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Introduction: Negotiation in intergroup conflict Stéphanie Demoulin and Carsten K.W. de Dreu Group Processes Intergroup Relations 2010 13: 675 DOI: 10.1177/1368430210379462 The online version of this article can be found at: http://gpi.sagepub.com/content/13/6/675

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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(6) 675–683 © The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermission.nav DOI: 10.1177/1368430210379462 gpir.sagepub.com

Introduction: Negotiation in intergroup conflict Stéphanie Demoulin1 and Carsten K.W. de Dreu2

Abstract Although conflicts most often occur between groups, research and theory on conflict management and negotiation have largely focused on the interpersonal system and ignored how groups negotiate a solution to their intergroup conflict. Thus we have a thorough understanding of the motivational, cognitive, and affective processes underlying the development of high quality solutions in interpersonal negotiation, but we know little about the extent to which these insights can be comfortably generalized to intergroup settings. Likewise, the large volume of work on intergroup perceptions and intergroup relations has much to say about intergroup negotiation, but these research areas have rarely been connected and produced systematic analysis. The current Special Issue presents research on these topics and aims at promoting cross-talk between negotiation researchers and social psychologists in the intergroup relation domain. Keywords conflict, intergroup processes, mixed-motive interdependence, negotiation, social identity

In 1995, Ayres and Siegelman published a fascinating study about car dealers’ offers and bargaining behaviors as a function of potential buyers’ gender and race. Data from more than 300 paired-audits in which buyers were trained to use identical scripted bargaining strategies strikingly demonstrated that women and African Americans start off negotiations from a much less favorable position than Caucasian males, and consequently obtain much less favorable outcomes. The mean level of a car dealer’s profit at the end of the negotiation was more than three times bigger when the buyer was a male African American than a male Caucasian. Clearly then, a negotiator’s group membership and associated intergroup processes play a significant, sometimes dramatic, role in negotiation behaviors and outcomes.

Despite the prevalence of intergroup negotiations in everyday life, traditional empirical research in the social psychology of negotiation typically focuses on individual processes and interpersonal dynamics (for reviews, see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007).

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Université catholique de Louvain University of Amsterdam

Corresponding author: Stéphanie Demoulin, Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Social Behavior, Université catholique de Louvain, 10, Place Cardinal Mercier, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. [email: [email protected]]


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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(6)

Outside social psychology, intergroup perspectives on negotiations are more common, for example, in disciplines such as law, economics, business, and anthropology (e.g., Friedman, 1994; Kelman, 2008; Walton & McKersie, 1965). The latter literatures, however, are often grounded in comparative and descriptive case analyses that, although rich and colorful, do not allow finegrained understanding of mediating psychological mechanisms and causal processes. Over the years, scholars have developed a thorough understanding of the motivational, cognitive and affective processes underlying the development of high quality solutions in interpersonal negotiation (De Dreu et al., 2007). With regard to intergroup settings, however, two critical issues remain. First, little is known about the extent to which insights from interpersonal negotiation can be safely generalized to intergroup settings, in which groups or their representatives negotiate to strike deals or resolve their conflicts—for example, do partner characteristics, or representatives’ personalities, influence intergroup negotiations in similar ways as they influence interpersonal exchanges? Put differently, we know very little about the ‘top-down’ effects of intergroup relations on the psychological processes involved when people negotiate between groups, and how this affects behavioral exchange and the quality of negotiated agreements. Second, although scores of researchers have devoted their careers to the study of intergroup relations and intergroup conflict (for a review, see Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010), negotiations have too rarely been directly considered in empirical studies as a strategy for the improvement of intergroup relations. Put differently, the social psychological literature is relatively silent about the bottom-up influence that interactive processes between negotiating individuals, and ensuing negotiated outcomes, may have on intergroup relations and intergroup conflict. The aim of this special issue of Group Processes and Intergroup Relations on Intergroup Negotiation is to promote interaction and cross-fertilization between two currently relatively distinct areas of social psychology: research on interpersonal negotiation, on the one hand, and work on

intergroup relations and conflict, on the other. Ultimately, such dialogue should allow the development of a multi-level framework; one that documents both top-down influences (from intergroup relations to interpersonal negotiation) and bottom-up processes (from interpersonal negotiation to intergroup relations), and how they drive conflicting groups towards or away from constructive interaction and negotiation. This will help us understand what makes negotiations more or less likely to result in mutually beneficial and satisfactory agreements, and what delineates the long-term consequences of (failure to engage or manage) constructive negotiation. As a first step towards this general aim, this Special Issue contains eight articles all dealing with the topic of intergroup negotiations. The first section contains articles considering the conditions anteceding the emergence of successful intergroup negotiations. Because intergroup conflict can be approached by other means than a constructive discussion between opposing parties, understanding the various variables that may lead to constructive rather than destructive behavior is an essential first step to understanding when and why groups move towards or away from negotiation as a means for solving their conflicts. The second section explores the unfolding of intergroup negotiations. The articles in this section consider different types of intergroup negotiation contexts: solo negotiators with a salient social identity; negotiations occurring between group representatives; and intergroup negotiations involving third-party interventions.

Setting the stage for intergroup negotiations Conflicts often have a mixed-motive nature— parties have incentives to cooperate with each other as well as incentives to compete (Schelling, 1960). Sometimes, competitive incentives take precedence and between-party hostilities emerge; sometimes, cooperative incentives take precedence and constructive between-party negotiations can be established. The latter may happen especially when parties need each other to manage or avert an impending catastrophe, when


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they perceive mutually enticing opportunities, or when they seek a constructive way out of a mutually damaging stalemate (De Dreu, 2010a). Negotiation is a rather constructive, cooperative form of managing (between-group) conflict, and one should explore the intra- and intergroup conditions that drive such a more or less cooperative approach towards the other group. Put differently, uncovering the processes that drive groups and their members toward between-group cooperation sets the stage for between-group negotiations to emerge. Four articles in this Special Issue address this issue. Two articles, by Halevy, Chou, Cohen, and Bornstein (2010), and by De Dreu (2010), examine cooperative tendencies in between-group prisoner dilemma structures. Such structures capture the mixed-motive interdependence underlying negotiation (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) and provide a tool to understand when and why people, alone or in groups, cooperate or not with another individual or group. Halevy and colleagues focus on one critical factor that detracts from between-group cooperation; relative deprivation. These authors employ the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma—Maximizing Difference game (IPD-MD, Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008), which helps disentangle ingroup cooperative from outgroup competitive behaviors. Individuals had to choose between: (1) not contributing and thus preserving their endowment for themselves; (2) making personally costly contributions to a within-group pool that benefits fellow ingroup members (including the contributor); and (3) contributing to a between-group pool that, in addition to benefiting the ingroup, also serves to reduce outgroup members’ gains. Building on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), regulatory focus theory (Higgins (1998), and on research examining legitimacy, fairness, and appropriateness perceptions of motivations and behaviors, Halevy and colleagues propose that intergroup competition is more likely to arise as a consequence of a relative disadvantaged position and the motivation not to fall behind the outgroup than to result from people’s desire to maximize a group’s relative advantage over the outgroup. These propositions were tested

in two experiments. In the first experiment, relative deprivation of one’s ingroup arose as the consequence of (alleged) previous outgroup members’ actions, whereas in a second study the ingroup’s disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the outgroup was attributed to random misfortune. Both studies confirmed that contribution to the between-group pool was greater for relatively deprived as compared to relatively advantaged group members. That is, relatively deprived group members were willing to adopt competitive behaviors towards the outgroup and chose a personally costly strategy that favored the ingroup at the same time as it deprived the outgroup from some resources. It was concluded that relative group outcome is more important than absolute outcomes and that the desire for one’s ingroup not to fall behind the outgroup increases intergroup competition, thereby reducing the chances for effective intergroup negotiations to take place. De Dreu’s (2010) article builds on the Halevy and colleagues’ article and uses the same IPD-MD paradigm to examine how one personality trait oftentimes investigated in interpersonal negotiation, social value orientation (SVO, De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995), impacts cooperative and non-cooperative tendencies in betweengroup conflicts. Doing so, De Dreu departs from a classical focus on intergroup structure as a determinant of intergroup conflict (e.g., Bornstein, 2003; Halevy et al., 2010) and further investigates chronic individual differences that traditionally predict general cooperative tendencies. De Dreu distinguishes pro-social individuals and their chronic orientation to value harmony, fairness, and cooperation from proself individuals whose orientation is directed at power and personal success which leads them to non-cooperation and the exploitation of others. Whereas the tendency for pro-self to display non-cooperative behavior is generalized across conditions, pro-social individuals’ inclination for cooperation is restricted to situations where others can be trusted and expected to cooperate (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Using Halevy et al.’s (2008) experimental game, De Dreu explores the impact of SVO on both ingroup love (i.e., personally costly cooperative


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behaviors that benefit the ingroup) and outgroup hate (i.e., costly behavior that harms the outgroup at the same time as it benefits the ingroup). Replicating earlier results by De Dreu and colleagues (2010), results first revealed that chronic pro-social individuals displayed more ingroup cooperative behaviors than their pro-self counterparts. Adding to this previous work, the current article shows that this effect is largely due to pro-socials placing higher trust in their fellow ingroup members rather than to fairness considerations (which would have potentially led prosocials to cooperate with both ingroup and outgroup members). Second, social value orientations showed no relation to outgroup distrust and outgroup hate. That is, intergroup competitive tendencies did not differ between pro-social and pro-self individuals. De Dreu concludes that social value orientations may play a more significant role in regulating within-group relations than intergroup conflict and competition. Both articles by Halevy et al. and De Dreu reveal critical boundary conditions, situated at the contextual and trait levels, for between-group cooperation and hostilities to emerge, and thus for between-group negotiations to become more or less likely. The next two articles, by Kamans, Otten, Gordijn, and Spears (2010) and by Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, and Petrovic (2010), move away from a game-theoretic approach and examine how socio-emotional tendencies in intergroup conflict drive preferences for various forms of conflict resolution, including constructive negotiation. Kamans and colleagues investigate, for example, how power differentials between groups affect the willingness of group members to engage in constructive interactions, thereby opening up the possibility for mutually beneficial between-group negotiations. In zero-sum situations where one group’s gain implies the other group’s loss, conflicts often escalate, becoming increasingly competitive and hostile, which undermines group members’ propensity to engage in constructive exchange. Although very robust, this phenomenon is by no means inescapable. Kamans and colleagues propose that one group’s power position in the structure as well as the likelihood

for power to determine intergroup outcomes should moderate the adoption of constructive vs. unconstructive conflict behaviors, thereby setting the stage for de-escalation vs. escalation of intergroup conflict. Kamans et al. hypothesized that when power is likely to determine one’s group victory or defeat, powerful group members should anticipate victory, making intergroup conflict less self-relevant, and favoring the adoption of constructive rather than unconstructive forms of conflict management. The reverse pattern was expected for powerless people. The anticipation of defeat by the powerless should render intergroup conflict very self-relevant to them and consequently should trigger the occurrence of unconstructive forms of behavior. In contrast, when the likelihood that power determines intergroup conflict outcome is low, powerful people might feel threatened which would lead them to adopt relatively more unconstructive forms of conflict behaviors than when their future victory is taken for granted. As for the powerless, facing the possibility that defeat is escapable, they should start perceiving opportunities and alternatives to the status quo, which would lead them to challenge the outgroup; employing constructive conflict behaviors so as not to upset the powerful group and waste their opportunities. Intriguingly, then, what Kamans and colleagues’ study shows is that powerful and powerless group members tend to engage in constructive forms of intergroup behaviors under diametrically opposed conditions. This contextual (and maybe temporal) asymmetry is probably not without consequences for intergroup misunderstandings during intergroup encounters and interactions (also see Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2009). Following Kamans and colleagues’ article, Spanovic et al.’s (2010) article addresses the link between group-based emotions and two other forms of conflict management strategy, namely intergroup aggression and intergroup yielding. Although earlier literatures have generally maintained that anger leads to aggression and confrontation, and fear to ‘flight’ responses and avoidance, these authors suggest that, under



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specific circumstances, fear could as well be a precursor of aggression (akin to defensive aggression, De Dreu et al., 2010). In particular, they argue that much of the earlier research on the role of fear in intergroup contexts was based on non-violent conflicts, or focused on emotions experienced as a result of past outgroup attacks rather than in anticipation of future outgroup aggression. Spanovic and colleagues propose that such situations, where conflict is resolved, avoidable, or easy to manage, fear might indeed not be linked to intergroup aggression but suggest that when perception of threat is enhanced because conflict seems unavoidable and future aggression probable, fear would precipitate intergroup aggression. Spanovic and colleagues contrasted in two studies the reactions of Serbs regarding their ingroup’s relationships with Muslims in two countries (Serbia/Kosovo in Study 1 and Bosnia in Study 2). The relationship between Serbs and Muslim Albanians in Serbia is still characterized by instability and uncertainty, whereas the one opposing Serbs to Muslim Bosnians in Bosnia has been stable for more than a decade. The authors expected that fear emotions would be positively related to support for intergroup aggression in the former case and that this relationship would not be present or would be reversed in the latter case. Their hypothesis was supported, and additional analyses revealed that the positive relation between fear and intergroup aggression was mediated by affiliation needs in Study 1. Finally, results of Study 2 further revealed that, when conflict is perceived as resolved or avoidable, the experience of fear strengthens preference for yielding and conciliatory behaviors. Together, the first four articles of this Special Issue highlight how between-group relations along with intra-personal states drive individuals and their groups to adopt a more or less cooperative and constructive approach towards the competing outgroup. As suggested above, cooperative intentions and constructive forms of intergroup behavior set the stage for intergroup negotiation to emerge, which is addressed in our second group of articles in this Special Issue.

The unfolding of intergroup negotiations Addressing actual negotiation, the first article in this second section opens by investigating identitybased intergroup effects in negotiations. Research has shown that intergroup contexts can make negotiations more competitive. Trötschel, Hüffmeier, and Loschelder (2010) build on this research to hypothesize that, in addition to dependencebased mechanisms, identity-based processes also play a role in accentuating the competitiveness of negotiations between groups.. Basing their reasoning on both negotiation research and social identity theory, they predict that the mere activation of group identities is sufficient to elevate competitiveness and to lead negotiators to arrive more frequently at partial impasses (i.e., nonagreements on parts of the total number of issues discussed in a given negotiation). In contrast to previous studies, Trötschel et al.’s approach contrasts the perceptions and behaviors of solo negotiators in intergroup contexts (i.e., where social identities are salient) to the perceptions and behaviors of solo negotiators in interpersonal contexts (i.e., where individual identities are salient). Trötschel and colleagues’ hypothesis was tested in two experiments involving integrative and distributive issues; in Study 1, the issues were intermixed, in Study 2, they were separated across two different negotiation phases. In addition, whereas the first experiment concentrates on perceptions and outcomes for the negotiators, the second study focuses on concession-making behaviors during the process of negotiation. Both studies confirmed the hypothesis that the mere salience of group identity is sufficient to produce heightened levels of competitiveness, lower levels of concessionmaking behaviors, and poorer final outcomes, and that this effect is found irrespective of the task at hand (integrative or distributive) or the type of group under study (real or minimal groups). Their studies point to the importance of considering the impact of social categorization and social identity processes in interpersonal negotiation contexts involving negotiators with a salient group (rather than individual) identity.


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Following Trötschel and colleagues’ findings that social identification is a powerful determinant of the way negotiations unfold, Demoulin and Teixeira (2010) suggest exploring the impact of stereotyping upon the appraisal of negotiation encounters. Their research builds upon the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) developed by Fiske and colleagues in the intergroup relation literature (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). According to SCM, the content of stereotypes varies along two fundamental dimensions of social judgment: competence and warmth. Competence is ascribed as a function of groups’ relative status, whereas warmth assessments depend on perceptions of groups’ competition tendencies. Competence assesses group members’ ability to carry out their intentions and effectively achieve their goals; warmth is related to group members’ intentions to be cooperative or competitive during interactions. Given the high informative potential of competence and warmth judgments for one’s appraisal of an intergroup encounter, Demoulin and Teixeira reasoned that, in a negotiation involving members of different groups, categorization of one’s opponent as a function of his/her social identity should activate the stereotypes linked to that particular identity and, as a consequence, should impact one’s appraisal of the negotiation. In their experiment, Demoulin and Teixeira presented participants with an opposing negotiator belonging to one out of four different groups. Groups were selected to reflect the four quadrants of the SCM (i.e., high status/competition; high status/cooperation; low status/competition; and low status/cooperation). In addition to verifying that the group manipulation indeed impacted participants’ perceptions of the opponent in terms of competence and warmth, the authors investigated the impact of social categorization salience upon three variables of major importance in negotiation research, i.e., participants’ inference of their opponent’s limits and goals, and zerosum perception of the negotiation situation. Consistent with hypotheses, results first revealed that the status of the opponent’s group influences perceptions of the opponent’s limits and

goals, with higher status groups being linked to stricter limits and goals. Second, the opponent’s group’s propensity to compete (vs. cooperate) increased (vs. decreased) perceptions that the negotiation was a zero-sum negotiation. Demoulin and Teixeira end their article by discussing the importance of considering social categorization processes in what appears at first sight to be an interpersonal negotiation. One of the most striking differences between intergroup and interpersonal negotiations is that the former very often take place through intergroup representatives (Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009). According to Steinel, van Kleef, van Knippenberg, Hogg, Homan, and Moffitt (2010), the fact that representatives are involved means that the negotiators’ behavior is not solely influenced by the negotiators’ own dispositions and motivations; it is also influenced by each negotiator’s dynamic relationship with his or her own group.. From this perspective, Steinel and colleagues investigate the combined impact of the representative’s standing within and need to belong to the group on his or her behavioral conformity to ingroup norms during negotiations. Earlier studies have shown that, compared to central/prototypical group members, peripheral members tend to behave more competitively in intergroup negotiations (Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007). Although one could interpret this as a general tendency for peripheral group members to be competitive, Steinel et al. suggest that how peripheral group members respond to their marginal, and thus insecure intragroup status depends on the type of norm that is promoted by the group. Specifically, Steinel and colleagues speculate that earlier findings were due in part to peripheral group members believing that their constituent group favored a competitive approach to negotiations over a more cooperative one. Steinel and colleague hypothesized that by changing the group norm into a more cooperative one, peripheral group members would conform to the norm and display cooperative instead of competitive intergroup negotiation behaviors. In addition,



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they suggest that this effect would be moderated by individual differences in the need to belong to the group—those with a strong need for ingroup acceptance would display more norm-congruent behaviors than those with a low need to belong or to be accepted. These hypotheses were supported. The author’s data speak to the highly sensitive question of who to send to the negotiation table. Although people may prefer prototypical representatives over peripheral ones, the current research points to conditions under which peripheral members may have an advantage in negotiation settings (see also, Teixeira, Demoulin, & Yzerbyt, in press). To the extent that peripheral members are motivated to enhance their position within the group, they will more likely act in accordance with group-normative expectations. We conclude this Special Issue with an article by Loschelder and Trötschel (2010). Confronting the classic observation that intergroup negotiations often lead to more competitive behaviors and interactions than interpersonal ones (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), the authors assess the effectiveness of a hybrid form of third-party intervention in alleviating these detrimental corollaries of negotiation in intergroup contexts. Third-party interventions are classically differentiated into mediation and arbitration. The main difference between the two is the extent of control the third party has over the outcome. Mediation involves lack of control whereas arbitration is characterized by total control. To take advantage of the respective strengths of each approach, some scholars have advocated sequentially combining both approaches into hybrid forms of interventions. Loschelder and Trötschel study the impact of mediation-arbitration interventions (med-arb) on competitive behaviors and partial impasses in intergroup negotiation contexts. In their first study, Loschelder and Trötschel show that, indeed, compared to interindividual negotiations, negotiations involving groups are more competitive and result in more frequent partial impasses. In addition, their study demonstrates that med-arb is a beneficial form of intervention in intergroup settings as it reduces the

number of partial impasses up to the levels obtained in interindividual situations. Their second study goes one step further to show that med-arb interventions are more beneficial than simple mediation in alleviating the detrimental effects that often characterize negotiation in intergroup contexts. Interestingly, the beneficial effect of med-arb interventions appears to be related to disputants’ higher ascription of decision control to the third party, which helps decrease competitive behaviors and, thus reduces partial impasses. Loschelder and Trötschel conclude by advocating the importance of exploring different forms of third-party interventions and other conflict management strategies for the improvement of intergroup negotiations.

Conclusion and further perspectives From a bird’s eye view, the publications in this Special Issue indicate an emerging trend to consider top-down influences on between-group negotiations. Together, the articles reveal much about how within-group dynamics, and betweengroup relations, affect the extent to which negotiations emerge and how they subsequently unfold. This emerging trend also highlights some gaps in our understanding that invite additional research. First, there is exceedingly little research on the longer-term consequences of betweengroup negotiations—how do negotiated agreements affect the relationships between groups in the longer run, in terms of reduced hostility and aggression, in terms of enhanced economic trade and collective prosperity, or in terms of reduced anxiety, fear, and stress-related responses at both the group and individual levels of analysis? Second, there is only limited insight into the ways between-group negotiations, through bottom-up influences, drive within-group dynamics and between-group relations—are mutually beneficial agreements with the other side appreciated and honed in the ingroup, or may they actually fuel within- and between-group conflict and disagreements? What are the conditions that enable representatives to ‘sell’ their agreement with the opposing group to their ingroup—why


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would groups reject negotiated agreements, and with what consequences to both intra- and intergroup dynamics? It is these and related questions that are triggered by the studies published in this Special Issue to identify promising directions for further inquiry in this important field. References Ayres, I., & Siegelman, P. (1995). Race and gender discrimination in bargaining for a new car. American Economic Review, 85, 304–321. Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K. L. (2000). Negotiation. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 279–314. Bornstein, G. (2003). Intergroup conflict: Individual, group, and collective interests. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 129–145. Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and mediation. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 531–582. De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010a). Social conflict: The emergence and consequences of struggle and negotiation. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 983–1024). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010b). Social value orientation moderates in-group love but not out-group hate in competitive intergroup conflict. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 13(6). De Dreu, C. K. W., Beersma, B., Steinel, W., & Van Kleef, G. (2007). The psychology of negotiation: Principles and basic processes. In A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 608–629). New York: Guilford Press. De Dreu, C. K. W., Greer, L. L., Handgraaf, M. J. J., Shalvi, S., Van Kleef, G. A., Baas, M., Ten Velden, F. S., Van Dijk, E., & Feith, S. W. W. (2010). The neuropeptide oxytocin regulates parochial altruism in intergroup conflict among humans. Science, 328, 1408–1411. De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (1995). Impact of social value orientation on negotiator cognition and behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1178–1188. Demoulin, S., Leyens, J-Ph., & Dovidio, J. F. (2009). Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities. New York: Psychology Press.

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Biographical notes is currently Professor and Director of the Centre for the Study of Social Behavior at the Catholic University of Louvain. Dr Demoulin’s research interests are on infra-humanization, intergroup relations, and intergroup misunderstandings. Recently, she has developed a new line of research in which she looks at intergroup negotiations and the processes that impact negotiations when negotiator partners do not share the same social category membership. stéphanie demoulin

carsten k.w. de dreu

is a Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science and Professor of Psychology at the University of Amsterdam. He studies social conflict, group processes and performance, and creativity, and has (co-)authored over 100 articles in journals such as the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, and Group Processes and Intergroup Relations. He currently is serving a three-year term as president of the European Association for Social Psychology.
