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Social Identity Precursors to the Hostile Media Phenomenon: Partisan Perceptions of Coverage of the Bosnian Conflict Kimberly Matheson and Sanela Dursun Group Processes Intergroup Relations 2001 4: 116 DOI: 10.1177/1368430201004002003 The online version of this article can be found at: http://gpi.sagepub.com/content/4/2/116

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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2001 Vol 4(2) 116–125

Social Identity Precursors to the Hostile Media Phenomenon: Partisan Perceptions of Coverage of the Bosnian Conflict Kimberly Matheson and Sanela Dursun Carleton University Perceptions of bias in an impartial media have been consistently documented among partisan audiences. It is argued that this phenomenon is grounded in the processes associated with a group identity that evoke cognitive differentiation between the in-group and the out-group and motivate in-group bias. Bosnian Serb and Muslim partisans and a group of nonpartisan controls responded to media coverage of the 1994 Sarajevo market bombing. Results indicated a strong hostile media effect. This effect was associated with in-group identification and cognitive differentiation between groups, the latter of which appeared to mediate the effect of identification. The extent to which the hostile media effect is a mechanism for enhancing a positive and distinct in-group identity was further supported by self-serving perceptions concerning which group was responsible for the bombing. It was suggested that the hostile media phenomenon reflects a form of in-group bias.

keywords cognitive differentiation, group identification, hostile media phenomenon

I T H A S B E E N widely held that the mass media plays a key role in political propaganda. Nations in turmoil have been known to actively control and subvert the public media in order to restrict and/or convey a particular stance on news stories that are viewed as controversial. While most people recognize that such stories are likely biased (Gunther, 1992), they nonetheless believe that the general public is naïve enough to be swayed by such media portrayals (Davison, 1983; Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1995; Price, 1989). Relatedly, partisan parties lacking political influence attribute hostile motives to the media,

and are likely to perceive bias in favor of the opposition even when the media has been objectively balanced in its coverage, a reaction that has been termed the ‘hostile media phenomenon’ (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985).

Author’s note Address correspondence to Kimberly Matheson, Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1S 5B6. [email: [email protected]]

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Vallone et al. (1985) noted that a substantial body of research has shown that evaluations of social information can be distorted by preconceived theories and beliefs. However, the majority of this research indicates that partisans will interpret inconclusive information as consistent with their own position, that is, they display a confirmator y bias. In spite of this research, anecdotal evidence suggested that perceptions of the media were an exception to the rule, leading Vallone et al. (1985) to empirically document that members of partisan groups do indeed perceive a hostile bias in news coverage that nonpartisans find balanced and objective. Vallone et al. showed that activists from opposing groups (pro-Israeli vs. pro-Arab) who viewed identical segments of television network news coverage of the 1982 Beirut massacre both perceived the coverage to be negatively biased against their own group. This phenomenon has been replicated in both experimental (GinerSorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Perloff, 1989) and survey research (Duck et al., 1995; Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1998; Gunther, 1992). Researchers have attempted to identify the factors that contribute to the hostile media phenomenon (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Gunther, 1992; Perloff, 1989; Vallone et al., 1985). Vallone et al. (1985) suggested that the same cognitive propensities that hostile media perceptions appear to contradict may be the basis for their existence. More specifically, through a process of biased assimilation, partisans are more likely to assimilate and accept at face value information that is supportive of their position, but to critically scrutinize information that threatens their position (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Because partisans have processed information in this way, there is repeated confirmation that the majority of evidence is in fact favorable to their own position (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Lord et al., 1979). As a result, when media coverage does not reflect this perceived preponderance of evidence, it is regarded as biased, and the objectivity unwarranted. Thus, partisans apply different standards for evaluating the objectivity of the coverage (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Vallone et al., 1985).

Given that the phenomenon appears to be unique to the media, Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994) further suggest that individuals may regard messages as biased because they hold an a priori belief that the media in general is biased, and they have no reason to believe that any specific coverage of events should be any different. Using a similar paradigm to Vallone et al. (1985), Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken found that, consistent with the differential standards explanation, partisans were more likely to judge the news coverage as biased. Moreover, prior beliefs about media bias exerted an independent effect on judgments of bias, suggesting that such judgments simply reflect the use of cognitive heuristics. However, Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken’s replication of the hostile media effect itself was weak at best. Unlike Vallone et al. (1985), Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken defined partisanship not on the basis of relevant group membership, but rather in terms of participants’ attitudinal propensities to the Westbank issue. Indeed, in a second replication study, Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken adopted a different media topic, namely the issue of abortion, and were unable to document hostile media perceptions among attitudinal partisans. It was suggested that such a definition of partisanship did not reflect sufficient involvement in the issues for participants to be motivated or threatened enough by the coverage to activate attributions of media bias (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). In line with this, Vallone et al. (1985) had previously noted that their early attempts to document hostile media perceptions had perhaps been disappointing because the participants were intellectually and emotionally uninvolved in the issues they had presented. They proceeded to demonstrate that among their partisan participants, those who were more knowledgeable, and rated themselves as higher in emotional involvement and concern were most inclined to view the media as biased against their group. The role of involvement has been stressed in several studies. Operationalizations of involvement have been primarily in terms of group identification (e.g. Gunther, 1992; Perloff, 1989), in that greater identification with a group presumably entails greater involvement

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with group relevant issues, and so a greater sensitivity to information that is discrepant with the group’s position. Consistent with this, group members who identify strongly with the relevant group identity are more likely to display the hostile media effect than members of the group who do not have a strong identity (Duck et al., 1998; Gunther, 1992; Perloff, 1989). Price (1989) argued that media coverage of events that involve conflict between groups or factions is particularly likely to evoke relevant social identities among audience members, and thereby lead to attributing a hostile bias to media coverage that is inconsistent with their group’s position. Similarly, Duck et al. (1998) showed that the hostile media effect was a function of threat to the group’s positive status. More specifically, group members who identified with a subordinate, rather than dominant, group were more likely to perceive media bias, particularly under conditions in which their status had the potential for change in a positive direction. This suggests that such perceptions are associated with the competitive strategy that subordinate groups adopt to achieve a positive and distinct social status. These findings are consistent with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and relatedly, Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). These theories claim that individuals categorize themselves as members of social groups. How group members respond to their social categorization is motivated by a need to derive a positive and distinct social identity (Abrams, 1992; Abrams & Hogg, 1988). As a result, when a social identity is salient, particularly in a competitive intergroup context, ingroup members are cognitively perceived to be similar on group-relevant dimensions, and to be distinct from individuals who do not belong to the category (Turner et al., 1987). These processes are at the base of group members’ tendency to display group-enhancing behaviors, or in-group bias (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Consistent with this, when an identity is made salient, the associated cognitive differentiation between groups may motivate perceptions of impartial media coverage as reflecting a hostile

bias, because such coverage is inconsistent with a portrayal of the in-group as positively distinct from the out-group.

The present study While past research has examined the role of group identification in the hostile media phenomenon, the present study extends that research by assessing whether the cognitive differentiation that highlights in-group similarities and distinctiveness from the out-group mediates the effects of group identification on perceptions of media bias. Consistent with Vallone et al. (1985) and others examining perceptions of the media, partisan identities were defined in relation to membership in conflicting groups. In the present study, partisan participants were recent Bosnian Serb and Muslim immigrants to Canada from the former Yugoslavia. With the collapse of Communism in 1989–90, competing national regimes came to power in most Yugoslav Republics. However, both Serbia and Croatia, driven by territorial ambition, used the mass media to inspire and provoke nationalistic fears and hatred. The development of a Muslim political party in Bosnia in 1990 was primarily a response to Croat and Serb aggressiveness. In an attempt to retain its multicultural identity, in February 1992, Bosnians voted to become an independent state; or more accurately, Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted for independence, as many Serbs followed the call of their leaders to boycott the vote. Serb leaders argued that the Muslims were trying to create an Islamic state in which Serbs, as a minority, would be persecuted to the point of genocide. With the backing of the Serbian government in Belgrade, the Bosnian Serb leaders demanded the establishment of a separate Serb republic on Bosnian territory, and by the end of April 1992, Serbs were seizing territory throughout Bosnia. The Bosnian slaughter had begun; Serbs and Muslims were openly at war. Bosnian Serbs and Muslims remain antagonistic groups to this day. In relating the war, completely different versions of the events were presented to the Yugoslavian public, depending on which

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national paper was conveying the story. Even scholars, driven by nationalist ardor, invented theories, exaggerated historical claims, and defined the heroes and villains along nationalist lines (Mojsez, 1994). Given this context, it should not be surprising to find that groups will perceive the media in general to be negatively biased against their own group. Moreover, to the extent that any specific coverage elicits processes associated with intergroup conflict, the coverage will be similarly viewed as biased. In sum, it was expected that partisan group members’ in-group identification would be made salient by media coverage of the intergroup conflict. Because such identification should evoke processes of cognitive differentiation between groups, partisan members would be motivated to view the in-group as distinctly positive from the outgroup. As a result, impartial media coverage that does not convey this bias would be viewed as hostile.

Method Participants Three groups of participants (N = 90) were included. The two groups of partisan participants were Muslims (n = 30) and Serbs (n = 30) living in Canada, that had emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina within the past six years. All of the participants had been adults living in the former Yugoslavia prior to the conflict. To recruit participants, a snowball technique was used, beginning with acquaintances of one of the authors whose own identity could be tied to either group due to her mixed marriage. As well, participants were recruited through announcements placed throughout a university campus and in relevant community centers (e.g. immigrant organizations). The partisan samples ranged in age from 23 to 52, and included 36 male and 24 female respondents. The third group of participants were nonpartisan controls (n = 30) recruited from introductor y psychology classes on the basis of self-reporting a lack of any personal connection to the former Yugoslavia. This group was somewhat younger (ages ranged from 18 to 26), although it was comparable in terms of sex breakdown (18 men and 12 women).

Procedure Participants were informed that the study concerned the media coverage of the conflict in Bosnia. They were run in small groups of three to six respondents that were homogeneous with respect to ethnic group membership. All materials had been translated into Serbo-Croatian to allow participants to complete the study in their language of choice. Before reading the media reports, partisan groups completed a measure of in-group identification. Participants then read two stimulus newspaper articles in random order. These articles concerned the 1994 bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace that killed 68 people. The primary focus of the articles was to convey that officials had been unable to determine who was responsible for the attack, the Serbs or Muslims. The first article, titled ‘UN can’t prove that Muslims have attacked their own’ cites United Nations (UN) officials arguing that the UN representatives in Sarajevo were unable to pinpoint the origin of the mortar shell. This article primarily relied on citing opposing opinions concerning the accusation that the ‘Muslims staged atrocities against their own people to gain international sympathy’ (Traynor, 1994, p. A6). The second article, titled ‘UN team can’t pin massacre on Serbs’ artillery: Muslim-led Bosnian army accused of staging shelling that killed 68’ covers the same incident, but provides more technical details regarding the UN investigation. It too cites UN officials who explain why they were unable to determine which side fired the mortar bomb (Washington Post, 1994). Both articles were selected based on a pilot study indicating that they were viewed by an independent nonpartisan sample as unbiased in their treatment of Muslims and Serbs. After reading each article, participants rated the perceived bias. Finally, a measure of intergroup differentiation was completed. Measures Group identification Partisan participants’ identification with their respective groups was assessed using a modified version of Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams (1986) group identification scale, adapted to reflect the Serb or Muslim categories. This scale consisted

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of 10 items (5 positively stated, and 5 negatively stated) reflecting awareness of group membership (e.g. ‘I identify with the Serb/Muslim nationality’), and affect in relation to their group membership (e.g. ‘I am glad that I belong to the Serb/Muslim national group’). Responses were on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). Ratings on negative items were recoded so that higher responses indicated stronger identification, and were averaged to create a single index of identification (Cronbach’s  = .83).1 Cognitive differentiation Partisan participants rated the extent of perceived similarity of members of their own nationality to one another on a series of 12 attributes (e.g. polite, lazy, aggressive) and 14 values (e.g. social justice, loyal to the nation) using a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1 (low degree of similarity) to 7 (high degree of similarity). Next, perceptions of similarity of members of their own group to members of the other nationality were assessed by the same items. For each item, scores on both measures of perceived in-group and intergroup variability were recoded such that higher scores reflected higher perceptions of in-group and intergroup differences (Turner et al., 1987). Ratios were then computed for each item by dividing perceptions of intergroup differences by perceptions of in-group differences. Finally, a mean score for each participant was calculated by taking a mean of these ratios (Cronbach’s  = .97). Observed mean scores ranged from .54 to 7.00, with higher ratios corresponding to greater differentiation between the in-group and the out-group than within the in-group. Perceptions of media coverage A revised version of the questionnaire developed by Vallone et al. (1985) was used to elicit perceptions of bias in the newspaper articles. In addition to the item dealing with overall bias (‘The overall tone of this article is . . .’), specific items asking participants to judge each on the relative number and strength of the arguments presented, and the ‘personal views of the editors of this article’ were included. Partisan participants also indicated their opinion on whether ‘after reading this

article initially neutral viewers would become more biased,’ their opinion of bias in the Western media in general, and who, in their opinion they thought was ‘responsible for the attack’ described in the media clippings. All of these items were responded to on 7-point scales (from 3 to 3), where the negative pole represented favoritism toward Serbs and the positive pole represented favoritism toward Muslims (with the midpoint favoring neither).

Results Descriptives To assess whether Serb or Muslim participants differed systematically on the social identity variables, mean reported levels were compared. Serbs and Muslims reported similar levels of identification with their groups (M = 3.82; SD = .79)(F < 1). However, the groups differed in the levels of cognitive differentiation (F(1, 58) = 5.59, p < .05; 2 = .09), such that Serbs differentiated less between the groups (M = 2.06; SD = 1.17) than did Muslims (M = 2.92; SD = 1.61). Perceived media bias To assess whether the hostile media effect was replicated, a 2 (article)  3 (group: Serb, Muslim, vs. nonpartisan) mixed-measures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the four items assessing participants’ perceptions of whether the articles were slanted in favor of either of the two nationalist groups. Only the main effect for group was significant (Pillais = .385; F(8, 170) = 5.06, p < .001; 2 = .192). Neither the main effect for article nor the twoway interaction was significant (F s < 1). As can be seen in Table 1, all of the univariate effects were significant. Follow-up pairwise comparisons (using Tukey’s correction to maintain family-wise error at p < .05) indicated that, consistent with the hostile media phenomenon, both Serbs and Muslims perceived the articles to be biased, relative to each other and to the nonpartisan group, in that both partisan groups viewed the articles as biased against their own group. As well, in contrast to the nonpartisan control group t-tests indicated that the perceptions of both Serbs and Muslims differed significantly from 0 (ps < .05) on all four variables,

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for perceptions of media bias Serbs Item Overall tone Editorial bias Argument strength Argument number

Nonpartisans

Muslims

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

.38a .30a .45a .38a

1.01 .69 1.04 1.02

.28b .38b .18b .17a

.92 .82 .81 .93

1.27c .98c 1.03c 1.23b

1.17 .98 1.11 1.19

F (2, 87) 19.22*** 24.74*** 16.74*** 18.20***

*** p < .001. Note : Ratings ranged from 3 (Biased against Muslims) to 3 (Biased against Serbs). Means with a common subscript within the same row fail to differ from each other at p < .05 (with Tukey’s correction).

confirming that each perceived the media to be hostile against their own group. In light of the further finding that Serb participants were more likely to believe that the Muslims were responsible for the market bombing (M = 1.60; SD = 1.28), whereas the Muslim participants reported believing that the Serbs were responsible (M = 2.13; SD = 1.55), (F(1, 58) = 103.94, p < .001; 2 = .642), it is not surprising that the partisan groups perceived the noncommittal newspaper coverage as being biased in favor of the opposing group. Moreover, both Serb (M = 2.50; SD = .86) and Muslim (M = 1.40; SD = 1.33) participants believed the Western media in general to be biased in favor of the out-group, (F(1, 58) = 182.02, p < .001; 2 = .758), and that a neutral third person would be influenced after reading the article, such that the Serbs believed that nonpartisans would become more pro-Muslim (M = .57; SD = .98), whereas Muslims believed they would become more pro-Serb (M = .97; SD = 1.28)(F(1, 58) = 27.15, p < .001; 2 = .319).

Perceptions of media bias as an in-group bias Correlation and regression analyses were conducted on the responses of the partisan groups to assess the pattern of relations between identification, cognitive differentiation and the hostile media phenomenon. Perceptions of bias in the stimulus articles were reduced to a single score by taking the average across the two articles for all items, and then taking the mean across the four items (Cronbach’s  = .96). Perceptions were further recoded such that high scores for all participants reflected greater perceptions that the media was biased in favor of the out-group and the out-group was more responsible for the bombing. Pearson correlations indicated that general beliefs of Western media bias and perceptions of bias in the stimulus articles were unrelated (see Table 2). Indeed, it appears that these two indicators of perceived media bias showed a somewhat different pattern of relations with the social identity variables. As can be seen in Table 3, when perceptions of bias in the articles were

Table 2. Pearson correlations among social identity variables and perceptions of the media event and coverage Identity Identity Cognitive differentiation Out-group as responsible Hostile media bias Western media bias

–.53*** .47*** .35** .63***

Cognitive differentiation

Out-group as responsible

Hostile media bias

–.45*** .51*** .41***

–.43*** .17

–.05

** p < .01; *** p < .001.

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Table 3. Regression coefficients predicting perceptions of media bias

Article bias Identification Cognitive differentiation Western media bias Identification Cognitive differentiation

r

B

.35** .51***

.11 .45***

.63*** .41**

.57*** .11

Unique variance explained .240*** .008 .144*** .380*** .230*** .009

** p < .01; *** p < .001.

regressed onto identification and cognitive differentiation scores, only cognitive differentiation scores significantly predicted perceptions of bias.2 Given that identification and cognitive differentiation were also significantly correlated, this would suggest that the relation between identification and perceived bias was mediated by the extent of cognitive differentiation. Consistent with the notion that the hostile media phenomenon is a mechanism for enhancing the in-group identity, such perceptions were significantly related to the belief that the other group was responsible for the event. In contrast, beliefs about bias in the Western media in general were primarily associated with identification with the in-group, as when they were regressed onto identification and cognitive differentiation, only identification directly predicted greater beliefs of bias. These beliefs about general media bias were not significantly related to perceptions of which group was responsible for the attack.

Discussion Past researchers have argued that the hostile media phenomenon is a group-based response stemming from individuals’ identification with a partisan group. In line with this, partisan participants in the present study were found to clearly demonstrate the hostile media phenomenon. Whether assessed in terms of the Western media in general, or the media’s coverage of a specific event, partisan participants perceived the media’s treatment of their group to be negatively biased. In contrast, nonpartisan participants did not perceive the media coverage to be particularly biased against either of the groups,

and indeed, unlike the groups examined by Vallone et al. (cf. Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Perloff, 1989), there did not appear to be objective support for the beliefs of bias demonstrated by either partisan group. Despite the impartiality perceived in the articles by the nonpartisans, both the Serb and Muslim groups showed evidence of the thirdperson effect, that is, the belief that in reading the articles, a neutral audience would be swayed in favor of the opposing group. This perception appears to be a consistent corollar y of the hostile media phenomenon (Duck et al., 1995, 1998; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Perloff, 1989; Vallone et al., 1985). Indeed, it has been argued that perceptions of the media’s influence on other readers are a group-based phenomenon as well. In particular, Duck et al. (1995, 1998) demonstrated that group members perceived the general public and out-group members to be more affected by biased media content than in-group members, and that perceptions of the differential influence on ingroup versus out-group members was associated with individuals’ strength of group identification. Duck et al. (1995) argued that perceptions of the reduced vulnerability of in-group members is consistent with a reaction motivated by a social identity in that it preserves in-group members’ self-identity as positive and distinct. It was also hypothesized that exposure to the media coverage of the conflict would evoke identity-based cognitive processes that reflected perceptions of the in-group as positive and distinct, and these factors in turn would motivate perceptions of a hostile media. Consistent with these expectations, the effects of identification

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on perceptions of the media coverage in the articles as hostile were mediated by participants’ level of cognitive differentiation. Moreover, both of these processes were associated with perceptions that the other group was most responsible for the bombing. Taken together, this would suggest that participants’ perceptions of who is the villain and who is the victim stem from the motivation to distinguish between the in-group and out-group in such a way as to reinforce a positive and distinct ingroup identity. It might be argued that the significant relations between cognitive differentiation and attributions of responsibility for the reported incident with media perceptions was due to a measurement artifact, in that these variables were both assessed following exposure to the media coverage whereas identity was assessed prior to it. This order of measurement made conceptual sense given that cognitive differentiation is a function of a social context that makes a group identity salient. However, if the relationship had been a mere measurement artifact, the same pattern of relations should be evident in predictions of a bias in the Western media, as this too was measured following exposure to the media coverage. This was not case. Media propaganda in the former Yugoslavia has been viewed as one of the most important weapons of war (Shawcross, 1994). Given this, perceptions of bias in the articles could simply reflect a more general perception of media bias. However, in the present study these perceptions were unrelated. This finding was not only unexpected, but differs from those of Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1994). It is possible that the relation between these perceptions is more relevant in response to attitudinally based issues as opposed to issues that make salient processes associated with intergroup conflict. Had the issue not been as personally involving, it may not have evoked the defensive processes to protect the group identity. This possibility would be consistent with Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken’s inability to document a strong hostile media bias among participants who were selected on the basis of attitudinal propensities as opposed to group membership.

The present research clearly supports the notion that hostile media perceptions reflect group-based processes, and in particular reflect a form of in-group bias. Media coverage of the intergroup conflict evoked a social identity that individuals were motivated to protect, and they did so through a set of cognitive processes that motivated them to reject the validity of media coverage that was not consistent with an ingroup bias. However, it is clear that the social identity processes that were implicated depend on the level of analysis of perceptions of media bias; more general perceptions were better predicted by more stable individual difference indicators of identity, whereas perceptions of specific media coverage were a direct function of cognitive processes that were situationally invoked, namely intergroup differentiation. Greater consideration needs to be given to these different levels of assessing media bias, particularly given their interchangeable use as outcome indicators of a hostile media effect across the literature. The vast majority of research on the hostile media phenomenon has pertained to media coverage of events entailing intergroup conflict and controversy. It is this competitive interaction that is argued to encourage a social identity and the ensuing processes and reactions (Duck et al., 1998; Price, 1989). Indeed, such conflict is regularly carried out in the mass media, whether it pertains to conflicts between nations, political parties, or even unions and management. Under these circumstances, it appears that no matter how impartial the media coverage, it is viewed with mistrust and hostility. However, the media is not always a tool of war; it may also be used as a tool for the negotiation of peace, as a conveyer of compromise, concession-making, and mutually beneficial solutions. The present research suggests that such coverage may be regarded with equal suspicion, thereby serving to undermine the peace-making process. However, reactions to such coverage have not been explored. A more comprehensive approach to the role of the media in intergroup relations is clearly an important direction for future research.

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Notes 1. The item ‘I make excuses for belonging to the Muslim/Serb nationality’ could not be translated, and so was not included. It was replaced with ‘I feel that it puts me at a disadvantage to belong to the Muslim/Serb nationality’. However, inter-item reliabilities indicated that this item (when recoded) was negatively related to the total scale score, and so was eliminated from the final index. 2. To ensure that a moderating effect was not an appropriate consideration, the interaction effect between identification and cognitive differentiation was assessed in hierarchical regressions. This effect was not significant for either perceptions of bias in the articles (F < 1), nor beliefs about Western media bias (F (1, 56) = 2.24, ns). The interactive effects of national group membership were similarly examined, and found to be nonsignificant for both media bias outcome variables (F s < 1), suggesting that the pattern of relations was the same for both partisan groups.

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social identity precursors to the hostile media phenomenon

Paper received 18 August 1999; revised version accepted 19 September 2000.

Biographical notes is an Associate Professor in Social Psychology at Carleton University. Her

K I M B E R L Y M AT H E S O N

research interests include social identity and its effect on collective consciousness and action. S A N E L A D U R S O N was a graduate student in Social Psychology at Carleton University. Her research interests include self-esteem and its relation to social identity among members of nationalist groups.

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