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Turkey and Russia : An emerging ‘strategic axis’ in Eurasia ? Emre Erşen1 Chargé de cours à l’Université de Marmara de Turquie Abstract Following Vladimir Putin’s election as the new president of the Russian Federation in 2000, relations between Turkey and Russia have continuously improved not only in terms of cooperation in technical areas such as trade and energy, but also regarding their dialogue in major regional and global political issues. The rapprochement between the two countries has been so remarkable that some even started to view it as the formation of a new strategic axis in Eurasia. Although the term ‘strategic’ may be a little too ambitious for defining the relations between Turkey and Russia, it is still possible to argue that the positive course of their bilateral relations throughout the 2000s replaced the old notion which viewed the two countries as geopolitical rivals in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The goal of this article is to reveal and analyze the major factors behind the emergence of this so-called ‘multidimensional partnership’ in Turkish-Russian relations in the 2000s. Résumé La Turquıe et la Russıe : des axes stratégıques naıssant au sein de l’Eurasıa ? Après l'élection de Vladimir Poutin en tant que nouveau président de la Fédération de Russie en 2000, les relations entre la Turquie et la Russie se sont sans interruption améliorées non seulement en termes de coopération dans les domaines techniques tels que le commerce et l'énergie, mais également en termes de dialogue dans les problèmes politiques régionaux et globaux importants. Le rapprochement entre les deux pays a été si remarquable que certains observarteurs ont même commencé à le considérer comme l’émergence d'un nouvel axe stratégique dans l’Eurasia. Bien que le terme “stratégique” puisse être peu trop ambitieux pour définir les relations entre la Turquie et la Russie, il est encore possible d'avancer que le cours positif des relations bilatérales tout au long des années 2000 a remplacé l’ancienne idée qui considérait les deux pays comme “rivaux géopolitiques” dans le Caucase et en Asie centrale. L’objectif de cet article est d'indiquer et d’analyser les principaux facteurs derrière l'apparition dudit “partenariat multidimensionnel” dans les relations turco-russes dans les années 2000.

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Ph. D., Marmara University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey.

Introduction

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urkey and Russia enjoy more than five hundred years of diplomatic relations with each other.2 However, this long history is dominated by deep conflicts, wars and mutual suspicion rather than good neighbourly relations. The well-documented historical animosities between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia resulted in many wars from the seventeenth to nineteenth century. Although the first few decades of the twentieth century brought some hopes for the newly founded Soviet Union and Republic of Turkey, which both seemed to be prepared for opening a new window in their relations as signified by the constructive dialogue between Lenin and Atatürk, things changed once again with the breaking out of the Second World War. Eventually, the two countries became members of two opposing camps starting from the second half of 1940s. The strict ideological limitations of the Cold War period made it even more difficult to start a new chapter in their bilateral relations. Still, particularly from 1960s onwards Ankara and Moscow tried to develop closer relations in the field of trade, industry and energy despite their ideological differences. In this regard, the end of the Cold War presented a unique opportunity in order to initiate a breakthrough in Turkish-Russian relations. However, despite all the optimism embodied in the treaties signed by Turkey and Russia at the beginning of the 1990s, such a breakthrough could never be realized. In fact, particularly after the 1992-93 period, the two countries were drawn into new conflicts stemming from their competing strategic interests over the newly independent states of Caucasus and Central Asia. Even the rapidly growing links in the fields of trade, energy and tourism could not change the image that Turkey and Russia have become ‘geopolitical rivals’ in the post-Soviet space. This image was frequently associated with the two countries’ clashing interests over a number of issues ranging from the extraction and transportation of the region’s rich energy resources to their role in each other’s ethnic/minority problems. However, things started to change in the first decade of the new millennium. The change of governments both in Turkey and Russia at the beginning of 2000s was accompanied by changes that were already taking place in the perceptions of the two countries regarding each other’s regional and global roles. Although the Turkish-Russian rapprochement, which started around the same time, seemed to be focused once again on the bright prospects of economic cooperation, the 2000s also marked the beginning of a new period in the development of 2

The author would like to thank to Marmara University’s Scientific Research Projects Unit (BAPKO) for its support to the research that led to this article (Project No: SOS-D-300609-0252).

Turkish-Russian Relations in the 1990s: Geopolitics versus Economics Most of the problems that emerged between Turkey and Russia in the 1990s originated from their competing strategic interests over the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this regard, it is particularly important to emphasize that immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey, which was very much concerned about losing its strategic importance in the eyes of the Western countries in the post-Cold War world, launched a policy of establishing extensive political, economic and cultural relations with the five newly independent Turkic republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).3 The so-called ‘Turkish model’ that was introduced by Ankara during this period was based on the promotion of secular democracy with a free-market economy and planned to provide guidance to the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia and Caucasus. A significant advantage of the Turkish model was the support it received not only from the West and Central Asian leaders, but also from Russia against the possible spread of Iran’s religious influence in the region. Despite the initial optimism surrounding the Turkish model, Russia soon started to get uneasy about this as it viewed Ankara’s rising political, economic and cultural activism in the region as a sign of ‘Pan3

Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated in December 1991 that Uzbekistan viewed Turkey as a ‘big brother’, while Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev said a few days later that Turkey was like a ‘morning star’ for the Turkic republics. See Gareth Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia, London: RIIA, 1995, p. 13.

E. Erşen : Turkey: and Russia an emerging ‘strategic axis’…

a common understanding about the political issues in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea regions. This article aims to discuss and analyze the dynamics behind the transition from the notion of geopolitical rivalry to multidimensional partnership in Turkish-Russian relations in the 2000s and understand to what degree the improvement of relations between the two countries can be defined as the emergence of a ‘strategic axis’ in Eurasia. The main argument of the paper is that the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia can best be anticipated with respect to developments in three spheres: bilateral, regional and global. While close trade and energy relations on the bilateral level seem to have acted as the driving force in Turkish-Russian rapprochement, the radical changes that took place in the regional (i.e. Eurasian) and global political context after the September 11 incident have also greatly contributed to the improvement of the relations. Especially the change in the nature of relations of both countries with the European Union (EU) and United States (US) in the post-September 11 period seems to be an important factor.

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Turkism’ in Turkish foreign policy. Turkish politicians’ frequent reference to the emergence of “a Turkic world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” particularly alarmed Moscow about Turkey’s intentions in the region.4 Eventually, Russia developed a more assertive policy under the name of the ‘Near Abroad’, which claimed the former Soviet space within its own natural geopolitical sphere of influence. During the period of 1992-94, accusations from both Turkey and Russia about each other’s real designs in the Caucasus and Central Asia became even more frequent.5 This period also represented the peak of Turkish-Russian geopolitical confrontation especially due to the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and overthrow of the Azeri President Ebulfez Elchibey. In fact, many political analysts believe that Russia not only provided strong political, economic and military support for the Armenians against Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also became a very significant actor in the staging of the coup against pro-Turkish Elchibey.6 According to some other analysts, on the other hand, the end of Elchibey period actually symbolized the end of the Turkish model.7 This disillusionment was perhaps the major reason for Ankara to step back from its geopolitical struggle with Moscow over the Near Abroad and concentrate more pragmatically on the issue of the natural resources of the Caspian basin. Between 1994 and 1999, transportation of the Caspian energy resources to Western markets became the most important point of conflict between Turkey and Russia as both defended the construction of oil pipelines that would run through their own territories. In the second half of the 1990s, the US also started to become included in this ‘pipeline game’ by supporting Turkey in order to deny Russia economic – and eventually political – control over the former Soviet 4

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This expression was officially used for the first time by Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in a speech in February 1992. For an excerpt from Demirel’s speech see Gencer Özcan, “Doksanlı Yıllarda Türkiye’nin Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı [Turkey’s Changing Security Environment in the Nineties],” in Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut (eds.), En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar [The Longest Decade: The Nineties in Turkey’s National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda], Istanbul: Boyut, 1998, p. 20. For example in May 1994, Doğan Güreş, the Turkish Chief of General Staff of the period, blamed Russia for pursuing “Tsarist expansionism” in the Caucasus. See Fatih Çekirge, “Güreş: Rusya Büyük Tehdit Oldu [Güreş: Russia Became a Big Threat],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 31 May 1994. A few months later, Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Mikhail Demurin implied Turkey was using Pan-Turkism as an instrument in its policies towards the newly independent states of the region. See IPS-Inter Press Service, 19 October 1994. See for example Thomas Goltz, “Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 92, Fall 1993, pp. 98.104. Gün Kut, “Elçibey’in Sonu, Türkiye Modelinin Sonudur [The End of Elchibey is the End of the Turkish Model],” Cumhuriyet [Turkish Daily], 24 June 1993.

Such concerns in Washington’s policy towards the region can be found in the US State Department’s Caspian Region Energy Development Report that was submitted to the Congress on 15 April 1997. 9 The so-called ‘Kurdish parliament in exile’ held its third meeting in October 1995 in a building which belonged to the Duma. In September 1997, the Duma accused Turkey of committing ‘genocide’ against the Kurds and the same year it supported the convening of two Kurdish conferences in Moscow. It also took a decision in November 1998 to grant political asylum to the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who was deported by Syria upon Turkey’s diplomatic and military pressure. 10 The problem could only be solved by the deployment of the missiles in Crete, instead of Cyprus. For details of Russia’s role in the emergence of the S-300 conflict see S. Gülden Ayman, Ankara Çalışmaları 2: Tırmandırma Siyasetinde Bir Örnek S-300 Krizi [Ankara Studies 2: S-300 Crisis as an Example in the Brinkmanship Policy], Ankara: ASAM, 2000, pp. 29-32. 11 For figures see Mensur Akgün and Turan Aydın, Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerindeki Yapısal Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri [Structural Problems in Turkish-Russian Relations and Proposals for Solution], Istanbul: TÜSİAD, 1999, p. 116. 8


space.8 This powerful US support was one of the most important advantages of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, which became the main competitor of the Baku-Novorossiysk route that was proposed by Russia. The Caspian pipeline was not the only issue that caused distress in Turkish-Russian relations. Most remarkably, Ankara and Moscow continued to accuse each other for supporting ethnic separatism. Throughout 1990s, the activities of some Chechen groups in Turkey were harshly criticized by the Russian government, while the Russian Duma’s obvious sympathy for the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) caused huge reactions in Turkey.9 Another issue that led to a political crisis between the two countries was a Russian company’s decision to sell S-300 air defence missiles to the Greek Cypriot government despite the deep concerns in Ankara regarding the threat to be posed by these missiles against Turkey’s military-strategic superiority on the island.10 Despite such negative developments in the political sphere, TurkishRussian economic relations continued to blossom especially until the Russian economic crisis of 1998. During the 1992-97 period, Turkey’s exports to Russia increased by 367%, while the total trade volume increased by 177%. These figures made Russia the fourth biggest partner of Turkey in total trade.11 Apart from the ‘shuttle trade’ that served as the power engine of the Turkish-Russian economic relations, Turkish construction companies undertook new projects in the Russian market, while the Turkish Mediterranean coast became one of the most favourite destinations for Russian tourists. The powerful economic dimension of Turkish-Russian relations was clearly revealed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdyn’s visit to Turkey in late 1997. During the visit Turkey and Russia agreed for the construction of the ‘Blue Stream’ natural gas pipeline that would provide

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Turkey with Russian gas for 25 years.12 The signature of the Blue Stream agreement was definitely a major development signifying the two countries’ interest in advancing their lucrative economic cooperation, despite the unresolved problems in the geopolitical sphere.

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2000s : From ‘Virtual’ to ‘Real’ Rapprochement

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In her article in 2000, Professor Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer used the concept of ‘virtual rapprochement’ to describe the Turkish-Russian relations in the 1990s and explained it as “a state of bilateral relations in which public manifestations of state-level adversity and hostility have nearly completely disappeared … [although] a hard kernel of mutual fear, mistrust and suspicion remains in the minds of the decisionmakers and political elites.” 13 In this sense, it can be argued that the appointment of Vladimir Putin as the prime minister of Russia in August 1999 was a decisive factor in turning the ‘virtual rapprochement’ between Turkey and Russia into a ‘real’ one. Here, Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy with its emphasis on Russia’s foreign economic relations and immense energy resources seems to have been particularly influential in the change of perceptions in Moscow about the future of its relations with Ankara – especially when one considers that the Blue Stream was one of the greatest projects of the Russian Gazprom company. Similar economic concerns also shaped Turkey’s gradually changing perception about Russia. An important sign of Ankara’s desire to continue its rapprochement with Moscow in this period was Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s visit to Russia in November 1999. Although the visit was harshly criticized by the opposition parties due to Russia’s ongoing second military intervention in Chechnya, Ecevit ignored the criticisms, insisted that Turkey viewed the issue as a “domestic problem” of Russia and signed a declaration with Putin about cooperation against terrorism.14 The signing of such a declaration between Turkey and Russia was of particular importance when one recalls that the two countries were accusing each other only a few years ago due to their stances in the Kurdish and Chechen issues. Another significance of Ecevit’s visit was that it started a wave of official visits between the two countries. For example, Mikhail Kasyanov, 12 13

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For details of the visit see Sami Kohen, “Bir ‘Stratejik Ortaklık’ Daha [Another ‘Strategic Partnership’],” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 17 December 1997. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 62. See Sami Kohen, “Rusya ile Rekabet Yerine İşbirliği [Cooperation Instead of Competition with Russia],” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 6 November 1999 and Hakan Aksay, “Terörle Mücadele Yakınlaştırıyor [Fighting Terrorism Brings Closer],” Cumhuriyet [Turkish Daily], 6 November 1999.

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“Gündem Enerji [The Agenda is Security],” Cumhuriyet [Turkish Daily], 24 October 2000 and “New Momentum in Turco-Russian Relations,” Turkish Daily News, 24 October 2000. For a detailed analysis of the visit also see Suat Kınıklıoğlu, “Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Kasyanov Ziyaretinin Anatomisi [Turkish-Russian Relations: Anatomy of Kasyanov’s Visit],” Avrasya Dosyası [Turkish Journal], Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 155-164. For details see “Ruslar da Swissotel’de [Russians are in Swissotel, too],” Hürriyet [Turkish Daily], 9 June 2001. In the appendix of the document, areas of cooperation were divided into three: Political Issues (Balkans, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Middle East, Iraq, Black Sea, Mediterranean issues, cooperation initiatives in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, cooperation on Eurasian issues in the international organizations, European security structure); Fighting International Terrorism (development of bilateral consultations on issues related with terrorism); Economic Sphere (energy, trade, communication, tourism, environment). For the full text of the document see http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_2_t.html (accessed 4 August 2008). For developments see Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Turkey-U.S. Odds in Black Sea over Russia,” Turkish Daily News, 31 March 2000 and “A New Organization is Born,” Turkish Daily News, 3 April 2001.


the new prime minister of Russia after Putin was elected the president, paid a significant visit to Turkey in October 2000. Kasyanov’s visit underlined the economic aspect of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement as it mostly tackled the issues of energy, trade and defence industry cooperation.15 The economic and trade relations were again on top of the agenda in Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to Ankara in June 2001.16 Improving relations in the field of economy definitely made a positive impact on Ankara and Moscow’s search for a common ground in their previously problematic relationship in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea. In this regard, the signature of the ‘Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia’ by the foreign ministers of the two countries in New York in 2001 was an important development since the document envisaged the establishment of a Joint Working Group for realization of closer cooperation not only in the economic sphere, but also regarding international terrorism and regional political issues.17 Another noteworthy step in the field of regional cooperation was Turkey and Russia’s inclusion in the Black Sea Force – a task force established by the littoral states of the Black Sea in the field of search and rescue operations, protection of the environment and mine cleaning.18 It is also important to underline the similarities between the foreign policy orientations of the Turkish and Russian governments in this period. In the case of Moscow, Putin’s foreign policy was first of all based on the acceptance that Russia did not obtain the sufficient economic, military and political resources to balance the power of the US on its own in the post-Cold War period. This pragmatism quite naturally led to the re-emergence of the concept of ‘multipolarity’, which was originally put forward by the former Russian Foreign Minister and

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Premier Yevgenii Primakov.19 Eventually, all three basic foreign policy and security documents (National Security Concept, Military Doctrine and Foreign Policy Concept) which were revised during the first year of Putin’s presidency listed the US attempts to establish a ‘unipolar’ world order among the greatest threats against Russia and emphasized the need to foster cooperation with other global and regional powers in Europe and Asia.20 Russian policy of multipolarity had interesting similarities with the foreign policy vision developed by the Turkish governments in the first half of the 2000s. For example, the Ecevit government’s foreign minister İsmail Cem emphasized the need for Turkey to follow a multidimensional foreign policy based on its “two-dimensional identity originating from the privilege of being both Asian and European.” 21 Cem’s vision was also shared by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, which came to power in Turkey in late 2002. Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, JDP’s chief advisor in foreign affairs, was particularly influential in setting up a ‘multi-dimensional and multi-track foreign policy’ based on the principles of ‘zero-problem relationship’ with the neighbouring countries and ‘rhythmic diplomacy’ aimed at maintaining communication with regional and global actors.22 Although some political analysts in Turkey and abroad expressed concerns about Davutoğlu’s foreign policy, which treated Turkey as a ‘pivotal state’ in Eurasia, and thought such a ‘Neo-Ottomanist’ vision could revive the geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Russia, the Turkish-Russian cooperation was further strengthened by new initiatives taken in the economic, political and military spheres.23 This was probably For a study which analyzes the basic parameters of Primakov’s doctrine see Ariel Cohen, “The Primakov Doctrine - The Missing Link between Russia and Iraq?” Heritage Foundation Report, No. 167, 15 December 1997, http://www.freerepublic.com/ focus/f-news/1259846/posts (accessed 14 September 2006). 20 For full texts of these documents see http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/index.html (accessed 30 October 2004). 21 Cited in Nikolay Kiriyev, “Avrasya Konseptleri Işığında Rusya-Türkiye İlişkileri [Russian-Turkish Relations in the Light of Eurasia Concepts],” in Gülten Kazgan and Natalya Ulçenko (eds.), Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya: Politik, Ekonomik ve Kültürel İlişkiler [Turkey and Russia Then and Now: Political, Economic and Cultural Relations], Istanbul: Bilgi University, 2003, p. 204. 22 See Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı [Turkey Should Become a Central Country],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 26 February 2004. For Davutoglu’s views on the regional and global policies to be followed by Turkey in the post-Cold War period, also see Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], Istanbul: Küre, 2002. 23 For example the two countries signed a military cooperation and training agreement during Russian Chief of General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin’s visit to Ankara in January 2002. A few months later, Turkish Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu visited Russia and gave the signals for closer cooperation in fighting terrorism. For details 19

Ankara–Moscow : An Emerging Eurasian Axis Against the West ? Both Turkey and Russia supported the US in its war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and enjoyed closer relations with Washington in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks. For example Putin was the first world leader to call the US President George W. Bush to offer Russia’s help after the September 11 incidents. In addition, he gave consent to the deployment of US military bases and troops in the strategically important Central Asian countries before the war in Afghanistan. Likewise, JDP continued its close relations with Washington both before and after the Turkish general elections. In fact, Erdoğan paid an important visit to the US in December 2002 only a month after the general elections that carried his party to power. It seems that the change of tides in both Turkey and Russia’s relations with the US came with Washington’s decision to attack Iraq. Russia was already questioning what it saw as a tendency towards ‘unipolarism’ in the US foreign policy. As such, the US decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty of 1972 in order to launch its own ‘missile defence program’ and the enlargement of NATO to the Baltic states contributed to the debate in Russia as to the actual benefits of the Russian-US rapprochement in the post-September 11 period. This questioning was probably one of the major factors that led the Kremlin to join France and Germany in February 2003 and sign a joint trilateral declaration against a possible US occupation in Iraq.25

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see Murat Yetkin, “ABD’yle Kaynaşma, Rusya’yla Yakınlaşma [Swarming with USA, Rapprochement with Russia],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 15 January 2002 and RIA Novosti, 4 June 2002. Abdullah Gül, “Turkey: 500 Years of Diplomatic Relations,” International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 50, No. 3, 2004, p. 150. For a similar view see “Putin’s Ties with ‘Axis of Evil’ Not Likely to Cool Relations with U.S.,” RFE/RL Newsline, 21 August 2002 and Anatolii Utkin, “America: Imperial Ambitions Rekindled,” International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 48, Issue 5, 2002, pp. 43-54.


because unlike the past, Ankara carefully refrained from creating new spheres of influence against Russia in the region. In fact, both the completion of the Blue Stream pipeline and the Moscow visit of JDP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (who later became the Prime Minister of Turkey) in late 2002 clearly demonstrated Turkey’s pragmatism in treating Moscow as a major economic partner and one of the most prominent tracks in its multi-track foreign policy. Abdullah Gül, the foreign minister of the JDP government (who was elected the president in 2007) also underlined this pragmatism by stating that Turkey’s foreign policy in Eurasia was not guided by “ideological, emotional or narrow national considerations.”24

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Turkey’s position was a little different though as it was carrying detailed talks with the US about the opening of a ‘northern front’.26 However, this did not prevent the Turkish Parliament from rejecting the government’s motion in March 2003, which requested permission for the deployment of US soldiers in Turkey and Turkish soldiers abroad. Not only did the Turkish Parliament’s decision put an end to the US plans for opening a northern front in the Iraqi war, it also led to a period of distant relations between Ankara and Washington for the next three years. In this new period, Turkey and US were frequently at odds with each other about several issues including the future of the regional Kurdish government and strengthened PKK presence in Iraq. Such disagreements also fuelled the anti-American sentiments in Turkey which were already on the rise since the beginning of the Iraqi war. 27 Russia’s relations with the US also continued to deteriorate in the 2003-05 period, but this time the primary cause was the ‘colour revolutions’ erupting in the former Soviet republics. Although it is dubious whether the US or European countries were actively involved in the anti-government demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the relatively visible Western support behind the success of the pro-Western opposition forces in Georgia and Ukraine caused resentment in Russia and negatively affected its relations not only with Washington, but also the European capitals.28 Interestingly enough, the 2003-05 period also indicated a downturn in Turkey’s relations with the EU. Although Turkey officially started accession talks with Brussels in 2005, Turkish-EU relations became 26

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The three major concerns of Ankara during the talks seemed to be the security problems to emerge in the region following the US intervention, expectations of serious economic losses for Turkey based on the experiences of the First Gulf War, and loss of prestige by supporting a military intervention which lacked international legitimacy. Çetin Güney, “AK Parti’nin Dış Politika Anlayışı Bağlamında TürkiyeABD İlişkileri [Turkish-USA Relations in the Context of the AK Party’s Foreign Policy Understanding],” Avrasya Dosyası [Turkish Journal], Vol. 11, No. 2, 2005, p. 47. A major turning point in Turkish-US relations came when the members of a Turkish special task force were taken into custody by the US soldiers in the Northern Iraqi city of Suleymaniyah in July 2003. The claims that the US soldiers mistreated the members of the Turkish team – and even put sacks on their heads – caused great anger in the Turkish press and public. On the other hand, several public opinion polls held around the same time demonstrated Turkish people’s negative feelings about the US. For example, the ‘Transatlantic Trends’ survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund in 2004 showed that only 28 percent of the Turkish people expressed positive views about the US. See Transatlantic Trends 2004, p. 21, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/ trends/doc/2004_english_key.pdf (accessed 3 October 2008). See Fehim Taştekin, “Portre: Ukrayna Seçimleri ve Turuncu Devrim [Portrait: Ukrainian Elections and Orange Revolution],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 29 November 2004; Stephen Blank, “Georgia: A Study in Democracy Exportation,” Asia Times, 6 December 2003 and Graeme P. Herd, “Colorful Revolutions and the CIS,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 2, March-April 2005, pp. 3-18.

It was claimed that Putin was distant to Erdoğan’s request for Russia’s support in the UN for the removal of international isolation over the Turkish Cypriots. See “Putin: Kıbrıs İçin Aramayın [Putin: Don’t Call for Cyprus],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 2 July 2005. 30 In May 2003, Turkey stopped importing natural gas from the Blue Stream pipeline and Gazprom threatened to take the issue to international arbitration. In September 2003, Putin warned Turkey not to prevent the transportation of oil by Russian tankers through the Turkish Straits. See “Mavi Akım’a Tahkim [Arbitration for Blue Stream],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 28 May 2003 and “Putin’den Anlayışlı Uyarı [Judicious Warning from Putin],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 18 September 2003. For details of the natural gas problem between Turkey and Gazprom also see “We Don’t Want to Play with You Anymore,” Izvestia, 24 June 2003 in What the Papers Say-Russia, 25 June 2003. 31 “Rusya 10 Yılda İkinci Büyük Ortağımız Oldu [Russia Became Our Second Biggest Partner in 10 Years],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 1 September 2004. 32 Deniz Zeyrek, “Gazprom’la Dörtlü Anlaşma [Four-Way Agreement with Gazprom],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 1 September 2004 and “Mavi Akım Güneye İnecek [Blue Stream Will Head South],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 5 December 2004. 29


increasingly complicated due to the Cyprus issue especially after the rejection of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s plan by the Greek Cypriots despite the approval it received both from the JDP government and Turkish Cypriots. The eventual accession of Greek Cypriots to the EU in May 2004 with the claim of representing the whole island further contributed to the disappointment and anger in Turkey about the EU process. An interesting factor that should be underlined here is that the Turkish-Russian relations continued to improve despite Moscow’s official stance in the Cyprus issue which was clearly in favour of the Greek Cypriots due to the powerful historical and religious links between the two parties. 29 Thus, it is possible to argue that at a time when both the Turkish public and government were becoming increasingly uncomfortable about the policies of the US and EU, Russia started to emerge as a popular partner regardless of Ankara and Moscow’s conflicting positions in controversial issues like Cyprus. On the other hand, none of the political discords between Ankara and Moscow was strong enough to overshadow the deepening economic cooperation between the two countries as reflected by new pipeline projects and peak figures in trade and tourism.30 For example, the volume of trade between Turkey and Russia reached nearly 10 billion dollars in 2004 and Russia became the second biggest trade partner of Turkey following Germany.31 During the same period, the number of Russian tourists travelling to Turkey was over one and a half million. In the field of energy, Turkey and Russia started talks about the possible extension of the Blue Stream pipeline to the south, while Gazprom signed agreements with the Turkish government for realization of several joint projects.32

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Apart from the enhanced cooperation in technical and economic issues, the two countries also achieved to maintain their dialogue on political issues in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea.33 In this regard, a very important development at the diplomatic level that symbolized the positive course in the Turkish-Russian political relations was Vladimir Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2004. The fact that Putin became the first Russian president to officially visit Turkey in 32 years coupled the importance of the visit, during which the TurkishRussian relations were elevated to the level of “multi-dimensional strengthened partnership.”34 Following Putin’s visit to Turkey, this time Erdoğan went to Moscow in January 2005 and the two leaders met once again in Sochi in July 2005. A few months later, Putin came to Turkey for the official inauguration of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline. After the ceremony, he and Erdoğan discussed the opportunities for the socalled ‘North-South Energy Corridor’ that envisaged the transportation of Russian oil via a new pipeline to be built between the Turkish cities of Samsun and Ceyhan.35 In view of all these developments, it is quite clear that the TurkishRussian rapprochement reached its peak at a time when both countries were becoming increasingly frustrated about their relations with the West. 36 This frustration gave way to comments in Turkey and abroad that the Turkish-Russian relations were actually turning into an emerging alliance against the policies of the West.37 Back in 2002, the then Secretary of the Turkish National Security Council General Tuncer Kılınç had already proposed the formation of a ‘Russian-Turkish-Iranian axis’ against the EU and his words had hinted the presence of proRussian sentiments in some circles in Turkey.38 As the Turkish-Russian rapprochement gained further momentum in the 2003-05 period, the same circles started to become particularly sympathetic to ‘Eurasianism’, See the details of Foreign Minister Gül’s visit to Moscow in ITAR-TASS, 25 February 2004. 34 Apart from a joint declaration on deepening of friendship and multi-dimensional partnership between Russia and Turkey, Putin and Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer signed six more agreements on issues such as defence industry and militarytechnical cooperation. See “Sezer ve Putin’den ‘Dostluk’ Deklarasyonu [‘Friendship’ Declaration From Sezer and Putin],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 6 December 2004. 35 “Putin Sözünü Tuttu [Putin Kept His Promise],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 1 October 2005. 36 See for example Ömer Taşpınar, “Batı’ya Kızgınlık Büyüyor [Anger Against the West Grows],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 27 July 2005. 37 For claims about a Turkish-Russian strategic alliance see Marie Jego, “Doğu’da Yeni Bir İttifak Doğuyor [A New Alliance Is Born in the East],” Le Monde, 11 September 2004 (Turkish translation of the article as published in Radikal on 14 September 2004) and Fiona Hill and Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 81-92. 38 “Kılınç: AB’den Destek Yok, Doğu’ya Bak [Kılınç: No Support from the EU, Look to the East],” Hürriyet [Turkish Daily], 7 March 2002. 33

Limits of Partnership : The Issue of Pipelines and RussianGeorgian War Despite all claims about the emergence of a Eurasian alliance between Turkey and Russia, pragmatism rather than ideology seems to have continued to shape the relations between the two countries. This was particularly evident in the developments which took place following the Ukrainian gas crisis at the beginning of 2006, when Russia stopped the natural gas flow to Ukraine due to a disagreement over pricing and Kyiv responded by consuming a part of the natural gas that was supposed to be flowing to Europe via Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian crisis inevitably compelled the EU to initiate new energy transportation projects and find alternatives for their dependence on Russian energy. The most important among these projects was the so-called Nabucco, which envisaged the construction of a new natural gas pipeline to carry the Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern natural gas via Turkey into Europe.40 Although the Ukrainian gas crisis caused serious concerns in the Turkish public about Turkey’s growing dependency on Russian energy, Ankara initially wanted to include Russia in the Nabucco project, too.41 However, Moscow was much more interested in a project called the ‘Blue Stream II’, which would carry the Turkmen gas to Europe through a pipeline to be built via Turkey in parallel with the original Blue Stream pipeline.42 Turkey’s reluctance to participate in this project and insistence 39

40 41

42

Attila İlhan, “Rusya ile ‘Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık’ Anlaşması [‘Multidimensional Partnership’ Agreement with Russia],” Cumhuriyet [Turkish Daily], 3 December 2001 and “Türkiye’nin Şanghay Örgütüne Adım Atması [Turkey’s Step into the Shanghai Organization],” Aydınlık [Turkish Weekly], 18 November 2001. For more information on the Nabucco pipeline see its official website at http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com. Erdal Şafak, “En Tehlikeli Silah [The Most Dangerous Weapon],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 3 January 2006. For an earlier article drawing attention to Turkey’s increasing dependency on Russia due to the Blue Stream pipeline see Sinan Oğan and İlke Aytekin, “Mavi Akım: Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Mavi Bağımlılık [Blue Stream: Blue Dependency in Turkish-Russian Relations],” Stratejik Analiz [Turkish Journal], Vol. 3, No. 32, December 2002, pp. 66-70. Igor Torbakov, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations,” The Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper, October 2007, p. 8.


a Russian philosophical school of thought dating back to the 1920s that has been recognized for its emphasis on a kind of anti-Western geopolitical alliance between the countries of Eurasia. Although neither Turkish, nor Russian governments provided any clues about their intention to form a ‘Eurasian alliance’ with each other against the West, Eurasianism continued to attract considerable attention in the neonationalist circles in Turkey.39

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to go on with the Nabucco, however, caused resentment in Moscow. In return, Russia became equally distant to the Turkish plans for constructing an oil pipeline from Samsun to Ceyhan and started to promote the Novorossiysk-Burgas-Alexandropoulis oil pipeline that was proposed almost a decade ago as an alternative to the BTC. It also initiated the ‘South Stream’ project, which planned to carry natural gas via a pipeline to be built under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, Italy and Austria. Moreover, Putin signed an agreement with Kazakh and Turkmen leaders in May 2007 for the transportation of Turkmen gas via Kazakhstan to Russia. The exclusion of Turkey from all these projects was viewed as a blow against its claims for becoming an ‘energy hub’ in the region.43 As the energy competition between Turkey and Russia gathered pace, concerns about Putin’s new energy strategy started to replace the claims about the formation of a Turkish-Russian axis in the region.44 However, the neo-nationalist circles in Turkey were still interested in the idea of a strategic ‘Eurasian’ bloc with Russia. Interestingly enough, this time the secular-minded Turkish Armed Forces was also placed in the centre of such anti-Western and pro-Russian sentiments. For example, both the Turkish and Western press pointed out to the emergence of a proRussian group inside the Turkish military as a reaction to Washington’s efforts to promote Turkey as a ‘moderate Islamic model’ in the Middle East.45 A very significant development in this regard was the publication on Turkish General Staff’s official website of the full text of Putin’s speech in the 43rd Munich Security Conference in which he harshly criticized the unilateralist policies of the US.46

For an article dealing with the concerns caused by the South Stream project in Ukraine and Turkey see Sergei Kulikov, “‘South Stream’ Alarms Kiev and Ankara,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 June 2007 in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 25 July 2007. For news in the Turkish press claiming that the Russian-Kazakh-Turkmen agreement meant ‘the death of the Nabucco’ see “Putin Enerji Darbesi İndirdi [Putin Struck an Energy Blow],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 13 May 2007 and Cenk Başlamış, “Putin Engeli [Putin Obstacle],” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 13 May 2007. 44 Some commentators even claimed that Putin pursued a policy of expansionism in Eurasia by making use of the energy card. See Cuneyt Ülsever, “Rusya Ne Yapmaya Çalışıyor? [What Is Russia Trying To Do?]” Hürriyet [Turkish Daily], 27 June 2007. 45 Neşe Düzel, “Rusya’nın Etki Alanına Girmiş Askerler Var [There Are Soldiers Under Russia’s Influence],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 21 May 2007. French newspaper Le Monde further claimed that the secularist Turkish military wanted to form a TurkishRussian-Iranian alliance against the cooperation between the US and JDP to promote moderate Islam in Turkey. “Le Monde: Türk Ordusu Rusya ve İran’la Alternatif İttifak İstiyor [Le Monde: Turkish Army Wants an Alternative Alliance with Russia and Iran],” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 20 June 2007. 46 See http://www.tsk.mil.tr/diger_konular/putin_konusma.htm (accessed 16 February 2007). For the full text of Putin’s speech see Rossiiskaya gazeta, 13 February 2007 in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 14 March 2007. 43

47 48 49

50

Fikret Bila, “Erdoğan: Rusya’yı Gözardı Edemeyiz [Erdoğan: We Can’t Ignore Russia],” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 2 September 2008. For details see Sami Kohen, “Kafkasya Platformu Hayal mi? [Is the Caucasian Platform a Dream?]” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 15 August 2008. According to the Montreux Convention, the non-littoral states could not have more than nine military ships in the Black Sea and these ships, the total tonnage of which could not be more than 45.000 tones, could not stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 days. Semih Idiz, “Washington ile Montrö Sıkıntısı [Montreux Problem with Washington],” Milliyet [Turkish Daily], 20 August 2008. Murat Yetkin, “Moskova’da Kritik Görüşme [Critical Meeting in Moscow],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 26 August 2008.


Despite the rising interest in Turkey in favour of a strategic alliance with Russia, Turkish-Russian relations were already going through a cooler period when the Russian-Georgian war broke out in August 2008. The five-day war, which started with Georgia’s invasion of its breakaway republic of South Ossetia and Russia’s outright military response to defend the Ossetians, left Turkey in a very difficult position particularly due to the risks posed by the war against regional stability in the neighbouring Caucasus and Ankara’s close political and economic relations both with Georgia and Russia. More importantly, Turkey was in no position to deny the fact that it obtained two thirds of its energy from Russia – a dependency which was also clearly acknowledged by Prime Minister Erdoğan.47 Such concerns inevitably urged Ankara to call for the establishment of a ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ which would bring together Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and Russia (excluding the US and EU) in order to prevent similar crises in the future. Erdoğan even made a small tour including Moscow, Tbilisi and Baku to seek support for the project.48 The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform proposal underlined Turkey’s intention to solve the regional matters together with Russia, rather than the West. Another development which strengthened this view was the way Turkey acted in the face of the US request to send military ships with the purpose of humanitarian aid to Georgia through the Turkish Straits. Despite its alliance ties with Washington, Turkey strictly applied the rules of the 1936 Montreux Convention that limited the foreign ships’ number, total tonnage and duration of stay in the Black Sea.49 After carefully evaluating the situation in line with international law, Ankara finally permitted the entrance of US ships into the Black Sea – a development which was disliked by Russia. Still, it should be noted that Moscow officially expressed its appreciation and understanding about Turkey’s sensitivity to act in line with international regulations.50 Some analysts in Turkey, on the other hand, viewed the RussianGeorgian war against Turkey’s interests in the region and interpreted the difficulties faced at the border posts by the Turkish trucks carrying various goods to Russia as Moscow’s reprisal for Ankara’s permission to

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US ships.51 However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov clearly denied these claims and emphasized the fact that fruitful trade relations between the two countries could not be sacrificed for such political concerns.52 When one considers that the trade volume between the two countries reached a total of 38 billion dollars as of 2008, it seems that economic interests once again played an important role in the maintenance of Turkish-Russian détente. After the Georgian crisis, Turkish-Russian relations continued to enjoy an even warmer atmosphere that is best signified by the frequency of high-level meetings between the two countries in the first half of 2009.53 Most importantly, Putin once again paid a significant visit to Ankara in August 2009. During this working visit, Russia obtained Ankara’s consent for conducting geological research for the South Stream pipeline in Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea, whereas Turkey finally achieved to convince Russia for jointly building the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline. This was particularly interesting when one considers that the South Stream was viewed as the main rival of the Nabucco, the final agreement of which was signed only a month ago in Istanbul. Another significant development during the visit was Putin’s announcement that a Russian-Turkish consortium won the tender for constructing Turkey’s first ever nuclear plant in Akkuyu.54 The ‘revived honeymoon’ in Turkish-Russian relations was also maintained in 2010. Erdoğan visited Russia yet again in January 2010 to discuss further cooperation projects including the establishment of an intergovernmental cooperation council between the two countries. In May, this time Russian President Medvedev came to Turkey and the two countries agreed to remove the visa restrictions between each other for Bülent Aras, “Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership,” SETA Policy Brief, No. 35, August 2009, p. 8 and Tuncay Babalı, “Turkey, Present and Past: Turkey at the Energy Crossroads,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2009, p. 30. 52 “Lavrov’dan ‘Gümrük’ Güvencesi: Türkiye’ye Bir Kastımız Yok [‘Customs’ Guarantee from Lavrov: We Don’t Have Any Designs against Turkey],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 3 September 2008. 53 First, Erdoğan and Putin came together and discussed the opportunities for further energy cooperation in an international conference in Davos in January 2009. A few weeks later, President Gül made a three-day visit to Moscow which was focused on the issue of improvement of energy and trade relations between Turkey and Russia. “Rusya’yla İlişkilere Gül Katkısı [Gül’s Contribution to Relations with Russia],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 14 February 2009. Same issues have again been tackled during Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow in May 2009. However, particular emphasis was put on the need to find a lasting solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “Erdoğan-Putin Görüşmesinden Notlar [Notes from Erdoğan-Putin Meeting],” Hürriyet [Turkish Daily], 16 May 2009. 54 For details of Putin’s visit see Deniz Zeyrek, “Vladimir Putin Ankara’daki ‘Enerji Günü’nde Bir Koyup Beş Aldı [Vladimir Putin Put One and Took Five on the ‘Energy Day’ in Ankara],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 8 August 2009. 51

Conclusion It is quite clear that the Turkish-Russian relations have significantly improved in the first decade of the new millennium. The dynamics of this rapid rapprochement can be analysed on three levels. First is the bilateral level which mainly includes the improvement of relations in areas such as trade, energy and tourism. As stated before, bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia reached very impressive figures throughout the 2000s. In fact, Russia became one of Turkey’s biggest trade partners in the 2000-10 period and the trade volume between the two countries is expected to reach 100 billion dollars in 2015. Ankara and Moscow’s cooperation in the energy field has further contributed to the continuation of the positive atmosphere in the bilateral relations especially after the initiation of the Blue Stream pipeline. Above all, both countries seemed to be well aware that the management of such a great pipeline project required a certain degree of stability and predictability in their relations with each other.55 This pragmatism was the major drive which designated the two governments’ policies towards each other. Although some circles in Turkey, Russia and the West sometimes viewed the Turkish-Russian rapprochement within the framework of a ‘strategic alliance’, it must be emphasized that neither Ankara, nor Moscow demonstrated such an intention. The Turkish government, for example, seems to have taken the Turkish-Russian relations merely as one of the dimensions of its multi-dimensional foreign policy.56 In this regard, one should keep in mind that during the same period, Turkey did not only try to improve its relations with Russia, but also with many other countries in Asia, Europe and even Africa. Turkey’s pragmatic policy regarding its relations with Moscow may also be observed in its enthusiasm to participate in the rivalling Nabucco and South Stream projects at the same time.

For a similar assessment see James W. Warhola and William A. Mitchell, “Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications,” Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2006, p. 130. 56 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu also stated that “Turkish-Russian relations constitute[d] an integral component of Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy.” Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Fostering a Culture of Harmony,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, January-March 2010, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14784 (accessed 16 November 2010). 55


stays up to thirty days. A few months later the Turkish parliament approved the Turkish-Russian intergovernmental agreement about the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Plant. All these developments once again revealed the important role energy and economic relations continued to play in the improvement of Turkish-Russian relations.

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Things have not been very much different for Russia, either. Despite Putin’s increasingly anti-Western discourse in foreign policy after 2005, it is hard to claim that Russia viewed its relations with Turkey within the framework of a strategic Eurasian alliance against the West. For example, despite all the attempts of the Turkish government to remove the UN embargo on Northern Cyprus in the post-Annan Plan period, Russia continued to prevent such resolutions in the Security Council. It also refused to include the PKK on its list of terrorist organizations, even though Putin frequently claimed that Turkey and Russia were close partners in fighting terrorism. On the regional level, the most important factor which facilitated the Turkish-Russian rapprochement was Ankara and Moscow’s search for a common understanding in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea. These regions in Eurasia, which were previously viewed by both countries as the object of a ‘geopolitical game’, gradually turned into an area for closer cooperation between the two countries. In this regard, the new millennium witnessed significant regional cooperation initiatives such as the Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia, Black Sea Force and Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Despite the radical changes that took place in global and regional politics especially after the September 11 incident, Turkey and Russia managed to maintain their regional dialogue throughout the 2000s. A significant example of this dialogue was given in 2009, when Moscow welcomed Turkey’s mediation efforts in the Russian-Georgian war, although it was at odds with both NATO and US during and after the crisis. Another significant factor that influenced the course of TurkishRussian relations at the regional level was the two countries’ bilateral relations with the EU. It should be recalled that the initial steps of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement were taken right after the EU’s Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, which denied membership for Turkey, while granting the same right to the Central and Eastern European countries along with Malta and Cyprus. In this regard, one should notice that the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia reached its peak at a time when Ankara was frustrated with the EU’s approach towards Turkey’s membership as well as the Cyprus issue, while Russia was critical about the EU’s stance in the colour revolutions in the former Soviet republics. On the global level, the most important factor which seems to have strongly influenced the Turkish-Russian relations has been the US foreign policy in the post-September 11 period. As mentioned earlier, the rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow deepened in the 2003-05 period when both countries started to manifest their disapproval about the US foreign policy in Eurasia and Middle East. The same trend was maintained in the 2009-10 period, although this time Turkey – rather

57

See for example Erdal Şafak, “Ankara-Moskova [Ankara-Moscow],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 13 February 2009 and Hasan Celal Güzel, “Rusya İle Tarihi Anlaşma [Historic Agreement with Russia],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 13 May 2010.


than Russia – seems to have viewed its relations with its neighbour as a way to compensate the stagnation in its relations with Washington. The deterioration of both Turkey and Russia’s relations with the US and EU around the same time urged some commentators to attribute a different meaning to the rapprochement that was taking place between the two countries. Some of them, for example, compared the TurkishRussian détente with the relatively worsened state of Turkish-US relations – particularly making reference to the rising anti-American feelings in the Turkish public.57 Together with Ankara’s active and relatively independent policies in the Middle East (i.e. tougher stance against Israel’s policies, new regional cooperation initiatives with Arab countries and closer relations with Syria, Iran and Hamas leadership in Palestine) Turkish-Russian relations became central in the popular debate about whether a ‘shift of axis’ from the West to the East has been taking place in Turkish foreign policy. Despite these claims, it is more likely that pragmatism instead of ideology played a decisive role in the improvement of Turkish-Russian relations. It should be noted that energy, trade and other economic issues continued to dominate the agenda of the relations between the two countries throughout the 2000s. Moreover, the geopolitical problems which arose due to the issue of pipelines in the second half of the 2000s demonstrated the limits of a ‘strategic alliance’ between Ankara and Moscow. Nevertheless, one may claim that the rapid rapprochement in the economic and energy spheres along with the development of a common understanding in regional security matters in Eurasia will most probably help Turkey and Russia advance their multi-dimensional partnership in the near future.

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“Putin: Kıbrıs İçin Aramayın [Putin: Don’t Call for Cyprus],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 2 July 2005. “Putin Enerji Darbesi İndirdi [Putin Struck an Energy Blow]”, Radikal [Turkish Daily], 13 May 2007. “Putin Sözünü Tuttu [Putin Kept His Promise],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 1 October 2005. “Putin’den Anlayışlı Uyarı [Judicious Warning from Putin],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 18 September 2003. “Putin’s Ties with ‘Axis of Evil’ Not Likely to Cool Relations with U.S.,” RFE/RL Newsline, 21 August 2002. “Ruslar da Swissotel’de [Russians are in Swissotel, too],” Hürriyet [Turkish Daily], 9 June 2001. “Rusya 10 Yılda İkinci Büyük Ortağımız Oldu [Russia Became Our Second Biggest Partner in 10 Years],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 1 September 2004. “Rusya’yla İlişkilere Gül Katkısı [Gül’s Contribution to Relations with Russia],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 14 February 2009. Sarıibrahimoğlu, Lale, “Turkey-U.S. Odds in Black Sea over Russia,” Turkish Daily News, 31 March 2000. Sezer, Duygu B., “Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 59-82. “Sezer ve Putin’den ‘Dostluk’ Deklarasyonu [‘Friendship’ Declaration From Sezer and Putin],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 6 December 2004. Stone, Christopher, “A Kemalist in the Kremlin,” Moscow Times, 4 April 2005. Şafak, Erdal, “En Tehlikeli Silah [The Most Dangerous Weapon],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 3 January 2006. Şafak, Erdal, “Ankara-Moskova [Ankara-Moscow],” Sabah [Turkish Daily], 13 February 2009. “‘Şanghay’ Sürprizi [‘Shanghai’ Surprise],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 13 January 2005. Taşpınar, Ömer, “Batı’ya Kızgınlık Büyüyor [Anger against the West Grows],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 27 July 2005. Taştekin, Fehim, “Portre: Ukrayna Seçimleri ve Turuncu Devrim [Portrait: Ukrainian Elections and Orange Revolution],” Radikal [Turkish Daily], 29 November 2004. Torbakov, Igor, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations,” The Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper, October 2007. Transatlantic Trends 2004, http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/2004_english_key.pdf (accessed 3 October 2008). “Türkiye’nin Şanghay Örgütüne Adım Atması [Turkey’s Step into the Shanghai Organization],” Aydınlık [Turkish Weekly], 18 November 2001. Utkin, Anatolii, “America: Imperial Ambitions Rekindled,” International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 48, Issue 5, 2002, pp. 43-54. Ülsever, Cüneyt, “Rusya Ne Yapmaya Çalışıyor? [What Is Russia Trying To Do?]” Hürriyet [Turkish Daily], 27 June 2007.


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