Thus, they developed a tendency to concentrate on certain cases that seemed to support their perception. The members of the "moderate" faction were not personally involved in conflicts with certain sects. Consequently, they had a broader understanding of "new religious and ideological communities" that included the whole spectrum of religious minorities. Without denying the possibility and actuality of conflicts in some cases, they were aware that the phenomenon of new religious movements is complex. Relying more on social scientific research than on personal involvement, they were anxious

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not to make generalizations that cannot be sustained. The way to reach a political compromise between these two positions was the usual one: A tacit understanding to give voice to both positions. Because new religious movements-that is, sects in the common sense-did not provide the expected atrocities, the "radical" faction was allowed to illustrate its alarmist position by other phenomena and hypotheses. Thus, black masses of Satanists with rapes and torture found their way into the report (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 84), and an excursion about ritual child abuse was inserted into the chapter on children in new religious and ideological communities (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, pp. 181-186). Another tactical compromise was to allow the presentation of hypotheses and suggestive questions to break the force of certain findings. A good example is the chapter on "Forms of social control and psychological destabilization" (5.1), which treats at length the question of what could be understood by "psychological dependency" and what are the possible dangers of psychological destabilization. Factual statements are avoided, and it is correctly stated that according to available studies, what is described as psychological dependency "appears as part of a search and adaptation behavior that can be neither induced nor replaced by psychological manipulation on the part of the group, but which may well be controlled by it" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a,p. 153). However, the scenarios described in the rest of the chapter convey the message that psychological dependency caused by "psychological destabilization" is indeed a danger. Thus, the text equally states that "[t]he manipulation of individuals by groups is amply documented" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 149), although not the slightest documentation is given. We may interpret this chapter as an attempt to obscure the simple truth that the hypothesis of psychological destabilization through the use of certain


95

"psycho-techniques" by sects could not be some of their expert members. However, the sustained by any evidence and contradicted report contains little that can be used to fuel the hysteria prevailing at the time the comthe available research results. Considerable compromising ingenuity mission was established. On the contrary, was applied to minimize the force of re- the report presents the results of research search that had been conducted on behalf obviously contradicting the usual anti-cult of the commission and that, therefore, could stereotypes, even if it avoids drawing too not simply be ignored. Particularly two much attention to these findings. Thus, the social scientific studies produced results SPD faction did not succeed in using the rethat were disturbing, because they chal- port to present its own alarmist version of lenged the prevailing picture of dangerous the sect problem. Strangely, they realized sects of the majority. One comprehensive their failure only when the draft of the genstudy on the social and psychological ef- eral conclusion was discussed. Although the fects of membership in new religious move- text (chapter 6.1) stresses the problems and ments was reduced to little more than conflicts that may arise in connection with one page (to be compared to almost four new religious movements, it avoids dramatipages on ritual child abuse). Furthermore, zation and does not ignore the research findits results are presented in the subjunctive ings. Also, it clearly, if not very prominently, mood, indicating that the commission did states that "[fjrom the perspective of society not identify with it (Deutscher Bundestag, as a whole, the new religious and ideolog1998a, pp. 112-115). In the other case, the ical communities [presently] do not pose a major empirical research project with a threat [danger] to government or society, or book-length report, the "radical" faction (to] any of the relevant domains in society" frankly refused to accept the draft sum- (Deutscher Bundestag, l 998a, p. 284; words marizing the results as part of the com- in brackets from original German). The SPD members rejected this conmission's report. The heated debate finally led to a strange compromise: In the main clusion and presented a minority opinion to text of the Final Report, the results of the this chapter of the report, which is a remarkstudy are presented only in brief (Deutscher able piece of ideological mutter (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 111 f), with reference Bundestag, l 998a, p. 30 I f). It throws off to the appendix, where an extensive sum- all restrictions that the commission had immary is given. Incidentally, this summary posed on itself when it asserted that "the is much longer than the original draft. The Enquete Commission has not endeavored to incident illustrates the sometimes irrational appraise religions or ideologies" (Deutscher forms of conflicts and compromises, which Bundestag, 1998a, p. 19 f). The SPD miexplain many of the inconsistencies of the nority vote does not conceal why it is opposed to new religious movements: "Nureport. From the point of view of political strat- merous new religious and ideological comegy, the government faction in the communities and psychogroups offer deceptive mission was successful. The majority re- or fictitious solutions to the problems faced port undercut the Social Democrats, who by individuals or society as a whole. Involvewere not allowed to gain political credibil- ment in these groups is often synonymous ity as lonely fighters against the danger of with a withdrawal from the political system sects; Although the compromises diminish and real life." And a little later: the value of the report as a piece of transIt is therefore necessary to realize that parent information, they were easily acceptvalues influencing individuals' activities able politically. They also served parts of through new religious and ideological the Christian Democrats' own clientele and

96 communities and psychogroups are a form of political and social protest. In the most extreme cases such values do not coincide either with the predominantly Christian values and standards of our country or with the concepts anchored in the Constitution that have to be defended primarily by political means (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 302).

This text leaves no doubt about the real conflict underlying the passionate opposition to "sects" on the part of these members of the commission: It is an ideological conflict between new religious and ideological communities and, as it were, old ideological communities. Because the SPD minority opinion must be regarded more as a political confession than a conclusion to the commission's findings, it did not receive any attention in the media. The government faction of CDU/CSU and FDP had succeeded in neutralizing the major opposition party. The two members of the Green faction did not support the report of the majority, but presented their own minority report (Deutscher Bundestag, l 998a, pp. 305-370). One reason was the ambiguities that characterize the majority report. Accordingly, our minority report mainly consists in a systematic and often verbatim exposition of the research results that had been presented to the commission. The conclusion drawn from these results is that individual conflicts in connection with new religious movements certainly exist. However, it is emphasized that conflicts are interactive processes, the causes of which usually cannot be attributed to only one side. Furthermore, conflicts are ubiquitous in pluralist societies and do not demand government interference as long as existing laws are not violated. Because no evidence for systematic violations of the law by new religious movements or their members had been found by the commission, it is not justified in regarding them as a danger or a social problem demanding government action. For this reason, our minority opinion

Hubert Seiwert

rejects all recommendations of the majority report demanding new legislation.

THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION The parliament had charged the commission not only to analyze the dangers and problems connected with new religious and ideological communities and to scrutinize the reasons for their supposedly growing membership, but also to draw up recommendations for political actions. Quite early in the deliberations, the majority reached consensus about a number of political measures, including new laws and the extension of the scope of existing laws. Unlike the drafts of the descriptive and analyzing chapters, which occasionally led to heated debates, the recommendations for action were not controversial. Because it was clear that the members of the Green faction would not support any new legislation, they usually abstained from the discussions. The recommendations of the majority were apparently not affected by the results of the inquiry. In fact, they may be said to contradict the statement of the report, that "new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups do not pose a danger to government or society or to any of the relevant domains in society" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 284), for the majority report recommends no less than five new acts and laws (6.2.2.2-6.2.2.6) and in six more cases the extension of the scope of legislation currently in force (6.2.3.1-6.2.3.3, 6.2.3.5, 6.2.3.6, and 6.2.4). Included are: 1. An act establishing a Foundation in the field of "new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups" 2. Introduction of a legal basis for the provision of public funds for private counseling and information centers (i.e., cult-watching organizations)

97


3. An Act Governing Commercial LifeCounseling Services 4. Introduction of responsibility under criminal law for legal entities and associations of persons (including cults and sects) 5. Making the operation of pyramid schemes a criminal offense 6. Including pyramid schemes under general laws concerning financial and insurance services 7. Charging the Federal Administrative Office with responsibility to act as an information and documentation center on "new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups" 8. An amendment to the Associations Act dispensing with the exemption of religious communities from the scope of application (i.e., providing a legal basis for the ban of sects and cults under certain circumstances) and amending the tax law ensuring that only religious organizations showing a modicum of loyalty vis-avis the constitution and the legal system will be recognized as nonprofit organizations for tax purposes 9. Amendment to the Act on NonMedical Practitioners and addition of "healing fraud" as a criminal offense 10. Changing the definition of usury in the criminal law to include the exploitation of psychological predicaments (by cults and sects, as they raise funds) 11. Calling for observation of the Scientology Organization by internal intelligence agencies 12. Calling for establishment of a European information center on "new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups"

introduces and permits direct public funding of private counseling and information centers (Deutscher Bundestag. 1998a, p. 286). Furthermore, indirect funding of private counseling centers should be provided by a foundation to be established (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, pp. 273, 285). Another recommendation deserving comment concerns the systematic observation of sects and psychogroups. A separate provision in the Act on the Establishment of the Federal Administrative Office is demanded to charge the office with the responsibility "(t]o collect and evaluate materials which are important for the development in the field of 'new religious and ideological communities and psychogroups,' including organizations or associations which are linked to such communities or groups, either legally and commercially or in terms of their religious or ideological objectives" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a. p. 288). It is difficult to understand how a commission with a considerable number of lawyers and judges among its members can demand the systematic collection of data about individuals and organizations selected exclusively with regard to their religious or ideological orientation. The same report that two pages earlier states that new religious and ideological communities pose no dangers to the government or society (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a, p. 284) now wants a federal agency"[ t]o publish information leaflets and other materials to educate the public at large and professionals in the field as to the (dangers] in the field of 'new religious and ideological communities and pychogroups'" (Deutscher Bundestag, l 998a, p. 288; English translation has "hazards" instead of "dangers," as in original).

THE AFTERMATH It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze these recommendations in detail. One of the more important points is the call to adopt a legal regime that explicitly

The Final Report was officially published on 9 June 1998. Ten days later, the spokespersons of the parties presented their positions

98 during a plenary session of the Bundestag (cf. Deutscher Bundestag, 1998d, p. 2452 ff). Reactions in the media were short and concentrated on the central statement that sects in general were not considered as a danger by the commission, which for the journalists was the main message of the official press release. Some critics attacked the minority opinion of the Green Party for having failed to join the lines against the invisible danger. Then the sect hysteria of the 1990s was over. In fall 1998, the federal elections brought a new government coalition of SPD and the Green Party. The agreements of the coalition do not mention the "sect problem" or the recommendations of the enquete commission. It was a commission the 13th Bundestag and the 14th Bundestag does not seem to be eager to put it on the agenda again. As of fall 1999, none of the proposed political and legislative measures have been tackled, but the enquete commission's report was once again a topic of discussion in the Bundastag in January 2000, but with no action taken at the time of this writing. For those who had hoped to utilize the enquete commission to make available public resources to combat new religious and ideological communities, it was a failure. In spite of the deficiencies that its Final Report certainly has, it contributed to a more rational and less emotional attitude towards new religious movements in Germany. How long this will prevail remains to be seen.

ADDENDUM: MAY 2002 Two years after the present chapter was written it is possible to assess more clearly the effects of the Enquete Commission. With regard to the media it is still true that public attention to new and alternative religions has almost disappeared. This may, however, be due to the change in government in 1998 that brought about new political themes to fill the papers. In any case, the anti-cult lobby did

Hubert Seiwert

not succeed in bringing the theme back to public attention. One interesting observations is that the change in government did not significantly affect government policy. The major opposition party still criticizes the government for not taking legislative measures to protect the population against dangers thought to be caused by sects and cults. What has changed is that the major opposition party now is the former government party and vice versa. In March 2002 there was a debate in the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) about implementation of recommendations that the Commission had made in its Final Report (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002, pp. 22557-22562, 22579 f). The spokesman of the government party (SPD) listed three points to show that the government had not been inactive. One was a program to qualify existing counseling institutions for dealing with cases related to sects and cults. Another was an amendment to the Civil Code (Burger!iches Gesetzbuch, BGB) that forbids corporal punishment in the education of children (§ 1631 BGB). This rule, of course, does not specify religious communities. Its being mentioned in this context reflects the opinion that corporal punishment of children is common in some minority religions. The most important point was an amendment to the Associations Act (Vereinsgesetz), which implements of one of the Enquete Commission's recommendations. The law allows the government to ban associations under certain specified conditions, such as criminal objectives or activities contradicting the constitutional order and the idea of international understanding. Until November 2001 religious associations were exempted from this provision i.e., it was impossible to ban them. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th the government took the opportunity to change the law. The new provisions were applied almost immediately to ban an Islamic community in Cologne on the charge of promoting hate against the Jews and Israel and aiming at


founding an Islamist state. Understandably, this ban was welcomed by the public in a situation when the fight against Islamist terrorism had high priority. The implications of the new law when applied to other religious associations were never discussed, although in the parliamentary debate the Scientology organization was mentioned as a possible target. Although the Associations Act does not entitle the government to ban religious (or other) associations at will and there always is the possibility to appeal against a ban, it cannot be denied that the new law changes the status of religions in the German legal system. The new law reinforces an already existing tendency of having two classes of religious communities with unequal rights. On the one hand there are religions that are juristic persons as associations, which at least in principle can be banned. This applies to all new religions and most religious minorities. On the other hand there are the traditional Christian churches and Jewish communities, which are corporations by public law and cannot be banned. These legal distinctions appear to be of little significance in practice. However, they introduce a two-class system of religions, which promotes the idea that only religious communities with corporate status are "recognized" religions. Actually, the German legal system has no provisions for the "recognition" of religions, but granting or denying the status of corporation by public law now has almost the same function. It is against this background that a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in December 2000 gains high significance. The community of Jehovah's Witnesses had appealed to the court because it was denied the status of corporation by public law. The case has a long history that started when in 1993 the State Government of Berlin refused to grant this status to Jehovah's Witnesses (Besier & Besier, 2000). While to lower courts decided in favor of the Witnesses, the Federal Administrative Court

99 supported the State Government's view. The central argument was that Jehovah's Witnesses do not allow their members to participate in public elections. Since the legitimacy of the State rests on democratic elections, it was argued that the Witnesses' refusal to take part negated and undermined this legitimacy (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 1997, pp. 15--17). This judgment was quashed by the Federal Constitutional Court because the argument has no legal basis and contradicts the constitution, for there are no provisions demanding religious communities support the existing political system. Since all religions have equal rights and Jehovah's Witnesses fulfill the formal requirements for being granted corporate status, denying it on these grounds is unconstitutional. However, the court left it open whether there might be other reasons to deny it, and the case was referred back to the lower courts (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2000). The case is symptomatic of tension between the legal and the political systems. The constitution secures the equality of all religions, including new and minority religions. In the political arena, however, there are considerable reservations against religious communities labeled as "sects" and "cults." The reluctance of the federal administration to take legislative measures seems to be caused primarily by former court decisions that narrowed the margin for political action. In any case, constitutional restrictions are more important than the aftereffect of the Enquete Commission. In fact, most speakers in the parliamentary debate of March 2002 conveyed the impression that they have only read the report's recommendations for action and reproduced the same stereotypes as five years before. This may disillusion those who believed in the rationality of politicians. They can find consolation from the fact that the fight against sects and cults does not attract any more the attention of the public and is fuelled more by the personal warfare of some lobbyists than

100 by a general climate of religious intolerance in Germany.

NOTES l. The accusations against me were reported in major German newspapers (e.g., Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 21.11.96, "Streitiiber Sachverstandige"; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21.11.96, "Streit belastet Arbeit der Enquete-Kommission"; Berliner Zeitung, 21.11.96, "Interner Streit gefahrdet Arbeit der Sekten-Kommission"; Leipziger Volksz.eitung, 23./24.11.96, "Krach in der ektenkommissionMitglieder in Scientology-Verdacht?" Cf. also Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 23./24.11.96, p. 8, "Interview mit dem Religionswissenschaftler Hubert Seiwert." 2. "Neuere religiose und weltanschauliche Bewegungen, sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen" (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996b). The translation of "weltanschaulich" (referring to Weltanschauung) is difficult. The English translation of the Final Report usually renders it as "ideological," which is a possible translation. However, in German there is a difference between weltanschaulich and ideologisch, the latter having negative connotations. The issue is of juridical significance because religiOse und weltanschauliche Bekenntnisse ("religious and worldview confessions") enjoy equal protection by the Constitution (Art. 4 of Grundgesetz). The same does not apply to "ideological" confessions or movements.

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101 evangelischen Zentra/stellefiir Weltanschauungsfragen, 61, 129-136. Niichtem, M. ( 1997). Zuviel der Ehre, Materialdienst der evangelischen Zentralstelle furWeltanschauungsfragen 60: 65. Seiwert, H. ( 1999). Der Staal als religioser Parteigiinger? Zu den Widerspriichlichkeiten des Mehrheitsberichtes der deutschen EnqueteKommission. In G. Besier, & E. K. Scheuch, (Eds.), Die 11eue11 lnquisitoren. Religionsfreiheit und Glaubensneid, Edition Interfrom, Ziirich, Vol. l, 340-359.